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On October 13, 2019, the J-20 was embedded into the "Wanghai Brigade", a brigade of the air force under the Eastern Theater Command. At the same year the aircraft was deployed, it sent a small team to take part in the "Red Sword-2019 system confrontation" and launched live ammunition to destroy the target aircraft. As more young pilots become the new generation of "Dragon Knights", even if their flight time on the J-20 is just over 100 hours, they can still play the power of "Galaxy warship" in the exercise. This is also the result of the further optimization of the "bottom-copying modification mode" mentioned above, which is further optimized after adapting to the characteristics of the J-20.
Does moving to ws-10 signify the engines satisfied performance requirements? Or did they simply do it to go domestic?
Engine improvements ... the WS-10 on the J-20 is on par with the 117S of the Su-35, currently Russia's most advanced aeroengine in operation. If the Chinese really really wanted to go domestic at the cost of some performance/reliability, they could have plopped the WS-10 into the first J-20 prototype in 2011.
The weeks leading up to January 11, 2011, marked a watershed episode for PLA watching. After years of cross-referencing enthusiast Chinese language defense chatter, monitoring the People’s Liberation Army’s operational security (OPSEC), carefully tracking rare semi-official and official statements, and debates about realism and ambition, the elusive fifth generation fighter project known since the mid-2000s variously as J-XX, J-13, J-14, XXJ, finally emerged in blurry poor-quality pictures at Chengdu Aircraft Corporation’s (CAC) factory from late December 2010. It arrived right on schedule.
As clearer pictures percolated from Chinese-language defense boards to the English language PLA watching forums, and then onto aerospace and defense blogs and mainstream alphabet soup media outlets, the finalized designation – J-20 – became accepted and widely used. Finally, on the aforementioned date, the first J-20 technology demonstrator conducted a successful maiden flight, accompanied by a J-10AS twin-seater chase plane.
In the years since then, including recently, much has been said and debated over the exact military and strategic consequences of the emergence of J-20 and the kind of fighter it will be. Less spoken of is the vindication and emergence of the modern PLA watching grapevine and methodology, whose open-source collaboration and dissemination of information was at the time able to predict various key aspects of the aircraft’s characteristics, milestones, and parameters, months or in many cases years before they were conveyed by traditional defense media or open-source government and military publications.
Big ticket PLA projects prior to the J-20 – such as the J-10 fourth generation fighter, 054/A frigates, 052B/C destroyers, and KJ-2000 AEW&C – all enjoyed their own lengthy period of speculation and analysis prior to their unveiling, but the limited number of stealth fighter types in the mid-2000s up to J-20’s maiden flight put the methodology of PLA watching to the test, which it ultimately passed with flying colors. It is not an exaggeration to say that since the J-20, the predictions and anticipation for various big ticket PLA projects that have emerged – the 052D and 055 destroyers, Y-20 strategic transport, FC-31 5th generation demonstrator, 002 and 003 aircraft carriers, 075 amphibious assault ship, among many others – as well as, various projects to emerge in the near future – the FC-31 derived carrier-borne fifth generation fighter, H-20 stealth bomber, and next generation surface combatants – would not have been taken seriously had the years of lead up to J-20 not so accurately predicted aspects of the aircraft, from configuration to role to expected arrival period.
It is in this context that the first decade of the J-20’s development, entry into service, and maturation will be discussed and reflected upon, and the prospects for its second decade be considered.
Another very good reading by Rick Joe, suggested to every one who wanna grasp the proper understanding of the J-20 development, present and future as well as the general development and maturity of the Chinese military industrial complex in virtually all domains. I just passed along the article to friends via other medium
I’m still going to ask you…how does the J-20 compare to the F-22?
Only the PLAAF and CAC know this for sure as such, I have to admit I don’t like questions like that. On the one hand because it is not my area of expertise and on the other hand because there is hardly any information available that enables an assessment. I also dare to doubt whether I could do this at all. For me, the question is more how the J-20 compares to its predecessor in PLAAF service and even more so, how the J-20 evolved. With this in mind, I am convinced that the F-22 was actually the benchmark for CAC but I am also convinced that it was clear to CAC that developing a twin-engine heavy fighter and a stealth aircraft for the first time after the J-10 would be a huge challenge. All of this coupled with the knowledge that one has hardly any experience in this area and, above all, that the engines will still only be temporary solutions. On the other hand, it has been around 15 years since the development of the F-22 and a lot has happened in China in the area of electronics, sensors and materials since then. But, it’s important to note that the predecessor of the J-20 in PLAAF service is the ‘Flanker’ and this came from a completely different period, was for a completely different requirement and was designed by a company with vastly more experience. So in conclusion, I am sure the J-20 is no worse than a J-11B in all areas of performance, but certainly – especially with the current interim engines – it does not come close to a F-22. I do not presume to make any further judgment.