# Indonesia Has Been Punching Below Its Weight (Bloomberg)



## Indos

Indonesia Has Been Punching Below Its Weight​





The PT Pertamina Gas Widuri liquefied petroleum gas tanker at Tanjung Priok Port in Jakarta, Indonesia, on Feb. 24. Booming commodity prices have yielded a rare current-account surplus for Indonesia.
Photographer: Dimas Ardian/Bloomberg

By
Chris Anstey
April 9, 2022, 3:45 AM PDT

Some countries are known for “punching above their weight,” as a humorous Danish TV clip of President Barack Obama’s bilateral meetings showcased several years ago. Few would disagree that Indonesia, by contrast, punches notably below its weight class.

The planet’s fourth most populous nation and the largest in the Muslim world, Indonesia is also geographically pivotal. It’s an archipelago so stretched out it’s the equivalent of spanning New York to Anchorage. Linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Indonesia straddles the crucial maritime artery on which east Asia’s biggest economies depend for their energy supplies and much of their exports.

But Indonesia’s 4.3% annual growth rate over the past decade has lagged behind regional neighbors Philippines and Vietnam. And Indonesia’s per-capita GDP of around $4,500 is little more than half that of Thailand’s.





The central business district of Jakarta, Indonesia 
Photographer: Dimas Ardian/Bloomberg

The nation of 273 million has struggled mightily with the infrastructure challenges inherent to a country spread across more than 900 inhabited islands, where moving goods and people around is very costly. President Joko Widodo, in office since 2014, has championed construction of new roads, railways and ports, and even a new capital. He’s also set a grand strategy of upgrading the country’s exports, focusing on refined and processed—rather than raw—commodities.

The domestic development focus has meant Jokowi, as the president is known, hasn’t invested much time or political capital in foreign policy. Indonesia’s financing needs have, however, dovetailed with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, and deepened the Southeast Asian nation’s ties with Beijing. China is by far Indonesia’s biggest trading partner, and in recent years has been its No. 3 investor, behind Singapore and Japan.

Indonesia has long stood for the idea of a multi-polar world, hosting the Bandung Conference in 1955 that launched the non-aligned movement of nations wary of both Washington and Moscow during the Cold War. 

That history, and the crucial monetary ties with Beijing, are the backdrop for Jakarta’s reluctance to side with the U.S., western Europe and other countries all over the world in sanctioning Russia over its war on Ukraine. Indeed, the Indonesian government last month signaled plans to invite Vladimir Putin to the Group of 20 summit scheduled for Bali this year. (Indonesia is this year’s rotating head of the group of big developed and emerging countries.)





Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s president, speaks in a prerecorded video during the United Nations General Assembly last year. 
Photographer: Michael Nagle/Bloomberg

The issue of Putin’s presence threatens to become a new source of tension between Jakarta and Washington. This week, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen noted that “I’ve made clear to my colleagues in Indonesia that we will not be participating in a number of meetings if the Russians are there.’’

Relations with the U.S. weren’t the best to begin with. Jokowi hasn’t visited the White House since President Joe Biden took office, and kept Donald Trump at arm’s length. The latter chilliness was tied to the Republican’s decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem—something that sparked protests by thousands of people in the predominantly Muslim nation.

The risk of deteriorating diplomatic ties with fellow democratic nations over the Russia question comes just as the Indonesian public is growing more skeptical about China. A new survey by the Australia-based Lowy Institute showed only 30% of Indonesians would be in favor of a Chinese firm taking majority control of an Indonesian company. And 60% thought “Indonesia should join with other countries to limit China’s influence.”


With his nation’s economic recovery just beginning, it’s an awkward moment for Jokowi to risk U.S. pressure over Russia. Booming commodity prices have yielded a rare current-account surplus, supporting the exchange rate. The rupiah has depreciated less than 1% this year against the U.S. dollar, even though its central bank has refrained from raising interest rates while the Federal Reserve has telegraphed sharp hikes. And the stable exchange rate has helped keep inflation below 3%—a fraction of the pace seen in many developed nations.

Kurt Campbell, the White House’s Asia czar, once said that Indonesia would rank first among countries most important to the U.S., but the least understood. The coming months will test the Biden administration’s ability to play the long game when it comes to this Southeast Asian giant. 









Indonesia Has Been Punching Below Its Weight


Some countries are known for “punching above their weight,” as a humorous Danish TV clip of President Barack Obama’s bilateral meetings showcased several years ago. Few would disagree that Indonesia, by contrast, punches notably below its weight class.




www.bloomberg.com

Reactions: Like Like:
1


----------



## Indos

Soft-Spoken Jokowi Emerges as Surprise Power Broker at G-20​
Jokowi shows how non-alignment can still bring foes together
Xi, Biden meet in Bali thaws relationship between the nations

By
Philip Heijmans and
Norman Harsono
November 17, 2022 at 11:48 GMT+7





Joko Widodo plants a tree at the Taman Hutan Raya Ngurah Rai Mangrove Forest, during the G20 summit on Nov. 16.Photographer: Alex Brandon/Pool/AFP/Getty Images


Despite being the world’s fourth-most populous nation and the biggest economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has long punched below its weight on international affairs. That changed at this year’s Group of 20 summit. 

With a mix of careful diplomacy and good humor, Indonesian President Joko Widodo managed to bring a sense of collegiality to a world riven by conflict and crisis. A meeting that started on the resort island of Bali with high tensions around Ukraine, US-China relations, climate change and inflation ended with a joint statement that seemed improbable only days before.......









Soft-Spoken Jokowi Emerges as Surprise Power Broker at G-20


Despite being the world’s fourth-most populous nation and the biggest economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has long punched below its weight on international affairs. That changed at this year’s Group of 20 summit.




www.bloomberg.com

Reactions: Like Like:
2


----------



## Indos

*Editor's Note:*

The world today is far from being tranquil. Facing a choice of the times between solidarity and division and cooperation and confrontation, the international community expects Asia to play a leading role. ASEAN countries are successively hosting three important multilateral meetings including the ASEAN Summit and Leaders' Meetings on East Asia Cooperation, the G20 Summit, and APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting. Focusing on the "Asian moment," the Global Times will invite several Chinese and foreign scholars to discuss how Asian countries can contribute "Asian wisdom" to the world amid unprecedented changes unseen in a century. This is the sixth of this series.

This is a busy month for Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular. No fewer than three summits of regional and global prominence were and are to be held almost successively. There was the summit of the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. That was followed by the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia. And soon the leaders of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies will meet in Bangkok, Thailand.

The concentration of these high-level meetings in this part of the world so soon after the easing of the coronavirus pandemic is perhaps a rather apt one. Asia, especially Southeast Asia, remains the vibrant part of the world that has continued to register impressive growth even amidst the economic doldrums brought about by the pandemic. 

It is no secret that the agendas of these summits are headlined by revitalization of the economy of the region and by extension the world. The ASEAN summit, for example, started negotiations for ASEAN members and China to upgrade their already quite impressive free trade agreement. ASEAN also firmed up its comprehensive strategic partnerships with the US and India. This sort of tightening the relationship between ASEAN and the major economies of the world aims not surprisingly to enable ever closer trade and investment that could hopefully jumpstart the stuttering regional and global economy. 

Some have dubbed these events to be the debut of the "Asian moment," or Asia's coming-out ceremony on a global scale, and quipped that the "Asian century" has finally arrived. Well, taken together, these summits could be viewed as more Asian major players stepping up to the world stage. Indonesia, in particular, has been very assiduous and conspicuous in holding the G20 summit. Over the last year, magnifying the famed Indonesian courtesy, President Joko Widodo has been travelling around the world to essentially hand-deliver invitations for most of the G20 heads of state or government to meet at the legendary resort island of Bali. 

And come the time, most of them did, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden, who also made use of the occasion to hold their first face-to-face bilateral summit which was previously rendered difficult by the pandemic. The two world leaders made clear the important positions of their respective country to one another, and various channels of communications were to be continued between both sides. The world at large would like to see the US and China engage more constructively with one another, much like they did so well until just a few years ago. That is because a healthy and robust US-China relationship would be beneficial not only to the two largest global economies concerned, but also to many others in an open world.

*Going back to Indonesia, as the leading regional power in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has at least for half a century not imposed its will on its neighbours, much to their relief. Now that Indonesia is about to once again assume ASEAN chairmanship, it is expected to shoulder heavier responsibility, not the least in forging consensus among ASEAN members on various strategic issues affecting the region.*

A crucial component of the Asian moment or the Asian century will be positive relations between China and Southeast Asia. The two neighboring sides are the leading trading partners of one another, and, as mentioned above, are in the process of upgrading their free trade ties. Building on the already impressive trade and investment ties, such upgrade must involve a shift from the quantitative to the qualitative in the fruits of their collaborations. For example, not only trade of goods, but also trade in services, ranging from education to digital economy, should be emphasised, as both China and Southeast Asia are transitioning into high value-added economic stages. And it would appear that both sides have indeed the determination to steer toward this mutually beneficial direction.

Another characteristic of the Asian moment could perhaps be gleaned from the perspective of the China-Malaysia relations, to take but one example. It is open knowledge that Malaysia and China have territorial disputes over the South China Sea. But instead of blowing loud trumpets over these seemingly insurmountable disputes, the two sides prefer to put their differences on back burner or at least discuss them bilaterally in a low-key manner, while their tremendous amount of trade volumes balloon. The people-to-people interactions between the two countries are also significant, with tens of thousands of students studying in each other's universities. This would undoubtedly contribute to better mutual understanding between the peoples, and is a positive example for others to emulate.

The Asian moment is not and must not just be a laurel of glory to be rested upon, instead it must be a duty to be diligently hoisted and fulfilled by all in Asia. Only then would peace and prosperity be achieved in common.

_The author is a senior fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn






Shouldering the ‘Asian moment’ for all - Global Times







www.globaltimes.cn




_


----------



## Indos

U.S. Relations With Indonesia​BILATERAL RELATIONS FACT SHEET
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
APRIL 19, 2022

*U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS*

Indonesia is a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific Region, and U.S.-Indonesia relations have taken on increasing importance. Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy, largest Muslim-majority country, the seventh-largest economy by purchasing power, and a leader in ASEAN. 

It possesses the world’s greatest marine biodiversity and its second greatest terrestrial biodiversity. Indonesia also borders the South China Sea, which has the world’s busiest sea lanes — more than $5 trillion in cargo and as much as 50 percent of the world’s oil tankers pass through the South China Sea every year. 

The United States was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia in 1949, following its independence from the Netherlands. Indonesia’s democratization and reform process since 1998 has increased its stability and security and resulted in strengthened U.S.-Indonesia relations.









U.S. Relations With Indonesia - United States Department of State


More information about Indonesia is available on the Indonesia country page and from other Department of State publications and other sources listed at the end of this fact sheet. U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS Indonesia is a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific Region, and U.S.-Indonesia relations have...




www.state.gov


----------



## Beast

Indos said:


> U.S. Relations With Indonesia​BILATERAL RELATIONS FACT SHEET
> BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
> APRIL 19, 2022
> 
> *U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS*
> 
> Indonesia is a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific Region, and U.S.-Indonesia relations have taken on increasing importance. Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy, largest Muslim-majority country, the seventh-largest economy by purchasing power, and a leader in ASEAN.
> 
> It possesses the world’s greatest marine biodiversity and its second greatest terrestrial biodiversity. Indonesia also borders the South China Sea, which has the world’s busiest sea lanes — more than $5 trillion in cargo and as much as 50 percent of the world’s oil tankers pass through the South China Sea every year.
> 
> The United States was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia in 1949, following its independence from the Netherlands. Indonesia’s democratization and reform process since 1998 has increased its stability and security and resulted in strengthened U.S.-Indonesia relations.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> U.S. Relations With Indonesia - United States Department of State
> 
> 
> More information about Indonesia is available on the Indonesia country page and from other Department of State publications and other sources listed at the end of this fact sheet. U.S.-INDONESIA RELATIONS Indonesia is a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific Region, and U.S.-Indonesia relations have...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.state.gov


Joko is not so keen to put Indonesia more closer to USA. He will prefer a 50/50 and keep Indonesia neutral between US and China.


----------



## Indos

Beast said:


> Joko is not so keen to put Indonesia more closer to USA. He will prefer a 50/50 and keep Indonesia neutral between US and China.



The neutral position is good for the world. Our Finance Minister stated to Blomberg reporter during G20 meeting that as large and important country in South East Asia, Indonesia choosing side like by joining AUKUS could create more intense competition between USA vs China that could lead to even war. 

Most of North East Asian countries have already been in US camp (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and this status quo should not be changed by adding another regional power into US camp. The US heavy support in Western Europe (Russia-Ukraine war) will also lead Western Europe to support US in their competition with China. US has already got more support from them. What USA wants is to have good relationship with Indonesia. Pelosi plane for example uses Indonesia territory when she wanted to visit Taiwan.

Indonesia position in Muslim world is also unique, rather the same with what happen between US and China competition. All of Middle East countries have good relation with us. Just several days ago Iran warship visited Tanjung Priok. I think our next concentration is to end power games in Middle East and solve dispute like what happened in Yemen and Libya. Maybe not in our focus currently, but there is chance to do that as we are also contributing in making peace in Afghanistan and has good relation with both former Afghan government and Taliban


----------



## Indos

Why Was the Iranian Navy in Jakarta?​Indonesia’s growing ties with Iran and other Middle Eastern states offer a good illustration of its “free and active” foreign policy tradition.

By *Patrick Dupont*
November 18, 2022





Credit: Depositphotos

On November 5, two Iranian naval vessels docked at a port in the Indonesian capital Jakarta for what would be an almost week-long “peace mission” to the archipelagic nation. The IRINS Makran, Iran’s only expeditionary sea base ship, and IRINS Dena, a light frigate, are part of a flotilla of Iranian navy ships circumnavigating the globe on a goodwill tour aimed at extending Tehran’s message of “peace and friendship” to the world.

The visit had all the hallmarks of port-call diplomacy: plenty of photo opportunities, press tours, and official visits to the Indonesian naval headquarters. Iranian sailors also had the opportunity to play sports with their Indonesian counterparts, visit an Islamic center, and go on a city tour of Jakarta.

The substance of official meetings between the two navies wasn’t anything out of the ordinary. Both sides discussed the potential for a cadet exchange program and the security of international sea lanes for commercial shipping from Iran and Indonesia.

This isn’t the first time the Iranian Navy has visited Indonesia either. In early 2020, the IRINS Kharg, an Iranian Navy logistics vessel carrying some 300 navy cadets, docked in Jakarta’s Tanjong Priok Port to celebrate 70 years of bilateral relations.

While such visits are ostensibly routine acts of naval diplomacy, it does raise questions about Indonesia’s diplomatic approach to the Sunni-Shia schism as a Muslim-majority country, as well as about Iran’s own interests in Southeast Asia.

*Enjoying this article?* Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.
To be sure, Indonesia and Iran have their differences. Indonesia is a vibrant democracy and quasi-secular state with the world’s largest Sunni population. On the other hand, Iran is an Islamic theocracy with the world’s largest Shia population. While Indonesia maintains good relations with Washington and is an active participant in building regional norms, Iran has actively sought to erode the U.S.-led world order.

Despite these seemingly stark differences, Indonesia and Iran have enjoyed relatively cordial relations since the 1950s. The relationship has survived both an Islamic revolution in Iran and the democratization of Indonesia. Even today, the relationship continues to grow. Last month, Tehran and Jakarta concluded their sixth round of negotiations on the Indonesia-Iran Preferential Trade Agreement. The deal would see increased business links, a reduction in tariffs, and an easing of financial transactions between the two countries. Indonesia and Iran have also sought to expand cooperation on parliamentary and judicial affairs, with Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi underlining the need to expand bilateral relations in a call earlier this year.

To understand why the Iranian navy was in Jakarta, and indeed, why Iran-Indonesia relations endure to this day, it is important to recognize the relative continuity of Indonesia’s foreign policy tradition.

Since gaining independence in 1945, Indonesia has been a champion of the non-aligned movement and has grounded its foreign policy in a principle known as _bebas aktif_, or “free and active.” Articulated by Indonesia’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta as “rowing between two reefs,” Indonesia has long sought to avoid becoming ensnared in great power rivalries while also playing an active role in world affairs.

By following what Indonesia has culturally regarded as _jalan tengah_, or the “middle way,” Jakarta has sought to preserve and maximize its strategic autonomy by playing rival powers off against one another. Much like Jakarta’s approach to great power rivalry during the Cold War and in the current age of strategic competition between Beijing and Washington, Indonesia has always pursued a neutral position when it comes to regional rivalries in the Middle East. Indonesia’s approach to Iran – and by extension Iran’s bitter rivalry with Saudi Arabia – is certainly no different.

While Indonesia has traditionally seen minimal involvement in Middle Eastern politics, its relationship with Saudi Arabia is undeniably important. In 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic, more than 200,000 Indonesians took the haj pilgrimage to Mecca. Millions more are on the waitlist.

The economic relationship is also important. Over a million Indonesians work in Saudi Arabia, sending invaluable remittances back to their families and into the Indonesian economy. Riyadh’s foreign investments in Indonesia can’t be overlooked either. Most recently, Jakarta has sought Saudi money to help fund its ambitious $32 billion project to relocate its capital city from the island of Java to Kalimantan.

Saudi Arabia has also invested billions of dollars in constructing mosques and religious universities and providing religious scholarships to Indonesian students – seemingly to help promote its own conservative brand of Islam. With religious conservatism on the rise in Indonesia in recent years, it appears as though Riyadh’s efforts have paid off to some extent.
But as Indonesia’s relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran demonstrate, the spread of Saudi Wahhabism hasn’t necessarily trickled down into Indonesia’s foreign policy. _Bebas aktif _has stayed the course.

We can see this clearly when we consider both Indonesia’s willingness to criticize Saudi Arabia and counterbalance the relationship with Iran. For example, Indonesia has long spoken out against the mistreatment of its domestic workers in the Kingdom, even moving to temporarily ban its citizens from working there. When Saudi Arabia’s King Salman visited Indonesia in 2016 as part of a regional tour to promote investment, Jokowi visited Tehran in the same year as a way of balancing out Saudi overtures.

*Enjoying this article?* Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.
Jakarta understands that Saudi Arabia is largely concerned with Tehran’s small but growing influence in Indonesia. It also understands that Iran is isolated on the world stage and will drop ideological fanaticism over the Sunni-Shia schism in the pragmatic pursuit of strategic trade and economic partnerships. The friendly relationship between Sunni-majority Indonesia and Shia-dominated Iran speaks to this.

Tehran, for its part, has benefited greatly from its relationship with Jakarta. Keeping in line with its tradition of neutrality, Indonesia largely remains silent on Iran’s internal affairs – from the overthrow of the Shah during the Iranian revolution of 1979 to the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Indonesia also abstained from a vote to impose sanctions on Iran in 2008 over its nuclear program. In 2020, it abstained from a vote on a resolution that would see an arms embargo on Iran extended.

However, in a testament to Indonesia’s treading of _jalan tengah_, Jakarta has no qualms about pursuing risks in the relationship – that is, going against Iran’s preferences in the search for a new equilibrium. For example, in 2021, the Indonesian Navy seized an Iranian crude oil tanker suspected of illegally transferring oil in Indonesian waters. Jakarta has also voted in favor of United Nations resolutions seeking to impose sanctions against Iran for its uranium enrichment activities.

The arrival of the Iranian Navy in Jakarta shouldn’t be overstated. It is after all a routine act of naval diplomacy and Indonesia is just one of many stops on the Iranian Navy’s global goodwill tour. What it does highlight, however, is the operationalization of Indonesia’s long-standing foreign policy tradition. Jakarta’s approach to Iran, and indeed its approach to the broader Iran-Saudi rivalry has little to do with the Sunni-Shia schism. Rather, it is foreign policy pragmatism at its best.









Why Was the Iranian Navy in Jakarta?


Indonesia’s growing ties with Iran and other Middle Eastern states offer a good illustration of its “free and active” foreign policy tradition.



thediplomat.com


----------



## Indos

Jokowi relationship with MBS is great. Indonesia is active players within OIC as well. 






The Islamic Games that is supported by Indonesia government since the beginning is something that I see as very positive for the Muslim world


----------



## Indos

Indonesia and US Minister of Defense press conference in Jakarta, Indonesia 21 November 2022.







__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1594572315064418304


----------



## Indos

President Erdoğan meets Widodo ahead of G-20 summit in Indonesia​BY DAILY SABAH​ISTANBUL NOV 14, 2022 - 9:03 AM GMT+3






President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Indonesian counterpart Joko Widodo met on Monday to exchange views on bilateral relations in Indonesia's Bali island, as the two countries inked several agreements in various fields to further enhance bilateral cooperation.

Erdoğan and Widodo discussed all aspects of the bilateral ties between Türkiye and Indonesia, and steps to enhance cooperation.

The Turkish president thanked Widodo for the "successful" term presidency of the G-20 and extended his support for Indonesia's assuming MIKTA's term presidency from Türkiye next April.

Established in 2013, MIKTA is a partnership made up of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Australia. All five countries in the group are G-20 members.

"The high-level strategic cooperation council mechanism that we have established together today is of historic importance for our bilateral relations," he added.



Also, Türkiye and Indonesia inked two agreements and five memorandums of understanding with boosting bilateral cooperation in their sights as top Turkish officials visit the country for a summit of the G-20.

Speaking at the signing ceremony, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto said the event highlighted "the strength and the depth" of bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

"The agreements signed today are not just (about) government-to-government cooperation in various strategic sectors such as in the field of defense," Subianto said, adding that they also sought to step up cooperation between businesses.

He said the ties between the two countries provide "concrete deliverables for the benefit and prosperity of the people of both Indonesia and Türkiye."

Hoping for the accords to be "swiftly implemented," the Indonesian defense chief said they would "inspire and motivate" other deals, especially for free trade.

On the bilateral meeting between the Turkish and Indonesian presidents, he said the two leaders would "announce a new level of cooperation, with the formation of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council."

"This is an important milestone in the Indonesia-Türkiye relationship since the establishment of the Indonesia-Türkiye Strategic Partnership in 2012," he said.

For his part, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu hailed ties between the two countries, saying there had been "great progress in our ties in recent years."

"We will soon witness a historic moment in our relations as our presidents will establish the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council," he added.

After affirming that the deals would further strengthen relations in many fields including the defense industry, research, forestry, environment, and development, Çavuşoğlu congratulated Indonesia for its successful G-20 chairpersonship.

"As two major powers in the Islamic world, our cooperation is vital for all Muslims worldwide," Çavuşoğlu added.

At the event, Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and Subianto inked one of the agreements in the field of defense, with another focused on forestry signed between the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of Indonesia and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Türkiye.

One of the five memorandums of understanding that were also initialed at the event was on research, technology, and innovation cooperation.

Another was signed in the field of environment, while a third was on development cooperation.

Joint production and distribution of electric buses were the focus of the fourth memorandum of understanding, while the last was on the development of the trans-Sumatera toll road, currently under construction to stretch across the Indonesian island of Sumatra.

The meeting came ahead of the G-20 summit, which will be held on Nov. 15-16 under the theme "Recover Together-Recover Stronger."

Erdoğan arrived in Indonesia's Bali Island on Monday to attend the G-20 summit. He was welcomed at Ngurah Rai International Airport by Indonesia's Minister of State Secretariat Pratikno, Minister of Health Budi Gunadi, and Governor of Bali Wayan Koster as well as Turkish Ambassador Ahmet Cemil Miroğlu.

The president is accompanied by first lady Emine Erdoğan, Çavuşoğlu, Akar, Treasure and Finance Minister Nureddin Nebati, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Vahit Kirişci, Communications Director Fahrettin Altun, Presidential Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalın, Defense Industries Presidency head Ismail Demir and ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) spokesperson Ömer Çelik.

On Nov. 15, Erdoğan will attend the first session on food and energy security and address all leaders and delegation heads.

Following lunch with G-20 leaders, Erdoğan will attend the second session on health and will address the participants.

On the final day of the summit, the president will hold bilateral meetings and hold a press conference.

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union are G-20 member states. Spain is also invited as a permanent guest. Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Bali to attend the summit on behalf of President Vladimir Putin.

Türkiye and Indonesia enjoy close and multifaceted relations, with a wide range of opportunities for further cooperation. Indonesia, which is the world’s third-largest democracy, is also the most populous Muslim-majority country and occupies a strategic location between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

Türkiye was one of the first nations that recognized Indonesia’s independence. Diplomatic relations were established in 1950 and the Turkish Embassy in Jakarta opened on April 10, 1957.

With the increase of mutual high-level visits since 2004, the bilateral relations gained new momentum and both countries decided to upgrade their ties to a strategic partnership. The two countries signed the joint declaration “Türkiye and Indonesia: Toward an Enhanced Partnership in a New World Setting” in Jakarta in April 2011.

The official visit of President Widodo to Türkiye in July 2017 has brought new perspectives to the bilateral cooperation, especially in the spheres of trade, health care, energy and the defense industry.

Çavuşoğlu paid an official visit to Jakarta on Dec. 20-22, 2020. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Retno Marsudi visited Türkiye between Oct. 11-14, 2021, which was the first bilateral visit at the level of an Indonesian foreign minister.

Türkiye and Indonesia closely cooperate with a number of international organizations. Indonesia is one of the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since July 2017, Türkiye has been a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN, and since 2010 the Turkish Embassy in Jakarta has been accredited to ASEAN.









President Erdoğan meets Widodo ahead of G-20 summit in Indonesia


President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Indonesian counterpart Joko Widodo met on Monday to exchange views on bilateral relations in Indonesia's Bali...




www.dailysabah.com


----------



## Indos

Indonesia’s Successful G20 Summit: A Turning Point?​13 December 2022
Author: Colin I Bradford, Brookings Institution

The Indonesian G20 year was like no other. The Russian war in Europe divided the G20. No G20 communiques emerged from the ministerial meetings held during the run-up to the summit in mid-November 2022. There was a moment when it seemed that the summit would only tackle low-hanging fruit. But Indonesian President Jokowi Widodo embraced the tensions rather than avoiding them.






By listening to all of the G20 governments, Widodo realised that the crucial nexus was the impact of security tensions on the global economy. Both security and economic issues had to be dealt with. Realising that the fate of the international community as a singular entity was at stake, President Jokowi Widodo pushed G20 leaders in their communique to ‘reaffirm our commitment to cooperate’, and to maintain that ‘it is essential to uphold international law and the multilateral system that safeguards peace and stability’ and that ‘the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible’. Quite a feat.

G20 members refused to expel Russia from G20 membership yet unified all other members around reaffirming these long-held principles essential for sustaining the viability of a single international community. The G20 member-states were able to agree on an extensive communique that demarcated lines of action to address global systemic challenges.

Pluralism emerged as the driver of political dynamics among great powers by highlighting the role of middle powers. Pluralism was evident in Indonesia’s leadership and in crucial language of the communique mediated by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which stated that ‘today’s era must not be of war’. The shifts in US–China relations resulting from discussions between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the margins of the G20 set a possible new tone in geopolitics. It highlighted the need for dialogue as a means of easing tensions.

Each of these elements contributed to clarifying the G20’s potential role as a viable platform for global governance. The question is whether the Bali G20 can be an enduring turning point.

What the Indonesian G20 Summit revealed more vividly than most is what the G20 is and is not.

The G20 is often thought of as a group. But it is better seen as a process_. _The G20 is not just a two-day leaders-level summit. There are ministerial meetings, working groups, task forces, Sherpa planning sessions and engagement groups meeting throughout the year.

The G20 now embraces the pluralism that is intrinsic to this eclectic grouping of member-states. Each of these countries now seek ‘strategic autonomy’ in their foreign policies and fervently avoid alignment with one side or the other of the geopolitical divide.

This pluralism is a positive political dynamic for global governance. It embraces contradiction rather than adhering to singular ideological orientations. Pluralism relies on a diversity of perspectives and acknowledges the complexity of issues to open policy space for convergence, rather than being confined to the narrow corridors of consensus. This is a major breakthrough away from confrontational narratives of the China–US relationship and from the war-driven divide between Russia and Europe.

These dynamics have enabled a fresh perception of the G20 as an ‘informal apex focal point’ rather than a ‘peak’ organisation of big powers. Middle powers play key roles in the G20, as demonstrated by Indonesia’s leadership and Modi’s initiative. This perception reveals that the G20 is not an institution but rather a ’network of networks’ which makes clear its informality and its porousness to external contributions.

The G20, unlike the G7, is value-neutral with respect to regime type, which facilitates dialogue among those who have different domestic values, cultures, institutions and behavioural patterns. It is a more interest-driven forum where the focus is on policy rather than polemics.

While the G20 is often thought of as a forum focussed on the global economy, it has evolved. It has become a focal point for systemic global issues that require strategic vision and political action not just economic policy coordination.

G20 summits have often been maligned by critics for their failure to reach conclusions or take decisive actions. It is true that the G20 performs better in moments of crisis than in more normal times. G20 members need to push each other to deliver policy, both in moments of crisis and beyond.

Global leadership is a political process, which is fluid and evolving. The informal and interactive nature of G20 processes provide governments throughout the year with ways to understand each other’s positions, perspectives and constraints. It enables them to forge common discourses and action options, which evolve based on diverse interests and ideas. G20 summits become means by which national political leaders push forward the frontiers of feasible ambition — constrained as they are by domestic politics.

Greater understanding of what the G20 processes really are will hopefully help create momentum for greater accomplishment in the next three years under the leadership of India, Brazil and South Africa.

_Colin Bradford is the lead co-chair of the China–West Dialogue consisting of thought leaders from Europe, China, Canada, Chile, Japan, South Korea and the United States seeking to ‘pluralise’ the bipolar US–China relationship. He is also a global fellow of the Berlin Global Solutions Initiative and a non-resident senior fellow working on the G20 and global governance at the Brookings Institution.









Indonesia’s Successful G20 Summit: A Turning Point?


Despite political challenges, the G20 is an indispensable forum for global leadership.




www.eastasiaforum.org




_


----------



## Indos

Indonesia’s year of diplomatic triumph loses a little of its gloss​2 January 2023
Author: Editorial Board, ANU






The G20 presidency in 2022 presented diplomatic and substantial challenges that threatened to blow the forum apart, or at least to semi-permanently incapacitate it. That Indonesia hosted a successful summit and passed leadership of the forum on to India in good working order was a diplomatic triumph for Indonesia’s leadership and significantly elevated the country’s standing on the global stage.

Despite its size and political weight — as the third-biggest democracy in the world, an emerging economy that is likely to be among the four biggest in the world within a few decades and its political leverage in Asia through ASEAN — few credited Indonesia with the capacity bring it off, in part a product of post-colonial prejudice, in part a product of ignorance about just where Indonesia is at in the world today.

Events were certainly stacked against a successful G20 summit last year. On top of the COVID-19 crisis, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sharply aggravated growing geopolitical tensions and the fragmentation of the world economy. The US trade and technology war with China signalled the acceleration of protectionism and international ‘decoupling’.

Recovery from the COVID-19 shock, the economic consequences of the Ukraine war, the steady deterioration of multilateral governance and the long-term spectre of climate change were all major challenges in their own right but, because they came at once and fed upon each other, needed vastly more effective global cooperation if they were to be managed with any measure of success.

The environment for international cooperation could not have been more toxic.

Without Indonesian convening power, it’s doubtful that there would have been a G20 summit at all in 2022.

That convening power derived from Indonesia’s status as a leader in the developing world, its central role in ASEAN and East Asia, its basic commitment to open, outward-looking development despite spasms of economic nationalism, its non-alignment to any of the big powers and its standing among world democracies. And Indonesia’s leadership team demonstrated that it had the mettle to wring every ounce of influence it could not just to hosting the meeting but delivering a credible measure of success.

The stakes were high. Not only was Indonesia’s emergent leadership role on the world stage on the line along with President Joko Widodo’s legacy, but also the viability of the G20 as a platform for coordinating the global economic recovery from the pandemic and managing global economic and other problems.

President Widodo and his ‘gang of four’ ministerial advisors from finance, trade, foreign affairs and the central bank made a huge political bet on the success of the G20 summit — knowing that failure would have been judged harshly by the Indonesian public, to whom the government had eagerly sold a success story in the lead up to the event, and by the international community, who would have delivered its own ruthless judgment on Indonesia’s frailties.

Jakarta’s gamble paid off: the G20 outperformed expectations, although the challenges facing global multilateralism remain. The Bali summit, against the odds, consolidated the G20’s self-designation as ‘the premier forum for global economic cooperation’.

Not only was Indonesia’s G20 high-wire G20 diplomacy a significant success in 2022, but its economy bounced back unexpectedly strongly from the pandemic. The World Bank predicts that the economy will enjoy a respectable annual GDP growth of 5.2 per cent for the full year.

But the Indonesian parliament’s enactment of a controversial new criminal code on 2 December revealed the jarring realities of domestic politics and took some of the shine off Indonesia’s year in the international sun.

As Liam Gammon explains in this week’s lead essay, ‘[t]he code satisfies a range of conservative agendas: from Islamists’ desire to police morality to the obsession of bureaucrats and nationalist politicians with protecting the “dignity” of the state and its officials.’

The flip side of Indonesia’s economic and geopolitical weight is that it also presents as part of a global trend of declining democratic quality. ‘A post-Jokowi reversal of regressive political trends doesn’t seem likely either’, notes Gammon. ‘Barring any radical constitutional change ahead of 2024, Indonesia’s democracy remains safe— albeit weaker and more illiberal, where dissent is anathematised and the rights of unpopular minorities, such as LGBT people, are subject to the whims of the majority.’ Contrary to some reporting, the new criminal code doesn’t explicitly ban same-sex relations but, with social conservatism on the front foot, such a ban could still come.

‘As Indonesia’s democracy displays its more illiberal face, the rhetoric of shared democratic values is a declining currency’, Gammon says.

As dismaying as these trends may appear, they should not distract from what’s at stake in engaging and backing up Indonesia’s emergent regional leadership role.

For Australia, where many see the country’s liberal democratic tradition as fundamental to its identity at home and on the world stage, the increasing congruence of its economic and strategic interests with those of Indonesia and its largely undemocratic neighbours in the region — in defending and husbanding a multilateral, open, rules-based economic order and resisting the entrenchment of cold war thinking and dynamics in Asia — is a reminder of the necessity for equanimity in the face of political realities Australian policymakers can’t change any time soon.

Such equanimity in the face of Indonesia’s conservative backsliding ought to inform how the bilateral relationship is framed politically in Australia. ‘Downplaying values and playing up interests doesn’t just mean interests in the sense of what Australia can achieve _in _Indonesia, commercially or otherwise’, says Gammon. ‘It means focusing instead on what Australia can achieve _with _Indonesia, as a fellow middle power with overlapping interests in respecting and reinforcing the rules of global trade and pursuing multilateral cooperation on transnational policy challenges’.

Indonesia, with all its foibles, is the Southeast Asian heavyweight and a global partner — as it proved so resoundingly in 2022 — with whom Australian leaders must now engage more than ever to forge a region that remains congenial to common economic, political and security interests.

_The EAF Editorial Board is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.



https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/01/02/indonesias-year-of-diplomatic-triumph-loses-a-little-of-its-gloss/


_


----------



## Indos




----------



## Indos

*All UN Members Agree Additional Iran Sanctions, Except RI*

*Tuesday, 04 March 2008*
Read 869 times






In the vote led by the Russian Ambassador to the UN at the UN Headquarters Vitaly Churkin, New York, only Indonesian negotiator Marty Natalegawa raised his hand when Churkin asked the session "Are there any abstentions?".

Russia is president of the UN Security Council for March.

Previously, Churkin had asked other Security Council member states to show their hands if they agreed to the draft resolution.

The ambassadors of 14 member countries all raised their hands in agreement, so that in the voting the Russian Ambassador stated that UN Security Council Resolution No. 1803 was officially passed with 14 votes in favor and one abstention.

When delivering a statement before the vote was held, RI's Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Marty Natalegawa, reiterated that at this time, additional sanctions against Iran were not the best way.

He also said, among other things, that the situation at the time of the previous resolutions regarding the imposition of sanctions against Iran, namely Resolutions Numbers 1737 and 1747, was not the same as the current situation, which Iran saw as Indonesia was working with the UN atomic monitoring agency, IAEA.

"With these considerations and reasons, President, Indonesia will vote on abstaining from the current draft resolution," Marty said in a session chaired by Vitaly Churkin.

Indonesia is also the only country that until the vote stated that it does not support the third resolution on additional sanctions for Iran.

Until the end of last week, at least three other countries, namely Libya, South Africa and Vietnam, still indicated that they would not support the resolution.

Monday's vote is a delay, which was previously planned for Saturday (1/3).

The sponsoring countries in the UNSC -- which prepared the draft -- namely Britain and France which on Thursday (28/2) said they would declare the draft ready for `voting` on Saturday, decided to postpone it until Monday (3/ 3).

The delay is said to be giving more time to four countries, namely Indonesia, Libya, South Africa and Vietnam, which have yet to show a desire to join other Security Council member countries in finalizing the draft.

The current members of the UN Security Council are five permanent members with veto rights, namely the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China and 10 non-permanent members without veto rights, namely Indonesia, South Africa, Libya, Vietnam, Belgium, Italy, Croatia, Panama, Costa Rica and Burkina Faso.

Resolution 1803 of 2008 added to sanctions against Iran, including adding a travel ban and freezing the assets of Iranian officials related to the nuclear development program and imposing a travel ban on those who are heavily involved in Iran's nuclear development activities.

For the first time, a ban on trade with Iran will also apply to products for both military and civilian use.

The sanctions will also include imposing financial controls on two banks suspected of being involved in nuclear development activities while all countries are asked to be 'cautious' in providing credit, guarantees or insurance to them.

In addition, inspections will also be carried out on ships suspected of carrying prohibited goods both to and from Iran.









Semua Anggota PBB Setujui Sanksi Tambahan Iran, Kecuali RI | Sekretariat Negara


Semua Anggota PBB Setujui Sanksi Tambahan Iran, Kecuali RI




www.setneg.go.id


----------

