# Learning by Doing Pakistan's Experience with Counterinsurgency: Shuja Nawaz



## jaibi

I made this post a while back on PDF but this article by Shuja Nawaz seems to have been taken offline for some reason. I think it's very important that we keep this learning alive and also have proof of our accomplishments like the articles that I recently wrote. Please, do give it a read if you're interested in how we dealt with the changing face of warfare and came out on top.

Thank you

*@dbc* *@PanzerKiel* *@Joe Shearer* *@That Guy* *@ghazi52* *@aziqbal* @bratava
@*Casus Belli* *@dbc* *@F.O.X* *@forcetrip* *@Hakan* @haviZultan *@Indos* *@KAL-EL* *@MilSpec* *@Mugwop* *@Munir* *@Neutron* *@S.U.R.B.* *@siegecrossbow* *@Signalian* *@SpArK* *@TOPGUN* *@TruthSeeker* *@vostok*

*@Ark_Angel* *@CommandEleven* *@CPGS* *@denel* *@Desertfalcon* *@GlobalVillageSpace* *@Quwa* *@RadioactiveFriends* *@TheMightyBender* *@Tps43*

*@Aamir Hussain* *@ajpirzada* *@araz* *@Awesome* *@Chak Bamu* *@Dazzler* *@Dubious* *@EagleEyes* *@ThePatriotReport* *@UnitedPak* *@T-Faz* *@Sapper* *@roadrunner* *@RescueRanger* *@Rafael* *@Pfpilot* *@notorious_eagle* *@niaz* *@muse* *@mean_bird* *@Manticore* *@Kasrkin* *@Jungibaaz* *@Jabar 1* *@Icarus* *@HRK* *@Elmo* *@Emmie* *@fatman17* *@Awesome*

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## doorstar

jaibi said:


> I made this a while back on PDF but this article seems to have been taken offline for some reason. I think it's very important that we keep this learning alive and also have proof of our accomplishments like the articles that I recently wrote. Please, do give it a read if you're interested in how we dealt with the changing face of warfare and came out on top.
> 
> Thank you
> 
> *@dbc* *@PanzerKiel* *@Joe Shearer* *@That Guy* *@ghazi52* *@aziqbal* @Bratva
> @*Casus Belli* *@dbc* *@F.O.X* *@forcetrip* *@Hakan* *@Indos* *@KAL-EL* *@MilSpec* *@Mugwop* *@Munir* *@Neutron* *@S.U.R.B.* *@siegecrossbow* *@Signalian* *@SpArK* *@TOPGUN* *@TruthSeeker* *@vostok*
> 
> *@Ark_Angel* *@CommandEleven* *@CPGS* *@denel* *@Desertfalcon* *@GlobalVillageSpace* *@Quwa* *@RadioactiveFriends* *@TheMightyBender* *@Tps43*
> 
> *@Aamir Hussain* *@ajpirzada* *@araz* *@Awesome* *@Chak Bamu* *@Dazzler* *@Dubious* *@EagleEyes* *@ThePatriotReport* *@UnitedPak* *@T-Faz* *@Sapper* *@roadrunner* *@RescueRanger* *@Rafael* *@Pfpilot* *@notorious_eagle* *@niaz* *@muse* *@mean_bird* *@Manticore* *@Kasrkin* *@Jungibaaz* *@Jabar 1* *@Icarus* *@HRK* *@Elmo* *@Emmie* *@fatman17* *@Awesome*


none of them that you "tagged" is coming because you've done it all incorrectly

@dbc @PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer @That Guy @ghazi52 @aziqbal @Bratva 
@Casus Belli @F.O.X @forcetrip @Hakan @Indos @KAL-EL @MilSpec @Mugwop @Munir @Neutron @S.U.R.B. @siegecrossbow @Signalian @SpArK @TOPGUN @TruthSeeker @vostok

@Ark_Angel @CommandEleven @CPGS @denel @Desertfalcon @GlobalVillageSpace @Quwa @RadioactiveFriends @TheMightyBender @Tps43

@Aamir Hussain @ajpirzada @araz @Awesome @Chak Bamu @Dazzler @Dubious @EagleEyes @ThePatriotReport @UnitedPak @T-Faz @Sapper @roadrunner @RescueRanger @Rafael @Pfpilot @notorious_eagle @niaz @muse @mean_bird @Manticore @Kasrkin @Jungibaaz @Jabar 1 @Icarus @HRK @Elmo @Emmie @fatman17 @Awesome

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## Joe Shearer

Is it me dreaming or has PDF taken a sharp turn for the better?

Thanks, @jaibi. Have downloaded it, and will read it at leisure; just at the moment, I'm trying to get on top of the narrative of the 1965 conflict.



jaibi said:


> I made this a while back on PDF but this article seems to have been taken offline for some reason. I think it's very important that we keep this learning alive and also have proof of our accomplishments like the articles that I recently wrote. Please, do give it a read if you're interested in how we dealt with the changing face of warfare and came out on top.
> 
> Thank you
> 
> *@dbc* *@PanzerKiel* *@Joe Shearer* *@That Guy* *@ghazi52* *@aziqbal* @bratava
> @*Casus Belli* *@dbc* *@F.O.X* *@forcetrip* *@Hakan* @haviZultan *@Indos* *@KAL-EL* *@MilSpec* *@Mugwop* *@Munir* *@Neutron* *@S.U.R.B.* *@siegecrossbow* *@Signalian* *@SpArK* *@TOPGUN* *@TruthSeeker* *@vostok*
> 
> *@Ark_Angel* *@CommandEleven* *@CPGS* *@denel* *@Desertfalcon* *@GlobalVillageSpace* *@Quwa* *@RadioactiveFriends* *@TheMightyBender* *@Tps43*
> 
> *@Aamir Hussain* *@ajpirzada* *@araz* *@Awesome* *@Chak Bamu* *@Dazzler* *@Dubious* *@EagleEyes* *@ThePatriotReport* *@UnitedPak* *@T-Faz* *@Sapper* *@roadrunner* *@RescueRanger* *@Rafael* *@Pfpilot* *@notorious_eagle* *@niaz* *@muse* *@mean_bird* *@Manticore* *@Kasrkin* *@Jungibaaz* *@Jabar 1* *@Icarus* *@HRK* *@Elmo* *@Emmie* *@fatman17* *@Awesome*

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## Indos

jaibi said:


> I made this a while back on PDF but this article seems to have been taken offline for some reason. I think it's very important that we keep this learning alive and also have proof of our accomplishments like the articles that I recently wrote. Please, do give it a read if you're interested in how we dealt with the changing face of warfare and came out on top.
> 
> Thank you
> 
> *@dbc* *@PanzerKiel* *@Joe Shearer* *@That Guy* *@ghazi52* *@aziqbal* @bratava
> @*Casus Belli* *@dbc* *@F.O.X* *@forcetrip* *@Hakan* @haviZultan *@Indos* *@KAL-EL* *@MilSpec* *@Mugwop* *@Munir* *@Neutron* *@S.U.R.B.* *@siegecrossbow* *@Signalian* *@SpArK* *@TOPGUN* *@TruthSeeker* *@vostok*
> 
> *@Ark_Angel* *@CommandEleven* *@CPGS* *@denel* *@Desertfalcon* *@GlobalVillageSpace* *@Quwa* *@RadioactiveFriends* *@TheMightyBender* *@Tps43*
> 
> *@Aamir Hussain* *@ajpirzada* *@araz* *@Awesome* *@Chak Bamu* *@Dazzler* *@Dubious* *@EagleEyes* *@ThePatriotReport* *@UnitedPak* *@T-Faz* *@Sapper* *@roadrunner* *@RescueRanger* *@Rafael* *@Pfpilot* *@notorious_eagle* *@niaz* *@muse* *@mean_bird* *@Manticore* *@Kasrkin* *@Jungibaaz* *@Jabar 1* *@Icarus* *@HRK* *@Elmo* *@Emmie* *@fatman17* *@Awesome*



Thanks I will try to read this interesting article.

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## HRK

doorstar said:


> USER=32460]@HRK[/USER]


have already downloaded it and have started to read it ...

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## Counter-Errorist

Thanks for the interesting read. Some questions after reading it, if you don't mind:

- Raheel Sharif's success had significant contributions from Kayani laying out the foundation for COIN training. Would that be right?

- The article is 9 years old, so it doesn't cover the changes post-Modi. We have been fighting, training and getting equipped for COIN and internal security operations for over a decade. How does that affect our conventional warfighting capability against India? By no means I mean to say we're neglecting the east, but resources needed to be split to counter the two types of warfare.

- How do the lessons learnt from COIN operations aid our conventional training?

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## Kamikaze Pilot

jaibi said:


> I made this a while back on PDF but this article seems to have been taken offline for some reason. I think it's very important that we keep this learning alive and also have proof of our accomplishments like the articles that I recently wrote. Please, do give it a read if you're interested in how we dealt with the changing face of warfare and came out on top.
> 
> Thank you
> 
> *@dbc* *@PanzerKiel* *@Joe Shearer* *@That Guy* *@ghazi52* *@aziqbal* @bratava
> @*Casus Belli* *@dbc* *@F.O.X* *@forcetrip* *@Hakan* @haviZultan *@Indos* *@KAL-EL* *@MilSpec* *@Mugwop* *@Munir* *@Neutron* *@S.U.R.B.* *@siegecrossbow* *@Signalian* *@SpArK* *@TOPGUN* *@TruthSeeker* *@vostok*
> 
> *@Ark_Angel* *@CommandEleven* *@CPGS* *@denel* *@Desertfalcon* *@GlobalVillageSpace* *@Quwa* *@RadioactiveFriends* *@TheMightyBender* *@Tps43*
> 
> *@Aamir Hussain* *@ajpirzada* *@araz* *@Awesome* *@Chak Bamu* *@Dazzler* *@Dubious* *@EagleEyes* *@ThePatriotReport* *@UnitedPak* *@T-Faz* *@Sapper* *@roadrunner* *@RescueRanger* *@Rafael* *@Pfpilot* *@notorious_eagle* *@niaz* *@muse* *@mean_bird* *@Manticore* *@Kasrkin* *@Jungibaaz* *@Jabar 1* *@Icarus* *@HRK* *@Elmo* *@Emmie* *@fatman17* *@Awesome*


A military strategy thread and you haven't tagged @Aasimkhan or did I miss his name? 

- PRTP GWD

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## araz

jaibi said:


> I made this a while back on PDF but this article seems to have been taken offline for some reason. I think it's very important that we keep this learning alive and also have proof of our accomplishments like the articles that I recently wrote. Please, do give it a read if you're interested in how we dealt with the changing face of warfare and came out on top.
> 
> Thank you
> 
> *@dbc* *@PanzerKiel* *@Joe Shearer* *@That Guy* *@ghazi52* *@aziqbal* @bratava
> @*Casus Belli* *@dbc* *@F.O.X* *@forcetrip* *@Hakan* @haviZultan *@Indos* *@KAL-EL* *@MilSpec* *@Mugwop* *@Munir* *@Neutron* *@S.U.R.B.* *@siegecrossbow* *@Signalian* *@SpArK* *@TOPGUN* *@TruthSeeker* *@vostok*
> 
> *@Ark_Angel* *@CommandEleven* *@CPGS* *@denel* *@Desertfalcon* *@GlobalVillageSpace* *@Quwa* *@RadioactiveFriends* *@TheMightyBender* *@Tps43*
> 
> *@Aamir Hussain* *@ajpirzada* *@araz* *@Awesome* *@Chak Bamu* *@Dazzler* *@Dubious* *@EagleEyes* *@ThePatriotReport* *@UnitedPak* *@T-Faz* *@Sapper* *@roadrunner* *@RescueRanger* *@Rafael* *@Pfpilot* *@notorious_eagle* *@niaz* *@muse* *@mean_bird* *@Manticore* *@Kasrkin* *@Jungibaaz* *@Jabar 1* *@Icarus* *@HRK* *@Elmo* *@Emmie* *@fatman17* *@Awesome*


Thank you for the illuminating read. I do require time to read and digest it and work and a Mrs allergic to my spending time in " frivulous activities" do not help. However this is what I call "Den reading" and I will read and respond in due course.
A

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## bananarepublic

doorstar said:


> none of them that you "tagged" is coming because you've done it all incorrectly
> 
> @dbc @PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer @That Guy @ghazi52 @aziqbal @Bratva
> @Casus Belli @F.O.X @forcetrip @Hakan @Indos @KAL-EL @MilSpec @Mugwop @Munir @Neutron @S.U.R.B. @siegecrossbow @Signalian @SpArK @TOPGUN @TruthSeeker @vostok
> 
> @Ark_Angel @CommandEleven @CPGS @denel @Desertfalcon @GlobalVillageSpace @Quwa @RadioactiveFriends @TheMightyBender @Tps43
> 
> @Aamir Hussain @ajpirzada @araz @Awesome @Chak Bamu @Dazzler @Dubious @EagleEyes @ThePatriotReport @UnitedPak @T-Faz @Sapper @roadrunner @RescueRanger @Rafael @Pfpilot @notorious_eagle @niaz @muse @mean_bird @Manticore @Kasrkin @Jungibaaz @Jabar 1 @Icarus @HRK @Elmo @Emmie @fatman17 @Awesome



That was a wonderful piece
I got two important points out of it.
1)FC openly embraced American training and guidance,while PA was very reluctant to do so.
2)FC operated on a shoestring budget and still performed excellent.

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## fatman17

bananarepublic said:


> That was a wonderful piece
> I got two important points out of it.
> 1)FC openly embraced American training and guidance,while PA was very reluctant to do so.
> 2)FC operated on a shoestring budget and still performed excellent.


Due to Gen Tariq foresightedness.

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## doorstar

bananarepublic said:


> 1)FC openly embraced American training and guidance,while PA was very reluctant to do so.


correct


bananarepublic said:


> 2)FC operated on a shoestring budget and still performed excellent.


 not quite, leaflet/booklet though excellent is not complete. if I remember correctly Pakistan was almost penniless then. Poverty stricken PA was going around in toyotas and the terrorists had better and more weapons than them.

FC on the other hand was riding around in Hueys, could call in drones at will, was also partially manned by ex-army men from UK/USA (at the US expense). all weaponry including ammo was supplied by the US for free too

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## Counter-Errorist

bananarepublic said:


> 1)FC openly embraced American training and guidance,while PA was very reluctant to do so.


PA was rightfully wary of American intelligence recruitment attempts.

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## bananarepublic

doorstar said:


> correct
> not quite, leaflet/booklet though excellent is not complete. if I remember correctly Pakistan was almost penniless then. Poverty stricken PA was going around in toyotas and the terrorists had better and more weapons than them.
> 
> FC on the other hand was riding around in Hueys, could call in drones at will, was also partially manned by ex-army men from UK/USA (at the US expense). all weaponry including ammo was supplied by the US for free too



Well it does state that the helicopters provided were insufficient and more were needed. It clearly does state that the funds provided were wholly insufficient for FC. But under the leadership of Gen Tariq they were used at their best .While PA got plenty of Equipment i guess the materials were insufficient to mount an offensive all over tribal areas and swat on the same time.

I would like to read up on what training the Americans and allies provided to FC . not much is out there regarding it.



Counter-Errorist said:


> PA was rightfully wary of American intelligence recruitment attempts.



Understandable


fatman17 said:


> Due to Gen Tariq foresightedness.



He was probably a Godsend for the war, I dont know who could've done a better job in countering the militancy. Which in the book is rightly used by Gen Tariq to describe the menece in the tribals.

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## jaibi

Not my list, brother, took it from the TT forum but thank you. 


doorstar said:


> none of them that you "tagged" is coming because you've done it all incorrectly
> 
> @dbc @PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer @That Guy @ghazi52 @aziqbal @Bratva
> @Casus Belli @F.O.X @forcetrip @Hakan @Indos @KAL-EL @MilSpec @Mugwop @Munir @Neutron @S.U.R.B. @siegecrossbow @Signalian @SpArK @TOPGUN @TruthSeeker @vostok
> 
> @Ark_Angel @CommandEleven @CPGS @denel @Desertfalcon @GlobalVillageSpace @Quwa @RadioactiveFriends @TheMightyBender @Tps43
> 
> @Aamir Hussain @ajpirzada @araz @Awesome @Chak Bamu @Dazzler @Dubious @EagleEyes @ThePatriotReport @UnitedPak @T-Faz @Sapper @roadrunner @RescueRanger @Rafael @Pfpilot @notorious_eagle @niaz @muse @mean_bird @Manticore @Kasrkin @Jungibaaz @Jabar 1 @Icarus @HRK @Elmo @Emmie @fatman17 @Awesome



Sir, thank you  I dearly miss the old PDF where we were sharp with our ideas but soft with our words. I'm doing my best to bring it back. 


Joe Shearer said:


> Is it me dreaming or has PDF taken a sharp turn for the better?
> 
> Thanks, @jaibi. Have downloaded it, and will read it at leisure; just at the moment, I'm trying to get on top of the narrative of the 1965 conflict.



Sir, your views would be awesome to read. 


HRK said:


> have already downloaded it and have started to read it ...



My sincerest apologies. 


Bagheera said:


> A military strategy thread and you haven't tagged @Aasimkhan or did I miss his name?
> 
> - PRTP GWD



Sir ji, how have you been? It's nice to see you again, of course, I understand that all activities need HQ permission 


araz said:


> Thank you for the illuminating read. I do require time to read and digest it and work and a Mrs allergic to my spending time in " frivulous activities" do not help. However this is what I call "Den reading" and I will read and respond in due course.
> A



The role of Lt Gen Tariq Khan is instrumental in these changes at the time. The Army has focused more on developing FC since then. 


bananarepublic said:


> That was a wonderful piece
> I got two important points out of it.
> 1)FC openly embraced American training and guidance,while PA was very reluctant to do so.
> 2)FC operated on a shoestring budget and still performed excellent.



I'm going to try to get sir to give an interview for us and would run a post for questions that people would like to ask. 


bananarepublic said:


> Well it does state that the helicopters provided were insufficient and more were needed. It clearly does state that the funds provided were wholly insufficient for FC. But under the leadership of Gen Tariq they were used at their best .While PA got plenty of Equipment i guess the materials were insufficient to mount an offensive all over tribal areas and swat on the same time.
> 
> I would like to read up on what training the Americans and allies provided to FC . not much is out there regarding it.
> 
> 
> 
> Understandable
> 
> 
> He was probably a Godsend for the war, I dont know who could've done a better job in countering the militancy. Which in the book is rightly used by Gen Tariq to describe the menece in the tribals.



These are excellent questions, let me give you my answers but these are mine, please bear that in mind. 



Counter-Errorist said:


> Thanks for the interesting read. Some questions after reading it, if you don't mind:



To quite some degree, yes. However, Gen Raheel Sharif's direction towards engagement expanded the theater of engagement more so than Gen Kiyani's strategy but to a degree, you are correct in that assessment. 


> - Raheel Sharif's success had significant contributions from Kayani laying out the foundation for COIN training. Would that be right?



Compared to conventional engagements, these ones are tougher, for instance, just take a look at the US in Korea and then in Veitnam. Unconventional warfare or asymmetrical warfare is designed to exploit the weak areas of conventional armies and having a military well experienced in the latter makes it stronger, in my opinion. For instance, new recruits and freshly passed out officers were posted directly to these areas. There are entire courses which have yielded battle hardened officers and entries which have done so for soldiers. There is a huge component of the psychology of warfare which cannot be ignored and it cannot be taught. Since these young men have been forged in that fire they're better than the rest. This is something that has been acknowledged because no amount of training makes up for the real thing. 

Secondly, the forces of Pakistan also used their strengths to counter the enemy. Therefore, many units of the artillery and infantry especially have gotten increased proficiency in terms of operational versatility and engagement. Moreover, as you've seen we've never neglected the Eastern sector either, continuously getting better equipment and trying to maintain the balance of power as well. Therefore, I would say that these two types of warfare aren't necessarily so different that experience in one of them does not translate well into the experience of the other. As far as resources are concerned then that's always been our challenge but I think we navigated through it quite well, given the dynamics in place. 


> - The article is 9 years old, so it doesn't cover the changes post-Modi. We have been fighting, training and getting equipped for COIN and internal security operations for over a decade. How does that affect our conventional warfighting capability against India? By no means I mean to say we're neglecting the east, but resources needed to be split to counter the two types of warfare.



It teaches us to be creative with our equipment, foresighted with our strategy, versatile with our tactics and therefore increases our versatility overall. My response above has more details. 


> - How do the lessons learnt from COIN operations aid our conventional training?

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## Joe Shearer

jaibi said:


> Not my list, brother, took it from the TT forum but thank you.





All power to you. Just at the moment, I am concentrating on 65, but hope to read your PDF by Thursday or Friday.



> Sir, thank you  I dearly miss the old PDF where we were sharp with our ideas but soft with our words. I'm doing my best to bring it back.






> Sir, your views would be awesome to read.
> 
> 
> My sincerest apologies.
> 
> 
> Sir ji, how have you been? It's nice to see you again, of course, I understand that all activities need HQ permission
> 
> 
> The role of Lt Gen Tariq Khan is instrumental in these changes at the time. The Army has focused more on developing FC since then.
> 
> 
> I'm going to try to get sir to give an interview for us and would run a post for questions that people would like to ask.
> 
> 
> These are excellent questions, let me give you my answers but these are mine, please bear that in mind.
> 
> 
> 
> To quite some degree, yes. However, Gen Raheel Sharif's direction towards engagement expanded the theater of engagement more so than Gen Kiyani's strategy but to a degree, you are correct in that assessment.
> 
> 
> Compared to conventional engagements, these ones are tougher, for instance, just take a look at the US in Korea and then in Veitnam. Unconventional warfare or asymmetrical warfare is designed to exploit the weak areas of conventional armies and having a military well experienced in the latter makes it stronger, in my opinion. For instance, new recruits and freshly passed out officers were posted directly to these areas. There are entire courses which have yielded battle hardened officers and entries which have done so for soldiers. There is a huge component of the psychology of warfare which cannot be ignored and it cannot be taught. Since these young men have been forged in that fire they're better than the rest. This is something that has been acknowledged because no amount of training makes up for the real thing.
> 
> Secondly, the forces of Pakistan also used their strengths to counter the enemy. Therefore, many units of the artillery and infantry especially have gotten increased proficiency in terms of operational versatility and engagement. Moreover, as you've seen we've never neglected the Eastern sector either, continuously getting better equipment and trying to maintain the balance of power as well. Therefore, I would say that these two types of warfare aren't necessarily so different that experience in one of them does not translate well into the experience of the other. As far as resources are concerned then that's always been our challenge but I think we navigated through it quite well, given the dynamics in place.
> 
> 
> It teaches us to be creative with our equipment, foresighted with our strategy, versatile with our tactics and therefore increases our versatility overall. My response above has more details.

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## HRK

jaibi said:


> My sincerest apologies.


for what .... ???

I download it from your post and reading ....

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## Joe Shearer

HRK said:


> for what .... ???
> 
> I download it from your post and reading ....



Try reading his comments as relating to the post below the comment, rather than the usual practice of relating to the post above.

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## doorstar

HRK said:


> for what .... ???
> 
> I download it from your post and reading ....


this is for you 


jaibi said:


> Sir, your views would be awesome to read.

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## fatman17

The US imparted training in COIN to the FC, wing by wing. In the end 47 wings were trained by US advisors. This was a on the job training of sorts but the US advisors did not take part in the actual fighting (which they were keen to ). Gen Tariq was hands on, there are pics of him eating food with the soldiers, he was a hard task master and his command style was well liked by the FC as well as the US. He would've made a brilliant COAS, but unfortunately he also had a disdain for democracy, therefore overlooked.


bananarepublic said:


> Well it does state that the helicopters provided were insufficient and more were needed. It clearly does state that the funds provided were wholly insufficient for FC. But under the leadership of Gen Tariq they were used at their best .While PA got plenty of Equipment i guess the materials were insufficient to mount an offensive all over tribal areas and swat on the same time.
> 
> I would like to read up on what training the Americans and allies provided to FC . not much is out there regarding it.
> 
> 
> 
> Understandable
> 
> 
> He was probably a Godsend for the war, I dont know who could've done a better job in countering the militancy. Which in the book is rightly used by Gen Tariq to describe the menece in the tribals.

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## jaibi

Sir that story is a whole nother chapter 


fatman17 said:


> The US imparted training in COIN to the FC, wing by wing. In the end 47 wings were trained by US advisors. This was a on the job training of sorts but the US advisors did not take part in the actual fighting (which they were keen to ). Gen Tariq was hands on, there are pics of him eating food with the soldiers, he was a hard task master and his command style was well liked by the FC as well as the US. He would've made a brilliant COAS, but unfortunately he also had a disdain for democracy, therefore overlooked.



Sir, like @doorstar and @Joe Shearer clarified; my text for you was that reading your views would be awesome. 



HRK said:


> for what .... ???
> 
> I download it from your post and reading ....

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## Enigma SIG

Quite an illuminating read. This is very old though. I'd love to read more about recent successes. Also i'd like to know how PA is keeping it's conventional edge given the amount of resources it had to divert for COIN in the past few years.

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## HRK

jaibi said:


> Sir, like @doorstar and @Joe Shearer clarified; my text for you was that reading your views would be awesome.


OK completed the reading of this paper and honestly I find myself incapable to comment on most of the things as there are many things I noted as new to me, but I do have one query about the change of Training regime of PA which as per this paper has shifted focus from traditional security threats to non-traditional and unconventional threats so it mean the training and experience our new recruits have gathered is related to nontraditional or unconventional war, so 

Could this cause any negative impact on traditional warfighting capabilities of PA .... ??? *If yes *then what would be the extent .... ???

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## DESERT FIGHTER

Gen Tariq was also considered too pro USA.


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## jaibi

Sir, firstly, you should notice that the paper was published a decade ago so at the time what S. Nawaz is referring to as a shift in training was more emphasis on fluid field level command of the junior officers and subsequent focus on section based actions instead of the traditional training of just platoon level action. That was supplemented over the traditional training rather than just being a substitute of it. I would say that the balance was well kept as far as operational capabilities are concerned. 
Secondly, the army also geared up to have every fighting regiment (infantry, armour or arty) have field experience. I have talked to some other veterans from abroad and this seems to be a unique feature to us. It was always there to some degree but it's rock solid now. 
Thirdly, the training at PMA was geared towards creating fighting fit men from the get go. The traditional sense of learning via regimental joining was negated. Courses reported straight to the battlefield. 
Overall, I think that it has made us stronger in this regard rather than any compromise being done. 


HRK said:


> OK completed the reading of this paper and honestly I find myself incapable to comment on most of the things as there are many things I noted as new to me, but I do have one query about the change of Training regime of PA which as per this paper has shifted focus from traditional security threats to non-traditional and unconventional threats so it mean the training and experience our new recruits have gathered is related to nontraditional or unconventional war, so
> 
> Could this cause any negative impact on traditional warfighting capabilities of PA .... ??? *If yes *then what would be the extent .... ???



I would disagree with that opinion. 


DESERT FIGHTER said:


> Gen Tariq was also considered too pro USA.

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## DESERT FIGHTER

jaibi said:


> Sir, firstly, you should notice that the paper was published a decade ago so at the time what S. Nawaz is referring to as a shift in training was more emphasis on fluid field level command of the junior officers and subsequent focus on section based actions instead of the traditional training of just platoon level action. That was supplemented over the traditional training rather than just being a substitute of it. I would say that the balance was well kept as far as operational capabilities are concerned.
> Secondly, the army also geared up to have every fighting regiment (infantry, armour or arty) have field experience. I have talked to some other veterans from abroad and this seems to be a unique feature to us. It was always there to some degree but it's rock solid now.
> Thirdly, the training at PMA was geared towards creating fighting fit men from the get go. The traditional sense of learning via regimental joining was negated. Courses reported straight to the battlefield.
> Overall, I think that it has made us stronger in this regard rather than any compromise being done.
> 
> 
> I would disagree with that opinion.


Thats not really my opinion.


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## jaibi

I said I disagree with 'that' opinion. 


DESERT FIGHTER said:


> Thats not really my opinion.


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## Joe Shearer

jaibi said:


> Sir, firstly, you should notice that the paper was published a decade ago so at the time what S. Nawaz is referring to as a shift in training was more emphasis on fluid field level command of the junior officers and subsequent focus on section based actions instead of the traditional training of just platoon level action. That was supplemented over the traditional training rather than just being a substitute of it. I would say that the balance was well kept as far as operational capabilities are concerned.
> Secondly, the army also geared up to have every fighting regiment (infantry, armour or arty) have field experience. I have talked to some other veterans from abroad and this seems to be a unique feature to us. It was always there to some degree but it's rock solid now.



Dear Sir, 

I write from a position of personal disadvantage, and am forced to keep my comments brief; that may be welcome to most who suffer them in their more florid versions!

You might like to take a look at the RR - Rashtriya Rifles - formations in the Indian Army. In my view, these are double-edged swords. On the one hand, they encapsulate what you have summarised in your remarks above, but to a very well-developed form. It is of course not comparable; the prey of the RR is typically a handful - five or six, at the most - of militants who slip over, commit an event or two, and are then cornered, and take refuge in civilian buildings. Quite different from the formidable adversaries that your FC faces. However, in essence, it is the same, sans the helicopters and the armaments beyond the scope of an infantry section. 

The ill effects are also obvious. Our own version of General Tariq, with his disdain for democracy, but, in addition, a penchant for making totally unwanted remarks that exasperated everybody, including his own sometime seniors, rose to the top, superseding two very deserving candidates - the third such supersession in Indian military affairs - solely on the basis of his counter-insurgency experience. His civilian masters valued such experience very much more greatly than it deserved, given their own penchant for the use of unnecessary force; they obviously hoped, contrary to what ensued, for a wave of harsh and repressive military actions. He himself thereafter, as is only natural, favoured subordinates with this highly questionable counter-insurgency background, and that pushed down the combat experience or the combat orientation of other officers. We will now pay the price.

You are already aware of the deep resistance within Indian circles to the AFSPA, that permits the supersession of the provisions of the Army Act, preventing the use of the Army against citizens of India, and frees the Army and the Central Armed Police (CAPF) from judicial liability for deaths of civilians that occur during counter-insurgency actions. I do not know the situation in Pakistan or the laws that apply, but without this provision, there was absolutely no way for the military to act in support of the civil administration without violating judicial and legal boundaries, or without applying Martial Law, that in India is unthinkable. These provisions, first applied in the north-east, are being lifted one area at a time.

Please consider the RR experiment in your reviews.

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## jaibi

Sir, that's a very important point that you've raised if we are to analyse the COIN spirit de corps in a more generalized manner. I would love to work on this if you would be so kind as to help me with the reading materials and research? 


Joe Shearer said:


> Dear Sir,
> 
> I write from a position of personal disadvantage, and am forced to keep my comments brief; that may be welcome to most who suffer them in their more florid versions!
> 
> You might like to take a look at the RR - Rashtriya Rifles - formations in the Indian Army. In my view, these are double-edged swords. On the one hand, they encapsulate what you have summarised in your remarks above, but to a very well-developed form. It is of course not comparable; the prey of the RR is typically a handful - five or six, at the most - of militants who slip over, commit an event or two, and are then cornered, and take refuge in civilian buildings. Quite different from the formidable adversaries that your FC faces. However, in essence, it is the same, sans the helicopters and the armaments beyond the scope of an infantry section.
> 
> The ill effects are also obvious. Our own version of General Tariq, with his disdain for democracy, but, in addition, a penchant for making totally unwanted remarks that exasperated everybody, including his own sometime seniors, rose to the top, superseding two very deserving candidates - the third such supersession in Indian military affairs - solely on the basis of his counter-insurgency experience. His civilian masters valued such experience very much more greatly than it deserved, given their own penchant for the use of unnecessary force; they obviously hoped, contrary to what ensued, for a wave of harsh and repressive military actions. He himself thereafter, as is only natural, favoured subordinates with this highly questionable counter-insurgency background, and that pushed down the combat experience or the combat orientation of other officers. We will now pay the price.
> 
> You are already aware of the deep resistance within Indian circles to the AFSPA, that permits the supersession of the provisions of the Army Act, preventing the use of the Army against citizens of India, and frees the Army and the Central Armed Police (CAPF) from judicial liability for deaths of civilians that occur during counter-insurgency actions. I do not know the situation in Pakistan or the laws that apply, but without this provision, there was absolutely no way for the military to act in support of the civil administration without violating judicial and legal boundaries, or without applying Martial Law, that in India is unthinkable. These provisions, first applied in the north-east, are being lifted one area at a time.
> 
> Please consider the RR experiment in your reviews.


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## Joe Shearer

jaibi said:


> Sir, that's a very important point that you've raised if we are to analyse the COIN spirit de corps in a more generalized manner. I would love to work on this if you would be so kind as to help me with the reading materials and research?



Two things: before I lose face with PanzerKiel, I have to finish the 65 narrative. Second, I would like to rope in jbgt90. Can we return to this in, say, three or four days, say, Sunday next, July the 5th?

You are right, we should take this very seriously, and it is an important subject. Robert Thompson is an obvious starting point; my father followed him almost like a text.

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## jaibi

Let's please keep this thread for the subject at hand, please.


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## Joe Shearer

@meghdut

I am gathering material on Nagaland, and smaller campaigns against the Mizos, the Bodos, and the damned to hell Karbi Anglong; should I include anybody else in the north-east? The Kukis never seemed to have their heart in armed action. Should I talk about ULFA? Will you vet the material? It will be voluminous and will need serious condensation to make sense to a totally unfamiliar audience.

Apart from this, there is the Naxalite rising, and its splitting and survival of several split factions, and the police reactions to them, also the civilian reactions to them including the reactions of the Sangh Parivar and its elected governments.

The major difficulty is to present these to an audience completely unfamiliar with the issues, the struggle for management of land and the fluctuating demographics of the north-east, the enormous complexities of the campaigns in the forests.

Your thoughts?


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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> @meghdut
> 
> I am gathering material on Nagaland, and smaller campaigns against the Mizos, the Bodos, and the damned to hell Karbi Anglong; should I include anybody else in the north-east? The Kukis never seemed to have their heart in armed action. Should I talk about ULFA? Will you vet the material? It will be voluminous and will need serious condensation to make sense to a totally unfamiliar audience.
> 
> Apart from this, there is the Naxalite rising, and its splitting and survival of several split factions, and the police reactions to them, also the civilian reactions to them including the reactions of the Sangh Parivar and its elected governments.
> 
> The major difficulty is to present these to an audience completely unfamiliar with the issues, the struggle for management of land and the fluctuating demographics of the north-east, the enormous complexities of the campaigns in the forests.
> 
> Your thoughts?


I may be able to help, at least regarding ULFA and Bodo militancy. The rest I need to read up though. I got some material of course. So okay I’m in. Moreover some background to the e unique situations in NE which gave rise to militancy needs to be briefly summarised . And you have to include ULFA, they were a major part of it.

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> I may be able to help, at least regarding ULFA and Bodo militancy. The rest I need to read up though. I got some material of course. So okay I’m in. Moreover some background to the e unique situations in NE which gave rise to militancy needs to be briefly summarised . And you have to include ULFA, they were a major part of it.



The background is equally important; I agree. But at this moment, I am concentrating on gleaning data about military or armed operations.

Your help will be invaluable.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> The background is equally important; I agree. But at this moment, I am concentrating on gleaning data about military or armed operations.
> 
> Your help will be invaluable.


Brushing up my knowledge now. Will surely help.

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## meghdut

@Joe Shearer You may include UNLA and PLA of Manipur.


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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> @Joe Shearer You ma. y include UNLA and PLA of Manipur.



I mentioned the Kukis, and thereby got the cart before the horse. The original rebellion was Meitei; the Kukis got involved because the Nagalim people barged in and started creating trouble. That actually led to a lot of tiny little movements formed around the different tribes; we now have an alphabet soup, all of whom survive on highway extortion.


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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> I mentioned the Kukis, and thereby got the cart before the horse. The original rebellion was Meitei; the Kukis got involved because the Nagalim people barged in and started creating trouble. That actually led to a lot of tiny little movements formed around the different tribes; we now have an alphabet soup, all of whom survive on highway extortion.


As I’m reading it again I’m increasingly drawn to the conclusion that the whole Insurgency of the NE was a real bloody mess. One feeding on the other and growing, one fades out and another takes it’s place. Damn!


Joe Shearer said:


> all of whom survive on highway extortion.




Laldenga and MNF are a great example. And also ULFA. In fact every one of the so called freedom fighters of NE turned out to be protection rackets.

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Laldenga and MNF are a great example. And also ULFA. In fact every one of the so called freedom fighters of NE turned out to be protection rackets.



@Nilgiri 

That is what our friends, the East Asian fanboys, don't know - and they are not bothered to know. It's like another hero's invasion of India along the sea-coast using hovercraft, or his coup de main in Ladakh using paratroopers. Anything goes.



meghdut said:


> As I’m reading it again I’m increasingly drawn to the conclusion that the whole Insurgency of the NE was a real bloody mess. One feeding on the other and growing, one fades out and another takes it’s place. Damn!



IMHO, one major reason was people treating Assam and the Assamese as power-of-attorney holders for the Indian state, required to do the central government's duties for no extra charge, over a period and an area that was completely not manageable at the state level.

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## Nilgiri

Joe Shearer said:


> IMHO, one major reason was people treating Assam and the Assamese as power-of-attorney holders for the Indian state, required to do the central government's duties for no extra charge, over a period and an area that was completely not manageable at the state level.



Spot on. Basic implementation of law and order of the state is so crucial to everything else....in fact I would say it is THE crucial thing above all else.....because it in very basic way promotes and helps the good people and businesses of an area while showing them that the bad apples and criminals get clamped down upon.

If the orders of state cannot be enforced, well people (with biggest sticks in area) take matters into their own hands....it is never as good as proper govt but it happens regardless and inevitably.

A while back for example I was looking into more detail than before of how the US incorporated the ex-confederate states back into the union over a period of almost a decade (and longer) after the war itself ended.

There were even reversals that are not that well known about, everyone seems to assume the war just ended and everyone got on the path of reconstruction and redemption etc...

For example Georgia was admitted but quickly kicked back out for a while (to bring martial law and suspension of constitution till appropriate level of basic peace at least for the major organs of the federal govt was brought about so the constitution was implementable). It was finally admitted for good once this was deemed achieved. All this was driven by the grievous law and order situation. Many other ex-CSA states re-admittance was delayed for many years for same reason.

Often certain mobs targeted such people as judges and sheriffs (of all level of authority and their families too) dispensing the significant laws passed in the US during the civil war itself that were not implementable in the CSA during the war for obvious reasons.

The situation continues in large ways in much of US inner cities and ghettos....there are unpopular answers to be had to solve the issue...but they are not politically apt.

India situation with the N.E is different in many ways of course...but some similarities can be found. The problems are exacerbated somewhat by the largely non-contiguous nature of the basic geography setup with rest of India.

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## Joe Shearer

Nilgiri said:


> Spot on. Basic implementation of law and order of the state is so crucial to everything else....in fact I would say it is THE crucial thing above all else.....because it in very basic way promotes and helps the good people and businesses of an area while showing them that the bad apples and criminals get clamped down upon.
> 
> If the orders of state cannot be enforced, well people (with biggest sticks in area) take matters into their own hands....it is never as good as proper govt but it happens regardless and inevitably.
> 
> A while back for example I was looking into more detail than before of how the US incorporated the ex-confederate states back into the union over a period of almost a decade (and longer) after the war itself ended.
> 
> There were even reversals that are not that well known about, everyone seems to assume the war just ended and everyone got on the path of reconstruction and redemption etc...
> 
> For example Georgia was admitted but quickly kicked back out for a while (to bring martial law and suspension of constitution till appropriate level of basic peace at least for the major organs of the federal govt was brought about so the constitution was implementable). It was finally admitted for good once this was deemed achieved. All this was driven by the grievous law and order situation. Many other ex-CSA states re-admittance was delayed for many years for same reason.
> 
> Often certain mobs targeted such people as judges and sheriffs (of all level of authority and their families too) dispensing the significant laws passed in the US during the civil war itself that were not implementable in the CSA during the war for obvious reasons.
> 
> The situation continues in large ways in much of US inner cities and ghettos....there are unpopular answers to be had to solve the issue...but they are not politically apt.
> 
> India situation with the N.E is different in many ways of course...but some similarities can be found. The problems are exacerbated somewhat by the largely non-contiguous nature of the basic geography setup with rest of India.



I'm surprised - very pleasantly surprised - that you know about what was known from the opposite point of view as the 'carpetbagger' era in the American South. That was a fascinating period, and one in which law and order gained a notional control, but the social reins very, very quickly went back into the hands of white supremacists.

Today, this is Republican country; there was a time, when, remembering which party Abe Lincoln belonged to, most Southrons were Democrats. I've seen the change in my own life time, from the days of the infamous Huey Long to today's Ron deSantis (yes, I know he capitalises it differently).

Have you seen the movie "In the Heat of the Night"? I wouldn't point you at something obvious like "To Kill a Mockingbird" after our duel over the best actors in western cinema.

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## Nilgiri

Joe Shearer said:


> "In the Heat of the Night"?



They call me MR TIBBS.

My favourite Sidney Poitier movie overall.

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## Nilgiri

Joe Shearer said:


> I'm surprised - very pleasantly surprised - that you know about what was known from the opposite point of view as the 'carpetbagger' era in the American South.



I forgot to add joe, looking back now at how I approached many topics for study. 

There was definite injection points of influence early on (as a kid)....and with time I basically expanded my understanding and context outwards after I read about the subject "window" itself in strong enough intensity. 

This one it definitely went something like: 

1) Gone with the Wind (big favourite read and movie watch of my mom particularly, a movie we watched a number of times)...it was definitely the injection point of influence for me looking back. I still bring up the story and movie from time to time and give her bits of historical addendum to it....she most enjoys it.

2) Civil war more generally (which I know most intensely about, this subject really consumed me for a few years) and larger body of movies, culture, books etc tied to it. After the 20th century world wars (which had similar injection points in youth), I would know most about this one in my estimation.

3) Broader stuff before and after because you cannot really understand 2) without it.

4) Broader understanding of lingering currents....both direct and transmuted somewhat

I try to always tell people who have passion for something in history (or a lot or all of it in general) to do likewise....because eventually you will find some very noticeable common threads to current timeframe and it does add a certain personal satisfaction and higher understanding.


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## HalfMoon

It is time to balkanize India 

1) Muslim Country of Kashmir & Kargil
2) Buddhist Countries of Ladakh, Sikkim & Arunachal
3) Parsi countries of Mumbai & Pune
4) Christian Country of Goa
5) Muslim Country of Deccan and Malabar
6) Christian Countries of Andhra & Tamilnadu
7) Muslim Countries of Bengal and Assam
8) Sikh Country of Punjab
9) Jain Country of Kutch and Marwar
10) Dalit Country of Chatisgarh, Odissa and Jharkhand
11) Christian Country of Meghalaya, Mizoram & Nagaland


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