# India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results



## Nilgiri

A look into the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan to better understand the context of the current prevailing situation and the possibilities and probabilities of various hypothetical engagements to come.

The previous thread chains for reference (where ORBAT and analysis among some members commenced):

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-6#post-11197800

More recently (highlight of a newer thread of similar vein):

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334338

@Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @jbgt90 @Signalian @Gryphon @Cuirassier

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## Joe Shearer

Nilgiri said:


> A detailed look into the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan to better understand the context of the current prevailing situation and the possibilities and probabilities of various hypothetical engagements to come.
> 
> The previous thread chains for reference (where ORBAT and analysis among some members commenced):
> 
> https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-6#post-11197800
> 
> More recently:
> 
> https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-14#post-12341126
> 
> @Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @jbgt90 @Signalian @Gryphon @Cuirassier



At last! Where have you been?

How do we proceed? Kindly define the rules of engagement. Does someone do a brief note on the Indian view of the subject, the subject being 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999?

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## Nilgiri

We will tag more as they appear in previous tagging. 

I suggest prelude should be chronological as possible. Starting with first Kashmir war of 47/48.. Then moving on to other wars.

i.e sequentially I hope for this thread (as time progresses):

A) Chronological Prelude+context (48, 65, 71, 99 and any other engagements of note in between). I say we let panzerkiel and joe lead here (with relevant input here as people can contribute). I believe Panzerkiel has already commenced on this.

B) Further (esp current) analysis based on A.

C) Conclusions

D) I (or another) might write a final product, using all discussed here for the PDM magazine or similar. So there is something for easier reference for the general reader.

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## TsAr

@PanzerKiel you have infused a new life into this forum, keep up with your good work, you have also brought the Old @Joe Shearer back to life.

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## Joe Shearer

TsAr said:


> @PanzerKiel you have infused a new life into this forum, keep up with your good work, you have also brought the Old @Joe Shearer back to life.



He is inspiring, as are @Cuirassier, @Psychic and our own Castor and Pollux, @Gryphon and @Signalian. One who is beyond all praise or censure is a dean of this forum, and that is @fatman17. I can only hope that he looks in from time to time, and encourages us all.

Hope to catch up tomorrow. Time for my beauty sleep.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> At last! Where have you been?
> 
> How do we proceed? Kindly define the rules of engagement. Does someone do a brief note on the Indian view of the subject, the subject being 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999?


I'll do it
...

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## PDF

PanzerKiel said:


> I'll do it
> ...


Can't help but chuckle when seeing a Pakistani volunteering to to put Indian Point of view on the table (Although I have no doubt a gentleman like you will be sincere in presenting their pov). I must confess that the intellect rich participants as Joe above mentioned them discussing the subject in a tranquil atmosphere makes students like me excited.

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## Nilgiri

Hachiman said:


> Can't help but chuckle when seeing a Pakistani volunteering to to put Indian Point of view on the table (Although I have no doubt a gentleman like you will be sincere in presenting their pov). I must confess that the intellect rich participants as Joe above mentioned them discussing the subject in a tranquil atmosphere makes students like me excited.



Don't get too _excited_....yet 

FWIW, panzerkiel knows so much and has surprised me an immense amount already...and I'm just referring to the "Indian point of view" stuff he has brought to table so far.

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## PanzerKiel

Hachiman said:


> Can't help but chuckle when seeing a Pakistani volunteering to to put Indian Point of view on the table (Although I have no doubt a gentleman like you will be sincere in presenting their pov). I must confess that the intellect rich participants as Joe above mentioned them discussing the subject in a tranquil atmosphere makes students like me excited.



Putting the Indian point of view has some reasons....

It will give Indians some food for thought what they have been doing wrong in the conventional wars...

Conversely, it will give Pakistani readers some food for thought as well, that what sort of superior thought processes our predecessors in the Armed Forces had which enabled us to evade, prosper and ultimately become an atomic power as well, while living next to a hostile neighbor who fought all these conventional wars to eliminate us as a strategic threat.....despite being several times bigger, but could not do so.

Gentlemen, my whole argument would be revolving around a single point, that despite India having superiority of almost types since inception, why it has not been able to prevail over Pakistan in 48, 65 and 71...


This way, we’ll come to know some real, and of course hidden capabilities and limitations of both the sides, which will help us in drawing relevant conclusions for our present and future discussions.


We should start by defining “victory”?


Is it by the number of enemy killed? Then the Americans won in Vietnam, because they killed ten times as many Vietnamese as the Vietnamese killed Americans.


Is it by the amount of equipment destroyed? Then the Germans must have won World War 2, because they destroyed more tanks, ships, and aircraft of the allies than the reverse.


Is it by amount of territory captured? Then the Arabs lost the 1973 war because Egypt’ s gains across the canal were more than offset by Israel’s gains against Syria and in its counterattack across the canal.


Now clearly none of these propositions is correct. The Americans lost in Vietnam, the Germans lost World War 2, and the Israelis were defeated 1973.


Victory has to be defined not in terms of casualties or territory but in terms of a favorable strategic outcome- Where there is no such outcome even an ostensible stalemate can actually imply a defeat.



*Take 1947-48 first. *

What was India’s strategic aim? There seems to have been none, though a reasonable strategic aim would have been the recovery of Jammu and Kashmir and the elimination of Pakistan as a strategic threat.

Before the war started, India had all of Jammu and Kashmir. India started with all of Kashmir as legally acceded to India, but when the war ended in 1948, somehow India found itself with just all of Jammu, two-thirds of Srinagar, and one-third of the northern districts.

In 1949, India planned to recover its losses in Kashmir. India had over 400,000 men under arms at this time, three times more than Pakistan, as well as clear superiority in the air. It had taken Indian generals 16 long months to get the hang of things. But nonetheless not an unreasonable period considering the experience of other armies and hardly surprising seeing as the Indian Army at independence had only three brigadier rank officers with command experience.

Indian critics can say that Pakistan was even in worse shape, so how did it manage to hang on to meat i t had seized at the start? India, at least, got more or less 3-4 divisions complete and most of the logistics and training bases of the joint Indian Army. If India had three experienced brigadiers, Pakistan had none, and not even a division with any semblance of completeness.

The Indian army’s performance, or lack of performance, is irrelevant to this analysis. Point is, simply, that given its numerical superiority and the advantage of a long war, the Indian Army would eventually have prevailed and won back all of Kashmir. The spring offensive would have been launched in April 1949 and probably by September or October of that year the issue would have clinched irrevocably in India’s favour.

However, it was not to be, and a cease-fire-was rung down. Why?

Because Pandit Nehru that great and lovable leader India, gave in to his need to maintain his internationalist image as a man of reason, a man of peace, a man open to negotiate any issue….

Nowhere did he think that the division of Kashmir would cripple India in the years to come, physically and emotionally.



*Coming to 1965*

The United States had embargoed military supplies to both countries on the outbreak of war. As Pakistan was at least 70% equipped with American arms, this was a very severe blow. As India had perhaps 5% American arms, this was of absolutely no consequence. So no fresh supplies were reaching Pakistan with the possible exception of some minor, clandestine shipments from Iran.

It was the Americans’ practice to give its ally the capability of resisting an enemy attack for about two weeks. After that, should it be deemed necessary the US would arrive with its own forces. It’s allies were, in effect, to maintain just trip- wire forces.

With the Pakistanis running out of ammunition, but with India just getting into its stride, this was the time to press the attack and go for broke. The first of the mountain divisions from the northeast had come up. 23 Mountain Division and its lead brigade had just entered action on the outskirts of Lahore. Whereas Pakistan’s strength was declining, Indian strength was increasing.

Instead of stepping up the offensive, India again accepted a cease- fire, this time pressurized by the Soviets. And brave little Shastri, the man who surprised the Pakistanis by crossing the international frontier in retaliation for attack of Pakistan 12/7 Infantry Divisions at Chhamb- Akhnur, went to negotiate with Ayub Khan at Tashkent.

At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.

Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.

Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.

But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.

In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.

In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.

India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.

This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.

If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.

Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.

Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.

But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war.

*Coming to 1971 War*

It is believed that in the 1971 War, India had three vital objectives, of which only one was the capture of East Pakistan, ‘the other two’ were liberation of Azad Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan’s war potential for 20 years, thus establishing India’s supremacy once and for all.

It is also believed that with the East Pakistan captured, the Indian Government abandoned the other two objectives because of American pressure, and that the pressure itself was a bluff.


Consider some of the exhibits.

The IA had budgeted for 40,000 casualties, easily three times those incurred in two weeks of fighting. Obviously a longer war was expected.

Lt.-Gen. K.P. Candeth’s entire plan for the Sialkot sector, where India deployed five infantry divisions and three independent armored brigades, makes sense only if we assume that he intended XI and XV Corps to eliminate the entire Sialkot salient, prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir. In conjunction with frontal attacks by 19 and 25 Divisions in Kashmir, this would have cracked the front and AK would have fallen.

The IA Kashmir divisions more or less stood by defensively, letting the Pakistanis do the attacking. This makes no sense unless the idea was to let the Pakistanis expend their strength before India launched a counteroffensive.

Indian Southern Command launched a large, corps-sized force into Sind. Its objectives were exceptionally clear to cut the line of communication between Karachi and Lahore at two points, Hyderabad City and Rahim Yar Khan. The secondary objectives which we must not mistake for the primary ones, were to draw down Pakistani reserves from all over Pakistan, thus easing the task of Indian troops advancing in other sectors, and to occupy as much of Sind as possible, to exchange for possible losses elsewhere.

Indian XI Corps defending Punjab, with greater strength than the opposing Pakistan IV Corps, contented itself with a defensive role, making no move to attack Pakistan. This makes no sense unless we again say that the objective was to conserve IA strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses, allowing breakthroughs to made at other points, namely in the north by I and XV Corps and in the south by Southern Command.

Negotiations to end the fighting in the east were being mooted by Farman Ali, East Pakistan’ s governor, as early as December 10, after the fall of Jessore. By December 12 the process was in fall swing because it was clear that Pakistan could not hold out. *The cease-fire was signed on December 16. Yet every single major Indian formation from Ferojpur to Uri and its counterpart on Pakistan’s side was getting ready for major offensives on December 17 and 19. As the war in the east wound down, both sides planned to step up the war in the west.*

Pakistan had reduced its air sorties to the minimum required to defend its air bases. It had, from the start of the war, kept four squadrons in reserve. Concurrently, it avoided committing, it’s two armored divisions. Clearly, it was conserving forces for an anticipated long war.

Indian critics may say that Indian armed forces had no objectives in the West Pakistan.

If India lacked objectives in the west, why did India acted in a manner calculated to make the Pakistanis believe that India was about to attack there? India had crossed the international frontier in the east on November 21, 1971, without provoking a Pakistani attack in the west. Pakistan had, after all, realized right from 1947 that it could not defend its eastern wing without a counteroffensive in the west. So why did this counteroffensive not come on the 21st November? Clearly, that the Pakistanis, at least, were willing to separate the issue of war in the east and a possible response in the west.

Thus war in the west was avoidable. Clearly Pakistan hoped to avoid war, remaining quiet for 13 days while several Indian brigades established strong positions inside East Pakistan.

The notion of a sectorial war is rather siliy, unless you are the weaker power hoping to limit the scale of hostilities. A stronger power has no incentive for the sectorial approach. By fighting across the board, it prevents the adversary from lightly defending low threat sectors and concentrating in high threat ones.

Pakistan’s hope of limiting the war were certainly belied. Point is that Pakistan, after having sat quietly for a crucial 13 days, had had no interest in attacking first in the west, that too in such impulsive and ineffectual fashion, unless it aimed to preempt an Indian attack in the west.

There was no need for India to attack in the west just to prevent reinforcement of the east. Pakistan GHQ had already refused General Niazi’s requests for two more divisions when the magnitude of India’s build- up became clear. With only 12 divisions left in the west, including two (17 and 33 Divisions) raised in extremely hurried fashion, for Pakistan to further weaken the west by reinforcing the east was to tempt India into attacking. Further, the naval blockade of East Pakistan was already in place in November. Reinforcement from the air could have provided only troops with their individual weapons. And, had India found it necessary, it would have mounted an air blockade of the east after the war began on November 21. Remember, Pakistan was outnumbered about ten to one in the air in the east, which contributed significantly to the rapidity of Indian victory.

If Indian strategy was offensive-defensive, then why did they not also attack in Kashmir and Punjab, instead of limiting their offensive to the Pathankot sector ? This requires further amplification.

It may be easily accepted that India has to preempt Pakistan by attacking from Pathankot. The 50- kilometer deep corridor is too shallow to absorb a Pakistani first strike. Equally acceptable is the proposition that India must attack in the desert to obtain territory for further negotiation and to force dispersal of Pakistani reserves.

But then why did India not attack from Chhamb as well? Chhamb is so hard to hold that only an immediate, swift attack towards Marala can protect it. Just as India cannot prevent Pakistan from gaining some ground wherever it attacks, Pakistan must lose ground wherever India attacks. An offensive-defensive strategy requires for attacks all across the front.

Similarly, why did India not attack in the Punjab, particularly from Fazilka, and thus pre-empt the considerable Pakistani gains made by Pakistan’s 105 (1) Brigade? Even though India’s Foxtrot Sector held the equivalent of a reinforced division. In any case, Pakistan, with fewer troops, saw no reason to hold its hand and attacked immediately.

If Indian intention was offensive- defensive, when India had attacked the Sialkot sector in massive force, why they continued attacking? After having advanced 10-kilometers India could have simply dug in and let the Pakistanis bash their heads against Indians, as happened to Pakistan in Lahore in 1965, and to India in Khem Karan and Fazilka in 1965 and 1971 respectively.

Why did India not launch the armored division into Pakistan instead of waiting for Pakistan to launch its I Armored Division, thus conceding the initiative? The argument that using India’s strategic reserve would have left nothing to counter Pakistan’s Southern Strike Force is incorrect. If India was worried about this strike force, better to attack first, forcing its dissipation in defending his territory, then to wait for Pakistan to do the same to us. Besides, India had an armored brigade available to defend against Pakistan’s 1 armored division had India attack by I Armored Division gone seriously wrong.

It is senseless to say India must keep their strike force idle because they have to wait for Pakistan to strike, otherwise India won’t be able to hold off his strike force, and then assume Pakistan is not similarly constrained.

In short, it is clear that India was not following an offensive- defensive strategy

In Sind India followed an offensive-defensive strategy.

In Multan/Punjab India waited for Pakistan, to attack and bog itself down before moving. This was defensive-offensive.

In Sialkot, India had to attack no matter what strategy was involved, but India continued attacking even after ensuring the security of the Pathankot Corridor. This was offensive-offensive.

In Kashmir, India allowed letting Pakistan show its hand before striking. This was defensive-offensive.

There was, thus, no question of an offensive-defensive strategy.

To reiterate, had India not intended offensive objectives, India could merely have played along with the Pakistanis and continued lying passive in the west, something that also suited them.

Possibly this is insufficient to convince the skeptical reader who will demand a higher standard of proof. This reader will insist that as India had no intention to make strategic gains in the west, their failure to achieve these gains is no evidence of a defeat for India.

To meet these objections lets switch our argument.

A failure of Indian nerve can be said as the explanation for Indian failure to push the 1971 war to a logical conclusion. Those who disagree say since India had limited objectives which they achieved, the war did reach a logical conclusion.

If this is correct, then Indian strategic objectives were clearly faulty and that in retrospect, even their success ended up as a failure.

How does it make sense to fight the same opponent for the third time in 25 years, especially when he is inferior to you, and leave him with his war potential intact so that he can hope for another war?

The failure to include the recovery of Azad Kashmir in Indian strategic objectives is itself a confession of weakness.

And in as much as Bangladesh is today hostile, and Pakistan stronger than in 1971, even Indian limited objectives failed. It is instructive to remember that Pakistan had one division with four brigades against Eastern India. Bangladesh feels it necessary to have a 1,50,000 army now. There was one PAF fighter squadron in the east, and an insubstantial and transient naval presence. Bangladesh has atleast three times as many fighter planes and a permanent naval presence.

Which takes us back to our first point….how to define victory….??



PanzerKiel said:


> Putting the Indian point of view has some reasons....
> 
> It will give Indians some food for thought what they have been doing wrong in the conventional wars...
> 
> Conversely, it will give Pakistani readers some food for thought as well, that what sort of superior thought processes our predecessors in the Armed Forces had which enabled us to evade, prosper and ultimately become an atomic power as well, while living next to a hostile neighbor who fought all these conventional wars to eliminate us as a strategic threat.....despite being several times bigger, but could not do so.
> 
> Gentlemen, my whole argument would be revolving around a single point, that despite India having superiority of almost types since inception, why it has not been able to prevail over Pakistan in 48, 65 and 71...
> 
> 
> This way, we’ll come to know some real, and of course hidden capabilities and limitations of both the sides, which will help us in drawing relevant conclusions for our present and future discussions.
> 
> 
> We should start by defining “victory”?
> 
> 
> Is it by the number of enemy killed? Then the Americans won in Vietnam, because they killed ten times as many Vietnamese as the Vietnamese killed Americans.
> 
> 
> Is it by the amount of equipment destroyed? Then the Germans must have won World War 2, because they destroyed more tanks, ships, and aircraft of the allies than the reverse.
> 
> 
> Is it by amount of territory captured? Then the Arabs lost the 1973 war because Egypt’ s gains across the canal were more than offset by Israel’s gains against Syria and in its counterattack across the canal.
> 
> 
> Now clearly none of these propositions is correct. The Americans lost in Vietnam, the Germans lost World War 2, and the Israelis were defeated 1973.
> 
> 
> Victory has to be defined not in terms of casualties or territory but in terms of a favorable strategic outcome- Where there is no such outcome even an ostensible stalemate can actually imply a defeat.
> 
> 
> 
> *Take 1947-48 first. *
> 
> What was India’s strategic aim? There seems to have been none, though a reasonable strategic aim would have been the recovery of Jammu and Kashmir and the elimination of Pakistan as a strategic threat.
> 
> Before the war started, India had all of Jammu and Kashmir. India started with all of Kashmir as legally acceded to India, but when the war ended in 1948, somehow India found itself with just all of Jammu, two-thirds of Srinagar, and one-third of the northern districts.
> 
> In 1949, India planned to recover its losses in Kashmir. India had over 400,000 men under arms at this time, three times more than Pakistan, as well as clear superiority in the air. It had taken Indian generals 16 long months to get the hang of things. But nonetheless not an unreasonable period considering the experience of other armies and hardly surprising seeing as the Indian Army at independence had only three brigadier rank officers with command experience.
> 
> Indian critics can say that Pakistan was even in worse shape, so how did it manage to hang on to meat i t had seized at the start? India, at least, got more or less 3-4 divisions complete and most of the logistics and training bases of the joint Indian Army. If India had three experienced brigadiers, Pakistan had none, and not even a division with any semblance of completeness.
> 
> The Indian army’s performance, or lack of performance, is irrelevant to this analysis. Point is, simply, that given its numerical superiority and the advantage of a long war, the Indian Army would eventually have prevailed and won back all of Kashmir. The spring offensive would have been launched in April 1949 and probably by September or October of that year the issue would have clinched irrevocably in India’s favour.
> 
> However, it was not to be, and a cease-fire-was rung down. Why?
> 
> Because Pandit Nehru that great and lovable leader India, gave in to his need to maintain his internationalist image as a man of reason, a man of peace, a man open to negotiate any issue….
> 
> Nowhere did he think that the division of Kashmir would cripple India in the years to come, physically and emotionally.
> 
> 
> 
> *Coming to 1965*
> 
> The United States had embargoed military supplies to both countries on the outbreak of war. As Pakistan was at least 70% equipped with American arms, this was a very severe blow. As India had perhaps 5% American arms, this was of absolutely no consequence. So no fresh supplies were reaching Pakistan with the possible exception of some minor, clandestine shipments from Iran.
> 
> It was the Americans’ practice to give its ally the capability of resisting an enemy attack for about two weeks. After that, should it be deemed necessary the US would arrive with its own forces. It’s allies were, in effect, to maintain just trip- wire forces.
> 
> With the Pakistanis running out of ammunition, but with India just getting into its stride, this was the time to press the attack and go for broke. The first of the mountain divisions from the northeast had come up. 23 Mountain Division and its lead brigade had just entered action on the outskirts of Lahore. Whereas Pakistan’s strength was declining, Indian strength was increasing.
> 
> Instead of stepping up the offensive, India again accepted a cease- fire, this time pressurized by the Soviets. And brave little Shastri, the man who surprised the Pakistanis by crossing the international frontier in retaliation for attack of Pakistan 12/7 Infantry Divisions at Chhamb- Akhnur, went to negotiate with Ayub Khan at Tashkent.
> 
> At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.
> 
> Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.
> 
> Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.
> 
> But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.
> 
> In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.
> 
> In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.
> 
> India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.
> 
> This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.
> 
> If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.
> 
> Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.
> 
> Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.
> 
> But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war.
> 
> *Coming to 1971 War*
> 
> It is believed that in the 1971 War, India had three vital objectives, of which only one was the capture of East Pakistan, ‘the other two’ were liberation of Azad Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan’s war potential for 20 years, thus establishing India’s supremacy once and for all.
> 
> It is also believed that with the East Pakistan captured, the Indian Government abandoned the other two objectives because of American pressure, and that the pressure itself was a bluff.
> 
> 
> Consider some of the exhibits.
> 
> The IA had budgeted for 40,000 casualties, easily three times those incurred in two weeks of fighting. Obviously a longer war was expected.
> 
> Lt.-Gen. K.P. Candeth’s entire plan for the Sialkot sector, where India deployed five infantry divisions and three independent armored brigades, makes sense only if we assume that he intended XI and XV Corps to eliminate the entire Sialkot salient, prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir. In conjunction with frontal attacks by 19 and 25 Divisions in Kashmir, this would have cracked the front and AK would have fallen.
> 
> The IA Kashmir divisions more or less stood by defensively, letting the Pakistanis do the attacking. This makes no sense unless the idea was to let the Pakistanis expend their strength before India launched a counteroffensive.
> 
> Indian Southern Command launched a large, corps-sized force into Sind. Its objectives were exceptionally clear to cut the line of communication between Karachi and Lahore at two points, Hyderabad City and Rahim Yar Khan. The secondary objectives which we must not mistake for the primary ones, were to draw down Pakistani reserves from all over Pakistan, thus easing the task of Indian troops advancing in other sectors, and to occupy as much of Sind as possible, to exchange for possible losses elsewhere.
> 
> Indian XI Corps defending Punjab, with greater strength than the opposing Pakistan IV Corps, contented itself with a defensive role, making no move to attack Pakistan. This makes no sense unless we again say that the objective was to conserve IA strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses, allowing breakthroughs to made at other points, namely in the north by I and XV Corps and in the south by Southern Command.
> 
> Negotiations to end the fighting in the east were being mooted by Farman Ali, East Pakistan’ s governor, as early as December 10, after the fall of Jessore. By December 12 the process was in fall swing because it was clear that Pakistan could not hold out. *The cease-fire was signed on December 16. Yet every single major Indian formation from Ferojpur to Uri and its counterpart on Pakistan’s side was getting ready for major offensives on December 17 and 19. As the war in the east wound down, both sides planned to step up the war in the west.*
> 
> Pakistan had reduced its air sorties to the minimum required to defend its air bases. It had, from the start of the war, kept four squadrons in reserve. Concurrently, it avoided committing, it’s two armored divisions. Clearly, it was conserving forces for an anticipated long war.
> 
> Indian critics may say that Indian armed forces had no objectives in the West Pakistan.
> 
> If India lacked objectives in the west, why did India acted in a manner calculated to make the Pakistanis believe that India was about to attack there? India had crossed the international frontier in the east on November 21, 1971, without provoking a Pakistani attack in the west. Pakistan had, after all, realized right from 1947 that it could not defend its eastern wing without a counteroffensive in the west. So why did this counteroffensive not come on the 21st November? Clearly, that the Pakistanis, at least, were willing to separate the issue of war in the east and a possible response in the west.
> 
> Thus war in the west was avoidable. Clearly Pakistan hoped to avoid war, remaining quiet for 13 days while several Indian brigades established strong positions inside East Pakistan.
> 
> The notion of a sectorial war is rather siliy, unless you are the weaker power hoping to limit the scale of hostilities. A stronger power has no incentive for the sectorial approach. By fighting across the board, it prevents the adversary from lightly defending low threat sectors and concentrating in high threat ones.
> 
> Pakistan’s hope of limiting the war were certainly belied. Point is that Pakistan, after having sat quietly for a crucial 13 days, had had no interest in attacking first in the west, that too in such impulsive and ineffectual fashion, unless it aimed to preempt an Indian attack in the west.
> 
> There was no need for India to attack in the west just to prevent reinforcement of the east. Pakistan GHQ had already refused General Niazi’s requests for two more divisions when the magnitude of India’s build- up became clear. With only 12 divisions left in the west, including two (17 and 33 Divisions) raised in extremely hurried fashion, for Pakistan to further weaken the west by reinforcing the east was to tempt India into attacking. Further, the naval blockade of East Pakistan was already in place in November. Reinforcement from the air could have provided only troops with their individual weapons. And, had India found it necessary, it would have mounted an air blockade of the east after the war began on November 21. Remember, Pakistan was outnumbered about ten to one in the air in the east, which contributed significantly to the rapidity of Indian victory.
> 
> If Indian strategy was offensive-defensive, then why did they not also attack in Kashmir and Punjab, instead of limiting their offensive to the Pathankot sector ? This requires further amplification.
> 
> It may be easily accepted that India has to preempt Pakistan by attacking from Pathankot. The 50- kilometer deep corridor is too shallow to absorb a Pakistani first strike. Equally acceptable is the proposition that India must attack in the desert to obtain territory for further negotiation and to force dispersal of Pakistani reserves.
> 
> But then why did India not attack from Chhamb as well? Chhamb is so hard to hold that only an immediate, swift attack towards Marala can protect it. Just as India cannot prevent Pakistan from gaining some ground wherever it attacks, Pakistan must lose ground wherever India attacks. An offensive-defensive strategy requires for attacks all across the front.
> 
> Similarly, why did India not attack in the Punjab, particularly from Fazilka, and thus pre-empt the considerable Pakistani gains made by Pakistan’s 105 (1) Brigade? Even though India’s Foxtrot Sector held the equivalent of a reinforced division. In any case, Pakistan, with fewer troops, saw no reason to hold its hand and attacked immediately.
> 
> If Indian intention was offensive- defensive, when India had attacked the Sialkot sector in massive force, why they continued attacking? After having advanced 10-kilometers India could have simply dug in and let the Pakistanis bash their heads against Indians, as happened to Pakistan in Lahore in 1965, and to India in Khem Karan and Fazilka in 1965 and 1971 respectively.
> 
> Why did India not launch the armored division into Pakistan instead of waiting for Pakistan to launch its I Armored Division, thus conceding the initiative? The argument that using India’s strategic reserve would have left nothing to counter Pakistan’s Southern Strike Force is incorrect. If India was worried about this strike force, better to attack first, forcing its dissipation in defending his territory, then to wait for Pakistan to do the same to us. Besides, India had an armored brigade available to defend against Pakistan’s 1 armored division had India attack by I Armored Division gone seriously wrong.
> 
> It is senseless to say India must keep their strike force idle because they have to wait for Pakistan to strike, otherwise India won’t be able to hold off his strike force, and then assume Pakistan is not similarly constrained.
> 
> In short, it is clear that India was not following an offensive- defensive strategy
> 
> In Sind India followed an offensive-defensive strategy.
> 
> In Multan/Punjab India waited for Pakistan, to attack and bog itself down before moving. This was defensive-offensive.
> 
> In Sialkot, India had to attack no matter what strategy was involved, but India continued attacking even after ensuring the security of the Pathankot Corridor. This was offensive-offensive.
> 
> In Kashmir, India allowed letting Pakistan show its hand before striking. This was defensive-offensive.
> 
> There was, thus, no question of an offensive-defensive strategy.
> 
> To reiterate, had India not intended offensive objectives, India could merely have played along with the Pakistanis and continued lying passive in the west, something that also suited them.
> 
> Possibly this is insufficient to convince the skeptical reader who will demand a higher standard of proof. This reader will insist that as India had no intention to make strategic gains in the west, their failure to achieve these gains is no evidence of a defeat for India.
> 
> To meet these objections lets switch our argument.
> 
> A failure of Indian nerve can be said as the explanation for Indian failure to push the 1971 war to a logical conclusion. Those who disagree say since India had limited objectives which they achieved, the war did reach a logical conclusion.
> 
> If this is correct, then Indian strategic objectives were clearly faulty and that in retrospect, even their success ended up as a failure.
> 
> How does it make sense to fight the same opponent for the third time in 25 years, especially when he is inferior to you, and leave him with his war potential intact so that he can hope for another war?
> 
> The failure to include the recovery of Azad Kashmir in Indian strategic objectives is itself a confession of weakness.
> 
> And in as much as Bangladesh is today hostile, and Pakistan stronger than in 1971, even Indian limited objectives failed. It is instructive to remember that Pakistan had one division with four brigades against Eastern India. Bangladesh feels it necessary to have a 1,50,000 army now. There was one PAF fighter squadron in the east, and an insubstantial and transient naval presence. Bangladesh has atleast three times as many fighter planes and a permanent naval presence.
> 
> Which takes us back to our first point….how to define victory….??




I will discuss some choosen sectors, from both the wars, so as to give the readers as how both sides fought the wars in these specific sectors, of varied terrain

.....by today's evening....

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## Joe Shearer

Hachiman said:


> Can't help but chuckle when seeing a Pakistani volunteering to to put Indian Point of view on the table (Although I have no doubt a gentleman like you will be sincere in presenting their pov). I must confess that the intellect rich participants as Joe above mentioned them discussing the subject in a tranquil atmosphere makes students like me excited.



@PanzerKiel inspires trust. 

Only one of the doyens such as @fatman17, and members of genuine goodwill and deep knowledge such as @jbgt90 could have equalled his acceptability to all sides.

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## Joe Shearer

It is obviously preferable to deal with the accounts narrated by @PanzerKiel one by one; that is, 1947-48 first. That is regarding my own contribution to the excellent, insight-rich narrative provided; of course, others will want to say their say, and of course, they must.

I may need a few minutes. My tonsorial situation resembles that of a great empire entered into its years of decline. While the centre is barren and merely a recipient of disproportionate attention, the outlying areas are in wild disarray; if I were to turn up at the door of @PanzerKiel's staff quarters in this state, it would probably lead to a few coins being flung my way, along with a quiet but forceful invitation to step across and continue my solicitation in the next street. 

Another hour perhaps.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> *Take 1947-48 first. *
> 
> What was India’s strategic aim? There seems to have been none, though a reasonable strategic aim would have been the recovery of Jammu and Kashmir and the elimination of Pakistan as a strategic threat.
> 
> Before the war started, India had all of Jammu and Kashmir. India started with all of Kashmir as legally acceded to India, but when the war ended in 1948, somehow India found itself with just all of Jammu, two-thirds of Srinagar, and one-third of the northern districts.
> 
> In 1949, India planned to recover its losses in Kashmir. India had over 400,000 men under arms at this time, three times more than Pakistan, as well as clear superiority in the air. It had taken Indian generals 16 long months to get the hang of things. But nonetheless not an unreasonable period considering the experience of other armies and hardly surprising seeing as the Indian Army at independence had only three brigadier rank officers with command experience.
> 
> Indian critics can say that Pakistan was even in worse shape, so how did it manage to hang on to meat i t had seized at the start? India, at least, got more or less 3-4 divisions complete and most of the logistics and training bases of the joint Indian Army. If India had three experienced brigadiers, Pakistan had none, and not even a division with any semblance of completeness.
> 
> The Indian army’s performance, or lack of performance, is irrelevant to this analysis. Point is, simply, that given its numerical superiority and the advantage of a long war, the Indian Army would eventually have prevailed and won back all of Kashmir. The spring offensive would have been launched in April 1949 and probably by September or October of that year the issue would have clinched irrevocably in India’s favour.
> 
> However, it was not to be, and a cease-fire-was rung down. Why?
> 
> Because Pandit Nehru that great and lovable leader India, gave in to his need to maintain his internationalist image as a man of reason, a man of peace, a man open to negotiate any issue….
> 
> Nowhere did he think that the division of Kashmir would cripple India in the years to come, physically and emotionally.



@jbgt90 @Nilgiri

_A quick aside: I have never once in all these years come across such an insight into Nehru's probable reasons for going to the UN. Quite clearly, he gave in to his Bloomsbury instincts,and thought of the internationalist aspects of the situation, and, egged on by Dickie Mountbatten, that son of the United Nations (had he not just finished a stint as Supreme Allied Commander South-east Asia?), went to the UN. His initial feelings of righteous indignation were transformed into cold horror when, led by the most unexpected Argentina, a lobby against the Indian position formed. 

For enthusiasts of conspiracy theories, this was not due to Pakistani diplomacy, for Zaffrullah Khan was at that point of time still arguing unsuccessfully for equal treatment of the two new Dominions. The reasons for this development are unknown, and I can only think darkly about a Peronist country intent on snubbing the victorious allies by this act of contrariness. 

I have myself never put forward this argument, because the context never permitted it. It was either a defence of a dead man and his reputation against khaki chaddis who insisted that the Two Nation Theory was indeed the keystone to South Asian politics and policies, or against green chaddis who careened into action full-tilt, insisting that Nehru was another sly bania (he was neither) who planned the UN intervention to distract attention, and thereafter stalled any discussion leave alone implementation for decades.

But that has nothing to do with the military situation.
_



PanzerKiel said:


> *Take 1947-48 first.*
> 
> What was India’s strategic aim? There seems to have been none, though a reasonable strategic aim would have been the recovery of Jammu and Kashmir and the elimination of Pakistan as a strategic threat.



It seems reasonable to assume that the Indian strategic aim was to contain the fighting and to take out one problem at a time; at that time, the Indian leadership was as busy as the Pakistani leadership with the problems of the refugees, whose bitter wounds had to be assuaged first, busy also with the disposal of the case against the assassins of the Mahatma, and the establishment of proper relations between the central government and the provincial governments.

Instead of an overall strategic objective, there were several minor sub-objectives, each of which came up for attention in serial mode, rather than in parallel.

So the first objective was obviously to save Srinagar, and preserve the Vale intact; the second objective was to clear the strip of territory north and south of Muzaffarabad, and incidentally, to recover Poonch and Rajauri and Naushera, that were under siege or had been captured outright; the third objective was to relieve Leh; the fourth, an afterthought, was to take back whatever could be retrieved of Baltistan, where Skardu fell after a one-year siege, Kargil had been captured, and Zoji La was under Pakistani (to be precise, States Forces) occupation.



> Before the war started, India had all of Jammu and Kashmir. India started with all of Kashmir as legally acceded to India, but when the war ended in 1948, somehow India found itself with just all of Jammu, two-thirds of Srinagar, and one-third of the northern districts.
> 
> This, then, occupied the attention of Brigadier Atal, and Thimayya, and Brigadier Usman dealing with the Jammu territory; nobody in particular was looking at Skardu, and the recapture of Kargil and the forcing of Zoji La were considered good enough to stay content with. Big mistakes but made by people struggling to find their feet and take decisions where earlier they had carried out orders.
> 
> In 1949, India planned to recover its losses in Kashmir. India had over 400,000 men under arms at this time, three times more than Pakistan, as well as clear superiority in the air. It had taken Indian generals 16 long months to get the hang of things. But nonetheless not an unreasonable period considering the experience of other armies and hardly surprising seeing as the Indian Army at independence had only three brigadier rank officers with command experience.



Cariappa, Thimayya and who else? Atal was a brigadier, and so was Usman.



> Indian critics can say that Pakistan was even in worse shape, so how did it manage to hang on to meat i t had seized at the start? India, at least, got more or less 3-4 divisions complete and most of the logistics and training bases of the joint Indian Army. If India had three experienced brigadiers, Pakistan had none, and not even a division with any semblance of completeness.



Here it is necessary to point out what happened in the confused and blurred fighting before and during the induction of the Indian Army. This will follow in the next post.

(cont.)

The intention of this thread is to identify reasons why the Indian Army (and, in later conflicts, the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy) did not do as well as its numbers and organisation should have led it to do. To get there, the major time-lines need identification. 

This view assumes that three different 'pulses' animated the Pakistani congeries (no disrespect intended):

The revolt of the jagir of Poonch starting from June 1947, initiated by the Sudans, and supported later by tribal lashkars, and even later by regular Pakistan Army troops; this was opposed by State Forces first, that lost Muzaffarabad, then were besieged in Poonch, and lost Rajauri and Naoshera.
The influx of tribal lashkars, who joined up with the newly formed Azad Kashmir forces, and attacked Srinagar through Baramula; this was from October 22, 1947 onwards; they were opposed first by National Conference volunteers, then by State Forces, then by the regular Indian Army;
The mutiny of the Gilgit Scouts, led by the British citizen, Major Alexander Brown, in August 1947 (?), and their seizing control of Gilgit, ambushing and neutralising State Forces, and attacking down the roadways into Baltistan and onwards into Ladakh (Leh); they were supported by lashkars deputed to their support, but quickly dispensed with; they were opposed by the State Forces that held out in Skardu for a year without relief and reinforcement, and by the regular Indian Army, that opened up Zoji La, relieved Leh and re-captured Kargil.
So what were the lessons to be learnt from these events? (to be cont.)



> The Indian army’s performance, or lack of performance, is irrelevant to this analysis. Point is, simply, that given its numerical superiority and the advantage of a long war, the Indian Army would eventually have prevailed and won back all of Kashmir. The spring offensive would have been launched in April 1949 and probably by September or October of that year the issue would have clinched irrevocably in India’s favour.

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## Joe Shearer

Joe Shearer said:


> This view assumes that three different 'pulses' animated the Pakistani congeries (no disrespect intended):
> 
> The revolt of the jagir of Poonch starting from June 1947, initiated by the Sudans, and supported later by tribal lashkars, and even later by regular Pakistan Army troops; this was opposed by State Forces first, that lost Muzaffarabad, then were besieged in Poonch, and lost Rajauri and Naoshera.


Here the Indian Army found itself fighting an irregular army composed of military veterans who were fighting for their homes. It was small-unit fighting, on the whole; platoon against platoon, companies as higher units of command, small arms and machine guns being the main firepower, with the sharper commanders using mortars, and the occasional use of artillery, typically light artillery, mountain artillery. The decentralised control of the Azad Kashmir forces was a distinct advantage. They did not fight in a vacuum, however; the Pakistan Army provided wireless links (the Indian Navy picked up these messages but did not know where they originated, and did not know whom to inform in the Indian Army). So there was a central command and control framework, but highly decentralised battle management. Against this, the Indian Army fought on highly centralised patterns, where decisions were taken at higher than battalion level, typically at brigade level, and executed down the line; it was nowhere near as flexible as the opposing pattern of operations.

The terrain influenced these fierce, small-scale engagements. The battle was for gaining control of towns in valleys, or in the lower reaches of a hill-side; while one side occupied it, the other side fired upon it from the hills and the mountain tops. So Poonch was besieged, and in spite of several spirited efforts, the siege could not be lifted before strenuous efforts had been made. Siege-relieving parties struggled through the hills, and gained access; the transit was through narrow valleys studded with spots ideal for ambushes, and not hospitable to large bodies of men.

The siege-relieving parties that got through thereby were unable to clear the surrounding hills of the besieging forces. It required, in the light of hindsight, much larger forces to lift these sieges. Thus also Rajauri cost a lot of time to be recaptured; in that time, it was treated worse by the captors than had been the fate of Baramula. The surrounding and nearby Indian Army forces were helpless to intervene.

These were actions on the southern front in Western Jammu; the same thing was happening further north, where Gurez, Tithwal and Uri were cleared of opposing forces in fairly quick order.

Why was there a difference between the southern sector of Western Jammu and the northern sector?

One answer might lie in the fact that the bulk of the resistance to the Indian Army was from the Sudans, and they were strong in the Sudanuti area, south of Muzaffarabad. There was no concentration of home-based soldiers in the north.

That brings us to the question: is the Indian Army today able to fight these small-unit engagements? has it learnt its lessons? Is there any scope for improvement? Any scope for a fresh look at our doctrine for these operations? Are there commonalties with our situation in the east? (to be cont.)

PS: The present-day use of artillery has not been mentioned here, not due to oversight, but to compare the situation then with a fragment of the situation now.

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## Psychic

Starting with the First Kashmir War. A few thoughts which I would like to share about the *beginning of 47-48 Kashmir war prior to tribal invasion*....





*
Military Assets*
At the time of partition, Pakistan, in the words of Jinnah was "moth eaten". It also inherited a "moth-eaten" military.

The distribution of military assets was as follows:

Pakistan got 7 out of 46 training establishments.
All three command workshops for service of armour vehicles, radars repair and crystal cutting fell in India(Agra,Kirkee,Secundrabad).
Out of 40 ordinance depots only 5 small retail depots fell in Pakistan. Main depots were to support military effort in South East Asia during WW2 with major depots in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta.
3 out of 12 engineer store depots came in Pakistan.
3 out of 17 ordinance factories came in Pakistan.
In addition, Pakistan depended upon goodwill of the Indian side for transparent transfer of assets. Although Gen Bucher had given strict orders for fair transfer of assets, his subordinates decreased transfer of arms and ammunition and increased innocuous items to make up the tonnage (as per their own admittance).

*Military Disparity *

Armor Regiments: Pakistan(6), India(8)
Infantry Regiments: Pakistan(8), India(9)
Battalions: Pakistan(33)[mainly of reduced strength], India(88)

Artillery Regiments : Pakistan(8), India(40)
India also had Gorkha regiments(not subject to division)
Total: Pakistan(150,000), India(400,000)
Apart from British officers, senior level Pakistani officers with field rank were very few. Result was that some had to be promoted without them posessing the required capacity.

*Disposition of Pakistan Army*

GHQ at Rawalpindi.
7th Division at Rawalpindi
8th Division at Karachi/Quetta
9th Division at NWFP
10th Division at Lahore
14th Division at East-Pakistan
3rd Armoured at Brigade at Risalpur

*Poonch uprising
*
When Poonchis revolted against Maharaja's despotic rule, Sardar Ibrahim Khan met colonel Akbar Khan and requested 500 rifiles. Akbar, who was at the Weapons and Equipment Directorate GHQ diverted some 4000 rifles sanctioned for Punjab Police to Kashmiris. It was decided to support the uprising without involvment of Pakistani regulars as the apprehension of Maharaja opting for India grew. Kashmir in Indian hands meant leaving the sovereignty and existence of Pakistan at the mercy of India.
It was assumed that out of the nine infantry battalions of the Kashmir State Forces, Muslim soldiers (22%) would not oppose their Muslim brothers leaving roughly 7000 Maharaja's forces to contend with. Akbar Khan's plan titled "Armed Revolt in Kashmir" envisaged strengthening the Kashmiris internally and at the same time taking steps to prevent arrival of armed assistance(military or otherwise) from India.

*Initial Pakistani Plan*

Following were the major land routes from Pakistan and India to Kashmir:
1- Rawalpindi - Muree - Kohala - Muzaffarabad - Baramulla - Srinagar
2- Abottabad - Garhi Habibullah - Muzaffarabad - Baramulla - Srinagar
2- Sialkot - Jammu - Banihal pass - Srinagar
3- Kathua - Jammu - Akhnoor - Beri Pattan - Noashera - Mendhar - Poonch - Bagh

There were only two main routes that linked India to Jammu and Kashmir:
1- Kathua - Jammu road
* Kathua Jammu road was unmetalled road which could be intredicted by guerilla action all along the present LOC.​2- Srinagar Airport.
* The airport had to be rendered unuseable.​
Akbar Khan assigned Col Sher Khan from MI to assess the situation in Kashmir. As per Col Sher Khan's assessment, the maharaja’s decision to accede to India depended on Indian assurances of effective military support. This support, including equipment, ammunition, weapons, rations and supplies, could not be effectively given until the Pathankot-Kathua road became fit for Motorized Transport (MT). The earliest it was expected was towards the end of October, therefore, the declaration to opt for India was expected then.
The stories of killings in East Punjab and Kashmir were spreading among the Pashtun tribes and it was expected that they will likely be involved.
It was assessed that in the winter season, with large parts of Kashmir under snow and the locals with their limited food stock and severe weather will not be in a position to stage any serious trouble. It will also be very difficult for the tribesmen to go to their assistance in large numbers. Sher Khan's assesment was that Maharaja was well aware of this situation and thus might delay his announcement until the weather started changing.

His assesment was accurate.

Keeping the British officers out of planning, the Pakistani Prime Minister approved a plan for liberation of Kashmir. Akbar Khan assumed overall charge of operations under the alias General Tariq.


PanzerKiel said:


> The Indian army’s performance, or lack of performance, is irrelevant to this analysis. Point is, simply, that given its numerical superiority and the advantage of a long war, the Indian Army would eventually have prevailed and won back all of Kashmir. The spring offensive would have been launched in April 1949 and probably by September or October of that year the issue would have clinched irrevocably in India’s favour.
> 
> However, it was not to be, and a cease-fire-was rung down. Why?


Pakistani leadership also showed a lack of performance by not allowing PA to intervene till it was too late. All the main routes to Kashmir were within striking range of PA. Sure, the political complication of sending regulars without securing accession was already there but was it worth it to lose large chunks of land in Kashmir instead? It was only when the survival of Pakistan itself was threatened did the Pakistan Army half-heartedly intervene, but it did intervene nevertheless, and without invitation of Maharaja. The lack of boldness displayed by PM Liaqat and his associates by limiting the role of regular army and allowing the enemy to consolidate proved to be too expensive for Pakistan.

Prior to the consolidation of Indians in Kashmir, Pakistan could've delivered a knockout blow by taking advantage of the geography of the region and doing the following: Infiltrating trained regulars to render Srinagar airfield useless coupled with a concentrated attack with ample artillery and air support to cut Jammu road. The geography favored us. However, due to timidity of our leadership, that military simple solution to the problem could not be applied and instead we had to rely solely on Azad forces.

Then, once the Indian forces were engaged inside Kashmir, the opportunity to secure advantage before ceasefire was squandered; when PM called off Operation Venus and forbade 7th division from attacking Beri Pattan despite the enthusiasm of Iskender Mirza, Gen Tottenham and Habibullah. Further maneuvers around Jammu and Pathankot had the potential to threaten flanks of any force that might've attacked Lahore.
The plan to take Beri Pattan road with 7th division and sever Indian LC. As per Iskender Mirza, that would have allowed us to destroy or incapacitate at least five Indian Divisions.
Here is an interesting account from Habibullah Khan who was the GSO of commander 7th division:
_"Having served as liaison officer to the prime minister, Habibullah knew him and so took the call. ‘I distinctly remember the prime minister telling me: “Habibullah, we are getting Kashmir on a plate and if one Pakistani soldier is killed I would call it murder by you.’” Habibullah retorted with: ‘Sir, in human history how many territories have been given on a plate?’ Nevertheless, Habibullah was asked to call off the attack. Habibullah recalls calling 10 Brigade and 14 Para Brigade (under Sher Ali) to stand down. But ‘some gunner officer told me that the guns were charged and could not be unloaded without firing. I telephoned the GOC and he said, ‘Let the bastard have it!’ Each gun fired the round in its breach and some medium guns fired extra rounds also.’ The result was the blowing up of the Indian dump near the Beri Pattan bridge and damage to the bridge itself. The expected infantry attack that would have followed the artillery attack never materialized because of the government of Pakistan’s instructions. Interestingly, Sinha, who as then a junior officer on the Indian side, notes in his later book on the Kashmir operation that this was a typical Pakistan Army action: artillery fire without infantry attacks!"_

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## PanzerKiel

All are requested to please keep sharing your thoughts and analysis on 48, 65 and 71 wars. 

Do please keep the desired result in mind.... Deriving relevant conclusions. 

With this info in the backdrop, and of course readily available for reference in this thread, we'll be somewhat better equipped to take on as to what will happen in future.

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## PanzerKiel

_*Some thoughts regarding Indian plans to attack in the desert sector……*_


On a map, getting to Hyderabad (Sind) from Rajasthan is a simple problem. India may have 4 to 1 superiority in combat power on the ground, superiority in the air, and control of the sea, including a diversionary amphibious landing near Karachi. Along the southern axis of the arrow head thrust from Kokhrapar to Hyderabad is 250 kilometers as the crow flies. From Tanot to Rahim Yar Khan or Reti involves crossing 100 kilometers of Pakistan territory. Given a modest advance of 20 kilometers a day, some critics assume that something less than two weeks is perfectly adequate to cut Pakistan in two. Presumably, there will be Indian losses in the Punjab. But these will be more than compensated for by the immense gains in Sind.

In reality, for all India’s superiority of force, the situation is likely to prove quite different. To see this, we will need to examine a variety of different factors.

In one of India not very recent two-sided wargame, Blue advanced against Red at ten kilometers a day or about 70 kilometers for the attack phase. At 10 kilometers a day it might be possible to reach Rahim Yar Khan or Reti in 12 days, but Hyderabad would require a month.

Can the exercise results be replicated in combat? Particularly as Red was not played by troops specialized in this role. The pressures are all to show Blue in a favourable light and Red in an unfavorable one. If 10 kilometers a day was the exercise advance, in real life it will be less, at least until substantial attrition has occurred and Indian forces enjoy an irresistible advantage, At 1 to 5 kilometers a day, no objective on the Karachi- Lahore railroad can be cut in 12 days. India will capture large areas of sand, and nothing else.


*Problems of supplying Indian Strike Forces in Desert*

Can 13 divisions (1 and 21 Strike Corps, along with supporting attacks by 10 and 12 Corps, plus reserves standing by) be supported in the desert sector? This does not appear likely. Lets see a possible scenario.


· The northern end is anchored by X Corps with two large divisions, an (I) armored brigade and an (I) brigade a total of ten brigades.

· The middle is I and II Strike Corps with may be three armored, one mechanized, one RAMFOR, two RAPID and two infantry divisions plus one or two ( I ) brigades.

· The southern end is XII Corps with two divisions plus at least one (I) brigade.

· The naval component is an amphibious brigade to the west.


The amphibious brigade will be supported by the Navy by sea, so the army does not have to support it .


There should be no difficulty in supplying and supporting X Corps, as it will advance only a short distance from its bases, which are all located on rail heads.

The initial supply of XII Corps is not as simple, because there is only the rail head at Bhuj and the road network is minimal. Still, cross- country movement through the Kutch in winter should be possible along carefully reconnoitered routes, as the marshes would have dried up to a considerable extent.

It is the nine divisions with I and II Corps that are worrying. The supplies required for the war would have been laboriously assembled over the past four months through the rail heads at Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur. But this is a huge force, and that too over the worst terrain in any of the plains sectors. Moving the supplies forward and into Pakistan to support the advancing troops will prove almost impossible only some fraction of the troops can be supported, and this reduces the odds that Pakistan faces.

While the armored spearhead has full trans desert mobility, all the wheeled supply vehicles used for support and for the infantry divisions are limited in this respect. It is unclear if the supplies required for an entire corps can be moved along one or two temporary desert roads since normally, a railhead is required to support a corps.

We can estimate that each division will require for each day’s combat consumption a thousand tons a day for an armored/mechanized division and about half that for an infantry division. The usage of the divisions themselves may well be less, but when all the supporting troops are added, and as the distance from the forward dumps to the front increases with the advance, the logistical requirements increase.


It can be argued that a rapid advance reduces the supply requirement because fixed battles, so greedily demanding of artillery ammunition, are avoided. Against this, the lack of proper roads of any sort multiplies wastages in transport. For example, we know from the World War 2 North Africa experience that three times as much fuel is required as might be thought.

In the desert, limited off road mobility creates another problem. Any blockade of the road leads to blocking of all movement behind the block because possibilities of going around the obstruction are limited. On a road where supplies are competing with the infantry moving up behind the armored spearhead, the possibilities for confusion and a breakdown of all movement are only too obvious. And it is not as if the movement is one way: empty vehicles, evacuated equipment and units, and redeploying units will all be fighting for space.

And as yet no account has been taken of enemy resistance and interdiction which will compound the difficulties by a factor of ten.

It may safely be concluded that the possibilities for supporting nine divisions, including four fully armored and mechanized, and two partially so, are dim. It will not just be the lower priority infantry that will be limited by supply constraints, it will be the spearhead itself. This will reduce Indian margin of superiority against Pakistan.

*Problem of Air cover in the Desert*

In 1971 Pakistan used an adhoc force from 33 Division to attack from Rahim Yar Khan to throw off 12 Division’s attack. This force appears to have consisted of an armored regiment with T-59s and an accompanying infantry brigade. Though referred to as “Pakistan’s attempt at a lightning Israeli style thrust”’ it had no intention of holding any ground or even precipitating a major battle, only of throwing Indian 12 Division off stride and thus preventing the attack on Rahim Yar Khan aimed at cutting the Karachi Lahore rail line.

It succeeded in its aim, as Indian 12 Division never really got going after that, though it captured some insignificant areas. The division was, of course, very badly handled and there were other problems, such as bad intelligence which led the division to believe it had a good (by desert standards) road on which to advance to Reti, whereas only an indifferent track existed.

The contributory factors do not alter the situation that when lateral mobility is limited, a small force can completely throw out of gear a much larger force. Committing less than a brigade to neutralize a division, and that too in an action lasting less than three days, is not a bad investment.

Conversely, the Pakistani attack was held by a lone company of 23 Punjab with a couple of recoilless rifles till daybreak. Then six Hunters from the Armament Training Wing at Jamnager, deputed to Jaiselmer to provide air cover for 12 Division’s attacks began their action. In 30+ sorties over two days the Hunters caused the tank regiment heavy damage. The Hunters included two trainers with limited ordnance capability, and two of the combat Hunters became non- operational during the course of operations. The aircraft used only canon fire and rockets, no bombs, The Pakistani force withdrew in good order.

Doubtless there were special considerations here too: the P.A.F., for example, was largely absent during this time and the Pakistani force had no integral anti-aircraft cover. The example is nonetheless valid.

There are reasons for this. (1 ) Neither India nor Pakistan can really operate in the face of enemy air attacks and the absence of their own air cover. This is no reflection on their courage or their training: only armies with a very long history of working without air cover, such as the North Vietnam Army, can adequately acquit themselves in such circumstances, (2) Acquisition of ground targets in the desert is a most simple affair because of the dust moving vehicles kick up. The dust cloud from a brigade-sized force can be visible at upto 80 kilometers. The ground troops, in effect, solve the problem of target acquisition, a most difficult one in normal terrain, by marking themselves for all to see.

It is easy to see one of the reasons Pakistan was not overly worried about protecting Sind. It would have let India come well in, and then attacked the large, conspicuous Indian armored formations from the air. Because they would be advancing, the Indians would be especially vulnerable.

In South Western Air Command India’s bases are well back. Once Indian force advance any substantial distance into Pakistan, the armored spearheads will outrun their air cover and become helpless. Pakistan, on the other hand, has at least six, perhaps more, bases available in the area.

The I.A.F. has a simple strategy for dealing with the problem of enemy air over the Desert: suppress all relevant P.A.F. air bases in 72-hours, and keep them suppressed. The I.A.F.’s inability to provide extended air cover to the armored spearheads is then of no consequence: the P.A.F. will be in no position to fly, and the few sorties can be handled by the air defence groups.

In 1971 , the IAF quickly put out of commission the seven Pakistani fighter air fields in East Pakistan. It first put Dacca out of action. The airfield was repaired in four hours. The IAF then reattacked and this time the airfield was repaired in six hours. The third time the IAF caught the repair crews in the open killing or wounding about 80 men, and after the PAF simply gave up leaving Dacca permanently out of commission.

In 1971, the PAF failed to keep even one IAF base out of action for one day. Generally bases were repaired within 6 to 8 hours. Today the same would apply to IAF attacks on Pakistani air bases. The 1971 Eastern example is not relevant today. Against the lone fighter squadron based in the East Pakistan, India deployed ten combat squadrons and there was a huge disparity in performance between the F-86 and the IAF Su-7s and Mi G-21s. Today the PAF will fight at much lesser odds, not 10 to 1. When 16 aircraft had to protect seven fighter fields and the entire Eastern wing to boot we need not be surprised that India succeeded so easily. And even then Pakistan was still flying from Dacca as late as seven days into the war. If we reran the scenario with three F- 7 squadrons and two fights of F-16s defending against ten IAF squadrons we would get a totally different outcome. If runway attack techniques and weapons have increased lethality airfield repair techniques have also improved.


*Then comes the Pakistani Defence itself….*

It is worth examining the Pakistani defences against Indian Southern Command’s attack in 1971. India had two divisions, about four armored regiments, and perhaps two (I) brigade groups plus commandos and BSF troops. Pakistan had its 18 Division out of Hyderabad, plus probably at least two brigades of 33 Division in southern Punjab, perhaps two regiments of armor, Rangers and Mujahids.

India appears to have committed everything except one (I) brigade, so that Pakistan faced seven infantry brigades and four tank regiments. Yet Pakistan held India back with two partially committed brigades. Part of 51 Brigade at Naya Chor held back 11 Division. Part of one brigade from 33 Division opposed 12 Division in the Reti-Rahim Yar Khan area. So Pakistan had the equivalent of four brigades uncommitted.

The results are well known: after an initial long jump to Naya Chor, India was stalled throughout the war.

There were two reasons Pakistan could hold off the Indian attack with minimal force. (I) It was prepared to trade space for time and allow the Indian advance to over stretch itself, and (2) because of the adverse terrain Indian forces could not leave the single axis / road of advance in each sub-sector to maneuver around the defenders. So India may have had a division each at Naya Chor and Ranigarh, but actually only a brigade at a time could fight. Moreover, increasing numbers of troops were required to hold down the line of communications as India advanced, further reducing the number of troops available. In as much as Pakistan itself was limited by the desert, it could not make any effective or decisive counter attacks and so did not throw back the Indians.

The point is that a large Indian force was stuck in the desert a long way from home. Had Pakistan used its 1 Armored Division in this area instead of keeping it facing Indian Foxtrot Sector, and had air cover been available, India would have been pushed out with huge losses.

In such a situation, which could be repeated today, India’s 3-to- l superiority cannot be utilized. If Pakistan were to accept battle then we could grind it down until the 3-to-1 became 9-to-1. But it may not accept battle.

*The Pakistani defence of Shakergarh in 1971 is also an example of the power of a modern defence. *

India employed three divisions (36. 39, 54 Divisions) and three (I) armored brigades (2, 14, 16) against the Shakergarh salient. Pakistan had its 8 Division and 8 (I) Armored Brigade, committed to the defense itself, with substantial forces (most of 6 Armored Division, some of 17 division, and regrouped troops from the reinforce 23 Division) in reserve. But it is important to realize that essentially two brigades and an armored brigade kept the Indians down to 1 kilometer a day advance.

Indian pressure was telling on Pakistan by December 17, 1971. Had the war continued, the reserves would have had to be committed, especially if Shakergarh had fallen. But the war was not to continue, and in the two weeks of action, Pakistan most economically held back India.

On Pakistan’s side perhaps four armoured regiments and about seven or eight infantry battalions were defending. This gives a combat power of about 20. On India’s side there were about ten armored regiments, and perhaps 21+ infantry battalions, say a combat power of 50+. (36 Division was missing two brigades in the Shakergarh operations so only 21+ battalions were available.) Squaring the two sides we get 400 for Pakistan vs. 2500 for India, or a six-to one superiority for India. Yet there was no rapid advance. Good knowledge of the terrain mattered a lot. Moreover Pakistan was also greatly aided by fixed defences and an interior area of battle.


*A word about 1971 Indian Campaign against East Pakistan*

This campaign can provide no guide to the future for the following reasons.


· Pakistan was morally on the defensive, and its troops were exhausted after a 9-month civil war. All the excesses of the civil war and counter insurgency told on their morale, their training, and their professionalism.

· The entire world community was against Pakistan in 1971 because of the excesses of the civil war. This told heavily on the national morale.

· East Pakistan was completely cut off by the Indian armed forces. There was neither any hope of reinforcement nor of escape. But in present day, Pakistan can expect to obtain essential war material, perhaps even troops, from fraternal countries. If India would attack Pakistan, for once the United States might well have permitted shipment of some war material from third countries. Both these factors would tremendously boost Pakistani morale.

· India had no intelligence problem as the locals came forward at each and every point to inform the attackers about the exact dispositions of the enemy. India also had several tens of thousands of locals, in the Mukti Bahini, fighting alongside. By themselves the Mukti Bahini was not a particularly impressive force. But combined with the regular Indian Army, it made an invaluable contribution. But in present day, doubtless India would have found locals to aid its cause, but nothing even remotely approaching the scale of support evidenced in East Pakistan, 1971, is conceivable. And conversely. Pakistan would have found local support in Kashmir, perhaps even in the Punjab.

· India had air supremacy. But today, India would have had to fight on the traditional odds of maybe 3 to 1 against PAF. In a short war, Pakistan would be able to neutralize the IAF.

· India’s initial strategy required seizing a narrow area around East Pakistan so that the independent republic could be declared. Lt.Gen. A. A.K. Niazi, who had excellent information, accordingly had deployed his forces all along the border. He could not afford to give up any terrain, because even a thousand square kilometers was sufficient for Indies purpose. This inflexibility, this attempt to defend everything simultaneously, predictably ended up with General Niazi defending nothing. Worse, when the Indians changed their strategy and decided to go for Dacca itself, the Pakistanis had no reserves to counter the new plan. However, now, Pakistan would have had plenty of ground to give up. Indian troops would be fighting blind inside Pakistan, because there would be no Mukti Bahini and hundreds of thousands of locals to help.

· This list of differences in the situation in East Pakistan, 1971, and today, is not exhaustive. But it suffices to make the point.







*A few additional points regarding 1971 war*

Analysing the 1971 war presents special problems because no access is available to the actual Indian strategic plan used for the west.

Consider, nonetheless, the situation in the west as of December 16, 1971 while the cease-fire in the east was being signed.

Pakistan had 12 divisions in the west, disposed as follows: Uri—Tithwal sector : 12 Division (over strength)

Poonch—Akhnur sector : 23 Division (over strength)


Sialkot sector : 8 and 15 Divisions, 2 and 8 (I)

Armored Brigades, elements of 6 Armored Division

Lahore sector : 10 and 11 Divisions, 3 (1) Armored Brigade

Sind/Multan : 18 and 33 Divisions

Southern. Strike Force : 1 Armored and 7 Division

Northern Strike Force : 6 Armored Division(-) and one third of 17 Division.

The Northern Strike Force was held up trying to slow the Indian drive on Shakergarh town and was not free for action elsewhere. One brigade of 6 Armored Division was already engaged on the Basanter River against Indian 16 (I) Armored Brigade, a clash between several squadrons on each side, wrongly described by an over-enthusiastic Indian press as the biggest tank battle since World War 2. 17 Division had already given up brigades to 23 Division for the Chhamb assault and to IV Corps (Lahore) to strengthen the defences there. It had only one uncommitted brigade left. Since the Indians were grinding forward by sheer force, not only would all of the remaining Northern Strike Force become committed, troops would have had to be pulled down from Kashmir and up from Lahore to hold the Indian attack once Shakergarh fell.

Pakistan’s only free reserves at this time were in the Southern Strike Force. The 1 Armored and 7 Divisions were fresh and uncommitted Nominally, 33 Division was also under this force, but it had detached a brigade for Sind, to aid 18 Division, and another was reinforcing the Multan sector defences, held primarily by 105 (I) and 25 (I) Brigades from Suliemanke and Bahawalpur respectively.

Now consider India’s line up

North: 3 Division at Leh, with two brigades to spare

Uri—Tithwal : 19 Division, almost equal in size to Pakistan 12 Division

Poonch—Rajouri— Mendhar: 25 Division (over strength). Two other brigades on the line north of Akhnur.

Akhnur—Jammu: 10 Division (over strength) and 26 Division, 3 (I) Armored Brigade

Sialkot: 36, 39, 54 Divisions, with 2, 14 and 16 (I) Brigades

Amritsar—Ferozepur: 7, 14 and 15 Divisions plus an armored brigade

Fazilka: Foxtrot Sector: 1 Armored Division plus three brigades

Desert: 11 and 12 Divisions plus two brigades

To summarize, India had 15 divisions of which one (3 Division out of Leh) was partially oriented towards China, to Pakistan’s 12. Pakistan’s Southern Strike Force was intact, and it was slightly better off in that Indian answer to it (1 Armored and 9 Divisions of Indian Army) was not a homogeneous or a cross trained force. HQ 1 Corps, which controlled the two Indian divisions on the date of the eastern cease-fire had actually come back to the west after having spent the better part of the year in Eastern Command, preparing for, and then participating in the Bangladesh campaign. 9 Division was normally based at Ranchi as a counter to Pakistan’s 14 Division in the East.

Against that however, India’s Foxtrot Sector held more than a division’s worth of troops. A lot of India’s strength just does not show up as divisions, but it is viable combat strength anyway.

The Indian Army has always obtained fewer divisions for a given number of men than Pakistan because (1) Indian territory is larger, implying more line of communication troops and (2) India tends to have an enormous number of less than division sized units, such as independent brigades, independent battalions, and ad hoc task forces.

For example, though officially India had four armored brigades during the 1971 war, actually it had 5, because one ad hoc brigade was constituted from spare odds and ends. These were available to Indian army because it had more armored regiments than Pakistan.

Similarly Foxtrot Sector was actually a division plus, though it did not appear as such because it was not given a divisional flag. In the western armies it would have been given a divisional number so that at least the Army would not confuse itself.

The GOC Foxtrot Sector was a Major General. He had under his command or available to him 67 (I) Brigade at Fazilka, 51 Parachute Brigade at Ganganagar, and 163 Brigade out of Leh at Suratgarh. Additionally he had an ad hoc force consisting of three engineer regiments and two infantry battalions at Abohar (though General Candeth says it was one, not two infantry battalions). This is not a recommended use of engineers, a scarce and precious commodity in a shooting war, but being fully trained as infantry, in emergencies they can be so used.

If we can examine the map on the outbreak of war we would see the odd brigade or two and Indian 1 Armored Division in the Fazilka Abohar area, whereas on Pakistan’s side was its full II Corps out of Multan with 1 Armored and 33 Divisions. So the situation would have appeared much to India’s disadvantage, particularly because the front here is wide open to large-scale armored movement.

During the war, when Pakistan 7 Division failed to appear in the J and K sectors, its normal war station, there was alarm in Western Command: this division could have moved southward to join Pakistan II Corps, to make a powerful force for an attack, against Fazilka southward, thus neutralizing India’s Sialkot push.

Now consider the way events in battle wreck the best laid plans. With 7 Division joining Pakistan II Corps, India was at a definite disadvantage. But when Pakistan learned of Indian 12 Divisions proposed attack towards Islamgarh and Tanot, it faced a serious problemsince against India’s desert force of two divisions and two independent brigades it had available only one division out of Hyderabad.

Pakistan’s 16 Division was earmarked as a reserve for this vast sector, but 16 division was in East Pakistan sent there in March 1971 to help stem the revolt. 33 Division bad been hurriedly raised in a period of six months to replace this division. It had, however, to do dual duty as a reserve and as a partner to 1 Armored Division. A brigade from it was detached to throw off the attack of Indian 12 Division. Then a brigade went to reinforce Pakistan 18 Division which was slowly giving way against Indian 11 Division’s advance along the Khokrapar-Naya Chor axis.

So we may guess that Pakistan 7 Division, trained for years to operate in Kashmir, had to be sent southward to face Foxtrot Sector. The Army may not have wanted the Indian public to see a division on Foxtrot Sector, but Pakistan GHQ saw it and a vital reinforcement for Poonch was diverted. This had its repercussions in Poonch sector where the Pakistan Army failed to break through despite much effort. 7 Division’ would have made the difference between stalemate and victory.

This microcosm of deployments and counter deployments is illustrative.

By December 16, 1971 the actual situation on the ground after the induction of HQ 9 Division and three brigades from the east, was more like 16 Indian divisions to Pakistan’s 12.
Therefore, at the time of the eastern ceasefire, India had a clear superiority in the west, partially because it had started moving troops from the eastern to the western theatre. Thus, India was quite capable of continuing the war.

Further reinforcements would have come if required: chief among these were 4 Division and 6 Division. (4 Division has always been part of the general reserves available to the Indian Army and 6 Division, while nominally assigned to the western UP broder, is always available to the west because the terrain in its area is so extreme that a single independent brigade can protect the area.)

Additional to these two divisions were two more: 8 and 57 Divisions, the Northeast counter-insurgency formations, which had participated in the war as part of IV Corps on East Pakistan’s easternmost flank.

Undoubtedly time was needed to shift them to the west. India did a fairly efficient job of rapidly transferring about 20,000 troops from HQ II Corps, HQ 9 Division, three brigades, plus tank and artillery regiments. At most three weeks would have been required for shifting four additional divisions.

With the equivalent of India’s 20 divisions to Pakistan’s 12 the war in the west could have been over in the short order.

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## Joe Shearer

This is a note sent to me by one of the finest young minds on this forum, in private. I reproduce it without his permission because of the value of the note. To protect his privacy, I omit his name.

_Joe if you would the role of Nehru is pretty hard to criticize. Leaders evolve with what they experience. A leader at peace time would struggle to lead in a war just like a leader at wartime would struggle to lead in peace. This has never been more proven than with the fact that Churchill was the British war hero who led the British to victory but was removed bcz he was not seen as an effective peace time leader. The military leadership of both countries blames the civilian leadership of that time however the leaders were product of their experience. India and Pakistan had largely won their independence through peaceful non violent efforts and through logical arguments. What the US needed mobilization to beat the super power of the world to earn their independence, india and Pakistan had done it through peaceful events, even if it was against a dead power. Nehru,Gandhi, Jinnah, liaqat, bacha khan, all of them were non violent in nature and believed in peaceful but firm resolution. They had carved large countries through this method. On that day when they succeeded, in their minds one thing was set that the world is now going to be non violent and the war to end all wars had actually ended all wars after all they didn't need to mobilize the masses to arms and fight city after city for their independence against a ruthless empire. What the British took a hundred years of violence to achieve, they had done it through a few decades of non violence thus non violence is the answer and peaceful resolutions will eventually solve the problems... This is the environment they were formed in, groomed in and succeeded in and nothing evolves your ideology more than success.
[16:17]
Then a month later they faced a massive conundrum. They faced war when nehru was talking about whether an army is needed or not and Jinnah was talking about india and Pakistan being like US and Canada. In these times, it was the military leadership that was aware since wars had groomed them. It was yahya khan during a celebration held by British at Quetta ta barracks had asked his superiors as to what they were celebrating since now rather than becoming a super power, the two nations will fight forever. This was in august 1947,
[16:18]
So joe when the opportunity to take Kashmir by force came, Pakistani leadership was found sleeping and wanting and same happened in junagad and Hyderabad. There was no desire to fight a war bcz war was not in their blood. Was it not habitullah who was told that that Kashmir was coming to Pakistan on a plate. There is a reason behind that statement. Its bcz they got such huge lands without spilling countless blood on it bar partition violence. They didn't have to fight decades of war like other nations did. They just didn't thus in that environment india and Pakistan found themselves in a state of war. What do you expect them to do? Of course they would mess up or underestimate the situation.
[16:18]
Nehru went to UN bcz his entire life had proven that conflicts can be resolved on table and conflicts can solved. He went to the UN since peace and non conflict had given them Pakistan and india so what is kashmir to that.
[16:18]
Leaders of peace and leaders of war are two different breeds just like how hasbrudal the splendid was different from Hannibal and hamilcar
[16:18]
He could make calls Hannibal couldnt and Hannibal could make calls hasbrudal couldn't. Pakistan and india found itself in a war with the two peaceful leaders the region had ever seen.
[16:19]
And there is the entire understanding as to why the leadership was found wanting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_
I just received this stunningly brilliant post-script. It is a must-read!

Once you have read it and digested it, sit back and ponder on this - this is a Pakistani member in his 30s! who is 28 and will be 29 this September.
_---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now that I think about it there is another example and a far closer home one. Faqir of ippi and bacha khan. Both of them were not happy with Pakistan and both of then were the same ethnicity no why did one raise weapons against Pakistan whereas the other led khudai khidmatgars on peaceful protests? Bcz both were products of their environment. Both were charismatic, had their set of followers and both stuck to their belief. Faqir of ippi, who had experienced war and fight with British his entire life to secure the freedom of roh did the exact same action against Pakistan that he had done against the British his entire life. He took up arms whereas bacha khan did what he had done his entire life which was protest peacefully. Could you imagine faqir of ippi sitting in a protest in Waziristan and bacha khan telling khudai khidmatgars to pick up arms. The reason bcz their life experience told them that their respective methods are efficient. Both of them had the same goal which was to push out Pakistan but they employed different ideals which they had done their entire lives and they had both found success in it in their experience. Same story happened with nehru or Jinnah. All were signing standstill agreements rather than sending army convoys. We did the same in Baluchistan. Signed standstill agreements. I mean Jinnah was arguing with khan of kalat like a lawyer on how Quetta is under the domain of Pakistan since Pakistan is a successor state of British in international law and thus inherited the treaties that British signed. Can you imagine the likes Chang ki shaik, Mao, or even Lenin or Trotsky or let's take a more close example, faqir of ippi doing that?
[19:16]
*so
[19:19]
The reason why Jinnah was doing that because that is how he had done it with British and Congress his entire life. Cabinet mission being torn apart by lawyers. The reason why Jinnah didn't move a finger to Hyderabad was bcz in his eyes Hyderabad was a separate legal state whose annexation or non annexation was no concern of Pakistan apart from belligerence of a neighbor.
[19:20]
Why would Pakistan send its army to save an area that is legally a separate state? Why even would Pakistan itself try to annex it even? Wouldn't that break international law? He thought like a lawyer with legal senses and India annexed Hyderabad simple.
[19:22]
Nehru was a peaceful protestor with Gandhi. Both of them simply did what they did their entire life. Protest in front of the world how they are wronged.
[19:23]
Liaqat did the same thing. The moment the war got 40km away from Pakistan territory, they agreed to a ceasefire and decided to protest in front of the world how they are wronged
[19:25]
Leaders are products of their environment just like you and I are joe. The difference is that they are far better,dedicated products with a vision. They may not always succeed. Some of the most charismatic leaders in history have failed but they were human. Chiseled by the experience that thought them, the environment that moulded them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_
@Nilgiri @jbgt90 @Naofumi @xeuss@BL33D

@PanzerKiel @TsAr @El Observer @JamD @Psychic @phantom @Gryphon @Signalian

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## Naofumi

Joe Shearer said:


> This is a note sent to me by one of the finest young minds on this forum, in private. I reproduce it without his permission because of the value of the note. To protect his privacy, I omit his name.
> 
> _Joe if you would the role of Nehru is pretty hard to criticize. Leaders evolve with what they experience. A leader at peace time would struggle to lead in a war just like a leader at wartime would struggle to lead in peace. This has never been more proven than with the fact that Churchill was the British war hero who led the British to victory but was removed bcz he was not seen as an effective peace time leader. The military leadership of both countries blames the civilian leadership of that time however the leaders were product of their experience. India and Pakistan had largely won their independence through peaceful non violent efforts and through logical arguments. What the US needed mobilization to beat the super power of the world to earn their independence, india and Pakistan had done it through peaceful events, even if it was against a dead power. Nehru,Gandhi, Jinnah, liaqat, bacha khan, all of them were non violent in nature and believed in peaceful but firm resolution. They had carved large countries through this method. On that day when they succeeded, in their minds one thing was set that the world is now going to be non violent and the war to end all wars had actually ended all wars after all they didn't need to mobilize the masses to arms and fight city after city for their independence against a ruthless empire. What the British took a hundred years of violence to achieve, they had done it through a few decades of non violence thus non violence is the answer and peaceful resolutions will eventually solve the problems... This is the environment they were formed in, groomed in and succeeded in and nothing evolves your ideology more than success.
> [16:17]
> Then a month later they faced a massive conundrum. They faced war when nehru was talking about whether an army is needed or not and Jinnah was talking about india and Pakistan being like US and Canada. In these times, it was the military leadership that was aware since wars had groomed them. It was yahya khan during a celebration held by British at Quetta ta barracks had asked his superiors as to what they were celebrating since now rather than becoming a super power, the two nations will fight forever. This was in august 1947,
> [16:18]
> So joe when the opportunity to take Kashmir by force came, Pakistani leadership was found sleeping and wanting and same happened in junagad and Hyderabad. There was no desire to fight a war bcz war was not in their blood. Was it not habitullah who was told that that Kashmir was coming to Pakistan on a plate. There is a reason behind that statement. Its bcz they got such huge lands without spilling countless blood on it bar partition violence. They didn't have to fight decades of war like other nations did. They just didn't thus in that environment india and Pakistan found themselves in a state of war. What do you expect them to do? Of course they would mess up or underestimate the situation.
> [16:18]
> Nehru went to UN bcz his entire life had proven that conflicts can be resolved on table and conflicts can solved. He went to the UN since peace and non conflict had given them Pakistan and india so what is kashmir to that.
> [16:18]
> Leaders of peace and leaders of war are two different breeds just like how hasbrudal the splendid was different from Hannibal and hamilcar
> [16:18]
> He could make calls Hannibal couldnt and Hannibal could make calls hasbrudal couldn't. Pakistan and india found itself in a war with the two peaceful leaders the region had ever seen.
> [16:19]
> And there is the entire understanding as to why the leadership was found wanting._


Did Nehru/Jinnah et al never thought of a possible war between the successor states of the partition? And how does it compares to say, the likes of Ataturk who seemingly handled both war and peace with brilliance? or he didn't? @Nilgiri

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## Joe Shearer

Joe Shearer said:


> 2. The influx of tribal lashkars, who joined up with the newly formed Azad Kashmir forces, and attacked Srinagar through Baramula; this was from October 22, 1947 onwards; they were opposed first by National Conference volunteers, then by State Forces, then by the regular Indian Army;



In the previous case, we saw the results of a regular Army fighting what was in effect an insurrection defended by trained, professional soldiers fighting in dispersed, decentralised detachments.

When we follow this pulse, we find what happened when a trained regular army came into collision with a band of irregulars.

This post is best read in close conjunction with #14 above.

To cut a long story short,and with profuse apologies for narrating a rather unheroic account of the matter, the tribals did nothing very much, other than their horrifying actions at Baramula, and the crucifying of Sherwani at the crossroads, after that man had fooled them about the route to Srinagar. First, they swept aside an understrength detachment of State Forces; the commander, Brigadier Rajinder Singh, who had been ordered by Hari Singh to fight to the last man and last bullet, did just that and died in action. Then they reached the outskirts of Srinagar, near the airport, and unexpectedly faced opposition. Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai and 1st Sikh had reached Srinagar. They clashed at Pattan; after an initial check, the tribals retired and tried to advance outflanking the detachment. This, too, was thwarted, but Ranjit Rai died in the battle. Indian Army armoured cars were deployed, and met the raiders at Shalateng, scattered them and the raiders were pursued to Baramula, from there to Uri, both of which were liberated.




The lessons are very simple: irregulars cannot stand up to regular troops unless the natural terrain is enormously in their favour. The British Indian Army had established this again and again in the north-west; the Pakistan Army in its recent counter-insurgency campaigns also showed that the irregulars could mount successful ambushes and inflict casualties, but never succeed against regulars.

That too makes it clear that simply dragooning random civilians into service and marching them with a few weeks training to the battle-field is unlikely to pay any great dividends.




Naofumi said:


> Did Nehru/Jinnah et al never thought of a possible war between the successor states of the partition? And how does it compares to say, the likes of Ataturk who seemingly handled both war and peace with brilliance? or he didn't? @Nilgiri



Ataturk did. That is why he was exceptional. This may annoy many, but he was a far greater leader in his context than were either Nehru or Jinnah.

To be honest, neither of them thought of war between the Dominions. Jinnah kept his house in Bombay running, thinking that he would come back to live in it once the job of settling in Pakistan was done. He would not have believed that a Pakistani would not be able to travel freely to India, or vice versa. Nehru never had any roots in what became Pakistan, but there is no reason to believe that if any kind of occasion had arisen, that he would have refused to travel to Pakistan.

Another example: my father was a friend of Suhrawardy. When he was planning his third and last book on his professional life, it was a compendium of friends he had known: Iqbal Athar Ali, later joined the Pakistani foreign service and was Ambassador to Belgium, and host to my parents when my father wanted to see the battlefield of Waterloo for himself, on his way back from the UK; Khwaja Mohammed Kaisar, his bosom friend, scion of the Nawab of Dhaka's family, who later became Pakistan's Ambassador to China and the midwife of Kissinger's secret visit to Chou En Lai, and the subsequent visit by Nixon; Tasleemuddin Ahmed, IG, East Pakistan, who nearly lost his life at the hands of the Butcher of Bangladesh, and his special friend, batchmate from Sarda Training College.

When Suhrawardy became Prime Minister of Pakistan, and commuted between the West and East Wings, he was in the habit of stopping over at Calcutta to lunch at Firpo's, where his bottle was kept preserved, with the pencil mark showing his last consumption. On one occasion, my father got a call from his ADC, asking the old man to join him for lunch. A very careful and very obviously phony official excuse followed, with the old man sweating bullets at the thought of his formidable superior, B. N. Mallik, getting wind of this call! The invitation was never repeated.

Neither Firpo's nor Suhrawardy thought that this lunch stop was at all anything out of the ordinary. Please note the dates; it wasn't early in the day.

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## PDF

PanzerKiel said:


> Consider, nonetheless, the situation in the west as of December 16, *1911* while the cease-fire in the east was being signed.


Typo : 1971*

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## Naofumi

Joe Shearer said:


> This is a note sent to me by one of the finest young minds on this forum, in private. I reproduce it without his permission because of the value of the note. To protect his privacy, I omit his name.
> 
> _Joe if you would the role of Nehru is pretty hard to criticize. Leaders evolve with what they experience. A leader at peace time would struggle to lead in a war just like a leader at wartime would struggle to lead in peace. This has never been more proven than with the fact that Churchill was the British war hero who led the British to victory but was removed bcz he was not seen as an effective peace time leader. The military leadership of both countries blames the civilian leadership of that time however the leaders were product of their experience. India and Pakistan had largely won their independence through peaceful non violent efforts and through logical arguments. What the US needed mobilization to beat the super power of the world to earn their independence, india and Pakistan had done it through peaceful events, even if it was against a dead power. Nehru,Gandhi, Jinnah, liaqat, bacha khan, all of them were non violent in nature and believed in peaceful but firm resolution. They had carved large countries through this method. On that day when they succeeded, in their minds one thing was set that the world is now going to be non violent and the war to end all wars had actually ended all wars after all they didn't need to mobilize the masses to arms and fight city after city for their independence against a ruthless empire. What the British took a hundred years of violence to achieve, they had done it through a few decades of non violence thus non violence is the answer and peaceful resolutions will eventually solve the problems... This is the environment they were formed in, groomed in and succeeded in and nothing evolves your ideology more than success.
> [16:17]
> Then a month later they faced a massive conundrum. They faced war when nehru was talking about whether an army is needed or not and Jinnah was talking about india and Pakistan being like US and Canada. In these times, it was the military leadership that was aware since wars had groomed them. It was yahya khan during a celebration held by British at Quetta ta barracks had asked his superiors as to what they were celebrating since now rather than becoming a super power, the two nations will fight forever. This was in august 1947,
> [16:18]
> So joe when the opportunity to take Kashmir by force came, Pakistani leadership was found sleeping and wanting and same happened in junagad and Hyderabad. There was no desire to fight a war bcz war was not in their blood. Was it not habitullah who was told that that Kashmir was coming to Pakistan on a plate. There is a reason behind that statement. Its bcz they got such huge lands without spilling countless blood on it bar partition violence. They didn't have to fight decades of war like other nations did. They just didn't thus in that environment india and Pakistan found themselves in a state of war. What do you expect them to do? Of course they would mess up or underestimate the situation.
> [16:18]
> Nehru went to UN bcz his entire life had proven that conflicts can be resolved on table and conflicts can solved. He went to the UN since peace and non conflict had given them Pakistan and india so what is kashmir to that.
> [16:18]
> Leaders of peace and leaders of war are two different breeds just like how hasbrudal the splendid was different from Hannibal and hamilcar
> [16:18]
> He could make calls Hannibal couldnt and Hannibal could make calls hasbrudal couldn't. Pakistan and india found itself in a war with the two peaceful leaders the region had ever seen.
> [16:19]
> And there is the entire understanding as to why the leadership was found wanting.
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_
> I just received this stunningly brilliant post-script. It is a must-read!
> 
> Once you have read it and digested it, sit back and ponder on this - this is a Pakistani member in his 30s!
> _---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Now that I think about it there is another example and a far closer home one. Faqir of ippi and bacha khan. Both of them were not happy with Pakistan and both of then were the same ethnicity no why did one raise weapons against Pakistan whereas the other led khudai khidmatgars on peaceful protests? Bcz both were products of their environment. Both were charismatic, had their set of followers and both stuck to their belief. Faqir of ippi, who had experienced war and fight with British his entire life to secure the freedom of roh did the exact same action against Pakistan that he had done against the British his entire life. He took up arms whereas bacha khan did what he had done his entire life which was protest peacefully. Could you imagine faqir of ippi sitting in a protest in Waziristan and bacha khan telling khudai khidmatgars to pick up arms. The reason bcz their life experience told them that their respective methods are efficient. Both of them had the same goal which was to push out Pakistan but they employed different ideals which they had done their entire lives and they had both found success in it in their experience. Same story happened with nehru or Jinnah. All were signing standstill agreements rather than sending army convoys. We did the same in Baluchistan. Signed standstill agreements. I mean Jinnah was arguing with khan of kalat like a lawyer on how Quetta is under the domain of Pakistan since Pakistan is a successor state of British in international law and thus inherited the treaties that British signed. Can you imagine the likes Chang ki shaik, Mao, or even Lenin or Trotsky or let's take a more close example, faqir of ippi doing that?
> [19:16]
> *so
> [19:19]
> The reason why Jinnah was doing that because that is how he had done it with British and Congress his entire life. Cabinet mission being torn apart by lawyers. The reason why Jinnah didn't move a finger to Hyderabad was bcz in his eyes Hyderabad was a separate legal state whose annexation or non annexation was no concern of Pakistan apart from belligerence of a neighbor.
> [19:20]
> Why would Pakistan send its army to save an area that is legally a separate state? Why even would Pakistan itself try to annex it even? Wouldn't that break international law? He thought like a lawyer with legal senses and India annexed Hyderabad simple.
> [19:22]
> Nehru was a peaceful protestor with Gandhi. Both of them simply did what they did their entire life. Protest in front of the world how they are wronged.
> [19:23]
> Liaqat did the same thing. The moment the war got 40km away from Pakistan territory, they agreed to a ceasefire and decided to protest in front of the world how they are wronged
> [19:25]
> Leaders are products of their environment just like you and I are joe. The difference is that they are far better, dedicated products with a vision. They may not always succeed. Some of the most charismatic leaders in history have failed but they were human. Chiseled by the experience that thought them, the environment that moulded them.
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_
> @Nilgiri @jbgt90 @Naofumi @xeuss@BL33D
> 
> @PanzerKiel @TsAr @El Observer @JamD @Psychic @phantom @Gryphon @Signalian


While the reflections presented above do sound convincing but I feel this interpretation strips the persons from their individuality and presents a quasi-deterministic worldview. 
Say Ben-Gurion, the man was educated in law, was a diplomat for all his lifetime (albeit a good one), participated in no major war (except being in Jewish legion in WWI and probaly indirectly co-ordinating Jewish militancy through Haganah) but the most amusing point I see is that he explicitly declared the need of decisiveness as a leader.


> The most revealing conversation that Shimon Peres ever had with his mentor, David Ben-Gurion, was perhaps his first. Peres was a young activist in Ha’Noar Ha’Oved, the Labor Zionist youth movement, when he asked the powerful and charismatic chairman of the Jewish Agency for a lift up the coast to Haifa from Tel Aviv. They spent most of the ride in silence, but then, just as they were approaching their destination, Ben-Gurion decided, out of nowhere, to tell the young man why he preferred Lenin to Trotsky. This was, for sure, a surprising admission. Trotsky was the fiery Jewish revolutionary filled with ideological fervor to match that of the Zionists of Ben-Gurion’s youth. “Lenin was Trotsky’s inferior in terms of intellect,” Ben-Gurion explained. But Lenin had a quality that Trotsky never possessed: “*He was decisive*.”
> The secret of Ben-Gurion’s leadership was, as legions of mythologizers have pointed out, his willingness to be — to borrow a recent leader’s inelegant but apt expression — *the decider*.


https://forward.com/culture/147083/secrets-of-ben-gurions-leadership/?p=all
But did he not fought an existential war against all odds with brilliance?
Does this not compels us look at the individual traits and merits of the concerned person(s) too? Or does it indicate that the inherent systems were different through which persons became leaders?

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## BL33D

_*This article is a narration of the battle of Asal Uttar in 1965 by the author and not about the IA's goals and achievements that the thread seeks to address.*_
*
Written By Austerlitz
*




*
*
*BACKGROUND :*
The 1960s began a difficult decade for India.The euphoria of independence was fading,the economy was shaky,there was a food crisis,the morale of the Indian army had taken a beating after the humiliation of 1962 against China.Nehru had breathed his last in 1964 and his successor -the diminutive Lal Bahadur Shastri was viewed as a compromise candidate ,perhaps even a weak one.Indian legislations to integrate Kashmir constitutionally put political pressure on the Ayub Khan military government.To Pakistani strategic planners the time must have seemed ripefor a military solution to enforce their geopolitical ambitions.

Pakistan had since 1958 been an US ally in CENTO and recieved over 1.2 billion dollars worth of military aid in equipment and money.This had bolstered the strength of the Pakistani armed forces to very impressive levels ,bristling as it was by 1965 with hundreds of the latest Patton tanks,Sabre jets and 155 mm artillery guns.The Indian army expansion and reorganization begun after 1962 was still in transition,and while the modernization process was incomplete pakistan held a decided advantage .Pakistan had to strike before the Indians could catch upwhile it still had the chance to impose a decisive victory on her rival.Zulfiqar Bhutto,advisor to Ayub Khan and later PM summed up the situation as the

‘’Last chance to take Kashmir by force’’

*Failure of Operation Gibraltar*

(Pakistan’s Grand Strategy)
Pakistan tested Indian resolve and its new weapons by probing constantly in the disputed Rann of Kutch area in repeated skirmishes during April 1965 ,this dispute was eventually settled by British mediation. Emboldened by its performance in the Rann of Kutch,from early August Pakistan launched _Operation Gibraltar _— thousands of pakistani soldiers and Commandoes infiltrated into Kashmir with the object of inciting a general uprising amongst the kashmiri population.It was believed the Indian Army would not cross the ceasefire line and merely defend itself.In the event it failed miserably,as locals informed the Indian army of the intruders which acted swiftly to contain them.In a daring attack the Indians crossed the ceasefire line took Haji Pir Pass-the main entry point of the infiltrators.Faced with a huge loss of face , Ayub unleashed his main conventional strategic scheme -Operation Grand Slam with the confident prediction -_’’Hindu morale will not stand a couple of hard blows at the right time and place’’._

*Operation Grand Slam*





(Pakistan’s assault — Chamb Sector)
Pakistan launched a massive combined armour-infantry assault in Chamb sector aimed at capturing the bridge at Akhnoor — the only all-weather lifeline of India’s main Infantry division in J & K (with 20 battalions) and then used as a staging point for the capture of Jammu,the main communications and logistics hub connecting India with Kashmir.The meagre indian force holding Chamb consisted of 4 infantry battalions and 1 light tank squadron of amx-13s.These faced a a pakistani assault of 8.5 infantry battalions as well as 2 armoured regiments( equipped with pattons which couldn’t be penetrated by the AMX tanks )with a pakistani local superiority of 2:1 in infantry,6:1 in armour and 6:1 in artillery.

*I Corps Offensive*

View attachment 634099

(I Corps counterattack in Sialkot sector)
Sorely pressed and on the verge of collapse at Akhnoor,India responded by crossing the International Border and launching its own offensive spearheaded by I corps in the Sialkot sector aimed at relieving the pressure on Akhnoor, carrying the war into the Pakistani heartland of Punjab and threatening Sialkot and Lahore, which would force Pakistan to divert its forces.In this it was succesful,as pressure soon slackened on Akhnoor which was held succesfully.As can be seen on the above map Pakistan’s great advantage in 1965 was that it possesed 2 large scale offensive maneuvre assets in 6th and 1st Armoured division.the 6th was facing the Indian offensive in Sialkot which contained India’s sole I Armoured division.Despite possesing a large overall numerical superiority in Infantry,in the actual battlespace this was reduced to near parity because as many as 38 battalions were tied up in Kashmir and several forces were on the China border.

*XI Corps Offensive*





(Indian XI corps Limited Offensive)
Even before I corps launched its offensive in Sialkot sector,Indian XI corps launched a limited attack on 6th September on the Lahore-Amritsar axis.This formation composed of the 15th ,7th and 4th Infantry divisions launched a three-pronged attack aimed at establishing a forward defensive line on what was ironically considered Pakistan’s great defensive asset in Punjab -the Ichogil Canal.This would capture useful territory which could be used as a bargaining tool later,as well as secure a strong defensive line for the Indian infantry against pakistani armoured attack on the canal line.It would also set up a staging area for a possible later offensive towards Lahore by 15 division in conjunction with the Northern offensive by I corps. XI corps expected to be faced by two pakistani infantry divisions — 10th and the newly raised 11th . Unknown to them, the crack pakistani 1st armoured division was waiting for them (its exact location being not known to Indian intelligence)





The axis of attacks were —
15th Infantry Division along the GT road on Amritsar-Lahore axis.
7th Infantry Division along Khalra-Barki-Bhikkiwind Axis
4th Mountain Division along Khemkaran -Kasur Axis.
The only reserve possesed by XI corps was the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade near Amritsar.This formation was composed of 2 armoured regiments -3rd Cavalry and 8 Cavalry(equipped with AMX-13) . The former was the only Indian armoured formation in the sector equipped with Centurion tanks -the one Indian tank capable of going toe to toe with Pattons.India in 1965 had only 4 regiments of Centurions,and 3 of those were in 1st Armoured division(initially all 4) in Sialkot sector.Indian HQ recognizing AMX equipped brigade wouldn’t be combat effective against pattons had reinforced 2nd Armoured Brigade on the eve of the war by transfering one of the four centurion regiments from 1st armoured division in the form of 3rd Cavalry.This proved to be a far-sighted decision.

*4th Mountain Division in Khem Karan Sector*
4th Mtn Div was tasked to capture the Ichogil canal line from Bedian to Lohgarh with one armoured regiment of 9 Deccan Horse( 2 squadrons) equipped with shermans for infantry support.They were tasked also to blow the bridge from Kasur to Khemakaran over the Ichogil canal.

_4th Mtn Div consisted of _-
> _7 Mountain Brigade consisting of 3 battalions( 4 grenadiers,7 grenadiers,1/9 Gurkha was half strength)_

> _62 Mountain Brigade consisting of 3 battalions (9 JAK,13 Dogra,18 Rajputana Rifles)_

>_ Integral Artillery Brigade_ with one Field Regiment (25 pounders), two Mountain Regiments (3.7 inch howitzers), one Medium Regiment (5.5 inch Guns) and one Light Regiment (120mm mortars).

4th Mountain Division began its attack o the 6th making modest progress owing to strong pakistani defences and its superior long range artillery.However oblivious to the Indians,Pakistan had prepared to deal its primary thrust in this sector.Instead of facing a single infantry brigade ,4 Mtn found itself faced by 11th infantry division with 2 infantry brigades plus the elite pakistani 1st armoured division.Sharp pakistani counterattacks made by 11th division whose commander acted with alacrity(using helicopters to assess the situation rapidly) and its tenous defensive position led to a disorderly withdrawal of 4th Mountain Division to Asal Uttar,just North of Khem Karan where it prepared to make its stand against the incoming onslaught.






The 2 infantry brigades(7 and 62) of 4th Mountain division regroup around Asal Uttar,hastily preparing defences and laying anti-tank mines on the main tank approach routes.They aresupported in the defense by 2 squadrons of 9 Deccan horse (shermans).

*Pakistani Plan*





The Pakistani operational plan was bold and ambitious,and reflected its need for a quick and decisive decision as it lacked the resources for a drawn out attritional struggle. The Pakistani offensive was to be launched in two phases.

Phase 1 entailed 11 Infantry Division to establish a bridgehead across the obstacle system in the area of Khem Karan. In Phase 2, 1 Armoured Division was to break out from the bridgehead in three axes.

The first was by 4 Armoured Brigade with two armoured regiments and a mechanized infantry battalion along Valtoha- Fatehabad and then astride the Sobraon branch canal, to capture the bridges of the Beas. This would cut off West Punjab from rest of India and sever XI corps main Line of Communications and supply.

The second axis was 3 Armoured Brigade with two armoured regiments and a mechanized infantry battalion along Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind-Taran Taran astride Kasur branch canal, to capture Jandiala Guru as also cut off the Grand Trunk road connecting Amritsar with Jallandhar.

The third axis entailed providing flank protection by 5 Armoured Brigade with one armoured regiment and an infantry battalion advancing west of axis Kasur — Khem Karan- Bhikkiwind.

It was planned to take Harike Bridge by 8th September and reach Beas Bridge by the evening of 9th.

If successful this would cut off Punjab West of the Beas,and allow for the encirclement and destruction of XI Corps by attacks from both flanks and rear,followed by the capture of Amritsar.The road to Delhi –a mere 24 hour drive would be open with no substantial reserves standing in the way. It had the potential to be what has been called India’s_ ‘Fourth Battle of Panipat_’ in the plains of Punjab.

*The Strategic Importance of Asal Uttar*
Asal Uttar here assumed a position of prime strategic importance,it commanded the approaches to the 2 main Pakistani thrust lines.Importantly,once past the Asal Uttar area the Pakistani armour would have free reign as terrain was flat and the natural river obstacles would only serve to secure the flanks of their armoured thrust.However before asal uttar this was a liability,the Pakistani bridgehead was very constricted hemmed in between the Rohi nallah and Sobraon branch.The frontage of a Pakistani attack around this area was a small 7kms,with not much space for broad outflanking movements.However once past Asal Uttar this would expand very quickly into a 15km frontage around Patti and a large 45 kms on the Tarn Taran area.Once the numerically and qualitatively superior Pakistani armour penetrated into these areas it would be extremely difficult for any Indian defensive to contain them as the space would allow them to use multiple armoured thrusts from different directions which the Indians lacking sufficient armour would not be able to counter adequately.From the Indian point of view thus it wascritical that the Pakistanis be stopped cold at Asal Uttar in a forward defensive before the Pattons could break out into the plains.Indian defensive preparations were conducted accordingly.

*OPPOSING ARMIES*
INFANTRY :
Both armies had a common origin and a shared heritage — The British Indian Army , and in many respects were very similar.For the infantry, the Regiment was the basic organizational unit.As in British army practice,in both subcontinental armies the regiments were not actually battlefield formations –that role being assigned to battalions.The regiment’s role was to provide well trained and cohesive battalions to the front.Thus its not surprising to have battalions of the same regiment scattered over multiple fronts.
The regiments were recruited generally on a regional basis,with regimental histories dating back to the Raj -and the common soldier took immense pride in his regiment.The battalions were grouped into brigades with 9 battalions in 3 brigades per Division in Indian case and 7 battalions in 3 brigades in Pakistani case.(for 4th mtn div,its 3rd brigade was away in another sector)






(7.62mm SLR Rifle)
The basic infantryman in both armies fought bravely and with tenacity,though lacking perhaps a bit in technical proficiency.Both armies used a mix of ww2 british equipment along with new equipment,in the case of pakistan particularly american material.The standard rifle for both armies was the .303 Lee Enfield SMLE ,though in Indian case this had been substantially replaced by the new Self-Loading Rifle (SLR) -a copy of the Belgian FN-FAL while Pakistan had begun equipping its infantry with smaller numbers of AK-56 kalashnikovs.The standard LMG was thegerman Mg-42 for PA and british Bren LMG for IA.Both sides used WW2 British Vickers in HMG role.For close combat better equipped units in Pakistan’s case had the German MP-5 submachine gun.Both sides used the British Sten gun and Sterling carbine.

In numbers,on the whole India had a large superiority of over 2:1 in infantry but this was heavily diluted in the actual battlearea due to large chunks of troops being tied down in Kashmir,the China Border and border with East Pakistan.In the actual Khem karan area,the reverse was true ! The Indians were at a disadvantage with 5.5 battalions facing 10 pakistani infantry battalions(3 of them Mechanized).






(106 mm Recoiless gun)
The anti -tank stopping power of infantry in this timeframe(before the era of anti-tank guided missiles) was quite low.Both sides relied primarily on handheld Bazookas and Jeep-mounted 106 mm Recoiless rifles as defense against tanks along with mines.Even here Pakistan enjoyed a much greater number of integral anti-tank weapons per infantry battalion than India,thanks to American aid.The Indian infantry battalion largely relied on 6 such jeep mounted 106mm Recoiless guns as anti-tank defense,but these were primarily defensive anti-tank ambush weapons incapable of going head on against tanks and could only take out the pattons at close range.It was in one of these vehicles that Quartermaster Abdul Hamid would perform heroics that would gain him immortality.






(M113 APC)
Pakistani Armoured Divisions were also provided with mechanized infantry on American built M113 APCs -1 mechanized infantry battalion per Armoured brigade.India didn’t have any mechanized infantry force.In Asal uttar,3 pakistani mechanized infantry battalions were involved to support the pakistani armoured attacks.These would operate in close conjunction with the armour disembarking the transported infantry squad close to the battle line and keeping up with the armored advance.

ARTILLERY











(25 Pounder and 3.7 Inch Howitzer)
Both countries inherited an effective artillery arm with the excellent tradition of british artillery.On paper India entered the war with 628 artillery pieces and Pakistan with 552 artillery pieces.On the ground,Pakistan had a decided superiority.All of India’s guns were WW2 vintage british guns .The bulk being 450 odd QF-25-pounders(87 mm),66 of 3.7 Inch (93 mm) howitzers and around 100 of 140mm british heavy howitzers.Pakistan too deployed 240 odd 25-pounders,72 of 3.7 inch howitzers as well as 72 of 105 mm guns.But its main advantage rested in the excellent american artillery pieces it had acquired — 126 of the 155mm M114 Heavy Howitzers and around 50 of the 203 mm M110 very heavy howitzers with greater range and punching weight than the indian guns.The redoubtable 25-pounder ,a veteran of the second world war was reliable and efficient if somewhat dated and used in bulk by both armies.







View attachment 634105

(M114 and M110)
Furthermore Pakistani artillery was trained to use the american method of using pre-timed fuzes ,so that projectiles fired at different trajectories would arrive at a target at very short interval for maximum destruction.This also allowed Pakistani artillery to disperse their guns a bit more and they also had better weapon locating equipment.Pakistani artillery performed very well throughout the war causing numerous casualities,particularly in the defensive battles against advancing indian forces.In Asal uttar their performance was to be lacklustre due to lack of proper deployment,co-operation and absence of proper intelligence on Indian positions.In contrast the Indian artillery,having these factors in its favour performed superbly.At Asal Uttar itself Pakistani artillery held a large advantage over India -The Indians could only muster 1 field regiment of 25 pdrs,2 x 3.7 inch gun regiments,1 x 140 mm medium regiment,1 sexton and 1 of 120mm mortar regiment.Pakistan could deploy 5 field regiments( 3 of them self-propelled) as well as 3 medium regiments(with 155 mm) and a heavy regiment with 203mm guns,plus 120mm mortar battery.This gave pakistan a numerical superiority in artillery 2 : 1 vis a vis the defending indian force as well as being superior in calibre.

*ARMOURED CORPS*





Both armies inherited the conservative style of employment of armour from the british army which had been repeatedly embarassed by the german panzers in mobile combat in ww2.While defensively solid,offensively they often found themselves coming up short.None of the armies had any large scale experience on the use of armour,as all armour units used in North Africa and Italy where Indian soldiers had fought were manned by british personnel.This would be reflected in the often clumsy employment of tanks either spread out like infantry formations ,or attempting to charge enemy positions like horse cavalry of old.(something the british had done very often in north africa).Overall pakistan entered the war with a decisive advantage in armour -pinning its hopes on this arm to rout the indian army.

PAKISTAN ARMOURED CORPS
Pakistani armoured corps began as a small elite body after partition but rapidly expanded from the mid 1950s when american equipment started flowing in.Pakistani armoured officers had been trained in the USA ,and this would find expression in bold attempts at outflanking on the battlefield which nonetheless were poorly executed due to bad staff planning and diminished crew standards(due to rapid expansion).Armour training was imparted at Armoured Corps Centre and School in Nowshera, with emphasis on offensive and integration with infantry.Standards had been further affected due to the favouritism brought in by the Ayub Khan military government in selection of officers based on loyalty.The officer training curriculum also had irregularities,often lacking an examination on completion.The patton crews were often found technically not proficient/familiarized enough to handle all the sophisticated equipment -particularly the rangefinder targeting mechanism.Pakistan reorganized its armoured corps in the 60s from 10 armoured regiments of 75 tanks each to 18 regiments of 44 tanks.

Pakistan entered the war with 806 tanks and tank destroyers in 18 armoured regiments.These included 356 M47/M48 Pattons,308 Shermans,96 Chaffee light tanks and 50 M36 Jackson tank destroyers.9 regiments (ones with shermans) were parcelled out among the infantry and the rest -all Pattons formed Pakistan’s 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions.At Asal Uttar Pakistan had its disposal 5 Patton regiments,1 Chafee Recon Regiment,1 Sherman Regiment.Facing an Indian tank force of 1 Centurion Regiment,1 Sherman Regiment (lacking a third of its strength)and 1 light AMX regiment(lacking a third of its strength).With an overall 3 :1 advantage in armour and an actual 5:1 advantage (5 patton regiments facing 1 centurion) for an outisde observer it should have been a walkover.

M-47/48 PATTON






Entering the battle with a formidable reputation,the Patton was considered one of the if not the best tank in the world with highly with a powerful 90mm gun and 2 heavy machine guns,night fighting Infra red capability,and a rangefinder for Long range single shot capability which allowed it to engage enemy armour at 2000 yrds.It had frontal armour upto 120 mm thick which could not be penetrated by the Indian shermans.The 106mm recoiless rifles,shermans,AMX had to rely on close range shots 500 yards from the sides to penetrate the tanks armour.Only the Indian Centurion had the armour and firepower to take on this machine head on.

INDIAN ARMOURED CORPS






(Both sides used shermans with short barrel 76 mm guns for infantry support and limited anti-tank duty)
Indian armoured Corps had only begun expansion after 1962,and thus most of the Indian units were more longstanding entities.High level Indian Officers were trained at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy In Britain,with Armoured Corps Training School at Ahmednagar,and further armour training centres in India.Tactics remained conservative,it involved establishment of a firm base from which to launch attacks and which acted as a fall-back position.These tactics provided for solidity in the defense but lack of boldness in offensive operations which could degenerate into frontal assaults.For crew training Indian army at this time mostly relied on British crew training manuals(particularly regarding centurions) with local improvisations .

India entered the war particularly inferior in the armoured component which could have had disastrous consequences.There were 14 Armoured Regiments in all with 186 Centurions,346 shermans,90 AMX and 90 PT-76.The 4 regiments of Centurions formed the hard core of the Indian armoured force.The Sherman was an obsolete infantry support tank and AMX and PT-76 were light vehicles capable of only reconaissance and support.India’s Armoured Formations were 1st Armoured Division and 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade.3 centurion regiments and 2 sherman regiments were in the former and 1 centurion and 1 AMX in the latter.Rest of the regiments were allocatted to the infantry divisions for support like 9 deccan horse to 4th mountain division.

Each Indian armoured Regiment was composed of 45 tanks in 3 squadrons . Each squadrons had 4 troops of 3 tanks each plus 2 command tanks for 14 tanks per squadron.Regiment has 3 command tanks.

CENTURION :






The backbone of the IAC were the 4 regiments of british made centurion tanks.Sturdy,reliable,accurate and with commendable firepower it is now considered one of the best post ww2 armoured vehicles and became a favourite of both the Indian and Israeli armies(which used them to deadly effect in 1967 and 1973).It was affectionately called _‘Bade bhai’_ (big brother) among Indian tank crews.

The design emphasized firepower and armour protection -heeding the hard lessons british tank designers faced against heavy german panzers throughout the war.It had very good armour ranging from 50–150mm and in 1965 was armed with a deadly accurate 20-Pounder(84 mm) Rifled tank gun(later replaced by the legendary 105 mm L7).It was not as sophisticated as the Patton lacking night fighting capability or rangefinder equipment.

The Indian Army improvised a simple but effective crew training method which did much to hone the skills of the centurion crews.The Field Miniature Range(FMR) was true to a scale 1:100 ground model including the half-inch square targets that represented enemy tanks.The firing end was a stripped down rifle externally slaved to the main 20-pounder gun on a mounting bracket which was operated by the tank loader.Tank actions would replicate crew drills used in live firing would carry out all tank shoots using this device.The gunner and commander could see the result of the shoot for real on the miniature targets which increased their confidence and proficiency.This method didn’t use up costly ammunition rounds but nonetheless provided extensive gunnery training.

The Indian Centurions developed the 3-round firing technique making full use of the centurions quick firing ability- where a competent gunner could fire 3 rounds in 12 to 15 seconds.At medium and close engagement ranges 600–1200 yrds the flat trajectory of the centurions super velocity ammunition required no range estimation and gunners could just set a mid range and fire away the 3-round set assuring a 90% hit probability.This superb rate of fire at mid-close ranges eclipsed the patton with its complicated rangefinder mechanism which being deadly in long range duels needed technically familiar and proficient crews,and were often unable to react in closer ranges to the unrelenting centurion fire before their tank was taken out .






India had 2 regiments of AMX-13 french light tank/tank destroyers in 1965.A cheap light vehicle it had very light armour but a sizeable 73mm gun.Though this could only engage pattons succesfully from the flanks at close ranges.One AMX regiment of 2nd armoured brigade(8 cavalry) joined the battle in the later stages but didn’t see heavy action,being largely employed for flank protection.It was mainly the 45 centurions of 3 cavalry that would be the main hope of Indian armour at Asal uttar.

*Contd.*

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## BL33D

*





ORDER OF BATTLE : PAKISTAN*

1st Armored Division (Maj. Gen. N.A.Khan)
12th Cavalry (Division reconnaissance regiment, Chaffees)

_Division Artillery_
3 (SP) Field Regiment
15 (SP) Field Regiment
16 (SP) Field Regiment
21 Medium Regiment
19 (SP) Light Anti Aircraft Regiment
1 Engineer Battalion

_3rd Armored Brigade_
19th Lancers (Pattons)
7th Frontier Force (Armored Infantry)

_4th Armored Brigade_
4th Cavalry (Pattons)
5th Horse(Pattons )
10th Frontier Force (Armored Infantry)

_5th Armored Brigade_
6th Lancers Pattons
24th Cavalry Pattons
1st Frontier Force (Armored Infantry)

11th Infantry Division (Maj Gen.A.H.Khan)
15th Lancers I Corps Reconnaissance Regiment
32nd Tank Delivery Unit (Sherman)

_Division Artillery_
26 Field Regiment
38 Field Regiment
12 Medium Regiment
9 Medium Regiment
35 Heavy Regiment
Troop/88 Mortar Battery
37 Corps Locating Regiment
3 Engineer Battalion
25 Signals Battalion

_21st Infantry Brigade_
5th Frontier Force
13th Baluch

_52nd Brigade_(deployed from Kasur-Khem Karan Road to Kasur-Ferozepur Road)
2nd Frontier Force
7th Punjab
12th Baluch

_106th Infantry Brigade_
1st East Bengal
7th Baluch

*ORDER OF BATTLE : INDIA*

2nd Independent Armored Brigade (Brig. T.K. Theograj)
3rd Cavalry (Lt. Col. S. Caleb) Centurions
8th Lancers (Lt. Cpl. P.C. Mehta) AMX-13
(Third regiment was away in another sector)
1st (SP) Field Regiment (Sextons)

4th Mountain Division [Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh]

9th (Deccan) Horse( Lt. Col. A.S. Vaidya ) Shermans

_7th Mountain Brigade (Brig. Sidhu)_
4th Grenadiers
7th Grenadiers
9th Jammu and Kashmir Regiment

_62nd Mountain Brigade(H.Guhilaut)_
1/9th Gorkha Rifles
13th Dogra
18th Rajputana Rifles

(33rd Mountain Brigade was away in another sector)






one X on top is brigade, two X division, one perpendicular bar squadron and 2 of those regiment.3 dots denote tank troop.The circular area is divisional defended sector of 4th Mtn division(couldn’t find a map with exact positioning of subordinate battalions)

The original Pakistani plan envisaged a dawn breakout in strength on the 8th,but a combination of poor engineering preparation and disruptive Indian artillery fire this was delayed by hours.Meanwhile the 4th Mtn breached the rohi nalla to swamp the terrain south and south west of the divisional defended sector to hinder armour operations,strengthened their defences as Gurbaksh Singh rallied his men to prepare to face the coming onslaught.His infantry battalions occupied the centre supported by the divisions anti-tank elements and divisional artillery to the rear with 2 squadrons of deccan horse in support on the flanks.

8 SEPTEMBER






Deccan Horse holds firm

The Pakistanis launched their offensive at 0830 hours on September 08 with a reconnaissance in force with two squadrons of Chaffees and one squadron of Pattons. Under cover of artillery fire, the advancing columns moved within 900 m of the Indian defences. At this point, they were engaged by tanks of Deccan Horse -hull down shermans hidden in the sugarcane fields. The Pakistani armour broke up into smaller groups and tried to infiltrate into the Indian defences_._The Pattons were visible to Indian recoilless rifle and tank crews who could see the swaying of the cane as the enemy approached and the upperworks of the Pattons’ turrets,while they themselves remained largely hidden.Opening fire close ranges A.Vaidya’s shermans held firm and destroyed 11 tanks for the loss of 4 of their own,after which the pakistani armour withdrew.

_Frontal Assault on 4th Mtn Div :_
Pakistan’s 5th Armoured Brigade then mounted a frontal assault on 4th Mountain Division .The attack was led by a regiment of Pattons, a squadron of Chaffees and a mechanized battalion .The attack made initial progress in the 1/9 Gorkha rifles sector but was eventually contained.The 4 Grenadiers faced repeated heavy attacks at 12:00 am and from 2:00 PM.Despite some of their trenches being overrun, the battalion with its anti-tank gunners comprising Subedar M.Chand and Havildar A. Hamid
knocked out four tanks and stopped the advance.

Maj.Gen Rajendra Nath writes about the Pakistani tactics(which showed american influence) -
‘’The way Pakistan was using its armour to assault our defended areas came as a great surprise to us, for we had never used our armour in peace time exercises or in war in such a bold and audacious manner. The Pakistani method of attack on our defended areas needs to be described in some detail. A typical tank assault would commence with the approach of light tanks boosted by Shermans or Patton tanks. They would feel for the gaps in our defended areas and probe our flanks to find out the extent of our defences while their artillery would keep our suspected positions engaged so that our anti-tank guns were not very effective. After this reconnaissance, some of their tanks would move to a flank partly to lure our tanks and partly to divert our artillery fire. Then Pakistan’s armour would assault our positions followed by their infantry in armoured personnel carriers. The tanks would assault with six to eight abreast firing their secondary and main armament and would be followed by the Infantry who would dismount from their armoured personnel carriers and attack our positions. All this time, their artillery would be neutralising our positions. Another method of assault was that Pakistan’s assaulting tanks, normally six to eight abreast well spread out, would charge our positions firing their guns but stop short of our positions, just outside the range of our anti-tank guns. Meanwhile, other follow up tanks would come up and try to envelop the defences and over run them from right or left flank. Their aim was generally to frighten our infantry and over run our positions.

A combination of above tactics had been tried by Pakistani forces against both 62 and 7 Brigade units who had gone on offensive on 6th September and captured Pakistan’s forward positions. Before these units could dig in, the Pakistan had used their armour and infantry boldly in assault which had unnerved some of our troops, for we had not taught or practised such tactics in our army till 1965. However, our troops had discovered that Pakistan’s armour assaults would fizzle out whenever our infantry stood its ground using its anti-tank guns and was supported by our artillery. The units of 4 Division were now getting accustomed to Pakistan’s pattern of armour and infantry assaults and so were giving a good account of themselves.’’

_First Blood for Centurions_
This phase is shown in last map.Around 2:30 pm pattons of 6Lancers sought to envelop the Indians with a flank attack along the western axis aimed at Chima to roll up the defences of 4thMtn from the rear and get into its artillery area.Here they were confronted by the centurions of B squadron of 3rd cavalry under maj Belvalkar.In a fluid meeting engagement at close ranges the centurion proved its mettle knocking out 5 pattons and 1 chafee.Daffadar Wasan singh’s lead centurion drew first blood with 2 patton kills.After this setback the pakistani armour withdrew _._






‘’Press hard and get all the bastards before they turn back and run’’ -Maj. Belvalkar over radio

Further North Pakistani tanks had reached Valtoha Railway station by 5:00 PM but were unable to consolidate their hold.They were overextended having left behind their infantry support which had been pinned down by indian artillery and machine gun fire,and snipers in the sugarcane fields.A move eastwards towards chima was blocked by B squadron and 3rd Cavalry’s A squadron was now moving in block to any forward movement.At this point Brigadier Bashir withdrew both his regiments(24c and 6L) to leaguer(reform,restock,refuel) at Khem karan -a controversial decision that has been criticized but was nonetheless consistent with british ww2 armoured practice.Indian sources claim the withdrawal was also precipitated by the movement of A squadron’s Centurions towards 6L and the deployment of C squadron on the open flank of 24C by Lt.Col Caleb.commander of 3 Cavalry.(A squadron however found the ground in front too soft and boggy for armour movement and withdrew back into the centre behind B squadron as a reserve ).These movements are shown in the map below.Overall the day had been a good one for the Indian defenders who had held firm despite some nervous moments,and every unit had played its part.The myth of the invincibility of the Patton had been shattered which raised the morale of the indian tank crews.

9 SEPTEMBER :






_Night attack on Rajputana Rifles -
_
At about 2:00 am after midnight,Pakistani pattons utilizing their infra-red equipment supported by mechanized infantry made a heavy assault on 18RajRif defended battalion sector.Brigadier Guhilaut,commander of 62nd Mtn Brigade had ordered the battalion to hold on even if forward trenches were overrun.The Pakistani tanks had to pass through mines and endure concentrated fire of five artillery regiments, which were firing on the unit’s frontage. This fire was supplemented by unit mortars and recoiless guns.Lt.Col Raghuvir Singh.commanding officer of 18RajRif set a personal example — when Pakistani tanks overran the positions defended by the forward deployed companies,leaving his command post and heedless of his personal safety he moved past 3 enemy tanks and under intense artillery bombardment reached the forward companies and reestablished contact with them.By 0330hrs Pakistani infantry advanced in APCs, but during their probing they encountered a minefield and withdrew.The Pakistani attack fizzled out as they failed to dislodge the determined defenders.

At dawn the PAF tried to soften up indian positions along with heavy artillery bombardment,but this didn’t have the desired effect on the well-dug in defenders.The IAF was also subdued and failed to cause any appreciable physical destruction of the enemy armour,but one interdiction strike on a supply train destroyed ammunition stocks and reduced the ammunition of the pattons to 30 rounds per tank causing logistical strain.

_All- Day Attacks on 4th Mtn Division -_
After dawn heavy attacks fell on 4 Grenadiers which fought back spiritedly under Lt.Col Bhatti.Two tanks were blown up on the minefield and another was destroyed by the recoiless guns of 4 Grenadiers.In the afternoon tanks and infantry again assaulted 18RajRif which fought back supported by divisional artillery and the tanks of Deccan Horse.Several pakistani tanks were lost,many tank commanders directing their vehicle with their head and torso exposed above the cupola fell victim to accurate small arms fire.Finally by 10:00 pm the pakistani armour withdrew.Casualities were heavy on both sides..The pakistani armour was facing steady heavy attrition,while the indian infantry too was being depleted.XI corps ordered 4 battalions to be broken up for the time being into smaller units to hold the line.






On the Flanks






(Brigadier Theograj encourages his men)

_On the Flanks — Calm before the storm_
On the flanks ,the day had been relatively quiet.6L attempted a broad flanking move along the Eastern axis but found out as A squadron had the previous day,the ground too boggy.Several tanks became immobilized and easy targets .Nonetheless some elements of its vanguard again reached Valtoha but later withdrew,there was no serious fighting -the day being characterized by cautious probes.
Meanwhile Brigadier Theograj,commander of 2nd Ind.Arm Brigade had arrived with his other regiment 8 Cavalry with AMX (minus 1 sq) and assigned it to flank protection.A massed pakistani armoured attack was now expected as by now its all its armoured regiments were accross the bridgehead.Since the centre was stoutly held by the infantry and Deccan Horse and the Eastern axis too boggy for large scale armour movement it left only the western axis from Bhura Karimpur towards mahmudpura as the most probable route for such an attack.Theograj and Caleb prepared the centurions of 3 Cavalry to meet such an attack with an elaborate ambush meant to catch the advancing Pak armour in a crossfire.But the attack didn’t come on 9th september,possibly due to insufficient preparation on the pakistani side.It would come the next day.

10 SEPTEMBER






(Deployment -10 September)

_Deployment -_
The pakistani plan was to pin down 4th mtn and Deccan Horse with 5th Arm.Brigade(24c,6L,1FF) and launch a sweeping envelopment on the Bhura Karimpur — Mahmudpura Axis with 4th Armoured Brigade(4C,5H,10FF) with 3rd Armoured brigade(1 armoured regiment,1 mechanized infantry battalion) in reserve (along with 11th division infantry) for expolitation and mopping up after the breakthrough.Brig .Theograj deployed the 2 AMX squadrons of 8C on the flanks . Theograj and Lt Col Caleb positioned the centurion squadrons in 2 concentric horseshoe shaped semi circles designed to bring the firepower of the entire regiment to bear on the incoming enemy armour in a devastating crossfire,while also providing defense in depth.B and C squadrons formed the first semicircle from dholan to chima with mahmudpura in the centre.The A squadron formed the 2nd semicircle.Areas were flooded on the approach routes to further bog down the pattons.






(Abdul Hamid’s Last stand)

_Final attacks on 4th Mtn Division_
5th armoured brigade with Pattons and Mechanized infantry in 4 Grenadiers sector in the morning and managed to break through the forward positions.Havildar Hamid who had already destroyed 4 tanks on 8th september stood his ground as pattons charged charged his defended locality and managed to knock out 3 more before being killed by a 4rth tank in a feat of heroics for which he posthumously recieved the Param Vir Chakra -India’s highest gallantry award.6Lancers made a final attack on 7 Grenadiers in the afternoon but this too was halted.

_The Trap is sprung -_





(4Cavalry in the trap)

The main pakistani armoured attack began at around 8:30 am when lead elements of Pakistan 4 cavalry approached Dholan,but were engaged by camouflaged centurions of C squadron which quickly knocked out 4 pattons. Maj. Sandhu,commander of C squadron positioned himself at Lakhna on one of the rooftops from where he tracked the movements of enemy armour and was able to provide a continous stream of information to HQ on enemy movements,and they acted accordingly.
Few tanks approaching Madar were shot at by A squadron deployed in the 2nd semicircle and a patton and APCs were destroyed.

‘’Whoever remains cooler under stress for a longer time will win.Identify,take good aim and shoot’.God be with you.’’ -Lt.Col Caleb over radio

The 2nd Squadron of 4 cavalry charged Mahmudpura but were caught in an ambush from the flank by 2nd Lt R.P.Joshi’s troop of centurions and were decimated losing 9 pattons and 2 Recoiless guns in minutes.The pattons were helpless,most of them couldn’t detect the centurions or never even got a shot off before falling to the centurions 3 round technique.Based on the information provided by Maj Sandhu,A Squadron readjusted its position and set up an ambush for the incoming 3rd Squadron of 4Cavalry which was battered in the crossfire.A troop of AMX from 8C also joined the fray from the flank.Naib Risaldar Jagdeo Singh destroyed 3 pattons in his centurion here.






(Camouflaged Centurion)

4 Cavalry was in desperate straits.It was squeezed on all sides by A and C squadron and had taken devastating losses.Its sister regiment in the 4rth Arm Brigade — 5th Horse was held upby the centurions of B squadron and a troop of AMX supported by massed artillery fire.Petrol and ammunition was low,it could neither move forward nor back.The infantry had been left behind as usual and had been pinned down by Indian artillery fire.The devastating impact of the concentrated fire of the Indian artillery particularly the sextons and 140mm guns commanded by P.C.Jesus can be gauged from an intercepted communication .Maj Gen.Nasir Ahmed Khan,Commander of 1 Armoured Division (GOC) watching the disintegration of his division from the air in a helicopter spoke directly to the 4th armoured Brigade Commander (BC)-

BC: ‘It’s not possible for us to advance any further due to stiff resistance. Heavy enemy shelling has completely pinned us down.’
GOC: ‘It is most important that the advance is continued. Therefore, in the name of Islam, Pakistan and Hillale Jurat, I command you get up and go forward.’
BC: ‘I will do my best but as things are I do not know how the hell I am going to do that. This bloody enemy artillery is knocking the hell out of us and I am afraid at the moment that I can’t do any better then this.’
GOC: ‘Move forward to your objectives forthwith.’
BC: ‘I cannot move; Indians are ahead of me.’
GOC: ‘Come and see me immediately.’
BC: ‘Where do I come? I don’t know.’
GOC: ‘Move straight on and turn right.’
BC: ‘Do you know where I am? If I turn left the Indians get me, if I turn right the artillery gets me. Where do I come and how?’
GOC: ‘Turn right till you hit the road, follow it and you will find me at milpost 36.’

In a desperate attempt to galvanize his men Maj.Gen Nasir attempted to meet up with his beleagured subordinates physically.But his Command troop was ambushed by 4 Grenadiers with recoiless guns.Brigadier Shammi,the divisional artillery commander was killed and Nasir Khan seriously wounded.The pakistani attack now rudderless,came to a standstill and collapsed after this.After dusk all Indian guns opened up in heavy bombardment of the trapped pakistani armour shattering the morale of the survivors completely,and desertion became common.Cut off,unable to retreat due to no petrol ,having lost physical communications with HQ and being steadily decimated 4 cavalry Regimental commander informed HQ barring relief he would surrender on the next morning.

11 SEPTEMBER :





(Surrender and Retreat of Pak armour)

_Endgame -_
In the morning of 11th the Indian centurions closed in from all sides,under fire pakistani crewmen and infantry broke, abandoned their vehicles and fled.A squadron commander Maj Vadera was able to capture 9 Pattons in perfect working condition and an APC.A few hours later regimental commander of 4cavalry surrendered with his surviving squadron commanders and ranks,found hiding in a sugarcane field.

Pakistani 3rd armoured brigade withdrew,being transferred to sialkot sector where Indian pressure was becoming serious.The remnants of 4rth armoured brigade also withdrew.Themauled 5th armoured Brigade was left behind as a covering force.The battle was over.

*AFTERMATH AND ANALYSIS*







AFTERMATH :

In the debacle at Asal uttar Pakistan lost 97 tanks including 75 of the latest pattons.The Indians lost 14 tanks(10 of Deccan horse,4 of 3 cavalry) and some damaged.Equivalent of 2 armoured regiments were wiped off the Pakistani order of battle -with 4 cavalry being physically wiped out as a formation.The Pakistani dream of capturing Punjab with a Fourth Panipat was shattered ,rather in a reverse Panipat its elite strike formation was defeated and Pakistan lost the initiative in the war .And it came at a place fittingly called Asal Uttar (The befitting reply).For the rest of the war the Pakistan Army would be busy mounting a desperate defense to save Lahore from the Indian Army which now had the momentum.Never again would Pakistan be in a position to achieve a decisive victory over India,after 1965 the disparity of forces would grow rapidly and would culminate in the defeat of Pakistan in 1971 and birth of Bangladesh.In this regard Asal Uttar may be regarded as one of the most ,if not the most decisive battle in the history of the Indian Republic.






_On top the 5 MVC recipients — From Left to right(top to bottom) — Maj.Gen Gurbaksh Singh (CO -4th Mtn Div),Lt.col Raghuvir Singh(CO — 18RajRif Battalion),Lt.Col A.Vaidya(CO — 9 Deccan Horse Regiment),Brigadier T.K.Theograj (CO — 2nd Ind Arm Brigade),Lt.col S.Caleb(CO — 3rd Cavalry Regiment)_









(Param Vir Chakra Recipient — Havildar Abdul Hamid)
Nearly a hundred pakistani tanks were assembled after the war near the battle site which came to be known as _‘Patton Nagar._’Foreign military attaches were invited to the display.While American military attaches were shocked at the destruction of so many of the new pattons,the british attache was admittedly delighted at the performance of the Centurion.The German military attache remarked that the_ ‘’Pakistani army’s plan had been bold,but perhaps only the German army could execute such a plan’’_.

The defenders at Asal Uttar were hailed as the_ ‘Saviours of Punjab’ _and 3rd Cavalry added to its name the sobriquet _‘Patton Wreckers’._5 Maha Vir Chakra and 1 Param Vir chakras were awarded as well as many gallantry medals .The local civilian population too rallied behind the army providing shelter in their homes,food and often acting as scouts in which capacity there were fatalities.

ANALYSIS :

Going into the battle Pakistan had all the advantages — it had enormous numerical superiority in armour and artillery,and advantage in quality as well.They had armoured infantry,night fighting equipment and helicopters available to the commander to observe the battle.Despite this the attack failed conclusively.

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE :
The pakistani armour was for the greater part of the battle used piecemeal,which retreated after taking losses.Never in the battle were all the Pakistani armoured regiments committed to the battle simultaneously,though the constricted nature of the bridgehead may have been a cause of this.The Indians repeatedly brought the full concentration of their artillery on needed sectors and in the final tank ambush centurion regiment achieved the most desired result-being able to bring nearly the entire firepower of the regiment on an advancing enemy through excellent deployment.

CO-OPERATION :LACK OF INFANTRY SUPPORT
This was probably one of the biggest reasons.The 11th Mtn divisions infantry brigades never entered the fight in a serious capacity which should have been used to try and clear the indian infantry after the armour failed repeatedly in its frontal charges.The infantry-armour co-operation between the mechanized infantry and the pattons was worse,with the former being left behind and getting pinned down with regularity leaving the latter isolated and even if the tanks made a gain,they were unable to consolidate it due to lack of infantry.Here i think the structure of the Pakistani armoured division was also faulty.It had 5 patton (and another chafee recon regiment) regiments in 3 brigades but this was only supported by 3 mechanized infantry battalions .That is just 1 infantry battalion to support 2 whole armoured regiments.The proportion of infantry was just too low to succesfully carry on the momentum of a penetration,and due to very low numbers were easily pinned down repeatedly.Here an example of the German Panzer Divisions can be taken.They began the war with a very large proportion of tanks ratio over 2:1.As the war wore on and more powerful anti tank defences were encountered in russia by mid-war the proportion had become 1:1 and by late war reversed to 2:1 in some cases.In the Panzer divisions of the post-war Bundeswehr we can see armoured brigades themselves have a ratio of 1:1 in them,but the armoured division also has an integral Panzergrenadier brigade too.German experience showed them the necessity of increased amount supporting infantry when the tanks were faced with dogged infantry supported by tanks,anti-tank weapons and artillery as at Asal Uttar.

COMMAND FAILURE :
Pakistani Staff planning for the operation was quite poor.The engineering preparations were insufficient causing delays in areas which were within pakistani territory and should have been pre planned given the long standing offensive plan.Logistics was shabby,with tanks often running out of petrol.Squadron commanders usually retreated after facing any heavy resistance.Brig Bashir withdrew his regiments from forward areas to leaguer on succesive days.Towards the end of the battle there was widescale desertion and surrender.There was no intermediate Corps HQ between Division and Army HQ which led to poor co-ordination between 1st Armoured Division and 11th Infantry Division.Towards the end of the battle — Chief of Army Staff Muhammad Musa arrived to personally micromanage the battle.As a result despite a brilliant strategic plan there was dismal execution.Indians were lucky ,they had been outfought as far as strategic concentration was concerned but when it came to executing the plan on the ground,the brave ranks and junior officers of the Indian army performed extremely well in foiling the Pakistani offensive despite huge odds.

DILUTION IN TRAINING :
Agha amin,a retired pakistani officer and analyst noted that the rapid expansion of the Pakistani armoured corps from 1958 may have affected the individual crew standards where not all the lessons may have been fully absorbed.The Indians who had not begun serious expansion after 1962 were still in the process of just expanding the armoured corps when the war broke out and thus the armour regiments were more cohesive.





(Jubiliant Civilians atop pattons)

USE OF TERRAIN :
Another key factor in the battle.The Indians contained the Pakistani bridgehead with a forward defense at Asal Uttar ensuring the short frontage of the battlefield would mean a frontal battle against a prepared indian defense,and the pattons would be unable to break out into the open plains where their mobility would be decisive.They also purposedly breached the canals in several areas to bog down pakistani armour and channel them into killzones. Finally excellent use was made of the sugarcane fields to hide the Indian armour and recoiless gun teams in ambush positions which prevented the Pattons from engaging in long range duels where they would have an advantage.At close ranges the patton’s advantage in rangefinding equipment and heavy armour were nullified.

Written by* Austerlitz* on strategicfrontier

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## BL33D

*1971Military Objectives of IAF*

*In East*

Eliminate the PAF at the earliest.
Render maximum assistance to the Army in the form of offensive support, transport and helicopter support and airborne operations.
Assist the Navy to isolate East Bengal from West Pakistan and also ensure that the PAF was not able to interfere with the operations of Indian naval ships and aircraft.
Ensure Air Defence of the area of responsibility.
To provide maritime air support to the Navy.
*In West*

In keeping with the aim of holding operations in the West, the IAF was to accomplish tasks in the following order of priority:
Priority One — Defence of the home bases.
Priority Two — Support to the Army and Navy, including gaining and maintaining favorable air situation over the tactical areas.
Priority Three — Counter air operations against enemy air bases and radar stations, and attacks on strategic targets which had a vital role in sustaining the economy and the war potential of the enemy.
To provide maritime air support to the Navy.

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## Joe Shearer

> The mutiny of the Gilgit Scouts, led by the British citizen, Major Alexander Brown, in August 1947 (?), and their seizing control of Gilgit, ambushing and neutralising State Forces, and attacking down the roadways into Baltistan and onwards into Ladakh (Leh); they were supported by lashkars deputed to their support, but quickly dispensed with; they were opposed by the State Forces that held out in Skardu for a year without relief and reinforcement, and by the regular Indian Army, that opened up Zoji La, relieved Leh and re-captured Kargil.



So far we looked at the account narrated by @PanzerKiel in terms of the uprising of the Sudans, their capture of Muzaffarabad and Rajauri, their siege of Poonch, their declaration of independence, their feting of the tribal lashkars passing through to Baramula, and the armed insurgency that they waged against the Kashmir State Forces, later, against the Indian Army.

The third pulse was the Gilgit Scouts actions, that took them, on foot, all the way to Leh.
(cont.)




BL33D said:


> 1971 Military Objectives
> 
> *In East*
> 
> Eliminate the PAF at the earliest.
> Render maximum assistance to the Army in the form of offensive support, transport and helicopter support and airborne operations.
> Assist the Navy to isolate East Bengal from West Pakistan and also ensure that the PAF was not able to interfere with the operations of Indian naval ships and aircraft.
> Ensure Air Defence of the area of responsibility.
> To provide maritime air support to the Navy.
> 
> View attachment 634133
> 
> 
> *In West*
> 
> In keeping with the aim of holding operations in the West, the IAF was to accomplish tasks in the following order of priority:
> Priority One — Defence of the home bases.
> Priority Two — Support to the Army and Navy, including gaining and maintaining favorable air situation over the tactical areas.
> Priority Three — Counter air operations against enemy air bases and radar stations, and attacks on strategic targets which had a vital role in sustaining the economy and the war potential of the enemy.
> To provide maritime air support to the Navy.



Please clarify that this is about the IAF exclusively. @PanzerKiel was talking in general about the overall objectives of all of the military.

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## PanzerKiel

Coming to individual sectors....

I believe that we have already discussed Kashmir and Sialkot Sectors before, in the previous thread......(maybe we can link that here as well...)

*Well, coming southwards, we have the Lahore Sector
*
The dominant reality of the Lahore sector is the immensely fixed strong defenses constructed since 1947 and steadily improved. Aside from the usual anti-tank ditches and canals, there are fixed strong points and extensive minefields.

1965 saw this sector as the focal point of both sides’ efforts, because Lahore and Amritsar are the main cities in the Punjab. Whereas India launched a three division attack with Lahore as the objective, Pakistan sought to push two divisions through Kasur in a brilliantly conceived effort to outflank the Punjab defences, and run down the open Delhi road.

Later, India denied than Lahore was its objective, but clearly the famous city was a hoped-for prize. Indian attack bogged down (1) on the fixed defences, including the unexpectedly tough resistance put up by the Pakistani Local Defence Units and (2) by the Pakistan Air Force attacks on Indian troops along the Grand Trunk Road. But with 23 Mountain Division coming up to join the attack, and with the prospect of fresh troops from the East, India could have broken through in a second offensive.

The Pakistani attack on Kasur, had it been successful, would have relied more on a psychological effect : two divisions could not have made it to Ambala, leave alone to Delhi. It is possible the intent was otherwise... captured documents by which the targets were assessed as being Ambala and Delhi may not be entirely reliable, as they can represent disinformation, options, or discussions.

We know there was severe pressure on India to withdraw behind the Beas when Pakistan attacked Kasur. This would have left most of Gurdaspur, Ferozpur, and Amritsar Districts to the Pakistanis. But Lt.- Gen. Harbax Singh, GOC Western Command, refused to withdraw. That, and a staunch defence by Indian 4 Mountain and Division and 2 (I) Armored brigade which bogged down Pakistani offensive at Khem Karan, ended the Pakistani hopes.

The battle for Khem Karan shows how misleading are comparison based on a simple analysis of numbers and equipment. Facing the powerful Pakistan 1 Armored and its accompanying 11 Infantry Divisions, with 6 regiments of armor between them, as against India one mountain division and an armored brigade should have been a losing proposition. Particularly so as Pakistan had five regiments of Pattons and one of Chaffers with its two divisions as against Indian Shermans, a much older tank. The Centurion equipped division, 1 Armored Division, was away in the Sialkot sector. 3 Cavalry, which later joined the battle, had Centurions.

(Readers interested in this historic clash should read Lt. Col. Bhupender Singh’ s excellent history of armor in the 1965 war, which along with Major Sita Ram Johri’ s two books on the 1962 war, is the best of the war histories in independent India.)

Theoretically the Pattons should have run through the Shermans like a knife through butter. The Sherman, a World War II veteran, should have been no match for the Patton, a first-line tank even for the U.S. at this time. But the indians were in good. defending positions, the attackers did nor see the defending tanks often till too late (fatal in armored warfare, as the person getting in the first shot usually wins) and, most important, both the Pakistan divisions were not in good combat shape. The 1 Armored had been diluted to raise 6 Armored Division, and the 11 Division was a new formation.

Indian 2(I) Armored Brigade was, on the other hand, an old, experienced formation. Also, India too had six regiments of armor available, so that the inferior characteristics of the defending tanks were not worsened by an inferiority of numbers.

Recalling Khem Karan will be important in our analysis of what may happen in the Punjab if Pakistan attacks in the same manner.

Today Pakistan defends its side of the border with a total of 14-15 brigades as opposed to eight in 1971. Pakistan IV Corps has its HQ at Lahore. This total of almost 15 brigades makes for a strong corps. In 1971, the reserve brigades were not in place, the corps reserve function being performed by one brigade of 17 Division.

Though this sector saw some fairly fierce clashes in 1971, as at Hussainiwala, there were no major battles as neither side thought it worth its time to attempt a breach of the other’s defences.

India in 1971 had its XI Corps with 7 and 14 Divisions around Ferozpur, and 15 Division of four brigades at Amritsar. An ad hoc armored brigade, later to become 6 (I) Armored Brigade, was also available.

India put two divisions at Ferozpur because the Kasur salient permits Pakistan to attack to the north or to the south. And in any case 14 Division detached 114 Brigade to protect Jalalabad-Muktsar, and 35 Brigade to 7 Division.

Because of the strong fixed defences in the northern Punjab sector, there is usually time to bring in reinforcing troops from outside. In 1971, for example, aside from the induction of 14 Division, the deployment of 36 Division to Gurdaspur as part of I Corps shortened 15 Division's sector.

*Coming to Multan Sector*

This area is nowhere near as fortified as from Fazilka northward, it is open terrain, and does not feature the same problems of movement as the true desert. It is also relatively sparsely populated.

In theory, a division should cover 30 kilometers. in World War I frontages were commonly a third of this, but with the development of so many infantry indirect fire weapons, greater mobility, and increases in artillery ranges, the larger frontages were accepted as standard and apply to this day. (There are exceptions, such as the border between the two Koreas, where the division density is greater).

In 1971, we saw that India and Pakistan had a dozen odd divisions for a front extending 1500-kilometers. The average frontage was, thus 150 kilometers, or five times greater than recommended. This was managed by leaving great gaps in the front held by small forces. For example: 51 (I) Parachute Brigade was responsible at the start of the 1971 War for a 250 km frontage. Pakistan, on its side, had only 18 Division to hold the 500 km area between Hyderabad and Karachi.

This was possible because both side had limited mobility, forcing deployments close to the rail terminal nodes. Areas where an enemy could concentrate could be easily identified from the start. Since the North Western rail network had been built for a united India, the terminal nodes were common.

With the improvement in road and rail communications (for example, with the conversion of the meter gauge railways on Indian side in this area to broad gauge), troop densities have steadily increased. Urbanization, semi-urbanization, and cultivation have created fresh obstacles and population. New canals have come up. This is starting to limit the scope of free movement as existed in 1971.

This in turn limits the possibility of concentration for a decisive breakthrough. Taking the Pathankot corridor as an example, Pakistan could theoretically concentrate four divisions against Pathankot: the road network in the area could sustain this build-up. But four divisions will get in each other’s way, as may have happened to India in 1971.

Worse, such a concentration is easily detected, and India would rush equalizing forces into the threatened area. This would again even out the balance and end the hope of decisive action.

But if the troops on both sides were fully mechanized, and if we talk of the room available in the Multan sector, then concentrating overnight anywhere within a 100 or 200 kilometer arc a would become feasible, allowing the full panoply of surprise, deception, and maneuver.

The low density road and rail nets in Multan sector cannot, needless to say, be compared to the high density nets existing further north. Nonetheless, they have improved on both sides , allowing large, multi- corps formations to be deployed. The slowness with which the deployment takes place provides ample opportunity for the other side to react. But a two axis attack can be launched, and the armor strike forces can shift as needed between axes. So while the fact of concentration would be no surprise to Pakistan, the play of armor would. Feints and diversions become possible. This opens up the prospect of victory on strategic scale.

We must, however, keep in mind that these possibilities exist because of Pakistan’ s shortage of troops. A permanent induction of another two divisions, if available, would inhibit any large scale Indian action.

Pakistan suffers because it has to split its strike forces between the north and the south. There is no way, given India’s large superiority in numbers, that the northern army reserve can move southwards to combine with the southern army reserve. India, on the other hand, has no problem concentrating its I and II Strike Corps where it wants, together with several other divisions.

Pakistan holds this area very lightly because it can afford to give up some ground in the face of an Indian attack. There is 14 Division for Suliemanke, 35 Division at Bahawalpur, and, 1 Armored Division at Multan. The running mate of I Armored Division in the southern army reserve is 40 Division from Okara. HQ II Corps is at Multan.

India’s deployments are substantially heavier in infantry, but lighter in armor. HQ X Corps is located at Bhatinda with under command two RAPIDS and 6 (I) Armored Brigade is. 16 Division replaced the old Foxtrot Sector, with brigades at Fazilka and Ganganager, and two in reserve at Chandi Mandir and Kasauli, in Haryana and Himachal respectively. 24 Division from Bikaner is assigned to the area, with one brigade at Suratgarh and three in Bikaner. 18 Division from Kota is in reserve.

Consider for a moment how the front between the two countries has gradually become locked.

In 1947-48, only the Western Kashmir border was fully occupied : the rest of the border was open.

By 1954, when Pakistan acceded to CENTO/SEATO, India deployed the equivalent of a corps in Kashmir (19, 25, 26 Divisions) and a corps in Punjab (Punjab Field Force) with divisions at Ambala, Ferozpur, and Amritsar (4, 5 and probably 27 Divisions: we are unsure about the exact number of the third division, which might in fact have been 20 Division). 1 Armored Division and 2 (I) Armored Brigade were the striking reserves.

Pakistan had no regular forces in Kashmir us such, but had a large deployment of so-called Azad Kashmir troops to match India’s three divisions.

By 1962 India had added 17 Division at Ambala to replace 4 Division sent to NEFA, 23 Division for Nagaland, and 21 Division as a general reserve. Essentially these raisings were for other parts of the country, and the western dispositions remained unchanged.

Pakistan by now had the 12 Division, and the 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 15 Divisions plus the 1 Armored Division and 106 (1) Armored Brigade to match India’ s armor. 7 Division was at Peshawar for internal security in the Tribal Zone and tasked to Kashmir in wartime, 8 was at Quetta for the entire southern part of the country and also for internal security, 9 was at Kharian, 10 was at Lahore, 15 was at Sialkot. 14 Division was at Dacca to cover the eastern wing. Now each side had seven divisions in the west.

In 1962-63 all the Punjab divisions except for 1 Armored had shifted to the east to become mountain divisions: 5, 17, 20 and 27 left, completely denuding the west. This was possible only because of American assurances and Pakistani cooperation. Pakistan was still staunchly anti-Communist in those days, and there was, also, perhaps a greater degree of trust between Ayub and Nehru than between other leaders of the two countries before or since.

Additional to converting all the Punjab divisions to mountain configuration, India also converted 4 and 23 Divisions. It raised 2, 6 and 8 Mountain Divisions. The 3 Division was raised for Ladakh.

For reasons not entirely clear, India now made a mistake. It should have replaced the Punjab forces on a one-to-one basis, raising four new infantry divisions. This would still have given India 13 divisions in all to Pakistan’s 8. With a couple of divisions extra Pakistan could have met the possibility of some India mountain divisions being diverted to the west.

But instead India sanctioned an additional six infantry and one armored division over and above the four replacement infantry divisions and four new raisings for the mountains. All of a sudden Pakistan faced not 10, but 25 Indian divisions with its total of 8. An 8 to 10 disparity was acceptable because of (1 ) the American commitment (2) the standardization of equipment thanks to American aid and (3) Pakistan’ s more compact territory. But an 8 to 25 disparity was potentially disastrous.

The seven extra divisions, beyond the replacement of four division shifted to the east (which included four divisions, available for expansion at short notice) allowed the process of sealing the front to begin.

Pakistan’ s response was marginal because it lacked domestic resources to match the build up. The United States was by now more even handed between India and Pakistan, and refused to consider strengthening Pakistan’s armed forces. Pakistan limited its response to raising only its 6 Armored and 11 Divisions, largely from its scanty reserve equipment stocks.

After the 1965 War India concentrated on filling out the divisions raised earlier, plus expanding the four cadre divisions. Pakistan raised three more divisions 23 for Kashmir, 18 for the desert, and 16 at Quetta to replace 8 Division that went to Sialkot. Now the front on Pakistan’ s side was getting as solid as on India’s, with the difference that Pakistan had very few free reserves.

After the Pakistan Civil War broke out, Pakistan sent 9 and 16 Divisions to the east, replacing them with 17 and 33 Divisions. This heavily increased the deployments in the east.

After 1971 Pakistan closed the Multan sector previously covered by independent brigades by putting 35 Division into Bahawalpur; and by adding to its reserves in Kashmir with 19 Division, Punjab with 9 Division, and the desert sector with 16 and 37 Divisions.

India at first responded slowly to the post-1971 Pakistani build up, because it still remained much stronger than Pakistan, and because many mountain divisions were finally assumed available on a permanent basis for the west. China was now not so feared as before the war, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 being the major comfort. India contented itself with raising only 16 and 18 Divisions for the Multan sector, and 31 Armored Division as a second strike force.

But then starting in 1976 India embarked on a whole new series of raisings, seven divisions in 8 years. Pakistan raised two, but was forced to permanently station four on its western border. This caused a net loss of two divisions on its India border just when India was making available i ts new raisings plus shifts from the east.

Now the entire front between the Nubra in Ladak and Anupgarh is militarized and locked, leaving only the desert and sea flanks open. One supposes that Pakistan will now start sealing off its desert sector, but still the density of troops from Ferozpur southwards will not be as great as to the north, allowing big battles to be fought here.

How can surprise be achieved on a totally locked front? Or do we face the possibility of repeating the Western Front as existed in France and Belgium in World War I, where tens of thousands of men died for gains measured in meters?

Let’s look at Central Europe at the end of cold war. NATO’s eight corps covered 750-kilometers, approaching the idea of 30 kilometers per division. Understandably, the Soviets expect to achieve no surprise as such. They count, instead, on using their massive in-place forces with rapid reinforcement from the heartland, and getting results before the flow of reinforcements and reservists from France, Britain, and the US begins. *In other words, they plan to win the war of mobilization. Pakistan seems to have followed the same pattern in Brass Tacks, Trident, Parakaram etc.*

Soviets understood fully well that if they cannot mobilize faster than NATO, they will get no better than a stalemate.

There is so little possibility of surprise in Central Europe that both sides know,, each others’ moves exactly. Soviet hopes for a quick victory are kept alive by NATO’ s shirking its required peacetime defense effort. If NATO gave its eight forward corps four divisions each plus provided for four reserve corps, the Soviets could not win even by mobilizing faster.

If the Soviets are to win how may they go about their invasion? The same way everyone else goes about it , by attrition warfare.And of course this is not going to work, because the west in the aggregate has much superior resources. But then how did the Germans manage to change the face of Europe in a few months? How did they defeat three of the most formidable armies of the day in quick succession, the Polish, the French, and. the Soviet? Particularly as the French Army, even without the British, Belgian and Dutch reinforcements was considered the most powerful in the world?

They succeeded because (1) they employed a new combination of weapons and tactics and (2) their operational capability was significantly superior to that of their opponents. Even then, the wars were long by our standards: over-running France took six weeks.

The German solution is inapplicable today because all armies are much more professional and better prepared. None will allow such a gap in weapons and tactics to grow as happened between Germany and France. If the India gets better weapons, Pakistan responds ; if India changes is tactics, Pakistan responds. Constant training and education ensure the tactical skill of both sides remains roughly similar.

India cnnnot expect a 1967 Arab-Israeli margin over Pakistan. India can only go the Soviet way, and take advantage of Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to match forces at reasonable levels.

*Thus, for India, it has to be attrition warfare all the way. To plan for anything else is futile since it will be then sacrificing the one big advantage it has, its superior numbers, an advantage which Indian has been unable to cash in any of the previous wars.*

*Coming to Desert Sector......*

Pakistan’ s permanent deployment in the area is small. HQ V Corps is at Karachi, along with 18 Division clearly identified at Hyderabad. Then we have 18 Division and 25 Mech Division as well, along with several independent brigades.

This excludes, of course, Pakistan’ s southern army reserve which can deploy to this area. In as much as the troops from Saudi Arabia and from Quetta take time to arrive in later, the permanent garrison is about 4 divisions.

India’s permanent garrison is normally about 9-12 brigades. India has raised HQ XII Corps out of Jodhpur.

This situation would be perfectly acceptable to Pakistan, except that it has nothing to face the several divisions that will be inducted in the form of the Indian strike corps. 
In 1971 India had its 11 and 12 Divisions, an independent infantry brigade, and a couple of extra tank regiments in the area. It launched 11 Division on the Barmer- Chor axis while 12 Division was to attack from Tanot to Islamgarh and Reti. The 340 (I) Brigade appears to have looked after the Kutch sector.

1*1 Division’s attack succeeded at first, because the Pakistanis simply fell back on Naya Chor, and then dug in*. The Indian attack ground to a halt.

*12 Division was thrown off its schedule by a Pakistani attack from the Reti side, consisting of a brigade of 33 Division and a tank regiment*. The force was attacked by a Hunter fighter detachment from Jodhpur and withdrew after suffering heavy losses but with its mission accomplished: 12 Division was no more a factor in the war.

India’s several raids into Pakistani Kutch were successful in boosting Indian morale, but could be of no strategic value because of the vast emptiness of the area.

Even when backed up to Naya Chor, P*akistan did not commit any brigade other than the one from 33 Division* used in the spoiling attack at Islamgarh. It *utilized, instead, mixed ad hoc forces’ consisting of a few companies of regulars, Rangers, and Mujahids.* Pakistan has always been especially adept at economically employing such forces to delay India’s advances while conserving i ts regulars. It was thus * able to keep in reserve almost its entire forces in Sind.*

The operational problem in the Great Indian Desert is, simply, the sand that lies upto 7 meters deep. In the Mideast and North African Deserts the sand cover is shallow. Bulldozers can quickly sweep paths for advancing troops. Wide ranging maneuver is possible, to the extent that the desert actions of World War 2 have been compared to naval battles finding a flank was always troublesome, because both sides would keep going south of each other.

Tracked vehicles have a low footprint - the weight of a 40-ton T-72 tank is distributed along several square meters of tracks, thus reducing pressure on sand to less than that of a two-ton jeep. The jeep will sink into the sand, the tank will float.

Tracked vehicles can move freely in the desert, but not so their wheeled support and the un-mechanized infantry. Some mobility is provided by low-pressure tired vehicle and by aluminum track-ways. The latter is laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour by specially equipped vehicles.

There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers of matting to help a division across sandy stretches, and laying matting to allow two corps to advance, and two more to operate on their flanks, to distances of hundreds of kilometers.

If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting a quarter of a million troops in the desert, provided a very large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles, wind and its own internal dynamics. This means the roadways have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.

Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.

During the early days of the 1971 War, Mr. K. Subhramanyam suggested that the success in the desert should be reinforced. As advances in other sectors were non-existent or slow, a third division should be committed to the desert. He was told that this was impossible, because our desert terrain required specialized equipment and training: forces from other sectors would not be able to function in this environment at such short notice.

@Joe Shearer @Nilgiri 

Why India has not been able to prevail, and how Pakistan has prevailed uptill now....i believe the answers to these queries are there in the posts of this thread....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Coming to individual sectors....
> 
> I believe that we have already discussed Kashmir and Sialkot Sectors before, in the previous thread......(maybe we can link that here as well...)
> 
> *Well, coming southwards, we have the Lahore Sector
> *
> The dominant reality of the Lahore sector is the immensely fixed strong defenses constructed since 1947 and steadily improved. Aside from the usual anti-tank ditches and canals, there are fixed strong points and extensive minefields.
> 
> 1965 saw this sector as the focal point of both sides’ efforts, because Lahore and Amritsar are the main cities in the Punjab. Whereas India launched a three division attack with Lahore as the objective, Pakistan sought to push two divisions through Kasur in a brilliantly conceived effort to outflank the Punjab defences, and run down the open Delhi road.
> 
> Later, India denied than Lahore was its objective, but clearly the famous city was a hoped-for prize. Indian attack bogged down (1) on the fixed defences, including the unexpectedly tough resistance put up by the Pakistani Local Defence Units and (2) by the Pakistan Air Force attacks on Indian troops along the Grand Trunk Road. But with 23 Mountain Division coming up to join the attack, and with the prospect of fresh troops from the East, India could have broken through in a second offensive.
> 
> The Pakistani attack on Kasur, had it been successful, would have relied more on a psychological effect : two divisions could not have made it to Ambala, leave alone to Delhi. It is possible the intent was otherwise... captured documents by which the targets were assessed as being Ambala and Delhi may not be entirely reliable, as they can represent disinformation, options, or discussions.
> 
> We know there was severe pressure on India to withdraw behind the Beas when Pakistan attacked Kasur. This would have left most of Gurdaspur, Ferozpur, and Amritsar Districts to the Pakistanis. But Lt.- Gen. Harbax Singh, GOC Western Command, refused to withdraw. That, and a staunch defence by Indian 4 Mountain and Division and 2 (I) Armored brigade which bogged down Pakistani offensive at Khem Karan, ended the Pakistani hopes.
> 
> The battle for Khem Karan shows how misleading are comparison based on a simple analysis of numbers and equipment. Facing the powerful Pakistan 1 Armored and its accompanying 11 Infantry Divisions, with 6 regiments of armor between them, as against India one mountain division and an armored brigade should have been a losing proposition. Particularly so as Pakistan had five regiments of Pattons and one of Chaffers with its two divisions as against Indian Shermans, a much older tank. The Centurion equipped division, 1 Armored Division, was away in the Sialkot sector. 3 Cavalry, which later joined the battle, had Centurions.
> 
> (Readers interested in this historic clash should read Lt. Col. Bhupender Singh’ s excellent history of armor in the 1965 war, which along with Major Sita Ram Johri’ s two books on the 1962 war, is the best of the war histories in independent India.)
> 
> Theoretically the Pattons should have run through the Shermans like a knife through butter. The Sherman, a World War II veteran, should have been no match for the Patton, a first-line tank even for the U.S. at this time. But the indians were in good. defending positions, the attackers did nor see the defending tanks often till too late (fatal in armored warfare, as the person getting in the first shot usually wins) and, most important, both the Pakistan divisions were not in good combat shape. The 1 Armored had been diluted to raise 6 Armored Division, and the 11 Division was a new formation.
> 
> Indian 2(I) Armored Brigade was, on the other hand, an old, experienced formation. Also, India too had six regiments of armor available, so that the inferior characteristics of the defending tanks were not worsened by an inferiority of numbers.
> 
> Recalling Khem Karan will be important in our analysis of what may happen in the Punjab if Pakistan attacks in the same manner.
> 
> Today Pakistan defends its side of the border with a total of 14-15 brigades as opposed to eight in 1971. Pakistan IV Corps has its HQ at Lahore. This total of almost 15 brigades makes for a strong corps. In 1971, the reserve brigades were not in place, the corps reserve function being performed by one brigade of 17 Division.
> 
> Though this sector saw some fairly fierce clashes in 1971, as at Hussainiwala, there were no major battles as neither side thought it worth its time to attempt a breach of the other’s defences.
> 
> India in 1971 had its XI Corps with 7 and 14 Divisions around Ferozpur, and 15 Division of four brigades at Amritsar. An ad hoc armored brigade, later to become 6 (I) Armored Brigade, was also available.
> 
> India put two divisions at Ferozpur because the Kasur salient permits Pakistan to attack to the north or to the south. And in any case 14 Division detached 114 Brigade to protect Jalalabad-Muktsar, and 35 Brigade to 7 Division.
> 
> Because of the strong fixed defences in the northern Punjab sector, there is usually time to bring in reinforcing troops from outside. In 1971, for example, aside from the induction of 14 Division, the deployment of 36 Division to Gurdaspur as part of I Corps shortened 15 Division's sector.
> 
> *Coming to Multan Sector*
> 
> This area is nowhere near as fortified as from Fazilka northward, it is open terrain, and does not feature the same problems of movement as the true desert. It is also relatively sparsely populated.
> 
> In theory, a division should cover 30 kilometers. in World War I frontages were commonly a third of this, but with the development of so many infantry indirect fire weapons, greater mobility, and increases in artillery ranges, the larger frontages were accepted as standard and apply to this day. (There are exceptions, such as the border between the two Koreas, where the division density is greater).
> 
> In 1971, we saw that India and Pakistan had a dozen odd divisions for a front extending 1500-kilometers. The average frontage was, thus 150 kilometers, or five times greater than recommended. This was managed by leaving great gaps in the front held by small forces. For example: 51 (I) Parachute Brigade was responsible at the start of the 1971 War for a 250 km frontage. Pakistan, on its side, had only 18 Division to hold the 500 km area between Hyderabad and Karachi.
> 
> This was possible because both side had limited mobility, forcing deployments close to the rail terminal nodes. Areas where an enemy could concentrate could be easily identified from the start. Since the North Western rail network had been built for a united India, the terminal nodes were common.
> 
> With the improvement in road and rail communications (for example, with the conversion of the meter gauge railways on Indian side in this area to broad gauge), troop densities have steadily increased. Urbanization, semi-urbanization, and cultivation have created fresh obstacles and population. New canals have come up. This is starting to limit the scope of free movement as existed in 1971.
> 
> This in turn limits the possibility of concentration for a decisive breakthrough. Taking the Pathankot corridor as an example, Pakistan could theoretically concentrate four divisions against Pathankot: the road network in the area could sustain this build-up. But four divisions will get in each other’s way, as may have happened to India in 1971.
> 
> Worse, such a concentration is easily detected, and India would rush equalizing forces into the threatened area. This would again even out the balance and end the hope of decisive action.
> 
> But if the troops on both sides were fully mechanized, and if we talk of the room available in the Multan sector, then concentrating overnight anywhere within a 100 or 200 kilometer arc a would become feasible, allowing the full panoply of surprise, deception, and maneuver.
> 
> The low density road and rail nets in Multan sector cannot, needless to say, be compared to the high density nets existing further north. Nonetheless, they have improved on both sides , allowing large, multi- corps formations to be deployed. The slowness with which the deployment takes place provides ample opportunity for the other side to react. But a two axis attack can be launched, and the armor strike forces can shift as needed between axes. So while the fact of concentration would be no surprise to Pakistan, the play of armor would. Feints and diversions become possible. This opens up the prospect of victory on strategic scale.
> 
> We must, however, keep in mind that these possibilities exist because of Pakistan’ s shortage of troops. A permanent induction of another two divisions, if available, would inhibit any large scale Indian action.
> 
> Pakistan suffers because it has to split its strike forces between the north and the south. There is no way, given India’s large superiority in numbers, that the northern army reserve can move southwards to combine with the southern army reserve. India, on the other hand, has no problem concentrating its I and II Strike Corps where it wants, together with several other divisions.
> 
> Pakistan holds this area very lightly because it can afford to give up some ground in the face of an Indian attack. There is 14 Division for Suliemanke, 35 Division at Bahawalpur, and, 1 Armored Division at Multan. The running mate of I Armored Division in the southern army reserve is 40 Division from Okara. HQ II Corps is at Multan.
> 
> India’s deployments are substantially heavier in infantry, but lighter in armor. HQ X Corps is located at Bhatinda with under command two RAPIDS and 6 (I) Armored Brigade is. 16 Division replaced the old Foxtrot Sector, with brigades at Fazilka and Ganganager, and two in reserve at Chandi Mandir and Kasauli, in Haryana and Himachal respectively. 24 Division from Bikaner is assigned to the area, with one brigade at Suratgarh and three in Bikaner. 18 Division from Kota is in reserve.
> 
> Consider for a moment how the front between the two countries has gradually become locked.
> 
> In 1947-48, only the Western Kashmir border was fully occupied : the rest of the border was open.
> 
> By 1954, when Pakistan acceded to CENTO/SEATO, India deployed the equivalent of a corps in Kashmir (19, 25, 26 Divisions) and a corps in Punjab (Punjab Field Force) with divisions at Ambala, Ferozpur, and Amritsar (4, 5 and probably 27 Divisions: we are unsure about the exact number of the third division, which might in fact have been 20 Division). 1 Armored Division and 2 (I) Armored Brigade were the striking reserves.
> 
> Pakistan had no regular forces in Kashmir us such, but had a large deployment of so-called Azad Kashmir troops to match India’s three divisions.
> 
> By 1962 India had added 17 Division at Ambala to replace 4 Division sent to NEFA, 23 Division for Nagaland, and 21 Division as a general reserve. Essentially these raisings were for other parts of the country, and the western dispositions remained unchanged.
> 
> Pakistan by now had the 12 Division, and the 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 15 Divisions plus the 1 Armored Division and 106 (1) Armored Brigade to match India’ s armor. 7 Division was at Peshawar for internal security in the Tribal Zone and tasked to Kashmir in wartime, 8 was at Quetta for the entire southern part of the country and also for internal security, 9 was at Kharian, 10 was at Lahore, 15 was at Sialkot. 14 Division was at Dacca to cover the eastern wing. Now each side had seven divisions in the west.
> 
> In 1962-63 all the Punjab divisions except for 1 Armored had shifted to the east to become mountain divisions: 5, 17, 20 and 27 left, completely denuding the west. This was possible only because of American assurances and Pakistani cooperation. Pakistan was still staunchly anti-Communist in those days, and there was, also, perhaps a greater degree of trust between Ayub and Nehru than between other leaders of the two countries before or since.
> 
> Additional to converting all the Punjab divisions to mountain configuration, India also converted 4 and 23 Divisions. It raised 2, 6 and 8 Mountain Divisions. The 3 Division was raised for Ladakh.
> 
> For reasons not entirely clear, India now made a mistake. It should have replaced the Punjab forces on a one-to-one basis, raising four new infantry divisions. This would still have given India 13 divisions in all to Pakistan’s 8. With a couple of divisions extra Pakistan could have met the possibility of some India mountain divisions being diverted to the west.
> 
> But instead India sanctioned an additional six infantry and one armored division over and above the four replacement infantry divisions and four new raisings for the mountains. All of a sudden Pakistan faced not 10, but 25 Indian divisions with its total of 8. An 8 to 10 disparity was acceptable because of (1 ) the American commitment (2) the standardization of equipment thanks to American aid and (3) Pakistan’ s more compact territory. But an 8 to 25 disparity was potentially disastrous.
> 
> The seven extra divisions, beyond the replacement of four division shifted to the east (which included four divisions, available for expansion at short notice) allowed the process of sealing the front to begin.
> 
> Pakistan’ s response was marginal because it lacked domestic resources to match the build up. The United States was by now more even handed between India and Pakistan, and refused to consider strengthening Pakistan’s armed forces. Pakistan limited its response to raising only its 6 Armored and 11 Divisions, largely from its scanty reserve equipment stocks.
> 
> After the 1965 War India concentrated on filling out the divisions raised earlier, plus expanding the four cadre divisions. Pakistan raised three more divisions 23 for Kashmir, 18 for the desert, and 16 at Quetta to replace 8 Division that went to Sialkot. Now the front on Pakistan’ s side was getting as solid as on India’s, with the difference that Pakistan had very few free reserves.
> 
> After the Pakistan Civil War broke out, Pakistan sent 9 and 16 Divisions to the east, replacing them with 17 and 33 Divisions. This heavily increased the deployments in the east.
> 
> After 1971 Pakistan closed the Multan sector previously covered by independent brigades by putting 35 Division into Bahawalpur; and by adding to its reserves in Kashmir with 19 Division, Punjab with 9 Division, and the desert sector with 16 and 37 Divisions.
> 
> India at first responded slowly to the post-1971 Pakistani build up, because it still remained much stronger than Pakistan, and because many mountain divisions were finally assumed available on a permanent basis for the west. China was now not so feared as before the war, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 being the major comfort. India contented itself with raising only 16 and 18 Divisions for the Multan sector, and 31 Armored Division as a second strike force.
> 
> But then starting in 1976 India embarked on a whole new series of raisings, seven divisions in 8 years. Pakistan raised two, but was forced to permanently station four on its western border. This caused a net loss of two divisions on its India border just when India was making available i ts new raisings plus shifts from the east.
> 
> Now the entire front between the Nubra in Ladak and Anupgarh is militarized and locked, leaving only the desert and sea flanks open. One supposes that Pakistan will now start sealing off its desert sector, but still the density of troops from Ferozpur southwards will not be as great as to the north, allowing big battles to be fought here.
> 
> How can surprise be achieved on a totally locked front? Or do we face the possibility of repeating the Western Front as existed in France and Belgium in World War I, where tens of thousands of men died for gains measured in meters?
> 
> Let’s look at Central Europe at the end of cold war. NATO’s eight corps covered 750-kilometers, approaching the idea of 30 kilometers per division. Understandably, the Soviets expect to achieve no surprise as such. They count, instead, on using their massive in-place forces with rapid reinforcement from the heartland, and getting results before the flow of reinforcements and reservists from France, Britain, and the US begins. *In other words, they plan to win the war of mobilization. Pakistan seems to have followed the same pattern in Brass Tacks, Trident, Parakaram etc.*
> 
> Soviets understood fully well that if they cannot mobilize faster than NATO, they will get no better than a stalemate.
> 
> There is so little possibility of surprise in Central Europe that both sides know,, each others’ moves exactly. Soviet hopes for a quick victory are kept alive by NATO’ s shirking its required peacetime defense effort. If NATO gave its eight forward corps four divisions each plus provided for four reserve corps, the Soviets could not win even by mobilizing faster.
> 
> If the Soviets are to win how may they go about their invasion? The same way everyone else goes about it , by attrition warfare.And of course this is not going to work, because the west in the aggregate has much superior resources. But then how did the Germans manage to change the face of Europe in a few months? How did they defeat three of the most formidable armies of the day in quick succession, the Polish, the French, and. the Soviet? Particularly as the French Army, even without the British, Belgian and Dutch reinforcements was considered the most powerful in the world?
> 
> They succeeded because (1) they employed a new combination of weapons and tactics and (2) their operational capability was significantly superior to that of their opponents. Even then, the wars were long by our standards: over-running France took six weeks.
> 
> The German solution is inapplicable today because all armies are much more professional and better prepared. None will allow such a gap in weapons and tactics to grow as happened between Germany and France. If the India gets better weapons, Pakistan responds ; if India changes is tactics, Pakistan responds. Constant training and education ensure the tactical skill of both sides remains roughly similar.
> 
> India cnnnot expect a 1967 Arab-Israeli margin over Pakistan. India can only go the Soviet way, and take advantage of Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to match forces at reasonable levels.
> 
> *Thus, for India, it has to be attrition warfare all the way. To plan for anything else is futile since it will be then sacrificing the one big advantage it has, its superior numbers, an advantage which Indian has been unable to cash in any of the previous wars.*
> 
> *Coming to Desert Sector......*
> 
> Pakistan’ s permanent deployment in the area is small. HQ V Corps is at Karachi, along with 18 Division clearly identified at Hyderabad. Then we have 18 Division and 25 Mech Division as well, along with several independent brigades.
> 
> This excludes, of course, Pakistan’ s southern army reserve which can deploy to this area. In as much as the troops from Saudi Arabia and from Quetta take time to arrive in later, the permanent garrison is about 4 divisions.
> 
> India’s permanent garrison is normally about 9-12 brigades. India has raised HQ XII Corps out of Jodhpur.
> 
> This situation would be perfectly acceptable to Pakistan, except that it has nothing to face the several divisions that will be inducted in the form of the Indian strike corps.
> In 1971 India had its 11 and 12 Divisions, an independent infantry brigade, and a couple of extra tank regiments in the area. It launched 11 Division on the Barmer- Chor axis while 12 Division was to attack from Tanot to Islamgarh and Reti. The 340 (I) Brigade appears to have looked after the Kutch sector.
> 
> 1*1 Division’s attack succeeded at first, because the Pakistanis simply fell back on Naya Chor, and then dug in*. The Indian attack ground to a halt.
> 
> *12 Division was thrown off its schedule by a Pakistani attack from the Reti side, consisting of a brigade of 33 Division and a tank regiment*. The force was attacked by a Hunter fighter detachment from Jodhpur and withdrew after suffering heavy losses but with its mission accomplished: 12 Division was no more a factor in the war.
> 
> India’s several raids into Pakistani Kutch were successful in boosting Indian morale, but could be of no strategic value because of the vast emptiness of the area.
> 
> Even when backed up to Naya Chor, P*akistan did not commit any brigade other than the one from 33 Division* used in the spoiling attack at Islamgarh. It *utilized, instead, mixed ad hoc forces’ consisting of a few companies of regulars, Rangers, and Mujahids.* Pakistan has always been especially adept at economically employing such forces to delay India’s advances while conserving i ts regulars. It was thus * able to keep in reserve almost its entire forces in Sind.*
> 
> The operational problem in the Great Indian Desert is, simply, the sand that lies upto 7 meters deep. In the Mideast and North African Deserts the sand cover is shallow. Bulldozers can quickly sweep paths for advancing troops. Wide ranging maneuver is possible, to the extent that the desert actions of World War 2 have been compared to naval battles finding a flank was always troublesome, because both sides would keep going south of each other.
> 
> Tracked vehicles have a low footprint - the weight of a 40-ton T-72 tank is distributed along several square meters of tracks, thus reducing pressure on sand to less than that of a two-ton jeep. The jeep will sink into the sand, the tank will float.
> 
> Tracked vehicles can move freely in the desert, but not so their wheeled support and the un-mechanized infantry. Some mobility is provided by low-pressure tired vehicle and by aluminum track-ways. The latter is laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour by specially equipped vehicles.
> 
> There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers of matting to help a division across sandy stretches, and laying matting to allow two corps to advance, and two more to operate on their flanks, to distances of hundreds of kilometers.
> 
> If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting a quarter of a million troops in the desert, provided a very large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles, wind and its own internal dynamics. This means the roadways have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.
> 
> Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.
> 
> During the early days of the 1971 War, Mr. K. Subhramanyam suggested that the success in the desert should be reinforced. As advances in other sectors were non-existent or slow, a third division should be committed to the desert. He was told that this was impossible, because our desert terrain required specialized equipment and training: forces from other sectors would not be able to function in this environment at such short notice.
> 
> @Joe Shearer @Nilgiri
> 
> Why India has not been able to prevail, and how Pakistan has prevailed uptill now....i believe the answers to these queries are there in the posts of this thread....



Superb.


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## PanzerKiel

I'll not be posting now......just to make sure to give enough time to everyone to let all, whatever has been already reflected, to sink in and get absorbed.

But ofcourse, am always available to answer any queries...

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## Joe Shearer

A few brief comments:

In fact, substantial economies are possible in the Indian deployment, if India keeps to the present high momentum of infrastructure building. From Uri to Poonch is 35 kms as the crow flies; it is 270 kms by road. The entire road stretch has to be patrolled, as it passes through some of the greatest population densities in the Vale, with all the consequential possibilities for friction that arise when massive troop movements take place regularly right through the middle of civilian thoroughfares.
There is a strong case for a circular road around the rim of the Valley. It is desirable that the military should be as little as possible sharing roads and living spaces with an exasperated population; out of sight, out of mind. 
A second benefit besides social distancing  of the Army and CAPF would be the vastly increased efficiency of road protection and the ability for Corps Commander XV Corps to shuffle his cards as he pleases, without worrying about the truly yogic manoeuvres that he presently has to undergo to send a brigade from A to B.
The Indian Army and the CAPF (BSF and CRPF) live under canvas. Putting in cantonments at the right places will hugely increase the availability and the good health of the deployed troops.
Looking at the list of air strips available within the Vale is instructive, in several senses. The air strips are intended for civilian traffic, not for military traffic, not in the way that Srinagar is equipped to handle warplanes. Therefore instructive, since it instructs our planners that more air strips OUTSIDE densely populated areas will help the air force immensely, although the additional air defence will also increase proportionately.
For both the Shakargarh salient and the Kasur salient, perhaps India is looking at the wrong formations to stop any Pakistan movement against the deployed troops. Instead of placing human flesh as a barricade, it is better to concentrate on what India can organise with greater speed, in lesser time, overall - artillery, both tubed and tubeless.
The final point is about the role of the Mountain Divisions. These are different from ordinary divisions insofar as they are stripped of certain additional resources to allow a light footprint in mountain warfare. That does not help, indeed, it becomes a burden when the Division is re-deployed to the Pakistani front from the Chinese front. This is a discussion by itself, but I hope the hint will allow readers to fill in the blanks.
I would like to concentrate on finishing the commentary of the 1947-48 conflict, including the lessons to be learnt and the impact of these developments on logistics and on support, before going into further detail on this truly superb summation.

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## PanzerKiel

PanzerKiel said:


> I'll not be posting now......just to make sure to give enough time to everyone to let all, whatever has been already reflected, to sink in and get absorbed.
> 
> But ofcourse, am always available to answer any queries...



previous posts...
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334338
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334888
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-9#post-12331302
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-7#post-12328984

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> I'll not be posting now......just to make sure to give enough time to everyone to let all, whatever has been already reflected, to sink in and get absorbed.
> 
> But ofcourse, am always available to answer any queries...



LOL.

You have given enough food for thought, more so for Indian readers than for Pakistani.

A knowledgeable friend of mine consoled me the other day when I was expressing great discomfort over the level of young officers in the Pakistan Army. "Look at your batch, Sir," he said. I was wondering what my IIM batch had to do with all this. "I mean your NDA batch," he clarified. I pointed out that most of them had retired between 2005 and 2010. "No, no, look at their quality!" It was a sobering reflection.

"For every one officer of the sort you are stressing about, there are nine others, at least five of whom are at one or two levels higher, who are duds."

The world looked brighter. He dimmed the lights with his next remark.

"It is exactly the same in the Indian Army, only we are bigger, so we have more duds."

My friend's NDA batch are at Lt. Col and Col., Group Captain and naval Captain levels, so he should know.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> LOL.
> 
> You have given enough food for thought, more so for Indian readers than for Pakistani.
> 
> A knowledgeable friend of mine consoled me the other day when I was expressing great discomfort over the level of young officers in the Pakistan Army. "Look at your batch, Sir," he said. I was wondering what my IIM batch had to do with all this. "I mean your NDA batch," he clarified. I pointed out that most of them had retired between 2005 and 2010. "No, no, look at their quality!" It was a sobering reflection.
> 
> "For every one officer of the sort you are stressing about, there are nine others, at least five of whom are at senior levels, who are duds."
> 
> The world looked brighter. He dimmed the lights with his next remark.
> 
> "It is exactly the same in the Indian Army, only we are bigger, so we have more duds."
> 
> My friend's NDA batch are at Lt. Col and Col., Group Captain and naval Captain levels, so he should know.



Interesting....

another hidden aim, for whatever i have presented in the past few days, is to give something to the Pakistani readers as well.

Due to obvious reasons, we also hear recriminations about Pakistan Army, its leadership, that isnt good, that it wasnt able to perform or win any wars in the past...

i just want to say one thing...in real life, numbers do matter, and Pakistan having denied India victory in conventional wars, or deterring Indian to go to war in Brass Tacks, Trident, Parakaram etc....if seen from a critical, military eye....are no small feats......purely going by the numbers game, we were gone in 1948 maybe....but look today, an atomic power and a credible army.....

so....food for thought for people living on both sides of the border....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Interesting....
> 
> another hidden aim, for whatever i have presented in the past few days, is to give something to the Pakistani readers as well.
> 
> Due to obvious reasons, we also hear recriminations about Pakistan Army, its leadership, that isnt good, that it wasnt able to perform or win any wars in the past...
> 
> i just want to say one thing...in real life, numbers do matter, and Pakistan having denied India victory in conventional wars, or deterring Indian to go to war in Brass Tacks, Trident, Parakaram etc....if seen from a critical, military eye....are no small feats......purely going by the numbers game, we were gone in 1948 maybe....but look today, an atomic power and a credible army.....
> 
> so....food for thought for people living on both sides of the border....



The Pakistan Army has shown resilience and the ability to learn from its mistakes, and also to innovate with available resources to build up strong defences - a useful reference is its use of HAT and LAT formations. To be honest, our real enemy is not the Army.



PanzerKiel said:


> Interesting....
> 
> another hidden aim, for whatever i have presented in the past few days, is to give something to the Pakistani readers as well.
> 
> Due to obvious reasons, we also hear recriminations about Pakistan Army, its leadership, that isnt good, that it wasnt able to perform or win any wars in the past...
> 
> i just want to say one thing...in real life, numbers do matter, and Pakistan having denied India victory in conventional wars, or deterring Indian to go to war in Brass Tacks, Trident, Parakaram etc....if seen from a critical, military eye....are no small feats......purely going by the numbers game, we were gone in 1948 maybe....but look today, an atomic power and a credible army.....
> 
> so....food for thought for people living on both sides of the border....



Also, showing that the opponent has not been able to suffocate the PA with overwhelming bulk is victory by itself. The key, I think, is the amazing quick reactions that the smaller force has displayed.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> The Pakistan Army has shown resilience and the ability to learn from its mistakes, and also to innovate with available resources to build up strong defences - a useful reference is its use of HAT and LAT formations. To be honest, our real enemy is not the Army.
> 
> 
> 
> Also, showing that the opponent has not been able to suffocate the PA with overwhelming bulk is victory by itself. The key, I think, is the amazing quick reactions that the smaller force has displayed.



Take the example of Ex Brass Tacks....1987.....just to show how PA leadership had been transformed by then due to a number of factors between 1971 and 1980s...hardly a decade and a half.....

In a curious way, the positions of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders were reversed in 1987. In 1971 , Mrs. Gandhi backed by a galaxy of brilliant advisors, kept a politically naive Field Marshal Yahya Khan dancing to her tune. In 1986/87, it was an astute General Zia backed by some of the best advisors Pakistan has ever had who kept Indian leadership dancing to his tune.

General Zia was a man of iron self-control. He had the measure of his stronger adversary and played him like a master fisherman playing a powerful shark -- one wrong move and the shark will destroy the fisherman. But with cunning, guile, and an enormous moral strength, the fisherman can defeat the shark. And this is exactly what General Zia had been doing.

and let me tell you....its been 50 years since 1971.....its a long time....



Joe Shearer said:


> The Pakistan Army has shown resilience and the ability to learn from its mistakes, and also to innovate with available resources to build up strong defences - a useful reference is its use of HAT and LAT formations. To be honest, our real enemy is not the Army.
> 
> 
> 
> Also, showing that the opponent has not been able to suffocate the PA with overwhelming bulk is victory by itself. The key, I think, is the amazing quick reactions that the smaller force has displayed.



*or take the example of PAF*

The PAF has always been far smaller than the IAF. The ratio has never been as bad as 1953, when India had about ten jet fighter squadrons to one of Pakistan’s but it has never been better than three-to-one. With resources being so tight, the P.A.F. has always striven to get the best return from a small force.

The PAF reached its peak about 1960. It had ten combat squadrons, seven on the F-86 Sabre, two on B- 57 (the American version of the Canberra) and one on the F- 104 Starfighter, and about 160 combat aircraft. The IAF had about 500 aircraft in 25 large squadrons. *The small Pakistani force operated....and still operates with high efficiency, learning quickly from its American mentors that a small number of highly professional pilots flying standardized aircraft, and backed up with first class maintenance and a well-organized air base system costs less, and is more powerful, than a larger, more disorganized force.
Performance of PAF is in front of us.*

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Take the example of Ex Brass Tacks....1987.....just to show how PA leadership had been transformed by then due to a number of factors between 1971 and 1980s...hardly a decade and a half.....
> 
> In a curious way, the positions of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders were reversed in 1987. In 1971 , Mrs. Gandhi backed by a galaxy of brilliant advisors, kept a politically naive Field Marshal Yahya Khan dancing to her tune. In 1986/87, it was an astute General Zia backed by some of the best advisors Pakistan has ever had who kept Indian leadership dancing to his tune.
> 
> General Zia was a man of iron self-control. He had the measure of his stronger adversary and played him like a master fisherman playing a powerful shark -- one wrong move and the shark will destroy the fisherman. But with cunning, guile, and an enormous moral strength, the fisherman can defeat the shark. And this is exactly what General Zia had been doing.
> 
> and let me tell you....its been 50 years since 1971.....its a long time....



I intend to go into a crouching foetal position on this one, and to say that the leadership we had in 86-87 was among the most inept and accident-prone. Playing Rajiv Gandhi was more playing a gigantic earth-worm than a shark. For us to face Zia when we were being led by this dunderhead was really unfair.



PanzerKiel said:


> Take the example of Ex Brass Tacks....1987.....just to show how PA leadership had been transformed by then due to a number of factors between 1971 and 1980s...hardly a decade and a half.....
> 
> In a curious way, the positions of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders were reversed in 1987. In 1971 , Mrs. Gandhi backed by a galaxy of brilliant advisors, kept a politically naive Field Marshal Yahya Khan dancing to her tune. In 1986/87, it was an astute General Zia backed by some of the best advisors Pakistan has ever had who kept Indian leadership dancing to his tune.
> 
> General Zia was a man of iron self-control. He had the measure of his stronger adversary and played him like a master fisherman playing a powerful shark -- one wrong move and the shark will destroy the fisherman. But with cunning, guile, and an enormous moral strength, the fisherman can defeat the shark. And this is exactly what General Zia had been doing.
> 
> and let me tell you....its been 50 years since 1971.....its a long time....
> 
> 
> 
> *or take the example of PAF*
> 
> The PAF has always been far smaller than the IAF. The ratio has never been as bad as 1953, when India had about ten jet fighter squadrons to one of Pakistan’s but it has never been better than three-to-one. With resources being so tight, the P.A.F. has always striven to get the best return from a small force.
> 
> The PAF reached its peak about 1960. It had ten combat squadrons, seven on the F-86 Sabre, two on B- 57 (the American version of the Canberra) and one on the F- 104 Starfighter, and about 160 combat aircraft. The IAF had about 500 aircraft in 25 large squadrons. *The small Pakistani force operated....and still operates with high efficiency, learning quickly from its American mentors that a small number of highly professional pilots flying standardized aircraft, and backed up with first class maintenance and a well-organized air base system costs less, and is more powerful, than a larger, more disorganized force.
> Performance of PAF is in front of us.*









Very helpful. Thank you very much.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I intend to go into a crouching foetal position on this one, and to say that the leadership we had in 86-87 was among the most inept and accident-prone. Playing Rajiv Gandhi was more playing a gigantic earth-worm than a shark. For us to face Zia when we were being led by this dunderhead was really unfair.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Very helpful. Thank you very much.



I always believe that Gen Sundarji and Arun Singh were on one side....the side which wanted war.....rest everyone was on the other side.....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> I always believe that Gen Sundarji and Arun Singh were on one side....the side which wanted war.....rest everyone was on the other side.....



I also think so, but @jbgt90 should be answering this one. His array of documentation on that period is unique.



PanzerKiel said:


> Take the example of Ex Brass Tacks....1987.....just to show how PA leadership had been transformed by then due to a number of factors between 1971 and 1980s...hardly a decade and a half.....
> 
> In a curious way, the positions of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders were reversed in 1987. In 1971 , Mrs. Gandhi backed by a galaxy of brilliant advisors, kept a politically naive Field Marshal Yahya Khan dancing to her tune. In 1986/87, it was an astute General Zia backed by some of the best advisors Pakistan has ever had who kept Indian leadership dancing to his tune.
> 
> General Zia was a man of iron self-control. He had the measure of his stronger adversary and played him like a master fisherman playing a powerful shark -- one wrong move and the shark will destroy the fisherman. But with cunning, guile, and an enormous moral strength, the fisherman can defeat the shark. And this is exactly what General Zia had been doing.
> 
> and let me tell you....its been 50 years since 1971.....its a long time....
> 
> 
> 
> *or take the example of PAF*
> 
> The PAF has always been far smaller than the IAF. The ratio has never been as bad as 1953, when India had about ten jet fighter squadrons to one of Pakistan’s but it has never been better than three-to-one. With resources being so tight, the P.A.F. has always striven to get the best return from a small force.
> 
> The PAF reached its peak about 1960. It had ten combat squadrons, seven on the F-86 Sabre, two on B- 57 (the American version of the Canberra) and one on the F- 104 Starfighter, and about 160 combat aircraft. The IAF had about 500 aircraft in 25 large squadrons. *The small Pakistani force operated....and still operates with high efficiency, learning quickly from its American mentors that a small number of highly professional pilots flying standardized aircraft, and backed up with first class maintenance and a well-organized air base system costs less, and is more powerful, than a larger, more disorganized force.
> Performance of PAF is in front of us.*



At the broadest level, and without any wish to offend, it is quite clear that the PAF is Pakistan's top service, followed by the PA, and both trailed by the PN. The Indian sequence is different, with the Navy perhaps the best. The point is that the PAF displayed something special in recent aerial clashes - mission-planning and execution capability. I don't think the IAF top leadership went wrong; it was the operational commanders who messed up, in multiple ways.

I will respond to your invitation to talk about all three services once the appropriate moment comes, while discussing 1965. Right now, a little bit more is needed to be done about presenting the facts about 1947-48, and that should be finished by tomorrow noon.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I will respond to your invitation to talk about all three services once the appropriate moment comes, while discussing 1965. Right now, a little bit more is needed to be done about presenting the facts about 1947-48, and that should be finished by tomorrow noon.



I always love to discuss about airforce and navies, as much as about Armies.....lets wait for that opportunity then....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> I'll not be posting now......just to make sure to give enough time to everyone to let all, whatever has been already reflected, to sink in and get absorbed.
> 
> But ofcourse, am always available to answer any queries...



It is interesting to speculate if any of your readers has read between your lines, and realised that you have put things in such a way that the future course of action for the Indian military defines itself. It is easier said, and thought, than done, but the logic is inescapable.

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## PanzerKiel

PanzerKiel said:


> I always love to discuss about airforce and navies, as much as about Armies.....lets wait for that opportunity then....



...since being brought-up in the best of tri-services traditions, am a great believer of tri-services synergy.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> I always love to discuss about airforce and navies, as much as about Armies.....lets wait for that opportunity then....



Having been born a Virgo, you must forgive me while I cross every 't' and dot every 'i'. I will hurry as much as I can.



PanzerKiel said:


> ...since being brought-up in the best of tri-services traditions, am a great believer of tri-services synergy.



My case is different, and my loyalty is bound to one service. The original of the device of a unit named 310 Squadron was painted by my mother. Its _original_ aircraft were inducted by her brother.

So let us give it one more day.

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## notorious_eagle

Joe Shearer said:


> The point is that the PAF displayed something special in recent aerial clashes - mission-planning and execution capability. I don't think the IAF top leadership went wrong; *it was the operational commanders who messed up, in multiple ways.*



Sir, thank you for bringing up this topic. I would love to get your feedback on this topic in regards to IAF's performance on Feb 27. 

IAF has top coverage in the form of Swordfish and Phalcons. Both these assets are data-linked providing the Indian C4I the ability to look deep inside Pakistan and share that information live with all the Sector Commanders. My question is, why didn't IAF pick up PAF's incoming strike package when it was expected that PAF would retaliate and the border was hot. From the limited information we have about IAF, it does not appear that the Phalcons were Airborne during the time of the confrontation. That would explain why the IAF interceptors were having an incredible tough time getting a comprehensive picture of the battlefield. The Swordfish and Phalcons are incredibly potent assets which clearly were not utilized to their full capacity. 

Where do you think the gaps were? Also, please expand on the part i highlighted bold? 

Please and Thank You

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## Gryphon

Joe Shearer said:


> The final point is about the role of the Mountain Divisions. These are different from ordinary divisions insofar as they are stripped of certain additional resources to allow a light footprint in mountain warfare. That does not help, indeed, it becomes a burden when the Division is re-deployed to the Pakistani front from the Chinese front. This is a discussion by itself, but I hope the hint will allow readers to fill in the blanks.



(Plains) Infantry Div = 3/4× Infantry Brigades + Arty Brigade + Armd Regiment

(Mountain) Infantry Div = *at least* 3× Infantry Brigades + Arty Brigade + (I) Armd Squadron [optional]*

*Applies to PA 12th Div + 19th Div + FCNA and to all IA Mountain Div's.

So, I don't see exactly what resources the MD's are lacking given their potential to absorb an (I) Mech or Armd Bde [into their ORBAT] while operating in the plains.

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## Joe Shearer

Gryphon said:


> (Plains) Infantry Div = 3/4× Infantry Brigades + Arty Brigade + Armd Regiment
> 
> (Mountain) Infantry Div = *at least* 3× Infantry Brigades + Arty Brigade + (I) Armd Squadron [optional]*
> 
> *Applies to PA 12th Div + 19th Div + FCNA and to all IA Mountain Div's.
> 
> So, I don't see exactly what resources the MD's are lacking given their potential to absorb an (I) Mech or Armd Bde [into their ORBAT] while operating in the plains.



That is IF there is armour or mechanised infantry attached to a Mountain Div on re-deployment in the plains. That soaks up an otherwise independent armoured brigade straightaway.

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## TsAr

@PanzerKiel and @Joe Shearer please also enlighten us as to what measures were taken and discussed by both the armies after apparent failure to achieve their targets.

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## Joe Shearer

notorious_eagle said:


> Sir, thank you for bringing up this topic. I would love to get your feedback on this topic in regards to IAF's performance on Feb 27.
> 
> IAF has top coverage in the form of Swordfish and Phalcons. Both these assets are data-linked providing the Indian C4I the ability to look deep inside Pakistan and share that information live with all the Sector Commanders. My question is, why didn't IAF pick up PAF's incoming strike package when it was expected that PAF would retaliate and the border was hot. From the limited information we have about IAF, it does not appear that the Phalcons were Airborne during the time of the confrontation. That would explain why the IAF interceptors were having an incredible tough time getting a comprehensive picture of the battlefield. The Swordfish and Phalcons are incredibly potent assets which clearly were not utilized to their full capacity.
> 
> Where do you think the gaps were? Also, please expand on the part i highlighted bold?
> 
> Please and Thank You



Of course, Chief. I will ask questions and leave it to readers to understand why those questions needed to be asked. My questions are:

Who on the IAF side had sat down and, at levels below the command level in each Air Force command, worked out _concurrently with planning the strike at Balakote_ what the reaction would be during the inevitable PAF counter-strike? Was it all left to the ground controller, as Abhinandan Varthaman's case seems to indicate?
Who decided, on the attack build-up being detected during the build-up, as it was, what reaction was to be prepared? 
Why was the IFF not on in the rescue chopper? Why was its mission not conveyed to the Air Defence teams?
Why were our AWACS aircraft not in evidence? Had they been flown already to zones outside the probable striking range of the PAF? If so, why did we invest in white elephants, that can't work for a living and has only symbolic value?
Why were only Bisons in action? Were the bigger planes flown away from danger zones due to the mismatch of BVR missile ranges? When did we get to know about this mismatch, and what steps were taken to rectify it? If there was a civilian failure of procurement at ministry level, why did we not get to hear about it?
Incidentally, the Bisons were jammed, as they were linked to Ground Control only during their mission, or that is the information seeping out.

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## Psychic

Joe Shearer said:


> Nehru was a peaceful protestor with Gandhi. Both of them simply did what they did their entire life. Protest in front of the world how they are wronged.


It is clear beyond doubt that Nehru's whispers in Mountbatten and Edwina's ears did the trick when Radcliffe bent the line in India's favour; Gurdaspur, through which the sole dirt track from India to Kashmir passed, fell squarely inside India along with prime real estate containing vital headworks. Even if one chooses to dismiss Beaumont's accusations, who did what is as clear as broad daylight to anyone who is able to connect the dots. Additionally we also know about Nehru's obsession with making Kashmir which was the land of his ancestors a part of India. His obsession made the region a powder keg besides making the lives of eight million Kashmiris a living hell. He did not give two hoots about the aspirations of the people; the only thing that mattered to him was getting a piece of paper signed. Regardless, the instrument itself was based on fraud and deceit as the date was fabricated which makes a case for intervention before accession. Intervention before accession so that Srinagar doesn't get out of hands. Nehru wasted no time in sending assistance once it was declared that the instrument has been signed and his overall conduct during the war was nothing like the lethargic response of Pakistani leaders who only sent the army in the month of May the following year after the Indians were already at the doorstep of Pakistan. Apart from that, Hydrabad was annexed through force and what followed was a massacre. Menon got to work getting states merger with India by hook or crook.

Now, the single fact that he went to the UN doesn't dryclean his aforementioned deeds. Despite Nehru and Gandhi's repeated promises of plebiscite, all they did to solve the issue was to stall talks with Pakistan. Something which even the UNCIP representatives acknowledged that is India was showing a lack of cooperation(unlike Pakistan). In private conversations, Nehru, the apostle of truth clearly stated that his intention was not to hold a plebiscite. Even post 1962 talks were nothing but a bone thrown at Pakistan. Expecting Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally without any guarantee is something which PA couldn't risk as that means that India could move her troops to all the way up to Pak-Kashmir border and present the international community with a fait accompli.

Nehru was anything but a man of peaceful protest and at least as far as the Kashmir region is concerned, he was a Machiavellian.

Coming to Jinnah, he had ordered Gracy to move a brigade in Jammu through Sialkot and another advancing on Muzaffarabad - Srinagar axis. That was before the consolidation of IA and owing to the proximity of PA garrisons to Kashmir and favorable land routes, such a move had the potential to checkmate any attempts by IA to militarily intervene. But, his orders fell on deaf ears as Pak civil and military leadership lacked the cojones. Whilst brave tribesmen, Gilgit Scouts and militias were battered by artillery, armored cars and spitfires, the Pakistani army was sitting on its behind. It only arrived too late in May 1948.

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## Nilgiri

Thank you for contributions thus far. I will have to read them all slowly and thoroughly when I have more time. 

The attention to detail and professionalism has been commendable from all of you, thanks.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> That is IF there is armour or mechanised infantry attached to a Mountain Div on re-deployment in the plains. That soaks up an otherwise independent armoured brigade straightaway.




Some differences between IA Infantry Divisions and Mountain Division

Infantry Divisions normally have an integral Armor Regiment (45 Tanks) and a Guards / ATGM Battalion (45-52 ATGMs, with varied platforms such as BRDMs or BMPs). This anti-tank firepower is not there in Mountain Divisions due to their specific role.

Even though both divisions have an Artillery Brigade having 3 Field, 1 Medium and 1 Light Regiment, however, Field Regiments of Mountain Divisions normally have short barreled pack howitzers (able to be dis-assembled in mountains), while Infantry Divisions have the normal ones.

With regards to mobility, Mountain Division's ASC is based on MULES, while normal infantry division is based on wheels. Mules wont be able to provide mobility to a mountain division in plains or deserts.

Infantry Division has overall 72 ATGMs while Mountain Division has 18 ATGMs.

No SATA battery is authorised to Mountain Division, Infantry Division has SATA elements.

These are some of the major differences between both....it can be plainly seen that Mountain Division's organization and _*TRAINING*_, does not allow them to be used in plains and deserts....they are simply not made for it......in dire emergency, yes, but otherwise no.




TsAr said:


> @PanzerKiel and @Joe Shearer please also enlighten us as to what measures were taken and discussed by both the armies after apparent failure to achieve their targets.



Achieving their targets....when? i mean you are asking about which time?



PanzerKiel said:


> Some differences between IA Infantry Divisions and Mountain Division
> 
> Infantry Divisions normally have an integral Armor Regiment (45 Tanks) and a Guards / ATGM Battalion (45-52 ATGMs, with varied platforms such as BRDMs or BMPs). This anti-tank firepower is not there in Mountain Divisions due to their specific role.
> 
> Even though both divisions have an Artillery Brigade having 3 Field, 1 Medium and 1 Light Regiment, however, Field Regiments of Mountain Divisions normally have short barreled pack howitzers (able to be dis-assembled in mountains), while Infantry Divisions have the normal ones.
> 
> With regards to mobility, Mountain Division's ASC is based on MULES, while normal infantry division is based on wheels. Mules wont be able to provide mobility to a mountain division in plains or deserts.
> 
> Infantry Division has overall 72 ATGMs while Mountain Division has 18 ATGMs.
> 
> No SATA battery is authorised to Mountain Division, Infantry Division has SATA elements.
> 
> These are some of the major differences between both....it can be plainly seen that Mountain Division's organization and _*TRAINING*_, does not allow them to be used in plains and deserts....they are simply not made for it......in dire emergency, yes, but otherwise no.
> 
> @Gryphon
> 
> 
> 
> Achieving their targets....when? i mean you are asking about which time?



and lets not forget, even the structure and organization of Infantry battalions of an infantry Division and those of the mountain division, that is also entirely different...both tailored for their specific role.

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## Gryphon

Joe Shearer said:


> That is IF there is armour or mechanised infantry attached to a Mountain Div on re-deployment in the plains. That soaks up an otherwise independent armoured brigade straightaway.



IA has plans to have all its (Plains) Infantry Div's converted into RAPIDs [RAPID (D) - Deployed, RAPID (D) - Reserve and RAPID (S)] and the divisional armoured regiment will be done away with in any case. You can't expect IA placing integral Mech/Armd Bdes (of MD's) in NE India and then mobilizing towards the western border - that armour being better utilized in (I) Armd/Mech Bdes - at least 11 of them in existence now.



PanzerKiel said:


> Some differences between IA Infantry Divisions and Mountain Division
> 
> Infantry Divisions normally have an integral Armor Regiment (45 Tanks) and a Guards / ATGM Battalion (45-52 ATGMs, with varied platforms such as BRDMs or BMPs). This anti-tank firepower is not there in Mountain Divisions due to their specific role.
> 
> Even though both divisions have an Artillery Brigade having 3 Field, 1 Medium and 1 Light Regiment, however, Field Regiments of Mountain Divisions normally have short barreled pack howitzers (able to be dis-assembled in mountains), while Infantry Divisions have the normal ones.
> 
> With regards to mobility, Mountain Division's ASC is based on MULES, while normal infantry division is based on wheels. Mules wont be able to provide mobility to a mountain division in plains or deserts.
> 
> Infantry Division has overall 72 ATGMs while Mountain Division has 18 ATGMs.
> 
> No SATA battery is authorised to Mountain Division, Infantry Division has SATA elements.
> 
> These are some of the major differences between both....it can be plainly seen that Mountain Division's organization and _*TRAINING*_, does not allow them to be used in plains and deserts....they are simply not made for it......in dire emergency, yes, but otherwise no.
> 
> @Gryphon
> 
> 
> 
> Achieving their targets....when? i mean you are asking about which time?
> 
> 
> 
> and lets not forget, even the structure and organization of Infantry battalions of an infantry Division and those of the mountain division, that is also entirely different...both tailored for their specific role.



Of course, divisions are shaped based on the terrain & role. In the north, there are Mountain Div's with Infantry brigades & vice versa. For Artillery & ASC also, its a mix. 

From Akhnoor to the Sriganganagar based formation, its heavily infantry but in wartime, everyone appreciates more infantry & artillery reinforcements, irrespective of these being plains or mountain.


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## Joe Shearer

Gryphon said:


> IA has plans to have all its (Plains) Infantry Div's converted into RAPIDs [RAPID (D) - Deployed, RAPID (D) - Reserve and RAPID (S)] and the divisional armoured regiment will be done away with in any case. You can't expect IA placing integral Mech/Armd Bdes (of MD's) in NE India and then mobilizing towards the western border - that armour being better utilized in (I) Armd/Mech Bdes - at least 11 of them in existence now.



Plans and reality are two different categories.

Secondly, please recall that the PLA in the north-east is in precisely the same topographical situation as the Indian Army in Kashmir; it is poised on the edge of a plateau, faces a frontal area of deep ravines and forested slopes, and has in front an opponent within these ravines and forested slopes and also in very well-connected low-level flatlands at the edge.

Just as the Pakistan Army can mobilise its armour and SP artillery in the low-level flatlands fringing the slopes of the Valley of Kashmir, the Indian Army needs to retain some part of its armour in the north-east to receive a Chinese push down the Arunachal slopes. The IA no longer thinks in terms of braving disproportionate Chinese numerical superiority at the end of its own communications lines with Mountain Divisions tasked to stick it out against all odds, and risking being cut off by swift Chinese advances through the ravines, as has happened in living memory.

It is also true that doctrine on this matter is in a state of flux; even while this debate is going on, India has given the Army the mandate to raise more Mountain Divisions. That is obviously a matter of some long-term importance; either the PLA should be faced on the plains, in which case Mountain Divisions will play only a diversionary role; or the PLA should be fought every inch of the way within the ravine and forest country, in which case there is all the responsibility of determining the opponent's most probable line of advance, and an enormous strengthening of logistics chains, far beyond present capabilities, but a maximum number of Mountain Divisions should be raised; or the PLA should be fought on the Xijang Plateau itself, a possibility that should not be ruled out of doctrinal deliberations, given certain trends and features that are in evidence.

For this last alternative, the type of formation needed is obviously vastly different from the other two scenarios, and nobody will prepare for warfare on that foundation unless something radical happens in the geo-strategic space. Also this last will take the kind of careful preparation that the PLA itself undertook in 1962;for nearly a year in advance, the build-up of supplies had begun (in the north-east only), some of this build-up ironically through Calcutta Port, and shipped out through mule-trains to the Chinese strong points. The PLA did not display overwhelming superiority in materiel accidentally; it was planned months ahead. Similarly, any plan to fight on the Xijang Plateau cannot depend on accidental superiority.

Where these choices dovetail with the concept of Independent Battle Groups that are being thought of for the western front is not yet clear. Will the northern front, facing the PLA, also see the introduction of this type of all-arms formation? What will the objectives be, how large will the formations be, how should they be armed - all these issues are under discussion at all times, and nothing has emerged in definitive terms on these issues.

At the end of the day, where Mountain Divisions fit into the big picture is still a matter of constant review. These were designed for the middle of the last nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where fighting on the NWFP determined their evolution and structure; these were specialist units with one purpose in life and one only. Their role in post-partition India has been migrated to the Kashmir peripheral area, and, more important, to the front in Arunachal.

They face two entirely different adversaries; one, a frugal, economical foe adept at reacting quickly and concentrating force quickly to forestall any attack, and equally practiced in mounting very aggressive attacks given the slightest opportunity, and focussed on defeating the Indian Army as its primary objective; the other, a lavishly-equipped organisation that has just undergone major transformation, has outstanding logistics, has its own industrial capacity for all types of war-fighting equipment, but is lothe to give battle because its entire concentration is on its own sea-coast, facing a breakaway province and an aggressive superpower.

Very clearly, there will be changes in the role and responsibilities of Mountain Division, and it may not be that all Mountain Divisions are identical. It may well be that, like Independent Battle Groups, these formations or their successors are organised around a central tactical and grand tactical objective, distinct for each Mountain Division, aggregated into strategic objectives at a higher level. It may be expected that the nomenclature will be retained but the cross-section of each formation is different, and they are each unique.

Above all, it needs to be borne in mind that the Pakistan Army is not the only thing in the mind of the Indian COAS as he shaves in the morning; he has other headaches as well. Secondly, whatever he may decide, after long and serious thought, in close consultation with other military leaders, the civilian decision-makers have their own time-frames and these do not always lead to successful outcomes. General Sunderji found this out to his cost, and each successive Chief has worried about initiating change and being unable to see it through, leaving his institution precariously poised between two stools.

@jbgt90

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## T90TankGuy

PanzerKiel said:


> I always believe that Gen Sundarji and Arun Singh were on one side....the side which wanted war.....rest everyone was on the other side.....


They were of one mind , its the best way to describe it . But the PM was of a different mindset , he did not want war as he wanted to revive the economy and bring India into a new age , If you see Rajeevs tenure , you will see he was the one to bring the IT sector and the telecom sector to India during his time . A war would have set us back by at least a decade .



Joe Shearer said:


> Plans and reality are two different categories.
> 
> Secondly, please recall that the PLA in the north-east is in precisely the same topographical situation as the Indian Army in Kashmir; it is poised on the edge of a plateau, faces a frontal area of deep ravines and forested slopes, and has in front an opponent within these ravines and forested slopes and also in very well-connected low-level flatlands at the edge.
> 
> Just as the Pakistan Army can mobilise its armour and SP artillery in the low-level flatlands fringing the slopes of the Valley of Kashmir, the Indian Army needs to retain some part of its armour in the north-east to receive a Chinese push down the Arunachal slopes. The IA no longer thinks in terms of braving disproportionate Chinese numerical superiority at the end of its own communications lines with Mountain Divisions tasked to stick it out against all odds, and risking being cut off by swift Chinese advances through the ravines, as has happened in living memory.
> 
> It is also true that doctrine on this matter is in a state of flux; even while this debate is going on, India has given the Army the mandate to raise more Mountain Divisions. That is obviously a matter of some long-term importance; either the PLA should be faced on the plains, in which case Mountain Divisions will play only a diversionary role; or the PLA should be fought every inch of the way within the ravine and forest country, in which case there is all the responsibility of determining the opponent's most probable line of advance, and an enormous strengthening of logistics chains, far beyond present capabilities, but a maximum number of Mountain Divisions should be raised; or the PLA should be fought on the Xijang Plateau itself, a possibility that should not be ruled out of doctrinal deliberations, given certain trends and features that are in evidence.
> 
> For this last alternative, the type of formation needed is obviously vastly different from the other two scenarios, and nobody will prepare for warfare on that foundation unless something radical happens in the geo-strategic space. Also this last will take the kind of careful preparation that the PLA itself undertook in 1962;for nearly a year in advance, the build-up of supplies had begun (in the north-east only), some of this build-up ironically through Calcutta Port, and shipped out through mule-trains to the Chinese strong points. The PLA did not display overwhelming superiority in materiel accidentally; it was planned months ahead. Similarly, any plan to fight on the Xijang Plateau cannot depend on accidental superiority.
> 
> Where these choices dovetail with the concept of Independent Battle Groups that are being thought of for the western front is not yet clear. Will the northern front, facing the PLA, also see the introduction of this type of all-arms formation? What will the objectives be, how large will the formations be, how should they be armed - all these issues are under discussion at all times, and nothing has emerged in definitive terms on these issues.
> 
> At the end of the day, where Mountain Divisions fit into the big picture is still a matter of constant review. These were designed for the middle of the last nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where fighting on the NWFP determined their evolution and structure; these were specialist units with one purpose in life and one only. Their role in post-partition India has been migrated to the Kashmir peripheral area, and, more important, to the front in Arunachal.
> 
> They face two entirely different adversaries; one, a frugal, economical foe adept at reacting quickly and concentrating force quickly to forestall any attack, and equally practiced in mounting very aggressive attacks given the slightest opportunity, and focussed on defeating the Indian Army as its primary objective; the other, a lavishly-equipped organisation that has just undergone major transformation, has outstanding logistics, has its own industrial capacity for all types of war-fighting equipment, but is lothe to give battle because its entire concentration is on its own sea-coast, facing a breakaway province and an aggressive superpower.
> 
> Very clearly, there will be changes in the role and responsibilities of Mountain Division, and it may not be that all Mountain Divisions are identical. It may well be that, like Independent Battle Groups, these formations or their successors are organised around a central tactical and grand tactical objective, distinct for each Mountain Division, aggregated into strategic objectives at a higher level. It may be expected that the nomenclature will be retained but the cross-section of each formation is different, and they are each unique.
> 
> Above all, it needs to be borne in mind that the Pakistan Army is not the only thing in the mind of the Indian COAS as he shaves in the morning; he has other headaches as well. Secondly, whatever he may decide, after long and serious thought, in close consultation with other military leaders, the civilian decision-makers have their own time-frames and these do not always lead to successful outcomes. General Sunderji found this out to his cost, and each successive Chief has worried about initiating change and being unable to see it through, leaving his institution precariously poised between two stools.
> 
> @jbgt90


For some reasons i do not seem to be getting notifications .

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## Joe Shearer

jbgt90 said:


> They were of one mind , its the best way to describe it . But the PM was of a different mindset , he did not want war as he wanted to revive the economy and bring India into a new age , If you see Rajeevs tenure , you will see he was the one to bring the IT sector and the telecom sector to India during his time . A war would have set us back by at least a decade .






> For some reasons i do not seem to be getting notifications .



I was trying to reach you to run that post past you, before posting it but couldn't get you on the phone. Are you back?

Have you read @PanzerKiel's summary posts?

Also please see #49, and #51. In #51, I wasn't able to fit in the Mountain Strike Corps conceptually; it simply doesn't fit. What is its role supposed to be?

In #46, responding to @notorious_eagle, did I get the details correct?

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Plans and reality are two different categories.
> 
> Secondly, please recall that the PLA in the north-east is in precisely the same topographical situation as the Indian Army in Kashmir; it is poised on the edge of a plateau, faces a frontal area of deep ravines and forested slopes, and has in front an opponent within these ravines and forested slopes and also in very well-connected low-level flatlands at the edge.
> 
> Just as the Pakistan Army can mobilise its armour and SP artillery in the low-level flatlands fringing the slopes of the Valley of Kashmir, the Indian Army needs to retain some part of its armour in the north-east to receive a Chinese push down the Arunachal slopes. The IA no longer thinks in terms of braving disproportionate Chinese numerical superiority at the end of its own communications lines with Mountain Divisions tasked to stick it out against all odds, and risking being cut off by swift Chinese advances through the ravines, as has happened in living memory.
> 
> It is also true that doctrine on this matter is in a state of flux; even while this debate is going on, India has given the Army the mandate to raise more Mountain Divisions. That is obviously a matter of some long-term importance; either the PLA should be faced on the plains, in which case Mountain Divisions will play only a diversionary role; or the PLA should be fought every inch of the way within the ravine and forest country, in which case there is all the responsibility of determining the opponent's most probable line of advance, and an enormous strengthening of logistics chains, far beyond present capabilities, but a maximum number of Mountain Divisions should be raised; or the PLA should be fought on the Xijang Plateau itself, a possibility that should not be ruled out of doctrinal deliberations, given certain trends and features that are in evidence.
> 
> For this last alternative, the type of formation needed is obviously vastly different from the other two scenarios, and nobody will prepare for warfare on that foundation unless something radical happens in the geo-strategic space. Also this last will take the kind of careful preparation that the PLA itself undertook in 1962;for nearly a year in advance, the build-up of supplies had begun (in the north-east only), some of this build-up ironically through Calcutta Port, and shipped out through mule-trains to the Chinese strong points. The PLA did not display overwhelming superiority in materiel accidentally; it was planned months ahead. Similarly, any plan to fight on the Xijang Plateau cannot depend on accidental superiority.
> 
> Where these choices dovetail with the concept of Independent Battle Groups that are being thought of for the western front is not yet clear. Will the northern front, facing the PLA, also see the introduction of this type of all-arms formation? What will the objectives be, how large will the formations be, how should they be armed - all these issues are under discussion at all times, and nothing has emerged in definitive terms on these issues.
> 
> At the end of the day, where Mountain Divisions fit into the big picture is still a matter of constant review. These were designed for the middle of the last nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where fighting on the NWFP determined their evolution and structure; these were specialist units with one purpose in life and one only. Their role in post-partition India has been migrated to the Kashmir peripheral area, and, more important, to the front in Arunachal.
> 
> They face two entirely different adversaries; one, a frugal, economical foe adept at reacting quickly and concentrating force quickly to forestall any attack, and equally practiced in mounting very aggressive attacks given the slightest opportunity, and focussed on defeating the Indian Army as its primary objective; the other, a lavishly-equipped organisation that has just undergone major transformation, has outstanding logistics, has its own industrial capacity for all types of war-fighting equipment, but is lothe to give battle because its entire concentration is on its own sea-coast, facing a breakaway province and an aggressive superpower.
> 
> Very clearly, there will be changes in the role and responsibilities of Mountain Division, and it may not be that all Mountain Divisions are identical. It may well be that, like Independent Battle Groups, these formations or their successors are organised around a central tactical and grand tactical objective, distinct for each Mountain Division, aggregated into strategic objectives at a higher level. It may be expected that the nomenclature will be retained but the cross-section of each formation is different, and they are each unique.
> 
> Above all, it needs to be borne in mind that the Pakistan Army is not the only thing in the mind of the Indian COAS as he shaves in the morning; he has other headaches as well. Secondly, whatever he may decide, after long and serious thought, in close consultation with other military leaders, the civilian decision-makers have their own time-frames and these do not always lead to successful outcomes. General Sunderji found this out to his cost, and each successive Chief has worried about initiating change and being unable to see it through, leaving his institution precariously poised between two stools.
> 
> @jbgt90


...
Of course, there is a reason that now, there is a very sizeable armor component in the barren fringes of 14 Corps.



Joe Shearer said:


> I was trying to reach you to run that post past you, before posting it but couldn't get you on the phone. Are you back?
> 
> Have you read @PanzerKiel's summary posts?
> 
> Also please see #49, and #51. In #51, I wasn't able to fit in the Mountain Strike Corps conceptually; it simply doesn't fit. What is its role supposed to be?
> 
> In #46, responding to @notorious_eagle, did I get the details correct?



Mountain strike Corps, is raising.... Another interesting topic...



Joe Shearer said:


> I was trying to reach you to run that post past you, before posting it but couldn't get you on the phone. Are you back?
> 
> Have you read @PanzerKiel's summary posts?
> 
> Also please see #49, and #51. In #51, I wasn't able to fit in the Mountain Strike Corps conceptually; it simply doesn't fit. What is its role supposed to be?
> 
> In #46, responding to @notorious_eagle, did I get the details correct?



17 Mountain Strike Corps, has at present two divisions....59 MD at Panagarh and 72 MD at Pathankot. 72 MD, in addition to 39 MD, presents more options for Northern and Western Commands. Moreover, with current Indian airlift capability of 9000 troops plus (with individual combat load, and all aircraft at 75% serviceability), 17 MSC can be airlifted anywhere...



PanzerKiel said:


> ...
> 
> 17 Mountain Strike Corps, has at present two divisions....59 MD at Panagarh and 72 MD at Pathankot. 72 MD, in addition to 39 MD, presents more options for Northern and Western Commands. Moreover, with current Indian airlift cap of 9000 troops plus (with individual combat load, and all aircraft at 75% serviceability), 17 MSC can be airlifted anywhere...



Possible roles can be....

separate offensive or reinforcing an offensive in Northern or Western Commands
As NC / WC / SWC / SC reserves or even Army reserves once 6 MD has been committed
Roles with respect to an Indian - Chinese confrontation are entirely different.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Plans and reality are two different categories.
> 
> Secondly, please recall that the PLA in the north-east is in precisely the same topographical situation as the Indian Army in Kashmir; it is poised on the edge of a plateau, faces a frontal area of deep ravines and forested slopes, and has in front an opponent within these ravines and forested slopes and also in very well-connected low-level flatlands at the edge.
> 
> Just as the Pakistan Army can mobilise its armour and SP artillery in the low-level flatlands fringing the slopes of the Valley of Kashmir, the Indian Army needs to retain some part of its armour in the north-east to receive a Chinese push down the Arunachal slopes. The IA no longer thinks in terms of braving disproportionate Chinese numerical superiority at the end of its own communications lines with Mountain Divisions tasked to stick it out against all odds, and risking being cut off by swift Chinese advances through the ravines, as has happened in living memory.
> 
> It is also true that doctrine on this matter is in a state of flux; even while this debate is going on, India has given the Army the mandate to raise more Mountain Divisions. That is obviously a matter of some long-term importance; either the PLA should be faced on the plains, in which case Mountain Divisions will play only a diversionary role; or the PLA should be fought every inch of the way within the ravine and forest country, in which case there is all the responsibility of determining the opponent's most probable line of advance, and an enormous strengthening of logistics chains, far beyond present capabilities, but a maximum number of Mountain Divisions should be raised; or the PLA should be fought on the Xijang Plateau itself, a possibility that should not be ruled out of doctrinal deliberations, given certain trends and features that are in evidence.
> 
> For this last alternative, the type of formation needed is obviously vastly different from the other two scenarios, and nobody will prepare for warfare on that foundation unless something radical happens in the geo-strategic space. Also this last will take the kind of careful preparation that the PLA itself undertook in 1962;for nearly a year in advance, the build-up of supplies had begun (in the north-east only), some of this build-up ironically through Calcutta Port, and shipped out through mule-trains to the Chinese strong points. The PLA did not display overwhelming superiority in materiel accidentally; it was planned months ahead. Similarly, any plan to fight on the Xijang Plateau cannot depend on accidental superiority.
> 
> Where these choices dovetail with the concept of Independent Battle Groups that are being thought of for the western front is not yet clear. Will the northern front, facing the PLA, also see the introduction of this type of all-arms formation? What will the objectives be, how large will the formations be, how should they be armed - all these issues are under discussion at all times, and nothing has emerged in definitive terms on these issues.
> 
> At the end of the day, where Mountain Divisions fit into the big picture is still a matter of constant review. These were designed for the middle of the last nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where fighting on the NWFP determined their evolution and structure; these were specialist units with one purpose in life and one only. Their role in post-partition India has been migrated to the Kashmir peripheral area, and, more important, to the front in Arunachal.
> 
> They face two entirely different adversaries; one, a frugal, economical foe adept at reacting quickly and concentrating force quickly to forestall any attack, and equally practiced in mounting very aggressive attacks given the slightest opportunity, and focussed on defeating the Indian Army as its primary objective; the other, a lavishly-equipped organisation that has just undergone major transformation, has outstanding logistics, has its own industrial capacity for all types of war-fighting equipment, but is lothe to give battle because its entire concentration is on its own sea-coast, facing a breakaway province and an aggressive superpower.
> 
> Very clearly, there will be changes in the role and responsibilities of Mountain Division, and it may not be that all Mountain Divisions are identical. It may well be that, like Independent Battle Groups, these formations or their successors are organised around a central tactical and grand tactical objective, distinct for each Mountain Division, aggregated into strategic objectives at a higher level. It may be expected that the nomenclature will be retained but the cross-section of each formation is different, and they are each unique.
> 
> Above all, it needs to be borne in mind that the Pakistan Army is not the only thing in the mind of the Indian COAS as he shaves in the morning; he has other headaches as well. Secondly, whatever he may decide, after long and serious thought, in close consultation with other military leaders, the civilian decision-makers have their own time-frames and these do not always lead to successful outcomes. General Sunderji found this out to his cost, and each successive Chief has worried about initiating change and being unable to see it through, leaving his institution precariously poised between two stools.
> 
> @jbgt90



Moreover, keeping the present Indian airlift capability of 9000 (+) troops along with their combat load, shifting mountain division from Eastern Command to the western border is much easier and possible.

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## Joe Shearer

You have to give me a few moments for recovery. I've done the Bengali Tomato Sweet Chutney for the third time running, it's come out perfect, I'm walking around with a head swollen to three times its normal hat size. Channa Dal by night, and tomorrow I hand over a tiffin carrier with the three compartments filled with Bengali dishes.

Life is good.

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## Cuirassier

Would appreciate analysis on higher-level of military organization in both India & Pakistan and how the current setups could influence war progress in theory (fluidity, flexibility etc.)


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## Lord Of Gondor

PanzerKiel said:


> with current Indian airlift capability of 9000 troops plus (with individual combat load, and all aircraft at 75% serviceability), 17 MSC can be airlifted anywhere...


First of all, really appreciate you(and other similar members) taking time out to post. Enjoy reading a lot.
The serviceability has been improved considerably(It is especially brilliant for the Transport fleet, both fixed and rotary).Exercise Gaganshakti a while back vetted that.
Very heavy emphasis on our Northern adversary now, more than ever before so quick movement of acclimatized troops is a thrust area for future contingencies. Will play a big factor in Indo-Pak equation as well.


> The scope of Gagan Shakti was impressive. Some of the key features of the exercise were as follows:-
> 
> • Diverse range of air combat mission were undertaken.
> • Air defence umbrella to help ground forces was created.
> • Long range maritime strikes with the help of maritime reconnaissance support from the Indian Navy aircraft were tested.
> • AWACS, air to air refueling, battalion group para drop, special operations with Garud Commandos, search-and-rescue of ground-air crew behind enemy lines, sea rescue and operations from advance landing grounds were conducted.
> • All qualified and medically fit crew upto 48 years of age were employed during the exercise.
> • Close cooperation with Airport Authority of India for airspace coordination was established.
> • Reliability of communication, network air defence system and software was tested.
> • Combat assets, including aircraft, missile systems and radar, were tested.
> • ‘Surge operations’ in which fighter aircrafts did maximum number of sorties in a 24 hour cycle were carried out. All air-to-ground ranges in India were made active.
> • The efficacy and integration of the recently inducted indigenous Light Combat Fighter Aircraft (LCA) Tejas was tested.
> • Round the clock operations of aircrafts like C-17 and IL-76 as well as tactical air-lift with C-130 and AN-32 were tested.
> 
> The exercise seems to have been flawlessly executed. Highlights of the Exercise were:-
> 
> •* The IAF was able to achieve 80 percent serviceability of aircraft *and 97 percent serviceability of radars, surface- to-air guided weapons. This was a big plus for the IAF.
> • The dispatch rate of combat assets was achieved up to 95 percent.
> • Combat support system were available upto 100 percent.
> • Excellent support was received from HAL, BEL and DRDO.
> • Different techniques for repairing runways after bomb damage were practiced.
> • Synergy with the Railways in mobilisation operations was achieved.


https://www.vifindia.org/article/2018/may/07/significance-of-exercise-gagan-shakti-2018

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## T90TankGuy

Joe Shearer said:


> I was trying to reach you to run that post past you, before posting it but couldn't get you on the phone. Are you back?
> 
> Have you read @PanzerKiel's summary posts?
> 
> Also please see #49, and #51. In #51, I wasn't able to fit in the Mountain Strike Corps conceptually; it simply doesn't fit. What is its role supposed to be?
> 
> In #46, responding to @notorious_eagle, did I get the details correct?


I need to go through the entire thread Joe , right now i am not free , will be so from tomorrow for a week . My Phone is reachable but for some reason,that i can say here, we had to block a lot of signals where i am posted. 
Lets talk tomorrow.

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## Joe Shearer

jbgt90 said:


> I need to go through the entire thread Joe , right now i am not free , will be so from tomorrow for a week . My Phone is reachable but for some reason,that i can say here, we had to block a lot of signals where i am posted.
> Lets talk tomorrow.



Waiting for tomorrow, anxiously. I want to check several things, starting with a Mountain Strike Corps. What is this animal?

More when we speak.



Cuirassier said:


> Would appreciate analysis on higher-level of military organization in both India & Pakistan and how the current setups could influence war progress in theory (fluidity, flexibility etc.)



This is strictly the department of @jbgt90 and @Hellfire (or whatever he calls himself now). All my contacts retired ten years ago; their contemporaries are just getting their stars.

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## Lord Of Gondor

notorious_eagle said:


> IAF has top coverage in the form of Swordfish and Phalcons. Both these assets are data-linked providing the Indian C4I the ability to look deep inside Pakistan and share that information live with all the Sector Commanders. My question is, why didn't IAF pick up PAF's incoming strike package when it was expected that PAF would retaliate and the border was hot. From the limited information we have about IAF, it does not appear that the Phalcons were Airborne during the time of the confrontation. That would explain why the IAF interceptors were having an incredible tough time getting a comprehensive picture of the battlefield. The Swordfish and Phalcons are incredibly potent assets which clearly were not utilized to their full capacity.


The citation for Wing Co. Abhinandan reveals important details.





Phalcon/Netra was managing the battle
"The enemy ac were under seamless airborne radar cover and control"


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## TsAr

Lord Of Gondor said:


> The citation for Wing Co. Abhinandan reveals important details.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Phalcon/Netra was managing the battle
> "The enemy ac were under seamless airborne radar cover and control"


Going by this narration raises a few questions, if indeed IAF AWACS were working then why was Abhinandan left on the mercy of the ground controllers who were presumably jammed by PAF. 
PAF had AMRAAMS in its inventory since the early 2000's, IAF should have prepared themselves for any eventualities.


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## Lord Of Gondor

TsAr said:


> Going by this narration raises a few questions, if indeed IAF AWACS were working then why was Abhinandan left on the mercy of the ground controllers who were presumably jammed by PAF.


He went for his kill by crossing the LC, his call.



TsAr said:


> PAF had AMRAAMS in its inventory since the early 2000's, IAF should have prepared themselves for any eventualities.


Yes fully prepared. In war losses happen.


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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> That's a non-sequitur.
> 
> Sam got the mandate from the political leadership, and told Bewoor in the West and Arora in the East what to do. He didn't actually go out there and pull triggers, and go ratatat at Pakistani planes flying overhead.
> 
> [Diversion]I had a fairly fixed idea about what happened in the west, driven by two factors:
> 
> Eftekhar (Iftikhar?) Janjua's firm grip on the battle he fought; the outstanding thing was the way he changed axis once his original thrust was defeated, and caught us off balance.
> Bewoor's general state of muddle, and the inability of Candeth to recover the situation.
> However, @PanzerKiel threw out a view that has made me think very hard about the whole situation; he points out that Longewala was a spoiling operation, and that it succeeded, because it completely 'spoilt' Khambatta's plans for his own deep strike into Pakistan. That is a new angle to that most unusual of battles, Hawker Hunters vs. armoured tanks, won by the Hunters (I don't remember things too well these days, and can't remember what tanks the Pakistani formation had deployed).
> 
> A fascinating thought. Coming from anyone else, I would have dismissed it as post-defeat justification; coming from that professional officer, the thought takes on very tangible dimensions. [End of Diversion]
> 
> What people don't realise was that the Indian Army had very modest aims all along. First, there was never any thought of destroying the West, never any thought of destroying the military capability of the Pakistan Army; the Pakistani Air Force was to be held at bay, then progressively whittled down by steadily increasing the sortie rate. The Indian Navy had the bit in its teeth, and were stopping for no one.
> 
> In the East, the first phase was to have been to slice off a piece of territory in which the emigres could hoist their flag. That grew to taking up the maximum amount of space possible to re-capture with the troops at Jake's disposal.
> 
> It was a stroke of daring audacity on Jake's part to fly to Dhaka and bully Niazi into surrendering. That was all his. Obviously he had to clear it with the corps commanders and with his own Army commander. But they presumably thought that it was a good idea, so there he was in Dhaka.
> 
> So my answer is - neither did. The soldiers were the ones who did it.



@Joe Shearer 
Two Pakistani armor regiments were involved.....newly raised 38 Cavalry with old Sherman tanks and 22 Cavalry with Chinese T-59 Tanks....

moreover, as far as 1971 surrender is concerned, apart from Gen Jacob, we should mention the role of Gen Nagra as well in securing the surrender...Nagra had known Niazi from before when he was posted as military advisor to Indian High Commission in Islamabad. The ceasefire had taken effect at 1700 hours on 15 December. On the morning of 16 December, Nagra, who was some 30 miles outside Dacca with elements of 95 Mountain Brigade and 2 Para, well after the ceasefire went into force, sent a message to Niazi to send his representative.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> @Joe Shearer
> Two Pakistani armor regiments were involved.....newly raised 38 Cavalry with old Sherman tanks and 22 Cavalry with Chinese T-59 Tanks....
> 
> moreover, as far as 1971 surrender is concerned, apart from Gen Jacob, we should mention the role of Gen Nagra as well in securing the surrender...Nagra had known Niazi from before when he was posted as military advisor to Indian High Commission in Islamabad. The ceasefire had taken effect at 1700 hours on 15 December. On the morning of 16 December, Nagra, who was some 30 miles outside Dacca with elements of 95 Mountain Brigade and 2 Para, well after the ceasefire went into force, sent a message to Niazi to send his representative.



I had completely forgotten about General Nagra. But my excuse would be that I was distracted, unhappy about thread drift, and trying to explain about only the two mentioned, General Manekshaw and General Jacob.

Thank you for the very useful reminder about the armour used by the two regiments in question; I was really feeling totally distracted, and incapable of thought.

Above all, thanks for the thought that their intervention unbalanced Khambatta. After reading what you said, I went back and looked events once again, and it seemed as clear as crystal.

You, dear Sir, are a spiffing marvel, and it is such a pleasure to be in your company.

PS: I will return to this thread,now that my culinary contribution to my little band of waifs is over; it went off very well, btw, but they liked most the dish I finished last and had made for the first time.

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## notorious_eagle

Joe Shearer said:


> Of course, Chief. I will ask questions and leave it to readers to understand why those questions needed to be asked. My questions are:
> 
> Who on the IAF side had sat down and, at levels below the command level in each Air Force command, worked out _concurrently with planning the strike at Balakote_ what the reaction would be during the inevitable PAF counter-strike? Was it all left to the ground controller, as Abhinandan Varthaman's case seems to indicate?
> Who decided, on the attack build-up being detected during the build-up, as it was, what reaction was to be prepared?
> Why was the IFF not on in the rescue chopper? Why was its mission not conveyed to the Air Defence teams?
> Why were our AWACS aircraft not in evidence? Had they been flown already to zones outside the probable striking range of the PAF? If so, why did we invest in white elephants, that can't work for a living and has only symbolic value?
> Why were only Bisons in action? Were the bigger planes flown away from danger zones due to the mismatch of BVR missile ranges? When did we get to know about this mismatch, and what steps were taken to rectify it? If there was a civilian failure of procurement at ministry level, why did we not get to hear about it?
> Incidentally, the Bisons were jammed, as they were linked to Ground Control only during their mission, or that is the information seeping out.



Thank You for this Sir. After scanning the questions you wrote, i am convinced the AWACS were not airborne during the time of the strike. 

This raises two questions: 

1. Were the AWACS not airborne due to the serviceability issues suffered by the IL78? The IL78's are notorious for poor serviceability. 
2. Or the Central Command did not believe PAF would retaliate due to the face saving given by IAF, thus, the orders were not given to have AWACS airborne 24/7. 

PAF's intercepts do reveal that AWACS were airborne immediately after PAF strike. But then again, that was too late.



Lord Of Gondor said:


> The citation for Wing Co. Abhinandan reveals important details.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Phalcon/Netra was managing the battle
> "The enemy ac were under seamless airborne radar cover and control"



@Joe Shearer 

Sir, i am sorry to say, if this is the citation the IAF published for WC Abhi, this is a disgrace to the professionalism of the Indian Armed Forces.

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## Joe Shearer

notorious_eagle said:


> Thank You for this Sir. After scanning the questions you wrote, i am convinced the AWACS were not airborne during the time of the strike.
> 
> This raises two questions:
> 
> 1. Were the AWACS not airborne due to the serviceability issues suffered by the IL78? The IL78's are notorious for poor serviceability.
> 2. Or the Central Command did not believe PAF would retaliate due to the face saving given by IAF, thus, the orders were not given to have AWACS airborne 24/7.
> 
> PAF's intercepts do reveal that AWACS were airborne immediately after PAF strike. But then again, that was too late.



I have been waiting for @jbgt90 to fill in the details,and hope that he is back in station. His details are likely to be accurate and current. @Hellfire might also have helped, but I cannot trace him any longer.



> @Joe Shearer
> 
> Sir, i am sorry to say, if this is the citation the IAF published for WC Abhi, this is a disgrace to the professionalism of the Indian Armed Forces.



I really do not wish to comment on an officer's citation.

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## PanzerKiel

keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians, a bit of 1962....

In 1962 India lost. But it could have won. How?

Simply by refusing to accept the Chinese unilateral cease-fire. Simply by uttering the words “The Government of India is determined to go on fighting till every inch of its soil is freed from enemy occupation.”

But would that not have prolonged the war? A war that we could not have won because India was already defeated?

No. Because with the onset of the hard winter, the Chinese would have had to retire. They could not maintain their troops on the snowy southern side of the Himalayas as they had outrun their communications in their rapid advance into India. Their entire winter policy for Tibet, to this day, calls for leaving the bare minimum forward. and withdrawing the rest to warm, permanent bases’ till the spring. Even in the warm weather they maintain only a third of a unit up a regiment will post a battalion forward, and the rest will remain in comfortable quarters till required.

There was no way in which China could have maintained 20,000 troops inside India through the winter relying on a couple of temporary one-ton roads for supply.

A setback is not a defeat. The Russians retreated one thousand kilometers across their own country suffering the heaviest casualties in the history of war. But they managed to stabilize the front and returned to take Berlin.

A defeat is in the mind--- if you do not give in, you can never be defeated.

The fighting for Thagla Ridge began in September 1962. By the time of the cease-fire, over 36 infantry battalions were in the theatre, the equivalent of four divisions. The Thapar plan for the defence of the Northeast, formulated in 1959, required three divisions for a sure defence of this sensitive area. Now India had the equivalent of four, plus the equivalent of an independent armored brigade waiting on the south bank of the Brahmaputra in case the Chinese crossed into the Indian plains.

The Chinese had perhaps the equivalent of four regiments (one and one-third divisions) against India along the western axis (Bomdila), and elements of a division against the eastern axis (Walong). Moreover, a Chinese division was much lighter in terms of engineers, transport, artillery than its Indian counterpart.

Most important, India had a fine air force of 500 combat aircraft, totally outclassing anything China possessed or anything it could operate out of Tibet.

Even though India had superiority on the ground, it gave in (Nehru again?). And the air force was never used. Why? 

Indian Hunters and Gnats would have been more than a match for the Chinese MiG-15s and MiG-17s, and Indian Canberras would have pounded Chinese troops on the ground. Every ton of fuel and ordnance required by the Chinese air force had to be brought across 2000- kilometers of mountain road. IAF operated from large well-connected bases in Eastern India. How long could the Chinese have even flown against IAF, leave alone fight?

IAF, however, was stood down, and the Indian army milled around putting more and more troops into the northeast till, within a year, there were eight large divisions in place.

It is to be accepted that everyone did a bad job before the war and when it broke out. Point is simply this: even after all the setbacks, all the disasters, India could have made a realistic assessment of its adversary, his limits, and own strength. India had only to keep its nerve, or at least recover it after the initial setbacks.

Had the Indian Army been told to go on fighting, it would have done so. After all, death is all a solider faces, and for a soldier there are fates a lot worse than death.

The Indian Army, however, was not told to continue. IAF was not ordered into action. No one ordered the bombing of Lhasa, Gyanste, Shigatse. There was no Lt. Col. Doolittle on Indian side, to make a symbolic—but what a symbol—raid on China . No one determinedly, got together a naval task force to sail off Canton and to lob a few shells at that city (like Pakistan Navy did on Dwarka). Nothing was done, substantial or symbolic, except a grateful acceptance of the ceasefire by a wholly shaken leadership, and by a Nehru so destroyed that he was broken and dead not long after.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians, a bit of 1962....
> 
> In 1962 India lost. But it could have won. How?
> 
> Simply by refusing to accept the Chinese unilateral cease-fire. Simply by uttering the words “The Government of India is determined to go on fighting till every inch of its soil is freed from enemy occupation.”
> 
> But would that not have prolonged the war? A war that we could not have won because India was already defeated?
> 
> No. Because with the onset of the hard winter, the Chinese would have had to retire. They could not maintain their troops on the snowy southern side of the Himalayas as they had outrun their communications in their rapid advance into India. Their entire winter policy for Tibet, to this day, calls for leaving the bare minimum forward. and withdrawing the rest to warm, permanent bases’ till the spring. Even in the warm weather they maintain only a third of a unit up a regiment will post a battalion forward, and the rest will remain in comfortable quarters till required.
> 
> There was no way in which China could have maintained 20,000 troops inside India through the winter relying on a couple of temporary one-ton roads for supply.
> 
> A setback is not a defeat. The Russians retreated one thousand kilometers across their own country suffering the heaviest casualties in the history of war. But they managed to stabilize the front and returned to take Berlin.
> 
> A defeat is in the mind--- if you do not give in, you can never be defeated.
> 
> The fighting for Thagla Ridge began in September 1962. By the time of the cease-fire, over 36 infantry battalions were in the theatre, the equivalent of four divisions. The Thapar plan for the defence of the Northeast, formulated in 1959, required three divisions for a sure defence of this sensitive area. Now India had the equivalent of four, plus the equivalent of an independent armored brigade waiting on the south bank of the Brahmaputra in case the Chinese crossed into the Indian plains.
> 
> The Chinese had perhaps the equivalent of four regiments (one and one-third divisions) against India along the western axis (Bomdila), and elements of a division against the eastern axis (Walong). Moreover, a Chinese division was much lighter in terms of engineers, transport, artillery than its Indian counterpart.
> 
> Most important, India had a fine air force of 500 combat aircraft, totally outclassing anything China possessed or anything it could operate out of Tibet.
> 
> Even though India had superiority on the ground, it gave in (Nehru again?). And the air force was never used. Why?
> 
> Indian Hunters and Gnats would have been more than a match for the Chinese MiG-15s and MiG-17s, and Indian Canberras would have pounded Chinese troops on the ground. Every ton of fuel and ordnance required by the Chinese air force had to be brought across 2000- kilometers of mountain road. IAF operated from large well-connected bases in Eastern India. How long could the Chinese have even flown against IAF, leave alone fight?
> 
> IAF, however, was stood down, and the Indian army milled around putting more and more troops into the northeast till, within a year, there were eight large divisions in place.
> 
> It is to be accepted that everyone did a bad job before the war and when it broke out. Point is simply this: even after all the setbacks, all the disasters, India could have made a realistic assessment of its adversary, his limits, and own strength. India had only to keep its nerve, or at least recover it after the initial setbacks.
> 
> Had the Indian Army been told to go on fighting, it would have done so. After all, death is all a solider faces, and for a soldier there are fates a lot worse than death.
> 
> The Indian Army, however, was not told to continue. IAF was not ordered into action. No one ordered the bombing of Lhasa, Gyanste, Shigatse. There was no Lt. Col. Doolittle on Indian side, to make a symbolic—but what a symbol—raid on China . No one determinedly, got together a naval task force to sail off Canton and to lob a few shells at that city (like Pakistan Navy did on Dwarka). Nothing was done, substantial or symbolic, except a grateful acceptance of the ceasefire by a wholly shaken leadership, and by a Nehru so destroyed that he was broken and dead not long after.



I really wish you had been around during the discussion on this between Chausim and myself; it was some years ago, and disappeared with many old files and records.

The terrible heat in Hyderabad has led to me making hit-and-run visits to the study, and to the computer and to this forum but there is a little bit left to be written up, and I hope to do it by tomorrow.

Meanwhile, if you look at the Indo-Chinese conflict of 62, you would not have failed to notice that the situation of the Indian Army in NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh and of the Pakistan Army in Azad Kashmir and the hinterland beyond are almost exactly in parallel, other than some fairly serious differences in logistical capability. So the Indian Army/PLA GF sit on high level plateaux looking down at the Pakistan Army/Indian Army on lower-level plains, with the distance between them covered by heavily-forested ravines and narrow rivers, equally accessible to both sides. The lower level plains are very well connected, the upper level one, in the case of Xijang, is also well-connected because the Chinese worked on it, but it is very badly connected in the Vale, because India never worked on it. About 70 to 80% of the friction in the Vale between the man in the street and the authorities is due to the coming onto common access roads of both very heavy military traffic and civilian commuter traffic.

So whatever the Pakistan Army can do in Kashmir - attack, but attack an enemy that knows how to defend - applies to whatever the Indian Army can do in Arunachal.

These do not apply to Ladakh, where the PLA GF seems to be intent on salami-slicing their way closer to Pakistan Army positions, and XIV Corps doesn't seem to know what to do about it.



PanzerKiel said:


> keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians, a bit of 1962....
> 
> In 1962 India lost. But it could have won. How?
> 
> Simply by refusing to accept the Chinese unilateral cease-fire. Simply by uttering the words “The Government of India is determined to go on fighting till every inch of its soil is freed from enemy occupation.”
> 
> But would that not have prolonged the war? A war that we could not have won because India was already defeated?
> 
> No. Because with the onset of the hard winter, the Chinese would have had to retire. They could not maintain their troops on the snowy southern side of the Himalayas as they had outrun their communications in their rapid advance into India. Their entire winter policy for Tibet, to this day, calls for leaving the bare minimum forward. and withdrawing the rest to warm, permanent bases’ till the spring. Even in the warm weather they maintain only a third of a unit up a regiment will post a battalion forward, and the rest will remain in comfortable quarters till required.
> 
> There was no way in which China could have maintained 20,000 troops inside India through the winter relying on a couple of temporary one-ton roads for supply.
> 
> A setback is not a defeat. The Russians retreated one thousand kilometers across their own country suffering the heaviest casualties in the history of war. But they managed to stabilize the front and returned to take Berlin.
> 
> A defeat is in the mind--- if you do not give in, you can never be defeated.
> 
> The fighting for Thagla Ridge began in September 1962. By the time of the cease-fire, over 36 infantry battalions were in the theatre, the equivalent of four divisions. The Thapar plan for the defence of the Northeast, formulated in 1959, required three divisions for a sure defence of this sensitive area. Now India had the equivalent of four, plus the equivalent of an independent armored brigade waiting on the south bank of the Brahmaputra in case the Chinese crossed into the Indian plains.
> 
> The Chinese had perhaps the equivalent of four regiments (one and one-third divisions) against India along the western axis (Bomdila), and elements of a division against the eastern axis (Walong). Moreover, a Chinese division was much lighter in terms of engineers, transport, artillery than its Indian counterpart.
> 
> Most important, India had a fine air force of 500 combat aircraft, totally outclassing anything China possessed or anything it could operate out of Tibet.
> 
> Even though India had superiority on the ground, it gave in (Nehru again?). And the air force was never used. Why?
> 
> Indian Hunters and Gnats would have been more than a match for the Chinese MiG-15s and MiG-17s, and Indian Canberras would have pounded Chinese troops on the ground. Every ton of fuel and ordnance required by the Chinese air force had to be brought across 2000- kilometers of mountain road. IAF operated from large well-connected bases in Eastern India. How long could the Chinese have even flown against IAF, leave alone fight?
> 
> IAF, however, was stood down, and the Indian army milled around putting more and more troops into the northeast till, within a year, there were eight large divisions in place.
> 
> It is to be accepted that everyone did a bad job before the war and when it broke out. Point is simply this: even after all the setbacks, all the disasters, India could have made a realistic assessment of its adversary, his limits, and own strength. India had only to keep its nerve, or at least recover it after the initial setbacks.
> 
> Had the Indian Army been told to go on fighting, it would have done so. After all, death is all a solider faces, and for a soldier there are fates a lot worse than death.
> 
> The Indian Army, however, was not told to continue. IAF was not ordered into action. No one ordered the bombing of Lhasa, Gyanste, Shigatse. There was no Lt. Col. Doolittle on Indian side, to make a symbolic—but what a symbol—raid on China . No one determinedly, got together a naval task force to sail off Canton and to lob a few shells at that city (like Pakistan Navy did on Dwarka). Nothing was done, substantial or symbolic, except a grateful acceptance of the ceasefire by a wholly shaken leadership, and by a Nehru so destroyed that he was broken and dead not long after.



I also think that there is a lot of impact of what happened at top levels to the Indian Army. Let me list them seriatim, solely from the point of view of what happened after the Chinese attacked Tawang.

Dalvi and his Brigade fell apart; Dalvi had not stood up very strongly to Biji Kaul, but for a Brigadier to tell a Corps Commander to naff off is not easy, as I hope you will agree.
The Div. commander later became an old friend of the Pakistan Army, and contributed his jeep to your War Museum; this was Niranjan Prasad's role in 62, and - wait for this - he survived and went on to be a Div commander in 65.
The Corps Commander was a city slicker who had a liking for the rounded phrase, and replied to a sceptical JCO's asking why the Indian Army was down, looking up at the PLA, by pompously proclaiming that while what the JCO was saying was unusual, it was even more unusual to have an officer of his level at the front.
Not being used to field conditions, he promptly fell ill, and, without handing over charge, got into hospital in Delhi.
He was replaced by Harbaksh, and was galvanised into action by the news, got off his sickbed and charged off to Walong, the other end of NEFA (Arunachal).
Harbaksh was asked to let go of IV Corps and take XXXIII Corps instead.

You are aware of all these incidents, and had published Biji Kaul's fictional account of Niranjan Prasad's coolness under fire.


Bogey Sen had gone past his use-by date, and was bumbling around ineffectively, but finally managed to cause serious problems.
The DMO, a scheming, thoroughly political Bengali officer, decided to get involved, informed everyone that he had 'cabinet' approval for his thoughts and deeds and plans, and tried to get the retreating units to make a stand at Se La. This landed up in becoming a 3-way tussle between himself, the Army Commander, Eastern Command, and Corps Commander, IV Corps. Nobody won, the jawans lost.
There were two Generals Pathania involved, and M. A. S. did the worse damage (M. S. was heading up the newly formed 2 Div in Walong, and messing up over there; the saving grace there was Rawlley, just as the saving grace in Ladakh was 'Teppy' Raina. 
The ONE Brigadier who was ready to fight from a 'box' (a concept that the British had used in Burma, when over-run by the IJA), Hoshiar Singh, was threatened with court-martial by A. S. Pathania if he didn't abandon Se La and retreat to the plains. He did withdraw, and was ambushed and killed on the way down.
My questions to you follow.

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## Arulmozhi Varman

Joe Shearer said:


> This is a note sent to me by one of the finest young minds on this forum, in private. I reproduce it without his permission because of the value of the note. To protect his privacy, I omit his name.
> 
> _Joe if you would the role of Nehru is pretty hard to criticize. Leaders evolve with what they experience. A leader at peace time would struggle to lead in a war just like a leader at wartime would struggle to lead in peace. This has never been more proven than with the fact that Churchill was the British war hero who led the British to victory but was removed bcz he was not seen as an effective peace time leader. The military leadership of both countries blames the civilian leadership of that time however the leaders were product of their experience. India and Pakistan had largely won their independence through peaceful non violent efforts and through logical arguments. What the US needed mobilization to beat the super power of the world to earn their independence, india and Pakistan had done it through peaceful events, even if it was against a dead power. Nehru,Gandhi, Jinnah, liaqat, bacha khan, all of them were non violent in nature and believed in peaceful but firm resolution. They had carved large countries through this method. On that day when they succeeded, in their minds one thing was set that the world is now going to be non violent and the war to end all wars had actually ended all wars after all they didn't need to mobilize the masses to arms and fight city after city for their independence against a ruthless empire. What the British took a hundred years of violence to achieve, they had done it through a few decades of non violence thus non violence is the answer and peaceful resolutions will eventually solve the problems... This is the environment they were formed in, groomed in and succeeded in and nothing evolves your ideology more than success.
> [16:17]
> Then a month later they faced a massive conundrum. They faced war when nehru was talking about whether an army is needed or not and Jinnah was talking about india and Pakistan being like US and Canada. In these times, it was the military leadership that was aware since wars had groomed them. It was yahya khan during a celebration held by British at Quetta ta barracks had asked his superiors as to what they were celebrating since now rather than becoming a super power, the two nations will fight forever. This was in august 1947,
> [16:18]
> So joe when the opportunity to take Kashmir by force came, Pakistani leadership was found sleeping and wanting and same happened in junagad and Hyderabad. There was no desire to fight a war bcz war was not in their blood. Was it not habitullah who was told that that Kashmir was coming to Pakistan on a plate. There is a reason behind that statement. Its bcz they got such huge lands without spilling countless blood on it bar partition violence. They didn't have to fight decades of war like other nations did. They just didn't thus in that environment india and Pakistan found themselves in a state of war. What do you expect them to do? Of course they would mess up or underestimate the situation.
> [16:18]
> Nehru went to UN bcz his entire life had proven that conflicts can be resolved on table and conflicts can solved. He went to the UN since peace and non conflict had given them Pakistan and india so what is kashmir to that.
> [16:18]
> Leaders of peace and leaders of war are two different breeds just like how hasbrudal the splendid was different from Hannibal and hamilcar
> [16:18]
> He could make calls Hannibal couldnt and Hannibal could make calls hasbrudal couldn't. Pakistan and india found itself in a war with the two peaceful leaders the region had ever seen.
> [16:19]
> And there is the entire understanding as to why the leadership was found wanting.
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_
> I just received this stunningly brilliant post-script. It is a must-read!
> 
> Once you have read it and digested it, sit back and ponder on this - this is a Pakistani member in his 30s! who is 28 and will be 29 this September.
> _---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Now that I think about it there is another example and a far closer home one. Faqir of ippi and bacha khan. Both of them were not happy with Pakistan and both of then were the same ethnicity no why did one raise weapons against Pakistan whereas the other led khudai khidmatgars on peaceful protests? Bcz both were products of their environment. Both were charismatic, had their set of followers and both stuck to their belief. Faqir of ippi, who had experienced war and fight with British his entire life to secure the freedom of roh did the exact same action against Pakistan that he had done against the British his entire life. He took up arms whereas bacha khan did what he had done his entire life which was protest peacefully. Could you imagine faqir of ippi sitting in a protest in Waziristan and bacha khan telling khudai khidmatgars to pick up arms. The reason bcz their life experience told them that their respective methods are efficient. Both of them had the same goal which was to push out Pakistan but they employed different ideals which they had done their entire lives and they had both found success in it in their experience. Same story happened with nehru or Jinnah. All were signing standstill agreements rather than sending army convoys. We did the same in Baluchistan. Signed standstill agreements. I mean Jinnah was arguing with khan of kalat like a lawyer on how Quetta is under the domain of Pakistan since Pakistan is a successor state of British in international law and thus inherited the treaties that British signed. Can you imagine the likes Chang ki shaik, Mao, or even Lenin or Trotsky or let's take a more close example, faqir of ippi doing that?
> [19:16]
> *so
> [19:19]
> The reason why Jinnah was doing that because that is how he had done it with British and Congress his entire life. Cabinet mission being torn apart by lawyers. The reason why Jinnah didn't move a finger to Hyderabad was bcz in his eyes Hyderabad was a separate legal state whose annexation or non annexation was no concern of Pakistan apart from belligerence of a neighbor.
> [19:20]
> Why would Pakistan send its army to save an area that is legally a separate state? Why even would Pakistan itself try to annex it even? Wouldn't that break international law? He thought like a lawyer with legal senses and India annexed Hyderabad simple.
> [19:22]
> Nehru was a peaceful protestor with Gandhi. Both of them simply did what they did their entire life. Protest in front of the world how they are wronged.
> [19:23]
> Liaqat did the same thing. The moment the war got 40km away from Pakistan territory, they agreed to a ceasefire and decided to protest in front of the world how they are wronged
> [19:25]
> Leaders are products of their environment just like you and I are joe. The difference is that they are far better,dedicated products with a vision. They may not always succeed. Some of the most charismatic leaders in history have failed but they were human. Chiseled by the experience that thought them, the environment that moulded them.
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_
> @Nilgiri @jbgt90 @Naofumi @xeuss@BL33D
> 
> @PanzerKiel @TsAr @El Observer @JamD @Psychic @phantom @Gryphon @Signalian


 Wasn't it odd? I mean Nehru grew up in times of WW1 and WW2 and believing the world will achieve peace through war seems far fetched. Peace was achieved by nuk bombing Japan. Destruction of Germany was such wholesome that Germans worked in India during 50's and 60's.
While he was responsible for guiding down the institution development along with ensuring federal characteristics govt, his foreign affairs hasn't been awesome if we judge by today's standards. NAM, Panchasheel might have looked brilliant on paper, but achieved little in terms of anything concrete. Just years after WW2 he said what was the need for army. When WW2 just taught how having an independent armed forces is very important for an independent nation as a whole.


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## Joe Shearer

Arulmozhi Varman said:


> Wasn't it odd? I mean Nehru grew up in times of WW1 and WW2 and believing the world will achieve peace through war seems far fetched. Peace was achieved by nuk bombing Japan. Destruction of Germany was such wholesome that Germans worked in India during 50's and 60's.
> While he was responsible for guiding down the institution development along with ensuring federal characteristics govt, his foreign affairs hasn't been awesome if we judge by today's standards. NAM, Panchasheel might have looked brilliant on paper, but achieved little in terms of anything concrete. Just years after WW2 he said what was the need for army. When WW2 just taught how having an independent armed forces is very important for an independent nation as a whole.



Not just foreign affairs; his allowing Menon to mishandle the military was verging on the criminal.

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## Buddhistforlife

Nilgiri said:


> A look into the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan to better understand the context of the current prevailing situation and the possibilities and probabilities of various hypothetical engagements to come.
> 
> The previous thread chains for reference (where ORBAT and analysis among some members commenced):
> 
> https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-6#post-11197800
> 
> More recently (highlight of a newer thread of similar vein):
> 
> https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334338
> 
> @Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @jbgt90 @Signalian @Gryphon @Cuirassier


Speaking of Pakistani tactics, in every Indo Pak wars, the Pak army used large number of informal militants. In 1947 and 1965, Pakistan


Nilgiri said:


> A look into the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan to better understand the context of the current prevailing situation and the possibilities and probabilities of various hypothetical engagements to come.
> 
> The previous thread chains for reference (where ORBAT and analysis among some members commenced):
> 
> https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-6#post-11197800
> 
> More recently (highlight of a newer thread of similar vein):
> 
> https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334338
> 
> @Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @jbgt90 @Signalian @Gryphon @Cuirassier


Watch Kabir Bedi's guns and glory. Excellent series and explains your questions-Aims,Results, Strategy in details. It is also pretty non biased.


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## Nilgiri

Buddhistforlife said:


> Watch Kabir Bedi's guns and glory. Excellent series and explains your questions-Aims,Results, Strategy in details. It is also pretty non biased.



I watched that stuff already....long time ago.

Nah man, its nowhere near the analysis I have read here lately ....especially full neutral and sound perspective from the Pakistani side.

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## Nilgiri

PanzerKiel said:


> keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians



Now that we have segued a bit to that theatre....you (and others) might find this blog post quite interesting to read:

http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2020/05/what-has-plagf-learnt-from-dogra-gen.html

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## Joe Shearer

Nilgiri said:


> Now that we have segued a bit to that theatre....you (and others) might find this blog post quite interesting to read:
> 
> http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2020/05/what-has-plagf-learnt-from-dogra-gen.html



It's a nice blog, as blogs go. I like him, but he has this appalling habit, like Armchair, of outlining the most outlandish manoeuvres, and then wishing into existence the entire logistics chain that would enable it (sometimes, very seldom, creating magic kingdoms of exotic weaponry as well). He refuses to use existing logistics capabilities as a constraint, and plan within that.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> It's a nice blog, as blogs go. I like him, but he has this appalling habit, like Armchair, of outlining the most outlandish manoeuvres, and then wishing into existence the entire logistics chain that would enable it (sometimes, very seldom, creating magic kingdoms of exotic weaponry as well). He refuses to use existing logistics capabilities as a constraint, and plan within that.



Aptly pointed out. Good read for Sunday morning..



Nilgiri said:


> Now that we have segued a bit to that theatre....you (and others) might find this blog post quite interesting to read:
> 
> http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2020/05/what-has-plagf-learnt-from-dogra-gen.html

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## PanzerKiel

Something which I've been pondering upon... 


Keeping in view India's near military history... 
And basing upon potential threats.... Like in planning we always say that you have to prepare for the worst... Which in this case is...

An offensive-defensive strategy based threat from Pakistan and China both...

A defensive-defensive strategy based threat from Bangladesh

And multiple threats to its vulnerable long sea coasts and port areas where its precious power projection assets are based

There ought to be separate air, land and sea components for all these threats to INDEPENDENTLY deal with these threats without waiting for or depending upon induction of outside forces. And then there ought to be SEPARATE theatre reserves for offensive or defensive contingencies. And superimposed upon all over this should be the national level reserves of army, navy and air force.

Example... Eastern Command forces have a big role to play against any offensive in the West.... What if some situation along Bangladesh or Siliguri ties them up? No offensive in the West then?

They against China... Same question... Are the already placed forces enough to ward off the worst of Chinese threat or potential threat? Or forces are inducted here as well to even out the odds? 

Then the sea coast, sea flanks.... What if we see a permanent deployment of Chinese amphibious forces at some port in Arabian sea? Won't India be forced to permanently detach potent forces to defend the probable landing beachhead sites.

Isn't this what is happening to India right now? India voices its intentions to go for GB and AK... And then a small incursion by PLA along LAC almost off balances it.

Best deployment of forces must be like... A potent defensive posture to deal with Chinese while simultaneously retaining the capability to go across against Pakistan....which is not the case right now. 

I believe that.... Of all the force tiers.... Tactical, operational, theatre and strategic... Some where, something is missing at a tier.... 

More thoughts might follow....

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## SQ8

Discussions that mirror the days gone by.. nostalgic and hopeful. 

However that citation for the Wg. Cdr will never be without doubt especially for those with greater ties to the military on this side. But then false claims have been made by PAF personnel in previous wars although for the Wg Cdr it seems to be more a case of fait accompli from the “new reich” in India - hopefully the next elections change things for the better.

Another aspect which was highlighted by a SOCOM friend of mine is the mentality of officers being rolled out from the IA in join training - “arrogant and argumentative” for a Black cat group versus “attentive to criticism” for A SSG group. This is perhaps one of the major factors leading to 26th versus 27th February and contrats opposite to what was known of Indian military attitudes prior to the new millennium.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Something which I've been pondering upon...
> 
> 
> Keeping in view India's near military history...
> And basing upon potential threats.... Like in planning we always say that you have to prepare for the worst... Which in this case is...
> 
> An offensive-defensive strategy based threat from Pakistan and China both...
> 
> A defensive-defensive strategy based threat from Bangladesh
> 
> And multiple threats to its vulnerable long sea coasts and port areas where its precious power projection assets are based
> 
> There ought to be separate air, land and sea components for all these threats to INDEPENDENTLY deal with these threats without waiting for or depending upon induction of outside forces. And then there ought to be SEPARATE theatre reserves for offensive or defensive contingencies. And superimposed upon all over this should be the national level reserves of army, navy and air force.
> 
> Example... Eastern Command forces have a big role to play against any offensive in the West.... What if some situation along Bangladesh or Siliguri ties them up? No offensive in the West then?
> 
> They against China... Same question... Are the already placed forces enough to ward off the worst of Chinese threat or potential threat? Or forces are inducted here as well to even out the odds?
> 
> Then the sea coast, sea flanks.... What if we see a permanent deployment of Chinese amphibious forces at some port in Arabian sea? Won't India be forced to permanently detach potent forces to defend the probable landing beachhead sites.
> 
> Isn't this what is happening to India right now? India voices its intentions to go for GB and AK... And then a small incursion by PLA along LAC almost off balances it.
> 
> Best deployment of forces must be like... A potent defensive posture to deal with Chinese while simultaneously retaining the capability to go across against Pakistan....which is not the case right now.
> 
> I believe that.... Of all the force tiers.... Tactical, operational, theatre and strategic... Some where, something is missing at a tier....
> 
> More thoughts might follow....



Music to my ears.

Unfortunately, today these views can be expressed only in think-tanks in Delhi, and those are rarely consulted, being left to take up propaganda against the rivals of the ruling party.

What you have articulated is that the resources and capabilities for dealing with Indian threats and potential threats need to be concentrated into 'theatres', and that all three military arms need to be combined within these theatres, as far as management is concerned. For instance,

China
Northern Command, from Leh to Bareilly
Central Command, from Bareilly to Kishanganj
Eastern Command, from Kishanganj to Tezpur
North-Eastern Command, from Tezpur to Walong
Island Command, Andaman & Nicobar Islands
Far Eastern Command, South Pacific Ocean

Bangladesh
Myanmar
Indian Ocean
Pakistan
On a careful working, it is possible to keep the head-count to reasonable limits, if not actually reduce them; the presence of the border forces is a factor, as they are about a platoon to every 3 kms in the west, two platoons to every 3 kms in the north. Unfortunately, we have to drop our obsession with aircraft carriers, and we need around 300 ships to give us coastal defence (in depth, including a land-based component attached to the maritime defences, and a long-range strike capability in the air), command over economic resources and sea lines of communications in the east, the south and the west, and war-fighting capabilities in the far east and in the west. Other requirements, such as anti-piracy patrolling, sea denial in the east and in the west, and amphibious capabilities, or expeditionary capabilities, are strictly secondary and must not be even thought of unless the basics have been met.

There is a real problem with the Air Force, and that has to be resolved on priority. The Navy needs re-orientation and a weaning away from their dreams of projecting national strength through carrier-borne aviation, together with a renewed focus on defending Indian sovereignty in the short-range, medium-range and the long-range. The Army needs to become specialist Armies, mission-oriented rather than formation oriented, and without the integumen of the old regiments, free of them without discarding them.

There may be a penalty to be paid for balancing forces; the head-count for the Air Force may treble from 140,000 to over 400,000, and the head-count for the Navy may be forced up from around 70,000 to over 300,000. This does not include production capacity.

Most of all, if nothing else happens, if the present rate of road-building and infrastructure development are continued, and if Logistics becomes a central military function common to all services, along with (electronic) Communications and Medical Support, we have overcome some of the obstacles of the past.



Socra said:


> Discussions that mirror the days gone by.. nostalgic and hopeful.
> 
> However that citation for the Wg. Cdr will never be without doubt especially for those with greater ties to the military on this side. But then false claims have been made by PAF personnel in previous wars although for the Wg Cdr it seems to be more a case of fait accompli from the “new reich” in India - hopefully the next elections change things for the better.
> 
> Another aspect which was highlighted by a SOCOM friend of mine is the mentality of officers being rolled out from the IA in join training - “arrogant and argumentative” for a Black cat group versus “attentive to criticism” for A SSG group. This is perhaps one of the major factors leading to 26th versus 27th February and contrats opposite to what was known of Indian military attitudes prior to the new millennium.



The entire episode had to be dressed up. The past loyalties and personal connections with an older and much respected senior had to be accommodated. The citation is not something that any sensible Indian will comment on, in public.

As for the second observation, we are breeding too many Arnab Goswamis in uniform, and the presence of our own miniature G. D. Bakshi as an expert commentator in Republic TV doesn't help. Maroof Raza has now been displaced by his Sanghi equivalent. This is indeed a 180 degree change.

A very old member, Sr. Nair, made a telling observation; he pointed out that most of the social media garbage - most, but not all - is generated in the north. We have lost an entire generation. He concluded with the soothing thought that these immature idiots would grow and mature in due course of time, but that sadly seems to be whistling past the graveyard.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Music to my ears.
> 
> Unfortunately, today these views can be expressed only in think-tanks in Delhi, and those are rarely consulted, being left to take up propaganda against the rivals of the ruling party.
> 
> What you have articulated is that the resources and capabilities for dealing with Indian threats and potential threats need to be concentrated into 'theatres', and that all three military arms need to be combined within these theatres, as far as management is concerned. For instance,
> 
> China
> Northern Command, from Leh to Bareilly
> Central Command, from Bareilly to Kishanganj
> Eastern Command, from Kishanganj to Tezpur
> North-Eastern Command, from Tezpur to Walong
> Island Command, Andaman & Nicobar Islands
> Far Eastern Command, South Pacific Ocean
> 
> Bangladesh
> Myanmar
> Indian Ocean
> Pakistan
> On a careful working, it is possible to keep the head-count to reasonable limits, if not actually reduce them; the presence of the border forces is a factor, as they are about a platoon to every 3 kms in the west, two platoons to every 3 kms in the north. Unfortunately, we have to drop our obsession with aircraft carriers, and we need around 300 ships to give us coastal defence (in depth, including a land-based component attached to the maritime defences, and a long-range strike capability in the air), command over economic resources and sea lines of communications in the east, the south and the west, and war-fighting capabilities in the far east and in the west. Other requirements, such as anti-piracy patrolling, sea denial in the east and in the west, and amphibious capabilities, or expeditionary capabilities, are strictly secondary and must not be even thought of unless the basics have been met.
> 
> There is a real problem with the Air Force, and that has to be resolved on priority. The Navy needs re-orientation and a weaning away from their dreams of projecting national strength through carrier-borne aviation, together with a renewed focus on defending Indian sovereignty in the short-range, medium-range and the long-range. The Army needs to become specialist Armies, mission-oriented rather than formation oriented, and without the integumen of the old regiments, free of them without discarding them .
> 
> Most of all, if nothing else happens, if the present rate of road-building and infrastructure development are continued, and if Logistics becomes a central military function common to all services, along with (electronic) Communications and Medical Support, we have overcome some of the obstacles of the past.



In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.

Aircraft carriers ... Yes.... In my opinion, Indians may require atleast 4 carriers each on both coasts.... With one in maintenance and 3 in seas.....and with them the usual paraphernalia of subs, ASW, AA and anti surface frigates, destroyers, replenishment oilers, minesweepers etc.... And then what use are these Carrier Battle Groups if you do not have big massive amphibious forces to land on enemy coast....

. By not presenting a potent amphibious threat, Indian CVBGs maybe nothing but potential targets for PAF and PLAF.

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## Nilgiri

Joe Shearer said:


> Maroof Raza has now been displaced by his Sanghi equivalent.



It's getting that bad eh? Thankfully I quit watching...even peeking into all that mess quite a while ago.



Joe Shearer said:


> He concluded with the soothing thought that these immature idiots would grow and mature in due course of time



They wont, they are clumsy unwieldy elephants that have gotten too emboldened from the peanut gallery....and they have convinced themselves they are ballerinas. Anyone gonna fancy sticking their neck out, stepping in and cutting them to shape? Nope. They essentially have to fall from their own giddiness at some point...everyone can see how dumb the circus was then...and smack their heads then like they knew it all along.

I take little solace in the fact this is happening closer to home in North America too....where I expect these people to know somewhat better on average. But it seems they just had a much longer sustained inertia of pleasantness and success behind them that kind of operates on a status quo vibe of its own. 

Nice, we are all utterly united worldwide in our rotten complacency and emotional gamesmanship in the end. God help us all.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in...



I really wish (in an abstract sense) it were not you saying this.



> 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....



I have an alternative explanation for this - underpreparedness. 

We simply jumped the gun. 

The massive holes in structure and in process that showed up were deeply disappointing. At the structural level, 

We effectively have no AD system in place; the PAF can walk in, position itself 20 to 50 kms inside its own air space and blow up anything at all that they want. Or, perhaps, we have the AD, but not the will to use it, especially against aircraft within their own air space and doing no harm until they squeeze the button. 
We went into the operation with no defence against the incremental range of the PAF air to air missiles. This is unbelievable.
We have no additional air bases in the north to supplement Srinagar, and that frankly seems to be insufficient.
In terms of process, 

Why were we not ready for the inevitable retaliatory strike? It is true that the retaliation could have happened anywhere at all, but given Pakistan's consistent line of defining Kashmir as a disputed area and as a legitimate combat zone, surely the first piece of Band Aid should have been applied there?
Where were the AWACS in support, and where were they if not in the sky? What is the point of acquiring all this glistening new machinery unless they are of use?
Do we have anything like a standard operating procedure to cope with jamming, and had we done any physical or electronic simulations of combat with jamming and electronic warfare, AND anti-electronic warfare, as factors?
Who planned the defence and stayed hands on, on the 27th? It is dismaying to see TV interviews of a Ground Controller; she did her best, but against jamming and against a pilot who seems to represent the worst of an already difficult lot, she was clearly out of her depth.
As you said, TOO MUCH TOO SOON.



> Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.



Ouch.



> Aircraft carriers ... Yes.... In my opinion, Indians may require atleast 4 carriers each on both coasts.... With new in maintenance and 3 in seas.....and with them the usual paraphernalia of subs, ASW, AA and anti surface frigates, destroyers, replenishment oilers, minesweepers etc.... And then what use are these Carrier Battle Groups if you do not have big massive amphibious forces to land on enemy coast....
> 
> . By not presenting a potent amphibious threat, Indian CVBGs maybe nothing but potential targets for PAF and PLAF.



The quick and dirty figure was 9, but not of equal size. Frankly, what we need for the Bay of Bengal are very small ones of the size of the original Vikrant, between 15,000 to 25,000 MT displacement, with two squadrons on board. What we need in the Arabian Sea has to rival a medium-sized US carrier, on non-nuclear propulsion. For the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, perhaps the same. But in terms of numbers, for each Carrier Battle Group on active duty at sea, there has to another retiring to base or venturing out, and there has to be a third undergoing major refit. So, three in each area, but - the good news - not of uniform size, now the bad news, if different, then demanding diversity of naval aircraft; and then the worst news - all of these vulnerable to a single cruise missile out of a swarm, fired from a platform well outside the range of a carrier's strike aircraft, 'sighted' by an innocuous offshore patrol vessel lurking near the battle group.

It just isn't worth it.

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## Nilgiri

Joe Shearer said:


> What we need in the Arabian Sea has to rival a medium-sized US carrier, on non-nuclear propulsion.



Nostalgia for me, many years back had a nice speculative convo with an American friend (retd USN) about USS kitty hawk being retired, overhauled and deployed for Indian Navy heh. 

I like the smaller carrier approach of yours, given its more apt to following the rule of 3:



Joe Shearer said:


> But in terms of numbers, for each Carrier Battle Group on active duty at sea, there has to another retiring to base or venturing out, and there has to be a third undergoing major refit.



The rule of 3! How I wish @Penguin were here for this discussion.



Joe Shearer said:


> all of these vulnerable to a single cruise missile out of a swarm, fired from a platform well outside the range of a carrier's strike aircraft, 'sighted' by an innocuous offshore patrol vessel lurking near the battle group.



Well well, this scenario would be modelled and accounted for in the CBG deployment doctrine...how to best detect and eliminate threats that can do a snipe shot.



Joe Shearer said:


> It just isn't worth it.



Especially not with this economic size we are at. These all cost big bucks....ramping up shipyard (build, maintain, upgrade, overhaul) capacity is already an issue in India with the current lower warship numbers. This all costs lot of money and resource.... this is why my interest over the years has changed drastically from the military side to more economic one.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I really wish (in an abstract sense) it were not you saying this.
> 
> 
> 
> I have an alternative explanation for this - underpreparedness.
> 
> We simply jumped the gun.
> 
> The massive holes in structure and in process that showed up were deeply disappointing. At the structural level,
> 
> We effectively have no AD system in place; the PAF can walk in, position itself 20 to 50 kms inside its own air space and blow up anything at all that they want. Or, perhaps, we have the AD, but not the will to use it, especially against aircraft within their own air space and doing no harm until they squeeze the button.
> We went into the operation with no defence against the incremental range of the PAF air to air missiles. This is unbelievable.
> We have no additional air bases in the north to supplement Srinagar, and that frankly seems to be insufficient.
> In terms of process,
> 
> Why were we not ready for the inevitable retaliatory strike? It is true that the retaliation could have happened anywhere at all, but given Pakistan's consistent line of defining Kashmir as a disputed area and as a legitimate combat zone, surely the first piece of Band Aid should have been applied there?
> Where were the AWACS in support, and where were they if not in the sky? What is the point of acquiring all this glistening new machinery unless they are of use?
> Do we have anything like a standard operating procedure to cope with jamming, and had we done any physical or electronic simulations of combat with jamming and electronic warfare, AND anti-electronic warfare, as factors?
> Who planned the defence and stayed hands on, on the 27th? It is dismaying to see TV interviews of a Ground Controller; she did her best, but against jamming and against a pilot who seems to represent the worst of an already difficult lot, she was clearly out of her depth.
> As you said, TOO MUCH TOO SOON.
> 
> 
> 
> Ouch.
> 
> 
> 
> The quick and dirty figure was 9, but not of equal size. Frankly, what we need for the Bay of Bengal are very small ones of the size of the original Vikrant, between 15,000 to 25,000 MT displacement, with two squadrons on board. What we need in the Arabian Sea has to rival a medium-sized US carrier, on non-nuclear propulsion. For the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, perhaps the same. But in terms of numbers, for each Carrier Battle Group on active duty at sea, there has to another retiring to base or venturing out, and there has to be a third undergoing major refit. So, three in each area, but - the good news - not of uniform size, now the bad news, if different, then demanding diversity of naval aircraft; and then the worst news - all of these vulnerable to a single cruise missile out of a swarm, fired from a platform well outside the range of a carrier's strike aircraft, 'sighted' by an innocuous offshore patrol vessel lurking near the battle group.
> 
> It just isn't worth it.



You are right... Unpreparedness of IAF last February... 
To put in tangible terms... 
None of the PAF assets.... Fighter, fighter escorts, EW, strike.... None of them were procured the previous day... I mean their capabilities are well known to everyone... Latest being thy block 52s which are also many years old now....
Peace time is always used to analyze opponent's capabilities based on his held assets.... And then comparing own capabilities based on own asset , plans and contingencies are made.... There must be something wrong in the peacetime operational planning process of IAF.... 

and then, on the ultimate day in February..... How come they didn't think of any retaliation from a country you have just bombed, a country which is your declared enemy, fought so many wars with... 

Is there a lack of C2 In IAF.... I mean once the PAF comes in, IAF interceptors go up on their own, Phalco comes and bugs out leaving everyone to PAF mercy, no SAR for the downed pilot... SAR would have required maybe Garuds standing by along with helis and fighter aircraft to provide top cover..... That Mi 17 shot down, again flying in a hot environment on its own....lack of situational awareness of Ground based AD elements since they didn't know who's in the air at the moment....... List goes on...

It all brings to one thing... Atleast.... On the Indian side... There was no ONE person who had the complete picture of the battlefield, both land and air.... If there were one, then this litany of mistakes would have been avoided...

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> You are right... Unpreparedness of IAF last February...
> To put in tangible terms...
> None of the PAF assets.... Fighter, fighter escorts, EW, strike.... None of them were procured the previous day... I mean their capabilities are well known to everyone... Latest being thy block 52s which are also many years old now....
> Peace time is always used to analyze opponent's capabilities based on his held assets.... And then comparing own capabilities based on own asset , plans and contingencies are made.... There must be something wrong in the peacetime operational planning process of IAF....
> 
> and then, on the ultimate day in February..... How come they didn't think of any retaliation from a country you have just bombed, a country which is your declared enemy, fought so many wars with...
> 
> Is there a lack of C2 In IAF.... I mean once the PAF comes in, IAF interceptors go up on their own, Phalco comes and bugs out leaving everyone to PAF mercy, no SAR for the downed pilot... SAR would have required maybe Garuds standing by along with helis and fighter aircraft to provide top cover..... That Mi 17 shot down, again flying in a hot environment on its own....lack of situational awareness of Ground based AD elements since they didn't know who's in the air at the moment....... List goes on...






> It all brings to one thing... Atleast.... On the Indian side... There was no ONE person who had the complete picture of the battlefield, both land and air.... If there were one, then this litany of mistakes would have been avoided





> ...



That's it.

I believe that there should have been local commanders in different zones empowered to coordinate integrated responses.

One input that is frankly unsatisfactory is that the AOC-in-C was just about being transferred. That is not much consolation; we cannot ask the PAF or the PLA AF to wait for our transfers to be complete and the incumbents to be in place and sufficiently briefed to be able to do their jobs. That seems to indicate that there is no continuity, and that the reporting level is quite paralysed during this transition.

Regarding the Air Rescue, we performed like the Keystone Cops. Believe me, no civilian project would have gone into action with such unpreparedness.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> That's it.
> 
> I believe that there should have been local commanders in different zones empowered to coordinate integrated responses.
> 
> One input that is frankly unsatisfactory is that the AOC-in-C was just about being transferred. That is not much consolation; we cannot ask the PAF or the PLA AF to wait for our transfers to be complete and the incumbents to be in place and sufficiently briefed to be able to do their jobs. That seems to indicate that there is no continuity, and that the reporting level is quite paralysed during this transition.
> 
> Regarding the Air Rescue, we performed like the Keystone Cops. Believe me, no civilian project would have gone into action with such unpreparedness.



Yeah... Frankly, AO in C absence should not have been an issue....
On the battlefield, the peacetime planning and training speaks out on behalf of the Commander.... If the outcome is favorable, then it's good.... If outcome is bad enough, then it means bad peacetime planning and no Commander on ground to correct it.... Even if the Commander may be physically available, but then he cannot correct the loopholes of a bad plan during a fluid battle...

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## Nilgiri

PanzerKiel said:


> Is there a lack of C2 In IAF.... I mean once the PAF comes in, IAF interceptors go up on their own, Phalco comes and bugs out leaving everyone to PAF mercy, no SAR for the downed pilot... SAR would have required maybe Garuds standing by along with helis and fighter aircraft to provide top cover..... That Mi 17 shot down, again flying in a hot environment on its own....lack of situational awareness of Ground based AD elements since they didn't know who's in the air at the moment....... List goes on...
> 
> It all brings to one thing... Atleast.... On the Indian side... There was no ONE person who had the complete picture of the battlefield, both land and air.... If there were one, then this litany of mistakes would have been avoided...



I personally have a feeling there was already stuff going on that disguised where PAF was gonna do something....starting right from after balakot happened (and IAF may have engaged in the same just before balakot to achieve a similar goal). Mock attacks, feints and more activity in general....like a disturbed hornet nest to provide cover for the final action time and place. All with knowledge of what various radars and sensors (on the other side) will likely show the opponent (and impress counter action and card-showing from him...or lull into false sense of security etc)....having modelled and trained on your own radar and sensor systems well beforehand. There was probably a few ladders to pick from already done by PAF's best, given the aptitude I have seen from just you here.

We won't be told any of this as its very classified stuff I would imagine.

The issue is the aggressor always has the initiative compared to the defender who must cover all bases and thus spread/hedge and not really have the same counter-initiative force, and in a one-off that counts for a lot.

There is also the different narratives of what exactly happened, which I wont go into, because that's all worn me out long ago.

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## PanzerKiel

Nilgiri said:


> Nostalgia for me, many years back had a nice speculative convo with an American friend (retd USN) about USS kitty hawk being retired, overhauled and deployed for Indian Navy heh.
> 
> I like the smaller carrier approach of yours, given its more apt to following the rule of 3:
> 
> 
> 
> The rule of 3! How I wish @Penguin were here for this discussion.
> 
> 
> 
> Well well, this scenario would be modelled and accounted for in the CBG deployment doctrine...how to best detect and eliminate threats that can do a snipe shot.
> 
> 
> 
> Especially not with this economic size we are at. These all cost big bucks....ramping up shipyard (build, maintain, upgrade, overhaul) capacity is already an issue in India with the current lower warship numbers. This all costs lot of money and resource.... this is why my interest over the years has changed drastically from the military side to more economic one.



.... Which means that India, as yet, may not be able to achieve her political and military aims due to on going expansion, transitions, an economy incapable of sustaining a LONG war which is the only option in which superiority of numbers can be exploited...

But then where is the problem? Because there is someone who just can't judge that what he's aiming for, can't be achieved and sustained.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Yeah... Frankly, AO in C absence should not have been an issue....
> On the battlefield, the peacetime planning and training speaks out on behalf of the Commander.... If the outcome is favorable, then it's good.... If outcome is bad enough, then it means bad peacetime planning and no Commander on ground to correct it.... Even if the Commander may be physically available, but then he cannot correct the loopholes of a bad plan during a fluid battle...



On a lighter note, I used to enforce my General Managers' leave opportunities, because it was only when they were away that I could assess how good a system they had built. If it could not function without them, they would return to a very demanding few weeks of very interactive system-building!

The best team I had ran AS/400 programming for a famous logistics company. I was gobsmacked when, soon after joining, I was given their Black Book; they had a better operations manual than their clients had, an operations manual ABOUT THEIR CLIENTS' OPERATIONS. It was a $5.0 million dollar a year client, some 20 years ago, so this was very reassuring.

Then due to circumstances beyond my control - I was then posted abroad - they were decapitated. According to reports from the site people, they carried on without missing a beat. They were cropped a second time; the second echelon went. They performed just as well. A third, and then a fourth time followed. 

This was the best team I have ever been associated with. Truly amazing.

In defence, similar things happened, but it is difficult to discuss those. There is an interesting story behind the five letter org. that you noticed, @Nilgiri, and it is connected to the Egyptians. It was stymied because of the most extraordinary reason, one that I cannot bring myself to mention on this forum.



PanzerKiel said:


> .... Which means that India, as yet, may not be able to achieve her political and military aims due to on going expansion, transitions, an economy incapable of sustaining a LONG war which is the only option in which superiority of numbers can be explored...





> But then where is the problem? Because there is someone who just can't judge that what he's aiming for, can't be achieved and sustained.



Bluntly, this is the problem, both in the civilian leadership and the military. It hurts to have it highlighted so starkly, but this is exactly where the problem is.I am sure that my political views are not influencing my judgement on this one.

@jbgt90



Nilgiri said:


> I personally have a feeling there was already stuff going on that disguised where PAF was gonna do something....starting right from after balakot happened (and IAF may have engaged in the same just before balakot to achieve a similar goal). Mock attacks, feints and more activity in general....like a disturbed hornet nest to provide cover for the final action time and place. All with knowledge of what various radars and sensors (on the other side) will likely show the opponent (and impress counter action and card-showing from him...or lull into false sense of security etc)....having modelled and trained on your own radar and sensor systems well beforehand. There was probably a few ladders to pick from already done by PAF's best, given the aptitude I have seen from just you here.



I don't agree.

This was a leadership failure. It simply means that our military leadership in the IAF hasn't figured out how to manage through a series of discrete state changes, opposed by changes in the adversary profile as well. The IAF was not in suspended animation; it was supposed to be, and is, an organisation tasked to meet certain national objectives. These change, but usually not abruptly. Some exigency might arise - Balakot - and the organisation needs to be able to cope with this seamlessly. In fact, it should be designed to cope with these, not to have to take them up as exceptions.

My feeling is that this was at the Air Commodore/ Air Marshal level, nothing to do with higher echelons EXCEPT THAT WHEN THINGS GO WRONG, IT IS ALWAYS THE HIGHER ECHELONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THINGS GOING WRONG.

The failure to verify the re-engagement of the IFF system, thanks to which the chopper was shot down, seems to point to some very weak leadership at that level. the Air Commodore/ Air Marshal level.




> We won't be told any of this as its very classified stuff I would imagine.
> 
> The issue is the aggressor always has the initiative compared to the defender who must cover all bases and thus spread/hedge and not really have the same counter-initiative force, and in a one-off that counts for a lot.
> 
> There is also the different narratives of what exactly happened, which I wont go into, because that's all worn me out long ago.



You qualified your observation by referring to the situation as a one-off, but it is still objectionable. Does that mean that there is NO defence possible? That horse won't run.

I have just got a caution (not a warning), and am feeling gutted. I'll be back in an hour.

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## Nilgiri

PanzerKiel said:


> .... Which means that India, as yet, may not be able to achieve her political and military aims due to on going expansion, transitions, an economy incapable of sustaining a LONG war which is the only option in which superiority of numbers can be explored...
> 
> But then where is the problem? Because there is someone who just can't judge that what he's aiming for, can't be achieved and sustained.



Its foolish (to me at least) to try defeat Pakistan militarily at this point. At best its about maintaining sufficient deterrence and always have the "all out" option there...but strictly not to be thought of as easy or lightly....or "first thing" like lot of (deplorable) mainstream interlocutors and politicians on our side have in fashion today. Your previous analysis that the best opportunities were earlier is spot on...but like you said it needed the cold stoic nerve to do so and to shoulder the economic cost then in doing so. Hindsight is 20/20.

With China there is only defensive deterrence on offer....they are simply a very different opponent of scale altogether (especially industrially and at bulk force), especially once you leave the tibetan plateau (which can at least be severed + constrained logistically somewhat in a capability that would likely be a stretch at India's current status and a true developed threat only in future). 

We are basically lucky that Tibet exists as a major obstacle and that there are crafty opponents to the east of China and where the USN pacific fleet and more come into play...in relation to the core industrial and populated areas of China.

The answer to Indias problems lie in the economy for me. Simply we are not rich, prosperous or industrialized enough at scale....our (middle) society is not reformed enough at scale either and does not apply the correct sustained pressure on the correct issues at enough intensity to get there (given we have set ourselves for this to be the destiny over any authoritarian or totalitarian option). 

i.e fight hard and well against the politicians, leaders and other kind of general upper crust villainy with entrenched and arrayed means and resources to keep a cushy status quo or an even better regression for them. 

That to me is the real war to fight for us, before we get to big ambitious plans for anyone else. We have so much to do right here at home....while sufficiently guarding the home and ensuring its existence.

I do hope at which point in winning this first one (if we ever win it), we realise this first one is the only one truly worth achieving rather than becoming what ends up ruining egotistical powerful countries inevitably again and again in history....and that everyone else learns that too so there really is no need for this nasty business of war and domination at all. 

Because (I say with highest regret) for every pure genuine warrior and noble spirit like you, there are simply too many lesser folks with lesser hearts that do not have honourable intentions for the vanquished...only fulfilling some terrible destiny of revenge or worse. They are simply going to ruin everything that give humans greatness given the opportunity, because they never see what they are...only what they think others are. These are the people that bring down every great human endeavour in the end....the painful laboured accumulation of so much truth, effort and worthiness ...destroyed so easily like flame to dry tinder. 

I have a feeling there is just too many of them around at all times (being avid student of history), even lurking inside seemingly good or average people....and you give them a diet of enough ego and delusion somehow, they are capable of any kind of damage and evil. Yes it is why I wish no war at all (though in ways I do earn my bread from honing a warfighting potential)..on anyone, anywhere, though I always preach a suitable defense and deterrence for all, the best they can manage and balance while ascending to something better all together....hopefully some system where there is no war at all. I abhor the statement "only the dead have seen the end of war". It is far too unsettling for me....I reject it as something eternal for humanity to experience. But the fate for it is in billions of other souls in the end...I am just one.



Joe Shearer said:


> I don't agree.



Oh what I am saying is in tandem to the great failures present and inherent in the system too. It does not excuse or explain away the problem you bring up.

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## PanzerKiel

A word about AD as well.... 

Fighting an air war with hot AD assets on ground requires precise coordination, good C2, complete picture of battlefield, hard training... And what not.. 

Very few countries have the requisite practical experience of this.... In my opinion Soviets and Russians have to their intense cold War experience, and North Vietnam which faced the US Air might.... And maybe Yugoslavia in the late 90s during the NATO bombing.... Egyptians and Syrians as well....

Rest all countries, Pakistan and India included.... Despite having potent AD weapons, do not have the requisite experience and knowhow of operating in a dense air environment..... And then, obviously, fearing fratricide, they normally allow one of them, either air force or AD elements, to engage.

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## Nilgiri

Joe Shearer said:


> You qualified your observation by referring to the situation as a one-off, but it is still objectionable. Does that mean that there is NO defence possible? That horse won't run.



I'll come to this a bit later maybe. I have veered off into entirely different thoughts now that I will need to let settle down and I need some sleep too soon.

You are correct, its still very inexcusable showing....given whats been arrayed and developed these days especially. It must be looked into in the strongest way possible. It should serve as a big wake up call and kick up the rear, especially if you engaged the first action.

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## rockstarIN

Joe Shearer said:


> I have been waiting for @jbgt90 to fill in the details,and hope that he is back in station. His details are likely to be accurate and current. @Hellfire might also have helped, but I cannot trace him any longer.


@notorious_eagle 

Hellfire confirmed that AWACS were on station.

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## Joe Shearer

rockstarIN said:


> @notorious_eagle
> 
> Hellfire confirmed that AWACS were on station.



Is that a fact? 

Really disappointed.

@PanzerKiel @Nilgiri @jbgt90



Nilgiri said:


> I'll come to this a bit later maybe. I have veered off into entirely different thoughts now that I will need to let settle down and I need some sleep too soon.
> 
> You are correct, its still very inexcusable showing....given whats been arrayed and developed these days especially. It must be looked into in the strongest way possible. It should serve as a big wake up call and kick up the rear, especially if you engaged the first action.



You go off to sleep, we'll talk later. Trust @PanzerKiel to put his finger on the sore spots, one after the other, with metronomic regularity.

PS: @jbgt90 has a very detailed and clear overview of equipment available for the beefing up of the IN, but he should say his say. I feel the IN needs to review its doctrine first, and decide its priorities before writing another cheque. The bottoms can come later.

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## rockstarIN

Joe Shearer said:


> s that a fact?
> 
> Really disappointed.
> 
> @PanzerKiel @Nilgiri @jbgt90



It was flying over Punjab and started moving to near the theatre once the action started. The battlefield was controlled from the ground as the first detection and further handling were from Ground and no hand over in-between to AWACS. Further reinforcements (Mig-29s & MKIs) were vectored by AWACS but PAF were long gone deep inside by the time they reached there.[/QUOTE]

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## Joe Shearer

With the indulgence of other contributors, the analysis of the lessons learnt from 1947-48 is being concluded here. First, with regard to the original actions, what were the take-aways? Second, what are the logistics and infrastructural failings shown by these actions? Third, in what ways might the Indian Army re-think the way it fights wars, after looking at solely the actions of 1947-48?



> The mutiny of the Gilgit Scouts, led by the British citizen, Major Alexander Brown, in August 1947 (?), and their seizing control of Gilgit, ambushing and neutralising State Forces, and attacking down the roadways into Baltistan and onwards into Ladakh (Leh); they were supported by lashkars deputed to their support, but quickly dispensed with; they were opposed by the State Forces that held out in Skardu for a year without relief and reinforcement, and by the regular Indian Army, that opened up Zoji La, relieved Leh and re-captured Kargil.





> So far we looked at the account narrated by @PanzerKiel in terms of the uprising of the Sudans, their capture of Muzaffarabad and Rajauri, their siege of Poonch, their declaration of independence, their feting of the tribal lashkars passing through to Baramula, and the armed insurgency that they waged against the Kashmir State Forces, later, against the Indian Army.





> The third pulse was the Gilgit Scouts actions, that took them, on foot, all the way to Leh.



What emerges from this third 'pulse' is that a cutting edge formation that outruns its logistics has in reality achieved nothing; all of its glorious gains must be given up before too long. The Scouts and their associated troops marched uphill to Skardu, a march of nearly 200 kms on foot, and uphill 700 metres, from 1500 metres above sea level to 2230 metres above sea level. After this march, completed in 10 days' time, they besieged Skardu. 

Skardu had been reinforced at the last moment by a Major in the State Forces service from his original location at Leh, and around 200 others. They travelled from Leh to Skardu, around 300 kms, in the dead of winter, over roads that were tracks and were not considered motorable. This garrison held out for six months; during this entire period, there were attempts to relieve the garrison, but it is difficult to believe that any effort was made that could have overcome the fairly modest resources of the besiegers. At the end, the garrison surrendered; the Major (promoted Lt. Col.) was kept alive due to his personal sporting relationship with General Gracey, and the others were executed.

The point is that there was no attempt at reinforcing this besieging group during the siege, and after the siege, opposing forces reached only as far as Kargil, so there was never anything to shake the hold of the Scouts on Skardu. 

The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.

To get back to the narrative, the Indian Army managed to air transport Stuart tanks up to Srinagar in dismantled condition,assemble them, and then make their precarious way along the very difficult track from Sonamarg to Zoji La. (to be cont.)

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> With the indulgence of other contributors, the analysis of the lessons learnt from 1947-48 is being concluded here. First, with regard to the original actions, what were the take-aways? Second, what are the logistics and infrastructural failings shown by these actions? Third, in what ways might the Indian Army re-think the way it fights wars, after looking at solely the actions of 1947-48?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What emerges from this third 'pulse' is that a cutting edge formation that outruns its logistics has in reality achieved nothing; all of its glorious gains must be given up before too long. The Scouts and their associated troops marched uphill to Skardu, a march of nearly 200 kms on foot, and uphill 700 metres, from 1500 metres above sea level to 2230 metres above sea level. After this march, completed in 10 days' time, they besieged Skardu.
> 
> Skardu had been reinforced at the last moment by a Major in the State Forces service from his original location at Leh, and around 200 others. They travelled from Leh to Skardu, around 300 kms, in the dead of winter, over roads that were tracks and were not considered motorable. This garrison held out for six months; during this entire period, there were attempts to relieve the garrison, but it is difficult to believe that any effort was made that could have overcome the fairly modest resources of the besiegers. At the end, the garrison surrendered; the Major (promoted Lt. Col.) was kept alive due to his personal sporting relationship with General Gracey, and the others were executed.
> 
> The point is that there was no attempt at reinforcing this besieging group during the siege, and after the siege, opposing forces reached only as far as Kargil, so there was never anything to shake the hold of the Scouts on Skardu.
> 
> The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.
> 
> To get back to the narrative, the Indian Army managed to air transport Stuart tanks up to Srinagar in dismantled condition,assemble them, and then make their precarious way along the very difficult track from Sonamarg to Zoji La. (to be cont.)



Excellent....
Logistics..... Operations can't continue on captured food and ammo...
Follow up forces to consolidate your success and secure the ground already captured....
Mules required to enable troops to carry mortars, MGs, and light artillery...
Winter clothing...
Dumping on your posts, because once they are attacked, no reinforcements or supplies will reach you for days or even weeks...

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## notorious_eagle

rockstarIN said:


> @notorious_eagle
> 
> Hellfire confirmed that AWACS were on station.



That's deeply disappointing on part of IAF if they only had one AWAC Airborne. On a side note, i think IAF is in desperate need of additional AWACS. For India's geographic size, it needs AWACS in the double digits to cover China, Pakistan and the Mighty Sea. 

Pakistan despite its size now has 11 AWACS online.



rockstarIN said:


> It was flying over Punjab and started moving to near the theatre once the action started. The battlefield was controlled from the ground as the first detection and further handling were from Ground and no hand over in-between to AWACS. Further reinforcements (Mig-29s & MKIs) were vectored by AWACS but PAF were long gone deep inside by the time they reached there.


[/QUOTE]

One AWAC airborne . Why was the other AWAC not airborne if the third was being kept as a reserve? 

I would love to learn more about India's C4I capabilities. I haven't found any good source so please feel free to share any source that you might come across. 

A fantastic piece on Pakistan's C4I capabilities @rockstarIN @Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @Nilgiri 

https://quwa.org/2016/03/08/pakistans-c4isr-introduction-overview-part-1/
https://quwa.org/2016/03/15/pakistans-c4isr-part-2-land-airborne-surveillance-systems/
https://quwa.org/2016/03/17/pakistans-c4isr-part-3-intelligence-reconnaissance/
https://quwa.org/2016/03/27/pakistans-c4isr-part-4-communications-data-links/

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## rockstarIN

notorious_eagle said:


> That's deeply disappointing on part of IAF if they only had one AWAC Airborne. On a side note, i think IAF is in desperate need of additional AWACS. For India's geographic size, it needs AWACS in the double digits to cover China, Pakistan and the Mighty Sea.
> 
> Pakistan despite its size now has 11 AWACS online.





Not really, It was said to be around Jalandhar.

Check Falcon's tracking range with 450 km. It is covering well areas including Part of Rajastan, entire punjab & J&K.

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## Cuirassier

Joe Shearer said:


> The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.





PakSher said:


> The conqueror of Zoji La, Major(R) Mohammed Khan Jarral(Deceased) got commission on 28th March 1942 from Indian Military academy (IMA), Dehra Doon. During 2nd World War, he served with the 2nd Jammu & Kashmir Rifles and went to Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Lebonan and Palestine. On partition he was appointed Adjutant Gilgit Scouts, on 8th August 1947 at Gilgit.
> Zoji La was captured by Major Mohammed Khan Jarral on July 7, 1948. When the Liberation War of the Northern Areas started in 1947-48, he joined hands with the Muslim feedom fighters against Maharaja Hari Singh's rule.He was given the command of a combined force consisting of "A" and "B" wings of the Gilgit Scouts with the task of capturing Zoji La and then if possible to advance towards Sonamarg and Srinagar. Major Jarral during the early outset of the Kashmir Liberation War captured Bunji in the last week of October, 1947 and liberated Astore area down to Gurez by the middle of November, 1947. He attacked the Sakardu Fort during the night of 11/12 Feburary, 1948. He ambushed and defeated the first Indian Relief Column lead by Brigadier Faqir Singh at Thorgopari, 15 miles south of Sakardu- Srinagar Road, on 17th March, 1948. The action of Thorgopari paved the way for Captain Jarral's subsequent successes in Baltistan area. He again ambushed and dislodged and humiliated the 2nd Indian Relief Column known as Indian Z-Brigade lead by Brigader Sanporan Singh at Parkuta.
> The enemy now knew that he was up against the determined men of Major Jarral's Force. Two Indian Generals, Thimayya and Srinagesh, were personally present with Brigader Atal during planning and mounting of an attack at Zoji La. It shows the great importance the Indians gave to it. Captain Jarral had built up the defences well and the credit goes to his ingenuity in organising his positions in such a manner that the enemy could not capture even the outlying bunkers and trenches. On June 12,1948 Major Jarral lead an attack on the two forward Indian companies at Khoru and Gumri. On June 22, Jarral's men made a surprise dawn attack on the pickets. The enemy called in aircrafts to bomb and strafe the area. A hand-to hand fight started. The enemy was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy casualties. A few other pickets were similarly attacked and captured. Simultaneously, Major Jarral was working his way up along the main axis and when the Patiala's realized that their rear was threatened, they withdrew in a disorder. The battle lasted for twenty days and Zoji La was captured on July 7,1948 by Captain Mohammed Khan Jarral. The enemy lost about 400 men and large quantities of ammunition and other stores fell into the hands of Jarral's Force.
> It is also very interesting to put on record that Major Jarral defeated General Srinagesh who was his former company commander at IMA Dehra Doon from where he got King's Commission. Major Jarral's courage and bravery against all the odds completely changed the whole scenario of the Liberation War of Northern Areas in 1947-48.
> Major(R) Mohammed Khan Jarral passed away in October 2008 in Mirpur (AK) at the age of 90 and is buriied at Chitar Pari, Mirpur

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Excellent....
> Logistics..... Operations can't continue on captured food and ammo...
> Follow up forces to consolidate your success and secure the ground already captured....
> Mules required to enable troops to carry mortars, MGs, and light artillery...
> Winter clothing...
> Dumping on your posts, because once they are attacked, no reinforcements or supplies will reach you for days or even weeks...



LOL.

You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).

Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> LOL.
> 
> You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).
> 
> Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.



Actually, I just summarized conclusions from your first part only ..... Was waiting for your next part....

Brevity, somehow, remains the hallmark of our profession.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> LOL.
> 
> You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).
> 
> Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.



Or shall we take on 1965 now...what do you think?



Joe Shearer said:


> With the indulgence of other contributors, the analysis of the lessons learnt from 1947-48 is being concluded here. First, with regard to the original actions, what were the take-aways? Second, what are the logistics and infrastructural failings shown by these actions? Third, in what ways might the Indian Army re-think the way it fights wars, after looking at solely the actions of 1947-48?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What emerges from this third 'pulse' is that a cutting edge formation that outruns its logistics has in reality achieved nothing; all of its glorious gains must be given up before too long. The Scouts and their associated troops marched uphill to Skardu, a march of nearly 200 kms on foot, and uphill 700 metres, from 1500 metres above sea level to 2230 metres above sea level. After this march, completed in 10 days' time, they besieged Skardu.
> 
> Skardu had been reinforced at the last moment by a Major in the State Forces service from his original location at Leh, and around 200 others. They travelled from Leh to Skardu, around 300 kms, in the dead of winter, over roads that were tracks and were not considered motorable. This garrison held out for six months; during this entire period, there were attempts to relieve the garrison, but it is difficult to believe that any effort was made that could have overcome the fairly modest resources of the besiegers. At the end, the garrison surrendered; the Major (promoted Lt. Col.) was kept alive due to his personal sporting relationship with General Gracey, and the others were executed.
> 
> The point is that there was no attempt at reinforcing this besieging group during the siege, and after the siege, opposing forces reached only as far as Kargil, so there was never anything to shake the hold of the Scouts on Skardu.
> 
> The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.
> 
> To get back to the narrative, the Indian Army managed to air transport Stuart tanks up to Srinagar in dismantled condition,assemble them, and then make their precarious way along the very difficult track from Sonamarg to Zoji La. (to be cont.)



Maj Jarral was there at Zoji La during the first phase of INdian attacks, he was then rotated.



notorious_eagle said:


> That's deeply disappointing on part of IAF if they only had one AWAC Airborne. On a side note, i think IAF is in desperate need of additional AWACS. For India's geographic size, it needs AWACS in the double digits to cover China, Pakistan and the Mighty Sea.
> 
> Pakistan despite its size now has 11 AWACS online.
> /



To sum up, IAF may be regarded at highly unbalanced......I mean they may have lot many fighters to show off, but then they do not have the corresponding number of EW / support aircraft to synergize the effects of all these assets and bring the strength of IAF on the battlefield.



Joe Shearer said:


> Regarding the Air Rescue, we performed like the Keystone Cops. Believe me, no civilian project would have gone into action with such unpreparedness.



Pulwama incident happened on 14 Feb, IAF went in on 26.....i mean IAF had fully 11 days to prepare the response, and prepare for PAF response as well....one wonders what they were doing for all these 11 days.

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## Joe Shearer

Joe Shearer said:


> LOL.
> 
> You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).
> 
> Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.





PanzerKiel said:


> Actually, I just summarized conclusions from your first part only ..... Was waiting for your next part....
> 
> Brevity, somehow, remains the hallmark of our profession.



What has emerged from the close look at operations in Kashmir in 1947-48 are these three very broad-brush conclusions, that are so broad as to offer few or no operational guidelines specific to the sector; however, for whatever they are worth, they seem to be

What the Indian Army has been doing in the eastern sector is as applicable, if not more, in the equally mountainous and equally thickly forested slopes of the Vale of Kashmir and its outer slopes. It needs to hone its small-unit jungle- and mountain-warfare skills. In addition, it must allow the border guards to shoulder their share of the burden, and withdraw a few kilometres. This will allow them to reduce their numbers, once released from the mechanical coverage of the entire frontage, but will demand the equipment for very quick, very strong reactions.
It need not worry about irregulars; it should continue to worry about regulars dressed and deployed as irregulars. That is now part of the DNA of the force that they oppose, and they need to address this issue firmly.
It needs to drastically improve its logistics, and ensure that all roads are 'redundant'; there must always be two, preferably even three ways to get from A to B, throughout the sector.
That touches upon, but does not focus upon the very serious role that logistics plays in this sector, where troops are at the end of a very long line of communications, and even the slightest dislocation can give rise to sleepless nights for the commanders.

In general, a useful approach to logistics will be to build circular roads around the Vale at contour lines at increasing heights. This will reduce a substantial amount of friction between civilians and the military convoys that seek to share the existing roads; these run right through thickly populated areas, and the security measures taken during convoy passage do not find friends anywhere in the Vale.

That is within the Vale. Outside it, there need to be more of the road-building that is mentioned so frequently nowadays: the Durbok-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road, for instance, but many more like it. There is automatically a need to build in two other features - one is a close vigilance over these roads, to stop Lawrence of Arabia theatrics, and the second is very careful joint planning with ecological experts. Even a cursory look at the map will reveal that there are serious economies to be achieved.

Manali to Dras via Keylong is 564 kms; Dalhousie to Dras, as the crow flies, is 210 kms.;
Kishtwar to Dras is hardly 120 kms.
Manali to Kargil is 500 kms.; as the crow flies, it is 275 kms.
One can go on and on, but this will offer a quick heads-up into the role of communications in the supply chain.

With that, it is time to look afresh at the Indian Army and its role in future, specifically in the boundaries of the old state of Jammu and Kashmir. (to be cont.)



PanzerKiel said:


> Or shall we take on 1965 now...what do you think?



I will finish in two small posts, of which one is already up.




> Maj Jarral was there at Zoji La during the first phase of INdian attacks, he was then rotated.



I see. That makes sense of the whole thing.



> To sum up, IAF may be regarded at highly unbalanced......I mean they may have lot many fighters to show off, but then they do not have the corresponding number of EW / support aircraft to synergize the effects of all these assets and bring the strength of IAF on the battlefield.



My take is that they haven't put their toys together into an integrated battle management system. All these gadgets and facilities have to be used. Now. Instead, people have procured these, and are now sitting in talk shows on television explaining what these weapons do.

What we had was more than enough to cover the ground of the entire episode.

[/quote]Pulwama incident happened on 14 Feb, IAF went in on 26.....i mean IAF had fully 11 days to prepare the response, and prepare for PAF response as well....one wonders what they were doing for all these 11 days.[/QUOTE]





Joe Shearer said:


> Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.



Coming to the last point relating to 47-48, what should the Indian Army be looking at, given these memories and war histories?

The present division of responsibility between XIV, XV and XVI Corps is all right, BUT your #77 made a very fundamental point: we cannot switch formations from one end to the other. So XIV Corps has to be detached from Northern Command, and attached to a different Theatre, running from 
Daulat Beg Oldie to Bareilly in UP, from 
Bareilly to Kishanganj in Bihar, from 
Kishanganj to Tezpore in Assam, and from 
Tezpore to Walong (not really; the correct point of assembly and coordination should be Dibrugarh or Jorhat)

XV and XVI Corps need to take stock, and use their paramilitary front rank effectively, to release regular troops from duty on the borders guarding lines and boundaries. There is no space to dwell on this in this summary.
Northern Command, with these two Corps, needs to identify missions that it will seek to execute at appropriate times, both in war-time and in the conditions of low-level conflict that prevail during peace-time.
These might include the expansion of the footprint forward of Turtuk;
The constant vigilance over Haji Pir Pass, whose recapture can make a significant difference in reducing vulnerability of the sector;
The sealing off of the Akhnoor salient;
The dog that barked at night.

These objectives cannot be met by putting together an ad-hoc force at short notice, but must be a thoroughly well-planned exercise, with ample options for the event that for each mission, the PA will throw a spanner in the works as soon as it possibly can.
With that, I put myself at the disposal of the contributors to move on to the 1965 conflict.

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## notorious_eagle

rockstarIN said:


> Not really, It was said to be around Jalandhar.
> 
> Check Falcon's tracking range with 450 km. It is covering well areas including Part of Rajastan, entire punjab & J&K.
> 
> View attachment 635964



Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?

As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?

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## PanzerKiel

notorious_eagle said:


> Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored.



That depends upon.... Well.. Depends upon the info which you have regarding the originating points of PAF strike, escorts, EW and Saab...



PanzerKiel said:


> That depends upon.... Well.. Depends upon the info which you have regarding the originating points of PAF strike, escorts, EW and Saab...



... Actually you may find some of those bases already covered by Phalcon.



notorious_eagle said:


> Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?
> 
> As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?



In my interaction with the pilots who took part, some innovative yet simple tactics were used due to which they were not deemed hazardous by Indians once they approached... Simple yet ingenious...

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## SQ8

notorious_eagle said:


> Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?
> 
> As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?


The MKI has been fluffed as a platform while relying on a mix and match that doesn’t work as performed. To no fault of its flyers it too suffers from the program management issues in India I keep harping about ad nauseum.

While we beat our chest regarding shooing the IAF away from their own skies, we forget that they(MKi and M2k) basically knew they were walking into a slaughterhouse and had no chance. So bugging out was the best option available to them even if not aligned with the ethos of what the Indian people were expecting of them. Such “charge of the light brigade” fancies are generally our hallmark and the result is also the same for us.

@Nilgiri Regarding the northern front, my comment on the other thread stands. Both sides are extremely hesitant to get into a conflict unlike our borders simply because the escalation rung is a very unknown entity.

@Joe Shearer is aware of the hints I throw regarding the relationship that’s deeper than the marianas and our dynamics.. whether in 10 years or 40; the subcontinent will rue its decisions on alliances and “friends”.

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## VCheng

Nilgiri said:


> A look into the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan to better understand the context of the current prevailing situation and the possibilities and probabilities of various hypothetical engagements to come.
> 
> The previous thread chains for reference (where ORBAT and analysis among some members commenced):
> 
> https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-6#post-11197800
> 
> More recently (highlight of a newer thread of similar vein):
> 
> https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334338
> 
> @Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @jbgt90 @Signalian @Gryphon @Cuirassier



The thread has the potential to become interesting once it moves from the BAW (Before Atomic Weaponry) era to the AAW (After Atomic Weaponry) era to discuss hypothetical engagements. (Bonus points if it can include the international ramifications and consequences, specially economic.)

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## Joe Shearer

VCheng said:


> The thread has the potential to become interesting once it moves from the BAW (Before Atomic Weaponry) era to the AAW (After Atomic Weaponry) era to discuss hypothetical engagements. (Bonus points if it can include the international ramifications and consequences, specially economic.)



Personally, I would rather make the most of the present atmosphere of enquiry and detachment from jingoism to enquire into the condition of the Indian military, and to look into the crystal ball regarding its future and its prospects.



Socra said:


> The MKI has been fluffed as a platform while relying on a mix and match that doesn’t work as performed. To no fault of its flyers it too suffers from the program management issues in India I keep harping about ad nauseum.
> 
> While we beat our chest regarding shooing the IAF away from their own skies, we forget that they(MKi and M2k) basically knew they were walking into a slaughterhouse and had no chance. So bugging out was the best option available to them even if not aligned with the ethos of what the Indian people were expecting of them. Such “charge of the light brigade” fancies are generally our hallmark and the result is also the same for us.
> 
> @Nilgiri Regarding the northern front, my comment on the other thread stands. Both sides are extremely hesitant to get into a conflict unlike our borders simply because the escalation rung is a very unknown entity.
> 
> @Joe Shearer is aware of the hints I throw regarding the relationship that’s deeper than the marianas and our dynamics.. whether in 10 years or 40; the subcontinent will rue its decisions on alliances and “friends”.



This is becoming a major issue for India.

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## Joe Shearer

VCheng said:


> The thread has the potential to become interesting once it moves from the BAW (Before Atomic Weaponry) era to the AAW (After Atomic Weaponry) era to discuss hypothetical engagements. (Bonus points if it can include the international ramifications and consequences, specially economic.)



After some thought, I feel we can talk about this subject once the existing one is over.

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## Armchair

PanzerKiel said:


> In my interaction with the pilots who took part, some innovative yet simple tactics were used due to which they were not deemed hazardous by Indians once they approached... Simple yet ingenious...



probably doppler notch


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## notorious_eagle

Socra said:


> The MKI has been fluffed as a platform while relying on a mix and match that doesn’t work as performed. To no fault of its flyers it too suffers from the program management issues in India I keep harping about ad nauseum.



I do agree with you that its certainly not the 'Raptor of Asia' or 'God's Gift to Earth' as hyped by our Indian friends, the SU30MKI is still a very potent platform. It hosts an excellent radar, avionics, ECM, legs and multiple assortment of A2A missiles. It's something not to be taken lightly.

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## Joe Shearer

notorious_eagle said:


> I do agree with you that its certainly not the 'Raptor of Asia' or 'God's Gift to Earth' as hyped by our Indian friends, the SU30MKI is still a very potent platform. It hosts an excellent radar, avionics, ECM, legs and multiple assortment of A2A missiles. It's something not to be taken lightly.



It is increasingly clear that we are not operating these disparate bits of technology in any kind of integrated or cohesive manner. We have acquired the planes, got a handle on their maintenance routines and their supply chain requirements, kept them in the air, exercised with them solo and in teams, even tried them out in tandem with the AWACS aircraft. But that is it.

On the face of it, these aircraft - not just the SU30, older aircraft already in inventory as well - have never been flown together in simulated defences against different scenarios, and no one is a designated 'battle commander' when such scenarios start playing out in real life. Balakot and aftermath tells us that neither have we figured out how to pull together all our resources - @PanzerKiel has already written about AD and SAR - nor have we designated any level, any authority who will take charge in times of strife.

One of Dhanoa's best exercises was the force-wide exercise in flying repeated sorties in stressed conditions, and it proved a brilliant success. It also gave us - in hindsight, alas - a deep insight into the thinking of the IAF highest echelons. The concern at those echelons is about the serviceability and deployability of the equipment of the IAF; will the planes fly? Can we make them fly for extended periods? What kind of attrition will we have to suffer in order to fly multiple sorties over several days? This is what was worrying them. But the problems were not ended here. We have this painful reminder from @Socra:



> The MKI has been fluffed as a platform while relying on a mix and match that doesn’t work as performed. To no fault of its flyers it too suffers from the program management issues in India I keep harping about ad nauseum.
> 
> While we beat our chest regarding shooing the IAF away from their own skies, we forget that they(MKi and M2k) basically knew they were walking into a slaughterhouse and had no chance. So bugging out was the best option available to them even if not aligned with the ethos of what the Indian people were expecting of them. Such “charge of the light brigade” fancies are generally our hallmark and the result is also the same for us.



What was NOT worrying them, it seems, was integration. The pulling together of resources and their deployment in effective defence; for that matter, in effective offence. Unless there is a serious effort at taking forward the proven high availability of aircraft into playing roles in a systematically-organised simulation of a defensive situation - or an offensive situation, we will keep facing problems where our SAM batteries don't go off, our AWACS, bought with parsimony and a penny-pinching attitude, are flying in the wrong places, and our pilots fly Ground Controlled Interception and lose communications with their Ground Controller due to electronic counter-measures.

It is a stressful, testing time for the new Chief. But the buck stops there.

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## SQ8

notorious_eagle said:


> I do agree with you that its certainly not the 'Raptor of Asia' or 'God's Gift to Earth' as hyped by our Indian friends, the SU30MKI is still a very potent platform. It hosts an excellent radar, avionics, ECM, legs and multiple assortment of A2A missiles. It's something not to be taken lightly.


Without a doubt, but when when using systems that work in harmony as they do on the domestic SM variant. 
Not failing mfds or unsynchronized datalinks. Moreover, as was always expected the R-77 and R-27 even mated with what was being touted as the world’s best PESA were not able to deliver wheras the AIM-120 and the APG-68 v9 from 1998 vintage(very little change in code) did.

While acerbic, the basic crux of the issue with present day India is arrogance regarding their abilities as a nation; and whenever nations have practiced it... be it the ruler of Baghdad or ourselves; the outcome has been negative in nature.. Kargil swears by it.

The WoT may have been catastrophic for Pakistan, but it truly taught our leadership and ourselves a lesson regarding our bloated sense of superiority when rag tag terrorists held a so called nuclear power hostage to capitulation. 
If today we let 27th feb get into our heads, we will see ourselves a cake walk for the next Indian aggression.

The same goes for India, unless a massive dose of humility hits the state machinery and military.. all the Rafales and meteors will do it no good.

The lessons being discussed point to one thing and one thing alone, training and discipline borne out of humility and a willingness to learn are keystone to any plan’s success.

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## rockstarIN

notorious_eagle said:


> Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?
> 
> As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?



First of all, Its not all about the Phalcons or any other platforms in station all the time. It depends upon situations and there are already ground-based radars too for all sectors. Detecting or tracking was not the reason for early slow response. Everything was detected the moment it took off from the bases. it was not considered as a threat. Like @PanzerKiel pointed out, few tricks like switching on IFF systems on the early flights may delay the perception of the threat level. RoEs to be maintained too(though stupid)

And yes, IAF is very much short of AWACS. The reason for not going immediate purchase was just pointed out by Joe and others above.

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## T90TankGuy

Joe Shearer said:


> Is that a fact?
> 
> Really disappointed.
> 
> @PanzerKiel @Nilgiri @jbgt90
> 
> 
> 
> You go off to sleep, we'll talk later. Trust @PanzerKiel to put his finger on the sore spots, one after the other, with metronomic regularity.
> 
> PS: @jbgt90 has a very detailed and clear overview of equipment available for the beefing up of the IN, but he should say his say. I feel the IN needs to review its doctrine first, and decide its priorities before writing another cheque. The bottoms can come later.


Actually an Awacs was on station , they did vector the eight jets to the area , but in the heat of the moment a lot of things happened, including WC Abhi crossing the LOC and falling for the trap . I cant divulge more due to obvious reasons , but yes we had a clear picture of every jet on the Pakistan side with the awacs and aerostat radars combined.



Joe Shearer said:


> Is that a fact?
> 
> Really disappointed.
> 
> @PanzerKiel @Nilgiri @jbgt90
> 
> 
> 
> You go off to sleep, we'll talk later. Trust @PanzerKiel to put his finger on the sore spots, one after the other, with metronomic regularity.
> 
> *PS: @jbgt90 has a very detailed and clear overview of equipment available for the beefing up of the IN, but he should say his say. I feel the IN needs to review its doctrine first, and decide its priorities before writing another cheque. The bottoms can come later.*




We have spoken about this on multiple occasions , but its purely theory and a bit gleaned form talking to my batchmates. May be one day i might post it here.

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## Joe Shearer

Socra said:


> Without a doubt, but when when using systems that work in harmony as they do on the domestic SM variant.
> Not failing mfds or unsynchronized datalinks. Moreover, as was always expected the R-77 and R-27 even mated with what was being touted as the world’s best PESA were not able to deliver wheras the AIM-120 and the APG-68 v9 from 1998 vintage(very little change in code) did.
> 
> While acerbic, the basic crux of the issue with present day India is arrogance regarding their abilities as a nation; and whenever nations have practiced it... be it the ruler of Baghdad or ourselves; the outcome has been negative in nature.. Kargil swears by it.
> 
> The WoT may have been catastrophic for Pakistan, but it truly taught our leadership and ourselves a lesson regarding our bloated sense of superiority when rag tag terrorists held a so called nuclear power hostage to capitulation.
> If today we let 27th feb get into our heads, we will see ourselves a cake walk for the next Indian aggression.
> 
> The same goes for India, unless a massive dose of humility hits the state machinery and military.. all the Rafales and meteors will do it no good.
> 
> The lessons being discussed point to one thing and one thing alone, training and discipline borne out of humility and a willingness to learn are keystone to any plan’s success.




Again, and again, and again, the single outstanding lesson towering above all others:



Socra said:


> The WoT may have been catastrophic for Pakistan, but it truly taught our leadership and ourselves a lesson regarding our bloated sense of superiority when rag tag terrorists held a so called nuclear power hostage to capitulation.
> If today we let 27th feb get into our heads, we will see ourselves a cake walk for the next Indian aggression.
> 
> The same goes for India, unless a massive dose of humility hits the state machinery and military.. all the Rafales and meteors will do it no good.
> 
> The lessons being discussed point to one thing and one thing alone, training and discipline borne out of humility and a willingness to learn are keystone to any plan’s success.



We face the additional peril that it is not simply our military leadership: the lesson extends to our civilian leadership just as much, in fact, a thousand times more: "... *unless a massive dose of humility hits the state machinery and military.. all the Rafales and meteors will do it no good.

The lessons being discussed point to one thing and one thing alone, training and discipline borne out of humility and a willingness to learn are keystone to any plan’s success.
*
At the present moment, this does not seem likely.

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## Ace of Spades

VCheng said:


> The thread has the potential to become interesting once it moves from the BAW (Before Atomic Weaponry) era to the AAW (After Atomic Weaponry) era to discuss hypothetical engagements. (Bonus points if it can include the international ramifications and consequences, specially economic.)



_dil karta hai likh dun kitab tere masumiat par_...

tag me once you have that "analysis"

P.S just passing through; ignore the post and please continue.

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## Joe Shearer

Ace of Spades said:


> _dil karta hai likh dun kitab tere masumiat par_...
> 
> tag me once you have that "analysis"
> 
> P.S just passing through; ignore the post and please continue.



Pass, friend; tag us all when you finish writing that book.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Pass, friend; tag us all when you finish writing that book.



Reminds me of Sentry Challenging procedure....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Reminds me of Sentry Challenging procedure....



I was pulling his leg about that! The challenge is usually rendered, "HoogoDya!" it is not clear if the sentry knows what he is saying. I don't know the current Hindi version, if there is one.

PS: May I start on the 1965 conflict? As you have seen, it takes me time, and I am unable to function between 11 in the morning and around 4 or 5 in the evening.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I was pulling his leg about that! The challenge is usually rendered, "HoogoDya!" it is not clear if the sentry knows what he is saying. I don't know the current Hindi version, if there is one.



I think the correct wording which goes which what you have highlighted is ...."Who goes there"......transformed into HoogoDya

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## VCheng

Joe Shearer said:


> After some thought, I feel we can talk about this subject once the existing one is over.



As someone reduced to mere spectating on PDF, I do look forward to a good discussion even in read-only mode. Military history is important, no doubt, but it must also be analyzed with an eye on the present and towards the foreseeable future as well. Please do carry on!

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> I think the correct wording which goes which what you have highlighted is ...."Who goes there"......transformed into HoogoDya



Yes, it is, indeed.



VCheng said:


> As someone reduced to mere spectating on PDF, I do look forward to a good discussion even in read-only mode. Military history is important, no doubt, but it must also be analyzed with an eye on the present and towards the foreseeable future as well. Please do carry on!



Why reduced to mere spectating? As you can see, on this thread, even outlying misfits find their voice. Jump in, the water's fine. But do let this finish; do hold on - if we were to go at @PanzerKiel 's speed, we would have finished by now, but accommodating my rambling, verbose posts is slowing us down by a factor of 3.

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## Joe Shearer

As we look at the conflicts in 1965 (there were several), what emerges most clearly is that Pakistan had a clearly defined plan of action, consisting of three phases:

Diversionary attack far away from the proposed main objective, both to send the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force to the wrong places, and to test the gleaming new toys acquired from their gleaming new friends, the Americans;
Covert attack seemingly by native Kashmiris in the Vale, to rouse up the citizenry against the supposedly hated occupying power;
If #2 did not succeed in toppling the entire Indian tower of cards, a formal attack by regular forces. 
It seems to make sense to combine @PanzerKiel 's excellent summary, presented much earlier, with the same break-down of the situation into discrete phases, _in order to draw lessons for the Indian Army from the analysis_.

With the indulgence of the other participants, that is what I shall proceed to do.

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## Joe Shearer

I would like to spend two posts on some associated issues relating to the 1965 conflict.

First, in this post, the conflict in the Rann of Kutch, and its implications. In the next, Operation Gibraltar and its implications. As always, as suggested, the main focus of the analysis will be what lessons may be drawn from the events described by the Indian Army.

*The Rann of Kutch*
According to the records of the British administration, the 23,000 odd sq. kms. of the Rann of Kutch belonged to Kutch; in pre-independence days, there was no dispute. In 1956, Pakistan tried to set up a post at Chhad Bet, but was dissuaded and withdrew. The Indians put in a company of policemen; the Gujarat policemen are not renowned for taking on heavy duties, and they treated the assignment as a necessary evil, to be suffered and to be left behind once the transfer to the next group was done. 

Now that a test run was desired, it was felt that this would be ideal, for two reasons:

It was as far away from Kashmir as could be imagined, being itself a dry arm of the sea that was inundated during the monsoons.
It was close to Pakistani resources in Sind, and far from Indian resources in Gujarat.
In those halcyon days, there was in fact no patrolling of this border, none at all.

Events moved quickly. The policemen on the Indian side were lethargic; so the Indus Rangers, their counterparts, built a road 2.5 kms inside the claimed Indian boundary line. This was discovered in January 1965 (what would have happened if it was not discovered is a matter for very amusing speculation). The opposite numbers met; far from withdrawing from patrolling the road, the Pakistani representative protested against Indian policemen coming up to the ruins of Kanjarkot on their patrols. The two sides disagreed; the Rangers occupied Kanjarkot. The Government of Gujarat got involved and protested, but to no avail; the Rangers cleaned up and fortified Kanjarkot. As a measure of prudence, the Indians put in a contingent of CRPF armed policemen, strengthened Chhad Bet, and sought to establish more posts on the boundary. Also, 31 Brigade was moved up, from Dhrangadhra to Bhuj.

On the 9th of April, the one of the new Indian police posts was shot up. The balloon was up. Event followed event in quick succession, and as is usual for Indo-Pakistani conflict, everything was over in three weeks, from 9th April to 1st May.

On the 10th, talks were proposed, but without vacation of occupied territories; on the 19th, the Indian Army took out the sector from the Area Command, HQ Maharashtra and Gujarat, and put Maj. Gen. P. O. Dunn in charge of 31 Brigade and 50 (Ind.) Para Brigade. These two brigades were supposed to cover 230 kms of boundary!

General Dunn was informed about Pakistani Army troop movements on the night of the 20th/21st April; this was the 8th Infantry Division reinforced by two regiments of armour. When Dunn asked for reinforcements, Southern Command agreed, but the GoI, advised in that direction by the COAS, refused to escalate or to be diverted. The Pakistani attack, led by Eftekhar Janjua, did well, and pushed out a number of police outposts, and came up to the defensive line of the Indian regulars. At this stage, a ceasefire was agreed upon.

The lessons learnt:

All parts of the border, including the international border, are negotiable, according to Pakistan;
The PA will fight behind irregulars or paramilitary until positions have been firmed up, and then intervene decisively with its regular troops;
It is unsafe to assume that a particular limited conflict will remain a limited conflict; at the very moment that FM Ayub Khan was speaking of living '...as good neighbours...' and of the need for the two countries to '... direct their resources and develop their economies in peace...', plans were being finalised for the follow-on campaigns.
As early as April 1965, India had clearly indicated her intention to open up the entire border if attacked very hard at any one point. Taking Shastri's statement as mere bluffing obscured the expansion of Operation Grand Slam by the Indian side when the pressure grew too high, and the thrusts launched towards Sialkot and Lahore respectively.
There is insufficient defensive resource in the Southern Rajasthan-Gujarat areas, against a serious Pakistani push.

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## Joe Shearer

*Operation Gibraltar*
This might be considered the second phase of a two-, possibly three-phase campaign launched by Pakistan. While the attack in Kutch might be considered the first, the trial run, this was the second, and it should have gained victory, if the assumptions of the planners had been correct. They were not.

The matter was extremely simple; a mix of regulars and irregulars would be injected into Indian administered J&K, and would mix with the people and create violent protests against the Indian Army, and that Army, facing a mass uprising, would vacate Kashmir, allowing for its reversion to its proper administration. As we all know, this did not work. There were a variety of reasons; the Kashmiri populace was not interested, and was not as disaffected as they should have been, the Indian Army was far more vigorous in its counter-insurgency role (as it was initially thought to be) than had been anticipated, and 33,000 over 7,000 commandoes (in the Boer War sense) were not enough to take on an Army Corps. The lessons learnt are simple, and repetitive; many of these were learnt in the earlier 47-48 conflict. For what they are worth, here they are:

The Pakistan Army has an irresistible urge to use irregulars. This is in its DNA, rather, in the national DNA. The very birth of Pakistan was marked with tremendous violence, and the new nation-state had been born in a welter of blood, suffering according to some authorities twice as many casualties as they inflicted. 
Again, during the battle for Kashmir in 47-48, irregulars were used because the regulars had not been released for deployment. 
The Indian Army, within Kashmir, was too strong then to be defeated in open battle.
_[ed.] However, it suffered a number of casualties from ambushes and surprise attacks and had to divert resources to deal with the menace._
_[ed.] XV Corps did not have sufficient reserves to absorb these urgent needs._
_[ed.] As XVI Corps did not exist, the diversion of resources to the Valley substantially weakened the strength available at Akhnoor to ward off any major thrust, such as Grand Slam._
The Indian Army inflicted a couple of major blows in its counter-insurgency sweep, most particularly the recapture of the Haji Pir Pass.
Logistics continued to be the Achilles Heel of the Indian forces in the Valley and in Ladakh.
With the failure of Operation Gibraltar, General Akhtar Hussain Malik's 'Plan B' came into play; that was code-named Operation Grand Slam. This event, and its consequences, are what constitute the bulk of the conflict of 1965, to which the Rann of Kutch incident and Operation Gibraltar were preliminaries.

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## Cuirassier

Note - Operation Gibraltar involved 5,000 - 7,000 AKRF, Mujahid Force and SSG troops. You can say it was 12 Division in disguise. While it failed at an overall strategic level due to the obvious faulty assessment & analysis by the planners, the tactical nuisance value was fairly good. And Ghaznavi Force's success in holding ground at Darhal - Budhal etc. showed how crucial local support was to achieve the Op's strategic goals.

According to the Indian Defence Minister, by August 23, an estimated 150+ 'infiltrators' including 2 officers were killed(only 1 officer casualty was confirmed in actual), 84 were claimed captured(which maybe truer than fatality claims), and in process 21 policemen & 46 Army troops were killed (including 5 officers). 

By August 23, the peak of Gibraltar had faded - IA started crossing LC at Tithwal and then in the Haveli Sector as August became September. These figures challenge the hype created over this operation and exaggerated losses depicted. Remember, for Pakistan most of the losses were incurred by Mujahids, who made up about 70% of the force. Most of the forces had to extricate in perilous conditions - but the human losses weren't as colossal as depicted. 2 officers died in the whole Op - in the Kutch affair we lost 3.

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## Joe Shearer

Cuirassier said:


> Note - Operation Gibraltar involved 5,000 - 7,000 AKRF, Mujahid Force and SSG troops. You can say it was 12 Division in disguise. While it failed at an overall strategic level due to the obvious faulty assessment & analysis by the planners, the tactical nuisance value was fairly good. And Ghaznavi Force's success in holding ground at Darhal - Budhal etc. showed how crucial local support was to achieve the Op's strategic goals.
> 
> According to the Indian Defence Minister, by August 23, an estimated 150+ 'infiltrators' including 2 officers were killed(only 1 officer casualty was confirmed in actual), 84 were claimed captured(which maybe truer than fatality claims), and in process 21 policemen & 46 Army troops were killed (including 5 officers).
> 
> By August 23, the peak of Gibraltar had faded - IA started crossing LC at Tithwal and then in the Haveli Sector as August became September. These figures challenge the hype created over this operation and exaggerated losses depicted. Remember, for Pakistan most of the losses were incurred by Mujahids, who made up about 70% of the force. Most of the forces had to extricate in perilous conditions - but the human losses weren't as colossal as depicted. 2 officers died in the whole Op - in the Kutch affair we lost 3.



Corrections made. 

I am not sure how to deal with your assessment of the tactical nuisance value. Other than kill 21 policemen and 46 jawans and officers, what was the result? Did it slow down any IA operation? Did it inhibit any IA operation? Haji Pir Pass still was attacked and re-captured; except Ghaznavi Force, every other detachment suffered, although I note with some considerable interest that this is mitigated in your view by the losses being mostly Mujahids, who made up about 70% of the force.

So nothing much happened; a few policemen and soldiers were killed, but the casualties on the Pakistani side were marginal. As far as failure of the objectives is concerned, I note that it was not a particularly deterrent development.

In any case, if I have read your views correctly, having planned for Operation Grand Slam, it might have been demoralising not to be able to launch it merely because of some success by the guerrillas + special services troopers, so it didn't matter what happened to Gibraltar; the main plan went ahead.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Corrections made.
> 
> I am not sure how to deal with your assessment of the tactical nuisance value. Other than kill 21 policemen and 46 jawans and officers, what was the result? Did it slow down any IA operation? Did it inhibit any IA operation? Haji Pir Pass still was attacked and re-captured; except Ghaznavi Force, every other detachment suffered, although I note with some considerable interest that this is mitigated in your view by the losses being mostly Mujahids, who made up about 70% of the force.
> 
> So nothing much happened; a few policemen and soldiers were killed, but the casualties on the Pakistani side were marginal. As far as failure of the objectives is concerned, I note that it was not a particularly deterrent development.
> 
> In any case, if I have read your views correctly, having planned for Operation Grand Slam, it might have been demoralising not to be able to launch it merely because of some success by the guerrillas + special services troopers, so it didn't matter what happened to Gibraltar; the main plan went ahead.



There were serious effects of Gibraltar, I'll present them shortly....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> There were serious effects of Gibraltar, I'll present them shortly....



Looking forward to it.

Incidentally, I went through a thread on the Skardu Air Base modernisation, and nearly did myself an injury laughing. Finally I deleted my response as it only have enraged the chipmunks, but a thought that lingers is that the Pakistan Army (and Air Force, and Navy) are in serious danger of being confined to barracks by these young lions and tigers.

PS: I would deem it a personal favour if you were to do a head-count of XV Corps, and explain to the young heroes that it does not add up to 700,000, not even by including the RR and the Central Armed Police (BSF, CRPF and CISF).

No hurry, any time you are bored and have the inclination.

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## Joe Shearer

*Operation Grand Slam and its ramifications*
While there is already a brilliant summation available, in this and succeeding linked posts, an account of events subsequent to Operation Gibraltar will be presented. This account will consist of the following:

Operation Grand Slam - the attack on Akhnoor-Chhamb-Jaurian;
NORTHERN COMMAND
Operations of Indian XI Corps
15th Inf. Div.
 7th Inf. Div.
 4th Mtn. Div.

Operations of Indian I Corps
6th Mtn. Div.
14th Inf. Div.
26th Inf. Div.


SOUTHERN COMMAND
Operations south of I Corps

Naval Operations: The PN at Dwarka
As usual, this will try to eschew an hour-by-hour narrative, and focus on the lessons learnt by the Indian Army during the conflict, thereafter, at the level of the entire set of events, an analysis of logistics requirements and an assessment of Indian Army needs in future, in the light of these events.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Looking forward to it.
> 
> 
> PS: I would deem it a personal favour if you were to do a head-count of XV Corps, and explain to the young heroes that it does not add up to 700,000, not even by including the RR and the Central Armed Police (BSF, CRPF and CISF)..



For Indian 15 Corps only,
Its a MINIMUM of
38 infantry battalions
4 PARA SF units
20 artillery regiments
4 AD regiments
5 Engineer units

Apart from these, Corps troops include
The Corps Sub Area
RRF V force
RRF K force

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> For Indian 15 Corps only,
> Its a MINIMUM of
> 36 infantry battalions
> 4 PARA SF units
> 19 artillery regiments
> 3 AD regiments
> 4 Engineer units
> 
> Apart from these, Corps troops include
> The Corps Sub Area
> RRF V force
> RRF K force



Brilliant!

Now I hope they'll believe me!


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## Cuirassier

IA Northern Command has 7 regular infantry/mountain divisions + 5 RR Forces (each under a MG). The PA X Corps has 4 division equivalents against these 12.

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## truthseeker2010

Joe Shearer said:


> Looking forward to it.
> 
> Incidentally, I went through a thread on the Skardu Air Base modernisation, and nearly did myself an injury laughing. Finally I deleted my response as it only have enraged the chipmunks, but a thought that lingers is that the Pakistan Army (and Air Force, and Navy) are in serious danger of being confined to barracks by these young lions and tigers.
> 
> PS: I would deem it a personal favour if you were to do a head-count of XV Corps, and explain to the young heroes that it does not add up to 700,000, not even by including the RR and the Central Armed Police (BSF, CRPF and CISF).
> 
> No hurry, any time you are bored and have the inclination.



Lets do a rough estimate:

There are 7 div of IA in NC, out of 5 would be for kashmir (150-170k)
RR 60 Btns (70-80k)
CPRF 70 btns (60-70k)
CAPF 45k
BSF 12 Btn (14k)
J&K Police 83k

Total 420-465k troops

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## Joe Shearer

truthseeker2010 said:


> Lets do a rough estimate:
> 
> There are 7 div of IA in NC, out of 5 would be for kashmir (150-170k)
> RR 60 Btns (70-80k)
> CPRF 70 btns (60-70k)
> CAPF 45k
> BSF 12 Btn (14k)
> J&K Police 83k
> 
> Total 420-465k troops



About 30% on the higher side.

Take only the divisions reporting to XV Corps, remember each RR contingent is 1,000 jawans, and the CRPF ARE the CAPF; the CAPF includes CRPF, and BSF (in other parts of India, they include the SSB, the Assam Rifles and the CISF). Most of the CRPF is posted elsewhere than in J&K; many of them are in Chhatisgarh, patrolling against Naxalites.

Most of the counter-insurgency is done by RR units working with the J&K Police. There is a macabre drill exercised between them that I do not want to go into just here.

Do remember that Northern Command includes XIV Corps, XV Corps and XVI Corps. Of these, XIV Corps is dedicated to the LAC (the Siachen Brigade and the 8th Mtn. Div. are assigned to the Siachen front and to the Dras-Kargil-Batalik front respectively); XV Corps is responsible for Kashmir but NOT for counter-insurgency; and XVI Corps is an overweight Corps guarding the Chicken's Neck, the Akhnoor-Chhamb-Jaurian salient. AFAIK, there are some armoured elements with XIV Corps, but nowhere else (of course, in XVI Corps as well).

The numbers in the Vale, even counting the RR, are nowhere near the numbers that fanboys have been given to quoting. This has been pointed out at least a dozen times by me and no doubt others have also given their figures.

Do take a look at the very rough outline by PanzerKiel. He has very properly taken the XV Corps reserve into account, something that I always forget to do, but he has divided the RR into two forces; actually, there are now three five, of which two are in the Vale working with XV Corps (totalling about 58,000 jawans), but the numbers even then are nowhere near the gigantic numbers usually bandied around.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> About 30% on the higher side.
> 
> Take only the divisions reporting to XV Corps, remember each RR contingent is 1,000 jawans, and the CRPF ARE the CAPF; the CAPF includes CRPF, and BSF (in other parts of India, they include the SSB, the Assam Rifles and the CISF). Most of the CRPF is posted elsewhere than in J&K; many of them are in Chhatisgarh, patrolling against Naxalites.
> 
> Most of the counter-insurgency is done by RR units working with the J&K Police. There is a macabre drill exercised between them that I do not want to go into just here.
> 
> Do remember that Northern Command includes XIV Corps, XV Corps and XVI Corps. Of these, XIV Corps is dedicated to the LAC (the Siachen Brigade and the 8th Mtn. Div. are assigned to the Siachen front and to the Dras-Kargil-Batalik front respectively); XV Corps is responsible for Kashmir but NOT for counter-insurgency; and XVI Corps is an overweight Corps guarding the Chicken's Neck, the Akhnoor-Chhamb-Jaurian salient. AFAIK, there are some armoured elements with XIV Corps, but nowhere else (of course, in XVI Corps as well).
> 
> The numbers in the Vale, even counting the RR, are nowhere near the numbers that fanboys have been given to quoting. This has been pointed out at least a dozen times by me and no doubt others have also given their figures.
> 
> Do take a look at the very rough outline by PanzerKiel. He has very properly taken the XV Corps reserve into account, something that I always forget to do, but he has divided the RR into two forces; actually, there are now three, but the numbers even then are nowhere near the gigantic numbers usually bandied around.



There are overall 200+ RR units in Kashmir.

14 Corps has an armored brigade under command.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> There are overall 200+ RR units in Kashmir.



True, but that is divided across XV Corps and XVI Corps. XV Corps itself has about 55-60 RR detachments, between 55,000 to 60,000 jawans.



> 14 Corps has an armored brigade under command.



Thanks; mentioned in passing in my post.

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## PanzerKiel

PanzerKiel said:


> There were serious effects of Gibraltar, I'll present them shortly....



Op Gibralter, well its effects...

Bulk of the Indian Army was engaged around Jura and Bedori Bulges which had already been reduced. Indian attention was fixed on these sectors thats why their commanders completely failed to detect the buildup for Grandslam (despite being warned by UN observers at the last moment). Thats why Indians were unable to disconnect themselves from the north, this allowed Grandslam the success it had.

On 1 Aug 65, there was a meeting at Srinagar in which COAS IA, GOC WC, GOC 15 Corps were there.
There main three points were...
IA over extended on CFL
Low standard of police bns in Kashmir
Ineffective Home Guard Organization.

The first news of Gibralter infiltration was received by IA on 5 Aug 65, once Salahuddin force was discovered at Dara Kasi and Nusrat was detected in Mendhar.

68 Brigade, the reserve of 15 Corps was moved to Tanmarg, no ther troops were readily available, less 4 J&K Militia units.
Can be judged from the fact that 4 Sikh LI was in Ambala, was alerted and then hastily air lifted to Srinagar.
Therefore, IA took some time to be effective.

On 8 Aug, Indian Def Secretary recommended Martial Law in state, however, Comd 15 Corps told him that he was confident of handling the situation.


Maj achievement of Gibralter forces include...

E/Nusrat mounted a daring attack against 4 Kumaon, in which 4 Kumaon lost its CO as well.

Salahuddin force managed to infiltrate till suburbs of Srinagar.

Gaznavi force, the most successful of Gibralter forces..almost got Ramban bridge....gained complete control of Budil area till it was ORDERED to exfil on 27 Sep.

G/Nusrat, the most successful of Nusrat forces, ambushed lead unit of 52 Mountain Brigade (3 Rajputana), killing 71 soldiers....captured Mandi

Meanwhile, Indians had increased artillery fire across CFL....GOC 12 Division asked for 4 Corps Artillery...this w to be first of its many successful actions....

On 15 Aug, 4 Corps Artillery opened up a well planned, surprise artillery fire plan which hit Indian 191 Brigade O Group, wounding many and killing the brigade commander, Brig B F Masters...Brigade ammo dump was also destroyed, IA abandoned Palanwala post due to artillery fire....lot may other losses due to artillery fire.

It is also pertinent to mention that till the end, Indians failed to open the Uri Poonch road which was one of their main aims in Bedori....


Overall

Losses in Jura and Bedori were negligible when compared with gains in Munawar gap by Grandslam..These losses were expected due to bad troops to space ratio in 12 Division...
however, these losses were still within the limited laid down by Pak GHQ.

In the end, IA committed more forces against Jura and Bedori, while having nothing to counter any Pak thrust towards Akhnur...Two IA brigades had already been pulled out of Jammu...so IA was playing almost as per the needs of Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division...

In fact, the full value of Gibralter was have been encashed only after capture of Akhnur, once 12 and 7 Division would have veered towards Naushara and Jammu....if this would have happened, there would have been no Operation Nepal by Indian 1 Corps.

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## Cuirassier

PanzerKiel said:


> Op Gibralter, well its effects...
> 
> Bulk of the Indian Army was engaged around Jura and Bedori Bulges which had already been reduced. Indian attention was fixed on these sectors thats why their commanders completely failed to detect the buildup for Grandslam (despite being warned by UN observers at the last moment). Thats why Indians were unable to disconnect themselves from the north, this allowed Grandslam the success it had.
> 
> On 1 Aug 65, there was a meeting at Srinagar in which COAS IA, GOC WC, GOC 15 Corps were there.
> There main three points were...
> IA over extended on CFL
> Low standard of police bns in Kashmir
> Ineffective Home Guard Organization.
> 
> The first news of Gibralter infiltration was received by IA on 5 Aug 65, once Salahuddin force was discovered at Dara Kasi and Nusrat was detected in Mendhar.
> 
> 68 Brigade, the reserve of 15 Corps was moved to Tanmarg, no ther troops were readily available, less 4 J&K Militia units.
> Can be judged from the fact that 4 Sikh LI was in Ambala, was alerted and then hastily air lifted to Srinagar.
> Therefore, IA took some time to be effective.
> 
> On 8 Aug, Indian Def Secretary recommended Martial Law in state, however, Comd 15 Corps told him that he was confident of handling the situation.
> 
> 
> Maj achievement of Gibralter forces include...
> 
> E/Nusrat mounted a daring attack against 4 Kumaon, in which 4 Kumaon lost its CO as well.
> 
> Salahuddin force managed to infiltrate till suburbs of Srinagar.
> 
> Gaznavi force, the most successful of Gibralter forces..almost got Ramban bridge....gained complete control of Budil area till it was ORDERED to exfil on 27 Sep.
> 
> G/Nusrat, the most successful of Nusrat forces, ambushed lead unit of 52 Mountain Brigade (3 Rajputana), killing 71 soldiers....captured Mandi
> 
> Meanwhile, Indians had increased artillery fire across CFL....GOC 12 Division for 4 Corps Artillery...the first of its many successful actions....
> 
> On 15 Aug, 4 Corps Artillery opened up a well planned, surprise artillery fire plan which Indian 191 Brigade O Group, wounding many and killing the brigade commander, Brig B D Masters...Brigade ammo dump was also destroyed, IA abandoned Palanwala post due to artillery fire....lot may other losses due to artillery fire.
> 
> It is also pertinent to mention that till the end, Indians failed to open the Uri Poonch road which was one of their main aims in Bedori....
> 
> 
> Overall
> 
> Losses in Jura and Bedori were negligible when compared with gains in Munawar gap by Grandslam..These losses were expected due to bad troops to space ratio in 12 Division...
> however, these losses were still within the limited laid down by Pak GHQ.
> 
> In the end, IA committed more forces against Jura and Bedori, while having nothing to counter any Pak thrust towards Akhnur...Two IA brigades had already been pulled out of Jammu...so IA was playing almost as per the needs of Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division...
> 
> In fact, the full value of Gibralter was have been encashed only after capture of Akhnur, once 12 and 7 Division would have veered towards Naushara and Jammu....if this would have happened, there would have been no Operation Nepal by Indian 1 Corps.


8 Kumaon's CO LTC MV Gore was killed in action at Dak Bungalow, Naugam in a raid conducted by men of the 9 AK, led by the legendary Haq Nawaz Kayani. Got an SJ for this as a Major, came out of retirement and got an SJ for '72 Leepa Ops - albeit posthumously.

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## PanzerKiel

Cuirassier said:


> 8 Kumaon's CO LTC MV Gore was killed in action at Dak Bungalow, Naugam in a raid conducted by men of the 9 AK, led by the legendary Haq Nawaz Kayani. Got an SJ for this as a Major, came out of retirement and got an SJ for '72 Leepa Ops - albeit posthumously.



Exactly, he was commanding E Group, Nusrat Force.....this action occurred on 13 August. Moreover, during exfil, this group managed to get across CFL through two IA units.

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## Joe Shearer

@PanzerKiel 

If I have understood you correctly, far from being the wipe-out that is reported in most accounts, the different units of the Gibraltar forces caused casualties in Indian Army formations, tied them down and distracted their attention sufficiently to allow preparations for Grand Slam to go forward with little or no warning. 

Is that it?

About the Uri-Poonch Road, how far did it lie from the Haji Pir Pass?

I take it that the conclusions from these are that

If GOC 12th Div had not been transferred in the middle of the engagement, Pakistani forces would have penetrated further, faster;
If the Indian XI Corps and I Corps had not intervened, the Jammu-Naoshera-Rajauri was lost, and the Jammu-Srinagar road was as good as lost.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> @PanzerKiel
> 
> If I have understood you correctly, far from being the wipe-out that is reported in most accounts, the different units of the Gibraltar forces caused casualties in Indian Army formations, tied them down and distracted their attention sufficiently to allow preparations for Grand Slam to go forward with little or no warning.



This is attested from the fact that Grandslam wasnt concieved at the spur of the moment, it was a properly planned operation. Its success was complemented by effects of Gibralter.



Joe Shearer said:


> @PanzerKiel
> 
> 
> About the Uri-Poonch Road, how far did it lie from the Haji Pir Pass?



It lies east of Haji Pir Pass, however, since regular PA units were manning the ridges overlooking the road, no movement on it by IA was possible. Road was No Man's Land.



Joe Shearer said:


> @PanzerKiel
> 
> I take it that the conclusions from these are that
> 
> If GOC 12th Div had not been transferred in the middle of the engagement, Pakistani forces would have penetrated further, faster;
> If the Indian XI Corps and I Corps had not intervened, the Jammu-Naoshera-Rajauri was lost, and the Jammu-Srinagar road was as good as lost.



Yes, the change of command was one bad bungle-up.

Your second point is also true......otherwise doesnt it seem to you strange the hurried fashion in which 1 Corps and 11 Corps were launched.

I hope the urgency with which IA opened up along the International Border on 6 Sep is a bit clear now.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> This is attested from the fact that Grandslam wasnt concieved at the spur of the moment, it was a properly planned operation. Its success was complemented by effects of Gibralter.



I hear you saying that there was a material effect of Gibraltar in softening up the front for Grand Slam.



> It lies east of Haji Pir Pass, however, since regular PA units were manning the ridges overlooking the road, no movement on it by IA was possible. Road was No Man's Land.



Interesting. So much of the heart-sickness at returning Haji Pir Pass was misplaced; although it was plugged as a conduit for passage of irregulars, its capture did not still enable passage between Uri and Poonch, as might have been hoped.



> Yes, the change of command was one bad bungle-up.



For that, I would refer you to the quip by M. J. Akbar, an observant Muslim.



> Your second point is also true......otherwise doesnt it seem to you strange the hurried fashion in which 1 Corps and 11 Corps were launched.
> 
> I hope the urgency with which IA opened up along the International Border on 6 Sep is a bit clear now.



Much, much clearer now.

First, PA troops, because of Gibraltar or in any case, were on top of the ridges along the line Uri-Poonch and perhaps further down south towards Rajauri (these were old battlegrounds from 47-48).
Second, there was sufficient dislocation and uproar so that all reserves - specifically, Corps reserves of XV Corps - were diverted to suppress them. You have mentioned that two brigades were diverted from Jammu to work with XV Corps on suppressing the attacks by Gibraltar Force contingents.
Third, the Haji Pir Pass was recaptured, but not the ridges to north and south, and this led to the Uri-Poonch road still being unpassable.
Fourth, there was nothing but 191 Brigade left to stop 12th Division's main attack, and that comprised of 3rd Mahar, 16th SLI and 15th Kumaon (not 8th Kumaon), as well as 9 Punjab, also 14th Field Artillery and a troop of 39th Medium Artillery. 
So it was not an under-strength Brigade with which Harbaksh faced 12th Div., it was a line-up from which two other brigades had been subtracted, and could not be brought back in time.

Most educative. Thank you very much.

@jbgt90

I know what you are going through, but you MUST keep up with this thread.

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## T90TankGuy

Joe Shearer said:


> I hear you saying that there was a material effect of Gibraltar in softening up the front for Grand Slam.
> 
> 
> 
> Interesting. So much of the heart-sickness at returning Haji Pir Pass was misplaced; although it was plugged as a conduit for passage of irregulars, its capture did not still enable passage between Uri and Poonch, as might have been hoped.
> 
> 
> 
> For that, I would refer you to the quip by M. J. Akbar, an observant Muslim.
> 
> 
> 
> Much, much clearer now.
> 
> First, PA troops, because of Gibraltar or in any case, were on top of the ridges along the line Uri-Poonch and perhaps further down south towards Rajauri (these were old battlegrounds from 47-48).
> Second, there was sufficient dislocation and uproar so that all reserves - specifically, Corps reserves of XV Corps - were diverted to suppress them. You have mentioned that two brigades were diverted from Jammu to work with XV Corps on suppressing the attacks by Gibraltar Force contingents.
> Third, the Haji Pir Pass was recaptured, but not the ridges to north and south, and this led to the Uri-Poonch road still being unpassable.
> Fourth, there was nothing but 191 Brigade left to stop 12th Division's main attack, and that comprised of 3rd Mahar, 16th SLI and 15th Kumaon (not 8th Kumaon), as well as 9 Punjab, also 14th Field Artillery and a troop of 39th Medium Artillery.
> So it was not an under-strength Brigade with which Harbaksh faced 12th Div., it was a line-up from which two other brigades had been subtracted, and could not be brought back in time.
> 
> Most educative. Thank you very much.
> 
> @jbgt90
> 
> I know what you are going through, but you MUST keep up with this thread.


I barely get any time for my self Joe. exhausted to the point i fall asleep in my car . let me go through this on sunday

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## Joe Shearer

jbgt90 said:


> I barely get any time for my self Joe. exhausted to the point i fall asleep in my car . let me go through this on sunday



I know. I hate doing this to you, but am desperate that you should not miss it.

Talk to you Sunday, possibly.

PS: This narrative is a huge supplement to Praval, especially if read with a map.

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## VCheng

Joe Shearer said:


> Interesting. So much of the heart-sickness at returning Haji Pir Pass was misplaced; although it was plugged as a conduit for passage of irregulars, its capture did not still enable passage between Uri and Poonch, as might have been hoped.



That pass and its environs is one of the most beautiful places on Earth that I have had the pleasure to see, its military aspects notwithstanding.

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## Psychic

In the 1965 war, the PAF suffered mid level command failure which many people are unaware of as it is eclipsed by the stellar performance of its fighting force. PAF's war plan which was akin to Operation Moked never materialized. The war plan envisaged pre-emptive strikes on all Indian forward air stations. The plan had the potential to knock the IAF out of war in the first two days of the conflict.

Sometime in June 1965, Asghar Khan had called all station commanders and squadron commanders for a brief at AHQ Peshawar. The field commanders were briefed about their war time plan. PAF's war strategy aimed at: (a) Minimizing enemy's superior numbers to create a favorable balance of air-power (b) Not allowing the enemy to carry out a surprise attack which would enable him to control the skies and support his land forces later on. 
The Salient features of the plan were as follows:
1- Dusk Attack: Raids on all enemy forward airfields and radars 15 minutes before sunset. Neutralize enemy assets and escape enemy's retaliation owing to lack of daylight. Sargodha, Peshawar and Maripur were allocated their respective targets.
2- Night Attack: B-57s were to carry out night bombings to maintain pressure. Enemy was also expected to retaliate with its canberas during the night.
3- Dawn Attack: Repeat attacks on enemy airfields the next morning. Dhaka was assigned Kalaikunda for dawn attack. It wasn't supposed to conduct dusk attack the previous evening owing to the fact that sunset occurs earlier in Bengal than in the Western theater and an earlier dusk strike, if carried out would alert the defenders in the West of impending raids.
The expected outcome was as follows:
1- Destruction of 50-60 IAF aircraft on the ground in the dusk attack.
2- Delay in IAF fighter operations caused by night bombing allowing for a follow up attack at dawn.
3- A second blow to enemy's capabilities at dawn.
3- Reprisal attacks by IAF against an already alert Pakistani air defence leading to infliction of heavy attrition on IAF's raiders at the hands of PAF interceptors.

The June Plan for which the PAF was fully trained and equipped was not executed due to the incompetence of some meek mid-level commanders. Only two strikes were launched (Pathankot and Kalaikunda) and both were successful. Further two strike packages from Sargodha destined for Adampur and Halwara were botched operations as the strikes were delayed and launched under-strength. The strikes were launched well after Pathankot was already struck and IAF defenses were already alerted. The late and under-strength launch of the strikes was a result of (alleged) lack of serviceable aircraft (in addition to indecisiveness and timidness). The lack of serviceable aircraft was owed to the ten PAF fighter planes which were sent to Chamb looking for targets of opportunity instead of being allocated for this all important task. The fact that the Sargodha commander couldn't find serviceable aircraft despite the presence of 60+ fighters at the station alludes to the extent of command failure. Maripur did not even bother to launch. Maripur's excuse was that it's assets were relocated up North; that was a poor justification for not launching strikes as IAF presence was not that strong in the South to begin with. This indicates a further failure in command when the aircraft relocated from Maripur were not dispersed in forward airfields but bunched up in Sargodha.

PAF owes a lot to the incompetence of the IAF(both at command and fighting level) in the 1965 war. Despite the fact that the Indian Army achieved total surprise at Lahore, the IAF failed to capitalize on the initial success of its sister service.
The failure of IAF can be summarized as follows:
1- Failure to launch air raids despite Indian Army's surprise attack at Lahore. It is now known that the IAF high command told its field commanders to launch missions against "targets of opportunity only" which shows how pathetic it was.
2- Failure to provide air-umbrella to Indian Army advancing towards Lahore. The extent of this failure can be gauged from the fact that 8 PAF sabres pounded advancing columns of 3 JAT and detachment of tanks for 17 minutes with impunity. The IAF was nowhere to be seen over the battlefield when Indian Army's advance was blunted by sabres which strafed and rocketted till they were low on ammo and fuel. (The SOP was to make one or two attack passes in such attacks which was discarded by the squadron commander)
3- Failure to inflict damage in reprisal attacks on the morning of 7th September. The first IAF attack against Sargodha was a complete surprise for PAF when 7 mysteres pulled up 3 miles from the airfield. The airfield was sprawling with around 70 aircraft at that time which presented a lucrative target. The IAF pilots however, did not press their attack and many of them jettisoned their rocket pods without even firing. They made just one pass in which little to no damage was done before exiting as if they were in a hurry to put out a fire somewhere. Had the IAF pilots shown some determination, they could've inflicted a significant damage. Contrast the lackluster performance of IAF's raiders to PAF's Pathankot attack which was at the outer fringes of sabre's operational range(which flew from Peshawar); three attack runs were conducted and 12 aircraft destroyed.

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## PanzerKiel

@Joe Shearer 

shall we move on to Grandslam, or has Gibralter sapped our will to continue?


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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> @Joe Shearer
> 
> shall we move on to Grandslam, or has Gibralter sapped our will to continue?



LOLOL.

I had hoped that your big days would distract your attention while I played with the kids. 

Now that I have been caught red-handed goofing off, I will move onto Grand Slam and its subsequent developments, keeping to the same philosophy that you have proposed on the whole: no minute, hour-by-hour descriptions, just broad conclusions about lessons learnt by the Indian Army from those, the impact on common factors (I keep emphasising logistics because I am familiar with it, but obviously there are others that are going to be increasingly important), and the third, last focal point being the outlook for the Indian Army going forward.

I will get down to it immediately my household tasks are over, in an hour or two.

You did say some very interesting and relevant things about Gibraltar, and it did take up some time, both in introspection and in very interesting discussions with informed and currently engaged military professionals. You will not be surprised to learn that there were mixed reactions; there was a recognition of the real impact on the XV Corps, and the debilitation of its resources, and there was also a defensive reaction pointing to the Army (not Navy or Air Force) headcount between 47 and 62, and between 62 and 65, and again between 65 and 71. The defence being, predictably, that we have learnt our lessons, and there are now sufficient resources to baulk any sudden surge of valour among our neighbours. 

Till 1'o'clock, then.

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## Joe Shearer

Joe Shearer said:


> *Operation Grand Slam and its ramifications*
> While there is already a brilliant summation available, in this and succeeding linked posts, an account of events subsequent to Operation Gibraltar will be presented. This account will consist of the following:
> 
> Operation Grand Slam - the attack on Akhnoor-Chhamb-Jaurian;
> NORTHERN COMMAND
> Operations of Indian XI Corps
> 15th Inf. Div.
> 7th Inf. Div.
> 4th Mtn. Div.
> 
> Operations of Indian I Corps
> 6th Mtn. Div.
> 14th Inf. Div.
> 26th Inf. Div.
> 
> 
> SOUTHERN COMMAND
> Operations south of I Corps
> 
> Naval Operations: The PN at Dwarka
> As usual, this will try to eschew an hour-by-hour narrative, and focus on the lessons learnt by the Indian Army during the conflict, thereafter, at the level of the entire set of events, an analysis of logistics requirements and an assessment of Indian Army needs in future, in the light of these events.



This may be a personal blind spot, but to an Indian observer or analyst, the actions of Pakistan's 12th Div. (under Akhtar Hussain Malik; 7th Div. under Yahya Khan) are no more than a prologue, a small collection of scenes setting the tone of the play; furthermore, the folklore surrounding this action is also a fixed narrative.

*THE NUMBERS INVOLVED:* This section, the southern part of the State of J&K, just to the north of its boundary with the Indian State of the Punjab, had always been guarded by a brigade; the Pakistan Army assembled a full division opposite it, with 3 full Brigades under its command, attacked without warning, and created terrible pressure on the Indian defences. Well, yes, more or less; but when we examine the situation in detail, we find a surprising situation rather different from what this bald statement of facts tends to show us.

First, 191 Brigade was an oversized brigade. A typical Indian Army brigade has 3 battalions, and perhaps a field artillery regiment (105 mm guns). 191 Brigade had no less than 5 battalions, and a full battalion each of the J&K Militia and the Punjab Armed Police, these being

3rd Mahar (+ 2 coys. of 3 J&K Militia);
6th Sikh LI (+ 2 coys. of 3 J&K Militia);
15th Kumaon;
9th Punjab;
5th Gorkha Rifles;
14th Field Artillery Regt. (+ 1 troop from 39 Medium Artillery Regt.);
C Squadron 20th Lancers (deploying AMX 13 light tanks)
In addition, the battalion of Punjab Armed Police on border duties.

Normally, three brigades would be (3 x 3 =) 9 battalions in an Infantry division, and it should, on the face of it, have been 9 battalions under Pakistan Army's 12th Div., and it should have been opposed by a mere 3 battalions under the Indian brigade. In reality, there were (as listed above) no less than 5 battalions under 191 Brigade, _and_ a full battalion of J&K Militia, so, 5 + 1, and we always omit to mention that two more brigades, 41st Mountain Brigade to serve in the front echelon and 28th Infantry Brigade in divisional reserve, had been assembled in the region, to serve under the newly raised 10th Infantry Division.

On top of that, the Pakistanis had 3 Brigades, but these were not 3-battalion brigades; 10th Brigade and 104th Brigade had only 2 battalions each, and the Azad Kashmir Brigade, 4th AK Brigade, had 3 battalions. So, a total of 7 battalions to oppose 191 Brigade's 6 _and_ the strength of 41st Mtn Brigade and 28th Inf. Brigade; not the overwhelming odds as we tend to visualise when thinking of a forlorn brigade facing all the might of a division.

However, the Pakistanis were reasonably strong in artillery, with a full artillery brigade opposed to the regiment + a troop of the Indians; their armoured strength opposed 2 full armoured regiments, 11th Cavalry and 13th Lancers, to the solitary squadron of the Indian 20th Lancers.

It was by no means an overwhelming numerical superiority of the Pakistanis.

*OTHER FACTORS: *In fairness, the confusion on the Indian side needs to be understood.

The brigade commander of 191 Brigade, Brig. Master, had been killed in action in mid-August, when a strong contingent of the Gibraltar Force overwhelmed the border defences of the 191 Brigade (the PAP battalion) with support from their artillery; death of the Brigadier and his GSO3 happened during the attempted counter-attack due to shelling by the Pakistan artillery.
In addition, the induction of 10th Division into the field created its own confusion. It was inducted from Bangalore, so had no idea of local conditions or of the commanders' minds and personalities of the 191 Bde. and its constituent battalions, and certainly no idea about the newly-attached brigades, 41st Mtn Bde or 28th Inf. Bde.
Finally, there was an intense pressure on the Indian side caused by the irregular warfare that had broken out due to Gibraltar, along with the heavy artillery firing that had caused casualties already, as noted above.
That leads us to summarise the lessons that might have been learnt by the Indian Army, below.

Pakistan will tend to use, wherever possible, irregulars in the first wave; as has been seen in 47-48, again in 65, again in 99, and as it is continuing today;
PA artillery and regulars will support these irregulars to the fullest extent, without any declaration of war. In this present instance, it is sufficient to cite the heavy artillery support that their 12th Div. received, first, during the irregular phase, during Operation Gibraltar, and second, during the regular set-piece attack by 12th Div., Operation Grand Slam.
Indian artillery needs strengthening, both with towed weapons from Akhnoor southwards, and SP weapons between Rajauri to Leh;

India has tended to perform badly during changes of command or changes of duty, for instance, during Kaul's attempted take-over of 4th Corps in 62, and during 10th Div. take-over of 191 Bde., 41 Mtn. Bde., and 28th Inf. Bde. For that matter, Pulwama happened during the replacement of one unit on the LOC by its successor.
The Indian Army is always caught by surprise by the opposition. We need both to raise the quality of our field intelligence, and the reaction time that we take to react. The PA seems to react by an order of magnitude faster.
A personal opinion: asking a Mtn. Div. to serve in the plains is just not logical.
There are several other rather painful conclusions that emerge not only from this conflict but also from the recent border crises on the border with China, but it is appropriate to raise this at a later point. Let us wait for that point.

We come next to action by XI Corps.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> This may be a personal blind spot, but to an Indian observer or analyst, the actions of Pakistan's 12th Div. (under Akhtar Hussain Malik; 7th Div. under Yahya Khan) are no more than a prologue, a small collection of scenes setting the tone of the play



If things would have gone according to GOC 12 Division desires, 12 Division would have veered towards Jammu, with 7 Division going towards Naushara.......Kashmir would have been more or less cut off from mainland India, road Jammu-Samba-Kathua interdicted.....



Joe Shearer said:


> For that matter, Pulwama happened during the replacement of one unit on the LOC by its successor.
> 
> The Indian Army is always caught by surprise by the opposition. We need both to raise the quality of our field intelligence, and the reaction time that we take to react. The PA seems to react by an order of magnitude faster.
> 
> A personal opinion: asking a Mtn. Div. to serve in the plains is just not logical.



Lets not forget the change in IAF command last Feb as well, around PAF riposte.

IA army being caught be surprise, despite having superior ISR capabilities, has a multitude lessons of its own....how come Pakistan Army manages to achieve surprise (Gibralter, Grandslam, Khem Karan, Kishengarh, Chamb (71), Fazilka (71, PA 105 Brigade), Brass Tacks, Trident, Kargil, Parakaram, Swift Retort....to name a few)

Ofcourse, as already highlighted, a Mountain Division is neither trained nor equipped for operating in non-mountainous terrain.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> If things would have gone according to GOC 12 Division desires, 12 Division would have veered towards Jammu, with 7 Division going towards Naushara.......Kashmir would have been more or less cut off from mainland India, road Jammu-Samba-Kathua interdicted.....



To be honest, I never understood the dichotomy. My understand was/is that the same units were to be managed by 7th Div only due to Yahya taking over. What was the difference between the two?



> Lets not forget the change in IAF command last Feb as well, around PAF riposte.
> 
> IA army being caught be surprise, despite having superior ISR capabilities, has a multitude lessons of its own....how come Pakistan Army manages to achieve surprise (Gibralter, Grandslam, Khem Karan, Kishengarh, Chamb (71), Fazilka (71, PA 105 Brigade), Brass Tacks, Trident, Kargil, Parakaram, Swift Retort....to name a few)




I didn't mention it for reasons of economy. It was, in fact, fairly high on my mind, along with the curiosity of the PAF having gone through a very major handing-over just weeks before, from Asghar Khan to Nur Khan, with no ill-effects whatever.
What you have mentioned is a very strange thing, that the IA seems to be caught flat-footed on every single occasion.



> Ofcourse, as already highlighted, a Mountain Division is neither trained nor equipped for operating in non-mountainous terrain.



It would not be proper of me to dwell on that, but I believe that a segregation into different theatres is essential. But that is so much above my pay-scale that there is no point in going into that.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> This may be a personal blind spot, but to an Indian observer or analyst, the actions of Pakistan's 12th Div. (under Akhtar Hussain Malik; 7th Div. under Yahya Khan) are no more than a prologue, a small collection of scenes setting the tone of the play; furthermore, the folklore surrounding this action is also a fixed narrative.
> 
> *THE NUMBERS INVOLVED:* This section, the southern part of the State of J&K, just to the north of its boundary with the Indian State of the Punjab, had always been guarded by a brigade; the Pakistan Army assembled a full division opposite it, with 3 full Brigades under its command, attacked without warning, and created terrible pressure on the Indian defences. Well, yes, more or less; but when we examine the situation in detail, we find a surprising situation rather different from what this bald statement of facts tends to show us.
> 
> First, 191 Brigade was an oversized brigade. A typical Indian Army brigade has 3 battalions, and perhaps a field artillery regiment (105 mm guns). 191 Brigade had no less than 5 battalions, and a full battalion each of the J&K Militia and the Punjab Armed Police, these being
> 
> 3rd Mahar (+ 2 coys. of 3 J&K Militia);
> 6th Sikh LI (+ 2 coys. of 3 J&K Militia);
> 15th Kumaon;
> 9th Punjab;
> 5th Gorkha Rifles;
> 14th Field Artillery Regt. (+ 1 troop from 39 Medium Artillery Regt.);
> C Squadron 20th Lancers (deploying AMX 13 light tanks)
> In addition, the battalion of Punjab Armed Police on border duties.
> 
> Normally, three brigades would be (3 x 3 =) 9 battalions in an Infantry division, and it should, on the face of it, have been 9 battalions under Pakistan Army's 12th Div., and it should have been opposed by a mere 3 battalions under the Indian brigade. In reality, there were (as listed above) no less than 5 battalions under 191 Brigade, _and_ a full battalion of J&K Militia, so, 5 + 1, and we always omit to mention that two more brigades, 41st Mountain Brigade to serve in the front echelon and 28th Infantry Brigade in divisional reserve, had been assembled in the region, to serve under the newly raised 10th Infantry Division.
> 
> On top of that, the Pakistanis had 3 Brigades, but these were not 3-battalion brigades; 10th Brigade and 104th Brigade had only 2 battalions each, and the Azad Kashmir Brigade, 4th AK Brigade, had 3 battalions. So, a total of 7 battalions to oppose 191 Brigade's 6 _and_ the strength of 41st Mtn Brigade and 28th Inf. Brigade; not the overwhelming odds as we tend to visualise when thinking of a forlorn brigade facing all the might of a division.
> 
> However, the Pakistanis were reasonably strong in artillery, with a full artillery brigade opposed to the regiment + a troop of the Indians; their armoured strength opposed 2 full armoured regiments, 11th Cavalry and 13th Lancers, to the solitary squadron of the Indian 20th Lancers.
> 
> It was by no means an overwhelming numerical superiority of the Pakistanis.
> 
> *OTHER FACTORS: *In fairness, the confusion on the Indian side needs to be understood.
> 
> The brigade commander of 191 Brigade, Brig. Master, had been killed in action in mid-August, when a strong contingent of the Gibraltar Force overwhelmed the border defences of the 191 Brigade (the PAP battalion) with support from their artillery; death of the Brigadier and his GSO3 happened during the attempted counter-attack due to shelling by the Pakistan artillery.
> In addition, the induction of 10th Division into the field created its own confusion. It was inducted from Bangalore, so had no idea of local conditions or of the commanders' minds and personalities of the 191 Bde. and its constituent battalions, and certainly no idea about the newly-attached brigades, 41st Mtn Bde or 28th Inf. Bde.
> Finally, there was an intense pressure on the Indian side caused by the irregular warfare that had broken out due to Gibraltar, along with the heavy artillery firing that had caused casualties already, as noted above.
> That leads us to summarise the lessons that might have been learnt by the Indian Army, below.
> 
> Pakistan will tend to use, wherever possible, irregulars in the first wave; as has been seen in 47-48, again in 65, again in 99, and as it is continuing today;
> PA artillery and regulars will support these irregulars to the fullest extent, without any declaration of war. In this present instance, it is sufficient to cite the heavy artillery support that their 12th Div. received, first, during the irregular phase, during Operation Gibraltar, and second, during the regular set-piece attack by 12th Div., Operation Grand Slam.
> Indian artillery needs strengthening, both with towed weapons from Akhnoor southwards, and SP weapons between Rajauri to Leh;
> 
> India has tended to perform badly during changes of command or changes of duty, for instance, during Kaul's attempted take-over of 4th Corps in 62, and during 10th Div. take-over of 191 Bde., 41 Mtn. Bde., and 28th Inf. Bde. For that matter, Pulwama happened during the replacement of one unit on the LOC by its successor.
> The Indian Army is always caught by surprise by the opposition. We need both to raise the quality of our field intelligence, and the reaction time that we take to react. The PA seems to react by an order of magnitude faster.
> A personal opinion: asking a Mtn. Div. to serve in the plains is just not logical.
> There are several other rather painful conclusions that emerge not only from this conflict but also from the recent border crises on the border with China, but it is appropriate to raise this at a later point. Let us wait for that point.
> 
> We come next to action by XI Corps.



Point regarding IA artillery....we should remember that in Kargil conflict, in order to attain the artillery superiority, IA had to induct artillery even from Western and South Western Commands' Strike Formations....desperate times do call for desperate measures, but imagine if something would have happened in Indian Punjab or Rajasthan at the same moment.....it would have been a replay of Grandslam.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> If things would have gone according to GOC 12 Division desires, 12 Division would have veered towards Jammu, with 7 Division going towards Naushara.......Kashmir would have been more or less cut off from mainland India, road Jammu-Samba-Kathua interdicted.....
> 
> 
> 
> Lets not forget the change in IAF command last Feb as well, around PAF riposte.
> 
> IA army being caught be surprise, despite having superior ISR capabilities, has a multitude lessons of its own....how come Pakistan Army manages to achieve surprise (Gibralter, Grandslam, Khem Karan, Kishengarh, Chamb (71), Fazilka (71, PA 105 Brigade), Brass Tacks, Trident, Kargil, Parakaram, Swift Retort....to name a few)
> 
> Ofcourse, as already highlighted, a Mountain Division is neither trained nor equipped for operating in non-mountainous terrain.



Is it true that there was little or no superiority of forces on the Pakistani side? That was an unwelcome discovery for me, having always taken it for granted that certain things happened due to certain circumstances.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> To be honest, I never understood the dichotomy. My understand was/is that the same units were to be managed by 7th Div only due to Yahya taking over. What was the difference between the two?



Nopes, there were additional troops already earmarked for the push towards Naushara and Jammu.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Point regarding IA artillery....we should remember that in Kargil conflict, in order to attain the artillery superiority, IA had to induct artillery even from Western and South Western Commands' Strike Formations....desperate times do call for desperate measures, but imagine if something would have happened in Indian Punjab or Rajasthan at the same moment.....it would have been a replay of Grandslam.



Absolutely. 

On artillery, I hope and pray that the plethora of options available to the IA will be exploited to the fullest (except that the difference in calibres is difficult to understand) and that there are full complements in every location. We in India need Artillery Divisions like mother's milk, considering the deterrent effect they would have on regular formations, and we are really shy of larger formations of more than brigade size.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> What you have mentioned is a very strange thing, that the IA seems to be caught flat-footed on every single occasion.



It is strange, yes.....but it has happened. Personally, i believe that Indian belief in its own superiority always goes counter productive to its performance.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Nopes, there were additional troops already earmarked for the push towards Naushara and Jammu.



??
Oh,really? Which were these?



PanzerKiel said:


> It is strange, yes.....but it has happened. Personally, i believe that Indian belief in its own superiority always goes counter productive to its performance.



Oscar's point, which is so relevant.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Is it true that there was little or no superiority of forces on the Pakistani side? That was an unwelcome discovery for me, having always taken it for granted that certain things happened due to certain circumstances.



Well yes, it is true. Going as per numbers, there was hardly an instance when Pakistan attacked with an absolute majority.



Joe Shearer said:


> Absolutely.
> 
> On artillery, I hope and pray that the plethora of options available to the IA will be exploited to the fullest (except that the difference in calibres is difficult to understand) and that there are full complements in every location. We in India need Artillery Divisions like mother's milk, considering the deterrent effect they would have on regular formations, and we are really shy of larger formations of more than brigade size.



Currently three IA artillery divisions are there against PA's 2. Its near parity.



Joe Shearer said:


> ??
> Oh,really? Which were these?



Two additional brigades were earmarked. Operation Roll Top was the one against Naushara.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Well yes, it is true. Going as per numbers, there was hardly an instance when Pakistan attacked with an absolute majority.
> 
> 
> 
> Currently three IA artillery divisions are there against PA's 2. Its near parity.



Yes, that emerged from Signalian's ORBAT, but I think if our generals can't think ahead, they need more guns.

Should I go on to XI Corps?

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Yes, that emerged from Signalian's ORBAT, but I think if our generals can't think ahead, they need more guns.



If IA Generals cant think ahead, even nukes wont be of any use.



Joe Shearer said:


> Should I go on to XI Corps?



Sure, why not.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> It is strange, yes.....but it has happened. Personally, i believe that Indian belief in its own superiority always goes counter productive to its performance.





PanzerKiel said:


> Well yes, it is true. Going as per numbers, there was hardly an instance when Pakistan attacked with an absolute majority.





> Two additional brigades were earmarked. Operation Roll Top was the one against Naushara.



At the end of the day, my conclusion is that, like the Chinese in 62, the Pakistanis had the upper hand in 65 in Chhamb due to

A clear plan;
Close coordination between different ground forces units assigned to the same objectives;
Purposefulness; they moved towards their goals, while we meandered around aimlessly.



PanzerKiel said:


> If IA Generals cant think ahead, even nukes wont be of any use.



Shubh shubh bolo ji, shubh shubh bolo.....




> Sure, why not.



In 1965, the Indian Army did not have a Northern Command. We had the Eastern Command, back at Calcutta after the 62 debacle, Central Command, at Lucknow, the older HQ of Eastern Command, Southern Command, with HQ at Pune, and the very important Western Command, that had a mandate from Leh to Sri Ganganagar in Rajasthan, just at the beginning of the Thar Desert.

To manage all this, the Army Commander had two Corps: XV Corps in Srinagar (XIV Corps didn't exist then) and XI Corps in Udhampur. We have seen how XV Corps was assaulted at all points by the contingents under Operation Gibraltar, and beat them back, not without taking casualties up to the level of Brigadier, and also captured the Haji Pir Pass, without, sadly, getting a grip on the heights bordering the Uri-Poonch Road. We have also seen how the short, sharp pressure led to a considerable diversion of troops to XV Corps, and left 191st Brigade alone to handle any pressure on the Jammu road*.

[* Thanks to inputs by @PanzerKiel, about the total effect of the Gibraltar contingents, about the inability to use the Uri-Poonch Road due to the heights overshadowing it being dominated by the Pakistan Army, and about the loss of Command reserves to the boiling situation in the Vale.]

According to conventional narrative, a lone, isolated 191st Brigade was suddenly attacked in full strength by an entire Pakistani Division; on further investigation, it turns out that the Brigade had been under attack for two weeks prior to the direct attack by the Pakistan regular Army, and had suffered the loss of the Brigade Commander to very heavy artillery barrages. It further turns out that 191st Brigade was quite beefy.

So why did General Harbaksh Singh, one of our best soldiers at the time, react so strongly to the thrust by 12th Div. against Chhamb? The following reasons applied:

191st Brigade was showing signs of wear and tear; three of its five battalions went into the hills to the north of the salient, two more were holding on by the skin of their teeth;
Of the other brigades, 41st was handled roughly and retreated to the rear, passing through the 10th Div. reserves, 28th Brigade, and going past the Div. HQ towards the highway;
Harbaksh had spent all his resources and his cupboard was bare. If the ongoing thrust by 12th Div. was to be fulfilled, there would be - difficulties.
So the General needed desperate measures. He took desperate measures.

In the first instance, he launched XI Corps at Lahore. Whether there was a real plan to capture Lahore or not is not known today any longer. What is known is that the initial target was the east bank of the Pakistani defensive feature, the Ichhogil Canal. Quite clearly, even this limited objective would jolt the Pakistan Army, and force them to adjust their military perspectives, or so seems to have been the thinking.

In the second instance, he sought to cut communications between Sialkot and Lahore. For this, he deployed I Armoured Corps. This Corps, newly raised, was in addition to his original XV Corps (in Srinagar) and XI Corps. It was commanded by Lt. Gen. P. O. Dunn, whom we have seen earlier commanding the defending division when the skirmishes at Chhad Bet had broken out.

We shall see in summary form, purely from the Indian Army point of view, what happened along each of these axes of attack, for XI Corps, by 4th Mountain Div., 7th Infantry Div. and 15th Infantry Div., and for I Corps, by 1st Armoured Div., 6th Mountain Div., 14th Infantry Div. and 26th Infantry Div., and the conclusions from these actions. 
(to be cont.)

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> At the end of the day, my conclusion is that, like the Chinese in 62, the Pakistanis had the upper hand in 65 in Chhamb due to
> 
> A clear plan;
> Close coordination between different ground forces units assigned to the same objectives;
> Purposefulness; they moved towards their goals, while we meandered around aimlessly.
> 
> 
> 
> Shubh shubh bolo ji, shubh shubh bolo.....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In 1965, the Indian Army did not have a Northern Command. We had the Eastern Command, back at Calcutta after the 62 debacle, Central Command, at Lucknow, the older HQ of Eastern Command, Southern Command, with HQ at Pune, and the very important Western Command, that had a mandate from Leh to Sri Ganganagar in Rajasthan, just at the beginning of the Thar Desert.
> 
> To manage all this, the Army Commander had two Corps: XV Corps in Srinagar (XIV Corps didn't exist then) and XI Corps in Udhampur. We have seen how XV Corps was assaulted at all points by the contingents under Operation Gibraltar, and beat them back, not without taking casualties up to the level of Brigadier, and also captured the Haji Pir Pass, without, sadly, getting a grip on the heights bordering the Uri-Poonch Road. We have also seen how the short, sharp pressure led to a considerable diversion of troops to XV Corps, and left 191st Brigade alone to handle any pressure on the Jammu road*.
> 
> [* Thanks to inputs by @PanzerKiel, about the total effect of the Gibraltar contingents, about the inability to use the Uri-Poonch Road due to the heights overshadowing it being dominated by the Pakistan Army, and about the loss of Command reserves to the boiling situation in the Vale.]
> 
> According to conventional narrative, a lone, isolated 191st Brigade was suddenly attacked in full strength by an entire Pakistani Division; on further investigation, it turns out that the Brigade had been under attack for two weeks prior to the direct attack by the Pakistan regular Army, and had suffered the loss of the Brigade Commander to very heavy artillery barrages. It further turns out that 191st Brigade was quite beefy.
> 
> So why did General Harbaksh Singh, one of our best soldiers at the time, react so strongly to the thrust by 12th Div. against Chhamb? The following reasons applied:
> 
> 191st Brigade was showing signs of wear and tear; three of its five battalions went into the hills to the north of the salient, two more were holding on by the skin of their teeth;
> Of the other brigades, 41st was handled roughly and retreated to the rear, passing through the 10th Div. reserves, 28th Brigade, and going past the Div. HQ towards the highway;
> Harbaksh had spent all his resources and his cupboard was bare. If the ongoing thrust by 12th Div. was to be fulfilled, there would be - difficulties.
> So the General needed desperate measures. He took desperate measures.
> 
> In the first instance, he launched XI Corps at Lahore. Whether there was a real plan to capture Lahore or not is not known today any longer. What is known is that the initial target was the east bank of the Pakistani defensive feature, the Ichhogil Canal. Quite clearly, even this limited objective would jolt the Pakistan Army, and force them to adjust their military perspectives, or so seems to have been the thinking.
> 
> In the second instance, he sought to cut communications between Sialkot and Lahore. For this, he deployed I Armoured Corps. This Corps, newly raised, was in addition to his original XV Corps (in Srinagar) and XI Corps. It was commanded by Lt. Gen. P. O. Dunn, whom we have seen earlier commanding the defending division when the skirmishes at Chhad Bet had broken out.
> 
> We shall see in summary form, purely from the Indian Army point of view, what happened along each of these axes of attack, for XI Corps, by 4th Mountain Div., 7th Infantry Div. and 15th Infantry Div., and for I Corps, by 1st Armoured Div., 6th Mountain Div., 14th Infantry Div. and 26th Infantry Div., and the conclusions from these actions.
> (to be cont.)



We'll discuss XI Corps operations later of course, but since you have made a mention, so some points...

Indian XI Corps did not enjoy the advantage of PA in Lahore sector.......that is, PA defences were based on BRB / Ichogil canal while XI did not have any formidable geographical or a water obstacle to base its defences. Capturing of area upto the canal till Kasur (4 Mtn Division) would have greatly improved the defensibility of XI Corps area and would have provided added security to Indian Punjab and its main cities. As per my understanding after reading Indian books, Lahore was a be-prepared mission which Indian Army was supposed to go for in case the opportunity presented itself and PA may be unable to defend it (3 Jat took the advantage). However, capture of all land till BRB was certainly one of the main aims of 7, 15 and 4 Mountain Divisions.

For the Indian offensive in Sialkot Sector, there was an Indian plan even in late 50s / early 60s where by Indian offensive was supposed to reach Marala Ravi Link Canal in the first phase, and then reach GT Road in order to cut it. Sialkot and Shakergarh would have been isolated and Marala Headworks would have been captured as well.

Indian 1 Corps has its own litany of.....well dont know that to call it......to start with, a newly raised Corps which had not even started to function as a Corps, no coordination, the Corps Commander was junior to his armored division commander Rajinder Sparrow.....list goes on....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> We'll discuss XI Corps operations later of course, but since you have made a mention, so some points...



PLEASE interject whenever you wish to; it is most useful in setting the mise en scene.



> Indian XI Corps did not enjoy the advantage of PA in Lahore sector.......that is, PA defences were based on BRB / Ichogil canal while XI did not have any formidable geographical or a water obstacle to base its defences. Capturing of area upto the canal till Kasur (4 Mtn Division) would have greatly improved the defensibility of XI Corps area and would have provided added security to Indian Punjab and its main cities.



Perfect.

That elements of 15th Infantry Div. penetrated as far as Batapore, with no base for its defences, and under air attack from a vigilant PAF, is creditable in itself. But the best was yet to be. Whatever 3 Jat won was given back with a generous hand by Brigadier Rikh, who succumbed to his Div. Commander's panic.



> As per my understanding after reading Indian books, Lahore was a be-prepared mission which Indian Army was supposed to go for in case the opportunity presented itself and PA may be unable to defend it (3 Jat took the advantage). However, capture of all land till BRB was certainly one of the main aims of 7, 15 and 4 Mountain Divisions.



Yes, Sir, indeed; that was clear. The canard about Chaudhuri planning his evening refreshment in the Lahore Gymkhana Club is one I traced back to a Calcutta rag called the Amrita Bazar Patrika, that has sunk without trace now. There was no basis for that story; as you have succinctly put it, Lahore was a target of opportunity for XI Corps, and its primary objective was reaching the East Bank of the Ichhogil Canal.

At Kasur, 4th Mountain Div. met a strong counter-attack and recoiled, and it was a coup d'oeil by Indian commanders to make a stand around Asal Uttar. The Independent Armoured Brigade under Brigadier Theograj and his regimental commander Col. Caleb played a key role in the ensuing battle. However, at the end of the day, it was a gallant recovery by 4th Mountain Div., and XI Corps was nowhere near the Canal in this sector.



> For the Indian offensive in Sialkot Sector, there was an Indian plan even in late 50s / early 60s where by Indian offensive was supposed to reach Marala Ravi Link Canal in the first phase, and then reach GT Road in order to cut it. Sialkot and Shakergarh would have been isolated and Marala Headworks would have been captured as well.



Your remarks following have a poignancy of their own for Indian readers.



> Indian 1 Corps has its own litany of.....well dont know that to call it......to start with, a newly raised Corps which had not even started to function as a Corps, no coordination, the Corps Commander was junior to his armored division commander Rajinder Sparrow.....list goes on....



Whenever I think of Rajinder Sparrow, I think of the sad fate of an able field commander who rises to a position where he is sadly no longer performing at his best. This was the dashing young chevalier of Zoji La, now the hesitant, risk-averse Divisional Commander of a Division that had the fate of the conflict in its hands.

Life is cruel.

As you must have noticed, both Corps had their full share of failure of command, in the case of XI Corps, an aggressive failure, in the case of I Corps, a sad failure of vision and a visible need to avoid failure.

Lt. Gen. Dunn was on the verge of retirement. I sometimes wonder.....

@PanzerKiel

You must be aware that members have been following the thread in order to read your commentary, not in order to follow the narrative, that is well-known by all who are interested in military history.

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## Pakistani Fighter

PA must encircle Indian army from Jammu and Baltistan. Valley will come by its own

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## Joe Shearer

Pakistani Fighter said:


> PA must encircle Indian army from Jammu and Baltistan. Valley will come by its own



Thank you for your intervention.

We need to balance @PanzerKiel, and we are all grateful for your stepping up to fill the breach.

PS: If I am permitted to wear my Munchhausen hat, you will soon get to hear that all the obsolete tanks being bought up all over the world have been assembled in and around Skardu. Now you need to work on Jammu....

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## PanzerKiel

PanzerKiel said:


> We'll discuss XI Corps operations later of course, but since you have made a mention, so some points...
> 
> Indian XI Corps did not enjoy the advantage of PA in Lahore sector.......that is, PA defences were based on BRB / Ichogil canal while XI did not have any formidable geographical or a water obstacle to base its defences. Capturing of area upto the canal till Kasur (4 Mtn Division) would have greatly improved the defensibility of XI Corps area and would have provided added security to Indian Punjab and its main cities. As per my understanding after reading Indian books, Lahore was a be-prepared mission which Indian Army was supposed to go for in case the opportunity presented itself and PA may be unable to defend it (3 Jat took the advantage). However, capture of all land till BRB was certainly one of the main aims of 7, 15 and 4 Mountain Divisions.
> 
> For the Indian offensive in Sialkot Sector, there was an Indian plan even in late 50s / early 60s where by Indian offensive was supposed to reach Marala Ravi Link Canal in the first phase, and then reach GT Road in order to cut it. Sialkot and Shakergarh would have been isolated and Marala Headworks would have been captured as well.
> 
> Indian 1 Corps has its own litany of.....well dont know that to call it......to start with, a newly raised Corps which had not even started to function as a Corps, no coordination, the Corps Commander was junior to his armored division commander Rajinder Sparrow.....list goes on....



A bit about history.....

Main reasons of IA decline TILL 1962 were mainly three
Pacifist political leaders
Leftist orientation
A belief that IA was a relic and last bastion of of British imperialism

First indian offensive plan against West Pakistan was formulated in 1951, with main attack against Lahore and secondary effort against Sailkot, limit of exploitation being MRLC.
The main objectives were to defend Kashmir and Punjab at all costs while limited offensive actions along rest of the border to gain space and keep main line of communication between Indian and Kashmir open.

Indian Wargame ABLAZE was a landmark which was again followed by intense planning and corrections

Prior to 1965

Concept of operation of Indian Western Command was...
That initiative is with Pakistan
Western Command should be able to first, blunt and stabilize PA offensive thrusts
WC should then be able to secure area east of BRBL, with Lahore as well IF POSSIBLE.

The new plan was
In phase 1, to capture area upto BRBL, eliminate Jassar enclave, and the bridge as well to negate any PA thrust towards Dera Baba Nanak.
In phase 2, to capture area till MRLC as already highlighted.

The SUDDEN advent of IA 1 Corps opened up new possibilities, options and problems as well, with regards to operational concepts and employment options.

There was a very heated debate between COAS and GOC of IA 1 Armored Division regarding the launch area of IA 1 Corps. Options available were either through Jassar, across Ravi towards North East, the other being from East of Jammu / area Samba towardss South West (which actually happened).

Positive points in favor of Jassar option (supported by COAS)
Move and concentration of a large force in the form of 1 Corps would be easily detected in Jammu Samba area as the road runs very near to the border.
Jassar option will allow IA 1 Corps to radiate threat in multiple directions (Narowal, Sialkot and Lahore), this option would auto protect the log bases of IA WC as well.
Samba thrust would be perforce a UNIDIRECTIONAL THRUST with very limited options afterwards.
Samba thrust would suffer from space constraints in Pak territory
Bad road network to support Samba thrust in Pak area

GOC 1 Armored was too much scared of a Jassar option as it involved crossing Ravi and he didnot want to engage in a bridghead operation, even though COAS tried to make him understand that in this case, the important Ravi crossing are in Indian territory, not Pakistan. He was all for Samba option as there was no river crossing involved in that case.

Even GOC WC supported COAS for Jassar option due to fol reasons....
Ravi xings in Indian territory, already secured
Engineer recce of these xings already done, operation deemed feasible by IA engineers
Surprise element would be on Indian side as they would be operating AGAINST the grain / relief of the land.

Opinion of GOC 1 Armored Division carried more weight since he was accepted as an authority on large scale armor operations based on his WW2 experience.
This all resulted into a bad compromise, whereby IA WC was tasked to launched offensive from Samba while protecting the road Pathankot-Samba and Dera Baba Nanak as well (28 Brigade op).

The above is a little background of what then transpired in the form of Operation Riddle and Nepal.

Just to add...

In-house friction within IA can be judged from the fact that previously, IA 1 Armored Division was Corps reserve of XI Corps in Punjab....once 1 Corps was raised, XI Corps VERY RELUCTANTLY, had to give it up for 1 Corps Ops, which is the main reason as to why XI Corps then had to limit the depth of its attack objectives (home bank of BRB).

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## Joe Shearer

I will be back at around 3'o'clock, after cooking lunch, eating it, and clearing up.



PanzerKiel said:


> A bit about history.....
> 
> Main reasons of IA decline TILL 1962 were mainly three
> Pacifist political leaders
> Leftist orientation
> A belief that IA was a relic and last bastion of of British imperialism



Much though it pains me to do so, in the interests of transparency and intellectual integrity, it is necessary to mention that there were pulls and pushes within the Indian military leadership as well, what you have referred to as in-house friction.

{EDIT} In addition, you have mentioned three points above. Some of these came to life in terms of a horror movie. Most of what I have mentioned below was entirely due to the then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon; there is now documentary proof of this negative influence.{END EDIT}


During General Thimayya's tenure, he was communicating regularly with the British High Commissioner in New Delhi, who, in turn, faithfully communicated every snippet of information to HMG.
This would not by itself have been important, but the UK still wanted to play a role in South Asia; in 1965, Harold Wilson was very active in getting India and Pakistan to the negotiating table.
Thimayya was accused in writing of 13 charges against him (based on gossip and on conjecture) while he was the COAS, by Lt. Gen. Thapar, the next most senior officer, who reported to him, and who told him in the letter that the PM was aware that this letter was being written and that the PM would be happy to hear Thimayya's side of the story.
Thapar wrote a similar letter to Thorat, but with only 5 charges rather than 13; in identical terms, Thorat was informed that the PM knew and would be happy to hear from him!
Thimayya himself wanted Thorat to succeed him; Thorat had a brilliant career in the Army, and was streets ahead of Thapar, although Thapar was the senior of the two.
Thimayya took it on himself to ask the President to appoint Thorat the next chief;
The President (Rajendra Prasad) agreed and actually issued orders appointing Thorat;
Krishna Menon and Nehru immediately said that this could not be, what the Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister) and the Pradhan Mantri (Prime Minister) wanted had to be implemented.
Finally the PM and RM prevailed.

Thimayya had gone to the RM with stories about one of his direct reports, alleging improprieties of an unknown nature, only to reverse himself a few days later saying that there had been a misunderstanding and that the entire matter had arisen due to that officer's wife's unpopularity.
Among other such incidents, besides the Gohar Ayub accusation, Manekshaw was accused of being excessively pro-British, as he had portraits of Clive and Hastings in his cabin at Wellington.
We all know about Kaul, and about Monty Palit, and how they had cowed down Bogey Sen. In Bogey Sen we had yet another very good officer in the field completely decaying away at senior level. Rajinder Singh Sparrow was not alone.



> First indian offensive plan against West Pakistan was formulated in 1951, with main attack against Lahore and secondary effort against Sailkot, limit of exploitation being MRLC.
> The main objectives were to defend Kashmir and Punjab at all costs while limited offensive actions along rest of the border to gain space and keep main line of communication between Indian and Kashmir open.
> 
> Indian Wargame ABLAZE was a landmark which was again followed by intense planning and corrections





> Prior to 1965
> 
> Concept of operation of Indian Western Command was...
> That initiative is with Pakistan
> Western Command should be able to first, blunt and stabilize PA offensive thrusts
> WC should then be able to secure area east of BRBL, with Lahore as well IF POSSIBLE.
> 
> The new plan was
> In phase 1, to capture area upto BRBL, eliminate Jassar enclave, and the bridge as well to negate any PA thrust towards Dera Baba Nanak.
> In phase 2, to capture area till MRLC as already highlighted.
> 
> The SUDDEN advent of IA 1 Corps opened up new possibilities, options and problems as well, with regards to operational concepts and employment options.
> 
> There was a very heated debate between COAS and GOC of IA 1 Armored Division regarding the launch area of IA 1 Corps. Options available were either through Jassar, across Ravi towards North East, the other being from East of Jammu / area Samba towardss South West (which actually happened).
> 
> Positive points in favor of Jassar option (supported by COAS)
> Move and concentration of a large force in the form of 1 Corps would be easily detected in Jammu Samba area as the road runs very near to the border.
> Jassar option will allow IA 1 Corps to radiate threat in multiple directions (Narowal, Sialkot and Lahore), this option would auto protect the log bases of IA WC as well.
> Samba thrust would be perforce a UNIDIRECTIONAL THRUST with very limited options afterwards.
> Samba thrust would suffer from space constraints in Pak territory
> Bad road network to support Samba thrust in Pak area
> 
> GOC 1 Armored was too much scared of a Jassar option as it involved crossing Ravi and he didnot want to engage in a bridghead operation, even though COAS tried to make him understand that in this case, the important Ravi crossing are in Indian territory, not Pakistan. He was all for Samba option as there was no river crossing involved in that case.
> 
> Even GOC WC supported COAS for Jassar option due to fol reasons....
> Ravi xings in Indian territory, already secured
> Engineer recce of these xings already done, operation deemed feasible by IA engineers
> Surprise element would be on Indian side as they would be operating AGAINST the grain / relief of the land.
> 
> Opinion of GOC 1 Armored Division carried more weight since he was accepted as an authority on large scale armor operations based on his WW2 experience.
> This all resulted into a bad compromise, whereby IA WC was tasked to launched offensive from Samba while protecting the road Pathankot-Samba and Dera Baba Nanak as well (28 Brigade op).
> 
> The above is a little background of what then transpired in the form of Operation Riddle and Nepal.
> 
> Just to add...
> 
> In-house friction within IA can be judged from the fact that previously, IA 1 Armored Division was Corps reserve of XI Corps in Punjab....once 1 Corps was raised, XI Corps VERY RELUCTANTLY, had to give it up for 1 Corps Ops, which is the main reason as to why XI Corps then had to limit the depth of its attack objectives (home bank of BRB).



It is very sad to reflect on Sparrow's role in his command of 1st Armoured Div.

More in two hours.

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## Cuirassier

You guys talking about XI & I Corps reminds me of how pathetic our higher organization was in the war. Only I Corps was present, which was redundant as most orders were bypassed and GHQ tried to control the situation with direct authority to divisional commanders. Our armoured spearhead was supervised by an infantry division's GOC thanks to having no Corps HQ to assume control; such inefficiencies paved the way for failure at Assal Uttar - Valtoha - Mahmudpura.

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## Joe Shearer

Cuirassier said:


> You guys talking about XI & I Corps reminds me of how pathetic our higher organization was in the war. Only I Corps was present, which was redundant as most orders were bypassed and GHQ tried to control the situation with direct authority to divisional commanders. Our armoured spearhead was supervised by an infantry division's GOC thanks to having no Corps HQ to assume control; such inefficiencies paved the way for failure at Assal Uttar - Valtoha - Mahmudpura.



It was Maj. Agha Amin, the Knight of the Acid Tongue, who quipped that in India-Pakistan conflicts, the side making the fewer mistakes won.

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## Joe Shearer

Much of this has been summarised earlier. Please feel free to skip it and move on.

What followed the beginning of Grand Slam is complex. Contrary to impressions that we have gathered so far, there was in fact a plan, Operation Riddle, prepared by the Indian Army in response to the Indian PM's request after the events of the Rann of Kutch. This had the three broad objectives as follows:

To destroy the ability of the Pakistan Army to wage war;
To occupy territory that could be used for negotiation later on;
To defend against Pakistan's attempts to grab Kashmir by force.
These are borrowed from Shuja Nawaz's presentation at the Hudson Institute, where he quotes from the book based on the war diaries of Y. B. Chavan. However, that presentation has its issues: 

For a pacifist Prime Minister such as Shastri to consider grabbing land in the Rann of Kutch is simply ludicrous; in fact, the intention was that of Pakistan.
For I Corps to be given this task well in advance of the conflict, when it had not been formed or deployed, is far-fetched. In the event, Mr. Nawaz mentions XI Corps as carrying out this plan, that had two parts to it:
An attack towards Lahore: this was led by XI Corps;
An attack towards Sialkot, to cut lines of communications between Sialkot and Lahore, and isolate forces in northern Pakistan from forces grouped around Lahore and located further south.

The problem was, as @PanzerKiel has pointed out already, General Chaudhuri and General Harbaksh Singh had very different views on the conduct of the war. There was a higher level version of this, in that the Defence Minister Chavan did not have confidence in his COAS; in meetings, Chavan felt, Chaudhuri would not answer questions fully, (read: honestly), and that in general, he was always keeping things close to his chest.

There was also a general impression about Chaudhuri in the minister's mind, that Chaudhuri was too careful and was a plodding kind of general. This is vindicated in part by his abrupt decision to pull Indian troops back behind Amritsar, leaving that city defenceless and open to capture by Pakistani forces, when the Pakistan Army got a breakthrough in Khem Karan.

Why did Pakistan have the impression that she could hold her own in a defensive war against India? 

For one thing, the force levels: there was a belief that India would need a 4:1 numerical advantage to attack Pakistan and penetrate her defences. The norm is 3:1; therefore the Martial Races premium in the minds of the Pakistani High Command may be calculated at (0.33 - 0.25 =) 0.08, or 1 in 12. In 1964, Pakistan had 8 Divisions, from some accounts; a ninth, the 6th Armoured Division, was set up in 1965 itself, and was sent into action. The general idea was to absorb an enemy attack successfully, and then counter-attack. Pakistani General Mahmud Ahmed has been quoted as reporting that the Pakistan Army HQ had estimated that India had 19 Divisions, but 7 were committed to the Chinese front, while 2 were committed to East Pakistan. Of the remainder, 4 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured Division, as well as an Armoured Brigade were in the Vale of Kashmir; this was an obvious morale booster for the planners in Pakistan, who felt that they should be able to take care of the 5 Divisions left over with no difficulty.

On the other hand, the ISI had apparently in August 1965 informed all concerned in the Pakistan Army, the Pakistan Navy and the Pakistan Air Force that the Indian Government had allowed the Indian COAS to cross the border into Pakistan whenever and wherever necessary. It is difficult to sympathise with Pakistani shock at Operation Riddle being launched at Lahore and Sialkot. The report also claimed that Indian troops were within striking distance of the International Border between India and Pakistan, but this makes strange reading. One only needs to see the distances that some units had to travel, the inability of others to got to battle because of their exhaustion, and the consequences of diversion of Mountain Divisions into plains field battles.

In the event, GHQ Pakistan believed that the main Indian effort would be in Kashmir, with some action against East Pakistan, but nothing against West Pakistan. This was incorporated into one of their Operations Directives.


It deals with the operations of two Indian Army Corps (I am writing this entirely from the point of view of the Indian Army), XI Corps and I Corps, and with the detailed operations of 15th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division and 4th Mountain Division. Within those broad categories, there was the specific operation of 54th Brigade and 38th Brigade under 15th Infantry Division, and their constituent battalions and armoured regiments and integral artillery. 

The Pakistani assessment of the war was that the Army punched above its weight, and held its own against a much larger adversary, and that the Air Force, too, played a major role in the initial stages of the war, while the Indian Air Force was nowhere to be seen at the outset, while the two navies played a very tangential role. However, the Pakistan Navy did make a very bold move, shelling Dwarka. This enfuriated the Indian CONS, who demanded a meeting with the Defence Minister, failed to get a release to attack, asked to see the Prime Minister, failed again, and went and met the President (reported in Chavan's war diaries). He was stalled at all three levels, told that the Navy would be brought in, but later, and had to be content with that. 

We have to reckon with two different points of view of how the Indian Army fared. One of them is obviously the Indian side, the other, equally obviously, the Pakistani side. So let us look at them.

Two sources have been cited to encapsulate the Indian point of view, the book War Despatched by General Harbaksh Singh, and a recent article by Manoj Joshi in The Wire. So "XI Corps performance was a sickening repetition of command failures leading to the sacrifice of a series of cheap victories." And "...I Corps, with the exception of a few minor successes, the operational performance was virtually a catalogue of lost victories. In two key battles, Dograi near Lahore and Phillora, early in the war, Indian forces broke through, but were pulled back by commanders who were worried that they had been sucked into a trap."

Akhtar Malik on the other hand says, "...we lost the initiative the very first day, and never recovered it." Another view, from Shuja Nawaz, was that the campaign was marked by "tactical brilliance and gallantry at the lower levels of command, nullified by a lack of vision and courage among the higher leadership of the Pakistan Army." 

Mahmud Ahmed's book was originally titled "Illusions of Victory", and was changed by the Pakistan Army to "History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965", had a similar assessment. Apparently 28 study groups were set up to dissect the lessons of the war at the Staff College, Quetta; it is not known how many were set up in India. 

This was NOT the official (=Government) point of view; Ayub Khan's government proclaimed the war a magnificent victory for Pakistan.

In effect, Pakistan had failed to liberate Kashmir, and had failed to rouse a popular uprising. India, with a numerically superior force, failed to dominate the Pakistan Army, and failed to make the Pakistan Army sue for peace.

@Cuirassier
@Mumm-Ra

For your consideration.

"The 1965 war was a war between two Second World War armies, trained to fight for someone else, and both sides demonstrated not a balance of power, but a balance of incompetence."
American General​

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## PanzerKiel

@Joe Shearer 

Delay from your side is delaying Indian offensive across international border as well.....IA is already hard pressed due to Grandslam.....Comd 191 Brigade, 10 Division and 15 Corps are heavily engaged.....7 and 15 division are standing by....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> @Joe Shearer
> 
> Delay from your side is delaying Indian offensive across international border as well.....IA is already hard pressed due to Grandslam.....Comd 191 Brigade, 10 Division and 15 Corps are heavily engaged.....7 and 15 division are standing by....



I thought I had responded to those.

Very well, I shall take up those details, 191 Brigade defence in depth, its retreat to the foothills to the north, and the perils faced by 41st Mtn. Brigade, its repulse, and its retreat through 28th Brigade to defensive positions behind, in the region of Akhnur.

I was waiting for your response to my last note, but shall take up detailed narration instead.

XI Corps 15th Div., 7th Div., and 4th Mtn. Div. to follow, finally I Corps and the Gadag Gallop.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Very well, I shall take up those details, 191 Brigade defence in depth, its retreat to the foothills to the north, and the perils faced by 41st Mtn. Brigade, its repulse, and its retreat through 28th Brigade to defensive positions behind, in the region of Akhnur.



Yes you did......just wanted to move forward....



Joe Shearer said:


> I was waiting for your response to my last note, but shall take up detailed narration instead.




Sorry that i missed it, could you please highlight it again?


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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Yes you did......just wanted to move forward....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sorry that i missed it, could you please highlight it again?



Yes, certainly.

That was #173, essentially Shuja Nawaz' presentation. There were points in it that made me feel very sore, but I presented the whole video for what it was worth. 

But I shall go on to the narrative of Grand Slam, and then the Lahore front.

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## Nilgiri

Finally caught up on the thread thus far.... keep going wonderful active participants.

I am forwarding some of this to my dad, he is especially very pleased to hear good, sound and fair opinions from across the border.

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## Joe Shearer

Let us classify posts from #152 to 178 as commentary, and return to a straight narrative of Grand Slam, until the point when General Yahya Khan was put in as Divisional Commander, with his own Divisional HQ of 7th Div., vice General Malik the author of Grand Slam.

We have already seen that around mid-August, 191 Brigade had lost its CO, and had been pretty roughly handled. The disposition of its components was all along the Cease Fire Line, in the plains, 3 Mahar and 3 GR north of the CFL, 6 Sikh LI to their south, hinged on Burejal, 15 Kumaon in echelon, on the Mandiala heights (this is reported in Google Maps as Mandiwala), so forming a curve facing the CFL, 9 Punjab further north in the hills, the J&K Militia distributed among the Mahars and the Sikh LI. The artillery was close to the 15 Kumaon in Mandiwala.

Better military minds than mine will no doubt have an explanation for this layout, but on the face of it, it seems reasonable. The front is covered, in linear fashion, but that was the precise weakness that had been noticed. 3 Mahar, 6 Sikh LI and 3 GR held the line, 9 Punjab held the hills immediately beyond 3 Mahar, and 15 Kumaon was in the middle of the curve formed by the front line, that is, by 3 Mahar, 3 GR and 6 Sikh LI, along with the divisional artillery and the brigade HQ.

41 Mtn. Brigade, on release to 10th Div., was to take up position between the border and Jammu, south of Mandiala, and the Corps reserve, 28th Bde., was to be further back, with the divisional headquarters, based on Akhnoor.

All very well, but within 4 days, 1st September to 4th September, all was over.

On the 1st, after an artillery bombardment starting at 03:30 and going on till 06:30, the Indian positions on the west to east alignment was attacked by 203 mm guns of the Pakistani artillery. At this time, no artillery of this bore was even available in the Indian Army; only the Field Artillery Regiment of 105 mm guns located on the Mandiwala heights and the troop of 155 mm Medium Artillery could oppose this terrifying assault.

Following this, three thrusts were launched, one, in the north, at the Mahars and Gorkhas, at Dewa, by the 4 Azad Kashmir Brigade supported by the 13 Lancers; they pushed the Mahars and the Gorkhas into the foothills behind and the positions between them and the easternmost Indian defences at Mandiwala lay clear.

At right angles to this, there two armoured attacks supported by infantry. One thrust was delivered east of Burejal by a squadron and was resisted by the AMX 13s of 20 Lancers; Major Amin describes these light tanks, not MBTs, as matchboxes in front of 11 Cavalry and 13 Lancers Pattons. Another thrust was by the 11 Cavalry and an infantry battalion attacking eastward at Moel, that is, at 15 Kumaon and the grouped recoil-less rifles of the brigade. There was no artillery support for the Indians against this attack, because the contingent located at Mandiwala was neutralised by counter-battery fire.

By the evening, the northern thrust had broken through the defences of the Mahars and the Gorkhas, and the way towards Mandiwala lay clear. This also compromised the position of the Sikhs, already under pressure from the 11 Cavalry. There was then a gap between the elements of the Mahars and the Gorkhas who had retreated into the foot-hills, and the 6 Sikh LI, still facing south but under great pressure from their right flank and to their front. 9 Punjab was too far back to give any support to these defensive positions. 15 Kumaon remained at Mandiwala, along with the artillery and the brigade HQ.

After a break, when the Pakistanis moved their engineers forward to support a tank crossing of the Jammu Tawi river, the attack commenced again. All troops were withdrawn to the east bank of the Tawi, and the defences were taken up by the newly-inducted 41 Mtn. Brigade. We have the situation then that the mountain brigade,without any anti-tank artillery as is normally carried by plains infantry divisions, was left facing the Pattons of the 11 Cavalry and the 13 Lancers. Besides making the remainder of the troops on the Mandiwala heights vulnerable, as well as the artillery and the brigade HQ, the way to Jammu was blocked only by the 28 Brigade positioned at Akhnoor, along with the 10 Div HQ.

In Greek drama, when the plot line reached unmanageable complications, the author usually launched a Deus Ex Machina. It was time for Field Marshal Ayub Khan to launch his own Deus Ex Machina.

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## Joe Shearer

On the morning of the 2nd September, this was the situation:

3 Mahars and the Gorkhas were sheltered in the foothills; they had had to give way against the assault by 4th Azad Kashmir Brigade and 13 Lancers, and the path forward to Mandiwala was open.
9 Punjab were behind them in the foothills.
6 Sikh LI had been badly mauled by the combined attacks at Moel and at Burejal on the CFL itself, and the orders had gone out for 191 Brigade elements to fall back on the east bank of the Jammu Tawi. The west bank was no longer tenable, and the 11 Cavalry, with support from engineering, had already crossed over; even the east bank was no longer tenable.
191 Brigade itself was asked to fall back to Akhnoor.
The J&K Militia attached to the Mahars and to the Sikh LI were caught up in the general melee, and were forced along with their attached organisations.
15 Kumaon, with its outgunned 105 mm Artillery Regiment, were left perched on the Mandiwala heights, staring down the barrel of a gun; both 13 Lancers, moving east from the CFL with the Azad Kashmir Brigade and 11 Cavalry, moving north to overwhelm the 6 Sikh LI, were closing in on the position.
At this point, the 41 Mtn. Brigade was deployed, with the usual mountain brigade equipment not including anti-tank weapons, facing the combined might of the two Patton-equipped cavalry regiments.

10 Div HQ was perched uneasily in between 41 Mtn. Brigade and 28 Brigade, based on Akhnoor.

Disaster was imminent.

Nothing happened on the 2nd.

Unknown to the Indians, the Pakistani GHQ has decided to replace Maj. Gen. Akhtar Husain Malik, author of the entire operation, with Maj. Gen. Yahya Khan, who arrived to take over the 7th Div. HQ, while General Malik departed. Yahya Khan decided he needed to take stock, and ordered a consolidation on the 2nd. That was all the time that Harbaksh Singh needed to get his own plans in order.

But that is later, on the 6th. To continue with events in the ongoing battle at Chhamb, the Pakistani 10 Brigade crossed the Tawi. A detachment to the south captured a position well to the south, the left flank, of the Indian 41 Mtn. Brigade, rendering it vulnerable to a flank attack. That was not to be needed.

On the 4th, the Pakistanis assaulted 41 Mtn. Brigade. During the day, they broke that brigade's defences, and forced its elements to fall back through 28 Brigade's lines to the HQ of 191 Brigade.

On the 5th, nothing much happened. Now that the road to Jammu, or, at least, to Akhnoor lay open, it was natural that the Pakistani side, that had completely convinced itself that it was performing a sandbox exercise, and that the sandbox was the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, completely ignored other options and possibilities, and airily dismissed the clear warnings of the 5'2" Indian Prime Minister about the right to strike anywhere, any time in response to a Pakistani attack.

On the 6th, there was a half-hearted attack on the 28 Brigade's position at Akhnoor, during the late afternoon and the night; the energy and enthusiasm was not there, because the news of the Indian XI Corps attack on Lahore had got through.

And there ended the brilliantly-conceived brilliantly-led Operation Grand Slam, that could have reached Jammu by the 6th, taking away the day of consolidation caused by Yahya's abrupt arrival on the battlefield in mid-battle.

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## Joe Shearer

At this point, before plunging into the narrative relating to the actions of the Indian XI Corps, and then I Corps, one asks oneself: what was Operation Grand Slam, after all? Was it, is it, just a footnote in history? 

It is so tempting to dismiss it with the thought that it was a child of the Pakistani military establishment, or at least, that part of it secretly engaged in planning the sequence of events that was to achieve a bigger victory than in the Rann of Kutch. On the other hand, it had an historical and public policy value.

This is the war that Pakistan should have fought, but didn't.

General Malik actually was outnumbered. Far from a conventional 3:1 superiority in numbers, he had fewer infantry battalions. But those who have learnt to use Lanchester equations would have a different story to tell. They would have pointed to the overwhelming superiority in armour, the overwhelming superiority in artillery, and would have said, with this force composition, cutting through a bloated infantry only formation would be as easy as a hot knife through butter. So two armoured regiments with the best contemporary armour, opposed to the light tanks of the Indian 20 Cavalry, a Corps artillery strength against one single solitary field artillery regiment and a troop of big guns: Malik knew precisely what to do, and how to do it. And he was precisely right in his execution. 

Thus he put pressure alternately on different points of the Indian front, first, a softening up with ambushes and hit-and-run raids, then, a softening up by massive artillery bombardment, third, probing attacks where the objectives were well-guarded by Indian Army troops, and then the last, fourth phase, the combined arms attack in full strength.

These tactics succeeded in the west, where the Azad Kashmir Brigade softened up the Mahars and the Gorkhas; it succeeded in the south, where the armoured regiment the 11 Cavalry softened up the 6 Sikh LI, and then broke through. It was at the last step, to bear down on 28 Brigade at Akhnoor, and to sweep them aside, that they faltered.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> At this point, before plunging into the narrative relating to the actions of the Indian XI Corps, and then I Corps, one asks oneself: what was Operation Grand Slam, after all? Was it, is it, just a footnote in history?
> 
> It is so tempting to dismiss it with the thought that it was a child of the Pakistani military establishment, or at least, that part of it secretly engaged in planning the sequence of events that was to achieve a bigger victory than in the Rann of Kutch. On the other hand, it had an historical and public policy value.
> 
> This is the war that Pakistan should have fought, but didn't.
> 
> General Malik actually was outnumbered. Far from a conventional 3:1 superiority in numbers, he had fewer infantry battalions. But those who have learnt to use Lanchester equations would have a different story to tell. They would have pointed to the overwhelming superiority in armour, the overwhelming superiority in artillery, and would have said, with this force composition, cutting through a bloated infantry only formation would be as easy as a hot knife through butter. So two armoured regiments with the best contemporary armour, opposed to the light tanks of the Indian 20 Cavalry, a Corps artillery strength against one single solitary field artillery regiment and a troop of big guns: Malik knew precisely what to do, and how to do it. And he was precisely right in his execution.
> 
> Thus he put pressure alternately on different points of the Indian front, first, a softening up with ambushes and hit-and-run raids, then, a softening up by massive artillery bombardment, third, probing attacks where the objectives were well-guarded by Indian Army troops, and then the last, fourth phase, the combined arms attack in full strength.
> 
> These tactics succeeded in the west, where the Azad Kashmir Brigade softened up the Mahars and the Gorkhas; it succeeded in the south, where the armoured regiment the 11 Cavalry softened up the 6 Sikh LI, and then broke through. It was at the last step, to bear down on 28 Brigade at Akhnoor, and to sweep them aside, that they faltered.



Am also one of those few who believe that Lanchester equation can be quiet misleading at times....it just deals with numbers instead of other important factors......an inherent limitation....

Just a short analysis of Op Grandslam....

for IA, battle of Akhnur was basically an example of a proper withdrawal operation......
PA failed to cash in the opportunities available from 1 to 4 Sep
PA also expected some threat from IAF which delayed their crossing of Tawi

On 1 Sep, Indian government gave permission to COAS to cross international border...
If PA would have continued to bash on, Akhnur should have been captured by 6 Sep...which may have paved the way for conditions of a strategic envelopment of IA in Punjab (the other pincer being PA 1 Armored and 11 Divisions from Khem Karan)

Op Grandslam also had to potential to link up with Gibralter forces which were comfortably holding in Budil area.


Coming to Operations Riddle and Nepal....

XI Corps attack plan was named RIDDLE.....
involved attack towards Lahore along three axis (15, 7 and 4 Mountain Divisions), they were to capture area uptill BRBLC, with a be-prepared mission to go across it in case of unexpected success...moreover, Jassar enclave was to be eliminated and its bridge capture to negate a Pakistani offensive option towards DBN.

1 Corps attack plan was named Nepal..
for which a bridgehead was planned in Bhagowal-Phillaurah area to provide a firm base for 1 Armored Division to break out towards MRLC and Daska....

Problems faced by IA...
first, owing to vast distances (international border to peacetime locations), WC was forced to stagger all these attacks...therefore all these formations had to attack right from their line of march without any rest or necessary coordination...
WC also did not have upto date maps of their area of operations....

Moreover, there was also indicators of indian reluctance to cross the international border....some reasons being...
PA's edge in armor (quantity and quality)
Superior PA artillery
F-104 (even though it was available in a limited quantity to have any major impact on the tactical battle)

GOC XV Corps, since he was hard pressed due to Gibralter and Grandslam, pressed COAS to open the international border so that PA pressure against him can be reduced. Therefore IA D Day was advanced to 6 Sep in order to relieve pressure against Akhnur..

IA formations started moving towards their launch location on ni 2/3 Sep, this move went entirely unnoticed despite the large distances involved.

A word about effects of Rann of Kutch agreement.....
it was a brilliant diplomatic coup for Pakistan, whereby it diffused tension and ensured withdrawal of Indian troops......but PA troops remained near the border since their peacetime locations were already near it. Despite the forward placement of PA troops, they still were surprised once IA offensive opened up across the international border.

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## Jackdaws

Just started reading this thread. I hope the quality is maintained. Congrats to @Joe Shearer & @PanzerKiel

From 1947/8 perspective - this is what I read and you two can shed some light. Sheikh Abdulla was the tallest leader in the State and after accession to India he demanded and got the Maharaja to abdicate and be replaced by his son

Also he recommended that India stop its offensive to recapture the erstwhile Princely State where it did because the Sheikh's influence did not extend to non Kashmiri speaking regions and it would be difficult to convince the people of the wisdom of accession to India. 

@Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel

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## Joe Shearer

Jackdaws said:


> Just started reading this thread. I hope the quality is maintained. Congrats to @Joe Shearer & @PanzerKiel
> 
> From 1947/8 perspective - this is what I read and you two can shed some light. Sheikh Abdulla was the tallest leader in the State and after accession to India he demanded and got the Maharaja to abdicate and be replaced by his son
> 
> Also he recommended that India stop its offensive to recapture the erstwhile Princely State where it did because the Sheikh's influence did not extend to non Kashmiri speaking regions and it would be difficult to convince the people of the wisdom of accession to India.
> 
> @Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel



PanzerKiel's commentary is stunning. How he remembers the exact order of battle, and who was doing what when, is something that flat out boggles my imagination.

Your comment about Sheikh Abdullah is something that I have read about before, but someone somewhere has to document it for verifiability. Just as, to give you an example, Jairam Ramesh' book on Krishna Menon, A Chequered Brilliance, throws extremely valuable light on the extent of damage that he did to the Indian military. I wish someone would confirm this, as it makes perfect sense. 

Sheikh Sahib would not have wanted to get entangled in West Jammu/Azad Kashmir politics; they had just recently rebelled against his leadership and his policies and revived the erstwhile Muslim Conference, that he had re-named to the National Conference. Neither would he have wanted to get to have to deal with Gilgit, knowing as little as he or any other Jammu and Kashmir politician knew about this remote location under British direct rule.

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## Joe Shearer

Jackdaws said:


> Just started reading this thread. I hope the quality is maintained. Congrats to @Joe Shearer & @PanzerKiel
> 
> From 1947/8 perspective - this is what I read and you two can shed some light. Sheikh Abdulla was the tallest leader in the State and after accession to India he demanded and got the Maharaja to abdicate and be replaced by his son
> 
> Also he recommended that India stop its offensive to recapture the erstwhile Princely State where it did because the Sheikh's influence did not extend to non Kashmiri speaking regions and it would be difficult to convince the people of the wisdom of accession to India.
> 
> @Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel



I was thinking about this thread and your remarks, and wanted to share with you some insights (into 65) that I got, either directly from PanzerKiel, or through his provocative remarks that made me dig harder in spots that I thought I had understood very well already.

I learnt that we tend to underestimate the effects of Gibraltar a lot. We are normally dismissive about it - the Pakistani special forces got no support from the locals, they were hunted down and killed, as a bonus, we rolled on to capture Haji Pir Pass - but that is clearly a mistake. PanzerKiel (and Cuirassier) adduced facts and figures to show that XV Corps was in fact bruised pretty severely by the operations of these special forces groups, perhaps one reason why Mitha's book is one of PanzerKiel's three favourites. We lost a CO of one of the Kumaon battalions, and the commander of 191 Brigade in the supporting artillery fire given to the intruders; that gives us a measure of the headaches they gave Katoch.
Gibraltar also may have contributed to softening up 191 Brigade, ahead of Grand Slam. Already having lost a CO, and then subjected to massive bombardment with guns that were far more powerful than ours, all five battalions of 191 Brigade were under stress. Only two battalions may have been badly battered - 3 Mahars and 6 Sikh LI, but 15 Kumaon was not very happy at the attention it was paid, and 3 GR seems to have suffered too. 9 Punjab may have got away with glancing injuries, but according to the good Major's account, 12 Div was supposed to hook left, while 7 Div - Yahya's command, replacing 12 Div - was to have battered its way through the Indian position at Akhnoor - the remnants of 15 Kumaon, 191 Brigade HQ, a fairly badly mauled 4 Mountain Div., sent to battle very strong armour with no weapons with which to battle them, and, supporting them, 28 Div.
I was surprised to find that numerically, the Indian 191 Brigade was possibly almost as strong as the Pakistani 10 Brigade, 104 Brigade and 4 Azad Kashmir Brigade put together, 5+1 battalions to their 7. However, in armour and in artillery, the PA had overwhelming superiority; 2 armoured regiments running Pattons, against a detachment of 2 squadrons of AMX 13 'matchboxes', and 203 mm artillery against a Field Artillery Regiment and a troop of 155 mm Medium Artillery.
It was impressive to see how Malik marshalled his forces. Two taps and a third, and then a massive tank charge, and the fighting of the 1st of September, the 3rd, the 4th and the 6th resulted in 3 battalions and their linked J&K Militia battalion jammed against the foothills, unable to move, unable to link up with the main forces, and simply waiting for the Azad Kashmir Brigade to lower the boom. Other formations had been swept out of their positions on the CFL and near Mandiwala and onto Akhnoor.
PanzerKiel argues, however, that this was a fighting retreat, and delayed the onslaught on Akhnoor by sufficient time to allow the Army commander, Harbaksh Singh, to launch attacks by XI Corps and I Corps and bring the PA off balance. As always, his observation must be considered seriously.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I was thinking about this thread and your remarks, and wanted to share with you some insights (into 65) that I got, either directly from PanzerKiel, or through his provocative remarks that made me dig harder in spots that I thought I had understood very well already.
> 
> I learnt that we tend to underestimate the effects of Gibraltar a lot. We are normally dismissive about it - the Pakistani special forces got no support from the locals, they were hunted down and killed, as a bonus, we rolled on to capture Haji Pir Pass - but that is clearly a mistake. PanzerKiel (and Cuirassier) adduced facts and figures to show that XV Corps was in fact bruised pretty severely by the operations of these special forces groups, perhaps one reason why Mitha's book is one of PanzerKiel's three favourites. We lost a CO of one of the Kumaon battalions, and the commander of 191 Brigade in the supporting artillery fire given to the intruders; that gives us a measure of the headaches they gave Katoch.
> Gibraltar also may have contributed to softening up 191 Brigade, ahead of Grand Slam. Already having lost a CO, and then subjected to massive bombardment with guns that were far more powerful than ours, all five battalions of 191 Brigade were under stress. Only two battalions may have been badly battered - 3 Mahars and 6 Sikh LI, but 15 Kumaon was not very happy at the attention it was paid, and 3 GR seems to have suffered too. 9 Punjab may have got away with glancing injuries, but according to the good Major's account, 12 Div was supposed to hook left, while 7 Div - Yahya's command, replacing 12 Div - was to have battered its way through the Indian position at Akhnoor - the remnants of 15 Kumaon, 191 Brigade HQ, a fairly badly mauled 4 Mountain Div., sent to battle very strong armour with no weapons with which to battle them, and, supporting them, 28 Div.
> I was surprised to find that numerically, the Indian 191 Brigade was possibly almost as strong as the Pakistani 10 Brigade, 104 Brigade and 4 Azad Kashmir Brigade put together, 5+1 battalions to their 7. However, in armour and in artillery, the PA had overwhelming superiority; 2 armoured regiments running Pattons, against a detachment of 2 squadrons of AMX 13 'matchboxes', and 203 mm artillery against a Field Artillery Regiment and a troop of 155 mm Medium Artillery.
> It was impressive to see how Malik marshalled his forces. Two taps and a third, and then a massive tank charge, and the fighting of the 1st of September, the 3rd, the 4th and the 6th resulted in 3 battalions and their linked J&K Militia battalion jammed against the foothills, unable to move, unable to link up with the main forces, and simply waiting for the Azad Kashmir Brigade to lower the boom. Other formations had been swept out of their positions on the CFL and near Mandiwala and onto Akhnoor.
> PanzerKiel argues, however, that this was a fighting retreat, and delayed the onslaught on Akhnoor by sufficient time to allow the Army commander, Harbaksh Singh, to launch attacks by XI Corps and I Corps and bring the PA off balance. As always, his observation must be considered seriously.




Luckily, in the form of Gen Akhtar and Gen Eftikhar, PA had the best commanders available in Chamb sector in both the wars..... 

Just like 3 Jat getting Dograi twice, PA advances again towards Akhnur in 1971 are no mean feat.

Just for info, our 17 division was grouped together with 23 division for Gen Eftikhar offensive.... Imagine what these two divisions could have done in Akhnur sector in 1971.... However situation elsewhere forced the employment of 17 division somewhere else.

191 brigade was later to move through 28 and 41 brigades towards Akhnur for its defense.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Luckily, in the form of Gen Akhtar and Gen Eftikhar, PA had the best commanders available in Chamb sector in both the wars.....
> 
> Just like 3 Jat getting Dograi twice, PA advances again towards Akhnur in 1971 are no mean feat.
> 
> Just for info, our 17 division was grouped together with 23 division for Gen Eftikhar offensive.... Imagine what these two divisions could have done in Akhnur sector in 1971.... However situation elsewhere forced the employment of 17 division somewhere else.
> 
> 191 brigade was later to move through 28 and 41 brigades towards Akhnur for its defense.



On our (Indian) western front, I believe Eftekhar Janjua's attack in the Chhamb sector was the best command performance in South Asia these 70+ years. It is mesmerising how he took a firm grip on an assault that was faltering, changed axis in mid-battle and broke through. 

M. J. Akbar wrote somewhere that (the Lord God) favoured India (he did not say the Lord God). Only that can explain Akhtar Malik's removal in 65, or Eftekhar Janjua's helicopter crash in 71.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> On our (Indian) western front, I believe Eftekhar Janjua's attack in the Chhamb sector was the best command performance in South Asia these 70+ years. It is mesmerising how he took a firm grip on an assault that was faltering, changed axis in mid-battle and broke through.
> 
> M. J. Akbar wrote somewhere that (the Lord God) favoured India (he did not say the Lord God). Only that can explain Akhtar Malik's removal in 65, or Eftekhar Janjua's helicopter crash in 71.



Another point to note......
Pakistan's attack in Chamb sector in 1965, the first of its kind, against 191 Brigade....

Op planning must have been later updated, PA planners must have taken into account that it would be difficult to repeat the same in 1971, therefore, grouped 17 Division with 23 Division in 1971...simple and logical.....

However, as already highlighted, 17 Division got sucked away due to operational requirements elsewhere, and 23 Division was required to conduct the attack all by itself (being a defensive, deployed division, with additional offensive task)...

....and then, as history is witness, Gen Eftikhar did not disappoint anyone.....despite all the above mentioned odds.

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## Pakistani Fighter

PanzerKiel said:


> Another point to note......
> Pakistan's attack in Chamb sector in 1965, the first of its kind, against 191 Brigade....
> 
> Op planning must have been later updated, PA planners must have taken into account that it would be difficult to repeat the same in 1971, therefore, grouped 17 Division with 23 Division in 1971...simple and logical.....
> 
> However, as already highlighted, 17 Division got sucked away due to operational requirements elsewhere, and 23 Division was required to conduct the attack all by itself (being a defensive, deployed division, with additional offensive task)...
> 
> ....and then, as history is witness, Gen Eftikhar did not disappoint anyone.....despite all the above mentioned odds.


Akhnoor was captured in Battle of Chamb?

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## PanzerKiel

Pakistani Fighter said:


> Akhnoor was captured in Battle of Chamb?



Nopes, in 1965, 13 Lancer spearheads almost reached Akhnoor......while in 1971, 23 Division attack was stopped after Tawi as Gen Eftikhar was killed in a heli accident.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Another point to note......
> Pakistan's attack in Chamb sector in 1965, the first of its kind, against 191 Brigade....
> 
> Op planning must have been later updated, PA planners must have taken into account that it would be difficult to repeat the same in 1971, therefore, grouped 17 Division with 23 Division in 1971...simple and logical.....
> 
> However, as already highlighted, 17 Division got sucked away due to operational requirements elsewhere, and 23 Division was required to conduct the attack all by itself (being a defensive, deployed division, with additional offensive task)...
> 
> ....and then, as history is witness, Gen Eftikhar did not disappoint anyone.....despite all the above mentioned odds.



I hope that when we have traversed the adventures of (Indian) XI Corps and I Corps in 1965, and come to 1971, you will give us your own narrative of General Eftekhar's battle management. I know it by heart, but don't have the vocabulary to tell this marvellous story. Marvellous from the point of view of military history; not as an Indian (as an Indian, it is uncomfortable to think that another Eftekhar might be under grooming for battle against us some day - in the words of Krishna's baby sister, who flew out of Kansa's clutches as he sought to murder her, "Tomare bodhibe je, Gokul-e barichhe shay". Not a good feeling).

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I hope that when we have traversed the adventures of (Indian) XI Corps and I Corps in 1965, and come to 1971, you will give us your own narrative of General Eftekhar's battle management. I know it by heart, but don't have the vocabulary to tell this marvellous story. Marvellous from the point of view of military history; not as an Indian (as an Indian, it is uncomfortable to think that another Eftekhar might be under grooming for battle against us some day - in the words of Krishna's baby sister, who flew out of Kansa's clutches as he sought to murder her, "Tomare bodhibe je, Gokul-e barichhe shay". Not a good feeling).



Out of several accounts, the one written by his own GSO-1 Ops Col Saeed is the best one....

Yeah sure, that man (Gen Eftikhar)... he proved to be too big a man for all the odds he had to face, both in the planning and execution...

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Nopes, in 1965, 13 Lancer spearheads almost reached Akhnoor......while in 1971, 23 Division attack was stopped after Tawi as Gen Eftikhar was killed in a heli accident.



One of the aspects of Indo-Pakistani military encounters that I find most uncanny is the way in which the Pakistan Army or Pakistani irregulars were baulked again and again by the long arm of fate. Baramula in 47-48, the mid-battle replacement of General Malik in 65, General Eftekhar's accident in 71.....

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## StormBreaker

PanzerKiel said:


> Out of several accounts, the one written by his own GSO-1 Ops Col Saeed is the best one....
> 
> Yeah sure, that man (Gen Eftikhar)... he proved to be too big a man for all the odds he had to face, both in the planning and execution...





Joe Shearer said:


> One of the aspects of Indo-Pakistani military encounters that I find most uncanny is the way in which the Pakistan Army or Pakistani irregulars were baulked again and again by the long arm of fate. Baramula in 47-48, the mid-battle replacement of General Malik in 65, General Eftekhar's accident in 71.....



You two make a good tag team on various convos, feels really good to face two professional gentlemen engage in convo

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## Joe Shearer

StormBreaker said:


> You two make a good tag team on various convos, feels really good to face two professional gentlemen engage in convo



Thanks, but that young man is streets ahead of me. I appreciate the equating, though; it's flattering, to say the least.

You do realise he's younger than my daughter? I hate to think of him facing our soldiers in a command position, in a few years' time.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> One of the aspects of Indo-Pakistani military encounters that I find most uncanny is the way in which the Pakistan Army or Pakistani irregulars were baulked again and again by the long arm of fate. Baramula in 47-48, the mid-battle replacement of General Malik in 65, General Eftekhar's accident in 71.....



Yeah, but i think fate intervened almost equally for both sides....
for Pakistan...Kutch agreement, Chawinda (25 Cavalry vs 1 Armored Brigade), Zafarwal (PA brigade minus against IA 14 Division), Lahore (22 Brigade / 10 Division counter attack from Ravi North towards south), Chengez Force 1971 in Shakergarh sector, actions of 24 Brigade and 8 IABG against Indian offensive in 1971, Fazilka / Sabuna 1971 against IA 67 IIB, 18 Division spoiling attack at Loganewala.... and later as we have already discussed, Pakistan's riposte to Brass Tacks (positioning of 1 and 2 Corps), Pakistan's counter to Op Trident, Parakaram...



StormBreaker said:


> two professional gentlemen



If two are professional and gentlemen both, then quality and constructive discussion is guaranteed.



Joe Shearer said:


> Thanks, but that young man is streets ahead of me. I appreciate the equating, though; it's flattering, to say the least.
> 
> You do realise he's younger than my daughter? I hate to think of him facing our soldiers in a command position, in a few years' time.



Thirst for learning is one thing which i dont intend to quench.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Yeah, but i think fate intervened almost equally for both sides....
> for Pakistan...Kutch agreement, Chawinda (25 Cavalry vs 1 Armored Brigade), Zafarwal (PA brigade minus against IA 14 Division), Lahore (22 Brigade / 10 Division counter attack from Ravi North towards south), Chengez Force 1971 in Shakergarh sector, actions of 24 Brigade and 8 IABG against Indian offensive in 1971, Fazilka / Sabuna 1971 against IA 67 IIB, 18 Division spoiling attack at Loganewala.... and later as we have already discussed, Pakistan's riposte to Brass Tacks (positioning of 1 and 2 Corps), Pakistan's counter to Op Trident, Parakaram...



Thought-provoking......

Chawinda, of course, is a classic, but it was cold feet on the part of (Indian) I Armoured Division Div. Commander, not any accident, and the sheer brass balls of 25 Cavalry, spreading itself across the path of a crack armoured division. The only parallel I can think of, other than HMS Glowworm, or the string bags attacking the Italian Fleet at Taranto, is the brazen attack by American (and Dutch) 'tin cans' in the Battle of the Coral Sea; the charge of the Light Brigade, but at sea.



PanzerKiel said:


> Yeah, but i think fate intervened almost equally for both sides....
> for Pakistan...Kutch agreement, Chawinda (25 Cavalry vs 1 Armored Brigade), Zafarwal (PA brigade minus against IA 14 Division), Lahore (22 Brigade / 10 Division counter attack from Ravi North towards south), Chengez Force 1971 in Shakergarh sector, actions of 24 Brigade and 8 IABG against Indian offensive in 1971, Fazilka / Sabuna 1971 against IA 67 IIB, 18 Division spoiling attack at Loganewala.... and later as we have already discussed, Pakistan's riposte to Brass Tacks (positioning of 1 and 2 Corps), Pakistan's counter to Op Trident, Parakaram...
> 
> 
> 
> If two are professional and gentlemen both, then quality and constructive discussion is guaranteed.







> Thirst for learning is one thing which i dont intend to quench.



Do you not see the enormous value to the entire world if you were to engage in leading Saudi and Emirati troops into battle against the Houthis? Or perhaps a permanent UN peace-keeping assignment?

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Chawinda, of course, is a classic, but it was cold feet on the part of (Indian) I Armoured Division Div. Commander, not any accident, and the sheer brass balls of 25 Cavalry, spreading itself across the path of a crack armoured division



Fate....for both sides.....if GOC 1 Armored DIvision could have used proper recce at the front of his division, he would have come to know that he was faced by 25 Cavalry only and would have swept this regiment aside.......same holds good for CO 25 Cavalry, if he would have known that he was facing the whole armored division, he might have been a bit defensive in his approach......
but then fate...1 Armored Division gets challenged by a lone armored regiment....a squadron each for the lead three armor regiments of the 1 Armored Division......Sparrow remains passive, Col Nisar goes head on and comes on top.



Joe Shearer said:


> Do you not see the enormous value to the entire world if you were to engage in leading Saudi and Emirati troops into battle against the Houthis? Or perhaps a permanent UN peace-keeping assignment?



Yes, but since we are discussing fate.....so in this case as well, fate will intervene.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Fate....for both sides.....if GOC 1 Armored DIvision could have used proper recce at the front of his division, he would have come to know that he was faced by 25 Cavalry only and would have swept this regiment aside.......same holds good for CO 25 Cavalry, if he would have known that he was facing the whole armored division, he might have been a bit defensive in his approach......
> but then fate...1 Armored Division gets challenged by a long armored regiment....a squadron each for the lead three armor regiments of the 1 Armored Division......Sparrow remains passive, Col Nisar goes head on and comes on top.







> Yes, but since we are discussing fate.....so in this case as well, fate will intervene.



<Damn. Rumbled.>

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## Joe Shearer

We have seen the prelude to the main engagements in 1965, almost the equivalent of a classical music quartet or a quintet to the entire symphonic orchestra of battles heard of elsewhere, even battles fought by the British Indian Army in Burma. Only 13 infantry battalions on the two sides combined, about 4 conventional divisions, 2 and a half armoured regiments, a Corps worth of artillery, sporadic interventions by the IAF. Nothing more than would constitute a skirmish in any campaign of the preceding WWII, or even the Korean War, with its massed infantry attacks combined skilfully with infiltration tactics to take apart far superior weaponry and a technology an order of magnitude higher.

But this was to change very shortly, as a second, and then a third Army Corps on the Indian side took on several divisions on the Pakistan side, and both sides fought like tigers to break the other side.

By the end of August, the Corps Commander Indian XV Corps evidently had had much to say to his Army Commander, the GOC-in-C Western Command, General Harbaksh Singh, and to his COAS, General Chaudhuri. Operation Grand Slam was the last straw; when 191 Brigade, weakened and demoralised by the preliminary engagements that deprived them of their CO, was shredded by General Malik's two Infantry Divisions, and two Armoured Regiments, and his artillery, even the reinforcing two brigades provided to support the nascent Indian 10th Division could not hold out against the onrushing enemy. Given a day's respite on the 2nd, they held out as long as they could on the 3rd and the 4th, until finally flesh and blood could take it no longer, and 41 Mountain Brigade regrouped behind their reserve brigade, 28 Brigade, and took position at Akhnur.

This was effectively the end of both Operation Gibraltar and Grand Slam, and left Indian XV Corps holding the Haji Pir Pass, but not the heights surrounding that feature, thus denying the Indian Army the use of the strategic Uri-Poonch Road; Indian 10 Division was left to hold out against the Pakistan Army 10 Brigade, 104 Brigade and 
4 Azad Kashmir Brigade, and two Patton-equipped armoured regiments, and artillery. Attacks on 10 Division continued on the 6th, and it was clear that this pressure would continue, even increase. 

The situation needed a sharp reaction.



notorious_eagle said:


> Sir please, let's think positive.
> 
> Despite all the false bravado by fanboys on this forum, my biggest fear is a conflict breaking out between India and Pakistan. Both sides are armed to the teeth, possess some of the most deadliest weapons and have mastery of the arms they possess. That's a lot of bodies sir.



Believe me, there is nothing that I would like to see less than our jawans in danger in war.



notorious_eagle said:


> Sir please, let's think positive.
> 
> Despite all the false bravado by fanboys on this forum, my biggest fear is a conflict breaking out between India and Pakistan. Both sides are armed to the teeth, possess some of the most deadliest weapons and have mastery of the arms they possess. That's a lot of bodies sir.



I'm so glad you're following this thread. It has been a re-education for me; I had no idea I had got so many things wrong.

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## Pakistani Fighter

Joe Shearer said:


> Baramula in 47-48


Elaborate


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## Pakistani Fighter

StormBreaker said:


> You two make a good tag team on various convos, feels really good to face two professional gentlemen engage in convo


He is getting information from our Military man. Joe needs to be watched. He maybe working for R&AW

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## Pakistani Fighter

Ok Guys. Any Tactic, Strategy for capturing Dehli and Western UP?


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## Counter-Errorist

I wish posting to this fantastic thread could be restricted to contributing members, to avoid derailments.

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## StormBreaker

Rashid Mahmood said:


> I'm 50.
> I have a serious personality.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Does being serious mean not being humble.


Your dp is even more serious than you 

@PanzerKiel ”Impression”, another example.

What vibes does my do give ?

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## PDF

Okay with everyones permission, I would like to ask Mods to delete the chit chat here from this thread and only keep the topic being discussed here safe. It is not that I didn't like the chat-on the contrary, it was fun ; but it won't do justice to the quality of posts produced here. I would like this thread to be reserved for that only. 
@Pakistani Fighter @ others....let's only post here with same level of content as the first 200 posts here have given to us. I can't due to my incompetency and that is why I am simply reading it quietly. @Rashid Mahmood Sir, you are also welcome to participate and give any inputs, even if of any single naval event between India-Pakistan. BTW, you will love reading this thread from post #1.


Gonna ask mods to clean posts after post #203 i.e from #204 to this post of mine. 

P.S: Do, kindly save posts or post it again in member's club if you want it to be reserved as moderation might terminate it. And again, forgive me everyone for all this selfishness and losing of your posts (if any or all). Thanks!

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## Amaa'n

Hachiman said:


> Okay with everyones permission, I would like to ask Mods to delete the chit chat here from this thread and only keep the topic being discussed here safe. It is not that I didn't like the chat-on the contrary, it was fun ; but it won't do justice to the quality of posts produced here. I would like this thread to be reserved for that only.
> @Pakistani Fighter @ others....let's only post here with same level of content as the first 200 posts here have given to us. I can't due to my incompetency and that is why I am simply reading it quietly. @Rashid Mahmood Sir, you are also welcome to participate and give any inputs, even if of any single naval event between India-Pakistan. BTW, you will love reading this thread from post #1.
> 
> 
> Gonna ask mods to clean posts after post #203 i.e from #204 to this post of mine.
> 
> P.S: Do, kindly save posts or post it again in member's club if you want it to be reserved as moderation might terminate it. And again, forgive me everyone for all this selfishness and losing of your posts (if any or all). Thanks!


*If you see anyone with off topic posts, report them & we will slap them with a thread ban, I will let all the mods know about this, any report about one liner, non serious, off topic , from this thread ...ban the member*



Hachiman said:


> P.S: Do, kindly save posts or post it again in member's club if you want it to be reserved as moderation might terminate it. And again, forgive me everyone for all this selfishness and losing of your posts (if any or all). Thanks!


Too late..thread has been cleaned...

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## Joe Shearer

Hachiman said:


> Okay with everyones permission, I would like to ask Mods to delete the chit chat here from this thread and only keep the topic being discussed here safe. It is not that I didn't like the chat-on the contrary, it was fun ; but it won't do justice to the quality of posts produced here. I would like this thread to be reserved for that only.
> @Pakistani Fighter @ others....let's only post here with same level of content as the first 200 posts here have given to us. I can't due to my incompetency and that is why I am simply reading it quietly. @Rashid Mahmood Sir, you are also welcome to participate and give any inputs, even if of any single naval event between India-Pakistan. BTW, you will love reading this thread from post #1.
> 
> 
> Gonna ask mods to clean posts after post #203 i.e from #204 to this post of mine.
> 
> P.S: Do, kindly save posts or post it again in member's club if you want it to be reserved as moderation might terminate it. And again, forgive me everyone for all this selfishness and losing of your posts (if any or all). Thanks!



You are perfectly right, and the chit-chat, though fun, was not relevant. It was a guilty pleasure.

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## Joe Shearer

What do we already know about the background to the 'sharp reaction'?

We know from inputs by Shuja Nawaz, and also from PanzerKiel, about the background to I Corps actions, but immediately, at this moment, it might help focus to look at XI Corps exclusively.

About XI Corps, we are reminded that I Armoured Div was very much part of XI Corps reserves, and Dhillon gave up command of I Armoured to I Corps with great reluctance. So we have General Dhillon executing his part of the operation short of the thunderbolt that he should have been able to hurl, and having to traverse clear country, with no defences to shield his troops, and these troops being almost exclusively PBI: 15 Infantry Div, 7th Infantry Div, and 4 Mtn Div. A quick flash forward: 15 Div zipped over its given line of attack, and not only reached the Ichhogil Canal, the given objective, but was recalled and then asked to advance a second time, in the teeth of a warned and aroused opposition. This, in spite of the visible war-weariness of the divisional commander, and his contribution to the legacy of the Pakistan Army - he donated his jeep to its war museum.

7 Div pushed forward rapidly to Hudiara, its objective; however, while its two brigades, 48 and 65, were to have leapfrogged each other, 48 to capture Hudiara and Nurpur, two points across each other on the Lahore road, and 65 to approach the position held by 48 and move on past it to the Ichhogil Canal, in reality, while 48 Brigade achieved its objectives, 65 faced the aroused Pakistan Army and made heavy weather of its advance. Their story effectively ended when 48 Brigade was diverted to support 4 Mtn Div. which was in trouble to the south of 7 Div's axis.

4 Mtn Div proved all over again that mountain troops really have no business fighting in the plains; why these troops were repeatedly deployed during this phase and immediately earlier is a mystery (we just saw 41 Brigade come up to support the badly battered 191 Brigade at Chhamb, and their rough handling by the two Pakistani armoured regiments supporting Grand Slam). On top of everything else, this division and its components had to travel very long distances, hundreds of kilometres, to reach its assembly point. It is best to deal with the actions of 4 Mtn Div. separately, as it saw the most action, even keeping in mind the magnificent performance of individual battalions within the 15 Infantry Division.

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## Joe Shearer

XI Corps, under Lt. General J. S. Dhillon, was asked to strike straight for the Pakistani defensive line at the Ichhogil Canal. The topography between Amritsar and Lahore is flat and unrelieved by any kind of cover; that leads to advantages and disadvantages both. The advantage was that armour could move quickly, stopped only by canals and waterways, including rivers; the disadvantages were that artillery and air attack both could stop an attacking team in its tracks. For that matter, it could also expose a defending team to a pounding.

XI Corps also had the element of surprise. Pakistan had not done anything particularly effective to defend Lahore. Even its 10 Division had been positioned in front of the city only the day before; actually, only hours before the Indian attack.

XI Corps then had, north to south, 15 Infantry Div., aiming for Dograi; 7 Infantry Div., aiming for Hudiara, and 4 Mtn. Brigade was launched at Kasur.

The initial objective was to advance along the GT Road to the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal, just next to the village of Dograi, which lay east of the Canal. To do this, General Dhillon had assigned 15 Infantry Division, that had two Brigades under command: 38 Brigade, tasked to take the road bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan, leading to the Pakistani enclave; and 54 Brigade, launched straight down the GT Road (the northernmost bridge near Dera Baba Nanak was assigned to 29 Brigade).

Let us see what happened at each of these bridges.

*BRIDGE OVER RAVI NEAR DERA BABA NANAK*

First, northernmost bridge near Dera Baba Nanak, and 29 Infantry Brigade; Brig. Pritam Singh, had captured this bridge and its enclave early on 6th September. Dera Baba Nanak was 80 kms southerly of Jammu, where all the excitement had been on the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th of September.

If I have read the maps correctly, this is the same bridge that connects Dera Baba Nanak to Kartarpur, over the Ravi, and allowing Pakistan access to its land enclave east of the Ravi; a bridge that has been much in the news recently.

However, the Pakistan Army, realising the situation in all its gravity with the three divisions attacking and gaining quick objectives on the 6th itself, reacted very strongly, and recovered much of the losses; this bridge was one of the first to be recovered. Around 15:00 HRS on the 6th, the Army Commander and the Corps Commander heard from Pritam Singh that the situation was dire, and that 29 Brigade should be allowed to fall back on the Batala Road, further behind his current position off the objective, of which he had been dispossessed.

There was logic behind this, although Pritam Singh had gone into a flap earlier than necessary. The thinking behind the bid to capture this bridge had been to pre-empt a Pakistani crossing in strength and a drive towards Gurdaspur and then towards Pathankot; Pathankot, it needs to be remembered, was 108 kms from Dera Baba Nanak, Gurdaspur only 70. They lay in the easterly direction from DBN; therefore withdrawing to the Batala Road, somewhat south-east of DBN, would allow Pritam to threaten the right flank of such an attack if it developed, and cut the lines of communication by attacking the connecting bridge.

However, Pritam Singh had not checked the situation on the ground, and was reacting to the tales of woe received from his forward battalions. While capturing the bridge in the early hours of the 6th, in darkness, the Indian troops had not noticed that a watchtower remained intact, and that the Pakistan Army were using it as an Artillery Observation Post, and calling down heavy fire from first light itself on the troops occupying the bridge. After softening them up for eight hours, the Pakistan Army advanced with tanks and overran two companies of the forward Indian battalion; the rest of the battalion managed to hang on. The shelling continued, and most of 29 Brigade got a fair share of attention.

This was the position at 14:00 HRS and this is what was partially reported to General Harbaksh Singh and General Dhillon at 15:00. On realising what had happened (or not happened, in this case), Dhillon ordered the 29 Brigade to stand firm, and put his GSO1 on site, to sit on Pritam Singh's head and generally encourage and edify him. For whatever reason, perhaps due to a refreshing and encouraging conversation with his Corps Commander, 29 Brigade first held out against a renewed Pakistani attack in the darkness of the 6th night, around 21:00 HRS, and then counter-attacked with armour at around 02:45 HRS on the 7th morning, winning back the bridge, and winkling out the mischief-making observation post. The PA, however, demolished one span of the bridge; in other words, the Indian defensive objective was achieved, the feared offensive move of the PA was still-born.

*BRIDGE OVER ICHHOGIL CANAL AT BHAINI DHILWAN*

The reader will have to bear with the narrative, as formation replaced formation in quick succession during the course of pursuing this objective.

Of the two brigades assigned to 15 Infantry Division, 38 Brigade was set to capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge, and it fell to 1 Jat to achieve that. They did that, but could hold on, due to heavy artillery and tank fire. Later, on their falling back around noon on the 6th, the Corps commander personally ordered 6 Kumaon of the reserve 96 Brigade to take up the task and re-capture the bridge. They were unsuccessful in their attack on the 7th September evening, but consolidated nearby, holding on until the 8th September evening.

On the 11th, however, opposing tanks and infantry that had followed 6 Kumaon and 1 Jat when they left their firm defensive positions near Ranian, began to pose a major threat. To support them, 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, held by the Corps, that had just fought a brilliant battle in the Kasur sector, was shifted from 4 Mtn. Division to 15 Infantry Division, and reinforced 96 Brigade, whose unit 6 Kumaon was. Relieved of pressure from the opposing armour, 96 Brigade now took back the bridge in three days' time, by the 14th September.

96 Brigade had been the corps reserve for XI Corps. As it had been committed, 50 Independent (Para) Brigade that had arrived on the field, was attached to XI Corps, but was relieved in two days time by our old friends, 41 Mtn. Brigade, last seen fighting for its life in front of 28 Brigade in Akhnoor, and forced to pass through that brigade to re-group and consolidate. That regrouped and consolidated formation now was transferred from XV Corps to XI Corps, and took up position as Corps reserve; 50 Independent (Para) Brigade moved to a point north of Atari.
____________________________________oxoxoxoxo_________________________________________

These, then, were the two smaller engagements that 15 Infantry Division had, involving 29 Brigade in the north, 38 Brigade, later 96 Brigade. 

The larger one was the battle for the Bridge over the Ichhogil near Dograi, fought by 54 Brigade, 3 Jat in particular, and the recoil and renewed attack on Dograi after the recall of the victorious troops by the Brigade Commander of 54 Brigade. This story might be named Victory into Defeat.

This will be narrated as *THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI.*

Besides this, 7 Infantry Division struck out for its own objectives, and was not really successful.

To be reported as *THE BRIDGE AT BARKI.*

The really significant fighting under XI Corps, however, was the fighting under 4 Mtn. Div. in the extreme southern edge of the Corps boundary. That might echo Field Marshal Bill Slim's book, and be described as Defeat into Victory.



(to be cont.)

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## Joe Shearer

Just to remind all readers of an earlier post in the thread by @PanzerKiel, here it is:



PanzerKiel said:


> Coming to Operations Riddle and Nepal....





> XI Corps attack plan was named RIDDLE.....
> involved attack towards Lahore along three axis (15, 7 and 4 Mountain Divisions), they were to capture area uptill BRBLC, with a be-prepared mission to go across it in case of unexpected success...moreover, Jassar enclave was to be eliminated and its bridge capture to negate a Pakistani offensive option towards DBN.





> 1 Corps attack plan was named Nepal..
> for which a bridgehead was planned in Bhagowal-Phillaurah area to provide a firm base for 1 Armored Division to break out towards MRLC and Daska....





> Problems faced by IA...
> first, owing to vast distances (international border to peacetime locations), WC was forced to stagger all these attacks...therefore all these formations had to attack right from their line of march without any rest or necessary coordination...
> WC also did not have upto date maps of their area of operations....





> Moreover, there was also indicators of indian reluctance to cross the international border....some reasons being...
> PA's edge in armor (quantity and quality)
> Superior PA artillery
> F-104 (even though it was available in a limited quantity to have any major impact on the tactical battle)





> GOC XV Corps, since he was hard pressed due to Gibralter and Grandslam, pressed COAS to open the international border so that PA pressure against him can be reduced. Therefore IA D Day was advanced to 6 Sep in order to relieve pressure against Akhnur..

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## Mumm-Ra

@waz @Jungibaaz @jaibi can we make this tread sticky please?

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## Joe Shearer

*PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE FOR THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI
*
If we look at how the conflict unfolded, there is a steady development of the theme visible up to a point. So we had irregulars in action in Operation Gibraltar, messing up the peace of mind of the Indian XV Corps, and getting Katoch to imitate Stephen Leacock's hero: "Lord Ronald said nothing; he flung himself from the room, flung himself upon his horse and rode madly off in all directions." Katoch managed to keep the upper hand, and even capture an important strategic feature, but not without suffering injuries; not crippling injuries, but in the context of things, given that 47-48 was 17 years before, most alarming. He successfully communicated his troubled state of mind to his Army commander, and to his Chief, during his conference with them at Srinagar, and it was actually while they were with him that news of Grand Slam broke upon them like a, well, thunderclap. General Chaudhuri immediately air dashed to Delhi (I've always wanted to use that phrase!), got permission for taking action with a free hand and issued orders for the Indian riposte; Operations Riddle and Nepal (for some reason, these names are never mentioned in Indian circles in Indian annals).

So we saw a progression; from an entire Army Corps facing a large number of irregulars (estimates differ), albeit with considerable 'sympathetic' support from heavy artillery across the line of control, fire that had its own effect in battering the Indian troops defending Chhamb-Akhnoor, we next had, in Operation Grand Slam, 7 battalions and 2 Armoured Regiments, and the artillery from a Corps, on the Pakistan side of the equation, facing 5 battalions, a light tank regiment and fairly innocuous artillery. The inevitable consequences followed; the Indian position of the newly-institutied 10 Division was opened up as if by a tin-cutter, with one segment doing a backward left wheel from a north-south orientation to a west-east orientation along the foothills, and another segment falling back before a traumatic armoured attack faced by a mountain brigade, 41 Mtn Brigade, to re-group behind the Corps reserve, 28 Brigade.

The Div. commander lost his job; very unfairly, considering that he only got a division that took up its war-time location on the very day that his enemy attacked, and considering that he was left with ad hoc formations deputed to him at the eleventh hour, including a Mountain Division that didn't have the tools to resist an armoured attack, and an armoured contingent that was frankly not fit to oppose main battle tanks in battle. But there it is; he and the CO, 15 Infantry Division, were the two divisional commanders to be removed.

Both were negligent in reporting, and tried to mislead their respective commanders, Chopra the Corps commander XV Corps General Katoch, and Niranjan Prasad, who had already two strikes against him (NEFA 4 Division, Kashmir 25 Division) the Corps commander XI Corps Joginder Dhillon.

That was the critical difference.

One last point: it was baffling to see XI Corps attacking on such a broad front. From Dera Baba Nanak to Kasur is 125 kms; we have XI Corps deploying 3 Divisions, 15 Infantry, 7 Infantry and 4 Mountain, with two brigades, 38 and 54, under the first, two brigades, 48 and 65, under the second, and 7 Mountain and 62 Mountain, under the third. In addition, 96 Brigade was pressed into service vice 29 Brigade, in the tussle over the bridge near Dera Baba Nanak.

General Harbaksh Singh has an explanation, and we will go into that later. It was not a terribly convincing explanation, having to do with this being originally a plan that would have deployed 1 Armoured Division along one of the captured bridges, and looking a bit pointless after the COAS had diverted 1 Armoured Division to his pet new 1 Armoured Corps, and made a joke of the entire plan. That does not explain why, having found that this was going through, the XI Corps plan had not been changed to strengthen one of the four access points to Pakistani territory.
*
*

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## Cuirassier

Joe Shearer said:


> *THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI: 15 DIV
> *
> If we look at how the conflict unfolded, there is a steady development of the theme visible up to a point. So we had irregulars in action in Operation Gibraltar, messing up the peace of mind of the Indian XV Corps, and getting Katoch to imitate Stephen Leacock's hero: "Lord Ronald said nothing; he flung himself from the room, flung himself upon his horse and rode madly off in all directions." Katoch managed to keep the upper hand, and even capture an important strategic feature, but not without suffering injuries; not crippling injuries, but in the context of things, given that 47-48 was 17 years before, most alarming. He successfully communicated his troubled state of mind to his Army commander, and to his Chief, during his conference with them at Srinagar, and it was actually while they were with him that news of Grand Slam broke upon them like a, well, thunderclap. General Chaudhuri immediately air dashed to Delhi (I've always wanted to use that phrase!), got permission for taking action with a free hand and issued orders for the Indian riposte; Operations Riddle and Nepal (for some reason, these names are never mentioned in Indian circles in Indian annals).
> 
> So we saw a progression; from an entire Army Corps facing a large number of irregulars (estimates differ), albeit with considerable 'sympathetic' support from heavy artillery across the line of control, fire that had its own effect in battering the Indian troops defending Chhamb-Akhnoor, we next had, in Operation Grand Slam, 7 battalions and 2 Armoured Regiments, and the artillery from a Corps, on the Pakistan side of the equation, facing 5 battalions, a light tank regiment and fairly innocuous artillery. The inevitable consequences followed; the Indian position of the newly-institutied 10 Division was opened up as if by a tin-cutter, with one segment doing a backward left wheel from a north-south orientation to a west-east orientation along the foothills, and another segment falling back before a traumatic armoured attack faced by a mountain brigade, 41 Mtn Brigade, to re-group behind the Corps reserve, 28 Brigade.
> 
> The Div. commander lost his job; very unfairly, considering that he only got a division that took up its war-time location on the very day that his enemy attacked, and considering that he was left with ad hoc formations deputed to him at the eleventh hour, including a Mountain Division that didn't have the tools to resist an armoured attack, and an armoured contingent that was frankly not fit to oppose main battle tanks in battle. But there it is; he and the CO, 15 Infantry Division, were the two divisional commanders to be removed.
> 
> **
> *
> *


Who replaced Gen Chopra?


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## Joe Shearer

@Cuirassier

I don't know. I only have this brutally direct piece of narration by Harbaksh Singh:

_In the meanwhile, a message came from 39 Medium Battery of Artillery (this was part of a Sikh Battalion converted into a Medium Artillery Regiment and the message was meant for me as Colonel of the Sikh Regiment) that the personnel of the 161 Artillery Regiment, deployed next to them, had deserted enmass, leaving their guns, with stacked ammunition, and wagon-line (vehicles) behind.They wanted them collected, lest they fall into enemy hands. Despite the desertion, they averred that the Medium Battery, in position, would continue to support the forward Brigade. Upon receipt of this message, I ordered the Divisional Commander, Major General Chopra, in the presence of his Corps Commander, to muster as much manpower and as many electrical mechanical engineers from his Division, as he could, and arrange to collect the guns, the ammunition and the vehicles. Having done so, he could then order 41 Mountain Brigade to withdraw that night. The orders for withdrawal were to get to the Brigade by 2 o’clock that afternoon, so that the Brigade Commander could plan his withdrawal properly. Thereafter, General Kashmir Katoch arid I left Akhnoor, by the same helicopter in which we had come, and flew back to our respective Headquarters._

_The next morning, the 5th of September, my Chief of Staff was rung up by General Officer Commanding 10 Division to say that the Brigade had come back safely, with all its equipment and ammunition. But before congratulating the General Officer Commanding for this successful operation, I asked my Chief of Staff to check up from the General Officer Commanding if the guns had also been brought back. His reply that they could not be brought back made me furious. I ordered his Corps Commander to hold a Court of Inquiry for this lapse. As a result of this inquiry, General Chopra was sacked from his appointment._

After finishing the narration of the battle for the bridge at Dograi, and for the bridge at Barki (by 7 Div in the second case), when we come to the actions of 4 Mtn Div. I plan to share some relevant extracts from several different accounts. I do not have the book written by Major General Joginder Singh*, who seems to have been a thorough-going pain in the, erm, elbow, which is a pity.

Please bear with me till then.

* There were two general officers named Joginder Singh. 
One was Major General Joginder Singh, Chief of Staff to Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh; the other was Lieutenant General Joginder Singh Dhillon, GOC-in-C XI Corps.

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## meghdut

@PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer , Gentlemen could you kindly include a bibliography to this thread for us to read? It would be highly appreciated .

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## Joe Shearer

*THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI: 15 DIV.
*
In keeping with the broad vision of capturing all 4 bridges across water obstacles that the PA had planned to use to defend itself and its territory minus what lay on the Indian side, the Indian 15 Infantry Div had been set the objective of reaching the bridge at Dograi, only a few kms from Lahore, and within shelling distance of the Lahore International Airport. The division had the 38 and 54 Brigades, and we have seen that 38 Brigade was busy with the bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan (that was ultimately captured on 14th September). That left Brigadier Rikh and his three battalions to deal with the bridge at Dograi.

The plan was simple.

3 Jat would take up position at the villages of Gosal and Dial, just 4 kms from the border at Wagah, and establish a firm base at Milestone 14 on the Lahore Road. 15 Dogra would leapfrog that position and attack the actual bridge another 3.5 kms on. Simultaneously 13 Punjab would make a right hook and capture another bridge that lay a little further south on the Dograi (or Dograe Kalan, as Google Maps prefers to call it) and Jallo.

With this, four out of five bridges that might be used for a break-out by the Pakistan Army would have been bottled up.

Plans last, according to military officers, until the moment of contact with the enemy. Quite in keeping with this aphorism, nothing went according to plan for this plan. It started off very well, with 3 Jat achieving its objectives and settling down to its well-earned rest and vantage point for the rest of the struggle. 15 Dogra faced problems from its kick-off point itself, and had to use 14 Horse to see off their unwanted company. By the time they reached the 3 Jat, they claimed they had suffered too many casualties to go on and take their objective, the bridge. 13 Punjab also got into a corner at Jallo Railway Station, on their way to their objective, suffered heavy casualties, and were stopped in their tracks.

[_I am sorry to report that another set of notes taking this forward, through the delegation of the operation to capture the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal to 3 Jat, their crossing of the Canal, their inability to hold the position due to lack of support and finally an order to withdraw, and their return to the same object and capture of the east bank of the canal around the 22nd has been lost; it is not clear how.

While I will obviously re-write it, readers may please forgive the repetitive inclusion of new passages, and saving this note incrementally; as each section gets written, it will be placed on the body of this note, and saved._]

*THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – DELEGATION TO 3 JAT AND THE ATTACK ON THE EAST BANK*

With the failure of the designated units to take up their assignments, Brigadier Rikh came up to Milestone 14 to confer with Lt. Col. Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. He asked 3 Jat if they would take up the task of 15 Dogra, to attack the east bank of the Icchogil Canal. Hayde agreed. By then a squadron of 14 Horse had arrived at Milestone 14, so they were roped in; it was agreed that one troop would go along with the Jats, and the other would follow after the settlement of Dograi had been cleared. With all this cleared and agreed all around, 3 Jat moved into action around 09:00 HRS on the 6th. They walked straight into an air attack, and lost men; in addition, they lost their recoilless rifles as well, and were left helpless against armour. This was to have critical consequences later.

As the leading company of 3 Jat collected themselves after the air attack, and moved forward on the GT Road, at this point running east-west, they came under heavy fire. Hayde then ordered the party to swing to the north and circle around the settlement. At the outset of this looping advance, they faced artillery fire while they were on the open field, got through it, and then attacked the fortifications on the east bank of the Canal.

The attack was successful. 3 Jat managed to clear the defences that they attacked on the east bank, and forced the troops stationed there to retreat to the west bank.

*THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – BATAPORE AND ATTOKE AWAN*

On inspecting the scene, Hayde realised that the bridge had been demolished by the defenders, but had fallen down neatly along its foundations, meaning that it could still be crossed as it had fallen. He led two companies across in the teeth of defending fire, and stationed them to north and south of the GT Road beyond the canal, in Attoke Awan and in Batapore respectively.

This was the furthest that Indian troops penetrated in 1965.

Unfortunately, the situation was not stable, and both companies had to retreat in about four hours, only for the battalion to be flung into battle just two weeks later, to engage with the Pakistan Army in the very hard-fought Battle of Dograi.

*THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – FOR WANT OF A NAIL*

Having got to the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal, the two companies of 3 Jat found themselves totally abandoned by their brigade. The company in Attoke Awan was driven back across the canal by heavy shelling from Sherman tanks. At this point, a troop of 14 Horse arrived on the east bank (it had been planned that one troop would accompany the original attack on the east bank, and the other would follow once Dograi had been pacified, but thanks to Hayde’s northward loop around Dograi, neither troop kept up – this was the earlier troop that had proceeded cautiously a quiescent Dograi and reached the bridge). Their covering fire encouraged Hayde to cross once again, and to reoccupy positions on the north side, just as before.

He was unable to communicate with his brigade HQ, as the equipment for man-packing their radio set had failed to arrive in the morning, so he sent three messengers to the 14th Horse to message brigade HQ and ask for anti-tank equipment; finally, since he got no replies, he sent off one of his officers. There was still no response, and the situation was bad for the Attoke Awan company in its exposed position and under enemy fire. Finally, he was forced to lead this company back, crossing the canal a 4th time.

On reaching the east bank, he got a shock. Lt. Brijendra Singh informed him that he had been asked to fall back, and to bring the infantry back also.

Hayde withdrew the company that had been holding its position in Batapore and fell back as ordered. It would take several hundred lives in a bloody battle two weeks later to get back to the east bank, and the only reason for this was the indecision of Brig. Rikh, and the panicky state of mind of the divisional commander, Major General Niranjan Prasad.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> One last point: it was baffling to see XI Corps attacking on such a broad front. From Dera Baba Nanak to Kasur is 125 kms; we have XI Corps deploying 3 Divisions, 15 Infantry, 7 Infantry and 4 Mountain, with two brigades, 38 and 54, under the first, two brigades, 48 and 65, under the second, and 7 Mountain and 62 Mountain, under the third. In addition, 96 Brigade was pressed into service vice 29 Brigade, in the tussle over the bridge near Dera Baba Nanak.



From a military point of view, the broad front front plan of XI was a necessity as well as beneficial....
...there are three approaches from Indian side towards lahore ---Amritsar-Lahore (shortest), Harike-Khalra-Barki and via Kasur....

XI Corps attack along these approaches, with a Division each, had the advantage of a converging attack (since all these approaches converge on Lahore)....which would make it difficult for PA 10 and 11 Division to hold....converging attack also meant that the more XI Corps advanced, the problem of inter Divisions (7, 15, 4 MD) support in terms of shifting of schwerpunkt would get easier...
....However, conversely, from PA view, the more XI attack came inside Pakistan, the more compact PA defences would become...its just like you may have a 100 men against 1, but due to geo constraints you have to pass through a defile or a single door, as a result, that 1 man can hold a bigger force for a long period of time....like 300 Spartans.

In order to cover the wide gap between 15 and 7 Division, IA deployed an adhoc force name RAJA TAL force.

XI also took away 96 Brigade under its own direct command in order to protect Amritsar against any PA attempt to take it..


Just a point of trivia....the presence of PA 11 Division was NOT KNOWN to Indian int orgs before the war.....they came to know about it once they came face to face with it


Coming specifically to Lahore and PA 10 Division

Main advantages enjoyed by PA 10 Division were....
BRB....already running parallel to IB, a ready made defence line.....ideally located at a distance from IB which allow PA to sufficiently attrite IA attack before the battle of BRB starts....
1/5 of 10 Division front in the north, almost 9000 yards......IA will have to face twin obstacles in the form of BRB and Ravi both...
Two approaches from Indian side towards Lahore...IA force to advance wide apart from IB, which allow 10 Division to respond to both thrusts separately without facing the joint power of 2 IA divisions....



Joe Shearer said:


> *THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI: 15 DIV.
> *
> In keeping with the broad vision of capturing all 4 bridges across water obstacles that the PA had planned to use to defend itself and its territory minus what lay on the Indian side, the Indian 15 Infantry Div had been set the objective of reaching the bridge at Dograi, only a few kms from Lahore, and within shelling distance of the Lahore International Airport. The division had the 38 and 54 Brigades, and we have seen that 38 Brigade was busy with the bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan (that was ultimately captured on 14th September). That left Brigadier Rikh and his three battalions to deal with the bridge at Dograi.
> 
> The plan was simple.
> 
> 3 Jat would take up position at the villages of Gosal and Dial, just 4 kms from the border at Wagah, and establish a firm base at Milestone 14 on the Lahore Road. 15 Dogra would leapfrog that position and attack the actual bridge another 3.5 kms on. Simultaneously 13 Punjab would make a right hook and capture another bridge that lay a little further south on the Dograi (or Dograe Kalan, as Google Maps prefers to call it) and Jallo.
> 
> With this, four out of five bridges that might be used for a break-out by the Pakistan Army would have been bottled up.
> 
> Plans last, according to military officers, until the moment of contact with the enemy. Quite in keeping with this aphorism, nothing went according to plan for this plan. It started off very well, with 3 Jat achieving its objectives and settling down to its well-earned rest and vantage point for the rest of the struggle. 15 Dogra faced problems from its kick-off point itself, and had to use 14 Horse to see off their unwanted company. By the time they reached the 3 Jat, they claimed they had suffered too many casualties to go on and take their objective, the bridge. 13 Punjab also got into a corner at Jallo Railway Station, on their way to their objective, suffered heavy casualties, and were stopped in their tracks.
> 
> [_I am sorry to report that another set of notes taking this forward, through the delegation of the operation to capture the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal to 3 Jat, their crossing of the Canal, their inability to hold the position due to lack of support and finally an order to withdraw, and their return to the same object and capture of the east bank of the canal around the 22nd has been lost; it is not clear how.
> 
> While I will obviously re-write it, readers may please forgive the repetitive inclusion of new passages, and saving this note incrementally; as each section gets written, it will be placed on the body of this note, and saved._]
> 
> *THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – DELEGATION TO 3 JAT AND THE ATTACK ON THE EAST BANK*
> 
> With the failure of the designated units to take up their assignments, Brigadier Rikh came up to Milestone 14 to confer with Lt. Col. Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. He asked 3 Jat if they would take up the task of 15 Dogra, to attack the east bank of the Icchogil Canal. Hayde agreed. By then a squadron of 14 Horse had arrived at Milestone 14, so they were roped in; it was agreed that one troop would go along with the Jats, and the other would follow after the settlement of Dograi had been cleared. With all this cleared and agreed all around, 3 Jat moved into action around 09:00 HRS on the 6th. They walked straight into an air attack, and lost men; in addition, they lost their recoilless rifles as well, and were left helpless against armour. This was to have critical consequences later.
> 
> As the leading company of 3 Jat collected themselves after the air attack, and moved forward on the GT Road, at this point running east-west, they came under heavy fire. Hayde then ordered the party to swing to the north and circle around the settlement. At the outset of this looping advance, they faced artillery fire while they were on the open field, got through it, and then attacked the fortifications on the east bank of the Canal.
> 
> The attack was successful. 3 Jat managed to clear the defences that they attacked on the east bank, and forced the troops stationed there to retreat to the west bank.
> 
> *THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – BATAPORE AND ATTOKE AWAN*
> 
> On inspecting the scene, Hayde realised that the bridge had been demolished by the defenders, but had fallen down neatly along its foundations, meaning that it could still be crossed as it had fallen. He led two companies across in the teeth of defending fire, and stationed them to north and south of the GT Road beyond the canal, in Attoke Awan and in Batapore respectively.
> 
> This was the furthest that Indian troops penetrated in 1965.
> 
> Unfortunately, the situation was not stable, and both companies had to retreat in about four hours, only for the battalion to be flung into battle just two weeks later, to engage with the Pakistan Army in the very hard-fought Battle of Dograi.
> 
> *THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – FOR WANT OF A NAIL*
> 
> Having got to the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal, the two companies of 3 Jat found themselves totally abandoned by their brigade. The company in Attoke Awan was driven back across the canal by heavy shelling from Sherman tanks. At this point, a troop of 14 Horse arrived on the east bank (it had been planned that one troop would accompany the original attack on the east bank, and the other would follow once Dograi had been pacified, but thanks to Hayde’s northward loop around Dograi, neither troop kept up – this was the earlier troop that had proceeded cautiously a quiescent Dograi and reached the bridge). Their covering fire encouraged Hayde to cross once again, and to reoccupy positions on the north side, just as before.
> 
> He was unable to communicate with his brigade HQ, as the equipment for man-packing their radio set had failed to arrive in the morning, so he sent three messengers to the 14th Horse to message brigade HQ and ask for anti-tank equipment; finally, since he got no replies, he sent off one of his officers. There was still no response, and the situation was bad for the Attoke Awan company in its exposed position and under enemy fire. Finally, he was forced to lead this company back, crossing the canal a 4th time.
> 
> On reaching the east bank, he got a shock. Lt. Brijendra Singh informed him that he had been asked to fall back, and to bring the infantry back also.
> 
> Hayde withdrew the company that had been holding its position in Batapore and fell back as ordered. It would take several hundred lives in a bloody battle two weeks later to get back to the east bank, and the only reason for this was the indecision of Brig. Rikh, and the panicky state of mind of the divisional commander, Major General Niranjan Prasad.




Good of you to mention PAF attacks against 54 Brigade ad 15 Dogra. PAF later on attacked 38 Brigade as well, 13 Punjab was routed as a result.

Reasons that IA was not able to consolidate 3 Jat success...
Repeated PAF strikes on follow-up echelons
Lack of foresight on the part of IA commanders
Absence of determined leadership at IA Brigade upwards
....in effect, it was a cheap victory which was thrown away


Just a side note....
There was a real worry on Indian side after the move of 2 IABG from Lahore front to Khem Karan on 13 Sep
XI Corps Commander, being a Sikh himself, somehow was haunted by Pak thrust towards Amritsar...therefore he constituted BHARAT FORCE, which was composed of RAJA TAL force and minor units of 2 IABG, its task being to save Amritsar while being prepared to support 15 Division...interesting point to note is that there was NO armr reserve with GOC 15 Division or Commander Bharat Force.

@Joe Shearer
50 Para Brigade attack...

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> @PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer , Gentlemen could you kindly include a bibliography to this thread for us to read? It would be highly appreciated .



I was waiting for @PanzerKiel to do that, since I lost all my books. However, I shall include a bibliography after finishing writing, when all the elements become clear (unless you want to start reading right away, in which case, please say so).

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I was waiting for @PanzerKiel to do that, since I lost all my books. However, I shall include a bibliography after finishing writing, when all the elements become clear (unless you want to start reading right away, in which case, please say so).


...would be a bit difficult for me to write that much names......

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> From a military point of view, the broad front front plan of XI was a necessity as well as beneficial....
> ...there are three approaches from Indian side towards lahore ---Amritsar-Lahore (shortest), Harike-Khalra-Barki and via Kasur....



XI Corps faced a major battle at each of these entrances, its 15 Division at Dograi on the Amritsar-Lahore approach, its 7 Division at Barki and its 4 Mountain Division at Kasur - Khem Karan - Asal Uttar.



> XI Corps attack along these approaches, with a Division each, had the advantage of a converging attack (since all these approaches converge on Lahore)....which would make it difficult for PA 10 and 11 Division to hold....converging attack also meant that the more XI Corps advanced, the problem of inter Divisions (7, 15, 4 MD) support in terms of shifting of schwerpunkt would get easier...
> ....However, conversely, from PA view, the more XI attack came inside Pakistan, the more compact PA defences would become...its just like you may have a 100 men against 1, but due to geo constraints you have to pass through a defile or a single door, as a result, that 1 man can hold a bigger force for a long period of time....like 300 Spartans.



One of the reasons that Harbaksh gave, and that in retrospect I should have taken on board with much greater respect, was his logic that the Ichhogil Canal was a two-edged sword: that while it was a formidable defence for the Pakistan Army against any attack on Lahore by the Indian Army, if the Indian Army could traverse the land gap between the border and the canal, the canal would become the Indian Army defensive line against the Pakistan Army itself.

This was also a reason for attacking the four bridges - Dera Baba Nanak, Bhaini Dhilwan, Dograi and the minor bridge near Jallo - to stop up any opening for counter-attack; so, too, for the bridge at Barki. The bridges further south, within the area of 4 Mountain Division near Kasur, are not included in these.



> In order to cover the wide gap between 15 and 7 Division, IA deployed an adhoc force name RAJA TAL force.





> XI also took away 96 Brigade under its own direct command in order to protect Amritsar against any PA attempt to take it..



*THE BRIDGE AT BHAINI DHILWAN AND 96 BRIGADE*

96 Brigade keeps popping in and out of the narrative; it may be recalled that 38 Brigade, operating to the north of 54 Brigade under the general command of 15 Infantry Division, had assigned 1 Jat to capture the Bhaini Dhilwan bridge. As has already been mentioned, 1 Jat got to the bridge, but retreated under heavy artillery and tank shelling. This was on the first day itself, on the 6th September.

This, among other things, including the air attacks on 54 Brigade, with heavy casualties to 13 Punjab, and the difficult passage faced by 15 Dogra, that stopped it from leapfrogging 3 Jat and attacking its objective, the bridge at Dograi, altogether, gave the 15 Div commander an impression that further progress was impossible, and he conveyed this to his Corps commander, General Dhillon. On personally inspecting the situation, along with the Army commander, Dhillon found that there had been casualties, but the situation was not out of control. 15 Div was ordered to continue, and 6 Kumaon was detached from 96 Brigade to support 1 Jat in taking the Bhaini Dhilwan bridge. This was attempted on 7th September, but did not succeed. On 8th September, the Pakistan Army counter-attacked, and put pressure on the combined forces of 6 Kumaon and 1 Jat, on the Ranian axis where they had retreated from their firm base established to attack the bridge.

To relieve pressure on 15 Div., 2 Armoured Brigade under Theograj, fresh from its exploits in the Kasur sector, was brought in on 13th September. 96 Brigade was freed up to take on the pressure, and by 14th September, had pushed back against the attacks, and captured the bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan.



> Just a point of trivia....the presence of PA 11 Division was NOT KNOWN to Indian int orgs before the war.....they came to know about it once they came face to face with it



This adds to the failure of Military Intelligence to anticipate trouble for XV Corps, and to spot preparations for Grand Slam against 10 Division of XV Corps.



> Coming specifically to Lahore and PA 10 Division
> 
> Main advantages enjoyed by PA 10 Division were....
> BRB....already running parallel to IB, a ready made defence line.....ideally located at a distance from IB which allow PA to sufficiently attrite IA attack before the battle of BRB starts....
> 1/5 of 10 Division front in the north, almost 9000 yards......IA will have to face twin obstacles in the form of BRB and Ravi both...
> Two approaches from Indian side towards Lahore...IA force to advance wide apart from IB, which allow 10 Division to respond to both thrusts separately without facing the joint power of 2 IA divisions....



As you mentioned in a parallel discussion on US 3 Army under Patton during the Battle of the Bulge, the numbers were approximately the same, but the cohesion among the 3 Corps that Patton handled was severely more effective than the cohesion among the 3 Corps, XV Corps, XI Corps and I Corps, that Indian Army Western Command handled.



> Good of you to mention PAF attacks against 54 Brigade ad 15 Dogra. PAF later on attacked 38 Brigade as well, 13 Punjab was routed as a result.



I wonder if you have Major General Jogindar Singh's book* on the conflict. He was Chief of Staff to Harbaksh Singh, and had rather a high opinion of himself. On this point, of PAF activity, Harbaksh lays the blame squarely on him for the failure of the IAF to give the Army support, stating that without consulting him, Jogindar had consented to the withdrawal of the IAF from Ambala. Harbaksh was unable to get air cover although originally XI Corps had been assigned 24 sorties and air control teams had been attached to Army formations.

Behind The Scene: An Analysis of India's Military Operations 1947-1971 Maj Gen (Retd) JOGINDAR SINGH, VSM (Class I) ISBN: 9781897829202 



> Reasons that IA was not able to consolidate 3 Jat success...
> Repeated PAF strikes on follow-up echelons
> Lack of foresight on the part of IA commanders
> Absence of determined leadership at IA Brigade upwards
> ....in effect, it was a cheap victory which was thrown away



At one point, Col. Hayde was less than 5 kms from Lahore International Airport.



> Just a side note....
> There was a real worry on Indian side after the move of 2 IABG from Lahore front to Khem Karan on 13 Sep
> XI Corps Commander, being a Sikh himself, somehow was haunted by Pak thrust towards Amritsar...therefore he constituted BHARAT FORCE, which was composed of RAJA TAL force and minor units of 2 IABG, its task being to save Amritsar while being prepared to support 15 Division...interesting point to note is that there was NO armr reserve with GOC 15 Division or Commander Bharat Force.



This, as you know, was due to the sudden recent formation of I Corps and posting of Major General Dunn as Corps Commander; originally 1 Armoured Div was the armoured reserve of XI Corps.



> @Joe Shearer
> 50 Para Brigade attack...



Coming to that, as a prelude to the Battle of Dograi.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> I was waiting for @PanzerKiel to do that, since I lost all my books. However, I shall include a bibliography after finishing writing, when all the elements become clear (unless you want to start reading right away, in which case, please say so).


Its okay Joe do it later if you so desire. I read a few already and want to expand my understanding of the matter. I asked for yours and panzerkiels suggestions because I don’t want to waste my time and money on jingoistic accounts which many books are. Please take your time Sir



PanzerKiel said:


> ...would be a bit difficult for me to write that much names......



Still Sir if you could later on put up a list here it would be really appreciated. You don’t have to list everything, just those you think are mostly unbiased and accurate , and also a good read

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Its okay Joe do it later if you so desire. I read a few already and want to expand my understanding of the matter. I asked for yours and panzerkiels suggestions because I don’t want to waste my time and money on jingoistic accounts which many books are. Please take your time Sir



Very briefly, as I nurse a stomach ache and take a brief break from the narrative, may I check if you have read this core list?

Indian Army After Independence - Major K. C. Praval
War Despatches - Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh
Behind the Scene - Maj. Gen. Jogindar Singh
There was also frequent and laudatory mention made by Shuja Nawaz of another book besides his own Crossed Swords.

There is a plethora of excellent books - judging by extracts and by reviews - written by Pakistani authors, and that is the long list that @PanzerKiel is referring to. There may be as many as a dozen in that list, and it is not one to be reproduced in a jiffy.



> Still Sir if you could later on put up a list here it would be really appreciated. You don’t have to list everything, just those you think are mostly unbiased and accurate , and also a good read

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> Very briefly, as I nurse a stomach ache and take a brief break from the narrative, may I check if you have read this core list?
> 
> Indian Army After Independence - Major K. C. Praval
> War Despatches - Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh
> Behind the Scene - Maj. Gen. Jogindar Singh
> There was also frequent and laudatory mention made by Shuja Nawaz of another book besides his own Crossed Swords.
> 
> There is a plethora of excellent books - judging by extracts and by reviews - written by Pakistani authors, and that is the long list that @PanzerKiel is referring to. There may be as many as a dozen in that list, and it is not one to be reproduced in a jiffy.


I read no 1 and 3 no2 is on my kindle and I’ll start as soon as I get to time. On top I read the following, Slender was the thread, History of Pakistan Army (Clloughley) 1965 air war by Pvs jagan, Witness to surrender , India’s wars since Independence by Sukhwant Singh Also From Kutch to Tashkent by Bajwa 
So I have some background now want to sharpen it , something on Siachen and Kargil maybe? I read VP Mallicks book in Kargil long back

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## PanzerKiel

meghdut said:


> I read no 1 and 3 no2 is on my kindle and I’ll start as soon as I get to time. On top I read the following, Slender was the thread, History of Pakistan Army (Clloughley) 1965 air war by Pvs jagan, Witness to surrender , India’s wars since Independence by Sukhwant Singh Also From Kutch to Tashkent by Bajwa
> So I have some background now want to sharpen it , something on Siachen and Kargil maybe? I read VP Mallicks book in Kargil long back



Kargil Conflict by Shireen Mazari

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## meghdut

PanzerKiel said:


> Kargil Conflict by Shireen Mazari


Thank you sir, I also downloaded Crossed Swords as recommended by @Joe Shearer

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> I read no 1 and 3 no2 is on my kindle and I’ll start as soon as I get to time. On top I read the following, Slender was the thread, History of Pakistan Army (Clloughley) 1965 air war by Pvs jagan, Witness to surrender , India’s wars since Independence by Sukhwant Singh Also From Kutch to Tashkent by Bajwa
> So I have some background now want to sharpen it , something on Siachen and Kargil maybe? I read VP Mallicks book in Kargil long back



Excellent!

I am glad that you got PVS Jagan; although he is so closely associated with Bharat Rakshak, I have respect for the homework he did. Perhaps you could add Himalayan Blunder by Dalvi; a lachrymose tale, but a cautionary one. Also one I personally hate, but that has a point of view that we have to take on board: India's China War, by Neville Maxwell.

That leaves Z. A. Khan, who wrote that exceptionally readable book, The Way It Was.

You obviously don't want to know anything about the Navy, or about the original British Indian Army.

As I limp back from a horrid stomach condition, it is good to see that someone has the inclination and interest, and also the money for these books.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> Excellent!
> 
> I am glad that you got PVS Jagan; although he is so closely associated with Bharat Rakshak, I have respect for the homework he did. Perhaps you could add Himalayan Blunder by Dalvi; a lachrymose tale, but a cautionary one. Also one I personally hate, but that has a point of view that we have to take on board: India's China War, by Neville Maxwell.
> 
> That leaves Z. A. Khan, who wrote that exceptionally readable book, The Way It Was.
> 
> You obviously don't want to know anything about the Navy, or about the original British Indian Army.
> 
> As I limp back from a horrid stomach condition, it is good to see that someone has the inclination and interest, and also the money for these books.


Get some rest Joe. And I read Dalvi, Maxwell and Mankekar already. I’m not much interested in Naval warfare. Have Keegans book though still unfinished. Pre Independence does interest me so please do recommend some on that. And oh I’m not rich many are pirated and Cheap Kindle versions . Thank you for your time Sir

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Get some rest Joe. And I read Dalvi, Maxwell and Mankekar already. I’m not much interested in Naval warfare. Have Keegans book though still unfinished. Pre Independence does interest me so please do recommend some on that. And oh I’m not rich many are pirated and Cheap Kindle versions . Thank you for your time Sir



Too much pending; just reached the eve of the Battle of Dograi. The sheer carnage - how does one deal with that? People charging into fixed lines of fire, that kind of thing. First, I have to deal with the curious case of 50 (Para) Brigade, and why Nambiar was sacked.

Then, after Dograi, that has to do with the 15 Division of XI Corps, there is 7 Division at Barki, and 4 Mountain Division at Kasur. ONLY after these very detailed battles can we even approach I Corps and the Pakistan Army's derring do, stopping I Armoured Division in its tracks.

Rest!

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> Too much pending; just reached the eve of the Battle of Dograi. The sheer carnage - how does one deal with that? People charging into fixed lines of fire, that kind of thing. First, I have to deal with the curious case of 50 (Para) Brigade, and why Nambiar was sacked.
> 
> Then, after Dograi, that has to do with the 15 Division of XI Corps, there is 7 Division at Barki, and 4 Mountain Division at Kasur. ONLY after these very detailed battles can we even approach I Corps and the Pakistan Army's derring do, stopping I Armoured Division in its tracks.
> 
> Rest!


 Take an R&R now lol. Go on batting we tailenders will tag along.

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## BL33D

Joe Shearer said:


> PanzerKiel's commentary is stunning. How he remembers the exact order of battle, and who was doing what when, is something that flat out boggles my imagination.
> 
> Your comment about Sheikh Abdullah is something that I have read about before, but someone somewhere has to document it for verifiability. Just as, to give you an example, Jairam Ramesh' book on Krishna Menon, A Chequered Brilliance, throws extremely valuable light on the extent of damage that he did to the Indian military. I wish someone would confirm this, as it makes perfect sense.
> 
> Sheikh Sahib would not have wanted to get entangled in West Jammu/Azad Kashmir politics; they had just recently rebelled against his leadership and his policies and revived the erstwhile Muslim Conference, that he had re-named to the National Conference. Neither would he have wanted to get to have to deal with Gilgit, knowing as little as he or any other Jammu and Kashmir politician knew about this remote location under British direct rule.


Glad you brought up The Chequered Brilliance. Shekhar Gupta sheds some light for the readers here, if you dont have the time to go through the book. A brilliant man but a disaster of a Defence Minister who contributed immensely to the most humiliating defeat of Independent India. Me and @Nilgiri had some chat about it. Hope he shares his thoughts when he is back.

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## TsAr

PanzerKiel said:


> Kargil Conflict by Shireen Mazari


slight correction it is by Nasim Zehra

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## PanzerKiel

TsAr said:


> slight correction it is by Nasim Zehra



Oh sorry..... Shireen Mazari is the other one referred.

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## meghdut

PanzerKiel said:


> Oh sorry..... Shireen Mazari is the other one referred.


Never mind dear Sir @PanzerKiel . Downloaded already. Thanks again. And please whenever if you feel like post links or book suggestions by authors you think are good reading.

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## Joe Shearer

@T-123456 

This is the other thread. I hope you like this, too.

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## Joe Shearer

*THE LEAD-UP TO THE BATTLE OF DOGRAI*

We had got to the point where 3 Jat had had to fall back to its Brigade HQ under orders from a Brigade Commander who saw that his own Division commander apparently had no confidence in the outcome of the battle. One of the outcomes of the repeated failures of Major General Niranjan Prasad in positions of command, of 4 Div in NEFA, of 25 Division in Kashmir, and finally, twice, separately, of 15 Division at Dograi, was his replacement with Major General Mohinder Singh, a far more active and forward-looking commander; also, Brigadier Rikh, who had proved so susceptible to the influence of his commanding officer’s moods and fancies, was evacuated due to injury, and replaced by Brigadier Niranjan Singh.

Some preparatory moves followed, serving as a prelude to the blood-soaked Battle of Dograi.

15 Division had been reinforced by 50 (Para) Brigade, as 38 and 54 Brigade had already taken a pounding in the first 6 days of the campaign from 6th September to 14th September.

Just to remind ourselves of the actions in that earlier period, Niranjan Prasad barely survived his panic attacks on the 6th and his recall of 3 Jat after they had managed a toehold for themselves in Batapore and Attoke Awan. He also survived a major battle for professional survival, that being his interview with his irate Corps commander and Army commander, with their instructions to 38 Brigade in his presence to press on and capture their target of the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. By this time, 1 Jat having suffered casualties and fallen back, 6 Kumaon from the Corps reserve, 96 Brigade, was asked to step in. They moved forward at dusk, but got stuck on the way. In trying to reach them physically, wireless communications having failed, Niranjan Prasad was ambushed, and, although he escaped personally, 12 men of his party and 4 jeeps were captured by the Pakistani forces.

After this huge propaganda success, and with a continued failure to meet his objectives weighing on the minds of his senior officers, Niranjan Prasad had been relieved on the 7th September itself, by Mohinder Singh.

The military situation reflected the gloomy command situation.

On the night of the 7th September, both brigades attacked objectives on the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal, and 96 Brigade continued to try for success capturing the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. None of these attacks succeeded. The next day, the 8th, the PA had strengthened its defences. It launched an armoured attack against the front-running Indian troops, and by the second day after that, by the 10th September, 15 Dogra’s position at Dial was overrun.

On the 9th September, the 50 Independent (Para) Brigade had come into the theatre, and helped to relieve the beleaguered Indian forces. The pressure continued; a little further south, 6 Kumaon and 1 Jat had left their positions and moved back on the evening of 8th September, on their failure to capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. This was a blessing in disguise; the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, fresh from its outstanding achievements at Asal Uttar, was wheeled in on the 11th September, stiffened the opposition and stopped the Pakistani advance, and allowed 96 Brigade, with morale uplifted, to attack and finally capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge by the evening of the 14th September.

Further reinforcements arrived on the 11th, when the 41 Mountain Brigade that had been swept aside by Pakistani armour in Chhamb, and had fallen back behind 28 Brigade, was re-assigned to this sector. It must be presumed that they had recovered from the bad scare it had got, going up against armour with no anti-tank weaponry, and had been equipped for battle on the open plains. So before the battle commenced, 50 Independent (Para) Brigade (on the 9th), 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (on the 12th) and 41 Mountain Brigade (on the 14th) had joined 15 Division. This was in addition to 38, 54 and 96 Brigade.

*THE TROUBLES OF THE PARA BRIGADE*

With this background, that takes us up to the end of day on the 14th September, we find Major General Mohinder Singh, determined to undo the errors of his predecessor, ordering the 50 (Para) Brigade to capture a stretch of the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal up to a rail bridge, reported destroyed, but fate uncertain, and to destroy another small bridge over the canal on a road between Dograi and Jallo. All this was to be done by 16th September. That date didn’t work; the Pakistan Army was discovered to be in greater strength than thought, and the attack was delayed by a day. 2 Para, a constituent battalion of the brigade, did capture the road bridge, but suffered horrible casualties, about 60 jawans; the bridge, incidentally,had already been blown up. So 60 soldiers died because there had been no possibility of aerial reconnaissance.

Brigadier Nambiar was removed from command. The new, dynamic division commander was determined to make a difference, and took Nambiar’s decision to dig in some distance away from the actual canal, to avoid fire from the west bank fortifications of the Pakistan Army. This was not taken well, and he lost his job.

Meanwhile, Nambiar’s worst apprehensions were realised because the Pakistani defenders, operating out of a village between the Para’s position and the canal, kept attacking the Indian troops, who suffered heavily from these attacks and from shelling and attacks by combined groups of armour and infantry. The PAF made its presence felt and caused, along with the others, heavy casualties to the Brigade. * 
*
The only silver lining to this very dark cloud was the Paras clearing of the village, Jhuggian Mohammed Baksh, on the night of 21/22nd September

As it happened, the Para Brigade’s movements were part of a larger movement, that turned into a full-scale battle, the Battle of Dograi.

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## Joe Shearer

*THE BATTLE OF DOGRAE KALAN*

I have been dreading writing about this battle; the carnage reminds one of the worst phases of the trench warfare of the First World War.

15 Division had decided that its three brigades (96 now being attached to it for all practical purposes), 38, 54 and 96 should advance simultaneously against three different and widely separated objectives; that was the prevailing style of this conflict, just to remind @PanzerKiel of the discussion about the concentration of 3 Army Corps in different hands, in the hands of Patton, and in the hands of Western Command. It was nothing to do with the ability of the individual commanders, as it happens; the topography and the line-up of the opposed troops was completely different.

So 96 Brigade that had last been attacking Bhaini-Dhilwan was to go for that objective once again; surprise was presumably not a consideration. 54 was to capture (re-capture) Dograe Kalan; 38 was to move forward to the line of the Ichhogil Canal. It is not surprising that an aroused and very hostile opponent ensured that both 96 Brigade and 38 Brigade failed; 54 Brigade succeeded, but at a heavy cost.

The plan for 54 Brigade was that of its three battalions, 13 Punjab (last met trying to get to the Dograe Kalan- Jallo Bridge on the 6th September, and suffering heavy casualties to the PAF ground attacks) would go down the GT Road and clear up the Pakistani concentration under cover of artillery fire; 15 Dogra, that had been holding the front line near Dial, would withdraw to remain in reserve; 3 Jat would swing out across the fields to the north of Dograe Kalan (once again) and take the village.

13 Punjab faced the Pakistan Army’s 8 Punjab, 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch. The irony is all-permeating. The 13 Punjab advanced under artillery cover, but came to a standstill soon after, due to very heavy artillery shelling. They got Indian artillery, the integral artillery of the division, to open fire again. Under cover of this massive exchange of artillery fire, 3 Jat quietly moved off-road and across the fields for their 5 kms. (!) approach march. Lt. Col. Hayde, whom we have met before crossing back and forth over the Ichhogil Canal to Attoke Awan and back, twice, had divided his attacking force to attack in company strength different sectors assigned to them. When the leading company on the outermost edge got close to the Canal, the Pakistani defenders opened fire.

I will not describe the battle in great detail. Reading accounts of the troops charging into machine gun fire was extremely trying. Here is one excerpt from Desmond Hayde:

“Suddenly, all hell broke loose from the East bank [of the Ichhogil Canal]. Tracers completely lit up the air and you could hear the angry buzzing of lethal lead, machine-gun fire appeared to be coming from every boot of the bank...with astounding courage, the forward platoons turned en masse and charged into this mass of fire....the casualties to the men were appalling; some went down in the minefields and others fell to machine gun fire, but through dogged determination the gap was closed and a terrific hand-to-hand fight....ensued.”

The battalion lost 80 men here alone. In the CO’s party of eight, only three men were left standing.

On the other side of the village, 13 Punjab was still fighting it out on the GT Road. At 06:15 HRS on the 22nd September, Hayde then opened fire with a medium machine gun and a recoilless rifle from the rear of the Pakistani ranks (his occupation of Dograe Kalan having outflanked the Pakistani position at Milestone 13) and that unexpected fire succeeded in dislodging the defenders.

The fighting did not stop. Around 07:30 HRS, Pakistani armour opened fire from the north, and were fought off with recoilless rifles. Until the ceasefire, however, Pakistani artillery did not let up.

Hayde now asked for reinforcements, and two companies of 15 Dogra joined him on the 22nd afternoon. This reinforcement helped 3 Jat to see off two separate attacks.

The casualties on both sides were horrific.

After the ceasefire, the Pakistanis collected their dead; 247 of them were counted in the 3 Jat area. The Jats lost an equal number, 216, of whom 10 were officers and 5 were JCOs. These 463 soldiers lost their lives solely because of a confused and timid Indian Major General.

This brings us to the end of the narration of events involving 15 Infantry Division.

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## PanzerKiel

Some additions...

7 Sep...GOC 10 Div decided to counter attack with the reserve brigade, 22 Brigade, east of BRB to cut GT Road between Dograi and Dial....Risks involved in this attack...a weakened 22 Brigade since it had already detached some forces to reinforce main defences and moreover, no rehearsal had been carried out for counter attack on the eastern side of BRB.....
However, GOC reasoned if he delays his counter attack, IA will be able to reinforce and attack with fresh vigor, a fresh attack with fresh troops will have a greater potential to breakthrough.

Hence 22 brigade counter attack was launched...in North-South direction, along the eastern bank of BRB...complete surprise was achieved since it was an entirely unexpected direction of attack..GT Road was therefore cut at Milestone 13.


A word about 50 Para Brigade attack...

Commander 50 Para Brigade, being originally part of Army reserves, was not happy on being placed under command an infantry division. He therefore displayed a mostly casual behavior and kept asking for written orders from Army HQ.

His 17 Sep attack went in with only ONE battalion, 2 Para, which went to ground short of its objective and reported completion.

His 18 Sep attack was again pulled back by the Brigade Commander himself....overall it displayed sluggish and ineffective leadership at brigade and unit level.


Overall, Indians were getting desperate in order to show some gains since ceasefire was being talked about... therefore simultaneous attacks were planned for 21/22 Sep by 15 Infantry and 4 Mountain Divisions...out of which 54 Brigade managed to re-capture Dograi, 50 Para Brigade got partial success while attacks of 38 and 96 Brigades were a failure.


A word about the second battle of Dograi....

Weakness in PA defence of Dograi can be attributed to...
-continuous engagement of defences by IA tanks and artillery in the days prior to attack
-Multiple IAF sorties
-Continuous casualties in the defending unit with no fresh troops
-Overall, gradual attrition of manpower and equipment

Dograi could have been held....however on 21 Sep, B Squadron ex 23 Cavalry which was covering the northern flank of Dograi defences, withdrew under local orders to the west bank of BRB......this withdrawal was not known to 16 Punjab (Dograi) nor to the Brigade HQ.

3 Jat attack from the northern flank of Dograi, therefore, which should have been met by the firepower of the armor squadron, managed to exploit the gap left by our armor and reached the rear of Dograi defences, behind 16 Punjab.

16 Punjab was therefore caught between the cauldron of 54 Brigade and 3 Jat, on being ordered to withdraw towards BRB, it was decimated.

10 Division managed to mount a counter attack swiftly in broad daylight to re-take Dograi which was heavily repulsed.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Some additions...
> 
> 7 Sep...GOC 10 Div decided to counter attack with the reserve brigade, 22 Brigade, east of BRB to cut GT Road between Dograi and Dial....Risks involved in this attack...a weakened 22 Brigade since it had already detached some forces to reinforce main defences and moreover, no rehearsal had been carried out for counter attack on the eastern side of BRB.....
> However, GOC reasoned if he delays his counter attack, IA will be able to reinforce and attack with fresh vigor, a fresh attack with fresh troops will have a greater potential to breakthrough.
> 
> Hence 22 brigade counter attack was launched...in North-South direction, along the eastern bank of BRB...complete surprise was achieved since it was an entirely unexpected direction of attack..GT Road was therefore cut at Milestone 13.



I really need a reference for the Pakistani side of the narrative. This makes so much clear. Milestone 13 being a target for the attack by 15 Div on the 21st/22nd, for instance.



> A word about 50 Para Brigade attack...
> 
> Commander 50 Para Brigade, being originally part of Army reserves, was not happy on being placed under command an infantry division. He therefore displayed a mostly casual behavior and kept asking for written orders from Army HQ.
> 
> His 17 Sep attack went in with only ONE battalion, 2 Para, which went to ground short of its objective and reported completion.



It is strange and painful to read this. Whatever his differences, he must have known that pushing out an attacking force with insufficient strength would cause heavy casualties. His desire to withdraw, in this context, doesn't seem to be rooted in concern for his men, but rather in a work-to-rule attitude. And his men paid the price.



> His 18 Sep attack was again pulled back by the Brigade Commander himself....overall it displayed sluggish and ineffective leadership at brigade and unit level.



This must have been an especially sensitive point, considering that several brigades under 15 Div had been led with such indifference.



> Overall, Indians were getting desperate in order to show some gains since ceasefire was being talked about... therefore simultaneous attacks were planned for 21/22 Sep by 15 Infantry and 4 Mountain Divisions...out of which 54 Brigade managed to re-capture Dograi, 50 Para Brigade got partial success while attacks of 38 and 96 Brigades were a failure.



A word about the second battle of Dograi....



> Weakness in PA defence of Dograi can be attributed to...
> -continuous engagement of defences by IA tanks and artillery in the days prior to attack
> -Multiple IAF sorties
> -Continuous casualties in the defending unit with no fresh troops
> -Overall, gradual attrition of manpower and equipment



The support from the IAF is not mentioned at all in Praval, for instance; air force oriented narratives seldom give details of sorties made for ground support.



> Dograi could have been held....however on 21 Sep, B Squadron ex 23 Cavalry which was covering the northern flank of Dograi defences, withdrew under local orders to the west bank of BRB......this withdrawal was not known to 16 Punjab (Dograi) nor to the Brigade HQ.



Presumably the orders were from the regiment commander.



> 3 Jat attack from the northern flank of Dograi, therefore, which should have been met by the firepower of the armor squadron, managed to exploit the gap left by our armor and reached the rear of Dograi defences, behind 16 Punjab.
> 
> 16 Punjab was therefore caught between the cauldron of 54 Brigade and 3 Jat, on being ordered to withdraw towards BRB, it was decimated.



This makes terrible reading. Most of the 267 casualties must have been 16 Punjab, then.



> 10 Division managed to mount a counter attack swiftly in broad daylight to re-take Dograi which was heavily repulsed.



Your added perspective makes this another very messy battle, and makes clear much of the very heavy casualty rate on both sides.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I really need a reference for the Pakistani side of the narrative. This makes so much clear. Milestone 13 being a target for the attack by 15 Div on the 21st/22nd, for instance.



For a start, Gen Mahmood's 1965 War book is a good one. Z A Khan's book as well.



Joe Shearer said:


> It is strange and painful to read this. Whatever his differences, he must have known that pushing out an attacking force with insufficient strength would cause heavy casualties. His desire to withdraw, in this context, doesn't seem to be rooted in concern for his men, but rather in a work-to-rule attitude. And his men paid the price.



A full brigade sized attack would have broken through easily.



Joe Shearer said:


> Presumably the orders were from the regiment commander.


 Yes.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> For a start, Gen Mahmood's 1965 War book is a good one. Z A Khan's book as well.
> 
> 
> 
> A full brigade sized attack would have broken through easily.
> 
> 
> Yes.



I cannot tell you what a difference in perspective your commentary brings. It is invaluable.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> This makes terrible reading. Most of the 267 casualties must have been 16 Punjab, then.
> 
> 
> 
> Your added perspective makes this another very messy battle, and makes clear much of the very heavy casualty rate on both sides.



Casualties were a mix from 16 Punjab and the counter attack by 10 Division.



Joe Shearer said:


> I cannot tell you what a difference in perspective your commentary brings. It is invaluable.



I'm a big believer of Rashomon effect.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Casualties were a mix from 16 Punjab and the counter attack by 10 Division.



While I was reading up for my narration right through my illness, the visions conjured up were very disturbing. This was a difficult encounter to write about. There was a Joseph Conrad book, "The Heart of Darkness", that came to mind repeatedly (it was re-made into a film,"Apocalypse Now").



PanzerKiel said:


> Casualties were a mix from 16 Punjab and the counter attack by 10 Division.
> 
> 
> 
> I'm a big believer of Rashomon effect.



Most apt!

My reference to Apocalypse Now was accidental, without having read your comment. Strange coincidence.

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## Joe Shearer

@PanzerKiel @jaibi
@Cuirassier @Hachiman @jbgt90 @meghdut @Mumm-Ra 

*ABOUT 15 INFANTRY DIVISION*

With this in front of us, what do we observe about units of the Indian Army, in common?

1. At that time, the Indian Army was strongly oriented to the Infantry. From the march of 5 kms over open fields by 3 Jat to get to their objectives, to using mountain troops to fight on the plains, without any serious anti-tank weapons to talk of, against an adversary with the latest, best tanks, this characteristic comes out very clearly.

2. The corollary is that given armoured support, these infantry formations did well. Examples: the support given by 14 Cavalry to 3 Jat to fend off the Shermans driving the Jats crazy in their bridgehead at Attoke Awan; the support given by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade to 96 Brigade, helping that brigade to capture the bridge at Bhaini-Dhilwan.

3. The PAF was very active, and troubled the 13 Punjab during their march to their jumping off point; actually rendering it ineffective as a fighting force for a little while; it troubled other IA units considerably during the conflict, most notoriously 50 Independent (Para) Brigade.

4. The IAF was absent during the early stages of this engagement. General Harbaksh Singh traces it back to his Chief of Staff, Major General Jogindar Singh, who apparently allowed the IAF to retire to remote locations without informing the GOC-in-C. That made nonsense of the prior arrangement of 24 sorties in support of the division. However, it is reported that they were very effective later.

5. Since the IA had war-gamed these situations, as stated by Jogindar Singh, it is odd that we find units arriving at the battlefield from very remote locations, as far as Ambala, and immediately being deployed, sometimes with vital pieces of equipment missing. 3 Jat went into action without its wireless set and lost contact with its Brigade HQ at a vital time, and thanks to the lack of communications between forward-deployed units and its brigade headquarters, nearly 500 troops died.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> @PanzerKiel @jaibi
> @Cuirassier @Hachiman @jbgt90 @meghdut @Mumm-Ra
> 
> *ABOUT 15 INFANTRY DIVISION*
> 
> With this in front of us, what do we observe about units of the Indian Army, in common?
> 
> 1. At that time, the Indian Army was strongly oriented to the Infantry. From the march of 5 kms over open fields by 3 Jat to get to their objectives, to using mountain troops to fight on the plains, without any serious anti-tank weapons to talk of, against an adversary with the latest, best tanks, this characteristic comes out very clearly.



Joe, from Haydes’ account it’s really disheartening to see that Jats had to make do with mere Super Bazookas to deal with armour. Bazookas were unreliable even during WW2 to use them after 20 years against far more advanced Tanks was suicide. It’s also shocking to see that an Inf Battalion only had 6 RCLs per unit. That they could achieve that much speaks volumes of their performance.


> 2. The corollary is that given armoured support, these infantry formations did well. Examples: the support given by 14 Cavalry to 3 Jat to fend off the Shermans driving the Jats crazy in their bridgehead at Attoke Awan; the support given by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade to 96 Brigade, helping that brigade to capture the bridge at Bhaini-Dhilwan.


Given their lack of anti armour capabilities Tank support would be a must for a successful operation I believe.
3. The PAF was very active, and troubled the 13 Punjab during their march to their jumping off point; actually rendering it ineffective as a fighting force for a little while; it troubled other IA units considerably during the conflict, most notoriously 50 Independent (Para) Brigade.
The way PAF performed suppressing IAFs combat operations and simultaneously providing effective CAS speaks volumes of their professionalism especially given their small size
4. The IAF was absent during the early stages of this engagement. General Harbaksh Singh traces it back to his Chief of Staff, Major General Jogindar Singh, who apparently allowed the IAF to retire to remote locations without informing the GOC-in-C. That made nonsense of the prior arrangement of 24 sorties in support of the division. However, it is reported that they were very effective later.

5. Since the IA had war-gamed these situations, as stated by Jogindar Singh, it is odd that we find units arriving at the battlefield from very remote locations, as far as Ambala, and immediately being deployed, sometimes with vital pieces of equipment missing. 3 Jat went into action without its wireless set and lost contact with its Brigade HQ at a vital time, and thanks to the lack of communications between forward-deployed units and its brigade headquarters, nearly 500 troops died.[/QUOTE]
Some bugger stole my Behind the Scenes book. Or else I would have looked it up again in context to this thread. Neve lend a book to anyone.

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Some bugger stole my Behind the Scenes book. Or else I would have looked it up again in context to this thread. Neve lend a book to anyone.



@jbgt90 is back in town, and declared free of the virus. So now I have no problem of resources.

Sorry to hear of your loss. Incidentally, I noticed that Jogindar preferred a slightly 'different' variation of the phrase for his book title; he calls it Behind the Scene. As far as he is concerned, nothing moved; it was a static picture.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> @jbgt90 is back in town, and declared free of the virus. So now I have no problem of resources.
> 
> Sorry to hear of your loss. Incidentally, I noticed that Jogindar preferred a slightly 'different' variation of the phrase for his book title; he calls it Behind the Scene. As far as he is concerned, nothing moved; it was a static picture.


I read it a very long time back so don’t recall it much, except his tirades against Harbaksh Singh. I am presently reading War Dispatches, and plan to re read KC Praval.

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> I read it a very long time back so don’t recall it much, except his tirades against Harbaksh Singh. I am presently reading War Dispatches, and plan to re read KC Praval.



I just got Pradhan's write-up of Chavan's war diary, and read it yesterday in between sleeping jags. Not meaty enough, although it was nice to get a glimpse into the personalities involved, and read about the political backdrop in India.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> I just got Pradhan's write-up of Chavan's war diary, and read it yesterday in between sleeping jags. Not meaty enough, although it was nice to get a glimpse into the personalities involved, and read about the political backdrop in India.


Name of the book?


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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> I read it a very long time back so don’t recall it much, except his tirades against Harbaksh Singh. I am presently reading War Dispatches, and plan to re read KC Praval.



When you read Praval, you will have problems with two several things. 

In 15 Div operations, for instance, he suddenly launches 29 Brigade at the bridge at Dera Baba Nanak, without saying where it is from. He doesn't say anything about 96 Brigade, and I had to learn from PanzerKiel about its status as reserve. Integral armour is hardly ever mentioned except to say that 14 Horse turned up and fired at the Pakistani Shermans to the north of Attoke Awan. 

Then he gets delicate when talking about the performance of units. 41 Mtn Brigade couldn't hold out against the Pakistani armoured attack; not surprising, but it is made to look as if the Brigade vanished from under the noses of the PA tanks like puffs of smoke, only to re-materialise on the other side of 29 Brigade at Akhnoor. He doesn't mention the debacle when 161 Artillery Regiment abandoned its guns, and that Major General Oberoi was sacked for failing to recover them. He doesn't mention that 2 Battalion COs had been removed from command, from those whose battalions were in action at Chhamb.

Then there is Harbaksh Singh's very sour remark about Niranjan Prasad having been a failure with 4 Division in NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh). In the same passage, he mentions another failure while commanding 25 Division. When was that? Was it possibly during that almost open mutiny when 25 Division was sought to be launched against Haji Pir Pass, but the Division commander took the permission of Katoch, the XV Corps commander, not to pursue the objective. It took strong threats of disciplinary action to get the COs moving. Was this Niranjan Prasad in charge of 25 Div, and was this the poor stint that he was alleged to have made before coming to 15 Infantry Division? 

You will have difficulties in reading the maps. For the time and in that age when his book was written, his maps are naturally handwritten, but not very readable.

He remains, however, a very valuable and comprehensive contributor. I am sure you will enjoy reading the book.



meghdut said:


> Name of the book?



1965 War: The Inside Story
Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War
by
R. D. Pradhan

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## Armchair

Some maps would do this thread a lot of good.

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## Joe Shearer

Armchair said:


> Some maps would do this thread a lot of good.



That is true, but how is that to be done? I have been retracing the situation topographically on Google Maps, but there is the issue of putting the formations in, in symbolic form, and showing their movement over the hours. There is also the question of reconciling the names used in narratives dating from that time to what appears on the maps today. Dograi is shown well to the south of where the battle took place, and the site of the battlefield is shown as Dograe Kalan. There are differences in almost every particular.

@Nilgiri had done the maps during the ORBAT exercise, but it is not clear how much he will agree to spend time and effort on this, considering his increase work-load.

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## Armchair

Joe Shearer said:


> That is true, but how is that to be done? I have been retracing the situation topographically on Google Maps, but there is the issue of putting the formations in, in symbolic form, and showing their movement over the hours. There is also the question of reconciling the names used in narratives dating from that time to what appears on the maps today. Dograi is shown well to the south of where the battle took place, and the site of the battlefield is shown as Dograe Kalan. There are differences in almost every particular.
> 
> @Nilgiri had done the maps during the ORBAT exercise, but it is not clear how much he will agree to spend time and effort on this, considering his increase work-load.



Perhaps someone like Nilgiri or someone similar can work with you and you can help him with the locations, vectors and so forth. Symbology is a pain for me to put in maps, in the end I just chose to put non-standard indicators.

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## Joe Shearer

Armchair said:


> Perhaps someone like Nilgiri or someone similar can work with you and you can help him with the locations, vectors and so forth. Symbology is a pain for me to put in maps, in the end I just chose to put non-standard indicators.



As I said, it depends entirely on his willingness. He is less and less active on the forum, although he initiated this thread at our joint request.

I was not hinting that you should do it, merely explaining the situation.

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## Joe Shearer

@Nilgiri

You may not like this, but please read the three posts above. Thank you.

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## Cuirassier

16 Punjab suffered 106 fatalities during the war - highest among all Punjab Regiment battalions. 

1 Baloch led the counterattack and suffered 30+ dead.

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## Joe Shearer

Cuirassier said:


> 16 Punjab suffered 106 fatalities during the war - highest among all Punjab Regiment battalions.
> 
> 1 Baloch led the counterattack and suffered 30+ dead.



I did not put the usual thank you notation because it seems obscene to put in a thank you next to these statistics of the dead. 

RIP.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> *ABOUT 15 INFANTRY DIVISION*
> 
> With this in front of us, what do we observe about units of the Indian Army, in common?
> 
> 1. At that time, the Indian Army was strongly oriented to the Infantry. From the march of 5 kms over open fields by 3 Jat to get to their objectives, to using mountain troops to fight on the plains, without any serious anti-tank weapons to talk of, against an adversary with the latest, best tanks, this characteristic comes out very clearly.
> 
> 2. The corollary is that given armoured support, these infantry formations did well. Examples: the support given by 14 Cavalry to 3 Jat to fend off the Shermans driving the Jats crazy in their bridgehead at Attoke Awan; the support given by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade to 96 Brigade, helping that brigade to capture the bridge at Bhaini-Dhilwan.
> 
> 3. The PAF was very active, and troubled the 13 Punjab during their march to their jumping off point; actually rendering it ineffective as a fighting force for a little while; it troubled other IA units considerably during the conflict, most notoriously 50 Independent (Para) Brigade.
> 
> 4. The IAF was absent during the early stages of this engagement. General Harbaksh Singh traces it back to his Chief of Staff, Major General Jogindar Singh, who apparently allowed the IAF to retire to remote locations without informing the GOC-in-C. That made nonsense of the prior arrangement of 24 sorties in support of the division. However, it is reported that they were very effective later.
> 
> 5. Since the IA had war-gamed these situations, as stated by Jogindar Singh, it is odd that we find units arriving at the battlefield from very remote locations, as far as Ambala, and immediately being deployed, sometimes with vital pieces of equipment missing. 3 Jat went into action without its wireless set and lost contact with its Brigade HQ at a vital time, and thanks to the lack of communications between forward-deployed units and its brigade headquarters, nearly 500 troops died.



I believe there is a logical explanation for almost everything....




Joe Shearer said:


> 1. At that time, the Indian Army was strongly oriented to the Infantry. From the march of 5 kms over open fields by 3 Jat to get to their objectives, to using mountain troops to fight on the plains, without any serious anti-tank weapons to talk of, against an adversary with the latest, best tanks, this characteristic comes out very clearly.



1965 war caught the IA in the midst of its post 1962 re-org and expansion. Since IA was still raising new formations, especially mountain divisions, therefore some mountains division did have the dual role....NEFA as well as Pakistan...... which is followed even as we speak. Rest of course the organization and training of mountain divisions is not suited for anything other than mountains.....they were used despite these disadvantages.



Joe Shearer said:


> 2. The corollary is that given armoured support, these infantry formations did well. Examples: the support given by 14 Cavalry to 3 Jat to fend off the Shermans driving the Jats crazy in their bridgehead at Attoke Awan; the support given by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade to 96 Brigade, helping that brigade to capture the bridge at Bhaini-Dhilwan.



Firepower.....doctrines of that time, of both sides, emphasized use of firepower instead of mobility of tanks. Presence of artillery and tanks always proved to be a booster for infantry except in some rare instances when infantry managed well without them.....



Joe Shearer said:


> 3. The PAF was very active, and troubled the 13 Punjab during their march to their jumping off point; actually rendering it ineffective as a fighting force for a little while; it troubled other IA units considerably during the conflict, most notoriously 50 Independent (Para) Brigade.



IA columns on roads presented good enough targets for PAF. 

Something which normally everyone misses are the effects of PA SSG ops against IAF airfields in 1965 (like readers miss the great effects of Gibralter, term it a failure and move on). A number of IA formations were employed to hunt for PA SSG paratroopers, their clogged vehicles on roads were also found by PAF and heavy casualties were inflicted.

Even till now, both PA and IA are not properly trained to conduct ops of all types in the face of heavy air attacks....hence we have seen that normally in our region, air power tips the balance. In my opinion, it should not be the case. Highly trained troops can adopt lot many measures to negate the effect of enemy air superiority. China (1950) and North Vietnam (60s/70s) are some major examples.



Joe Shearer said:


> 5. Since the IA had war-gamed these situations, as stated by Jogindar Singh, it is odd that we find units arriving at the battlefield from very remote locations, as far as Ambala, and immediately being deployed, sometimes with vital pieces of equipment missing. 3 Jat went into action without its wireless set and lost contact with its Brigade HQ at a vital time, and thanks to the lack of communications between forward-deployed units and its brigade headquarters, nearly 500 troops died.



Such things are part of normal drills and procedures. However, as mentioned before as well, IA was under great pressure to open the front quickly on international border due to the bad situation in Akhnur. Therefore, many IA formations attacked from the line of march, without stopping, without coordinating basic things with their supporting units, without recce.....

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## Armchair

Joe Shearer said:


> @Nilgiri
> 
> You may not like this, but please read the three posts above. Thank you.



He can't respond, he is banned. Perhaps someone else from the Indian camp...

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## Joe Shearer

Armchair said:


> He can't respond, he is banned. Perhaps someone else from the Indian camp...



Doesn't have to be; this is intended to be a bi-partisan account. After finishing the whole narrative, and receiving PanzerKiel's comments, it is hoped to make this a 'neutral', bi-partisan narrative; both sides' points of view should be reflected.

More than ten years ago, there was a similar exercise done on 1962 with my friend @chauism. It went very well, because we trusted each other, and it turned out to be entirely irrelevant which of the amendments was by the Chinese partner, and which by the Indian partner. It was liked by all, even by the hard-core Indian partisans, who were very active even in that day and age, this being before the surgical strike by @waz. 

It can be done.

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## Joe Shearer

*7TH DIVISION AND THE BATTLE OF BARKI*

Having considered the entire history of the 15 Division, it is time to consider the efforts of 7 Division, deployed immediately to the south of 15 Division, in the centre of the broad attack by XI Corps on the Pakistani line of defence on the locus of the Ichhogil Canal.

A reminder: the broad plan of action for XI Corps was to attack through its constituent divisions, 15 Division, 7 Division and 4 Division, towards the bridges and crossings over the Ichhogil Canal. 7 Division was given the task of attacking the crossing over the Canal at the village of Barki, in a south-east to north-west direction, on the road to Lahore; this was the task of 48 Brigade, while 65 Brigade was to capture the crossing at Bedian, to secure the left flank of the 48 Brigade attack from counter-attack by the PA.

It is sad to see that this part of the offensive got bogged down fairly early, was forced back onto the front foot by firm pressure from divisional command, lost soldiers in frontal attacks, and finally ended in the Battle of Barki. This battle had a tragic aftermath, and that will come into the narrative when looking at the actions of 4 Mountain Division.

*PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS*

Before the attack commenced on 6th September, 7 Division was arranged on a north-east to south-west axis, almost 90o to the line of advance planned; so, Divisional HQ was at Narla (north-west of Bhikhiwind), 48 Brigade was further forward on the road to Lahore, and 65 Brigade was further on that NE-SW line, south of the Lahore Road, in the Marimegha area. The plan was for 17 Rajput to detach itself from the 65 Brigade concentration point, and secure the Bedian bridge by 18:00 HRS that evening (6th September evening). In front of 65 Brigade, 48 Brigade would advance along the road, supported by Central India Horse and artillery, and take Barki, by the same time, 18:00 HRS that evening.

Like 15 Division, 7 Division also achieved early successes. Before dawn, the border outposts were cleared. By 05:30 HRS, the Brigade (48 Brigade) advanced down the road; in front was 6/8 Gorkhas, backed up by 19 Maratha LI and 5 Guards. When they came close to an intermediate water bearing body called the Hudiara Drain, the opposition opened fire. The Gorkhas were pinned down, but recovered, and cleared the village Hudiara, lying north of the Lahore Road, by 10:30, and landed up facing very strong enemy positions across the Drain and on the Drain (meaning, to its east), so they dug in South of the village.

Across the Road was the village of Nurpur; 5 Guards was asked to clear that, cross was promptly foiled by the PA sensing the intentions of 5 Guards moving into Nurpur; they pre-empted the move, retreated to the other side of the Drain and blew up the bridge. The Guards continued, cleared Nurpur, and by 17:00 HRS on the 6th, had crossed the Drain and swung right, northwards, to cut off the new Pakistani positions on the west bank. The Pakistanis retreated to their strong point at Barki, which was very well fortified. The target of 18:00 HRS was clearly not going to be achieved.

At this stage, the Divisional HQ decided that 65 Brigade was to pass through 48 Brigade, already astride the Drain, cross the Drain over a Bailey Bridge, to be built by the Engineers and clear Barki. However, the PAF had other ideas, and attacked the road and formations in and around the starting point of the planned attack. The Engineers were badly delayed, and finally the Bailey Bridge came up on the Drain only by PM on the 7th September.

Meanwhile, 17 Rajput had got bogged down, literally, in its attempt to capture Bedian. First, its armoured adjunct, the troop from CIH that was to help its advance, got stuck in the slushy ground; Alone, by itself, 17 Rajput failed to take the Pakistani positions, defending Bedian with exactly the opposite strength of one infantry battalion and armour, so they dug in east of the Bridge. The enemy counter-attacked at night, but was driven back, and decided to slow down any possible attack by flooding the area by cutting the Upper Bari Doab Canal. So that put paid to that, at least for the time being.

Back on the roadside and on the Drain, the Engineers had struggled through artillery and air attacks and put up the Bailey Bridge by the afternoon of the 7th. This left 65 Brigade free to deploy two component battalions, 9 Madras and 16 Punjab, to attack and capture a village on the west side of the drain, 3 kilometres west, named Barka Kalan that same evening.

On the 9th, Lt.Gen. Dhillon visited Divisional HQ and wanted relentless action, including the use of armour at night, that had been done so successfully at Dera Baba Nanak immediately before that. That night, Barka Khurd, another village north of the Lahore Road, was cleared and occupied.

*On the 9th evening,* therefore, elements of 65 Brigade – 9 Madras and 16 Punjab* – were sitting at Barka Kalan, 3 kms west of the Hudiara Drain, on the Ichhogil Canal due south of Barki; another element was in occupation of Barka Khurd, on the west of the Drain, East-South-East of Barki. That Brigade’s third battalion, 17 Rajput, was left at Bedian, watching against any sudden attack by the opposition.

48 Brigade was in echelon behind 65 Brigade, on the Lahore Road, occupying Nurpur south of the Road (5 Guards) and Hudiara to the north (6/8 Gorkhas). 19 Maratha LI were in reserve.

* In a twist of fate, the Pakistani 16 Punjab and the Indian 16 Punjab were both involved in the 1965 conflict. Sadly, the Pakistani 16 Punjab suffered the heaviest casualties of any Punjab Regiment during the conflict, as pointed out by Cuirassier earlier.

@Cuirassier

*THE BATTLE*

The Battle of Barki itself was remarkable from the Indian point of view for one formation’s excellent performance, and for the sad fact that this performance led to that unit getting decimated soon afterwards. But we are running ahead.

There was a great deal of anxious preparation for the actual attack on Barki, scheduled for the night of 10th/11th September. A new battalion had joined 7 Division, and this battalion, 4 Sikh, was assigned the task of attack along with Central India Horse. The attack was to have been in two phases – this, incidentally, seems to have been a particular favourite of the Brigade Commander, for a forward battalion to capture a point, and for a follow-up formation to ‘pass through’ and move towards the next objective. So 16 Punjab was the follow-up formation to 4 Sikh’s attack on Barki.

Barki proved to be a very tough nut to crack. Much on the lines of the house-by-house fighting last seen at Dograi, Barki was protected by pill-boxes, and entrenchments at each house. Even more, the PA 155 mm howitzers covered the Lahore-Wagah axis, and engaged the field artillery attached to 7 Division, just at 19:30 HRS, when the 4 Sikh commenced their attack, but the Sikhs pressed hard, in spite of losing nearly 150 men in their battalion, and in spite of the troubles that their armoured back-up, the CIH, went through, losing 4 tanks in very short order in a minefield. The regiment also lost its CO to injuries to which he succumbed later.

By 20:45 HRS, 16 Punjab were able to pass through to the Ichhogil Canal, along with surviving elements of the CIH, only to find that the PA had already prudently blown up the bridge.

This was indubitably success, but at a very high cost, a cost that was to be multiplied in the most stupid move that was made soon afterwards, affecting 4 Sikh.

Still on 7 Division’s front, however, 48 Brigade sought to make the most of the situation by attacking a village on the other side from Bedian, but failed the first time, on the 10th September.

There was a change of command then, and Brigadier Sahaney was posted out and Brigadier Pyara Singh took over.

The attack on the village, Jahman, was renewed, and it was taken a few days later, on the 15th.

At this stage, as part of the re-shuffling of forces that took place around 15th September, 48 Brigade was sent off in support of the beleaguered 4 Mountain Division, and that marked the end of 7 Division actions in the 65 conflict.

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## Joe Shearer

This leaves us with two and a half matters to examine: XI Corps in the southernmost part of its domain, and 4 Mountain Division's actions; I Corps and that sad story, presented with a markedly Indian twist, of the dog that barked in the night; other events in the deep south at Munnabao.

At least 4 Mountain Division will be presented tomorrow, and I Corps, if it can be done.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> *7TH DIVISION AND THE BATTLE OF BARKI*
> 
> Having considered the entire history of the 15 Division, it is time to consider the efforts of 7 Division, deployed immediately to the south of 15 Division, in the centre of the broad attack by XI Corps on the Pakistani line of defence on the locus of the Ichhogil Canal.
> 
> A reminder: the broad plan of action for XI Corps was to attack through its constituent divisions, 15 Division, 7 Division and 4 Division, towards the bridges and crossings over the Ichhogil Canal. 7 Division was given the task of attacking the crossing over the Canal at the village of Barki, in a south-east to north-west direction, on the road to Lahore; this was the task of 48 Brigade, while 65 Brigade was to capture the crossing at Bedian, to secure the left flank of the 48 Brigade attack from counter-attack by the PA.
> 
> It is sad to see that this part of the offensive got bogged down fairly early, was forced back onto the front foot by firm pressure from divisional command, lost soldiers in frontal attacks, and finally ended in the Battle of Barki. This battle had a tragic aftermath, and that will come into the narrative when looking at the actions of 4 Mountain Division.
> 
> *PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS*
> 
> Before the attack commenced on 6th September, 7 Division was arranged on a north-east to south-west axis, almost 90o to the line of advance planned; so, Divisional HQ was at Narla (north-west of Bhikhiwind), 48 Brigade was further forward on the road to Lahore, and 65 Brigade was further on that NE-SW line, south of the Lahore Road, in the Marimegha area. The plan was for 17 Rajput to detach itself from the 65 Brigade concentration point, and secure the Bedian bridge by 18:00 HRS that evening (6th September evening). In front of 65 Brigade, 48 Brigade would advance along the road, supported by Central India Horse and artillery, and take Barki, by the same time, 18:00 HRS that evening.
> 
> Like 15 Division, 7 Division also achieved early successes. Before dawn, the border outposts were cleared. By 05:30 HRS, the Brigade (48 Brigade) advanced down the road; in front was 6/8 Gorkhas, backed up by 19 Maratha LI and 5 Guards. When they came close to an intermediate water bearing body called the Hudiara Drain, the opposition opened fire. The Gorkhas were pinned down, but recovered, and cleared the village Hudiara, lying north of the Lahore Road, by 10:30, and landed up facing very strong enemy positions across the Drain and on the Drain (meaning, to its east), so they dug in South of the village.
> 
> Across the Road was the village of Nurpur; 5 Guards was asked to clear that, cross was promptly foiled by the PA sensing the intentions of 5 Guards moving into Nurpur; they pre-empted the move, retreated to the other side of the Drain and blew up the bridge. The Guards continued, cleared Nurpur, and by 17:00 HRS on the 6th, had crossed the Drain and swung right, northwards, to cut off the new Pakistani positions on the west bank. The Pakistanis retreated to their strong point at Barki, which was very well fortified. The target of 18:00 HRS was clearly not going to be achieved.
> 
> At this stage, the Divisional HQ decided that 65 Brigade was to pass through 48 Brigade, already astride the Drain, cross the Drain over a Bailey Bridge, to be built by the Engineers and clear Barki. However, the PAF had other ideas, and attacked the road and formations in and around the starting point of the planned attack. The Engineers were badly delayed, and finally the Bailey Bridge came up on the Drain only by PM on the 7th September.
> 
> Meanwhile, 17 Rajput had got bogged down, literally, in its attempt to capture Bedian. First, its armoured adjunct, the troop from CIH that was to help its advance, got stuck in the slushy ground; Alone, by itself, 17 Rajput failed to take the Pakistani positions, defending Bedian with exactly the opposite strength of one infantry battalion and armour, so they dug in east of the Bridge. The enemy counter-attacked at night, but was driven back, and decided to slow down any possible attack by flooding the area by cutting the Upper Bari Doab Canal. So that put paid to that, at least for the time being.
> 
> Back on the roadside and on the Drain, the Engineers had struggled through artillery and air attacks and put up the Bailey Bridge by the afternoon of the 7th. This left 65 Brigade free to deploy two component battalions, 9 Madras and 16 Punjab, to attack and capture a village on the west side of the drain, 3 kilometres west, named Barka Kalan that same evening.
> 
> On the 9th, Lt.Gen. Dhillon visited Divisional HQ and wanted relentless action, including the use of armour at night, that had been done so successfully at Dera Baba Nanak immediately before that. That night, Barka Khurd, another village north of the Lahore Road, was cleared and occupied.
> 
> *On the 9th evening,* therefore, elements of 65 Brigade – 9 Madras and 16 Punjab* – were sitting at Barka Kalan, 3 kms west of the Hudiara Drain, on the Ichhogil Canal due south of Barki; another element was in occupation of Barka Khurd, on the west of the Drain, East-South-East of Barki. That Brigade’s third battalion, 17 Rajput, was left at Bedian, watching against any sudden attack by the opposition.
> 
> 48 Brigade was in echelon behind 65 Brigade, on the Lahore Road, occupying Nurpur south of the Road (5 Guards) and Hudiara to the north (6/8 Gorkhas). 19 Maratha LI were in reserve.
> 
> * In a twist of fate, the Pakistani 16 Punjab and the Indian 16 Punjab were both involved in the 1965 conflict. Sadly, the Pakistani 16 Punjab suffered the heaviest casualties of any Punjab Regiment during the conflict, as pointed out by Cuirassier earlier.
> 
> @Cuirassier
> 
> *THE BATTLE*
> 
> The Battle of Barki itself was remarkable from the Indian point of view for one formation’s excellent performance, and for the sad fact that this performance led to that unit getting decimated soon afterwards. But we are running ahead.
> 
> There was a great deal of anxious preparation for the actual attack on Barki, scheduled for the night of 10th/11th September. A new battalion had joined 7 Division, and this battalion, 4 Sikh, was assigned the task of attack along with Central India Horse. The attack was to have been in two phases – this, incidentally, seems to have been a particular favourite of the Brigade Commander, for a forward battalion to capture a point, and for a follow-up formation to ‘pass through’ and move towards the next objective. So 16 Punjab was the follow-up formation to 4 Sikh’s attack on Barki.
> 
> Barki proved to be a very tough nut to crack. Much on the lines of the house-by-house fighting last seen at Dograi, Barki was protected by pill-boxes, and entrenchments at each house. Even more, the PA 155 mm howitzers covered the Lahore-Wagah axis, and engaged the field artillery attached to 7 Division, just at 19:30 HRS, when the 4 Sikh commenced their attack, but the Sikhs pressed hard, in spite of losing nearly 150 men in their battalion, and in spite of the troubles that their armoured back-up, the CIH, went through, losing 4 tanks in very short order in a minefield. The regiment also lost its CO to injuries to which he succumbed later.
> 
> By 20:45 HRS, 16 Punjab were able to pass through to the Ichhogil Canal, along with surviving elements of the CIH, only to find that the PA had already prudently blown up the bridge.
> 
> This was indubitably success, but at a very high cost, a cost that was to be multiplied in the most stupid move that was made soon afterwards, affecting 4 Sikh.
> 
> Still on 7 Division’s front, however, 48 Brigade sought to make the most of the situation by attacking a village on the other side from Bedian, but failed the first time, on the 10th September.
> 
> There was a change of command then, and Brigadier Sahaney was posted out and Brigadier Pyara Singh took over.
> 
> The attack on the village, Jahman, was renewed, and it was taken a few days later, on the 15th.
> 
> At this stage, as part of the re-shuffling of forces that took place around 15th September, 48 Brigade was sent off in support of the beleaguered 4 Mountain Division, and that marked the end of 7 Division actions in the 65 conflict.



7 Div ops...

Firm base was established by 65 Brigade during night 5/6 Sep....this way 7 Div lost surprise....moreover it was a time consuming process of establishing a firm base...even though there was no requirement of making it in INDIAN territory which was already secured....

48 Bde took the lead, advanced and contacted PA defences on Hudiara Drain...later capturing Nurpur and Hudiara...however Hudiara bridge was partially blown by PA.

On 7 Sep, 65 Bde took over the advance from 48 Bde, with 4 Sikh in the lead....however, there was a communication failure within 48 Bde and its units....Barki was captured on 10 Sep, however, Barki bridge was destroyed by the defenders.....

7 Div offensive then stopped, with troops moving towards Khem Karan....

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> 7 Div ops...
> 
> Firm base was established by 65 Brigade during night 5/6 Sep....this way 7 Div lost surprise....moreover it was a time consuming process of establishing a firm base...even though there was no requirement of making it in INDIAN territory which was already secured....
> 
> 48 Bde took the lead, advanced and contacted PA defences on Hudiara Drain...later capturing Nurpur and Hudiara...however Hudiara bridge was partially blown by PA.
> 
> On 7 Sep, 65 Bde took over the advance from 48 Bde, with 4 Sikh in the lead....however, there was a communication failure within 48 Bde and its units....Barki was captured on 10 Sep, however, Barki bridge was destroyed by the defenders.....
> 
> 7 Div offensive then stopped, with troops moving towards Khem Karan....



Many thanks.

It did seem redundant for 65 Brigade to create a firm base on a flank with so much activity giving away their intentions just to lunge for the bridge the next morning. The fierce fire received by 48 Brigade constituent battalions 6/8 Gorkhas and 19 Maratha LI the next morning was only to be expected. It is also a painful thing reading again and again of frontal attacks delivered without artillery support (or none mentioned) or tank fire as a substitute, some in broad daylight. Also, everyone seems to have marched to their targets all the way; not just the last mile, but all the way from their rail-head.

This has been covered, on the lines narrated; I started last night arranging the material segregating 47-48, 65 and 71, with your remarks on these as introductions to each chapter. The discussion on the individual actions is being presented as an afterword to each chapter. Once it looks fair and equitable and balanced on both sides, I will try - this in the medium time range after all the narrative is there in PDF - to put in citations; for which purpose, I have asked jbgt90 for the books he has to be sent to me urgently.



PanzerKiel said:


> 7 Div ops...
> 
> Firm base was established by 65 Brigade during night 5/6 Sep....this way 7 Div lost surprise....moreover it was a time consuming process of establishing a firm base...even though there was no requirement of making it in INDIAN territory which was already secured....
> 
> 48 Bde took the lead, advanced and contacted PA defences on Hudiara Drain...later capturing Nurpur and Hudiara...however Hudiara bridge was partially blown by PA.
> 
> On 7 Sep, 65 Bde took over the advance from 48 Bde, with 4 Sikh in the lead....however, there was a communication failure within 48 Bde and its units....Barki was captured on 10 Sep, however, Barki bridge was destroyed by the defenders.....
> 
> 7 Div offensive then stopped, with troops moving towards Khem Karan....



Naturally my focus is on finishing the narrative; now 4 Mountain Division and I Corps at hand, all the rest described above to follow, once we have your critique of actions narrated.

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## Joe Shearer

Before posting the next narration, of the doings of 4 Mountain Division, an apology to all readers. 

My sources are all written from the point of view of the same side. The narrative lacks balance.Until I get access to the masterpieces that have been written in Pakistan, this tendency to incline to one side will continue. Please bear with me through this set, and through the rest.

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## Joe Shearer

*FOREWORD*

_At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 100 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.

Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.

Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.

But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.

In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.

In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.

India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.

This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.

If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.

Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.

Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.

But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war._

*THE THIRD PRONG – 4TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION*

Having seen 15 Division and 7 Division in action, it remains to observe the action of the southern-most division, 4 Mountain Division, of XI Corps.

A mountain infantry division is not intended to fight armour or mechanised infantry in the plains. It is intended to defend mountain territory against an enemy similarly equipped, not against an enemy who might have armoured elements, or heavy artillery deployed against it in the open. Its organisation in battalions and companies is different; it has no anti-tank weaponry (at the time of the events we are discussing, normal plains infantry divisions had the 106 mm recoilless rifle, or the less effective 57 mm recoilless rifle.

It is a measure of the times that the 4 Mountain Division was alerted early in September; issued 4 instead of the regulation 6 recoilless rifles per battalion; entrained at 02:00 HRS on 5th of September in the Simla hills and detrained at 22:00 HRS near Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up its HQ. That was a 370 kms train journey. The troops then marched 10 to 12 kms to their forming-up places for the attack, which was to start at 05:30 HRS on the 6th September.

The division also got the Deccan Horse, which joined the division at Ambala, and travelled with it 320 kms by road.

The divisional line-up was:

4 Mountain Infantry Division

Deccan Horse

7 Mountain Infantry Brigade – Brig. D. S. Sidhu
1/9 Gorkha Rifles
4 Grenadiers
7 Grenadiers

62 Mountain Infantry Brigade – Brig. H. C.Gehlaut
9 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles
13 Dogras
18 Rajputana Rifles


*THE TERRAIN*

The layout of the actions that took place can be described simply, and concentrating on the Indian side, starts with the town of Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up HQ.


About 22 kms away, in the West by South West direction, lay Kasur in Pakistan, one of the primary targets.
Waigal, on the Rohi Nullah, was 14 kms away from Valtoha, in a West by North West direction;
Bedian was 17.5 kms away, north west of Valtoha.
Ballanwala, on the India-Pakistan border was 15 kms away, West by South West, more or less in the exact same compass bearing as Kasur, further behind within Pakistan.

62 Brigade was mustered 10 to 12 kms forward from Valtoha, so these intimidating distances from Valtoha need to be reduced by the radial distance between Valtoha and their locations; very approximately –

Waigal - 3 kms

Bedian - 6.5 kms

Ballanwala - 4 kms

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## meghdut

@Joe Shearer it was 100 Ind. Armoured Brigade that was converted to 6th Armd . Division not 106. And was it 57mm RCL or 3.5 in SUPER Bazookas issued as infantry at weapons to IA formations?


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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> @Joe Shearer it was 100 Ind. Armoured Brigade that was converted to 6th Armd . Division not 106*. And was it 57mm RCL or 3.5 in SUPER Bazookas issued as infantry at weapons to IA formations?



I am following Praval, Indian Army After Independence, pg 348. You may be right, but I am faithfully going by Praval unless contradicted by a more detailed source.

3.5" Bazooka is around 89mm and has not found a place in Praval's narration. He mentions only 57 mm and 106 mm recoilless rifles. Perhaps you could take a closer look and help us to correct this detail.

* @PanzerKiel - for kind perusal

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> I am following Praval, Indian Army After Independence, pg 348. You may be right, but I am faithfully going by Praval unless contradicted by a more detailed source.
> 
> 3.5" Bazooka is around 89mm and has not found a place in Praval's narration. He mentions only 57 mm and 106 mm recoilless rifles. Perhaps you could take a closer look and help us to correct this detail.
> Ok the book states it’s standard for mountain divisions so it may differ from normal infantry division.
> * @PanzerKiel - for kind perusal


I got it from ‘A History of the Pakistan Army’by Brian Cloughley. Regarding the bazooka I got it from Brig Haydes’ book where he mentions it. I’m not sure about it but guess at weaponry should be standard across units. 
Okay Praval states it’s standard for mountain divisions so I guess it differed from normal infantry divisions.

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## Joe Shearer

*THE TERRAIN*

The layout of the actions that took place can be described simply, and concentrating on the Indian side, starts with the town of Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up HQ.


About 22 kms away, in the West by South West direction, lay Kasur in Pakistan, one of the primary targets.
Waigal, on the Rohi Nullah, was 14 kms away from Valtoha, in a West by North West direction;
Bedian was 17.5 kms away, north west of Valtoha.
Ballanwala, on the India-Pakistan border was 15 kms away, West by South West, more or less in the exact same compass bearing as Kasur, further behind within Pakistan.

62 Brigade was mustered 10 to 12 kms forward from Valtoha, so these intimidating distances from Valtoha need to be reduced by the radial distance between Valtoha and their locations; very approximately –

Waigal - 3 kms

Bedian - 6.5 kms

Ballanwala - 4 kms

When we looked at 7 Division, we were faced with an additional obstacle in front of the Ichhogil Canal, the Hudiara water obstacle. Here, too, we have the Rohi Nulla, or the Kasur Nalla. This Nulla came in from India into Pakistan, and flowed parallel to the Ichhogil Canal for some distance. It was aligned with a bund; a bund is a double wall aligning a water course, one wall on each side that holds in the waters of that water course. The water course flows between the parallel lines of the bund.

*OBJECTIVES*

In line with the general XI Corps objective to position the units under its command along the Ichhogil Canal and use it as a defensive barrier turned against the Pakistan Army, the plan for 4 Mountain Division, brought in to plug the gap between 7 Division and the 67 Infantry Brigade at Hussainiwala, was to use one brigade, 62 Brigade, to capture the crossing points over the Rohi Nulla at two locations and form a plug to prevent any Pakistani advance from those points.

In this first phase, 62 Brigade was to capture the bridge over the Nulla on the Khem Karan-Kasur Road and another crossing over the Nulla further south, on a road from Khem Karan to Ganda Singh Walla.

They also needed to form a ‘plug’.

Just to insure against any irruption from those two bridges, the brigade was under orders to form a firm base more or less between the two axes, from which any entry from either side could be contested. In addition to its constituent battalions, 9 J&K Rifles, 13 Dogra and 18 Rajrif, 62 Brigade was given the Deccan Horse and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles.

In the second phase, the other brigade, 7 Brigade, was to fan out and use its two battalions remaining (1/9 Gorkhas having gone to 62 Brigade) to attack the three points on the Rohi Nulla mentioned earlier, Bedian to the north, Waigal in the centre and Ballanwala to the south.

62 Brigade were to move forward from its positions on the Nulla, secure the east bank of the Canal, and destroy all bridges in their sector (the entire divisional sector).

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## blain2

PanzerKiel said:


> I believe there is a logical explanation for almost everything....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 1965 war caught the IA in the midst of its post 1962 re-org and expansion. Since IA was still raising new formations, especially mountain divisions, therefore some mountains division did have the dual role....NEFA as well as Pakistan...... which is followed even as we speak. Rest of course the organization and training of mountain divisions is not suited for anything other than mountains.....they were used despite these disadvantages.
> 
> 
> 
> Firepower.....doctrines of that time, of both sides, emphasized use of firepower instead of mobility of tanks. Presence of artillery and tanks always proved to be a booster for infantry except in some rare instances when infantry managed well without them.....
> 
> 
> 
> IA columns on roads presented good enough targets for PAF.
> 
> Something which normally everyone misses are the effects of PA SSG ops against IAF airfields in 1965 (like readers miss the great effects of Gibralter, term it a failure and move on). A number of IA formations were employed to hunt for PA SSG paratroopers, their clogged vehicles on roads were also found by PAF and heavy casualties were inflicted.
> 
> Even till now, both PA and IA are not properly trained to conduct ops of all types in the face of heavy air attacks....hence we have seen that normally in our region, air power tips the balance. In my opinion, it should not be the case. Highly trained troops can adopt lot many measures to negate the effect of enemy air superiority. China (1950) and North Vietnam (60s/70s) are some major examples.
> 
> 
> Such things are part of normal drills and procedures. However, as mentioned before as well, IA was under great pressure to open the front quickly on international border due to the bad situation in Akhnur. Therefore, many IA formations attacked from the line of march, without stopping, without coordinating basic things with their supporting units, without recce.....



You are 110% right about the SSG raids. Indians had to move entire formations for search and mop-up/pacification efforts when the airborne attacks were carried out. Having actually spoken to some of the SSG officers who took part in these raids, this was the one common theme they all mentioned. I.e. the effect of their tactical operations (the purpose of which was to neutralize IAF assets on the ground) was more on the strategic side as Indians had to rebalance the employment of quite a few of their formations thus improving the situation for Pakistani defenses. So these attacks were well worth the immense sacrifice all these officers and ORs made in this Kamikazi mission.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I am following Praval, Indian Army After Independence, pg 348. You may be right, but I am faithfully going by Praval unless contradicted by a more detailed source.
> 
> 3.5" Bazooka is around 89mm and has not found a place in Praval's narration. He mentions only 57 mm and 106 mm recoilless rifles. Perhaps you could take a closer look and help us to correct this detail.
> 
> * @PanzerKiel - for kind perusal



It is 100 IAB.

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> @Joe Shearer it was 100 Ind. Armoured Brigade that was converted to 6th Armd . Division not 106. And was it 57mm RCL or 3.5 in SUPER Bazookas issued as infantry at weapons to IA formations?



Please note, @PanzerKiel has confirmed your observation, and I am correcting the text accordingly. Thank you for your alertness and for your evident interest.

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## Stealth

There was and there will be no rules of engagement btw both..... Pakistan initiated wars to capture specific areas. Indians attack or responded or fight against us with this faith or ideology "let entirely remove Pakistan from the map". Both sides failed.... In the bigger picture, with a 1X4 ratio, the biggest failure of India despite large force, failed to completely destroy Pakistan.


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## Joe Shearer

Stealth said:


> There was and there will be no rules of engagement btw both..... Pakistan initiated wars to capture specific areas. Indians attack or responded or fight against us with this faith or ideology "let entirely remove Pakistan from the map". Both sides failed.... In the bigger picture, with a 1X4 ratio, the biggest failure of India despite large force, failed to completely destroy Pakistan.



Noted.

In the bigger picture, never mind the details, it is always the biggest failure of India despite large force.



> Indians attack or responded or fight against us with this faith or ideology "let entirely remove Pakistan from the map"



Not in 47-48. Indian troops fought to vacate aggression, and to recover those parts of the state of J&K that had been lost. Not enough a peanut shell fell outside these areas.
Not in 65. Indian troops fought to resist a very large scale infiltration by regulars dressed as irregulars, and an attack with armour and artillery against her troops. Their counter-attack was specifically intended to achieve the Ichhogil Canal and convert it into a defensive line against Pakistan. Not much of entirely removing Pakistan from the map going on.
Not in 71. Indian troops fought to normalise conditions in East Pakistan, to enable the relief of 10 million refugees then living on Indian soil, and finally fought to neutralise the brutality and violence used by an army against its own people. Even Pakistani observers have commented in caustic terms about the lack of aggression in Indian operations on the western front; when they had opportunities, they failed to take them or drive home an advantage. Can't say this is indicative of the entirely removing Pakistan from the map mentality. One of the very inactive Army commanders became the next COAS, so government of India, and the redoubtable Mrs. Gandhi could not have been exactly displeased with his holding his hand.
Not in 99. Indian troops again fought to vacate aggression, and were bound by the rules of engagement not to cross to the Pakistani side. The IAF was similarly restricted.

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## Joe Shearer

*THE INDIAN ATTACK: 62 BRIGADE*

At 05:30 on 6th September, three units moved out.

To the north, on the Khem Karan-Kasur Road, 9 J&K Rifles advanced to the bund, captured the near-side embankment, but could not cross over to the far-side embankment.

To the south, on the Ganda Singh Wala side, 13 Dogra had also got to their objectives.

There is a piece of Pakistani territory sticking into India just south of Khem Karan, and 18 Rajputana Rifles squeezed out that bulge, and, along with some policemen, occupied it.

This state of satisfaction did not last very long. There was a strong counter-attack on the Ganda Singh Wala side, after heavy shelling; the attacking infantry came in armoured personnel carriers supported by tanks, very sophisticated methods for the times! The Dogras were unable to call for artillery support because the artillery officers were missing, one wounded, the other untraceable. After losing men, they withdrew.

At night, the situation worsened. Enemy shelling continued; the Dogra battalion retreated in disorder.

Meanwhile, further north, the Pakistani forces had broken out from a targeted location called Ballanwala, and outflanked the 9 J&K Rifles. The CO took 2 companies still in contact and retreated towards Div HQ at Valtoha. He had left behind two companies of the J&K Rifles; with the opposition swarming all around, there was no doubt that those two companies were in mortal danger.

There is an unexpected happy ending to report. The next day, as the division was regrouping around the village of Asal Uttar, Deccan Horse was asked to cover the movement of the infantry, and screen them. This they did to very great effect, and allowed the re-grouping to take place peacefully and efficiently. They also fished out the isolated two companies of the 9 J&K Rifles from the vicinity of the Rohi Nulla.

Before coming to this regrouping, one must continue the narrative where it had stopped.

By the evening of the 6th, all the victories of the morning had turned to ashes in the mouth of the CO 4 Mountain Division; not only was the Ganda Singh Walla position overrun, and the Dogras back at base, the Khem Karan- Kasur bridge capture had also had to be abandoned, as the position had been outflanked by a Pakistani break-out from Ballanwalla.

*THE INDIAN ATTACK: TRIAL BY FIRE FOR 7 BRIGADE*

But how did they break out? The Grenadiers had been assigned to capture and hold them; 7 Grenadiers were assigned to Ballanwala and got to within 50 m. of the target, but was driven back by very heavy artillery fire. Indian artillery could not mount counter-battery fire as the communications between the guns and the forward artillery officer was disrupted by the failure of the wireless set. For some unfathomable reason, the next target north, Theh Pannun, was assigned to 4 Grenadiers, but the one after that, the northernmost point, Waigal, was again to 7 Grenadiers.

Theh Pannun was reached, but the bridge could not be destroyed as the Engineer party had not come up in time. 4 Grenadier had to retreat under heavy fire.

Waigal again was reached by the tanks of a composite attack, but the infantry couldn’t get through, again, due to very heavy fire.

The picture was the same at the southern end, at Ballanwala, when by 21:00 HRS, 7 Grenadiers, backed by massive artillery fire, got to the Bund, but was shelled and machine-gunned very severely as they tried to cross the Nulla. They withdrew, and the badly shot-up detachment passed through other Indian Army lines and reached the Div HQ at Valtoha.



blain2 said:


> You are 110% right about the SSG raids. Indians had to move entire formations for search and mop-up/pacification efforts when the airborne attacks were carried out. Having actually spoken to some of the SSG officers who took part in these raids, this was the one common theme they all mentioned. I.e. the effect of their tactical operations (the purpose of which was to neutralize IAF assets on the ground) was more on the strategic side as Indians had to rebalance the employment of quite a few of their formations thus improving the situation for Pakistani defenses. So these attacks were well worth the immense sacrifice all these officers and ORs made in this Kamikazi mission.



One of the lessons learnt from this discussion is that the Indian Army discounted the SSG raids. That should read - analysts of the Indian Army's reactions to events tend to discount the SSG raids. It dislocated the processes that had been envisaged for reacting to an attack by regular troops, unbalanced Western Command, and led to a lot of scrambling and ad hoc decision-making in the conflict that followed.

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## Joe Shearer

*KEEPING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AT BAY:
RE-GROUPING*

By this time, between 21:00 HRS (when the Grenadiers broke and retreated) and 02:00 HRS, when J&K Rifles split into two and the CO hustled the coherent portion back to safety, Major General Gurbaksh Singh had seen two sets of soldiers arrive exhausted back at his HQ. He decided that this must mean that the Pakistani armour was in hot pursuit; it also meant that his own divisional artillery was in imminent danger of attack. He asked his artillery brigade commander, Brigadier J. S. Sandhu, to shell the rail and road bridges over the Rohi Mulla and the Canal, with everything he had. The brigadier was happy to oblige, and between 03:30 HRS, when the shelling started, and for the full day following, there was no enemy activity. This allowed 4 Division to fall back in good order and to take up positions to receive that attack that had been forestalled by Brigadier Sandhu’s shelling.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Many thanks.
> 
> It did seem redundant for 65 Brigade to create a firm base on a flank with so much activity giving away their intentions just to lunge for the bridge the next morning. The fierce fire received by 48 Brigade constituent battalions 6/8 Gorkhas and 19 Maratha LI the next morning was only to be expected. It is also a painful thing reading again and again of frontal attacks delivered without artillery support (or none mentioned) or tank fire as a substitute, some in broad daylight. Also, everyone seems to have marched to their targets all the way; not just the last mile, but all the way from their rail-head.
> 
> This has been covered, on the lines narrated; I started last night arranging the material segregating 47-48, 65 and 71, with your remarks on these as introductions to each chapter. The discussion on the individual actions is being presented as an afterword to each chapter. Once it looks fair and equitable and balanced on both sides, I will try - this in the medium time range after all the narrative is there in PDF - to put in citations; for which purpose, I have asked jbgt90 for the books he has to be sent to me urgently.
> 
> 
> 
> Naturally my focus is on finishing the narrative; now 4 Mountain Division and I Corps at hand, all the rest described above to follow, once we have your critique of actions narrated.




A few closing points regarding the Lahore front...sort of analysis....

First, lets solve the riddle of Op Riddle...it did live up to its name...
It conception was at fault.....being that to defend and improve the defensibility of Indian Punjab by an advance up til BRBL....it was a very limited objective which was set....not the best way.

Moreover, since Pakistan had the advantage of interior lines in Lahore sector....it could radiate threat towards Amritsar, Patti or Ferozepur...therefore, GOC of IA XI had three choices

first--deploy minimum forces on ground for defence, while holding the max in reserve for a massive counter attack at the right moment.

Second--launch a pre-emptive attack towards Lahore, cross BRBL and attempt to tie down max PA reserves.

Third--Capture area till eastern bank of BRB...which was the safest and cautious option. However, this option meant that the offensive elements would be stretched all along the front in order to reach BRBL...this force-stretch would automatically invite a PA penetration attack.

Therefore, it can be said that IA was everywhere, but they were not strong anywhere, they were unable to mass their superiority in any one sector in order to achieve the required dominance to help them achieve their desired aims.

GOC IA XI Corps also remained torn between PA threats to Amritsar and Khem Karan.

With regards to IA 6 Sep offensive...
-It achieved tactical surprise.
-However, it lacked finesse and boldness in its execution.
-Best option would have been to stagger the attacks of 15 and 7 Divisions...this way the divisional reserves of PA 10 Division would have been employed against one IA prong, leaving the other prong with a free run.

Undue caution remained the hallmark of Op Riddle. IA, since they did achieve surprise, had the potential to capture the important bridges over BRB / Ravi, but caution didnt help them.

There are couple of theories whether Lahore indeed was the intended objective for IA in 1965.

Couple of points which go in its favour are...
-the plan of the IA to cross BRB and make a bridgehead doesnt make sense unless it was planned to go further towards Lahore.
-PAF aircraft detected long convoys of engineer bridging vehicles east of Batapur. This indicates that IA wont stop at BRB but was planning to cross it for deeper objectives.

Some points which go against this theory....
-Both divisions (7 and 15) did not employ their full potential. They attacked with only two brigades each.
-Both these divisions were not having the required number of maps of this area, moreover, the maps which were available were outdated with old names.
-Their maps did not have any details of BRB.
-All attacking troops were employed from their line of march without rest or coordination which left them in no condition for operations across BRB.
-And then the formations employed were not the best which were available.

For IA, armor was the worst handled outfit. All attacks were led by infantry instead of armour. All the bridges could have been speedily captured by armor. Armor was also not employed as a punch but was distributed in packets.


Coming to PA 10 Division.
They overall mounted a good defence of their area. Their rehearsals and thorough briefing did pay off. Initial allocation of resources, initial dispositions and location was Divisional reserves were also sound.

The most outstanding feature of 10 Division battle was their sound perception of IA ops. For this Divisional staff should be lauded.

Launching of Divisional reserves (22 Brigade) within 48 hours from an unexpected direction not only reflects on the accurate reading of the battle but also GOC's boldness. Due to the aggressive posture of 10 Division, IA 15 Division was thrown off balance.

However, 10 Division made some mistake as well...like units were frequently broken and dished out. Dograi debacle could have been avoided if the integrity of 16 PR could have been ensured. Its depth company, which was from another unit, vacated the defences without informing 16 PR which had dire consequences later on.

PAF and PA artillery played their customary roles and were instrumental in all the engagements.



Joe Shearer said:


> *THE TERRAIN*
> 
> The layout of the actions that took place can be described simply, and concentrating on the Indian side, starts with the town of Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up HQ.
> 
> 
> About 22 kms away, in the West by South West direction, lay Kasur in Pakistan, one of the primary targets.
> Waigal, on the Rohi Nullah, was 14 kms away from Valtoha, in a West by North West direction;
> Bedian was 17.5 kms away, north west of Valtoha.
> Ballanwala, on the India-Pakistan border was 15 kms away, West by South West, more or less in the exact same compass bearing as Kasur, further behind within Pakistan.
> 
> 62 Brigade was mustered 10 to 12 kms forward from Valtoha, so these intimidating distances from Valtoha need to be reduced by the radial distance between Valtoha and their locations; very approximately –
> 
> Waigal - 3 kms
> 
> Bedian - 6.5 kms
> 
> Ballanwala - 4 kms
> 
> When we looked at 7 Division, we were faced with an additional obstacle in front of the Ichhogil Canal, the Hudiara water obstacle. Here, too, we have the Rohi Nulla, or the Kasur Nalla. This Nulla came in from India into Pakistan, and flowed parallel to the Ichhogil Canal for some distance. It was aligned with a bund; a bund is a double wall aligning a water course, one wall on each side that holds in the waters of that water course. The water course flows between the parallel lines of the bund.
> 
> *OBJECTIVES*
> 
> In line with the general XI Corps objective to position the units under its command along the Ichhogil Canal and use it as a defensive barrier turned against the Pakistan Army, the plan for 4 Mountain Division, brought in to plug the gap between 7 Division and the 67 Infantry Brigade at Hussainiwala, was to use one brigade, 62 Brigade, to capture the crossing points over the Rohi Nulla at two locations and form a plug to prevent any Pakistani advance from those points.
> 
> In this first phase, 62 Brigade was to capture the bridge over the Nulla on the Khem Karan-Kasur Road and another crossing over the Nulla further south, on a road from Khem Karan to Ganda Singh Walla.
> 
> They also needed to form a ‘plug’.
> 
> Just to insure against any irruption from those two bridges, the brigade was under orders to form a firm base more or less between the two axes, from which any entry from either side could be contested. In addition to its constituent battalions, 9 J&K Rifles, 13 Dogra and 18 Rajrif, 62 Brigade was given the Deccan Horse and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles.
> 
> In the second phase, the other brigade, 7 Brigade, was to fan out and use its two battalions remaining (1/9 Gorkhas having gone to 62 Brigade) to attack the three points on the Rohi Nulla mentioned earlier, Bedian to the north, Waigal in the centre and Ballanwala to the south.
> 
> 62 Brigade were to move forward from its positions on the Nulla, secure the east bank of the Canal, and destroy all bridges in their sector (the entire divisional sector).



A few words about the defending PA 11 Division.
It was facing several problems of its own, since it had just been raised.
- It was NOT having its R&S unit.
-It Engineer unit was short of all sorts of equipment, including bridges.
-Signal unit was also short of communication sets.
-It had no S&T unit.
-6 Lancers, the divisional armor unit, was equipped with the older version of M47 tanks.
-Divisional artillery was having mix calibres.



Joe Shearer said:


> *FOREWORD*
> 
> _At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 100 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.
> 
> Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.
> 
> Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.
> 
> But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.
> 
> In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.
> 
> In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.
> 
> India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.
> 
> This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.
> 
> If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.
> 
> Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.
> 
> Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.
> 
> But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war._
> 
> *THE THIRD PRONG – 4TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION*
> 
> Having seen 15 Division and 7 Division in action, it remains to observe the action of the southern-most division, 4 Mountain Division, of XI Corps.
> 
> A mountain infantry division is not intended to fight armour or mechanised infantry in the plains. It is intended to defend mountain territory against an enemy similarly equipped, not against an enemy who might have armoured elements, or heavy artillery deployed against it in the open. Its organisation in battalions and companies is different; it has no anti-tank weaponry (at the time of the events we are discussing, normal plains infantry divisions had the 106 mm recoilless rifle, or the less effective 57 mm recoilless rifle.
> 
> It is a measure of the times that the 4 Mountain Division was alerted early in September; issued 4 instead of the regulation 6 recoilless rifles per battalion; entrained at 02:00 HRS on 5th of September in the Simla hills and detrained at 22:00 HRS near Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up its HQ. That was a 370 kms train journey. The troops then marched 10 to 12 kms to their forming-up places for the attack, which was to start at 05:30 HRS on the 6th September.
> 
> The division also got the Deccan Horse, which joined the division at Ambala, and travelled with it 320 kms by road.
> 
> The divisional line-up was:
> 
> 4 Mountain Infantry Division
> 
> Deccan Horse
> 
> 7 Mountain Infantry Brigade – Brig. D. S. Sidhu
> 1/9 Gorkha Rifles
> 4 Grenadiers
> 7 Grenadiers
> 
> 62 Mountain Infantry Brigade – Brig. H. C.Gehlaut
> 9 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles
> 13 Dogras
> 18 Rajputana Rifles
> 
> 
> *THE TERRAIN*
> 
> The layout of the actions that took place can be described simply, and concentrating on the Indian side, starts with the town of Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up HQ.
> 
> 
> About 22 kms away, in the West by South West direction, lay Kasur in Pakistan, one of the primary targets.
> Waigal, on the Rohi Nullah, was 14 kms away from Valtoha, in a West by North West direction;
> Bedian was 17.5 kms away, north west of Valtoha.
> Ballanwala, on the India-Pakistan border was 15 kms away, West by South West, more or less in the exact same compass bearing as Kasur, further behind within Pakistan.
> 
> 62 Brigade was mustered 10 to 12 kms forward from Valtoha, so these intimidating distances from Valtoha need to be reduced by the radial distance between Valtoha and their locations; very approximately –
> 
> Waigal - 3 kms
> 
> Bedian - 6.5 kms
> 
> Ballanwala - 4 kms




A word about 4 Mountain Division...

Their orders were
-secure area east of BRB
-destroy bridge on Khem Karan-Kasur road.
-Contain any PA offensive.

4 Mountain Division had also its fair share of problems...
-It had only two brigades.
-It was a mountain division, not trained or organized to fight in the plains.
-They had 75 mm RRs instead of 105/106...moreover these they had only at the rate of 4/unit instead of normal 6/unit.
-9 H was placed under command at the last moment, once they started their move, therefore no coordination or marrying up could be done.
-Its artillery was ill-organized for giving fire support in plains.



Joe Shearer said:


> *KEEPING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AT BAY:
> RE-GROUPING*
> 
> By this time, between 21:00 HRS (when the Grenadiers broke and retreated) and 02:00 HRS, when J&K Rifles split into two and the CO hustled the coherent portion back to safety, Major General Gurbaksh Singh had seen two sets of soldiers arrive exhausted back at his HQ. He decided that this must mean that the Pakistani armour was in hot pursuit; it also meant that his own divisional artillery was in imminent danger of attack. He asked his artillery brigade commander, Brigadier J. S. Sandhu, to shell the rail and road bridges over the Rohi Mulla and the Canal, with everything he had. The brigadier was happy to oblige, and between 03:30 HRS, when the shelling started, and for the full day following, there was no enemy activity. This allowed 4 Division to fall back in good order and to take up positions to receive that attack that had been forestalled by Brigadier Sandhu’s shelling.




Some reasons of 4 Mountain Division rout....
-They were thrusted straight into battle after an almost 320 km journey.
-No recce of their new area.
-They were not given clear info about PA deployments.
-Both its brigades were launched on a broad front front without any depth in their attack.
-Both brigades had staggered H Hours.
-Armor was misused as usual.
-Artillery hardly intervened, was unable to silence PA artillery.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> A few closing points regarding the Lahore front...sort of analysis....
> 
> First, lets solve the riddle of Op Riddle...it did live up to its name...
> It conception was at fault.....being that to defend and improve the defensibility of Indian Punjab by an advance up til BRBL....it was a very limited objective which was set....not the best way.
> 
> Moreover, since Pakistan had the advantage of interior lines in Lahore sector....it could radiate threat towards Amritsar, Patti or Ferozepur...therefore, GOC of IA XI had three choices
> 
> first--deploy minimum forces on ground for defence, while holding the max in reserve for a massive counter attack at the right moment.
> 
> Second--launch a pre-emptive attack towards Lahore, cross BRBL and attempt to tie down max PA reserves.
> 
> Third--Capture area till eastern bank of BRB...which was the safest and cautious option. However, this option meant that the offensive elements would be stretched all along the front in order to reach BRBL...this force-stretch would automatically invite a PA penetration attack.
> 
> Therefore, it can be said that IA was everywhere, but they were not strong anywhere, they were unable to mass their superiority in any one sector in order to achieve the required dominance to help them achieve their desired aims.



Effectively, as you pointed out, IA radiated out from a point on diverging lines of advance, an open invitation for the opponent to pick gaps and counter-attack. With three divisions in hand, the battle was fought at company level, in a penny-packet kind of deployment. It sounds very well to turn the Pakistani defensive feature, the Ichholgil Canal, against them, but that so contradicts the principle of concentration of forces, or of keeping the opposition off balance, or of using superior numbers to overcome superior position.



> GOC IA XI Corps also remained torn between PA threats to Amritsar and Khem Karan.



In fact, that is a kind summation. Dhillon Sahib was nowhere in the picture in the developments at Khem Karan; he was busy fire-fighting on behalf of 15 Division on the Lahore axis, and looking anxiously over his shoulder at the Battle of Barki. Finally, 41 Mountain Brigade (from poor, sad, battered 10 Division) and the Sikhs who had lost 150 men in the Battle of Barki, were moved in to reinforce 4 Mountain Division at Khem Karan when they were trying to win back the town, but it was too little too late, and even to deploy a tired, depleted 4 Sikh to spearhead an attack on an angry, aroused Pakistani redoubt around Khem Karan was an open invitation to trouble.

It is fair to say that the Khem Karan front was entirely managed by three officers; first, by Major General Gurbaksh Singh, notwithstanding his pessimism and his message to his Army Commander, as he carefully arranged his four surviving battalions to defend his fall-back position; second by Brigadier Theograj's inspiring leadership of the 1 Independent Armoured Brigade, and Salim Caleb's leadership of his Centurions in the 3 Cavalry.



> With regards to IA 6 Sep offensive...
> -It achieved tactical surprise.
> -However, it lacked finesse and boldness in its execution.
> -Best option would have been to stagger the attacks of 15 and 7 Divisions...this way the divisional reserves of PA 10 Division would have been employed against one IA prong, leaving the other prong with a free run.



Presumably 15 Div to go first, and focus all attention on themselves, and allow 7 Div to focus on the Barki axis, a battle that was hard-fought in the actual event, but that could have been easier to achieve for the Indian Army if part of the defenders had been diverted to the defence of Lahore.



> Undue caution remained the hallmark of Op Riddle. IA, since they did achieve surprise, had the potential to capture the important bridges over BRB / Ravi, but caution didnt help them.
> 
> There are couple of theories whether Lahore indeed was the intended objective for IA in 1965.
> 
> Couple of points which go in its favour are...
> -the plan of the IA to cross BRB and make a bridgehead doesnt make sense unless it was planned to go further towards Lahore.



I believe that Defence Minister's Chavan's War Diary provides some useful inputs, albeit not directly, but in terms of a commentary by his Private Secretary, R.D. Pradhan:



> _As soon as the conflict flared up, General Chaudhuri and the Directorate of Military Operations gave final touches to Operation Riddle planned as an offensive action to secure the eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal. *It was felt that the mere presence of the Indian troops on the canal opposite Lahore would draw Pakistani forces from Sialkot and other areas and thus reduce its offensive capabilities in other sectors. Moreover, if India could establish a bridgehead over the canal, the Pakistan Army would be forced to fight there and that would lead to the attrition of her smaller army. *By basing the defence line along the canal India would confine the war to Pakistani territory. Operation Riddle was planned to meet an eventuality like the one the Indians were facing on 4 September. That was the _next move _as noted by Chavan in his diary._


1965 War: The Inside Story
Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War
Chapter 7: Operation Riddle: Counter Offensive
pp34 onwards​I submit that an Army with its back to the wall is more likely to be thinking in terms of a desperate defensive measure than of an attack that will win the day. This is not only supported by the demonstrated defensive mind-set of Indian commanders, including the very temperamental and moody COAS, General Chaudhuri, but also by a consideration of the dates and the plans that revolved around dates and timing. Thus:



> _The bold plan originally envisaged that I and XI Corps would launch simultaneous offensives in the Sialkot and Lahore Sectors respectively. While the XI Corps would establish a defence line along the Ichhogil Canal, I Corps would establish itself along with the MRL._ *The success of Operation Riddle was based on a surprise attack on two sectors simultaneously. However, by 4th September the Indian troops in the Chhamb-Akhnur area had come under unbearable pressure and a diversionary attack had become desperately essential as Pakistani forces were poised to launch attack towards Akhnur.*



Whatever aggressive spirit had permeated the plan in its original form was wholly dissipated by the firm grip on the throat of Western Command that Operation Grand Slam had given General Malik.



> _After the reverses in the battle for Jaurian, the situation was getting desperate and the Indian commanders had to advance the attack by XI Corps for the night of 5/6 September, I Corps were still on the move to their concentration areas and Operation Riddle could not be launched as originally planned. Realising urgency, Chavan approved Chaudhuri's decision to launch the XI Corps into attack across the international border in the Punjab. This was a desperate move and carried high risks. Chavan recorded on 4 September that: _the step will change the complexion of the entire sitation. "If we fail - and I cannot even imagine of it - the Nation fails.



Quite clearly, Operation Riddle had been transmuted by circumstances into a desperate move to relieve pressure, from being a dagger thrust into the key location of Lahore.
​


> -PAF aircraft detected long convoys of engineer bridging vehicles east of Batapur. This indicates that IA wont stop at BRB but was planning to cross it for deeper objectives.



Considering that the bridge had been found collapsed only that morning, and considering that Hayde and his men had made their way across it, clearly if they had really seen such a sight, it would mean that a crossing had been pre-meditated, and it was not just a spur-of-the-moment opportunism by Brigadier Rikh.



> Some points which go against this theory....
> -Both divisions (7 and 15) did not employ their full potential. They attacked with only two brigades each.
> -Both these divisions were not having the required number of maps of this area, moreover, the maps which were available were outdated with old names.
> -Their maps did not have any details of BRB.
> -All attacking troops were employed from their line of march without rest or coordination which left them in no condition for operations across BRB*.
> -And then the formations employed were not the best which were available.**



This part is too full of speculative element really to conclude one way or the other.

* We have already read about the advancing of the date of the attack. Quite clearly, those formations - 62 Brigade travelling for 20 hours from Simla to Valtoha, then marching 12 kms. to its jumping off point, Deccan Horse travelling with the Division 320 kms from Ambala - had been warned and moved in a manner timely from point of view of an attack two or three days later, and had to move straight into battle.

** Too many mountain troops were summoned for duties in the plains; worse, they had no anti-tank resource and, worse still, had to face attacks by armoured units. 41 Mountain Brigade being a prime example.



> For IA, armor was the worst handled outfit. All attacks were led by infantry instead of armour. All the bridges could have been speedily captured by armor. Armor was also not employed as a punch but was distributed in packets.



Comment is superfluous.

The only good handling of armour was during the three-day battle of Asal Uttar.



> Coming to PA 10 Division.
> They overall mounted a good defence of their area. Their rehearsals and thorough briefing did pay off. Initial allocation of resources, initial dispositions and location was Divisional reserves were also sound.
> 
> The most outstanding feature of 10 Division battle was their sound perception of IA ops. For this Divisional staff should be lauded.
> 
> Launching of Divisional reserves (22 Brigade) within 48 hours from an unexpected direction not only reflects on the accurate reading of the battle but also GOC's boldness. Due to the aggressive posture of 10 Division, IA 15 Division was thrown off balance.
> 
> However, 10 Division made some mistake as well...like units were frequently broken and dished out. Dograi debacle could have been avoided if the integrity of 16 PR could have been ensured. Its depth company, which was from another unit, vacated the defences without informing 16 PR which had dire consequences later on.
> 
> PAF and PA artillery played their customary roles and were instrumental in all the engagements.





PanzerKiel said:


> A few words about the defending PA 11 Division.
> It was facing several problems of its own, since it had just been raised.
> - It was {ed.} not {end ed.}having its R&S unit.
> -It Engineer unit was short of all sorts of equipment, including bridges.
> -Signal unit was also short of communication sets.
> -It had no S&T unit.
> -6 Lancers, the divisional armor unit, was equipped with the older version of M47 tanks.
> -Divisional artillery was having mix calibres.



Comments by @PanzerKiel speak for themselves.



PanzerKiel said:


> Some reasons of 4 Mountain Division rout....
> -They were thrusted straight into battle after an almost 320 km journey.
> -No recce of their new area.
> -They were not given clear info about PA deployments.
> -Both its brigades were launched on a broad front front without any depth in their attack.
> -Both brigades had staggered H Hours.
> -Armor was misused as usual.
> -Artillery hardly intervened, was unable to silence PA artillery.



Again, further comment is superfluous.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Comments by @PanzerKiel speak for themselves.
> .



I just corrected my post....11 Div was NOT having its integral R&S unit.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> I just corrected my post....11 Div was NOT having its integral R&S unit.



Amended in the quoted portion.

These are amendments to portions earlier posted. Please consider them instead of the earlier posts. An effort has been made to reflect the time lines.

*THE INDIAN ATTACK: 62 BRIGADE*

At 05:30 on 6th September, three units moved out.

To the north, on the Khem Karan-Kasur Road, 9 J&K Rifles advanced to the bund, captured the near-side embankment, but could not cross over to the far-side embankment.

To the south, on the Ganda Singh Wala side, 13 Dogra had also got to their objectives.

There is a piece of Pakistani territory sticking into India just south of Khem Karan, and 18 Rajputana Rifles squeezed out that bulge, and, along with some policemen, occupied it.

This state of satisfaction did not last very long. There was a strong counter-attack on the Ganda Singh Wala side, after heavy shelling; the attacking infantry came in armoured personnel carriers supported by tanks, very sophisticated methods for the times! The Dogras were unable to call for artillery support because the artillery officers were missing, one wounded, the other untraceable. After losing men, they withdrew.

At night, the night of the 6th September, the situation worsened. Enemy shelling continued; the Dogra battalion retreated in disorder.

Meanwhile, further north, the Pakistani forces had broken out from a targeted location called Ballanwala, and outflanked the 9 J&K Rifles. The CO took 2 companies still in contact and retreated towards Div HQ at Valtoha. He had left behind two companies of the J&K Rifles; with the opposition swarming all around, there was no doubt that those two companies were in mortal danger.

There is an unexpected happy ending to report. The next day, the 7th September, as the division was regrouping around the village of Asal Uttar, Deccan Horse was asked to cover the movement of the infantry, and screen them. This they did to very great effect, and allowed the re-grouping to take place peacefully and efficiently. They also fished out the isolated two companies of the 9 J&K Rifles from the vicinity of the Rohi Nulla.

Before coming to this regrouping, one must continue the narrative where it had stopped.

By the evening of the 6th, all the victories of the morning had turned to ashes in the mouth of the CO 4 Mountain Division; not only was the Ganda Singh Walla position overrun, and the Dogras back at base, the Khem Karan- Kasur bridge capture had also had to be abandoned, as the position had been outflanked by a Pakistani break-out from Ballanwalla.

*THE INDIAN ATTACK: TRIAL BY FIRE FOR 7 BRIGADE*

But how did they break out? The Grenadiers had been assigned to capture and hold them; 7 Grenadiers were assigned to Ballanwala and got to within 50 m. of the target, but was driven back by very heavy artillery fire. Indian artillery could not mount counter-battery fire as the communications between the guns and the forward artillery officer was disrupted by the failure of the wireless set. For some unfathomable reason, the next target north, Theh Pannun, was assigned to 4 Grenadiers, but the one after that, the northernmost point, Waigal, was again to 7 Grenadiers.

Theh Pannun was reached, but the bridge could not be destroyed as the Engineer party had not come up in time. 4 Grenadier had to retreat under heavy fire.

Waigal again was reached by the tanks of a composite attack by armour and infantry, but the infantry couldn’t get through, again, due to very heavy artillery fire.

The picture was the same at the southern end, at Ballanwala, when by 21:00 HRS on the 6th night, 7 Grenadiers, backed by massive artillery fire, got to the Bund, but was shelled and machine-gunned very severely as they tried to cross the Nulla. They withdrew, and the badly shot-up detachment passed through other Indian Army lines and reached the Div HQ at Valtoha.

*KEEPING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AT BAY:
RE-GROUPING*

By this time, between 21:00 HRS (when the Grenadiers broke and retreated) and 02:00 HRS (on the 7th now, past midnight), when J&K Rifles split into two and their CO hustled the coherent portion back to safety, Major General Gurbaksh Singh had seen two sets of soldiers, the Dogras and 7 Grenadiers, arrive exhausted back at his HQ. He decided that this must mean that the Pakistani armour was in hot pursuit; it also meant that his own divisional artillery was in imminent danger of attack. He asked his artillery brigade commander, Brigadier J. S. Sandhu, to shell the rail and road bridges over the Rohi Nulla and the Canal, with everything he had. The brigadier was happy to oblige, and between 03:30 HRS, when the shelling started, and for the full day following, the 7th of September, there was no enemy activity. This allowed 4 Division to fall back in good order and to take up positions to receive that attack that had been forestalled by Brigadier Sandhu’s shelling.

The Divisional HQ shifted back 10 kms to the hamlet of Gharyala, and the remaining four battalions, 1/9 Gorkhas, 4 Grenadiers, who had come out of Theh Pannun under fire, two companies of 9 J&K Rifles, brought out in the nick of time from the mayhem on the Ruhi Nulla after being outflanked by the opposition breaking out of Ballanwala, and 18 Rajputana Rifles, vacating their position in the Pakistani enclave were arranged in defensive positions around the village of Asal Uttar.

*THE BATTLE OF ASAL UTTAR: THE HORSESHOE*

By 15:00 HRS, the Engineers had laid land mines all around the defensive positions of the infantry battalions. Before describing the battle that ensued in detail, over the three days of fighting that followed, some of the state of mind of the general officers involved on the Indian side needs to be depicted.

All the events described above took place on the 6th of September, and by the night, Major General Gurbaksh Singh felt the need for moral sustenance and sent a messenger to the Army Commander, stating, effectively, that 4 Mountain Division had cracked up. For Gurbaksh (gifted by the Guru) to seek help from Harbaksh (gifted by God) was quite appropriate, but the GOC-in-C, after having been woken up at 3 in the morning with this message, decided to check for himself before taking any action. In any case, it was not at all clear what he could call upon; at this time, the early hours of the 7th September, 15 Division was trying to keep its footing after the disastrous recall from Batapore, 7 Division had just been stopped short of its objectives, and would resume fighting only on the 10th, and 23 Mountain Division was still miles away, rushing along as best as it could. XV Corps could not help; it was just recovering from the tumultuous events of the previous four days of fighting, on the 1st, 3rd, 4th,and 6th, and needed time to recover. 41 Mountain Brigade, having been brushed aside by Pakistani armour during Grand Slam, needed time to recover its morale, and was useful only during the great re-shuffle that took place around the 15th of September.

On personal inspection, General Harbaksh Singh came to the conclusion that the situation could stand a little pressure even then, and no replacement of 4 Mountain Division was needed. [To be continued]

@meghdut 
@PanzerKiel
@blain2 
@Hachiman 
@TsAr 

Please note #281 has been uploaded with minor modifications to #276 and #277. The modifications consist of including a lot more data about time lines, ie, when and at what time did something happen.

When I was reading it from my sickbed, it seemed to be confusing for a reader to keep track of events, so these amendments were made. Hope it makes the narrative clearer.

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## Nilgiri

Joe Shearer said:


> @Nilgiri had done the maps during the ORBAT exercise, but it is not clear how much he will agree to spend time and effort on this, considering his increase work-load.



It will be done...just flesh out more points here (I still have to read + catch up a great bunch here), and you know where to reach me easily when you have say a concise word doc for location of units in say an engagement snapshot or set-piece analysis....mapping it will be easy as I already have the symbols and everything. 

I won't be going too advanced this time with the large reusable-orbat map concept etc, we will just zoom in to areas we want etc.

We can do it chronologically or we can do it by interest priority.

@jaibi @PanzerKiel 

Get better with your health in mean time my friend Joe. My free time on matter will likely also coincide well I feel down the road when we get more to the picture/visual bit after these current written commentaries/exchanges are largely completed.

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## Mumm-Ra

Nilgiri said:


> It will be done...just flesh out more points here (I still have to read + catch up a great bunch here), and you know where to reach me easily when you have say a concise word doc for location of units in say an engagement snapshot or set-piece analysis....mapping it will be easy as I already have the symbols and everything.
> 
> I won't be going too advanced this time with the large reusable-orbat map concept etc, we will just zoom in to areas we want etc.
> 
> We can do it chronologically or we can do it by interest priority.
> 
> @jaibi @PanzerKiel
> 
> Get better with your health in mean time my friend Joe. My free time on matter will likely also coincide well I feel down the road when we get more to the picture/visual bit after these current written commentaries/exchanges are largely completed.



That mapping will be a great service. Half the time I gotta open google maps to see which areas are being talked about. Good to have you back

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> Amended in the quoted
> embankment.
> 
> To the south, on the Ganda Singh Wala side, 13 Dogra had also got to their objectives.
> 
> There is a piece of Pakistani territory sticking into India just south of Khem Karan, and 18 Rajputana Rifles squeezed out that bulge, and, along with some policemen, occupied it.
> 
> This state of satisfaction did not last very long. There was a strong counter-attack on the Ganda Singh Wala side, after heavy shelling; the attacking infantry came in armoured personnel carriers supported by tanks, very sophisticated methods for the times! The Dogras were unable to call for artillery support because the artillery officers were missing, one wounded, the other untraceable. After losing men, they withdrew.
> 
> At night, the night of the 6th September, the situation worsened. Enemy shelling continued; the Dogra battalion retreated in disorder.
> 
> Meanwhile, further north, the Pakistani forces had broken out from a targeted location called Ballanwala, and outflanked the 9 J&K Rifles. The CO took 2 companies still in contact and retreated towards Div HQ at Valtoha. He had left behind two companies of the J&K Rifles; with the opposition swarming all around, there was no doubt that those two companies were in mortal danger.
> 
> There is an unexpected happy ending to report. The next day, the 7th September, as the division was regrouping around the village of Asal Uttar, Deccan Horse was asked to cover the movement of the infantry, and screen them. This they did to very great effect, and allowed the re-grouping to take place peacefully and efficiently. They also fished out the isolated two companies of the 9 J&K Rifles from the vicinity of the Rohi Nulla.
> 
> Before coming to this regrouping, one must continue the narrative where it had stopped.
> 
> By the evening of the 6th, all the victories of the morning had turned to ashes in the mouth of the CO 4 Mountain Division; not only was the Ganda Singh Walla position overrun, and the Dogras back at base, the Khem Karan- Kasur bridge capture had also had to be abandoned, as the position had been outflanked by a Pakistani break-out from Ballanwalla.
> 
> *THE INDIAN ATTACK: TRIAL BY FIRE FOR 7 BRIGADE*
> 
> But how did they break out? The Grenadiers had been assigned to capture and hold them; 7 Grenadiers were assigned to Ballanwala and got to within 50 m. of the target, but was driven back by very heavy artillery fire. Indian artillery could not mount counter-battery fire as the communications between the guns and the forward artillery officer was disrupted by the failure of the wireless set. For some unfathomable reason, the next target north, Theh Pannun, was assigned to 4 Grenadiers, but the one after that, the northernmost point, Waigal, was again to 7 Grenadiers.
> View attachment 647305
> 
> Theh Pannun was reached, but the bridge could not be destroyed as the Engineer party had not come up in time. 4 Grenadier had to retreat under heavy fire.
> 
> Waigal again was reached by the tanks of a composite attack by armour and infantry, but the infantry couldn’t get through, again, due to very heavy artillery fire.
> 
> The picture was the same at the southern end, at Ballanwala, when by 21:00 HRS on the 6th night, 7 Grenadiers, backed
> 
> When I was reading it from my sickbed, it seemed to be confusing for a reader to keep track of events, so these amendments were made. Hope it makes the narrative clearer.


Some addendums if I could

4 Mountain Divn attack was held of by 11 Inf Divn PA .
13 Dogra broke from PA counter attack supported by Tank and artillery fire
; and they broke again at the new defensive line at Nianwalla.

PA artillery fire was far super to the IA counterpart . They had much better quality of equipment and training. IA was usually outgunned most of the time.

Apart from Dogras Other battalions like 7 th Grenadiers, 9 Jak Rif and 18 Raj Rif were also cracking up. So the situation of 4 Mountain was desperate enough that the GOC suggested that 4 out of 6 units should be disbanded!(Fortunately for India the situation was somehow retrieved)

PA planned for OP Mailed Fist during 1964. It was to be unleashed when PA holding formations had blunted IA attacks and mostly stabilised the front. Then GHQ will unleash the premiere Armoured formation of PA against the most vulnerable point of IA s line.
With IA 4 mountain Divn in disarray now was the time for the PA counterstroke.
@Joe Shearer , @PanzerKiel

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## Joe Shearer

Useful.

As soon as my condition subsides sufficiently to allow me to knit together various strands, I will include these.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> Useful.
> 
> As soon as my condition subsides sufficiently to allow me to knit together various strands, I will include these.


Take Care Joe we can wait, with your approval may I add something more to the thread?

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## TsAr

Joe Shearer said:


> Useful.
> 
> As soon as my condition subsides sufficiently to allow me to knit together various strands, I will include these.


Get well soon...

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Take Care Joe we can wait, with your approval may I add something more to the thread?



Please do feel free, but please check with @PanzerKiel. He is our thought leader.

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## meghdut

@PanzerKiel Sir will it be fine if I add some observations of mine in this thread like the one above?

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## PanzerKiel

meghdut said:


> @PanzerKiel Sir will it be fine if I add some observations of mine in this thread like the one above?



Sure dear.

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## meghdut

Continuing the previous post

Op Mailed Fist was an ambitious plan whose objective may possibly be investing Amritsar. If Pakistan was able capture or even lay siege to Amritsar it may well have brought a favourable outcome to her war aims ; which neither Gibraltar nor Grand Slam could achieve. The plan was also kept as top secret even from senior officers till 6th September.
It also appears that IA was unable to locate the 1st Armd. Divn and thus was truly taken by surprise.
So it seems that the plan had a reasonably good chance of success, it achieved surprise, drove back attacking forces in disorder and pressed home with alacrity could very well keep the demoralised troops of 4th mtn under pressure and achieve its aims. Speed was vital for it’s success.
However just as Grand Slam PA again gave IA a breather. Khem Karan which was to be the launchpad for the armoured Blitzkrieg was captured only on 8th . This gave IA the vital time needed to gather up her battered units and stiffen them up for the upcoming invasion. It also gave India to make defensive preparations which as it turned out was just enough to blunt the only PA counterstroke of the war
@Joe Shearer ,@PanzerKiel

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## PanzerKiel

...
@Joe Shearer 
any plans for launch of PA riposte?


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## Pakistani Fighter

PanzerKiel said:


> any plans for launch of PA riposte?


What do you mean by this?


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## PanzerKiel

Pakistani Fighter said:


> What do you mean by this?



You may find your answer if you follow the thread.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> ...
> @Joe Shearer
> any plans for launch of PA riposte?



Yes Sir, although I am bed-ridden, I have finished the draft, and requested a friend to look through it; hope to upload the remaining portion covering XI Corps by tomorrow/day after. I am sorry about the delays, but it has been a difficult time.

The narrative is covered up to the failed attempts to attack Kasur once again, in the vain hope that there would be a numbed response.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Yes Sir, although I am bed-ridden, I have finished the draft, and requested a friend to look through it; hope to upload the remaining portion covering XI Corps by tomorrow/day after. I am sorry about the delays, but it has been a difficult time.
> 
> The narrative is covered up to the failed attempts to attack Kasur once again, in the vain hope that there would be a numbed response.



Do please get well soon.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Do please get well soon.



It's an incurable disease, dear Sir; it's old age! Even a year ago, I had twice this animation and energy. 

Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume,
labuntur anni, nec pietas moram
rugis et instanti senectae
adferet indomitaeque morti......

Alas, friend Postumus, 
The years glide swiftly by,
Nor will righteousness give pause,
To wrinkles, to advancing age,
Or to invincible Death.



Joe Shearer said:


> Yes Sir, although I am bed-ridden, I have finished the draft, and requested a friend to look through it; hope to upload the remaining portion covering XI Corps by tomorrow/day after. I am sorry about the delays, but it has been a difficult time.
> 
> The narrative is covered up to the failed attempts to attack Kasur once again, in the vain hope that there would be a numbed response.


How I wish I had made your acquaintance even a year earlier.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> How I wish I had made your acquaintance even a year earlier.




Like we discussed earlier as well....fate's intervention.

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## Joe Shearer

@meghdut

This is indicative of the kind of 'normalisation' we discussed. The Pakistan Army point of view has to be included to give us a balanced narrative. Note the impact on 15 Division in general, and on 16 Punjab in particular, as specific themes that need incorporation when dealing with 15 Division and with 7 Division.



PanzerKiel said:


> Coming to PA 10 Division.
> They overall mounted a good defence of their area. Their rehearsals and thorough briefing did pay off. Initial allocation of resources, initial dispositions and location was Divisional reserves were also sound.
> 
> The most outstanding feature of 10 Division battle was their sound perception of IA ops. For this Divisional staff should be lauded.
> 
> Launching of Divisional reserves (22 Brigade) within 48 hours from an unexpected direction not only reflects on the accurate reading of the battle but also GOC's boldness. Due to the aggressive posture of 10 Division, IA 15 Division was thrown off balance.
> 
> However, 10 Division made some mistake as well...like units were frequently broken and dished out. Dograi debacle could have been avoided if the integrity of 16 PR could have been ensured. Its depth company, which was from another unit, vacated the defences without informing 16 PR which had dire consequences later on.
> 
> PAF and PA artillery played their customary roles and were instrumental in all the engagements.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> @meghdut
> 
> This is indicative of the kind of 'normalisation' we discussed. The Pakistan Army point of view has to be included to give us a balanced narrative. Note the impact on 15 Division in general, and on 16 Punjab in particular, as specific themes that need incorporation when dealing with 15 Division and with 7 Division.


Okay I got it.

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## Joe Shearer

@meghdut 

Here we have an insight into the reasons for the success of IA 1 Independent Armoured Brigade, in the absence of the scouting and reconnaissance components of 11 Division. The weakness in engineering was the reason for the fatal delay of 7th September, that gap day between the driving back of 4 Mountain Infantry Division and mounting the overdue attack on the withdrawn infantry battalions in their new positions between Chima and Lakhna, around Mahmudpura. Note, too, that while the PA artillery was very aggressive in meeting the advance by IA infantry advancing towards Kasur, and engaged in trying to cross the Ruhi Nulla or the main canal, it was unable to provide quite the same assistance to the charging PA armour.



PanzerKiel said:


> A few words about the defending PA 11 Division.
> It was facing several problems of its own, since it had just been raised.
> - It was NOT having its R&S unit.
> -It Engineer unit was short of all sorts of equipment, including bridges.
> -Signal unit was also short of communication sets.
> -It had no S&T unit.
> -6 Lancers, the divisional armor unit, was equipped with the older version of M47 tanks.
> -Divisional artillery was having mix calibres.



@meghdut

Please note that some of this is thinking aloud, and ruminating on what @PanzerKiel has already written as commentary. If you have time, just read these.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> @meghdut
> 
> Here we have an insight into the reasons for the success of IA 1 Independent Armoured Brigade, in the absence of the scouting and reconnaissance components of 11 Division. The weakness in engineering was the reason for the fatal delay of 7th September, that gap day between the driving back of 4 Mountain Infantry Division and mounting the overdue attack on the withdrawn infantry battalions in their new positions between Chima and Lakhna, around Mahmudpura. Note, too, that while the PA artillery was very aggressive in meeting the advance by IA infantry advancing towards Kasur, and engaged in trying to cross the Ruhi Nulla or the main canal, it was unable to provide quite the same assistance to the charging PA armour.
> 
> 
> 
> @meghdut
> 
> Please note that some of this is thinking aloud, and ruminating on what @PanzerKiel has already written as commentary. If you have time, just read these.


 I followed this thread diligently till now. I read an interesting speculation by Sukhwant Singh. He speculates that both PA and IA were British trained , most of their Sr Officers were at that time KCIOs and so highly influenced by British style of warfare which favoured defensive approach, achieving overwhelming superiority in numbers and firepower and trade space for time till such conditions are met. Also whenever attacking use attrition rather than manoeuvre to achieve victory. 
He moreover argues that such tactic was bound to fail in short wars fought in the subcontinent hence was ill suited for both armies. He concludes saying that the same attitude actually bolstered the defensive potential of both armies at the cost of their offensive capabilities. So both performed better in defence than while attacking which manifested itself Asal Uttar and Chawinda battles to the less than satisfactory performance of both countries premier armoured formations.

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## Joe Shearer

@meghdut

These showed up, as we see, in the narration itself, vividly.



PanzerKiel said:


> A word about 4 Mountain Division...
> 
> Their orders were
> -secure area east of BRB
> -destroy bridge on Khem Karan-Kasur road.
> -Contain any PA offensive.





> 4 Mountain Division had also its fair share of problems...
> -It had only two brigades*.
> -It was a mountain division, not trained or organized to fight in the plains**.
> -They had 75 mm RRs instead of 105/106...moreover these they had only at the rate of 4/unit instead of normal 6/unit**.
> -9 H was placed under command at the last moment, once they started their move, therefore no coordination or marrying up could be done^.
> -Its artillery was ill-organized for giving fire support in plains***.



The reasons for the disastrous attacks by 4 Mountain Division are very clearly outlined by these points.

(*)Lower than normal strength of infantry;
(**) Not organised for plains fighting;
(***)Artillery uncertain about plains conditions;
(^) No coordination with Deccan Horse (General Vaidya's regiment), who fought very well on their own in the rescue of the isolated two companies of Dogras, and in shielding the defeated infantry formations digging in, but as isolates, not as a coordinated, integrated effort.
We learn from this that if some few factors on the PA side had come together, we might have had a different situation altogether.



meghdut said:


> I followed this thread diligently till now. I read an interesting speculation by Sukhwant Singh. He speculates that both PA and IA were British trained , most of their Sr Officers were at that time KCIOs and so highly influenced by British style of warfare which favoured defensive approach, achieving overwhelming superiority in numbers and firepower and trade space for time till such conditions are met. Also whenever attacking use attrition rather than manoeuvre to achieve victory.
> He moreover argues that such tactic was bound to fail in short wars fought in the subcontinent hence was ill suited for both armies. He concludes saying that the same attitude actually bolstered the defensive potential of both armies at the cost of their offensive capabilities. So both performed better in defence than while attacking which manifested itself Asal Uttar and Chawinda battles to the less than satisfactory performance of both countries premier armoured formations.



Reasonable, but please recall the comment - can't remember the exact location - about the PA being better in attack and the IA being better in defence. Or did I imagine that? It sounds so apt.

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## Joe Shearer

Joe Shearer said:


> All the events described above took place on the 6th of September, and by the night, Major General Gurbaksh Singh felt the need for moral sustenance and sent a messenger to the Army Commander, stating, effectively, that 4 Mountain Division had cracked up. For Gurbaksh (gifted by the Guru) to seek help from Harbaksh (gifted by God) was quite appropriate, but the GOC-in-C, after having been woken up at 3 in the morning with this message, decided to check for himself before taking any action.



There is an error here. It was Lt. Gen. J. S. Dhillon, GOC, XI Corps, who concluded that 4 Mountain Infantry Division was beaten and needed replacement. Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh of 4 Mountain Infantry Division, had NOT written off his own command, and was working hard to set up defences against the inevitable PA riposte. When Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh arrived on the scene, Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh was busy repairing his defences.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> @meghdut
> 
> Here we have an insight into the reasons for the success of IA 1 Independent Armoured Brigade,.


Hey Joe it was 2nd IAB

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Hey Joe it was 2nd IAB



LOL.

So sorry. 

The effects of too much headache, too little sleep and seeing an alphabet soup of military abbreviations.

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## meghdut

@PanzerKiel , Just talked with @Joe Shearer , he has already finished with the Asal Uttar battle and wants to put some finishing touches. Unfortunately he has lost network connections completely since morning and can’t even access PDF ( and anything else for that matter) . He wishes to upload it tomorrow if possible and asked me to inform you and other interested members and apologies for the delay.

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## Joe Shearer

Just got back my connection twenty minutes ago. Will upload to you, @meghdut, for verification, so that an error-free account can be uploaded to PDF. I am five days behind, but will try to make up. The Bajwa and Harbaksh Singh books will help only in the next phase, as it will slow things down if I am to try and read them and make sense of them for the present. 

Thanks to all for bearing with me.

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## Joe Shearer

*RECAPITULATION: BEFORE THE BATTLE*

To recapitulate:

On the 6th of September, the 62 Brigade of 4 Mountain Infantry Division attacked to the south-west, targeting the bund over the Ruhi Nulla on the main road, and another point on the road going off at an angle to the main road, going to Ganda Singh Wala.

It was also, as a second phase, to go beyond the bunds and reach the Ichhogil Canal from Ballanwala to Ganda Singh Wala, acting in concert with 7 Brigade, that was to reach the Canal further north, in the stretch between Ballanwala and Bedian.

For this, 62 Brigade had three battalions of its own, 9 J&K Rifles, 13 Dogras and 18 Rajputana Rifles, and one battalion from the other brigade, 7 Brigade,1/9 Gorkha Rifles, and also the armoured component, 9 Horse, the Deccan Horse, so, four infantry battalions and an armoured regiment. 9 J&K was to go for the bund on the Ruhi Nulla on the main road Khem Karan - Kasur, 13 Dogra were to take the southern section on the Ganda Singh Wala side. 18 Rajrif were assigned to squeeze out an enclave to the south of the firm ground around Khem Karan; 1/9 Gorkhas remained under the Divisional command for the time being.

62 Brigade won early gains, on the 6th September morning, and lost it all by the evening. 9 J&K Rifles got to the nearside embankment of the bund, but could not cross the Nulla or capture the far side emba/nkment against the heavy and concentrated artillery and tank fire. The Dogras, getting their objectives on the Nulla in the morning, lost it at 13:00 HRS to a mechanised infantry and tank push, preceded by an artillery barrage. We have seen, in the commentary on the action, the unfamiliarity of the artillery component to offering supporting fire in the plains, and to operating in the plains in general. The artillery officers with the battalion could not help; one was wounded, the other missing. By night, the battalion was defeated and retreated; even their firm base was abandoned, and the path was open for the Pakistani counter-attack.

9 J&K Rifles, sheltering around the near-side embankment of the Ruhi Nalla, were victims of the debacle further north. First, 7 Grenadiers, attacking Ballanwala, were repelled by heavy artillery fire. Again, there was no supporting fire from their own artillery, and this time, the problem was with the wireless. Later, in the afternoon, another attack did not come off. Second, 4 Grenadiers attacking Theh Pannun, reached the Canal, but could not blow up the bridge as the Engineering detachment did not turn up. Third, even further north, another team of 7 Grenadiers, supported by a troop of tanks, attacked Waigai; the tanks survived the shelling, the infantry could not brave it, the tanks alone could not hold it, so the party retreated. Fourth, a second attack by 7 Grenadiers on Ballanwala, supported by divisional artillery (mountain artillery fighting in the plains), got them to the eastern, near-side embankment of the Nulla, but heavy firing by Pakistani defenders, using machine guns and mortars, prevented them from going further; the intention was to cross the Nulla and the bund beyond, the western, far-side bund. Under heavy fire, they retreated right up to the Division HQ in Valtoha.

The path lay open for the PA to advance from Kasur or from any point on the Icchogil Canal that was bridged, and then after any bridge on the Nulla.

When the attack came, it was not a frontal attack. Pakistani armour burst out of the Ballanwala bridge at 02:00 HRS; the way ahead directly towards Khem Karan was clear, but the force made a sharp turn parallel to the Nulla it had just crossed, and outflanked the J&K Rifles formation guarding the eastern approach to the bridge across the Nulla on the Kasur-Khem Karan Road. Now this road, too, was open for PA armour to cross over.

The riflemen were split into two by the attack; the CO retreated with two companies, but they lost touch with each other in the darkness and reached Division HQ at Valtoha in bits and pieces. The other two companies, left behind in the confusion, were happily rescued during the course of the day by Deccan Horse.

Major General Gurbaksh Singh had the mortification of seeing two separate battalions, 7 Grenadiers and 9 J&K Rifles, scrambling to reach his HQ position searching for safety. He ordered his divisional artillery commander to target the bridges over the Nulla and, behind it to the West, over the Canal.

The Indian accounts believe that this stemmed the Pakistani advance just sufficiently long enough for 4 Mountain Division to re-group. The Pakistani account points to heavy damage to the Ichhogil Canal bridge due to a tank accident.

The pause enabled Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh to arrange his battered and defeated infantry battalions into a defensive position around Asal Uttar, while he himself shifted his divisional headquarters from Valtoha to Gharyala. The formations were the 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, 4 Grenadiers, 9 J&K Rifles (2 companies at first, 2 more on rescue by Deccan Horse), 13 Dogras and 18 Rajputana Rifles. A minefield was laid around infantry positions by the Engineers, under cover of the tank regiment.

The Deccan Horse shielded these activities, and also rescued 2 companies of 9 J&K Rifles from their precarious position on the Ruhi Nulla, where they had been left behind during the precipitate withdrawal of the other half of the battalion.

With the infantry in place, with their artillery well located and with the integral armour in the shape of the Deccan Horse, 4 Mountain Infantry Division was as ready as it could be, to receive any assault at arms. However, as a matter of abundant precaution, 2 Independent Armoured Brigade was also assigned to keep a watching brief from an immediately rearward location.



*THE PAKISTAN ARMY PLAN: BRIDGEHEAD, BREAKTHROUGH, 
EXPLOITATION*

In simple terms, the Pakistan Army plan was a classic:


an Infantry Division reinforced by additional armour would break into Indian defences and form a bridgehead;
a strong Armoured Division would then pass through and break out through the weakened Indian perimeter;
in the final step, the Armoured Division would travel at speed through undefended Indian hinterland, reaching strategic objectives rapidly.
So Major General Abdul Hamid’s 11 Infantry Division would undertake the first step. It consisted of a strong line-up of two infantry brigades and a strong Patton-tank equipped armoured regiment; it would be reinforced by another Armoured Brigade to assault the Indian defences.

The break through by a strong Armoured Division was assigned to the crack 1 Armoured Division. Commanded by Major General Nasir Ahmed Khan, this division had five regiments, organised as three brigades.

In the exploitation phase, those three brigades would take their own individual routes forward, ensuring that the enemy was continuously under pressure on one or the other front. The routes were formed around initial objectives; the first, the Sutlej bridge over Harike, to be reached the first day (45 kms from Kasur, 35 kms from Khem Karan, as the crow flies); the second, Jandiala Guru, east of Amritsar (45 kms from Harike); the third, the bridge over the Beas (50 kms from Harike), both to be reached on the second day. In other words, in rough daily transit of 40 to 50 kms at a time, not particularly out of reach for M-47 or M-48s, representing perhaps two hours each of unopposed passage, the objectives would be reached, and the next stage of break-out could be decided.

Apart from completely outflanking XI Corps, and finding its way to within 20 kms of the sensitive Sikh centre of Amritsar, to defend which every Sikh in sight would have abandoned whatever he was doing and rushed back, this would find the column, on the second day, in a line with Ludhiana and Chandigarh, equidistant between Srinagar and Delhi, and on the lines of communications between the rest of India and her bases at Udhampur (200 kms) and Pathankot (140 kms).

At the time that the plan might have been made, there might not have been any concrete information available about the Indian I Corps; so this would have looked like an upsized Grand Slam, hooking around Amritsar instead of Jammu, and isolating not just XV Corps, but XI Corps as well.

*A quick aside about the topography. *

There were two roads out of Khem Karan, one leading to Bhikhiwind, one angled further right to Patti. Asal Uttar, on which village the 4 Mountain Infantry Division defences were based, lies about 5 kms out of Khem Karan on the road to Patti. It is important to know this because Indian deployment was on this crossbar, the Lakhna – Chima Kalan Road. The heavy fighting took place in the region between Asal Uttar and these two villages that are about 11 kms apart.

*Interlude: Orientation and the roads around the battlefield *The road from Khem Karan to Amritsar is 60 kms, running north by north-east. Five or six kms up the road is the turn to the village of Asal Uttar, as mentioned before; another twenty kms. up is the town of Bhikhiwind, hence the name the Bhikhiwind Road.

On turning right on the Bhikhiwind Road, Asal Uttar is two and a half kilometres away. That road then turns left and heads towards Patti, about twenty five to twenty six kms.away, angling away from the Bhikhiwind Road in the north-east direction. This is what is referred to in the literature as the Bhikhiwind axis, and the Patti axis. The Patti Road also contains, quite close to Asal Uttar, the earlier HQ of 4 Division, Valtoha, and further on the road, towards Patti, the shifted HQ, at Gharyala.

About 20 kms from Asal Uttar, to the right of the Patti Road, is the village of Chima (look for Chima Kalan on Google Maps; Cheema takes you far, far away). To the left of the Patti Road is the other village of Lakhna. Set in a little, it is 5 kms further away from Khem Karan than Chima Kalan. One can imagine the Khem Karan – Patti road as the upright of a ‘T’, and the road connecting Lakhna and Chima Kalan, at right angles to the Khem Karan – Patti Road, would be the crossbar of the ‘T’.

While 4 Mountain Infantry Division had arranged its forces around Asal Uttar, 2 Independent Armoured Brigade was further back, strung out in a north-westerly direction, originally facing towards Khem Karan, between the villages of Chima Kalan and Lakhna. These two are located on the south side and the north side of the road leading from Bhikhiwind to Harike, so effectively, we have a triangle: the base being this road, one side, ending in Asal Uttar, starting from Bhikhiwind; the other side, also ending in Asal Uttar, starting from the intersection of the Bhikhiwind-Harike Road with the Patti road.

*THE BATTLE OF ASAL UTTAR - 8TH TO 10TH SEPTEMBER*

*On the 8th September *A preliminary probing attack was launched by Chaffee tanks on the morning of the 8th; they advanced under artillery cover along the Khem Karan – Bhikhiwind axis, and kept advancing even against Indian artillery, and stopped only when brought under fire by the Sherman tanks of Deccan Horse. Since a frontal attack seemed to be likely to face strong opposition, the attacking force split into smaller groups to outflank the firmed up infantry positions. They were fairly successful, and at one stage had surrounded the 1/9 Gorkhas, the 9 J&K Rifles and 62 Brigade HQ. Deccan Horse, in their hyperactive style, came in and mounted a counter-attack, and managed to stall the Chaffee contingent.

But this was a probing attack; the main attack came in the afternoon of the 8th with Patton tanks that overran the 1/9 Gorkhas positions; 4 Grenadiers intervened and knocked out 4 tanks, but that did not stop the bulldozing charge of the MBTs, who broke through all obstacles and overran the trenches of the Grenadiers; they also got into the positions of 18 Rajasthan Rifles, and endangered 7 Brigade HQ.

At this stage, the first of several interventions by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade occurred. 3 Cavalry under Lt. Col. Salim Caleb, stepped in. They had been positioned in the Chima Kalan – Lakhna area, and their intervention cost the attacking force 4 Pattons and a Chaffee. The attack then probed the area to the west of this encounter.

By end of day on the 8th, the PA had successfully advanced from the line of the Ruhi Nulla into the former positions of the 4 Mountain Infantry Division, just before the village of Asal Uttar, and had been probing the prepared defensive positions of the Indians, frequently overrunning the Indian defences, but did not make a break-through; the Chaffees were thwarted by Deccan Horse with its Shermans, the Pattons were halted by 3 Cavalry, fighting Centurions.

*On the 9th September *The Pakistani attack started at 02:00 HRS. 2 Independent Armoured Brigade had moved its other components into place beside 3 Cavalry into two sickle-shaped formations between Chima Kalan and Lakhna, even before the formal assignment of his brigade to the command of 4 Mountain Infantry Division.

When the attack took place, in spite of heavy artillery, tank and infantry fire from all hands in 4 Div, the tanks kept moving forward, until they hit the minefield laid by the engineers. However, there was to be only minor respite; during the first half of the daylight hours, there were probing attacks, as well as aerial attack.

The heavy all-arms attack came in the afternoon.

First, the softening up. PA artillery opened fire, there was aerial attack as well, for an hour. Then the armour advanced, attacking 18 Rajrif from three directions in their outlying positions. A fierce battle broke out, and the tanks sought to come into redoubts of 18 Rajrif. Indian artillery and armour lay down very heavy defensive fire, but it could not stop the attack. This bitter, close quarters battle continued for some time until Pakistani armour came so deep into the defences of the infantry that relatively close-range weapons came into play. Recoilless rifles and, later, rocket launchers were fired. The attack finally let up at 22:00 HRS.

*On the 10th September *For a third day in succession, there was a determined effort to break through.


Brigadier Theograj had positioned his 2 Independent Armoured Brigade with the previous two days’ experiences in mind. 8 Cavalry with its AMX 13 light tanks was positioned on the flanks of the layout; it was hoped that this would funnel the Pakistani armour towards the Centurions lined up to meet their advance.

From their movements, it was apparent that the Pakistani armour was trying to outflank the defensive positions by moving north parallel to the Ruhi Nulla, to attack them from behind. However, this had been anticipated, as the main approach through the Bhikhiwind Road had already been reasonably well defended, and an attack on the Indian left flank was also difficult; there was no way to penetrate deep enough across the front of the line of Indian defences to take the attack to the right, to the Indian left flank, that was guarded by another Nulla. Only a deep penetration on the left, that is, on the Indian right flank, remained.

As an outcome of this deconstruction of the tactical alternatives left to the Pakistani forces, and in anticipation of a deep attack down the Indian right flank, along the Nulla, the Nulla had been breached and the water let out, making the fields soggy and muddy and very difficult to traverse for tank, for wheeled vehicle or foot soldiers. There was the additional handicap of the battlefield in general, a factor already mentioned, the high standing crops that took away the range advantage of the Pakistani tanks’ guns, and that allowed their own progress to be tracked by the visible movement of wireless masts on the tanks.

This prompted the Indians to adopt two tactics to address the Pakistani tanks: it was assumed that any infantry might accompany them would be fought off by the Indian infantry. The first was to fire upon the tanks from the Centurions, the moment they emerged from concealment in the cane; the second was to let loose hunter-killer teams with recoilless rifles mounted on 4 wheel drive vehicles, to search for targets of opportunity.

The 4 Grenadiers found themselves under attack first of all, by a battalion of infantry backed up by armour. The tanks managed to overrun some of the trenches, but by their very nature, could not find the main defences. When the 3 Cavalry realised how close the Pattons had got, they advanced, and a melee ensued. This was when Havildar Major Abdul Hamid destroyed three tanks in succession before being shot by the fourth.

It was at this point of the battle that Maj. Gen. Nasir Ahmed Khan, Divisional Commander, 1 Armoured Division (P), was injured by shellfire. He went forward with his reconnaissance team to a very advanced position on the Bhikhiwind Road. Having given his location on a clear message over the radio, he was attacked by a 4 Grenadier raiding party, and also by a very accurate salvo by 4 Division divisional artillery. He was injured, and his divisional artillery commander was killed.

With their thrust down the Bhikhiwind Road being unsuccessful, the next Pakistani effort came on the Patti Road that 10th evening. This push came close to 62 Brigade HQ, but was repelled by 7 Grenadiers, who stepped up in defence, but paid a heavy price, losing four officers in this counter-attack.

By 22:00 HRS, the Pakistani armour started retreating. For all purposes the Battle of Asal Uttar was over.

*Afterword: *Almost all the battalions of 4 Mountain Infantry Division had proved unable to overcome the impossible odds set them, to tackle fighting in the plains with inadequate artillery organisation or provision, with no anti-tank weapons, or ad hoc supplies almost on the field of battle, and in the teeth of heavy artillery fire and air attack.

13 Dogra was the first; 9 J&K Rifles, with its CO unable to take the strain, broke and ran; 1/9 Gorkha Rifles let down Gorkha tradition by simply melting away from the battlefield, later, once re-grouped, offering little or no resistance to enemy armour attacks; 4 Grenadier and 7 Grenadier both failed to press home attacks, albeit attacks in the teeth of determined opposition, but made up with their stout resistance once reformed and set to defend. The only battalion to emerge with self-esteem intact was the Rajputana Rifles.

The Deccan Horse, under Vaidya, managed to be in six different places at once, and was fortunate that these six places were neither contested hotly by the enemy, nor were subjected to sustained attack.

The unit that distinguished itself at all times in all ways was the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade. They were always ahead of the curve, anticipating both turns in the battle and higher command instructions – Brigadier Theograj had taken up defensive positions to protect the remainder of 4 Division even before receiving orders placing him under Gurbaksh Singh. 3 Cavalry, in particular, shone; its CO, Salim Caleb, went on to Major General rank when he retired.

I have not commented on the Pakistan Army units as this paper is about the Indian Army, and addresses the question of why it failed to win outright victories, given its significant advantages.

*THE BATTLE OF KHEM KARAN*

What followed this remarkable turn-around by a defeated Division was tragic. Until the ceasefire was declared, Indian forces tried to recapture Khem Karan, and Pakistani forces resisted them every inch of the way.

There were three phases of these events:


An attack on Khem Karan by the Indian Army, with the 2 Mahars and 4 Sikhs on the 11th night/12th afternoon, that led to their being repulsed;
Several minor actions against enemy positions north-west and south-east of Khem Karan around the 12th/13th, and actions against enemy pockets north-west of Chima (that shows how deep the PA had penetrated) on 15th September;
A final attack on the night of the 21st /22nd September that was not pressed home with much determination, and gained little.
Then the ceasefire intervened.

Immediately after the three-and-a-half days of terrible struggle of the Battle of Asal Uttar, the respective commanders’ thoughts must have turned to the next outlook. On the Pakistani side, the impact of the Indian I Corps threatening movements would be occupying their entire attention; in contrast to the units involved under XI Corps, or those under XV Corps, I Armoured Division under the reputed Rajinder Singh would have been a formidable psychological prospect. The Kasur-Khem Karan movement, in contrast, was a brilliant move, but it did not succeed. Nobody could have predicted the Lazarus-like revival of the Indian infantry battalions that were so brutally treated and dismissed during their own attempts at aggression against all reason; all but 13 Dogra made their appearance in the stout defence put up as Asal Uttar, all but 1/9 Gorkhas played their bit in the stormy three days that ensued. There were tragedies, there were comic interludes, to the extent that the grim task of war permits comedy, but from the Indian side, the outstanding images that remain are three – of Rajrif fighting it out toe to toe with formidable Pakistani attacking forces, favoured by the Pakistani brigadier’s repeated recalls to laager, of a promoted Havildar reverted to his platoon, taking on four tanks in a group single-handed, with no doubt in anyone’s mind that ultimately, he would have to pay the price, and a sharp and intelligent tactical decision by a regimental commander and his equally shrewd brigadier to convert the local conditions to suit them, and meeting their opponents’ technically superior equipment with plain, simple but well-rehearsed equipment use.

On the Pakistani side, there is a tragic story of outstanding valour and initiative at the regimental and battalion level, let down by the command failures of their general staff. That is a story for PanzerKiel to tell.

As the two forces faced each other, after the fighting on the 10th September, the uppermost thought in Indian minds was the recovery of Khem Karan. On the very next night after the climactic battle at Asal Uttar, the night of the 11th / 12th September, 7 Brigade was asked to take up the recovery of Khem Karan.

The order of battle had changed.

The ferociously effective 2 Independent Armoured Brigade had been shifted to the area of 15 Infantry Division to bolster the sagging fortunes of that division. In its place, in a manner of speaking, 4 Mountain Infantry Division had got two reinforcements – 2 Independent Armoured Brigade had left behind 2 Mahars, and 4 Sikhs were brought away from 7 Division’s battle at Barki. What people didn’t realise was the 4 Sikhs had made a mark at Barki against heavy odds, and had suffered serious casualties – some 150 dead, wounded or taken prisoner. They should have been rested but when the CO was asked by the Colonel of the Sikh Regiment, that outstanding Sikh chief of Western Command, if he and his men would celebrate the anniversary of Saragarhi by leading the attack, that man felt unable to demur. So they were to go ahead and to get to a point east of Khem Karan before dawn, and wait for the hammer to fall on them acting as anvil; that hammer was to be 2 Mahar, advancing to the right of the town, to the point where the Khem Karan distributary crossed the Bhikhiwind Road, to link up with the Sikhs. 9 J&K Infantry, in spite of its tribulations, overrun by Pakistani armour as it sheltered behind the east bank of the Ruhi Nulla, half of them fled with their CO to safer climes in the vicinity of the Brigade HQ, the abandoned half rescued by Deccan Horse and the enthusiastic Col. Vaidya, was to be in reserve.

4 Sikhs faced tragedy. They got to a suitable point east of Khem Karan, but found themselves next to a sleeping tank laager of Pakistani tanks. They deployed nearby, and the inevitable followed; the CO and more than half the battalion were captured, the rest were casualties.

2 Mahar fared no better. They attacked the outposts, supported by Deccan Horse tanks, and reached the canal distributary, but got no further; there, they were strafed by the PAF, shelled by the PA artillery, lost eight tanks and generally had a terrible morning, on the 12th.

The divisional commander persisted in his attack. The 9 J&K were brought out from reserve, and, together with two troops each of Deccan Horse and 3 Cavalry, attacked again; it didn’t work. They achieved the crossing of the distributary of the canal, and one tank troop reached the outskirts of Khem Karan, but under PAF attack and heavy artillery fire, the rest of the group retreated and the troop that had gone forward was taken prisoner.


_Several minor actions against enemy positions north-west and south-east of Khem Karan around the 12th/13th, and actions against enemy pockets north-west of Chima (that shows how deep the PA had penetrated) on 15th September;_
2 Independent Armoured Brigade reverted to 4 Division at this time, on the 12th. With their help, some positions to the north-west and to the south-east of Khem Karan were cleared. This did not make the slightest difference to the status of Khem Karan.

*Reorganised Order of Battle *

4 Mountain Infantry Division –

+ 29 Brigade 
+ 41 Mountain Infantry Brigade
+ 48 Brigade (from 7 Division)

- 7 Brigade
___________________________________________________________________

29 Brigade

1/5 Gorkha Rifles
2 Madras
+ 13 Dogras

41 Mountain Infantry Brigade

1/8 Gorkha Rifles
3/4 Gorkha Rifles
15 Kumaon

62 Brigade

9 J&K Rifles
18 Rajputana Rifles
- 13 Dogras

One point to observe is the composition of this mountain brigade; except for 2 Madras, all battalions were either hillmen or rifle regiments (18 Rajputana Rifles) – the Gorkhas were, of course, both hillmen and riflemen.


_A final attack on the night of the 21st /22nd September that was not pressed home with much determination, and gained little._
With this reorganised order of battle, 4 Division sought to make another attempt to recover Khem Karan. However, it was trying to do so with very tired troops. 13 Dogras had been handled very roughly at the preliminary stages of the attack on Kasur; 15 Kumaon had had the unpleasant experience of being swept to one side during the developing phases of Grand Slam; 9 J&K Rifles had suffered a CO who had left his battalion to fend for itself when surprised by Pakistani armour debouching over the bridge over the Ruhi Nulla at Ballanwala; 18 Rajputana Rifles had fought very fiercely during Asal Uttar and had been overrun at least once by Pakistani armour, although they had recovered gallantly.

The plan was made for 41 Brigade to capture Khem Karan outright during the night of the 21st (revised date; the original could not be kept). With the core of the town in hand, the outskirts, east of the town and along the distributary, were to be cleaned up by 29 Brigade immediately thereafter.

The attack was not a success.

None of the battalions pressed home the attack with anything like determination; on the contrary, Pakistani counter-attacks were desperate affairs, mounted with fierce determination, and making no difference that losses were suffered.

*CEASEFIRE*

A ceasefire, effective from 03:30 HRS on 23rd September, was agreed by both sides.

@PanzerKiel @Cuirassier @jaibi @meghdut

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## meghdut

Some points of note in this battle are -

There was intelligence failure in not having been able to locate the crack 1 AD . That failure led to the initial debacle while trying to attack.

It also showed that yet again infantry if not properly supported cannot itself prevail against determined defence well covered by artillery and with armour reserves backing it up. 4 mtn was ill equipped to conduct offensive operations, with inadequate artillery, less than normal allocation of AT resource (4 rcl against normal 6). Moreover they trained to operate the lighter 57mm rcl not the heavy 106 and it ought to have caused avoidable confusion on the eve of attack.

4 mtn trained to operate in mountainous Himalayan terrain suitable for infantry operations but not conducive to large scale armoured operations being conducted on this theatre. To use such a unit who was untrained for the terrain also under strength (2 Bde vs normal 3) reflects poorly on Indian offensive preparations. That it was incapable of effective offensive was reflected in it’s subsequent bungling of attacks on Khem Karan. It should however must be pointed out that it did performed admirably well in defensive operations around Asal Uttar, which may have been the way it was trained to operate all along.

Lastly 4 mtn did break from the initial combined arms assaults it faced. S. Singh states that it was the 1st time IA infantrymen were facing major armoured push( Grand Slam was only 2 Patton Regt) and the initial shock may have contributed to the rout. Fortunately however the situation was rectified and the reprieve it got on 7th gave the formation ample time to overcome the initial panic and also receive some morale boost in form of 2 IAB, which if provided earlier may not have resulted in such a fiasco in the first place.

@Joe Shearer ,@PanzerKiel

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Lastly 4 mtn did break from the initial combined arms assaults it faced. S. Singh states that it was the 1st time IA infantrymen were facing major armoured push( Grand Slam was only 2 Patton Regt) and the initial shock may have contributed to the rout.



A good point, but the Indian Army top leadership knew about the artillery and the armour, and the proposal for pentomic organisation, that the Americans had brought in. We had Centurions (as well as AMX 13 and Sherman light tanks). Why were the exercises inoculating our troops against armoured attack missing?

Similarly, on @PanzerKiel's point about readiness to face air attack: we are, even today, unprepared for defending against aerial attacks.

Instead of grand field manoeuvres involving large numbers of MBTs, how come we do not practice these aspects? starting from defence against air attacks, and night-fighting, and close coordination with the Air Force?



meghdut said:


> Grand Slam was only 2 Patton Regt



Even that frazzled the nerves of 15 Kumaon.

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## kongn

Possibly the worst defeat in pakistani military history with huge local superiority in armour and artillery,4-5 patton regiments plus chaffees were defeated by a single centurion regiment plus some obsolete shermans and jeeps.AMX were spectators.


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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> There was intelligence failure in not having been able to locate the crack 1 AD . That failure led to the initial debacle while trying to attack.



What worries me as an Indian is that there still seems to be an asymmetry in intelligence gathering quantity and quality. It is not at all clear that Indian Military Intelligence knows what it needs to know about the Pakistani order of battle. There have been lots of purchases of surplus and redundant armour from other nations; what are these destined for? Are new units being formed, for instance, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders? Are old units being strengthened? Are old units being revived by replacement of what is felt to be less effective?

Certainly professional intelligence gathering will not be reported in the media, but information tends to seep out, and the usual suspects who make a living out of speculative reporting on neighboring military developments would have had tons to say about anything significant that is discovered. Their silence seems to mean that little has been discovered. Or, at the very least, that such discoveries will not make headline or TRP-worthy news.



kongn said:


> Possibly the worst defeat in pakistani military history with huge local superiority in armour and artillery,4-5 patton regiments plus chaffees were defeated by a single centurion regiment plus some obsolete shermans and jeeps.AMX were spectators.



Quite right.

What we should worry about is that this was an unexpected defeat, that this went 'against the run of play', so to speak. There was every rational reason to believe that the superior technology would prevail.

Therefore, what is important is to analyse how it happened, not merely what happened.

It is equally important to find out why mountain troops were committed to a battle where their defeat was assured; we cannot afford to forget that the preliminary to this battle was the routing of Indian attacks on the Pakistani positions, on the Ruhi Nulla, and on the Ichhogil Canal.

For that matter, we cannot afford to forget, either, that the aftermath to this 'worst defeat in pakistani military history' was followed by another dismal performance in attacking Pakistani positions in and around Khem Karan and trying to recover these from the same defeated forces that were actually reduced to bolster Pakistani defences in the Sialkot area.

Another cause for concern is the very long passages, 200 kms. at a time, that Indian troops had to traverse to get to battle, that they entered straight out of the trains, without rest, a pause for equipment, or time for briefing or orientation. An armoured team travelled from Ambala to Valtoha, another infantry formation moved from the Himachal hills to the same theatre; these are the weak points that we need to address, as these (the distance between cantonment and battle-field) remain, both on our western flank and on the northern.

@kongn

I hope Indians examining these events will agree that what took place was due to an intention to prevent failures, as much as to produce successes - a policy, in game theory terms, of Minimax, not of Maximin. It sounds faint-hearted, but as @jbgt90 has never tired of pointing out in his rare posts, this was the first of the three major renovations that the Indian military (distinct from the Air Force and from the Navy) underwent.

On a frivolous note, it was, and is, Pakistani policy that followed Maximin. As a pacifist formerly engaged in defence services, my hope is that that will remain so.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> What worries me as an Indian is that there still seems to be an asymmetry in intelligence gathering quantity and quality. It is not at all clear that Indian Military Intelligence knows what it needs to know about the Pakistani order of battle. There have been lots of purchases of surplus and redundant armour from other nations; what are these destined for? Are new units being formed, for instance, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders? Are old units being strengthened? Are old units being revived by replacement of what is felt to be less effective?
> 
> Certainly professional intelligence gathering will not be reported in the media, but information tends to seep out, and the usual suspects who make a living out of speculative reporting on neighboring military developments would have had tons to say about anything significant that is discovered. Their silence seems to mean that little has been discovered. Or, at the very least, that such discoveries will not make headline or TRP-worthy news.


That indeed is true it won’t be newsworthy. Moreover I feel our intelligence apparatuses periodically gets complacent and then get caught with pants down. Kargil, 26/11 are just two comes to mind. I feel Joe our country needs to more open regarding military affairs. Or else blunders we don’t know of will keep getting shifted under carpet citing Official Secret Act and National Security.



Joe Shearer said:


> in game theory terms, of Minimax, not of Maximin. It sounds faint-hearted, but as @jbgt90 has never tired of pointing out in his rare posts, this was the first of the three major renovations that the Indian military (distinct from the Air Force and from the Navy) underwent


Hey joe can you elaborate on this sounds too good to pass up.

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Hey joe can you elaborate on this sounds too good to pass up.



There are sure to be greater experts in Game Theory than I on the forum. However, in very, very brief, Maximin is the policy of Maximising the Minimum expected gain; Minimax is the opposite, pessimistic policy of Minimising the Maximum loss! The stark difference between unbounded optimism and all-pervasive pessimism.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> but as @jbgt90 has never tired of pointing out in his rare posts, this was the first of the three major renovations that the Indian military (distinct from the Air Force and from the Navy) underwent


What about this? I’m genuinely curious. What are the three renovations? And what about IN and IAF? No hurry , and if you feel it doesn’t fit the context of the thread than we can discuss over messaging.

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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> What about this? I’m genuinely curious. What are the three renovations? And what about IN and IAF? No hurry , and if you feel it doesn’t fit the context of the thread than we can discuss over messaging.



@jbgt90 

Yours!

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## Joe Shearer

kongn said:


> Possibly the worst defeat in pakistani military history with huge local superiority in armour and artillery,4-5 patton regiments plus chaffees were defeated by a single centurion regiment plus some obsolete shermans and jeeps.AMX were spectators.



A sobering reflection is that Salim Caleb and his 3 Cavalry, who made all the difference in the battle, only joined 2 Independent Armoured Brigade at the last instant, on the eve of battle.

General Chaudhuri, having taken away Western Command's armoured reserve, 1 Armoured Division, and formed I Corps around it, made amends for this very frustrating last moment decision by shifting one of the four Centurion regiments out of 1 Armoured Division and attaching it to 2 Independent Armoured Brigade.


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## T90TankGuy

Joe Shearer said:


> @jbgt90
> 
> Yours!


you go ahead , i am better at the spoken word. You , the-written one.


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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> What about this? I’m genuinely curious. What are the three renovations? And what about IN and IAF? No hurry , and if you feel it doesn’t fit the context of the thread than we can discuss over messaging.



On messaging it is.

This evening.

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## meghdut

jbgt90 said:


> you go ahead , i am better at the spoken word. You , the-written one.


I’ll be much obliged if you would kindly share something here Sir



Joe Shearer said:


> On messaging it is.
> 
> This evening.


I’ll be home early today being weekends . Will call you then.

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## T90TankGuy

meghdut said:


> I’ll be much obliged if you would kindly share something here Sir
> 
> 
> I’ll be home early today being weekends . Will call you then.


Get my number from @Joe Shearer and do give me a call , heard a lot about you . SMS me beforehand so i pick up when you call .



meghdut said:


> What about this? I’m genuinely curious. What are the three renovations? And what about IN and IAF? No hurry , and if you feel it doesn’t fit the context of the thread than we can discuss over messaging.


There were three times the IA went through shifts in their Orbat , tactics and equipment. Each time the IA changed tactics on how to fight the enemy and bring about a cohesiveness within .
The First was between 62-69
The second between 84-89
The third was between 2002 and 2010 .
While the former two were driven by the then COAS and his Staff, the latter was based on the findings of an internal committee and was finalized somewhere in 2010 . The increase in the Paramilitary forces during the 2011-2014 was a direct result of this .

The IN had its epiphany during the 2003-2005 period. will elaborate later about it , May be on the PH as i am uncomfortable posting here .

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## meghdut

jbgt90 said:


> Get my number from @Joe Shearer and do give me a call , heard a lot about you . SMS me beforehand so i pick up when you call .
> 
> 
> There were three times the IA went through shifts in their Orbat , tactics and equipment. Each time the IA changed tactics on how to fight the enemy and bring about a cohesiveness within .
> The First was between 62-69
> The second between 84-89
> The third was between 2002 and 2010 .
> While the former two were driven by the then COAS and is Staff, the latter was based on the findings of an internal committee and was finalized somewhere in 2010 . The increase in the Paramilitary forces during the 2011-2014 was a direct result of this .
> 
> The IN had its epiphany during the 2003-2005 period. will elaborate later about it , May be on the PH as i am uncomfortable posting here .


Thank you ,when will it be convenient for me to call you?

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## T90TankGuy

meghdut said:


> Thank you ,when will it be convenient for me to call you?


Tomorrow morning between 11-12 is good .

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## meghdut

jbgt90 said:


> Tomorrow morning between 11-12 is good .


I got your no. Will send you a sms now.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> By end of day on the 8th, the PA had successfully advanced from the line of the Ruhi Nulla into the former positions of the 4 Mountain Infantry Division, just before the village of Asal Uttar, and had been probing the prepared defensive positions of the Indians, frequently overrunning the Indian defences, but did not make a break-through; the Chaffees were thwarted by Deccan Horse with its Shermans, the Pattons were halted by 3 Cavalry, fighting Centurions.


There was another advance on this day towards Voltoha simultaneously with 24 cavs advance towards Chima conducted by 6 Lancers with one company of 1 FF . This advance was more successful, and they reached Valtoha railway station around 1600 hrs without suffering much losses.But they too were ordered back to lagger at Khem Karan.


Joe Shearer said:


> The Pakistani attack started at 02:00 HRS. 2 Independent Armoured Brigade had moved its other components into place beside 3 Cavalry into two sickle-shaped formations between Chima Kalan and Lakhna, even befo


This was a 2 Bde attack, much stronger than yesterday’s 2 Regt attack. 


Joe Shearer said:


> Then the armour advanced, attacking 18 Rajrif from three directions in their outlying positions. A fierce battle broke out, and the tanks sought to come into redoubts of 18 Rajrif.


It is claimed that there wasn’t adequate infantry to support the armoured spearhead, and this may well be so as 5 Bde had a single battalion supporting 2 Regts. Also the ground was soggy so that stalled the armour advance and the CO of 6 Lancers was killed in action. This caused confusion among the attackers.


Joe Shearer said:


> Only a deep penetration on the left, that is, on the Indian right flank, remained.


This attack was spearheaded by 4Cav under 4AB. They ran into the prepared defences of 2IAB and suffered heavy casualties. 
There were plans to launch a second attack on Asal Uttar after the 24 cav attack failed. But perhaps the death of Artillery Commander and wounding of the GOC stopped it.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> The attack was not a success.
> 
> None of the battalions pressed home the attack with anything like determination; on the contrary, Pakistani counter-attacks were desperate affairs, mounted with fierce determination, and making no difference that losses were suffered


H. Singh severely criticised the conduct of operation by 41 Bde. The attacking battalions 1/8 GR and 15 Kumaon did not press home the attack and were subsequently repulsed. 2 Mahar did achieve it’s objectives but was driven away by intense artillery fire.

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## Joe Shearer

@jaibi
@PanzerKiel

Just received 'War Despatches' earlier on the 14th afternoon, and after winding up on line, started reading it.

It's very depressing; all the information that was NOT available in Praval, all the maps that were unreadable, everything is available in 'War Despatches; all that labour poring over the text and trying to fit formations to the Order of Battle, locations in the text to the map, events to the map, everything is available, in clear, crisp pictures or text.

"If only we had the Rafale now....."

On a constructive note, please let me know what I should finish off next. My inclination is this:

Narration of I Corps actions, to allow us to capture @PanzerKiel's additional comments, if any;
A note on the INDIAN CONCEPT OF NON-CONTACT WARFARE from the point of view of present Indian capability as seen in readily accessible public data;
An introduction to counter-insurgency operations in South Asia.

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## Paro_Peagus

jbgt90 said:


> There were three times the IA went through shifts in their Orbat , tactics and equipment. Each time the IA changed tactics on how to fight the enemy and bring about a cohesiveness within .
> The First was between 62-69
> The second between 84-89
> The third was between 2002 and 2010 .
> While the former two were driven by the then COAS and his Staff, the latter was based on the findings of an internal committee and was finalized somewhere in 2010 . The increase in the Paramilitary forces during the 2011-2014 was a direct result of this .
> 
> The IN had its epiphany during the 2003-2005 period. will elaborate later about it , May be on the PH as i am uncomfortable posting here .


@Joe Shearer can you write more on this. Based on your discussions if possible.


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## Joe Shearer

Paro_Peagus said:


> @Joe Shearer can you write more on this. Based on your discussions if possible.



Well....perhaps. Frankly, I am hesitant. There are two reasons for hesitating.

Let me think about it, please.

Meanwhile, I have THREE tails to chase just now. So it has to be fitted in somewhere 

PS: Fitted in at the tail end, I hasten to reassure you.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> @jaibi
> @PanzerKiel
> 
> Just received 'War Despatches' earlier on the 14th afternoon, and after winding up on line, started reading it.
> 
> It's very depressing; all the information that was NOT available in Praval, all the maps that were unreadable, everything is available in 'War Despatches; all that labour poring over the text and trying to fit formations to the Order of Battle, locations in the text to the map, events to the map, everything is available, in clear, crisp pictures or text.
> 
> "If only we had the Rafale now....."
> 
> On a constructive note, please let me know what I should finish off next. My inclination is this:
> 
> Narration of I Corps actions, to allow us to capture @PanzerKiel's additional comments, if any;
> A note on the INDIAN CONCEPT OF NON-CONTACT WARFARE from the point of view of present Indian capability as seen in readily accessible public data;
> An introduction to counter-insurgency operations in South Asia.


Good you got the printed edition I bought the kindle version and maps are impossible to read.


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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Good you got the printed edition I bought the kindle version and maps are impossible to read.



.....and then Amazon stabbed me in the back.

The delivery man said he'd left my second book with the security guard today, and I rushed down.

The package contained A Beginners' Guide to Ayurveda, by Vaidya Rajesh Kotecha and Prof. Mita Kotecha.

My on-line message says that 
*From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965*
by Farooq Naseem Bajwa

now stands delivered.

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> .....and then Amazon stabbed me in the back.
> 
> The delivery man said he'd left my second book with the security guard today, and I rushed down.
> 
> The package contained A Beginners' Guide to Ayurveda, by Vaidya Rajesh Kotecha and Prof. Mita Kotecha.
> 
> My on-line message says that
> *From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965*
> by Farooq Naseem Bajwa
> 
> now stands delivered.



Return it immediately. Such shit happens

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## TsAr

Joe Shearer said:


> @jaibi
> @PanzerKiel
> 
> Just received 'War Despatches' earlier on the 14th afternoon, and after winding up on line, started reading it.
> 
> It's very depressing; all the information that was NOT available in Praval, all the maps that were unreadable, everything is available in 'War Despatches; all that labour poring over the text and trying to fit formations to the Order of Battle, locations in the text to the map, events to the map, everything is available, in clear, crisp pictures or text.
> 
> "If only we had the Rafale now....."
> 
> On a constructive note, please let me know what I should finish off next. My inclination is this:
> 
> Narration of I Corps actions, to allow us to capture @PanzerKiel's additional comments, if any;
> A note on the INDIAN CONCEPT OF NON-CONTACT WARFARE from the point of view of present Indian capability as seen in readily accessible public data;
> An introduction to counter-insurgency operations in South Asia.


All 3 points will be welcomed. Just start with what you can furnish quickly.

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## Joe Shearer

TsAr said:


> All 3 points will be welcomed. Just start with what you can furnish quickly.



Sounds like a plan.

#2
#1
#3

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> @jaibi
> @PanzerKiel
> 
> Just received 'War Despatches' earlier on the 14th afternoon, and after winding up on line, started reading it.
> 
> It's very depressing; all the information that was NOT available in Praval, all the maps that were unreadable, everything is available in 'War Despatches; all that labour poring over the text and trying to fit formations to the Order of Battle, locations in the text to the map, events to the map, everything is available, in clear, crisp pictures or text.
> 
> "If only we had the Rafale now....."
> 
> On a constructive note, please let me know what I should finish off next. My inclination is this:
> 
> Narration of I Corps actions, to allow us to capture @PanzerKiel's additional comments, if any;
> A note on the INDIAN CONCEPT OF NON-CONTACT WARFARE from the point of view of present Indian capability as seen in readily accessible public data;
> An introduction to counter-insurgency operations in South Asia.



Would have loved to go after serial 1, since it would lead us towards closing 65. My suggestion would be Ser 1 then 3 and lastly 2.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Would have loved to go after serial 1, since it would lead us towards closing 65. My suggestion would be Ser 1 then 3 and lastly 2.



Fortunately (for myself), I found War Despatches 'un-putdownable', and am midway through his account of I Corps. I will follow your suggestion and upload from tomorrow . I hope @meghdut will spot errors and help me eliminate them so that members do not have to wade through error-laden narratives.

On serial 3, the main point is about the enormous diversity of counter-insurgency that the Indian state has faced. Some of this is rooted in personal and family involvement; much else relates to the north-east of India, regarding which not all Pakistani members may be immediately familiar.

On serial 2, it is a strange coincidence that you should put it at the end of the sequence, since a most knowledgeable friend, a member of this forum, has been briefing me on the actual situation and correcting many wrong notions I had.

#1, #3 and #2 it is.

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## PanzerKiel

meghdut said:


> There was another advance on this day towards Voltoha simultaneously with 24 cavs advance towards Chima conducted by 6 Lancers with one company of 1 FF . This advance was more successful, and they reached Valtoha railway station around 1600 hrs without suffering much losses.But they too were ordered back to lagger at Khem Karan.
> 
> This was a 2 Bde attack, much stronger than yesterday’s 2 Regt attack.
> 
> It is claimed that there wasn’t adequate infantry to support the armoured spearhead, and this may well be so as 5 Bde had a single battalion supporting 2 Regts. Also the ground was soggy so that stalled the armour advance and the CO of 6 Lancers was killed in action. This caused confusion among the attackers.
> 
> This attack was spearheaded by 4Cav under 4AB. They ran into the prepared defences of 2IAB and suffered heavy casualties.
> There were plans to launch a second attack on Asal Uttar after the 24 cav attack failed. But perhaps the death of Artillery Commander and wounding of the GOC stopped it.



Just some points from my side regarding PA 1 Armored / 11 Div ops.

PA failed to exploit the unprepared defences of 4 MD after their rout. This gave them time to put up a hasty defence first which then transformed into a deliberate one.

5 AB's initial push managed to find the gap south of the rail line leading towards Khem Karan (6 Lancer's action) which was not exploited and the regiment was called back. IA then managed to plug this gap. Overall, 5 AB's failure was their bad recce of the front which deprived them of any knowledge of IA defences and their gaps.

4 AB then again attacked in a void. First, they themselves were not a potent enough force to force a defensive reaction on 4 MD. Their outflanking move failed in the sense that they bumped again into 4 MD. Again, bad recce....its nothing out of the world, just procedural mistakes...and in this case, as it turned out, bad map reading skills on the part of 4 AB commander who was twice corrected by the CO of under commander MIB but even then did not pay any heed to it.

Moreover, 4 and 5 ABs always started their attacks late in the day, which left precious little day time to operate. Moreover, both brigades made it their business to give up their daily gains after last light and retire to their respective leaguers. They fought for the same area each day.

I am always full of admiration for GOC WC, Gen Harbaksh, for the role he played in 65 War. As commander of almost all the IA troops who took part in 65 war, he proved his mettle. He was always found wherever IA was about to break. He made his personality felt and did not feel shy in visiting the critical sectors of his front whenever there was a need. This thing was found lacking on PA's side. In case of Khem Karan as well, for me, GOC WC played the role of no less than a Strike Corps which strengthened 4 MD.

Some analysis of Khem Karan battle...
It was good tankable terrain, though the tall grass obstructed observation at times.

There was a clear lack of judgement and anticipation on the part of PA commanders.

Southern approach, which was empty and founded by 6 Lancers, was not exploited.

Infantry-tank cooperation was a serious issue.

Poor wireless discipline as well, one PA armored unit continued to transmit everything in clear, without code.

The PA bridgehead was one big mismanaged operation in which almost everything went wrong.

No articulating HQ in the form of a Corps HQ to control and coordinated the ops of 1 AD and 11 ID.

No artillery was used for the attacks against 4 MD defences even though two divisional artillery and one Corps artillery brigades were available.

PAF was not utilized against 4 MD defences.

PA operation in total ignorance of IA strength and defences. It was due to procedures related to recce not being followed.



Now coming to the 4 MD attempts to retake Khem Karan once 1 AD moved out and 11 ID settled for defence.

This time, IA made the same mistake which PA did. Hurling tanks against fixed defences.

PA missed another golden opportunity when 2 IAB was suddenly called to support IA 15 Div. 2 IAB remained away and returned after 48 hours, a fact not seen by PA.

Khem Karan was finally defended by PA's one infantry brigade and an armored brigade.

For IA, it was now a matter of prestige to re-capture Khem Karan. However, there were no reserves with 11 Corps or WC for this task. Therefore, 4 Sikh, which was sorely tired after its capture of Barki, was pulled out and launched in an infiltration op. 2 Mahar was also launched.
CO 4 Sikh was even reminded of 12 Sep, the date of Battle of Saraghari, by GOC WCso that he would make a supreme effort.

CO 4 Sikh initially objected to his unit's op due to...
-ordered to infiltrate the same night on which he arrived, without any rest.
-He had not fully assembled is unit yet.
-Unfamiliar AOO.
- He was given just one night to go through PA infantry brigade supported by an armored brigade.

4 Sikh was subsequently decimated since PA opened fire at close range. 4 Sikh managed to hit a cauldron which was ringed by PA dug-in tanks, SP guns and infantry. Many became POWs. Almost 200 all ranks of 4 Sikh participated in this attack.

IA tried one last, major and desperate attack on 21/22 Sep before the ceasefire.

However, IA had again faulty int regarding PA defences. PA also had dug-in all tanks which proved difficult to eliminate. IA armor, again, was again in support role of infantry instead of leading the infantry. This time, PAF intervened and took our IA artillery gun positions first. IA lack of training in night operations was also evident since they continuously used star shells and flares which provided PA gunners with good indications of IA troops.
....and also, as usual, there was no sign of IAF, which should have intervened massively.

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## meghdut

PanzerKiel said:


> Just some points from my side regarding PA 1 Armored / 11 Div ops.
> 
> PA failed to exploit the unprepared defences of 4 MD after their rout. This gave them time to put up a hasty defence first which then transformed into a deliberate one.
> 
> 5 AB's initial push managed to find the gap south of the rail line leading towards Khem Karan (6 Lancer's action) which was not exploited and the regiment was called back. IA then managed to plug this gap. Overall, 5 AB's failure was their bad recce of the front which deprived them of any knowledge of IA defences and their gaps.
> 
> 4 AB then again attacked in a void. First, they themselves were not a potent enough force to force a defensive reaction on 4 MD. Their outflanking move failed in the sense that they bumped again into 4 MD. Again, bad recce....its nothing out of the world, just procedural mistakes...and in this case, as it turned out, bad map reading skills on the part of 4 AB commander who was twice corrected by the CO of under commander MIB but even then did not pay any heed to it.
> 
> Moreover, 4 and 5 ABs always started their attacks late in the day, which left precious little day time to operate. Moreover, both brigades made it their business to give up their daily gains after last light and retire to their respective leaguers. They fought for the same area each day.
> 
> I am always full of admiration for GOC WC, Gen Harbaksh, for the role he played in 65 War. As commander of almost all the IA troops who took part in 65 war, he proved his mettle. He was always found wherever IA was about to break. He made his personality felt and did not feel shy in visiting the critical sectors of his front whenever there was a need. This thing was found lacking on PA's side. In case of Khem Karan as well, for me, GOC WC played the role of no less than a Strike Corps which strengthened 4 MD.
> 
> Some analysis of Khem Karan battle...
> It was good tankable terrain, though the tall grass obstructed observation at times.
> 
> There was a clear lack of judgement and anticipation on the part of PA commanders.
> 
> Southern approach, which was empty and founded by 6 Lancers, was not exploited.
> 
> Infantry-tank cooperation was a serious issue.
> 
> Poor wireless discipline as well, one PA armored unit continued to transmit everything in clear, without code.
> 
> The PA bridgehead was one big mismanaged operation in which almost everything went wrong.
> 
> No articulating HQ in the form of a Corps HQ to control and coordinated the ops of 1 AD and 11 ID.
> 
> No artillery was used for the attacks against 4 MD defences even though two divisional artillery and one Corps artillery brigades were available.
> 
> PAF was not utilized against 4 MD defences.
> 
> PA operation in total ignorance of IA strength and defences. It was due to procedures related to recce not being followed.
> 
> 
> 
> Now coming to the 4 MD attempts to retake Khem Karan once 1 AD moved out and 11 ID settled for defence.
> 
> This time, IA made the same mistake which PA did. Hurling tanks against fixed defences.
> 
> PA missed another golden opportunity when 2 IAB was suddenly called to support IA 15 Div. 2 IAB remained away and returned after 48 hours, a fact not seen by PA.
> 
> Khem Karan was finally defended by PA's one infantry brigade and an armored brigade.
> 
> For IA, it was now a matter of prestige to re-capture Khem Karan. However, there were no reserves with 11 Corps or WC for this task. Therefore, 4 Sikh, which was sorely tired after its capture of Barki, was pulled out and launched in an infiltration op. 2 Mahar was also launched.
> CO 4 Sikh was even reminded of 12 Sep, the date of Battle of Saraghari, by GOC WCso that he would make a supreme effort.
> 
> CO 4 Sikh initially objected to his unit's op due to...
> -ordered to infiltrate the same night on which he arrived, without any rest.
> -He had not fully assembled is unit yet.
> -Unfamiliar AOO.
> - He was given just one night to go through PA infantry brigade supported by an armored brigade.
> 
> 4 Sikh was subsequently decimated since PA opened fire at close range. 4 Sikh managed to hit a cauldron which was ringed by PA dug-in tanks, SP guns and infantry. Many became POWs. Almost 200 all ranks of 4 Sikh participated in this attack.
> 
> IA tried one last, major and desperate attack on 21/22 Sep before the ceasefire.
> 
> However, IA had again faulty int regarding PA defences. PA also had dug-in all tanks which proved difficult to eliminate. IA armor, again, was again in support role of infantry instead of leading the infantry. This time, PAF intervened and took our IA artillery gun positions first. IA lack of training in night operations was also evident since they continuously used star shells and flares which provided PA gunners with good indications of IA troops.
> ....and also, as usual, there was no sign of IAF, which should have intervened massively.


Thank you Sir, I was very keen to read your summary on this most interesting piece of action. It was very rewarding indeed .

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## Joe Shearer

What Indian XI Corps achieved and failed to do are very interesting. They failed in their initial attacks, due to their lack of experience of warfare in the plains, their lack of equipment for warfare in the plains,especially against armour, and, perhaps their exhaustion on having reached the battle fields after very long journeys from their bases.

Indian I Corps had its own set of problems, many of them concerned with a higher level of military leadership. In the following narrative, we will traverse their actions from the date they joined battle.

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## Joe Shearer

Since writing about XI Corps, I have had the privilege of now having two books, regrettably, not a third, to consult as I construct my halting narrative.

Earlier, it was solely Maj. Praval's account. Now, I have General Harbaksh Singh's account, War Despatches, to lend clarity to the events, although sadly, neither is complete in terms of maps and illustrations of the ebb and flow of battle. The third, that might have made all the difference, Farooq Naseem Bajwa's From Kutch to Tashkent, unfortunately got switched at the despatch end, and will land up only on Tuesday, too late to use for this series of posts. I am frankly afraid of Major Amin's works, that I prefer to all others, partly because I have read so few others; they are too hedged in with restrictions.

It seemed best to report events in three sections: the build-up, the Battle of Phillora, and the Battle of Chawinda.

The earlier related comments by @PanzerKiel have been sought to be attached as prologue or epilogue, or foreword and afterword.

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## Joe Shearer

Some reminders of PanzerKiel comments:

These will set the context for the narrative of events in the Sialkot sector, which is where the events relating to Indian I Corps took place.
__________________________________________________________________________________________

On the Pakistan’s side, that is the Sialkot Sector

Pakistan’s great advantage in this area is that Sialkot is a single sector with excellent internal lines of communications. This is why Pakistan can keep just two infantry divisions, an armored brigade and an (I) infantry brigade in this area. In a short war, these troops are adequate to prevent India from making any major gains.

With a force of 5 Divisions (plus) in Sialkot and Shakergarh sectors, not adding reinforcements located nearby, Pakistan is well- protected in the face of the several Indian divisions in Jammu and Pathankot sectors.

Because of its interior lines of communication, Pakistan can attack Jammu, Samba, Kathua, Pathankot and Gurdaspur with equal facility, or switch forces with ease. Pakistan does not have everything its own way in Shakergarh salient, which is thrusting into India, is vulnerable to being pinched out by India, as IA had started to do in 1971. The problem for India is that by advancing, it pushes Pakistani troops back into a more compact, more easily defended area, and a long war becomes inevitable for decisive results.

To buttress its defense and to utilize the minimum number of troops, Pakistan has fortified the entire area. There are a number of rivers, canals, and tributaries. For example, the Ravi protects the entire south eastern side of the Sialkot sector. The same does not apply to India, because in order to attack Dera Baba Nanak, the gateway to Gurdaspur, Pakistan has only to concentrate on its own side of the Ravi.

To strengthen these water obstacles, Pakistan has also created a series of single and double DCBs. Even a relatively narrow water obstacle can hold up an army for long periods: we have only to remember what happened to the US 36 Infantry Division at the crossings of the Rapido River in Italy in World War II.

It should be noted that when war gainers assign values for the defence against a heavy attack, it is customary to allow defenders behind seriously prepared obstacles almost 3.5 times greater chance of destroying the attacker than in open, hastily prepared defenses. And since the area in question is relatively small, with the entire line fortified, outflanking the line of fortifications is impossible.
__________________________________________________________________________________________

As far as format is concerned, I'll prefer to follow from Indian point of view, we'll discuss both, but my main focus would be that why india has not prevailed in the conventional wars..... From this argument, the capabilities and limitations of both sides will come up.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
The United States had embargoed military supplies to both countries on the outbreak of war. As Pakistan was at least 70% equipped with American arms, this was a very severe blow. As India had perhaps 5% American arms, this was of absolutely no consequence. So no fresh supplies were reaching Pakistan with the possible exception of some minor, clandestine shipments from Iran.

It was the Americans’ practice to give its ally the capability of resisting an enemy attack for about two weeks. After that, should it be deemed necessary the US would arrive with its own forces. It’s allies were, in effect, to maintain just trip- wire forces.

With the Pakistanis running out of ammunition, but with India just getting into its stride, this was the time to press the attack and go for broke. The first of the mountain divisions from the northeast had come up. 23 Mountain Division and its lead brigade had just entered action on the outskirts of Lahore. Whereas Pakistan’s strength was declining, Indian strength was increasing.

Instead of stepping up the offensive, India again accepted a cease- fire, this time pressurized by the Soviets. And brave little Shastri, the man who surprised the Pakistanis by crossing the international frontier in retaliation for attack of Pakistan 12/7 Infantry Divisions at Chhamb- Akhnur, went to negotiate with Ayub Khan at Tashkent.

At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.

Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.

Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.

But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.

In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.

In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.

India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.

This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.

If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.

Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.

Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.

But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war.
__________________________________________________________________________________________

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## ashtar Janjua

TsAr said:


> @PanzerKiel you have infused a new life into this forum, keep up with your good work, you have also brought the Old @Joe Shearer back to life.


Sir Old soldiers never die they just fade away.... @PanzerKiel

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## Joe Shearer

After reading several accounts, including the source I have been using so far, Major K. C. Praval’s Indian Army After Independence, it seemed that @meghdut ‘s summary of Cloughley is the most economical. So it is presented here to take our narrative forward. @meghdut has done a marvellous job condensing Cloughley, and I have only made minor grammatical or orthographic corrections in several places.

*THE SIALKOT SECTOR*

The Indian attack in the Sialkot sector began on the night of 7th September on two axes; the Jammu Sialkot road and a parallel route some 12 miles to the south east. I Corps consisted of following unit

(i) 26 Inf Division, advanced on the axis of Jammu Sialkot road via the border village of Suchtgarh. G Ahmed claims it consisted of 4 Inf. Bdes and 2 Armd. Regts.

(ii) 6 Mtn. Div on the southern axis , crossed border near the village of Charwa.

(iii) 1 Armd. Joined the advance on the first light of 8th September, crossing the border near Charwa moving SE towards Chawinda; consisting of 2 Armrd Bdes with two ARs each and a lorried Ind. Bde with 2 batts. But having exchanged one/two of it’s Centurion equipped Regts. With Sherman Regts. of 2 IAB was understrength.


In the opening stages of the battle Pak 1st Cops covered the Sialkot sector with 15 Inf.Div. consisting of 7 battalions in 4 Bdes. (24,101,104,115) with 25 Cav as Armd Regt and a good allocation of artillery. But there were problems, not the least of which was that 115 Bde was fighting in the Jassar area, where it was required to remain for the rest of the war. 101, Bde (19 Punjab, 13FF) was the only formation directly defending Sialkot, and was located astride the main road to Jammu where it faced the onslaught of the Indian 26 Div. 24 bde(2 punjab, 3 FF and 25 Cav) was between the border and Chawinda, which lies due east of an almost right-angled bend in the Sialkot-Lahore railway. 104 Bde, which consisted of a single battalion 9 Baluch, was in reserve in the area of Uggoke/Raipur, about four miles west of Sialkot. It seemed that in the Jammr/Sialkot sector the Indian army might be able to bring sufficient force to bear to carry the day and even win the war. India’s 1 Corps advanced with two Inf Divisions and an Armd. Division against a Pakistani Armd. Bde and a single Inf. Division that had fragmented and understrength fighting units, no cohesive defensive plan, and some leaders of dubious quality who were always under considerable pressure. India’s 1 Armd. Div was ready to exploit the advantage won by the infantry that preceded it. The way to west seemed open.


6 Armd division , consisting of the Guides Cav, 22nd Cav. 1st SP Regt. Of 25 pdr on tracked chassis, and 4 FF (in total a Bde of 80 tanks 12 guns and 700 infantry) was in leaguer around Kot daska, 15 miles SW of Sialkot and 30 miles west of border . Chawinda, where it was to win it’s spurs , was 20 miles away. The units moved quickly when it became apparent that the Indian invasion was taking place.

*THE INDIAN THRUST ALONG THE MAIN SIALKOT ROAD*

*In the north 2 batts of India*’s 26 ID crossed the border astride the Jammu-sialkot road at midnight on 7th September. They quickly overcame the outposts of the Sutlwj Rangers but were brought to a halt by 101 Bde and weight of PA artillery. According to Mankekar and Johri, the approaches to Sialkot ‘bristled with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun-emplacements’, the latter including ‘ three field and one medium artillery regts. one heavy battery and one heavy mortar regts’. A concentration of this number of guns and mortars would cover an area of 500/150 meters in which the weight of shells and mortar bombs from one round of fire from each equipment would be approximately two tons. It does indicate that PA artillery fire was substantial and effective.

26 div. managed to reach the village of Kalarawanda, about 3 miles west of the border, by the time of the cease fire . There was a massive effort on the part of the IA on the northern axis of the Sialkot front, but an advance of only 3 miles cannot be called satisfactory when one considers the numerical superiority of 26 div. the defence of Sialkot by 19 Punjab and 13 FF and their supporting gunners were effective.

*CHAWINDA BATTLES*

Also at about midnight of 7th , two bdes of India’s 6 mountain division crossed the border south of the 26 div. axis and occupied the villages of Maharajke and Charwa just inside Pakistan. The battalions in the assault were 4 Raj Rif, and 2/5 Gurkha rifles. They secured the firm base for the advance of 1 AD at first light. In fact although the armour came through as planned, the immediate border area was not secure for several days because _PA stay behind parties wreaked havoc by sniping and ambushing. _The division’s 1 AB reached the village of Phillora and the line of the Sialkot-Lahore railway by 0900, but it’s right flank was exposed by the failure of 43 inf bde to move quickly enough to keep up. Explanations vary regarding the reasons for this, Johri claims there was a downpour which bogged down the vehicles, Verghese states the armour simply outran the wheeled vehicles, but whatever happened, the Armd Bde had no flank protection. Then a hastily assembled ad-hoc force under direct command of HQ 1 Corps Gujranwala , moved east quickly and stuck on 8 September. It forced the IA back to border where it remained for two days before advancing again.

The PA had three Armd. Regts. and three Inf.battalions, a mixture of units from 1st Armd.(6th?) and 24 Inf. Bde. India had two Armd. bde with two Regts. and an Inf. Battalion. Forces about equal strength had met in battle and one had been made to retreat. Unfortunately for PA, it had insufficient armour immediately available to strike a quick blow that would have destroyed the Indian armour which was, naturally , in some disarray,. Even Verghese claims that “1st Armoured division was hit….hard in the rib, because it dashed forward somewhat rashly”.

Both sides used the lull to regroup. The Indians rapidly regained balance and probed forward, while the Pakistanis brought up as many reinforcements as they could to match the preponderance of Indian armour, which was also being augumented. It was a desperate time for PA. they well knew IA still had reserves while almost every unit of PA ORBAT was already committed to the fight. 11 Cav arrived from Chhamb along with 4 Inf. Bde(14 Punjab and 6FF) not a minute too early to join ain defending the area against the Indian assault which began at first light of 11 September.

The Indians advanced on two axes, Charwa-Chawind and Kaloi-Pagowal. The battalion group advancing on the latter route was repulsed and forced to fall back to the Kaloi area. On the Chawinda axis, the Indians reached Phillora after a series of head-on tank and infantry battles in which the two sides slugged it out until dusk when 5 Jat(100 killed), 5/9 GR, elements of the Poona Horse, and 4 Horse took and held the village. Battles raged over the area until cease-fire. The Indians knew it was essential for them to take Chawinda; the Pakistanis knew that if they did, the ground between Lahore and Sialkot would open up for their further advance as there were no forces available for defence further west. On 12 Spetember the PA tried without success to retake Phillora and next day Indians tried to outflank Chawinda from the east but, in an impressive display of flexibility, PA moved 19 and 20 Lancers and 1 FF (of 1 Ad) to tis defence and the Indian advance was halted after fierce fighting. Gulzar Ahmed acknowledged that “It must be said to the credit of the Indian AArmy that they fought with commendable courage and determination on this day”. An attack against Chawind was planned on 14th but, in classic employment of good intelligence and efficient artillery, the PA located the FUP of the Garhwali battalion that was to lead the assault and brought fire down on it. The battalion was forced to withdraw and the attack did not take place.

On the night of 15/16 September the Indians again tried to outflank the main PA force, this time by pressing west to Jassoran, three miles due west of Chawinda, across the railway line, then south to cut off Chawinda from the rear. Once the village was isolated, the Indians considered it would fall. At first the advance went well, with Jassoran being occupied at about 1100 on the 16 by 8 Garhwali rifles, supported by 1 Sqdn of 2 Poona Horse. The infantry than turned south and managed to take the village of Buttar Dograndi, but their armour was engaged so heavily by PA AT weapons that it could not advance further. The battalion held out until 17th then was forced to withdraw to Jassoran. It had been impossible to reinforce the unit in order to continue the advance, but neither could the Pakistanis bring in enough force to mount a counter attack. Furthermore the PA artillery was running short of ammunition. By mid September the daily allocation of 155mm ammo was five rounds per gun! The embargo on Pakistan was taking effect.

In spite of ammo shortage and tank casualities, the PA regrouped and managed to clear the area west of Chawinda around the railway line on 18/19 September; but did not manage to fully retake the station at Alhar, the north side of which remained in Indian hands until the cease-fire. The PA planned Operation Wind Up for 19/20 September with the aim of outflanking the Indians and penetrating west to cut them off. But it was cancelled for various reasons.

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## meghdut

@Joe Shearer , another Russian, hehe. Nevertheless thank you. I actually condensed the account. I’ll take to your advice and try to do something original. Thanks again Sir.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> I am always full of admiration for GOC WC, Gen Harbaksh, for the role he played in 65 War. As commander of almost all the IA troops who took part in 65 war, he proved his mettle. He was always found wherever IA was about to break. He made his personality felt and did not feel shy in visiting the critical sectors of his front whenever there was a need.



After reading his _War Despatches_, I began to understand your assessment more fully. It is as you said; where he was not present, the area of action of I Corps, for instance, things did not go well.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> After reading his _War Despatches_, I began to understand your assessment more fully. It is as you said; where he was not present, the area of action of I Corps, for instance, things did not go well.



Its both positive and negative.

Positive in the sense that GOC WC, despite the long frontage of his Command, did not shy away from visiting his frontline commanders. A commander, irrespective of his level (platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, Corps and Army), can only influence a battle with his Command Reserves. You may have noted that there were NO COMMAND RESERVES at the disposal of GOC WC. This left little choice with him except to set personal example and be visible whenever the situation turned critical somewhere. And its amply clear that his personal example and presence worked wonders and saved Indian Army many a times.

Negative in the sense that.....what if GOC WC were of the same caliber as of Commander 1 Corps, XI Corps, 1 Armd Div or even 15 Div. You can well imagine what would have happened. Gen Chaudhri, COAS, was also hardly seen anywhere, especially during the war itself.

@Joe Shearer like one of your associates told you, and you quoted here as well....Indian Army, being bigger than PA, has also greater number of duds. Its all relative. Smaller country, smaller share...bigger country, bigger share.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> You may have noted that there were NO COMMAND RESERVES at the disposal of GOC WC. This left little choice with him except to set personal example and be visible whenever the situation turned critical somewhere. And its amply clear that his personal example and presence worked wonders and saved Indian Army many a times.



On reading the accounts from different points of view by different authors, this was the most incredible fact that emerged. I can hardly believe that the Indian Army attacked with such paper thin resources, and spread out in such a way that there was no local superiority anywhere, EXCEPT for two or three days right at the outset of I Corps' abortive attack.

Thank Heavens for Harbaksh Singh. 

I have been promised by a rather more well-endowed member that he will get me Major General Jogindar Singh's _Behind the Scene_; I am looking forward to reading it as the excerpts I have read so far show it to be the same as Jake's book on his military life and his war experiences; a Chief of Staff who despised his Commander. I could only think despairingly of von Gneisenau and of Ludendorff. When will we learn to work in teams with loyalty towards each other? Is it impossible?



PanzerKiel said:


> Negative in the sense that.....what if GOC WC were of the same caliber as of Commander 1 Corps, XI Corps, 1 Armd Div or even 15 Div. You can well imagine what would have happened. Gen Chaudhri, COAS, was also hardly seen anywhere, especially during the war itself.



I worked with the General's son, and he was one of only three managers with whom I worked successfully in 35 years; like others in my family, I was found to be an excellent superior, a prickly equal and an impossible subordinate. So I was terribly sorry, very, very disappointed to read about his performance in this test. 

It was only on reading excerpts from Jogindar Singh's book that I realised that Muchu had been GOC XV Corps in his time. What was he doing, allowing his troops to be strung out like so many picquets along the tortuous border? Why did he create I Corps and recall Dunn from leave preparatory to retirement? What was he doing attacking from what clearly, in retrospect, was the wrong spot and in the wrong line of advance? Why did such a key person keep having mood swings, that Chavan reports in his diary? (I have my major reservations about Chavan, but that is another story, based on my complete antagonism towards Gopal Bewoor). How could he panic and ask that Indian troops retire behind the Beas? Why was he so ill-informed about Indian reserves and materiel status? I get a headache thinking of these; they go to bear out my theory, that I have repeatedly advanced, that the divine power was with India, not with Pakistan; nothing else can explain our survival.

You talked of 15 Div.; we had discussed this before, when you pointed out that Biji Kaul had commented that Niranjan Prasad had proved cool under fire. My objection to that remains; where did Biji hear or see enemy fire? He never saw it in his entire career, most of which was in the ASC; where did he see Niranjan Prasad braving it? Considering the rapid steps that the good Major General took when danger threatened?

I Armoured Division did not do well; however, on reading Harbaksh Singh, and on reading excerpts from Jogindar's poisoned book, I realised that my own pet hate was here, too, doing his bit. Brigadier K. K. Singh messed up in these movements, and he not only survived his ham-handed handling of his Armoured Brigade, but was leading a Division in 71, and retired as a Lieutenant General replete with honours and a Wikipedia page to himself. Theograj, to the best of my knowledge, retired in the same rank in which he fought Asal Uttar, Brigadier.

I personally think XI Corps could have done little, given an old woman like Niranjan Prasad leading one Division, and given the unbelievable decision to put a Mountain division to attack the world's best tanks with nothing much to stave them off with. However, perhaps you would say that it isn't enough to dig out excuses, it needs the digging out of victory from the situation. I believe Gurbaksh Singh was the least harmful of the top generals.

As for Dunn, the poor man should have not been recalled from Leave preparatory to retirement.

It was difficult reading these books and reading your comments. Painful.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> After reading several accounts, including the source I have been using so far, Major K. C. Praval’s Indian Army After Independence, it seemed that @meghdut ‘s summary of Cloughley is the most economical. So it is presented here to take our narrative forward. @meghdut has done a marvellous job condensing Cloughley, and I have only made minor grammatical or orthographic corrections in several places.
> 
> *THE SIALKOT SECTOR*
> 
> The Indian attack in the Sialkot sector began on the night of 7th September on two axes; the Jammu Sialkot road and a parallel route some 12 miles to the south east. I Corps consisted of following unit
> 
> (i) 26 Inf Division, advanced on the axis of Jammu Sialkot road via the border village of Suchtgarh. G Ahmed claims it consisted of 4 Inf. Bdes and 2 Armd. Regts.
> 
> (ii) 6 Mtn. Div on the southern axis , crossed border near the village of Charwa.
> 
> (iii) 1 Armd. Joined the advance on the first light of 8th September, crossing the border near Charwa moving SE towards Chawinda; consisting of 2 Armrd Bdes with two ARs each and a lorried Ind. Bde with 2 batts. But having exchanged one/two of it’s Centurion equipped Regts. With Sherman Regts. of 2 IAB was understrength.
> 
> 
> In the opening stages of the battle Pak 1st Cops covered the Sialkot sector with 15 Inf.Div. consisting of 7 battalions in 4 Bdes. (24,101,104,115) with 25 Cav as Armd Regt and a good allocation of artillery. But there were problems, not the least of which was that 115 Bde was fighting in the Jassar area, where it was required to remain for the rest of the war. 101, Bde (19 Punjab, 13FF) was the only formation directly defending Sialkot, and was located astride the main road to Jammu where it faced the onslaught of the Indian 26 Div. 24 bde(2 punjab, 3 FF and 25 Cav) was between the border and Chawinda, which lies due east of an almost right-angled bend in the Sialkot-Lahore railway. 104 Bde, which consisted of a single battalion 9 Baluch, was in reserve in the area of Uggoke/Raipur, about four miles west of Sialkot. It seemed that in the Jammr/Sialkot sector the Indian army might be able to bring sufficient force to bear to carry the day and even win the war. India’s 1 Corps advanced with two Inf Divisions and an Armd. Division against a Pakistani Armd. Bde and a single Inf. Division that had fragmented and understrength fighting units, no cohesive defensive plan, and some leaders of dubious quality who were always under considerable pressure. India’s 1 Armd. Div was ready to exploit the advantage won by the infantry that preceded it. The way to west seemed open.
> 
> 
> 6 Armd division , consisting of the Guides Cav, 22nd Cav. 1st SP Regt. Of 25 pdr on tracked chassis, and 4 FF (in total a Bde of 80 tanks 12 guns and 700 infantry) was in leaguer around Kot daska, 15 miles SW of Sialkot and 30 miles west of border . Chawinda, where it was to win it’s spurs , was 20 miles away. The units moved quickly when it became apparent that the Indian invasion was taking place.
> 
> *THE INDIAN THRUST ALONG THE MAIN SIALKOT ROAD*
> 
> *In the north 2 batts of India*’s 26 ID crossed the border astride the Jammu-sialkot road at midnight on 7th September. They quickly overcame the outposts of the Sutlwj Rangers but were brought to a halt by 101 Bde and weight of PA artillery. According to Mankekar and Johri, the approaches to Sialkot ‘bristled with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun-emplacements’, the latter including ‘ three field and one medium artillery regts. one heavy battery and one heavy mortar regts’. A concentration of this number of guns and mortars would cover an area of 500/150 meters in which the weight of shells and mortar bombs from one round of fire from each equipment would be approximately two tons. It does indicate that PA artillery fire was substantial and effective.
> 
> 26 div. managed to reach the village of Kalarawanda, about 3 miles west of the border, by the time of the cease fire . There was a massive effort on the part of the IA on the northern axis of the Sialkot front, but an advance of only 3 miles cannot be called satisfactory when one considers the numerical superiority of 26 div. the defence of Sialkot by 19 Punjab and 13 FF and their supporting gunners were effective.
> 
> *CHAWINDA BATTLES*
> 
> Also at about midnight of 7th , two bdes of India’s 6 mountain division crossed the border south of the 26 div. axis and occupied the villages of Maharajke and Charwa just inside Pakistan. The battalions in the assault were 4 Raj Rif, and 2/5 Gurkha rifles. They secured the firm base for the advance of 1 AD at first light. In fact although the armour came through as planned, the immediate border area was not secure for several days because _PA stay behind parties wreaked havoc by sniping and ambushing. _The division’s 1 AB reached the village of Phillora and the line of the Sialkot-Lahore railway by 0900, but it’s right flank was exposed by the failure of 43 inf bde to move quickly enough to keep up. Explanations vary regarding the reasons for this, Johri claims there was a downpour which bogged down the vehicles, Verghese states the armour simply outran the wheeled vehicles, but whatever happened, the Armd Bde had no flank protection. Then a hastily assembled ad-hoc force under direct command of HQ 1 Corps Gujranwala , moved east quickly and stuck on 8 September. It forced the IA back to border where it remained for two days before advancing again.
> 
> The PA had three Armd. Regts. and three Inf.battalions, a mixture of units from 1st Armd.(6th?) and 24 Inf. Bde. India had two Armd. bde with two Regts. and an Inf. Battalion. Forces about equal strength had met in battle and one had been made to retreat. Unfortunately for PA, it had insufficient armour immediately available to strike a quick blow that would have destroyed the Indian armour which was, naturally , in some disarray,. Even Verghese claims that “1st Armoured division was hit….hard in the rib, because it dashed forward somewhat rashly”.
> 
> Both sides used the lull to regroup. The Indians rapidly regained balance and probed forward, while the Pakistanis brought up as many reinforcements as they could to match the preponderance of Indian armour, which was also being augumented. It was a desperate time for PA. they well knew IA still had reserves while almost every unit of PA ORBAT was already committed to the fight. 11 Cav arrived from Chhamb along with 4 Inf. Bde(14 Punjab and 6FF) not a minute too early to join ain defending the area against the Indian assault which began at first light of 11 September.
> 
> The Indians advanced on two axes, Charwa-Chawind and Kaloi-Pagowal. The battalion group advancing on the latter route was repulsed and forced to fall back to the Kaloi area. On the Chawinda axis, the Indians reached Phillora after a series of head-on tank and infantry battles in which the two sides slugged it out until dusk when 5 Jat(100 killed), 5/9 GR, elements of the Poona Horse, and 4 Horse took and held the village. Battles raged over the area until cease-fire. The Indians knew it was essential for them to take Chawinda; the Pakistanis knew that if they did, the ground between Lahore and Sialkot would open up for their further advance as there were no forces available for defence further west. On 12 Spetember the PA tried without success to retake Phillora and next day Indians tried to outflank Chawinda from the east but, in an impressive display of flexibility, PA moved 19 and 20 Lancers and 1 FF (of 1 Ad) to tis defence and the Indian advance was halted after fierce fighting. Gulzar Ahmed acknowledged that “It must be said to the credit of the Indian AArmy that they fought with commendable courage and determination on this day”. An attack against Chawind was planned on 14th but, in classic employment of good intelligence and efficient artillery, the PA located the FUP of the Garhwali battalion that was to lead the assault and brought fire down on it. The battalion was forced to withdraw and the attack did not take place.
> 
> On the night of 15/16 September the Indians again tried to outflank the main PA force, this time by pressing west to Jassoran, three miles due west of Chawinda, across the railway line, then south to cut off Chawinda from the rear. Once the village was isolated, the Indians considered it would fall. At first the advance went well, with Jassoran being occupied at about 1100 on the 16 by 8 Garhwali rifles, supported by 1 Sqdn of 2 Poona Horse. The infantry than turned south and managed to take the village of Buttar Dograndi, but their armour was engaged so heavily by PA AT weapons that it could not advance further. The battalion held out until 17th then was forced to withdraw to Jassoran. It had been impossible to reinforce the unit in order to continue the advance, but neither could the Pakistanis bring in enough force to mount a counter attack. Furthermore the PA artillery was running short of ammunition. By mid September the daily allocation of 155mm ammo was five rounds per gun! The embargo on Pakistan was taking effect.
> 
> In spite of ammo shortage and tank casualities, the PA regrouped and managed to clear the area west of Chawinda around the railway line on 18/19 September; but did not manage to fully retake the station at Alhar, the north side of which remained in Indian hands until the cease-fire. The PA planned Operation Wind Up for 19/20 September with the aim of outflanking the Indians and penetrating west to cut them off. But it was cancelled for various reasons.



Some points from my side regarding the battle of Chawinda / Sialkot

Indian 1 Corps was raised in April - May 1965 as a spare HQ, with its Commander P O Dunn junior to Sparrow who was commanding 1 Armored Division under him. Initially there were no troops under command HQ 1 Corps.

The mandate given by GOC WC to GOC 1 Corps was..
Advance along axis Pathankot-Samba, EITHER towards Jammu or Daska to relieve Jammu...
OR establish bridgehead on Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak area, and then advance till MRLC.

Later 1 Armored, 6 Mountain, 14 and 26 Infantry Divisions were placed under command 1 Corps.

Overall final plan was for 6 Mountain and 14 Infantry Divisions to secure a lodgement from which 1 Armored Division will breakout. 26 and 14 Infantry Divisions were to protect the flanks of 1 Armored Division by pushing towards Sialkot and Zafarwal respectively.

PA 6 Armored division had its own problems due to its hasty raising. They included...
- Absence of Brigade HQs between Div HQ and units
- Absence of Div artillery HQ
-absence of Col Staff
-each armored regiment had one squadron of obsolete M36B2 tank busters.
-Armored Infantry units had no APCs, only trucks.
-15 RRs per unit instead of 27 RRs.
-Ineffective signal comm eqpt
-6 Armored Division was actually to undergo a test exercise in Oct 1965 to gel some cohesion due to the hasty raising, but the war came first.

Strangely, once IA 1 Armored Division was identified, PA 6 Armored Division was given a defensive task to hold ground, a task suited for infantry formations, not armor.

As usual , IAF again failed to play any role in furthering the operations of IA 1 Corps.

IA 14 Division also missed a golden opportunity to capture Zafarwal keeping in view of paucity of troops on PA side initially.

Overall, Op Nepal ended as a stalemate.
Root cause which was identified was lack of schwerpunkt....there was no real strength of IA forces on any given axis.

Op Nepal forces advanced on a wide front which resulted into dilution of forces. Hence, again, there were NO RESERVES with Corps / Div commanders.
14 Division was supposed to be the Corps reserve formation, but it was initially cannibalized, and subsequently scattered.

Moreover, there was strategic direction of IA 1 Corps...a specific direction in which the Corps could have focused all its efforts.

1 Armored Brigade of IA 1 Armored Division operated with only two armor regiments, there was lack of a third regiment which could have been used for exploitation.

GOC 1 Armored Division, instead of showing boldness and going deep or for outflanking maneuvers, settled for shallow jabs only. 

IA feint at Jassar and diversionary effort could have better exploited if these actions could have been included in the overall planning.

1 Corps overall showed undue caution which was clear by its policy of detaching major forces for flank protection instead of in attack.

Weak command and control of GOC 1 Corps was also clearly evident.

It can also be said that overall, this battle was a competition between the ineptness of Indian commanders in applying operational strategy principles and inability of PA commanders to handle large formations in the field.

PA suffered due to incorrect assessment of IA strength and its intentions. PA in Sialkot had no reason to be surprised by IA 1 Corps offensive since it opened two days after 6 September.

Later, in a hurried fashion, PA pulled out 1 AD from Khem Karan and deployed it in Sialkot sector with no plans for its employment. This shows that there no peacetime contingency plans for employment of PA 1 AD in Sialkot sector.

Later, it was also found that IA was operating with outdated maps, with no new features or names. This shows their peacetime preparation and planning for an offensive in Sialkot sector.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Indian 1 Corps was raised in April - May 1965 as a spare HQ, with its Commander P O Dunn junior to Sparrow who was commanding 1 Armored Division under him. Initially there were no troops under command HQ 1 Corps.



He was actually recalled from leave preparatory to retirement! Why this formation was felt necessary, and why this Corps Commander was dragged out of seclusion, will remain a mystery.



PanzerKiel said:


> The mandate given by GOC WC to GOC 1 Corps was..
> Advance along axis Pathankot-Samba, EITHER towards Jammu or Daska to relieve Jammu...
> OR establish bridgehead on Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak area, and then advance till MRLC.



It seems that the parallel (and most irregular) conversation between the COAS and the Corps Commander, eliminating the Army Commander (GOC-in-C Wn. C.) quite early on decided on one of these alternatives and went strong on it.

This unfortunate short-circuiting continued throughout the very brief prelude to hostilities. Fortunately so; it is uncomfortable to think of what might have happened given more time for these interpersonal dynamics to play out.



PanzerKiel said:


> Overall final plan was for 6 Mountain and 14 Infantry Divisions to secure a lodgement from which 1 Armored Division will breakout. 26 and 14 Infantry Divisions were to protect the flanks of 1 Armored Division by pushing towards Sialkot and Zafarwal respectively.



I thought, after reading again, that establishing the bridgehead - securing a lodgement - was done quite efficiently. The next part didn't quite go off, and I'd like to know your assessment of why. One reason could be the September time-frame and the state of bad roads, but there must be other reasons, which is where I do not have the boldness to go.



PanzerKiel said:


> - Absence of Brigade HQs between Div HQ and units
> - Absence of Div artillery HQ
> -absence of Col Staff
> -each armored regiment had one squadron of obsolete M36B2 tank busters.
> -Armored Infantry units had no APCs, only trucks.
> -15 RRs per unit instead of 27 RRs.
> -Ineffective signal comm eqpt
> -6 Armored Division was actually to undergo a test exercise in Oct 1965 to gel some cohesion due to the hasty raising, but the war came first.



That is a bit stunning to read, but points to a conclusion that both sides were ill-prepared, that another six months would have done both armies a world of good.

MAYBE placing Dunn in charge of I Corps was a prelude to pushing up Rajinder Singh after Dunn's retirement very soon afterwards.



PanzerKiel said:


> As usual , IAF again failed to play any role in furthering the operations of IA 1 Corps.



THIS needs a separate thread! 

Chavan in his diary is so pleased with Arjan Singh. The government is pleased with Arjan Singh and gives him the 5 star rank (after retirement). 

Why?



PanzerKiel said:


> IA 14 Division also missed a golden opportunity to capture Zafarwal keeping in view of paucity of troops on PA side initially.



Again, to paraphrase, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. There was nothing (almost) facing 14 Division. What slowed them down?

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I thought, after reading again, that establishing the bridgehead - securing a lodgement - was done quite efficiently. The next part didn't quite go off, and I'd like to know your assessment of why. One reason could be the September time-frame and the state of bad roads, but there must be other reasons, which is where I do not have the boldness to go.



Yes you are right. The lodgement operation went well. 

For 1 AD, two routes were choosen.
43 Lorried Brigade was to advance along Green route towards Bhagowal. 1 Armored Brigade was to advance on Red route towards Phillaurah.

Problem here was that for 1 AD, there was no alternative apart from these two routes ONLY.

43 Lorried Brigade was the first to bog down due to single track limitation and mud due to rain.

Moreover, the left flank of 1 Armored Brigade was left unprotected since 62 Cav, which was supposed to protect it, was lacking aggressiveness and was facing broken ground as well. PA 13 FF, which was an R&S unit equipped with 106 RRs, duly exploited this gap and destroyed SP guns which were moving behind the lead armor regiments of 1 Armored Brigade. 1 AB, thinking of being attacked by PA armor from the rear, stopped and then withdrew towards Sabzpir.

After Philaurah, 1 AD was given two days break. This time, 1 Armored Division tried to outflank PA defences from the west, however, they bumped into the 4 Corps Artillery gun areas, where PA artillery engaged them with open sights. This, along with counter attacks by PA armor, repulsed 1 AD attack.
1 AD tried the same thing again on 16 Sep, again was engaged by artillery and tanks, but this time, it was pulled out for good, around 20 Sep.



Joe Shearer said:


> Again, to paraphrase, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory



We have already discussed this aspect, we know both armies did this in 65 and 71.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Yes you are right. The lodgement operation went well.
> 
> For 1 AD, two routes were choosen.
> 43 Lorried Brigade was to advance along Green route towards Bhagowal. 1 Armored Brigade was to advance on Red route towards Phillaurah.
> 
> Problem here was that for 1 AD, there was no alternative apart from these two routes ONLY.
> 
> 43 Lorried Brigade was the first to bog down due to single track limitation and mud due to rain.
> 
> Moreover, the left flank of 1 Armored Brigade was left unprotected since 62 Cav, which was supposed to protect it, was lacking aggressiveness and was facing broken ground as well. PA 13 FF, which was an R&S unit equipped with 106 RRs, duly exploited this gap and destroyed SP guns which were moving behind the lead armor regiments of 1 Armored Brigade. 1 AB, thinking of being attacked by PA armor from the rear, stopped and then withdrew towards Sabzpir.
> 
> After Philaurah, 1 AD was given two days break. This time, 1 Armored Division tried to outflank PA defences from the west, however, they bumped into the 4 Corps Artillery gun areas, where PA artillery engaged them with open sights. This, along with counter attacks by PA armor, repulsed 1 AD attack.
> 1 AD tried the same thing again on 16 Sep, again was engaged by artillery and tanks, but this time, it was pulled out for good, around 20 Sep.
> 
> 
> 
> We have already discussed this aspect, we know both armies did this in 65 and 71.



I had hoped, but dared not expect, such an answer. The matter is so much clearer after your illuminating comments.

I keep reading about this legendary Pakistani cavalry regiment that threw itself across the path of the oncoming 1 Arm. Brigade, and frightened them into retreat. Where did this incident take place?

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> I had hoped, but dared not expect, such an answer. The matter is so much clearer after your illuminating comments.
> 
> I keep reading about this legendary Pakistani cavalry regiment that threw itself across the path of the oncoming 1 Arm. Brigade, and frightened them into retreat. Where did this incident take place?


25 Cavalry, Col Nisar, he also retired as a Brigadier. Must remind you of several who ended like him.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> 25 Cavalry, Col Nisar, he also retired as a Brigadier. Must remind you of several who ended like him.



Some of the best did, while the K. K. Singhs and the Gopal Bewoors soared. 

Within this narrative, we have Brigadier Theograj retiring as Brigadier; he performed perhaps the best among the general officers in the conflict.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> Some of the best did, while the K. K. Singhs and the Gopal Bewoors soared.
> 
> Within this narrative, we have Brigadier Theograj retiring as Brigadier; he performed perhaps the best among the general officers in the conflict.



On our side, apart from Brig Nisar (25 Cav), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 AD), Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div) and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Div at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> On our side, apart from Brig Nisar (25 Cav), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 AD), Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div) and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Div at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.



I know General Malik was posted as Ambassador to Turkey and died mysteriously in a road accident. To hear that General Sarfraz, after that back to the wall defence, was sidelined, and Abrar, after making an ad hoc formation slapped together from what was essentially war wastage reserves fight for every inch against the chosen men of the Indian Army, causes mixed feelings.

It is sad that their services were not retained for their Army. The fighting spirit they showed, most of all, Nisar, would have helped Pakistan six years later.

It is a good thing for us in India that their country did not value them as it should have. To have had them fighting for Pakistan would have been troubling, knowing, as all do, what happened in Bewoor's beat, knowing Khambata's paralysis and frozen inactivity after Longewala, knowing that Manekshaw's personal urgings got nowhere close to breaking the timid and indecisive responses of several key commanders in this theatre. Eftekhar Janjua of Kutch fame, who survived, troubled us enough at Chhamb; nobody likes to talk about that, and nobody cares to remember that, against the backdrop of the campaign in the east.

I am gathering material for my note to you and @jaibi about the Indian perspective on counter-insurgency, and the experience behind Vairangte, covering police, para-military and military actions alike, but after that is done, it is a great desire of a large number of us that you should illuminate a narrative of the western front actions of 1971 as you have done this.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> The fighting spirit they showed, most of all, Nisar, would have helped Pakistan six years later.
> 
> it is a great desire of a large number of us that you should illuminate a narrative of the western front actions of 1971 as you have done this.



Even then, despite being sidelined as commandant of Armor School , Brig Nisar was given command of the famous ad-hoc Chengez Force in Sialkot sector where he was supposed to fight a delay action for 72 hours but was able to delay IA for more than a week. God knows what would have happened if he would have been commanding 8 Armored Brigade at Barapind.

As far as 1971 is concerned, I would love to.

Am all for it, you decide.....

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## PanzerKiel

GENERAL AKHTER HUSSAIN MALIK LETTER TO GENERAL ABDUL ALI MALIK

My Dear brother,
I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:
a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.
b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.
c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.
d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.
e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!
f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.
g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
Please remember me to all the family.
Yours, 
Akhtar Hussain Malik

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## saiyan0321

PanzerKiel said:


> GENERAL AKHTER HUSSAIN MALIK LETTER TO GENERAL ABDUL ALI MALIK
> 
> My Dear brother,
> I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:
> a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.
> b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.
> c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.
> d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.
> e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!
> f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.
> g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
> I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
> In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
> Please remember me to all the family.
> Yours,
> Akhtar Hussain Malik



Lets try to revive this old thread. 

I remember reading this letter before and one of the first questions that came to my mind was did we succeed in bringing the Kashmir issue out of the freeze? i am guessing the international light to Kashmir issue was meant to be UN Resolutions and Super Power pressure for plebiscite. So did that materialize? If we look at the resolutions then it would seem that it did not materialize at all. 

Some of the best UN resolutions that carried the favorable position for Pakistan were the resolutions in the 1950s and i would guess that the non-freezing of the issue was, the coming of such Resolutions. Let me add to that.

In 1950 the council Passed Resolution 80 which was a marked shift from Resolution 47 since contrary to 47, Resolution 80 called for mutual demilitarization of Kashmir and withdrawl of the armed forces by Pakistan and India, it called upon local authority to govern the three regions, Gilgit Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and the State of Kashmir which meant that the Resolution gave a form of defacto credence to the Azad government and ofcourse to the Azad forces which were equated with the State of Kashmir forces. 

The all important Mcnaughton report and his solutions were made part of the Kashmir resolution. Then in 1952 we had Resolution 98 which again gave credence and recognition to the Azad forces since the number of troops by both Pakistani, Indian, Azad forces and State of Kashmir were decided. Post them the 1957 Resolutions called for restraint by both parties. 

So an unfreezing would be the above and its implementation, disregarding any opposition. However the 1965 resolutions were Ceasefire resolutions in relation to Kashmir. Ofcourse discussions were held in the UN but starting a war and sending in military men and risking a war for a few words is not equitable exchange. Equitable exchange on the minimum would have been atleast a Resolution in line with the Resolution 80 or 98 or some form of absolute pressure. 

The reason why i am saying this is because in war we study military objects and how those objects were achieved and how and why those objectives failed and while we study every aspect from Gibraltar, grandslam, Khem Karan, Lahore, sialkot, Haji pir Pass, Akhnur dagger, however we ignore this war objective and it was a war objective which was to bring the Kashmir issue in the scope of the world. Why and how did that objective fail and whether it failed or not? This question is ignored and i think the reason is that it is seen as a last saving grace where it is stated that " look atleast we got this objective." However lack of concrete resolution makes one wonder whether it was this objective where we witnessed our greatest failure or not. From 1965 November Resolution 126 was the last one and it spoke only of ceasefire and then the next resolution was in 1971 concerning December 1971. 

From the political non-freezing front, what did we gain and if this was the central objective then what did we hope to gain and what did that gain look like? Initiating a conflict is such a big thing that the result should have been greater than the Resolution 80

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## saiyan0321

Adding to the Previous post, the political objective of internationalizing Kashmir didnt happen and along with that we witnessed that Pakistan's own stock in the International world plummeted since the US denied military exports to both countries and this embargo hit Pakistan the hardest since it was reliant on military equipment whereas we witnessed how in the Iran and Iraq war, the US helped Iraq everywhere it could. 

So if we compare these two situations. The Resolution 80 and the non-existence of another of its kind post 1965 and the US support where for Pakistan it created an embargo but in Iraq Iran war, it supported Iran as much as it could which means that in terms of political goals of Internationalizing Kashmir and gaining International support, Pakistan failed in both objectives. So what was the reason for such a failure.

A major reason were the following. 

1. Political objectives do become part of the war effort. That is natural like General Lee in the American Civil War where he counted on the political defeat of lincoln as a means for an end to the war effort of northern america. However this case was different because here Political objective was not becoming part of the war effort but war effort was becoming part of the political object. This meant that the political side of things was extremely effort and the entire skirmishes and battles would be centered around the political concept. The political objects werent just the internationalizing of Kashmir or the world support after but also internal political dynamics that were part of this as well. A victory would allow Ayub Khan more security and more power and would see the Democratic Restoration Movement die out which werent just happening in Pakistan but also in Azad Kashmir and coming to Azad Kashmir, by 1965 there were protests for the implementation of a proper governance system and a victory in concern of Kashmir would have given Ayub Khan a strong excuse when dealing with Ghulam Abbas, Sardar Ibrahim, Abdul Qayyum, Khurshid and amanullah. All of them especially the last name as Amanullah and his Plebiscite party was creating a very disturbing situation in Azad Kashmir. A victory in the Kashmir cause would allow Ayub Khan to not only stand as a titan infront of these politicians but would have also allowed him to garner more central power of Azad Kashmir as hero of Kashmir. Akhtar Malik may not know this but Ayub needed that victory to be his and his alone because All of those names had huge prestige behind them and they were all respected in Kashmir. Ayub needed something of the same stature to stand against them. 
By focusing on political objectives, the war effort did not receive the necessary time and strategic planning that would have taken into account all the factors like the most important one that whether this action would lead to war and if it did, would India open another front? You are starting a major operation with the thought that this is done to internationalize Kashmir, then you are going to struggle when things get out of hand. 

2. Whether Political or military, an objective of the war must be achieved and for its achievement, all planning and resources must be spent and all scenarios must be taken into account. Pakistan leadership did not take into account how far Is India willing to go which was quite odd considering that in 1962, India displayed that it was willing to enter into military solutions against military attacks. Yet even with that, we witness that the strategic thinking was simply not given its due share and the objectives were based on the best case scenario rather than the worst case scenario. The political objective of internationalization was also not given its due share of thinking like what happens when the world does not focus on the flashpoint but on those that are making it a flashpoint. Pakistan wanted to display initially that look, people are fighting the Indian army and are capturing areas and the situation is getting worse and when it would reach its apex either the UN would intervene or Pakistan would intervene militarily like it did in 1948. This was gibraltar however this was absolutely the best case scenario. Worst case scenario was that the infiltration effort would fail and the world would start to condemn Pakistan as aggressive and India would retaliate strongly. Basically that is what happened. Where was the solution for this. Why wasnt this analyzed? what was the counter plan in the UN? There was none and Bhutto played a very leading role in this. 

3. The US support was dwindling by mid 1960s and was not at the level of 1950s which we saw with Pakistan trying to shift from the US influence when it condemned the Us actions in Vietnam and when Pakistan started to have greater relations with China which irked the US greatly especially the Sino-Pak Treaty 1963 and although they never condemned the treaty, they were not pleased that Pakistan had hatched out a dispute resolution. By 1965 the relations were sour between the two countries and here is the thing, In bhutto's book myth of independence, we see bhutto write on this topic on how the US wanted Pakistan to lend credence to the US war effort since it was getting no support and there was diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, so here we witness one of the worst case scenarios already taking place that the strategic ally was angry and i think because of that, US also canceled a state visit to Pakistan. So when this was happening, how could we count on the US support in our war effort. By the end of 1950s, we witness that the US was getting closer and closer to India since India offered a concrete ground to contain China. By mid 1960s it was abundantly cleat that the US relations with Pakistan and India were not like their Relations with both the nations in the 1950s. So expecting Us support as a political objective would be similar to having annexation of Calcutta and Delhi as the 1965 military objective. It was that impossible and the exact same thing happened. Pakistan, which had used alot of its ammunition and was not exactly home to huge reserves of equipment, found itself in a military embargo by its largest military importer. India on the other hand had the USSR


4. Now we come to resolutions. When the war effort began i.e gibraltar, did Pakistan file for any UN meeting or try to present any resolution or did anything beforehand to make sure the wheels would immediately turn the moment gibraltar began? No it had not. Pakistan had done little diplomatic homework in order to make sure the operation remained as much a secret as possible and due to this alot of the wheels that turned were left to their own devices for turning rather than being egged on by the prepared homework. Ideally the moment gibralter began, three days later the nations, under diplomatic influence should have presented resolutions and condemnations to India and the US making hostile statements and the UN floor echoing with Kashmir. There was no foreign policy homework. Military objectives require military preparation like if you annex to amritsar then the army would be creating corps and divisions for attacking and defending and holding, buying ammunition and equipment and vehicles for transport, paramilitary to be trained for hostile occupied regions. Military objective would see military preparation and just like that political objectives would see political preparation. The german empire happily allowed Lenin to send his papers and writing to Russia so that the Russian empire would become occupied with internal dissent. That is a semblance of political preparation. We seemed to have done nothing but the idle promises of Bhutto and the result was that the military objectives did not witness that much of a failure than the political ones did. They flat out failed and they were the ones that needed the most preparation. 

and with that i hope @PanzerKiel and @Joe Shearer would start the 1971 war. Joe dont dilly dally

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## Joe Shearer

saiyan0321 said:


> Lets try to revive this old thread.
> 
> I remember reading this letter before and one of the first questions that came to my mind was did we succeed in bringing the Kashmir issue out of the freeze? i am guessing the international light to Kashmir issue was meant to be UN Resolutions and Super Power pressure for plebiscite. So did that materialize? If we look at the resolutions then it would seem that it did not materialize at all.
> 
> Some of the best UN resolutions that carried the favorable position for Pakistan were the resolutions in the 1950s and i would guess that the non-freezing of the issue was, the coming of such Resolutions. Let me add to that.
> 
> In 1950 the council Passed Resolution 80 which was a marked shift from Resolution 47 since contrary to 47, Resolution 80 called for mutual demilitarization of Kashmir and withdrawl of the armed forces by Pakistan and India, it called upon local authority to govern the three regions, Gilgit Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and the State of Kashmir which meant that the Resolution gave a form of defacto credence to the Azad government and ofcourse to the Azad forces which were equated with the State of Kashmir forces.
> 
> The all important Mcnaughton report and his solutions were made part of the Kashmir resolution. Then in 1952 we had Resolution 98 which again gave credence and recognition to the Azad forces since the number of troops by both Pakistani, Indian, Azad forces and State of Kashmir were decided. Post them the 1957 Resolutions called for restraint by both parties.
> 
> So an unfreezing would be the above and its implementation, disregarding any opposition. However the 1965 resolutions were Ceasefire resolutions in relation to Kashmir. Ofcourse discussions were held in the UN but starting a war and sending in military men and risking a war for a few words is not equitable exchange. Equitable exchange on the minimum would have been atleast a Resolution in line with the Resolution 80 or 98 or some form of absolute pressure.
> 
> The reason why i am saying this is because in war we study military objects and how those objects were achieved and how and why those objectives failed and while we study every aspect from Gibraltar, grandslam, Khem Karan, Lahore, sialkot, Haji pir Pass, Akhnur dagger, however we ignore this war objective and it was a war objective which was to bring the Kashmir issue in the scope of the world. Why and how did that objective fail and whether it failed or not? This question is ignored and i think the reason is that it is seen as a last saving grace where it is stated that " look atleast we got this objective." However lack of concrete resolution makes one wonder whether it was this objective where we witnessed our greatest failure or not. From 1965 November Resolution 126 was the last one and it spoke only of ceasefire and then the next resolution was in 1971 concerning December 1971.
> 
> From the political non-freezing front, what did we gain and if this was the central objective then what did we hope to gain and what did that gain look like? Initiating a conflict is such a big thing that the result should have been greater than the Resolution 80



You have revived it, but on a dangerous point.

You have also ignored an important cognate point.

The only successful threads on PDF in which Indian members may be involved are those that deal strictly with military matters or with dilemmas relating to Indian sociology, politics and economy. I have no doubt that any attempt by an Indian member even to refute some of the more egregious narrations by a small group of trouble-making members (not Indian) will lead to uproar. So bringing up Kashmir effectively is a signal to Indian members that they must stay away.

The consequences are not particularly important from a real-life point of view, but they are belittling, even humiliating. There seems to be little point in inviting that kind of humiliation.


saiyan0321 said:


> Adding to the Previous post, the political objective of internationalizing Kashmir didnt happen and along with that we witnessed that Pakistan's own stock in the International world plummeted since the US denied military exports to both countries and this embargo hit Pakistan the hardest since it was reliant on military equipment whereas we witnessed how in the Iran and Iraq war, the US helped Iraq everywhere it could.
> 
> So if we compare these two situations. The Resolution 80 and the non-existence of another of its kind post 1965 and the US support where for Pakistan it created an embargo but in Iraq Iran war, it supported Iran as much as it could which means that in terms of political goals of Internationalizing Kashmir and gaining International support, Pakistan failed in both objectives. So what was the reason for such a failure.
> 
> A major reason were the following.
> 
> 1. Political objectives do become part of the war effort. That is natural like General Lee in the American Civil War where he counted on the political defeat of lincoln as a means for an end to the war effort of northern america. However this case was different because here Political objective was not becoming part of the war effort but war effort was becoming part of the political object. This meant that the political side of things was extremely effort and the entire skirmishes and battles would be centered around the political concept. The political objects werent just the internationalizing of Kashmir or the world support after but also internal political dynamics that were part of this as well. A victory would allow Ayub Khan more security and more power and would see the Democratic Restoration Movement die out which werent just happening in Pakistan but also in Azad Kashmir and coming to Azad Kashmir, by 1965 there were protests for the implementation of a proper governance system and a victory in concern of Kashmir would have given Ayub Khan a strong excuse when dealing with Ghulam Abbas, Sardar Ibrahim, Abdul Qayyum, Khurshid and amanullah. All of them especially the last name as Amanullah and his Plebiscite party was creating a very disturbing situation in Azad Kashmir. A victory in the Kashmir cause would allow Ayub Khan to not only stand as a titan infront of these politicians but would have also allowed him to garner more central power of Azad Kashmir as hero of Kashmir. Akhtar Malik may not know this but Ayub needed that victory to be his and his alone because All of those names had huge prestige behind them and they were all respected in Kashmir. Ayub needed something of the same stature to stand against them.
> By focusing on political objectives, the war effort did not receive the necessary time and strategic planning that would have taken into account all the factors like the most important one that whether this action would lead to war and if it did, would India open another front? You are starting a major operation with the thought that this is done to internationalize Kashmir, then you are going to struggle when things get out of hand.
> 
> 2. Whether Political or military, an objective of the war must be achieved and for its achievement, all planning and resources must be spent and all scenarios must be taken into account. Pakistan leadership did not take into account how far Is India willing to go which was quite odd considering that in 1962, India displayed that it was willing to enter into military solutions against military attacks. Yet even with that, we witness that the strategic thinking was simply not given its due share and the objectives were based on the best case scenario rather than the worst case scenario. The political objective of internationalization was also not given its due share of thinking like what happens when the world does not focus on the flashpoint but on those that are making it a flashpoint. Pakistan wanted to display initially that look, people are fighting the Indian army and are capturing areas and the situation is getting worse and when it would reach its apex either the UN would intervene or Pakistan would intervene militarily like it did in 1948. This was gibraltar however this was absolutely the best case scenario. Worst case scenario was that the infiltration effort would fail and the world would start to condemn Pakistan as aggressive and India would retaliate strongly. Basically that is what happened. Where was the solution for this. Why wasnt this analyzed? what was the counter plan in the UN? There was none and Bhutto played a very leading role in this.
> 
> 3. The US support was dwindling by mid 1960s and was not at the level of 1950s which we saw with Pakistan trying to shift from the US influence when it condemned the Us actions in Vietnam and when Pakistan started to have greater relations with China which irked the US greatly especially the Sino-Pak Treaty 1963 and although they never condemned the treaty, they were not pleased that Pakistan had hatched out a dispute resolution. By 1965 the relations were sour between the two countries and here is the thing, In bhutto's book myth of independence, we see bhutto write on this topic on how the US wanted Pakistan to lend credence to the US war effort since it was getting no support and there was diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, so here we witness one of the worst case scenarios already taking place that the strategic ally was angry and i think because of that, US also canceled a state visit to Pakistan. So when this was happening, how could we count on the US support in our war effort. By the end of 1950s, we witness that the US was getting closer and closer to India since India offered a concrete ground to contain China. By mid 1960s it was abundantly cleat that the US relations with Pakistan and India were not like their Relations with both the nations in the 1950s. So expecting Us support as a political objective would be similar to having annexation of Calcutta and Delhi as the 1965 military objective. It was that impossible and the exact same thing happened. Pakistan, which had used alot of its ammunition and was not exactly home to huge reserves of equipment, found itself in a military embargo by its largest military importer. India on the other hand had the USSR
> 
> 
> 4. Now we come to resolutions. When the war effort began i.e gibraltar, did Pakistan file for any UN meeting or try to present any resolution or did anything beforehand to make sure the wheels would immediately turn the moment gibraltar began? No it had not. Pakistan had done little diplomatic homework in order to make sure the operation remained as much a secret as possible and due to this alot of the wheels that turned were left to their own devices for turning rather than being egged on by the prepared homework. Ideally the moment gibralter began, three days later the nations, under diplomatic influence should have presented resolutions and condemnations to India and the US making hostile statements and the UN floor echoing with Kashmir. There was no foreign policy homework. Military objectives require military preparation like if you annex to amritsar then the army would be creating corps and divisions for attacking and defending and holding, buying ammunition and equipment and vehicles for transport, paramilitary to be trained for hostile occupied regions. Military objective would see military preparation and just like that political objectives would see political preparation. The german empire happily allowed Lenin to send his papers and writing to Russia so that the Russian empire would become occupied with internal dissent. That is a semblance of political preparation. We seemed to have done nothing but the idle promises of Bhutto and the result was that the military objectives did not witness that much of a failure than the political ones did. They flat out failed and they were the ones that needed the most preparation.
> 
> and with that i hope @PanzerKiel and @Joe Shearer would start the 1971 war. Joe dont dilly dally



From tomorrow. I have resolved only to post in exceptional cases, to clear tagged posts, in the evenings, after lunch.

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## saiyan0321

Joe Shearer said:


> You have revived it, but on a dangerous point.
> 
> You have also ignored an important cognate point.
> 
> The only successful threads on PDF in which Indian members may be involved are those that deal strictly with military matters or with dilemmas relating to Indian sociology, politics and economy. I have no doubt that any attempt by an Indian member even to refute some of the more egregious narrations by a small group of trouble-making members (not Indian) will lead to uproar. So bringing up Kashmir effectively is a signal to Indian members that they must stay away.
> 
> The consequences are not particularly important from a real-life point of view, but they are belittling, even humiliating. There seems to be little point in inviting that kind of humiliation.
> 
> 
> From tomorrow. I have resolved only to post in exceptional cases, to clear tagged posts, in the evenings, after lunch.


that is extremely sad joe and worrying and this thread was surviving on a mutual exchange and frankly that is another factor of the conflict that should be studied.

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## Joe Shearer

Let me quote a wise young friend, who shut me up pretty effectively:

_Joe you find crumbs and present them as full meals but reality is that the plate is barren. There is no food. Do you think those days when M.Sarmad would write long essays on validity of hadith or Indus on the history of the Indus valley or WAJsal on gilgit baltistan or Slav defence on his blogs or Vcheng with his posts, will ever return?_

_They will not. The most common members now are the groups that are ransacking . ._

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## saiyan0321

Joe Shearer said:


> Let me quote a wise young friend, who shut me up pretty effectively:
> 
> _Joe you find crumbs and present them as full meals but reality is that the plate is barren. There is no food. Do you think those days when M.Sarmad would write long essays on validity of hadith or Indus on the history of the Indus valley or WAJsal on gilgit baltistan or Slav defence on his blogs or Vcheng with his posts, will ever return?
> 
> They will not. The most common members now are the groups that are ransacking . ._


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## Mumm-Ra

Joe Shearer said:


> You have revived it, but on a dangerous point.
> 
> You have also ignored an important cognate point.
> 
> The only successful threads on PDF in which Indian members may be involved are those that deal strictly with military matters or with dilemmas relating to Indian sociology, politics and economy. I have no doubt that any attempt by an Indian member even to refute some of the more egregious narrations by a small group of trouble-making members (not Indian) will lead to uproar. So bringing up Kashmir effectively is a signal to Indian members that they must stay away.
> 
> The consequences are not particularly important from a real-life point of view, but they are belittling, even humiliating. There seems to be little point in inviting that kind of humiliation.
> 
> 
> From tomorrow. I have resolved only to post in exceptional cases, to clear tagged posts, in the evenings, after lunch.



That is very unfortunate. It was a delight to read you comments and this was/is an exceptionally brilliant thread. I hope you will change your stance soon.

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## Joe Shearer

Mumm-Ra said:


> That is very unfortunate. It was a delight to read you comments and this was/is an exceptionally brilliant thread. I hope you will change your stance soon.



The failure to move on smoothly is acknowledged. It has to be broached, sooner is preferable to later.

On the brilliance of the thread, it has to be pointed out that we had the benefit of a professionally competent military mind; that made all the difference.

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> The failure to move on smoothly is acknowledged. It has to be broached, sooner is preferable to later.
> 
> On the brilliance of the thread, it has to be pointed out that we had the benefit of a professionally competent military mind; that made all the difference.


.... Something which was present on both sides.... Patience and a clear mind to accept logic based arguments completely isolated from emotions.

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## Ghost 125

Joe Shearer said:


> *A quick aside about the topography. *
> 
> There were two roads out of Khem Karan, one leading to Bhikhiwind, one angled further right to Patti. Asal Uttar, on which village the 4 Mountain Infantry Division defences were based, lies about 5 kms out of Khem Karan on the road to Patti. It is important to know this because Indian deployment was on this crossbar, the Lakhna – Chima Kalan Road. The heavy fighting took place in the region between Asal Uttar and these two villages that are about 11 kms apart.
> 
> 
> 
> About 20 kms from Asal Uttar, to the right of the Patti Road, is the village of Chima (look for Chima Kalan on Google Maps; Cheema takes you far, far away). To the left of the Patti Road is the other village of Lakhna. Set in a little, it is 5 kms further away from Khem Karan than Chima Kalan. One can imagine the Khem Karan – Patti road as the upright of a ‘T’, and the road connecting Lakhna and Chima Kalan, at right angles to the Khem Karan – Patti Road, would be the crossbar of the ‘T’.
> 
> 
> @PanzerKiel @Cuirassier @jaibi @meghdut


a small correction here.. the cheema village in question here is not chima kalan, 11 km away but cheema khurd imediately north of assal uttar (some 1.5 Kms). it is between Lakhna (NW) and assal uttar (S). The chima kalan is even beyond Valtoha and Gharyala and saw no action during the battles.

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## Joe Shearer

Ghost 125 said:


> a small correction here.. the cheema village in question here is not chima kalan, 11 km away but cheema khurd imediately north of assal uttar (some 1.5 Kms). it is between Lakhna (NW) and assal uttar (S). The chima kalan is even beyond Valtoha and Gharyala and saw no action during the battles.



Much appreciated.

I was trying to reconcile the current place names in Google Maps with the less than adequate mentions in my sources.

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## Sine Nomine

Joe Shearer said:


> Let me quote a wise young friend, who shut me up pretty effectively:
> 
> _Joe you find crumbs and present them as full meals but reality is that the plate is barren. There is no food. Do you think those days when M.Sarmad would write long essays on validity of hadith or Indus on the history of the Indus valley or WAJsal on gilgit baltistan or Slav defence on his blogs or Vcheng with his posts, will ever return?
> 
> They will not. The most common members now are the groups that are ransacking . ._


If current trajectory remains unaltered,in next few years it would be sad end of board which once attracted people from all over world.

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## saiyan0321

This Thread is a brilliant archive of conflicts between Pakistan and India and the analysis even more so however i think we have missed out on the Rann of Kutch Conflict and for this let me make up to the best of my limited ability and knowledge. I am no military man nor it is my career choice so forgive any mistakes i may have made unknowingly. I have tried to compile as much information of this event as i could,

The conflict had two major battles. Battle of Sardar Post and Battle of Bets. Today we will talk about Battle of Sardar Post and take the magnifying glass to this conflict and its battles. First of all, Whilst we must avoid the sensitivity of politics, we cannot and should not avoid the history of diplomacy and the recorded events that took place. This is important to understand that we cannot look at conflicts, especially indo-pak conflicts without giving homage some levels of diplomacy. So we must talk about internal affairs, history, diplomacy and international relations (this is especially true when in our calculations, US and International pressure plays an important role).


Rann of Kutch Conflict
Battle Of Sardar Post
By
Usman Khan Yousafzai aka Saiyan0321​

The history of conflicts between Pakistan and India has been a hotly documented affair with both sides providing their versions of the story and both sides making sure that solely their narrative survives the test of time. In the list of conflicts, the Rann of Kutch conflict often takes a backseat due to the subsequent events of 1965 however what most military historians fail to understand that this conflict created the domino effect that led to the 1965 conflict as the result of the conflict provided Pakistan army with a victory that would make the army overconfident of its prowess whereas India discovered the chinks in its armor and looked to bring appropriate changes to it. The confrontation was not something of a ‘spur of a moment as is often believed. In fact records from both sides hold that they were well aware of a flashpoint developing and there were diplomatic and military exchanges beforehand. The conflict contained small versions of blunders and tactics that would become the hallmark of the two armies and would be displayed in the 1965 conflict. This, often ignored conflict, thus deserves proper study and this is what this article looks to do. It would be impossible to record all of the happenings within just one article and nor would it do justice. This article shall be divided into four separate pieces. The first shall contain the events leading to the conflict. Second shall include the Battle of Sardar Post the first engagement on Rann. The third article shall contain the Battle of bets where the most fighting happened and the last article shall contain the subsequent result, military results, and impacts along with the diplomatic solution. With that said let us first understand the history of the conflict.

For centuries there has been a dispute between the rulers of Sindh and Kutch about the territory of Rann, an area composed of salt marsh with little to no resource with only coarse grass to show. The region was home to wild asses, gazelles and seasonal grazing livestock. The geography of the region was composed of flatlands with only small elevated hills called ‘Bets’ ranging from a few yards to several mile-long elevations. It remained largely dry except for the monsoon season when the area would be submerged and the ‘bets’ would become islands. The state of Kutch was surrounded in the north by the Great Rann, east by Little Rann, south by the Gulf of Kutch and west by the Arabian Sea. The Raos of Kutch always desired of annexing the region to their small state and in 1904 Maharaja Rao Khenjraji pressed on the claim over Rann but he died in 1908 and in 1924 the state of Kutch acceded to the British Empire and became a Princely State however the claim on Rann remained. The British formed a boundary commission in 1938 but with the beginning of the world war, the commission was abandoned. The region in its entirety, including Kutch, was under the governance of the governor of Sindh. The state of Kutch acceded to India and with that, the age-old dispute arose as India claimed all of Rann whereas Pakistan claimed the northern part of the Great Rann above the 24th Parallel which was above the head of Kori Creek and Lakhpat and crossed Mori Bet and included Dharamsala. Pakistan is recorded to have established some posts in the region but abandoned them in 1953 most likely due to economic factors and the inability of Pakistan to patrol the region. The Pakistani side was patrolled by the Indus Rangers whereas the Indian side was patrolled by the Special Reserve Police (SRP). Since 1947, both sides had looked to solve the dispute peacefully and in the 1950s several diplomatic notes were exchanged detailing the dispute and the claims made by both sides. The terrain itself favored those that held the Bets since the flatland meant that no troop movements could be disguised and the element of surprise was extremely hard to take however if we are to look at logistics and communication then Pakistan held the advantage.

The area of Rann of Kutch can be divided into three major zones. The Great Rann, Kutch, and little Rann. This salt desert, unlike other regions of the Indo-Pak border, remained without any demarcation at the time of the partition. This "...bed of arm of the sea, raised by some natural convulsion above its original level'" was a disputed territory between the States of Sind and Kutch. "But the Rann is now chiefly dry land—a salt. Barren, blinding waste of sand, where only the wild *** can thrive. ...". According to the Imperial Gazetteer of India,

"The area of the (Kutch) state (exclusive of the Rann) is 7,616 square miles. ...The whole territory of Kutch is almost entirely cut off from the continent of India; north by the Great Rann. East by the Little Rann, south of the Gulf of Kutch, and west by the Arabian Sea.”

The Raos of Kutch had long cherished the desire of annexing the Rann to their small state. In 1904. Maharaja Rao KhenjatJi, ruler of Kutch since 1876, laid claims on the Rann but he died in 1908 with his dream of annexation unfulfilled.' In 1924. The State of Kutch acceded to British India and consequent to the territorial adjustments for administration. The control of the Rann passed to the Governor of Sind. The question of demarcation of boundaries between Sind and Kutch then seemed unimportant, because both now formed part of the British Empire. British acting upon their characteristic policy of 'divide and rule' generated a territorial dispute in the Rann between the Mirs of Sind and the Raos of Bhuj and then kept it dormant or alive as it suited their policy."

In 1938. A survey commission was mutually appointed by the States of Sind and Kutch to resolve the issue but the outbreak of the Second World War precluded the settlement of the dispute. When the war ended the British knew that they could no longer keep their hold over the subcontinent as the hostile population and the dwindling economy along with the international calls for decolonization, the end of the century-long rule finally came to end.

At the time of partition, India laid claim over the whole Rann while Pakistan claimed only the northern part. Consequently, the Sind Police Rangers (later designated Indus Rangers) established posts along the Pakistani side of the Rann and patrolled along a track ten miles south of the Customs Track. In 1953, perhaps for reasons of economy, some of the ranger posts were abandoned and patrolling was discontinued by Pakistan. India lost no time in establishing its claim over the entire territory of the Rann. Despite such the two nations did not look to seek a military solution to the problem and relied on diplomacy. The tactic had worked with Pakistan securing the Indus Water Treaty and also demarcating the border with China through the Sino-Pak Agreement 1963 thus there was a sincere feeling that diplomacy can work here. The region itself was barren apart from shepherds and border patrols from check posts and whenever these border patrols were rarely challenged. In MAP 1 it can be seen how the great Rann, where the conflict takes place, is flat saline land.

Cubit and Montfort (1991) defined Rann of Kachchh as "a desolate area of unrelieved, sun-baked saline clay desert, shimmering with the images of a perpetual mirage". The monotonous flatness, salinity, and unusual inundation have rendered the Rann as a place of mysterious ground. This flatness of the region made sure that surprise would be very difficult to accomplish in any military engagement and large-scale buildups could be noticed by a keen eye and responsible le scouting and intelligence missions.

Pakistan did hold a strong advantage that was denied to the Indian military and that was connectivity. If you would notice that in MAP 2, you would see that the Indian region of Kutch, Great Rann and Little Rann, is largely a desert and has little connectivity whereas the Pakistani region is home to multiple connected roads and railways especially to major cities such as Hyderabad, Umerkot and Sukkur. The railway and road link with Badin allows for quick reinforcements to be sent in no time in contrast to India where the reinforcement would have to be gathered in Bhuj before they could be sent forward. Pakistan was also blessed with a long road that connected Badin to Kadhan to Rahim ka Bazar and Diplo in case a retreat was in order. In fact if I were to go in more detail it would be that the railway connection at Badin was only 26 miles north of the Indian claim line and only 113 miles east of Karachi, where Pakistan's 8 Division was based. There was also a bridge over the river Indus at the Pakistani city of Hyderabad, north of Badin, which meant by way of a ferry crossing Pakistan could quietly and easily move troops from Badin along the Kutch border while other routes would allow for deployment southward into the disputed area. The approaches to the Rann of Kutch from the Indian side were much more difficult than those from Pakistan, as the nearest Indian regular military formation was the 3 Infantry Brigade which was stationed in Ahmedabad, 180 miles east of the railway station at a small town located in the Rann but 110 miles from the disputed border. There was a road from Bhuj to the town of Khavda, approximately 44 miles away from Bhuj, and although Khavda was closer to the Rann/Sindh border, the road from Bhuj was almost impassable in the monsoon season. The road and rail links from India into the Rann, therefore, followed long routes and India's military posts inside Kutch were dependent on vulnerable lines of communication and supplies. Logistics were with Pakistan in this conflict and it would be seen as the conflict would begin

Pakistan held a railway connection to Badin only 26 miles north of the disputed line and only 113 miles away from Karachi where the 8th division was based. There was also a bridge on the Indus River in Hyderabad which meant that while there was a 186-mile long railway link from Karachi to Rann, there existed a shorter land route of 130 miles. Badin was forward well connected to Khadhan and Rahim ka Bazar which was along the Custom Track where patrolling was done. India on the other hand was disadvantaged with connectivity due to the large desert terrain. The 31st Infantry Brigade was located in Dhangadhra and Ahmedabad which was 180 miles east of the railway station at Bhuj, located 110 miles from the border. From there was the road to Khavda 44 miles away and while it was closer to the dispute, the road between Khavda and Bhuj would be submerged during monsoon season. The 31st Infantry included the 1st Mahar, the 2nd Sikh Light Infantry and the 17th Rajputana Rifles. With this, we can understand the terrain and the advantages held by both sides. By 1964 a flashpoint was starting to emerge as diplomatic measures were failing. On 12th May 1964, an Indian patrol arrested 3 Pakistani Nationals near the abandoned Kanjarkot fort, a strategic location that connected to areas like Rahim Ka Bazar, Mara, Ding, and Sutiar along the road. India claimed the fort as a territory 1500 yards south of their claim line whereas Pakistan saw it 300 meters above the disputed border. The three nationals were returned on the basis that they had strayed there. This incident displays two very important things. That the treatment of the nationals was different as to their treatment on the Ceasefire Line which displays that there was a concentrated effort by both sides to solve this diplomatically and its recording which shows that this was a rare incident and its happening was a display of the deteriorating situation.

On 25th January 1965, the SRP noticed a fresh track to Kanjarkot fort which linked to Ding and Sutiar with Ding 4 miles northwest of Kanjarkot fort and Sutiar 11 miles west. The Indian side responded vigorously with the district magistrate sent to inspect the region and the SRP was ordered to patrol even more vigorously. Pakistan was not blind to what they saw as an incursion to their side and on 30th January an Indian patrol was challenged by the Rangers. On 3rd February the same happened and India launched a diplomatic protest and on 5th February the Indian patrol consisting of four jeeps, 2 of SRP and 2 of regular units was met by a large contingent of Indus Rangers and after a heated exchange, the Indian patrol returned to their post at Chad Bet. The Pakistani commander of the Rangers was assured that Kanjarkot fort would be a flashpoint and the Indian patrols needed to be held back. He cordoned off the fort and when this was discovered by the Indian patrol, a diplomatic note was sent on 12th February where India protested the action.

A meeting was held between Deputy Inspector General Ranjkot Range and Lieutenant Colonel Aftab Ali of the Indus Rangers on 15th February. Both sides claimed the fort as both claimed the area around the fort as their own and showed evidences of patrols thus the meeting brought no solution. The problem was that due to the history of the border, there was no proper demarcation and both sides used the local ground rules to try to decide a working boundary. Both sides claimed that they had patrolled the area for years and held regular patrols in the surrounding area and the Kanjarkot fort thus ensuring defector rule. Pakistan claimed that it had always patrolled the Ding-Surai Track and India claimed that even before Pakistan moved, India would always patrol the area however in the notes, neither side claimed the date of the patrols nor when they began nor could they bring forth any evidence that would give proper dates and tracks of the patrol and if both sides were telling the truth, then it is very interesting that neither side encountered each other in all these years and their encounters only happened when they started to show exact dates of patrols On 18th February another note was sent and on 19th February the same was reiterated by the Indian High commissioner to Bhutto.

General Tikka Khan, who was the GOC of the 8th division, ordered the Rangers to Occupy the fort before the SRP could and this was done on 22nd February.

India countered by reinforcing Chad Bet and established a strong presence, posts and supplies at Suigam, Bela, Vigiokot Karim Shahi and a place that would be called Sardar Post.

KC Paravel

“India countered the move by reinforcing Chad Bet and established strong police posts at Suigam, Bela, Vigiokot, Karim Shahi and a place that would be known as Sardar post. At the same time, the 31st light infantry brigade, consisting of 17th Rajputana Rifles, 2bd Sikh Light Infantry and 1st Mahar, was ordered to move from Dhrangadhra to Bhuj. The brigade’s task was to prevent any major thrust from Pakistan, it was not to establish any posts on the border.”

The Indian GHQ authorized Operation Kabbadi, which was meant to remove the Pakistani presence from Kanjarkot fort but by now the fort was heavily fortified and the Pakistan I presence of the 51st Brigade, comprising of three battalions of which 2 of those, 18th Punjab and 6th Baluch were located at Malir and 8th FF (Frontier Force) was at Hyderabad. The 31st Brigade of the Indian army was led by S.M. Pahalajani and this brigade was tasked to take the fort and in case of any thrust, move even across the international border however no action of such was taken nor any offensive against the fort mounted. The patrolling did get more aggressive and it seemed the situation was escalating. The most interesting thing to notice is that the Pakistani record of 22nd February as the date of occupation whereas the Indian diplomatic notes place occupation before it. It is most likely that the previous occupation was largely done by small groups of rangers who would challenge Indian patrols causing incidents and on 22nd February the area was taken with full force and reinforced. Either way, if Pakistan denied presence before, it could no longer do so now.

The 31st Brigade was told to move to Bhuj to counter any Pakistani offensive and the 51st Brigade of the 8th Division of Pakistan took control of the Indus rangers with the express commands to

“Ensure strict vigilance and have the Indus Rangers patrol the area extensively, Establish close liaison with the Rangers and the HQ of 8th Division and support the Indus Rangers in their operations with the avoidance of provocation and maintenance of the Status Quo.”

Brigadier Azhar, commander of 51st brigade visited the region and in March, established HQ at Badin and placed two formations in Malir on 4-hour notice. During this period, the Indian positions remained on the defensive and while defenses were beefed up, there was no evidence that the Indian army was actively taking control or attempting to implement the orders of Operation Kabbadi which resolved around retaking the Fort and removing the Pakistani Presence from the sector.

Kanjarkot was an official hotspot and both sides looked ready for a conflict. The situation was upped again by the Gujarat Home minister who gave the Indian version of events and stated that

“India was ready to accept the challenge if the situation worsened.”

On 1st March Pakistan sent a note to India stating that the area around Kanjarkot had been the de facto region of Pakistan since 1947 and rejected Indian request for the meeting of the two Surveyor-Generals on the grounds that the matter of the border was a political discussion between two governments. Pakistan asserted that it only patrolled the region and had not occupied which was in stark contrast to the orders of General Tikka and the ground situation. Considering the operation Kabbadi from the Indian GHQ, it is safe to say that Pakistan had occupied the fort before 22nd February and had fortified it on 22nd February. The lack of Indian military action gives credence to this fact. On 4th March the Indian foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, held a press conference where he stated that Pakistan had never been in control of the region of kanjarkot and the Rann of Kutch was a disputed area whose borders had never been demarcated properly. The Pakistani military command started to secure the area by moving the 18th Punjab to Diplo, 8th FF (without the A company) was moved along with a battery of the 14th Field Regiment to Kadhan.

Company A of 8th FF and a troop of 120 mm Mortars numbering a total of six were moved to Rahim Ka Bazar. 6th Baluch remained in Malir. The seriousness of the situation can be assessed with the fact that the 6th Baluch were ordered to move to East Pakistan but that order was canceled and they were told to stay at Malir and provide support and the brigade was later moved to Hyderabad. The 6th Baluch were to reconnoiter the routes to Khokhropar and Umerkot. 18th Punjab was ordered to cover Vingi and Jat Trai and provide support to the Indus Rangers and the Frontlines. The 51st Brigade now had full control of the region and did aggressive patrolling. The Indian Patrols were now challenged at every step but India was not willing to sit still and lose the initiative. The newly fortified and constructed posts gave India a good starting point to harass the Pakistani Patrols as well.



To better understand, it would be prudent to peruse Map 2&3. In this map, we can clearly see that the Indian position was not as dire as it may look. In fact, India was well poised to strike KanjarKot the moment more reinforcements arrived. Sardar Post overlooked KanjarKot and threatened the flank of the fort whereas India had occupied and strengthened all the positions in front of KanjarKot Fort, threatening the Track and the lines to the fort all the way from Chad Bet. It was becoming clear to the HQ at Badin that if the Indian Army launched an attack along Vingi, Jat Trai and Rahim ka Bazar, then the Fort would find itself in an untenable position of having to defend itself from the Sardar Post and the offensive from Vigiokot. In such an event the fort may fall endangering Rahim Ka Bazar, Mara and Ding and would force the Pakistani Army to fall back to defend the Mara, Rahim, Saro and Diplo line, losing quite a lot of the initiative. It was becoming clear that for this line of Vingi, Jat Trai and KanjarKot to be secure, Sardar Post had to fall which would not only allow the Flank to be secure but also secure the entire line, creating it the perfect first-line defense for Rahim Ka Bazar. As long as the post existed, the first line was always in threat. This was tripled when the Indian forces, Outflanking Pakistan, established a Post at Ding on 5th April and set up Shalimar Post in front of KanjarKot Fort. With the Ding post, the danger to the fort quadrupled and any counter-attack could be pre-empted. The first line for the defense of Rahim Ka Bazar was in danger and Ding post endangered Mara and Ding itself and the fort was in great danger. Over here we can see that now the Indian forces in the area were securing posts and strategic locations to implement the orders of Operation Kabaddi. The Pakistani fortification did indeed place them on the backfoot but by building their advantages, they moved to outflank KanjarKot. Pakistan now had only two options. It could both leave the fort and move back to Rahim Ka Bazaar or it could launch an offensive on the posts and secure the area around KanjarKot Fort to secure the line.

Brigadier Azhar arrived in Badin on 11 March and on 27th March, the Indian High Command started a joint exercise called ARROWHEAD in the Gulf of Kutch where INS Vikrant, several frigates and destroyers along with a brigade group did a joint service exercise. Both sides were ready for any incident of fire for this to become hot.

On 30th March Pakistan sent an aide memoire to India describing the Indian military action as provocative. While these talks were going on India had begun reconnaissance flights over Kutch and had, by its own admission, started to patrol areas that it had never patrolled before and closer to the Pakistani tracks. Although the patrols were well within the Indian area, they were however a violation of Ground Rule 9 that the status quo must be maintained. Pakistan protested very strongly against the new patrols.

There was great pressure among the public and the opposition for India to do something as the response was seen as meek and lackluster and drew criticism with reminders of 1962. Many critics bashed the government stating that in 47 they had lost 1/3rd of Kashmir to Pakistan, In 62 they had lost Aksai Chin to China and in 65 they would lose Kutch to Pakistan. Swaran Singh would argue in the Lok Sabha, when the correlation was highlighted, that all those scenarios were different and it was highly unfair and ridiculous to compare these situations and present them as similar and he went on to explain how the Chinese had built a properly engineered road whereas the Pakistanis had built only a mud track for the passage of trucks. This was not well received as the parliament shouted at the government for incompetency and accused the government of being inefficient and coward and demanded to know why the Indian military was not being properly sent with set objectives.

On 11th March India proposed a meeting at any level acceptable to Pakistan where a solution could be discussed however India did not solely focus on diplomacy and strengthened its hand during this period by making Sardar Post and post at Vigiokot to defend each other. Pakistan would establish posts at Ding as well. India was strengthening its position but there is no evidence to suggest that India believed that this would lead to confrontation with regular army soldiers. Now before we head to the Battle of Sardar Post, let us analyze the criticism levied by the Indian opposition and critics.

The Indian response was not lackluster at all. In fact the criticism was truly unfair since many were reeling from the events of 1947 and 1962 and felt that an India that is not tough will simply lose all its territory. Many saw this as a repeat of the colonial era and the times when invasions would come from the lands west of the Indus but there is a world of difference between tough and warlike and the actions of the government were tough. The opposition demanded them to be warlike hostile. The Indian government did not sit idly by at all. It immediately reinforced old posts, set up new ones, armed the men that were present and held their ground. They did advance patrolling into areas they had not ventured before and where they were challenged, they also challenged any Pakistan patrol that came their way. The call that they should bring the Indian army is also unfair since, as has been established above, the Indian army was sent to the area. It was a proportional response where vigorous patrolling was met with vigorous patrolling and new posts were met with new posts. Pakistan sent its 51st Brigade which took control of the Rangers and India sent the 31st Infantry Brigade which took control of the SRPF and both sides had them stationed on the front lines while they had their forces at the back to stop any thrust from the other side. The Indian response was adequate to the situation and the hostile criticism was unwarranted. They strengthened their position and continued a diplomatic push. This was a tough response and very different from 1962.

On 6th April, the HQ ordered the Brigade to capture Sardar Post, Jungle Post (A post near Sardar Post, securing, reinforcing and supplying it) and Shalimar post which was located in front of the KanjarKot Fort. Doing so would secure the fort and secure the defensive line and with the fall of these positions, the dangerous Ding post would fall by itself or any offensive would be a lot easier. On paper, the plan was very sound and tactically there were no faults since the fall of all three would truly secure KanjarKot Fort and Ding post would have no choice but to either surrender or retreat. If Sardar Post alone fell, then the other posts were not strong enough to hold out.

The attack night was planned to be 7-8th April However, the movement of the battalions to the concentration area was delayed which forced the brigade commander to postpone the attack to the night of 8-9 April. The H hour was fixed at 0100 hours. On 7th April, the HQ ordered Brig. Azhar to take the three posts and for this, an attack plan was formed where the 6th Baluch (Understrength having left a large rear party at the Cantonment numbering no more than 300-400 out of a total 800 battalion) would take the Shalimar post and Company A and B of the 18th Punjab (Strength 100-150 in a company) would attack Camp A and Company D and B of the 8th Frontier Force would Attack Camp B whereas Company A and C of the 8th FF were to be committed wherever the situation demanded. At 0200 hours, the attack would begin.

It must be clarified that the number of troops that participated in this battle are grossly over overestimated with some foreign sources citing 3500-4000 soldiers. This misinformation has largely grown to the thinking that the entire 51st Brigade participated and some have even given numbers to be of 10,000 thinking that the entire 8th division participated. Reality is quite different. The number in a company in Pakistan contains 100-150 troops depending on strength of the Brigade. In this offensive, the 6th Baluch was at battalion strength which would normally contain 700-800 troops but the 6th Baluch had left a large contingent behind at cantonment and were understrength whereas the two companies of the FF force D & B Company had 100-150 men each and the 18th Punjab Company A & B had 100-150 men meaning that the maximum number of participating troops, accounting for the understrength 6th Baluch would be somewhere between 1000-1200.

The enemy at Shalimar Post had a single Company (Strength not mentioned thus presumed to be full) with Jungle Post the same. The Sardar Post had somewhere between a Single Company to 2 Companies according to various sources but one thing is assured that 2 Companies were out on patrol and this is according to Indian Sources. There is little available scholarship on the Battle.

Little before midnight on 8 April, Brigadier Azhar accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Iqbal Malik, CO 14th Field Regiment arrived in the concentration area. In the meantime, 6th Baluch secured the ground where the two attacking battalions were to form up for the attack. The H hour had to be postponed to 0200 hours because 18th Punjab arrived late in the forming up place and without their artillery observer, Lieutenant Riaz. The officiating commander of 83rd Independent Mortar Battery, Captain Nazar was ordered to accompany 18th Punjab as the artillery observer in the attack. A silent attack began at 0200 hours with two companies each of 18 Punjab and 8 FF heading for Camps A and B respectively. The leading elements of both battalions reached the forward enemy positions covering almost 3000 meters, a considerable distance, for an assault on foot. The surprise was nearly achieved by B Company of 18 Punjab as it was almost on its objective before a lone Indian sentry challenged them.

Lieutenant Farukh Khatlani, commanding B Company 18 Punjab ordered the charge. Amid the confusion that followed, the company overran half of Camp A's positions. Further assault was checked by enemy machine guns from Camp B which was not yet under attack by Company B and D of the 8th FF. The attack was to happen simultaneously since the Sardar Post, itself was divided into three major camps and these camps would make sure to defend each other. The B Camp had the deadly machine guns and behind Camp A and B was Camp C, whose adjacent were the dangerous mortars but the delay meant that an unengaged Camp B was free to fire at Company B of 18th Punjab. The Company was caught in a precarious situation.

As a result, Lieutenant khatlani and his company CO Subedar Mauz Muhammad were both killed. Captain Nazar called for fire on the objective but he too fell, mortally wounded. His signaler,Kifayat Ullah, tried to continue but a bullet knocked out the Wireless set while another killed him. The artillery and the Mortar battery, which was to cover the Companies, could not be used. With the key personnel in the company dead, the attack Of B Company 18th Punjab came to a halt.

The question is where was Company A during this time after all both companies were to attack together at Camp A.

Company A of 18th Punjab under Major Nadir Hussain drifted to their right and instead Of attacking Camp A simultaneously with Company B, arrived opposite Camp B which was the Objective of Company B and D of the 8th FF objective. The leading elements of 8th FF, (B Company on the left and D Company on the right) had also drifted to their right, and as a result, B Company of 8th FF arrived at Camp B, behind A Company of 18th Punjab (Map 5). The Indian positions at Camp B were stronger and the attacking force met stiff resistance.

Even then Somehow, Sardar Karnail Singh, the Indian commander at Sardar Post who had his headquarters at Camp B, surrendered with seventeen of his men. As at Camp A, only half the positions at Camp B were overrun and the depth positions not only held their own but brought to hear effective fire on 18th Punjab troops at Camp A.

Lieutenant Colonel Mumtaz Ali, CO 18 Punjab, realizing that his A Company was on the wrong objective decided to disengage Camp B and ordered it to attack the enemy opposite it at Camp B and swing around behind Camp A and support B Company. This was a costly move since such disengagement brought the Company under fire from Camp B and C and soon the Company found itself pegged and being fired from all sides. In this attempt, Major Nadir and some of his men got wounded and he withdrew his company to allow the enemy to be engaged by his artillery observer. At this stage, CO 18th Punjab ordered D Company to reinforce B Company at Camp A, but they had hardly begun to move forward when enemy mortar fire checked their advance. The offensive had begun in the worst possible fashion. The 8th FF Company B and D had not partaken much and had found itself checked by enemy mortars whereas Company A and B of 18th Punjab had struggled with logistics, finding themselves lost. The mismatch timing meant that the Companies attacked in the worst possible fashion and the 14th field Regiment, Artillery, had been barely used allowing Sardar Post to effectively push back the attack.

At about 1030 hours, with the offensive going nowhere, CO 18th Punjab ordered his forward companies to dig in and hold out until 8th FF had cleared Camps B and C.

The 8th FF’s attack on Camp B was led by Major AHQ Zahid. Commanding B Company on the left and Major Luqman Mahmud commanding D Company on the right. As mentioned above these two companies strayed towards their right whereby only B Company assaulted Camp B (with A Company of 18th Punjab at Camp A). To make things worse, the wireless communication between the battalion and the attacking companies broke down. Since the attack was to be a silent one, wireless silence had been imposed and was to be broken on contact with the enemy. But when this was necessitated, the wireless failed altogether.

At about 0330 hours, CO 8th FF moved forward with A Company to establish contact with the forward companies But A Company's movement was also checked by enemy mortar and machine gun fire from the area of High Ground (Map 5). The attack was being halted. During this period, it was maintained that 2 Companies of Sardar Post had been out patrolling and reinforcement from Vigiokot could arrive if they were alerted. The situation needed to be resolved and resolved right now.

Now during this time, we have to wonder where the 6th Baluch was. Well At about 0430 hours, 6th Baluch reported that it had occupied Shalimar Post, the enemy having withdrawn without any fight and was the only attack point which had been very successful and was free to help the other companies but this had to be done before reinforcement for any reinforcement would stagnate the offensive and allow for the Indian army to come in full force.

Brigadier Azhar decided to use the 6th Baluch for a new offensive. At 0830 Hours, the 6th Baluch was at Ding where they were regrouped. Brig. Azhar ordered them to attack Camp B and C and then attack Camp A with the forward companies to capture Sardar Post and move to remove the Jungle Post with full strength. On paper, this plan looked concrete however it needed to be executed perfectly. Azhar decided to deploy the Battalion along with Company A & C of the 8th FF to cover their understrength. They were to attack Camp C and provide aid for the capture of Camp B. Lt. Riaz, who was to be the Artillery observer for the deployed companies but had failed to reach them, was ordered to be sent with them but he left without a wireless set! Even before the beginning, the offensive would run into trouble.

Lt. Colonel Zaidi. CO 6th Baluch decided to approach his objective from the west. 6 Baluch reached Dhand Nullah at about 1130 hours and on crossing it the battalion came upon open ground. The salty marshes offered either open plain ground or ‘Bets (Elevated mudflats 3-5 feet above ground). The area north of the Custom Track held dunes ranging 40-300 ft in height but the south was open ground making vehicular movement both easy and very dangerous since ‘Bets’ provided unobstructed observation. This meant any movement could be seen on the open ground and could be fired on. The conflict had begun at night but by now, the light of day was full and provided an unobstructed view of all that happened and moved. The second offensive had taken too long and time wasted disadvantaged the offensive.

Lt. Colonel Zaidi ordered Lieutenant Riaz to engage enemy machine guns firing from Sardar Post only to discover that he didn’t have a wireless set. This caused massive confusion and delay as the force stood in open ground in front of enemy machine guns without artillery cover. At 1400 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Zaidi ordered D Company to probe forward and locate the enemy positions. The company had hardly advanced 400 meters when it came under machine gunfire. Lieutenant Riaz engaged the machine guns with artillery at 1430 hours when eventually Second Lieutenant Ahmed Sultan of 14th Field Regiment arrived with a wireless set and joined 6th Baluch but by then any surprise the offensive was to have, was completely removed and the attack was disadvantaged.

Lt. Colonel Zaidi ordered C Company 8th FF to move forward while he moved with his own C Company. Within minutes the troops were subjected to machine gun and mortar fire and the attack ground to a halt. Since their presence in the open ground and their slow attack and late wireless calls had allowed them to utilize all the power of the post to attack the incoming offensive. While the situation was difficult, the offensive was not hopeless. In fact the attacks of the night had weakened the post considerably and neither the patrolling companies had returned nor any reinforcement had arrived. The atmosphere in the post was of desperation and the pinned down Companies could launch another offensive if proper leadership was used. In fact, the most major part was that 14th Field Regiment which had been barely used yet but was their most powerful weapon. If used alone, they could endanger the post and break its defenses. True military skills and leadership are seen when things go south, as offensives become late, surprises and covers blown, it is there we witness true officers. When things go right, every officer looks like Rommel. The situation on the Pakistani end was not dire and all they needed was to use the 14th field Regiment and mount an offensive under their cover and capture the post. Half of Camps A and B had already fallen but alas this was not so.

Not satisfied with the progress of the operation, Brigadier Azhar ordered CO 6th Baluch to suspend further attacks until he reached their position. Having been informed of enemy reinforcements on their way from Vigiokot, he was eager to capture Sardar Post before their arrival. However, Brigadier Azhar was unable to reach the 6th Baluch position and rather than ask them to pursue the attack, he called the offensive off and he reasoned that the prospects of its capture were bleak and enemy reinforcements were on their way. Brigadier Azhar decided to call off the operation and withdraw to a more defensible position. However, the reality was different since the artillery shelling under the directions of Lt. Riaz had forced the enemy to a full retreat where they abandoned all three Camps. The Indians felt themselves stretched and surrounded and felt that neither reinforcement nor the patrols were coming and thus decided to abandon their position and retreat 2 miles south to Vigiokot post. The coveted Sardar Post was within grasp had only one step been taken towards that direction. This was a scene that would repeat itself often when these two armies would clash when neither side knew the other's plight and would make decisions based on assumptions.

Sardar Post, which 51 Brigade had attacked so desperately, remained vacant for some time. The Indians waited and when the Pakistani forces showed no inclination of taking it, they re-occupied it—this time with regular troops. In fact, it was an Indian air WAR OP aircraft which discovered that Sardar Post was unoccupied.

“The AOP which had arrived at Bhuj to take the Brigadier artillery Southern Command to 11th Field Regiment's practice in the Little Rann now came in useful. It new over the Sardar post and saw no sign of the Pakistani movement. A patrol from the leading battalion confirmed that Sardar Post had not been occupied by Pakistani troops. The patrol firmed in at Sardar Post and stayed there until an infantry company relieved it.”

In the words of Major (Retired) Sita Ram John,

"The same afternoon an Indian army contingent was sent to occupy Sardar Post. The contingent was surprised to find that Pakistan had not occupied the post. It was undefended. The Indians reoccupied it."

Following the reoccupation of the Sardar Post, the Indian Army Headquarters took charge of the situation in the Rann of Kutch more earnestly. According to an Indian point of view, "The operations in Kutch were till then being conducted by a static formation: Maharashtra and Gujrat Area, with its headquarters at Bombay." The preparations began for the next encounter that would end the Rann of Kutch Conflict and that would be the famous ‘Battle of Bets’ and it would be this battle that would give Pakistan the confidence in its military to undertake offensives against India. On 9th April India sent a diplomatic protest Note and on 10th April Pakistan replied to the note rejecting Indian allegations, demands for a ceasefire and high political talks. Shastri also took a hardline by stating that India would only talk about border demarcation if Pakistan vacated Kanjarkot Fort and would repeatedly insist on doing so. The 9th April diplomatic Note had contained that request.

Perhaps the best way to analyze the operation would be a later Indian government report into war described this episode with some accuracy when it stated,

“The Brigadier of 51st from Pakistan had handled the operation as ineptly as Brigadier Pahlajani of 31st Infantry Brigade of India.”

Both would be sidelined from the theater. A quick analysis of the entire offensive tells us some very important things.

Artillery, Night and Defense

The Pakistani offensive had 1000-1200 against the Indian 150-300 men, who had positions entrenched as well as Mortars at height. The rule of thumb is that against a defending enemy you attack with a ratio of 1:3 in favor of the offensive army and if there is height then 1:6 in favor of the offensive army. The plains made the numbers even more visible. Pakistan employed the 14th Field Regiment however due to lack of wireless contact the artillery remained ineffective during the offensive until the end when it showed its devastation and highlighted that if used correctly early, then this battle would have been over before the first light as was the original plan. The requirement of the numbers pointed to two important things that in the plains such a large number could be seen and could come under fire immediately thus it needed two major covers. Artillery and the Night. The offensive had to use the artillery efficiently and had to finish before the first light. General Tikka’s orders actually included this important part that the offensive must be completed before first light. The operation would become multiple times dangerous under daylight. Yet the importance of both was not understood and the offensive happened in the worst possible manner.





Communication Break Down

The first moment of the Offensive underwent a major communication breakdown as wireless sets were broken and communication to the HQ and to the 14th Field Regiment was an absolute mess. The attack was to be a silent one to achieve surprise and radio silence is indeed kept when silent attacks happen however here, like in all silent attacks, radio silence was only to be kept till the contact with the enemy however contact with the enemy led to an absolute breakdown in communication as wireless sets were broken, there was no plan for second communication officer, and the Company entered into chaos. The HQ was completely in the dark about how the Company was doing and where the other Companies were. The entire leadership of a Company fell to enemy guns which led to the halting of the offensive. Company A’s plan to aid Company B in Camp A by swirling around also points to lack of communication as the Company A CO had no idea that the Company A leadership was not there and any surrounding movement would require Company A to have prior info and leadership to attack together at Camp A. Company B and D of 8th FF where themselves unaware as to what was happening and the lack of communication displayed a lack of urgency especially on the part of 6th Baluch which had easily completed its objective and could have aided Company A but only communicated the fact that they had won the Post without a fight when the offensive began at 0200 Hours, at 0430 Hours and regrouped at Ding at 0830 Hours, 4 Hours later.



Coordination and Logistics.

Silent attacks circle around coordination and logistics. The Companies were unaware of their position for most of the offensive and this created a lack of coordination. Two companies were to attack Camp A and two were to attack Camp B so that neither Camp could defend the other and would be overwhelmed however the two Companies of 18th Punjab were the only ones that fought hard and achieved success at a level as well but the lack of coordination was open. Company A felt the blow of the entire Post and when Company B came to the fight, Company A had already halted and Company B came alone against the most fortified position of Sardar Post. Company B and D of 8th FF barely did anything and found Company D had found itself checked by mortars. Coordination was absolutely zero and this immediately blunted the offensive. Logistical sense attributed to the Companies veering right and it became worse when Company A tried an impossible maneuver that only saw it enter into the cross fire from Camp B and Camp C. The Mortars, the most dangerous weapon of Sardar Post, remained unchecked. The silent attack was meant to avoid the Mortars and Machine Guns but the failed coordination allowed for the maximum utility of both by the enemy. This was witnessed again when LT. Riaz had forgotten his wireless set and he was an artillery observer. Previously he had forgotten himself causing a delay in the start of the operation and then he had forgotten the wireless set. This meant that by full midday, the artillery was necessary but could not be used immediately.



Delays, Delays, Delays.

As I said that the offensive was best to be fought under the Night sky and daylight was the absolute worst enemy of such an offensive in such geography yet the offensive was delayed an hour due to the absence of the artillery observer and the attacks were delayed as well with Camps being engaged one at a time. The attack by D Company of 8th FF came at a massive delay and was checked immediately since the Post was fully alerted and the battery fully ready to fire at any Company that was in its range. The 6th Baluch took its time in reporting the Post takeover and then took 4 hours to regroup at Ding and then the next delay came with LT. Riaz forgetting his Wireless set as the attack which was to begin at 1400 Hours was delayed and this was when the 6th Baluch was standing in the plains in open sight. The delay in artillery allowed for the Post to shore up for another offensive and immediately checked the advance. Lastly was the delay caused by Brig. Azhar, who felt he had to be there himself and called for a complete halt of the offensive till his arrival yet he failed to get there and the offensive was completely halted in the middle of open ground in broad daylight.







Panic and Nerves

In a battle, things do go wrong. Equipment fails, men cower, weapons jam, all and everything that could go wrong do go wrong however the mark of a strong soldier is how long can he keep his nerve and think with a cool head and not panic. Here we saw the leadership panic immediately. Even before the offensive, the absence of the artillery observer was shocking and then we witnessed how Major Nadir, despite his success panicked at his presence at Camp B and tried to reposition himself to the initially planned position rather than utilize constructive thinking and continue the offensive at Camp B. His unnecessary movement stalled and blunted his own attack which could have been effective with Company B of 8th FF which was behind him. Camp B was the most dangerous position and it was through Camp B that the Mortar positions could also be targeted.

We see the immediate Panic by Brig. Azhar again when he thought the offensive halted and his decisions only made the offensive stall even more. IT was clear that by 1500 Hour, he had lost his nerve and his call for a retreat towards a more defensible position showed his thinking especially when that was the time to continue the offensive. The artillery had finally been used properly and it was the time to lead an attack to see what would happen but his nerves lost and he would undertake a strategy that would be employed by both Pakistan and India in the 1965 conflict and that was to immediately go into the defensive and retreat to defensible positions. This lone decision caused, what could have been a successful offensive to fail horridly.



These battles are important to study because we see mistakes and failures that can teach us many important military lessons. Not all offensive succeed but learning from failure is the most important trait of an army and even today this battle is important as a study because, in this short battle, we can decipher many things that can help us understand the coming Battle of Bets and the 1965 war and this battle would ring the coming of a massive conflict between Pakistan and India but that is a study for another time.




















SOURCES

“History of Indo-Pak War- 1965” By General Mahmud Ahmed

“From Kutch to Tashkent” By Farooq Bajwa

“The Pakistan Army; War of 1965” By Shaukat Riza

“India’s Paratroopers; History of the Parachute Regiment of India” By KC Praval

“The Indo-Pak Clash in the Rann of Kutch” By Major Ahmed Saeed

“The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965” By Major Sita Ram Johri

“History of the Regiment of Artillery—Indian Army” By Major Generaql DK Palit

“History of Indo-Pak War 1965” Chakravorty B.C History Division, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi,



Maps Sourced from

“History of Indo-Pak War- 1965” By General Mahmud Ahmed


@Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @Irfan Baloch @SQ8 @Arsalan and i dont know who else is interested in this thread.

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## Joe Shearer

@saiyan0321

Very well written.

As you know, I am not on line as much as I used to be.

Let me respond when I can. Bear with me.

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## Raja Porus

*The Battle of Chamb-1971*​


> *Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN makes a very well researched and informative study of the Battle of Chamb in 1971*​


*T*he Battle of Chamb of 1971 stands out as the finest display of an offensive battle in the Indo-Pak operational scenario. Symbolically speaking it was this battle which sustained the morale of the army in West Pakistan and provided much needed credibility to sustain and preserve the army’s image in the wake of the traumatic events of December 1971. The Indians justly described it as “the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war”. (refers page.488-the Indian armour history of the Indian Armoured Corps -1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi). It is ironic that Third World countries study Napoleon and Slim when they have great military commanders like Eftikhar, Akhtar and Abrar. The Battle of Chamb of 1971 was an epic feat of arms. Even today it stands out as one of the most instructive battles of all three Indo-Pak wars in terms of operational strategy, small unit actions, handling of armour and above all as a supreme example of the power of personality and leadership in war.

Any student of the art of war who wishes to understand the Indo-Pak way of war will find the battle complete in terms of valuable insights and thought-provoking lessons connected with leadership, strategy and tactics. Above all the Battle of Chamb convincingly proves that the major part of pitfalls and drawbacks which inhibit many Third World armies are more connected with leadership morale and conceptual hangovers and have little connection with material factors like equipment or simple numerical inferiority or superiority.

*THE ESSENTIAL FACTS*
*THE BATTLE GROUND*

Chamb had become a household name in Pakistan in 1965, thanks to the famous Operation Grand Slam and General Akhtar Hussain Malik’s lightning advance towards Akhnur. In 1965, however, it was a much easier place to enter since its importance had been realised by the Indians only shortly before the war started. Thus in 1965 Chamb was held only by an independent Infantry Brigade while in 1971 it was held by an Infantry Division which had been heavily fortifying and improving its defences since 1965, keeping in view the lightning Pakistani advance in this sector in 1965.

The sector is bounded by the ceasefire line/international border in the west and south while a range of hills constitutes its northern portion running roughly in an east west line. Some ridges, however, jut downwards from this range of hills and run along a north south alignment, most prominent of these being the Phagla Sakrana Bridge which perpendicularly cuts the main road/approach to Chamb from west and provides good defensive positions like Point 994 etc. Average relative height of Phagla Sakrana Ridge was 60 to 70 feet and it ran south till a place called Jhanda. The most prominent and tactically most important ground in the entire sector were two ridges known as Mandiala North and South. These two ridges dominated Chamb and the bridge over River Tawi 2 miles north of Chamb. No attacker advancing towards Chamb or planning to attack the bridge or to bypass Chamb from the north and cross River Tawi could be successful unless these two ridges were captured. Both the ridges ran in a roughly north west-south west direction and were parallel to each other. Both were 60 to 70 feet high. Mandiala North ran along southern bank of Sukh Tao Nullah from its bend near village Kahni till a round hill near 200 R. The southern ridge dominated the town of Chamb and the Tawi bridge. River Tawi and Sukhtao Nullah were the two main water courses running from north to south. Sukhtao Nullah was a tributary of Tawi and joined it a little north of the Tawi bridge. In the summers River Tawi was a partial tank obstacle with a wide bed steep banks with crossing places at Chhanni Chamb and Mandiala. In the winters, however, tanks could cross the river after recce. There were, however, boggy patches on both sides of the river south of Chamb. (Refers-page. 498-Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C. Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987 and the Indian Armour-Maj Gen. Gurcharan Singh-earlier quoted-page 488).The Tawi was spanned by a bridge built after the 1965 war about 2 km north of Chamb. Average width of Tawi was 150-300 yards (Refers-discussion of the author with various participants of the 1971 operation from 11 Cavalry, 28 Cavalry and 19 Baluch) and was roughly 7 to 8 kilometers east of the ceasefire line/international border. The area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a funnel which is wide at its western entrance and gets progressively narrower by virtue of closer successive proximity of lines of hill on the north and the River Chenab to the south. Thus the defenders’ task became easier as an attacker advanced eastwards from Koil to Jaurian and to Akhnur making any outflanking operation more and more impracticable by virtue of high hills on the north and the unfordable River Chenab to the south. All the ridges in the area followed a north south alignment with a ridge and a nullah (dry water course) alternating each other approximately every 1000 to 2000 metres all the way from the international border till River Tawi making the defenders task easier and the attackers task extremely arduous and time consuming. Most of the area was covered by 8 to 10 feet high grass and wild shrubs and was sparsely populated. The continuous line of hills on the north, however, made the gunners task very easy and this was true specially for area around Chamb Mandiala and Kamali Chappar. Thus a large proportion of casualties were caused by artillery fire. The most dominating and high features in the sector were however in the north i.e. the red hill lalaea etc. These were however away from Chamb and were of local significance. Their loss or possession had no connection with the advance towards Chamb or Palanwala in direct terms. The main metaleed roads in the area were road Koil-Chamb running from Koil on the border till Chamb and two metalled roads east of Tawi i.e., Akhnur-Jaurian) Chamb and Akhnur-Kalit Mandiala which were parallel the former being south of the latter.

*COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING FORCES*

In 1965 Pakistan enjoyed technical superiority over the Indian armour by virtue of having technically superior US Patton tanks. In 1971 this was no longer the case since the Indian army possessed the Russian T-54/55 tanks and the Patton was no longer the best tank in the subcontinent. In 1965 the Indians had a squadron of French AMX-13 tanks in Chamb as compared to two Pakistani armoured regiments in the initial phase. Thus the situation in 1971 was radically different from 1965. The Indian 10 Infantry Division had been deployed in Chamb since 1965. The Indian units in Chamb knew the area like the palm of their hand and had made extremely thorough preparations for its defence. In 1965 the newly raised headquarters 10 Indian Infantry Division had arrived in Akhnur from the south on 28 August 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. The Indian Military Historian exhibited great intellectual honesty when he rightly said “In 1965 the Pakistanis had succeeded in capturing Chamb with a surprise attack. There should have been no surprise in 1971 but they succeeded again). (Refers-page 494 the Indian Army after independence -Major K. C. Praval-earlier quoted).

The Indian 10 Infantry Division had four Infantry Brigades (14 battalions, two regiments of armour i.e. 9 Deccan Horse (T54) 72 Armoured Regiment (T-55), 2 independent armoured squadron ex-Central India Horse (AMX-13), two engineer battalions, six regiments of artillery (two medium, three field, one light). The division also had a para-company and a company of ATGM of entac ATGMs. Two BSF battalions manning the border were also under command 10 Division. The Pakistani 23 Division was a five Infantry Brigade Division, however, its fifth Infantry Brigade i.e. 7 AK Brigade (three battalions) was facing largely the 25 Indian Infantry Division deployed north of 10 Indian Division. Thus against 10 Indian Division the Pakistan 23 Division could field four infantry brigades (13 battalions). The Pakistani artillery consisted of four field regiments, one field battery, two mountain batteries, one medium battery, a section of heavy guns. The most formidable force multiplier for the Pakistan Artillery, however, was Brigadier Naseerullah Khan Babar who compensated for lack of sophisticated Russian guns on part of the Pakistani artillery. The 23 Division had two armoured regiments i.e. 26 Cavalry which was its integral armoured regiment (Sherman 11) 11 Cavalry which was placed under command in October 1971 (T-59) was also placed under command. In addition Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade was also placed under command in end October 1971.

Outwardly it appears from the above mentioned information that 23 Division was superior only in terms of armour vis-a-vis the 10 Indian Division. However in actual fact it was vice versa. All Indian tanks in both the armoured regiments were T-54/55 which were slightly superior to T-59; whereas only 11 Cavalry and 28 Cavalry possessed T-59 while the 26 Cavalry and 12 independent squadron were equipped with the obsolete Sherman 11/M-36/B-2 tanks of world war vintage. Further 28 Cavalry had just 31 tanks. In total 23 division had 129 tanks out of which 55 Sherman 11/M-36/B2 were largely ineffective in operational terms; leaving some 74 T-59 against some 90 T-54/T-55 tanks. Thus though slightly numerically inferior in numbers i.e. 129 versus 104; the Indians were qualitatively superior as far as armour was concerned. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb- Lt. Col Saeed- (GSO-I 23 Div in 1971- P.13 Army Education Press-1979). In addition the Indian T-54/55 tanks possessed pads ammunition firing capability which was not available as far as the Pakistani T-59 tanks were concerned. The T-54/55 gun had a far superior stabilisation system.

In artillery there was relative parity; Pakistan having 130 guns of all calibres while the Indians possessed 126 guns which could have possibly been increased to 144 guns if 19 Brigade Artillery of the neighbouring Indian 26 Division also extended fire support to the 10 Infantry Division.

Three Pakistani battalions i.e. 42 Punjab, 47 Punjab and 33 FF were only 8 to 9 months old. The AK regiments were also not as well trained as the regular infantry. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page.2). On the Indian side the 72 Armoured Regiment was a newly raised regiment having been raised in Ahmad Nagar in July 1971. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page. 412)

It is significant to note that even General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu has acknowledged the fact that T-59 and M-36 Shermans were far inferior to Indian tanks technically in his history of Indian Armoured Corps. Thus General Gurcharan stated “A major weakness in the Pakistan army at the time was the state of its armour ... The Americans had stopped military aid after 1965 war to both India and Pakistan. The step did not materially affect India’s capability but Pak armour was seriously handicapped ... she had to resort to alternative sources and imported 225 T-59 tanks from China but the number was not large enough to replace her aging fleet ... Sherman tank destroyers etc. were by 1971 becoming obsolescent. Even Chinese T-59, the latest in the Pak inventory were a Chinese version of the Russian T-54 which the Soviets had discarded and replaced by a much improved T-55 version. (Refers-page 425-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted).

*SIGNIFICANCE OF CHAMB SECTOR*

The area of Chamb was regarded as territory of crucial significance by both India and Pakistan. For the Indians its defence was of paramount significance since it was the direct approach to the Indian jugular vein of Akhnur Bridge which lay on the main Indian line of communication to the Indian 25 Division holding Poonch and all area west of Pir Punjal Range in Kashmir. Capture of Akhnur by Pakistan could lead to an easy advance towards the Jammu Srinagar Road at least theoretically, although in 1971 the Pakistan army was in no position to carry out such an ambitious offensive. The Indians based on their harsh experience in 1965 i.e. the lightning Pakistani offensive towards Akhnur were firmly resolved to pre-empt any Pakistani move towards Chamb by resorting to an offensive operation into Pakistan territory from Chamb.

The Pakistani military planners on the other hand perceived the Indian position of Chamb as a springboard from which the Indians could launch a swift counterstroke into the soft underbelly of Pakistan and sever the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road; which was just 35 to 40 miles from the Indian held territory of Chamb. The Pakistani fears about Indian designs were further compounded by the fact that unlike the area south of River Chenab there was no water obstacle in between Chamb and the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road running north to south though the towns of Kharian, Lalamusa and Gujrat; all three of which were within striking range of Chamb.

*THE BATTLE PLANS*
*THE INDIAN PLAN*

There was some difference of opinion among the various Indian commanders at various levels regarding the proposed Indian design of battle in Chamb. The GOC Western Command General Candeth wanted to initially fight a governing troops withdrawal battle from the border till River Tawi to wear down and exhaust the expected Pakistani attack on Chamb; followed by a change of posture and a deliberate Indian counter attack which would push the attacking Pakistani troops backwards. The Indian counter attack was based on employment of a complete Independent Armoured Brigade with three armoured regiments (8th Light Cavalry, Central India Horse, 72 Armoured Regiment) one mechanised infantry regiment (7th Grenadiers) and a fourth Integral Armoured Regiment of 10 Division i.e. the Deccan Horse. The plan visualised having just one infantry battalion west of Tawi assisted by a tank squadron. The plan was based on the assumption that complete surprise would be achieved by rafting all three armoured regiments of the 3rd Armoured Brigade across the Chenab. (Refers-the western front- Lt. Gen. K. P Candeth-Allied Publishers Delhi 1984-page-75). (refers-history of the Indian armoured corps earlier quoted page-483). It appears that by November 1971 the Indian General Headquarters lost the nerve to launch this formidable plan which keeping in view the great Indian numerical superiority in tanks; had the potential to seriously jeopardise 23 Division’s operational position at worst and at best ensure that Chamb stayed in Indian hands. However by November 1971 the Indian GHQ prevailed upon Candeth to not to resort to the initial unorthodox and bold plan and instead follow a typical Indo-Pak compromise plan of holding territory west of Tawi in strength. It appears that both the GOC Western Command Candeth and the Corps Commander 15 Corps General Sirtaj Singh were obsessed with launching an attack and did not take the Indian GHQ’s orders to stand on defensive till ordered otherwise. According to Major K. C. Praval this information reached the HQ 10 Indian Division only on the evening of 01 December; primarily because of lethargy in passing down information (refers-the Indian Army after Independence earlier quoted-page. 495). There is an apparent divergence in the accounts of Candeth and Praval and it is obvious that it was not lethargy in passing down orders but overconfidence in the impregnability of their position on account of superior numbers which led the Indian command to underestimate the offensive potential of the 23rd Division.

*THE INDIAN PLAN WAS AS FOLLOWING:*

1. Area west of Tawi to be initially held by two brigades i.e. the 28 Brigade holding the hill sub-sector i.e. area Dewa Red Hill Laleal etc. The 191 Brigade to hold area west of Tawi and to the south of 28 Brigade in strength with three battalions holding area west of Tawi and one battalion east of Tawi supported by a tank squadron ex-Deccan Horse and ATGM company with the following dispositions:-

a. 5 Sikh holding area south of Laleali-Dewa and Mandiala.

b. 4/I Gurkha Rifle in the middle holding area Mole and Phagla.

c. 5 Assam defending area Barsala-Jhanda-Munawar and the Darh crossings over Tawi.

d. 10 Garhwal east of Tawi in area Chhati-Tahli Hamirpur.

(Refers: The Western Front:- Page 76 and History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Page. 483)

2. 52 Infantry Brigade east of Tawi in area Kalit Troti with be prepared orders to occupy defences on East Bank of Tawi in case of a Pakistani attack and defend the southern approach i.e. Line Hamir Pur-Chati-Tali which was at the moment thinly held on extended frontage by 10 Garhwal. This brigade was also designated to advance into Pakistan territory along with 68 Indian Brigade in case of an Indian offensive mounted inside Pakistan territory from Chamb.

3. 68 Brigade was not deployed fully/partially unlike the other infantry brigades and was held in reserve along with 72 Armoured Regiment to either defend Chamb or Akhnur area as a reserve force or to be prepared to launch the projected Indian offensive inside Pakistan territory.

4. According to K.C Praval the 15 Corps plan was to use 10 Infantry Division to advance along the north bank of Chenab river towards Tanda-Gujrat while 26 Infantry Division was to advance south of River Chenab towards Sialkot. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence-earlier quoted-page. 493). It appears that Candeth did have grandiose plans of advancing inside Pakistan as amply seen from Praval’s previously quoted account of 15 Corps plans. However, since Candeth wrote his book more than a decade later he wisely disassociated with his earlier plan and we don’t find any of what Praval stated in his book about 15 Corps plans in Candeth’s book.

5. The RHQ of Deccan Horse was located east of Tawi at Kachreal. It’s a squadron was tasked to cover the approaches to Chamb from the south and west and was located west of Tawi River under command 191 Brigade. B squadron was located at Kachreal along with the RHQ, C Squadron was tasked to cover the southern approach and was located in the 10 Garhwal area east of Tawi river. The regiment’s CO was wounded in an accident and the regiment was commanded by its 2/IC during the entire operation. (Refers-The History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page.483)

6. The Indians had full intentions of launching an offensive and for this reason had left a gap in between the area Barsala- Jhanda which was only covered by a dummy minefield. They had also left a similar gap in the area south west of the southern crossing places near the 20 Pakistan Brigade area. Later on this gap in between Barsala and Jhanda greatly facilitated the advance of the armoured brigade towards Chak Pandit. (Refers - the History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page-483).

*THE PAKISTANI PLAN*

The Pakistani GHQ had given GOC 23 Division the primary task of clearing the enemy held territory up to River Tawi. (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal -i- Muqueem Khan, National Book Foundation - Islamabad-1973-page-197.)

We have seen that terrain in the northern part of the sector was more hilly and broken than in the south. Before the war started there was a school of thought that the ideal line of advance into Chamb was from the south i.e. from north of Tanda. However, according to General Fazal-i-Muqeem, General Eftikhar had rejected this idea. The General’s rationale for doing so was that although in the north terrain was bad; this fact was balanced by the fact that in the south the enemy was much stronger and there was a greater chance to surprise the enemy. (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.197).

The key idea of General Eftikhar’s plan was that once Mandiala bridge was captured; the Indians would be forced to abandon Chamb and all area west of Tawi; since the loss of the bridge would outflank their entire position west of Tawi and render it untenable. In brief 23 Division plan was as following:-

1. 66 Brigade and 111 Brigade to secure lodgement in the area between Mungawali-Khalabat Jhil in the north and Ghogi in the south. This lodgement would result in the breakup of the main line of Indian forward defended localities and provide own armour with a firm base for breakout at first light. This operation was to commence at 2100 hours 03 Dec and the lodgement established by first light on 04 December 1971.

2. 11 Cavalry Group comprised 11 Cavalry, a squadron of 26 Cavalry,

4 Punjab, one company 19 Baluch (Recce & Support), 24 field company engineers were to breakout from area Manawanwali in the northern part of the lodgement and advance towards Mandiala cutting road Dewa Mandiala at Kamali Chappar and to secure the home bank of Tawi in Mandiala area on night 4/5 December 1971. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-15). 11 Cavalry Group was theoretically under Command 66 Brigade but practically speaking as we shall see later 66 Brigade HQ had little control if any on the battle fought at Mandiala.

3. 111 Brigade to carry out offensive probe towards Chamb and Chak Pandit and draw enemy reserves. On 05 December 111 Brigade was to advance and capture Chamb.

4. Following the capture of Chamb; the 66 Brigade and the 111Brigade were to clear the entire salient up to west bank of Tawi.

5. Operations across Tawi were planned but no fixed plan was made and the future plan to do so was to be in relation to the operational situation later. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted— page-15).

6. 20 Brigade in the south was to hold ground in the south, to make attack demonstrations in area Burjeal-Manawar and Nadala enclave. According to the division’s GSO-I the primary task of the 20 Brigade was to hold ground against a possible counter offensive of the enemy in the southern half of the salient. (Refers-Ibid-Page-15). Later on once the main attack of 66 and 111Brigade in the north had succeeded; the Brigade was to advance northward as far as possible capturing Jhanda Manawar etc.

7. In the north opposite what the Indians called hill sub-sector there were two Pakistani brigades i.e. 4 AK Brigade and 7 AK Brigade. The GOC correctly appreciated that no major fighting would take place in this area.

8. The HQ 2 Armoured Brigade was assigned 12 Independent Armoured Squadron, 13 AK Battalion, 28 Cavalry (A surprise arrival which joined the division after last light 04 Dec), and a company R & S. It may be noted that 13 AK was Reserve Battalion of 7 AK Brigade but had been ordered to march south on 02 December to be part of the main attack in the south as part of 2 Armoured Brigade.

*CONDUCT OF BATTLE*
*THE INITIAL ATTACK AND THE BATTLE OF MANDIALA*

The initial two days of the Battle of Chamb proved Moltkes famous saying that no plan survives on contact with the enemy. 66 Brigade started its attack after the preparatory bombardment which had commenced at 2020 hours 03 December and by 0200 accomplished its task of capturing an area of 3000 yards depth. Thus a lodgement area wide enough for 11 Cavalry Group to break out was secured. 111 Brigade, however, failed to accomplish its assigned task to capture a similar 3000 yards deep objective south of 66 Brigade. It was held up by an enemy company in Moel area.

Meanwhile the Indians who had been alerted by the preparatory bombardment took the following counter measures:-

a. Deployed three tank troops of “A” Squadron Deccan Horse in areas Barsala, Jhanda and Munawar respectively in order to cover the southern approach to Darh crossings on the Tawi.

b. The fourth troop of the A/M Squadron was kept as reserve in depth.

c. The RHQ of Deccan Horse moved to Chamb close to 191 Brigade Headquarters from Kachreal. Two troops from “B” Squadron Deccan Horse previously east of Tawi were sent to border posts at Moel Add Paur where Pakistani tanks had been reported on the evening and night of 03 December. Squadron Headquarters of “B” Squadron was deployed along with two troops in depth at Barsala.

d. One troop of “C” Squadron which was supporting 52 Brigade was detached and sent to defend the Mandiala crossing. (Refers-History of Indian Armour-Page-484)

These counter measures taken on night 03 December illustrated that the Indians expected the attack in the south, since no armour was sent to cover the Dewa Mandiala approach.

Meanwhile 11 Cavalry Group had commenced its advance towards Mandiala and by mid-day was reported by Indians in area Gurha on track Mandiala-Dewa. HQ Indian 191 Brigade correctly sensed the threat posed by 11 Cavalry tanks to Mandiala and at 0900 hours ordered Deccan Horse to reinforce the northern axis. Thus two tank troops of Deccan Horse’s “B” Squadron were sent to Phagla and Mandiala ridge respectively. The remaining two RHQ Deccan Horse were sent to take position at Gurha north west of Mandiala. The sheer Indian desperation may be gauged from the fact that the two RHQ tanks were sent to engage the main enemy attack. At mid-day 11 Cavalry appeared in area Gurha and was immediately engaged by the RHQ Tanks Deccan Horse and B Squadron Deccan Horse tanks at Mandiala. The Indian tanks were deployed in extremely dominating positions and within few minutes 11 Cavalry lost 7 tanks. It is best in a battle account to quote the enemy and this is how the Indian historian of the Indian armoured corps described the traumatic but epic battle of Mandiala:-

“About mid-day 11 Cavalry made its appearance in area Gurha ... RHQ tanks had selected their position well and within a few minutes knocked out 7 T-59 tanks and two recoilless guns ... 11 Cavalry less a squadron had, however, followed a route further north along the bed of Sukhtao Nullah. 191 Brigade must have been unaware of this thrust. Enemy tanks appeared behind Mandiala north and Gujha ridge along the Nala bed and destroyed a “B” Squadron tank in Mandiala. They also shot up the squadrons’ echelons dispersed in the foothills. By three P.M. 11 Cavalry had captured Mandiala north but could not secure the crossing held by a troop of tanks from “C” Squadron, Deccan Horse”. (Refers: History of Indian Armoured Corps-Page-485)

11 Cavalry had suffered heavy casualties on 04 December i.e. 5 tanks destroyed and 9 men killed and 7 wounded. In total 11 tanks were hit.4 Punjab occupied Mandiala north.

Meanwhile 28 Cavalry had been assigned to 23 Division and had reached area Assar on the evening of 03 December. 66 Brigade which was supposed to overall control 11 Cavalry operations was stuck up at Phagla and was in no position to provide any infantry support to 11 Cavalry or to control its operations.

The 111 Brigade which was supposed to have captured Chamb by 05 December was still near the border many miles from Chamb. A situation entirely unexpected had thus developed. General Eftikhar, however, remained unruffled and resolute and adopted the following modified plan:-

a. 11 Cavalry to go into Leaguer behind Gura and to rest, replenish and recuperate. Resume attack on Mandiala after replenishment.

b. HQ 4 AK Brigade along with 6 AK and 13 AK to establish a bridgehead east of Tawi after last light 04 December capturing high ground east of Sahamwan.

c. 28 Cavalry to breakout from the Bridgehead secured by 4 AK Brigade at first light 05 December to capture Pallanwala and advance as eastwards as possible.

d. 11 Cavalry to stay in reserve on 05 December 1971.

e. 66 Brigade to move forward, and follow 11 Cavalry groups advance and close up to River Tawi.

f. 111 Brigade and 20 Brigade to continue as per initial battle plan.

Meanwhile by mid-day 04 December the Indian commander was clear about the main direction of Pakistani attack. Thus the Deccan Horse was reinforced by one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which joined Deccan Horse by the evening of 04 December. In addition one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment and 7 Kumaon (68 Brigade) were despatched from Akhnur to launch a counter attack to recapture Mandiala north. The regiment along with C Squadron 72 Armoured Regiment, however, reached the east bank of Tawi after last light 04 December and immediately lost its Commanding Officer due to Pakistani artillery shelling along with 4 other officers of 7 Kumaon’s O Group. Thus the battalion being rendered leaderless could not be immediately deployed. Since it had reached Tawi after last light its mission was changed to take up positions on the east bank overlooking Mandiala crossing. On 04 December only the para company of 9 Commando was guarding Mandiala crossing and Mandiala crossing was only saved, thanks to the tenacious courage of the 5 Sikh and the tank troops of Deccan Horse which were holding Mandiala south.

It may be noted that by the evening of 04 December the B Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which had been placed under Command Deccan Horse was deployed west of Tawi; two troops on the Phagla ridge facing west and north west and the Squadron Headquarters and two troops in reserve at Chak Pandit.

*THE 4 AK BRIGADE ATTACK ACROSS TAWI 04/05 DECEMBER 1971*

4 AK Brigade was assigned 13 AK and 47 Punjab minus a company for the attack across Tawi. One squadron of 26 Cavalry and 12 Independent Squadron which had only 4 tanks available was also under command 4 AK Brigade. The 4 AK Brigade’s attack plan was as following:-

a. 6 AK and 13 AK to launch night attack across Tawi; 6 AK on the left and 13 AK on the right. Both the battalions were to capture Spur Feature.

b. Two companies of 47 Punjab and one squadron 26 Cavalry under command RHQ 26 Cavalry and one company 47 Punjab were to be held in reserve.

It may be noted that there was literally no enemy in front of 4 AK Brigade, 7 Kumaon still lost due to loss of its CO and O Group and just one Indian para company holding the Chamb Mandiala bridge. At night it appeared that only a miracle could save the Indians.

4 AK Brigade had been alerted to launch the attack from 1000 hours 04 December. Later the subject attack was postponed from 1800 hours 04 December to 05 December 0400 hours. Both the 6 AK and 13 AK were well aware about their tasks in the planned attack. However, somehow at the appointed time the CO of 6 AK failed to join the unit to lead it into the approach march to the forming up place since he had lost his battalion. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb Col Saeed-pages 42 and 43). 13 AK, however, launched the planned attack at 0300 hours 05 December. 13 AK ran into the Indian unit 9 Jat and dispersed it and advanced forward to capture its objective i.e. Spur Feature. However, no unit was supporting it and the Indians in its rear reorganised themselves and surrounded the brave battalion in the morning. Elements of 5 Sikh, 9 Jat now surrounded 13 AK organised a breakout back to own lines but lost heavily losing 26 men killed and 50 wounded including its brave CO Col. Basharat Raja who was taken prisoner.

During this whole confusion 4 AK Brigade HQ passed back the information that both its battalions had captured the Spur Feature and ordered its reserve i.e. elements of 26 Cavalry and companies of 47 Punjab to move forward and consolidate the bridgehead. When these moved forward the Indians who had by now reoccupied their defensive positions.

Candeth the Indian GOC western command acknowledged 13 AK’s performance in the following words:-

Pakistan’s 13 AK Battalion had by then succeeded in capturing the bridge (Mandiala) but their attempts to get their tanks across was thwarted by 9 Horse ... Taking advantage of the gap caused by absence of 7 Kumaon 13 AK Battalion got through to the gun positions of 39 medium and 216 medium regiments”.

Refers-The Western Front-Candeth-Page-79

As per the Indian account the situation of utter panic caused by 13 AK attack was only checked by personal intervention of Commander Indian 68 Brigade who in words of Praval “reached the scene on the morning of December 5 with a company of 9 Jat mounted on two troops of tanks from 72 Regiment 5 (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-497). Absence or presence of commanders can be decisive in crisis situations. The previously mentioned Indian accounts prove that 4 AK Brigade attack across Chamb had the potential to cause a major crisis in the Indian position, provided 4 AK Brigade Headquarters had exercised control on the battle like fighting from the front like Commander 68 Brigade who joined the battle all the way from Akhnur. Once compared with General Shaukat Raza’s account of the 4 AK Brigade the Indians sound very different; Shaukat Raza had the following to say about 4 AK Brigade:-

“By first light 5 December Brigade Major 4 AK Brigade confirmed capture of Bridgehead over River Tawi. The information was premature. Enemy positions had been reinforced. As our troops neared Tawi the Indians counter attacked with tanks, our troops hurriedly withdrew”. (Refers-the History of the Pakistan Army-Shaukat Raza Services Book Club-1990-page-182).

Once the actual situation was discovered by 4 AK Brigade early in the morning of 05 December; a feeble attempt was made to retrieve the situation by sending forward a squadron of 26 Cavalry and parts of 47 Punjab; but by now the Indians had firmly regained their composure and 26 Cavalry Squadron failed to advance suffering three tank casualties in the process. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-45) in the meantime Headquarters 23 Division discovered that 66 Brigade was still in the lodgement area and had not closed on to River Tawi as earlier ordered. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-42). Had 66 Brigade been at Tawi’s west bank near Mandiala 4 AK Brigade’s position could have been saved. It may be noted that HQ 66 Brigade had been ordered on 04 December 1971 to move forward and relieve 11 Cavalry Group i.e. 4 Punjab which was holding Mandiala north. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-46). These orders had been passed at 0900 hours 04 December 1971.

*MODIFIED PLAN TO CAPTURE CHAMB-05/06 DECEMBER AND ITS EXECUTION*

The operational situation on the morning of 05 December was as following:

a. 13 AK was back on west bank of Tawi having failed to hold the Bridgehead due to absence of 6 AK.

b. 66 Brigade was still in lodgement area west of Phagla.

c. 111 Brigade had failed to capture Point 994 the crucial feature dominating the approach to Chamb. The Point was captured once by 10 Baluch but lost soon as a result of a resolute Indian counter attack.

d. 20 Brigade had made no worthwhile progress.

e. 11 Cavalry had failed to succeed in its probing efforts in Sukh Tao and Tawi river area due to heavy fire from east of Tawi and Mandiala south which dominated the approach to Tawi bridge.

It was something like failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack in 1965 in Khem Karan. The whole atmosphere was grim and gloomy. General Eftikhar, however, retained his mental equilibrium and was not unnerved by the reverses of 04/05 December. He immediately adopted the following modified plan to carry on the battle:-

a. Bulk of the armour to be pulled out from area north of Chamb and regrouped in area east of Jaimal Kot for launching a fresh attack on Chamb Salient from the south aimed at Area Chak Pandit south of Chamb with HQ 2 Armoured Brigade comprising 28 Cavalry, one Squadron 11 Cavalry, one Squadron 26 Cavalry, 23 Baluch, one Company R & S.

b. Pressure to be kept on the Indian position north of Chamb by continuing the attack on Mandiala south using 11 Cavalry minus one squadron, and 4 AK Brigade.

c. 111Brigade to continue its attack on Chamb. One squadron 26 Cavalry also assigned to 111Brigade for this attack.

d. 66 Brigade to continue its attack towards Mandiala south.

2 Armoured Brigade units started moving towards the forward assembly area east of Jaimal Kot starting from evening of 05 December and the movement continued throughout the night 05/06 December 1971. By 0445 hours the infantry units arrived in the forward assembly area. 23 Baluch commenced the attack at 0530 hours and soon captured Bakan and Paur its objectives. There was hardly any opposition since no attack was expected by the Indians in this area. At 0800 hours 2 Armoured Brigade commenced its advance towards Chak Pandit. Opposition was nil since by 05 December the Indians were convinced that the main Pakistani attack was coming from the north. The intentionally left Indian gap in their minefield between Barsala and Jhanda proved a blessing in disguise for the 2 Armoured Brigade. A few tanks were, however, damaged on the outer fringes of the dummy minefield. The tanks of 2 Armoured Brigade captured Chak Pandit at 1730 hours, in the evening 2 Armoured Brigade captured Pallanwala.

It may be noted that once 2 Armoured Brigade had first encountered the dummy minefield between Barsala and Jhanda on its way to Chak Pandit; the progress of their advance had become very slow since they had started probing to find a gap in the minefield. It was at this juncture that the GOC flew in his helicopter to Chanir where he met Commander 2 Armoured Brigade and exhorted him to make a frontal rush and cross the minefield. Once this was done the Brigade made an almost clean sweep with the exception of three tanks damaged. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page-58 and page.59) Colonel Saeed in his book surprisingly noted about this incident that surprisingly very few tanks ran over mines” (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-59). It was so because the minefield was dummy and left to enable the Indians to launch their planned offence inside Pakistan!

Meanwhile Mandiala South was captured by 4 AK Brigade by the evening of 06 December 1971. What the Indians had refused to abandon in three days hard fighting was lost in one evening by means of a brilliant indirect approach as a result of the modified plan of 23 Division i.e. the advance to Chak Pandit. At 1930 hours in the evening of 06 December GOC 10 Indian Division Major General Jaswant Singh decided to give up the western bank of Tawi. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted -page. 487). Orders were given to Headquarters 191 Indian Brigade to withdraw to the eastern bank of Tawi at 1930 hours 06 December 1971. The Indian withdrawal was completed by midnight 06/07 December and the hotly contested bridge at Mandiala was blown up at midnight.

It is significant here to describe that it was 5 Sikh which was the real obstacle holding 66 Brigade and 4 AK Brigade from capturing Mandiala south. This fact was well acknowledged by GSO-I of 23 Division Lt Col. Saeed in the following words once he described 5 Sikhs crucial role on the two days i.e. 04 and 05 December in the following words:-

“If the Indian Commander now knows full details of what was coming for him on the morning of 05 December he can rightly congratulate the Commanding Officer of 5 Sikh and the Squadron Commander who held Mandiala south that day with so much grit and determination. They both saved a sad day for him”. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Page.51)

THE FINAL BID FOR PALLANWALA

While 2 Armoured Brigade was moving towards Chak Pandit the indomitable General Eftikhar had made up his mind to use 2 Armoured Brigade to attack Pallanwala across Tawi from Chak Pandit. Whatever historians may think the Indians have acknowledged the fact that it was well within 23 Divison’s capability to capture Pallanwala. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence K.C. Praval-earlier quoted-page 498).

Chamb was captured by 2 Armoured Brigade by the morning of 07 December. This was a foregone conclusion since the Indians had already abandoned it on night 06/07 December 1971.

General Eftikhar gave his orders for capture of Pallanwala at 1430 hours on 07 December. 2 Armoured Brigade was to cross Tawi east of Nageal. General Eftikhar correctly appreciated that Pallanwala could be captured if an immediate attack was made. A fact which has been acknowledged much later with the benefit of hindsight by Indian historians (Refers-KC Praval Indian Army after Independence page. 498). Thus General Eftikhar wanted that the attack across Tawi on Pallanwala should commence by late evening. When the GOC told Commander 2 Armoured Brigade about his plan. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade felt that the timings were too tight but was firmly ordered by the GOC to carry out these orders. The order to establish the bridgehead could not be implemented since the two battalions who were supposed to establish the bridgehead could not be located by Commander 2 Armoured Brigade as per General Shaukat Raza. (Refers-History of Pakistan Army-1966-71 page.185). Col Saeed the GSO-I of the Division, however, categorically states in his book that 23 Baluch which was supposed to launch the attack and knew about Commander 2 Armoured Brigades O Group for the subject attack did not send any officer to attend the O Group. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 67). Whatever the actual reason the fact is indisputable that 23 Division lost a golden opportunity to capture Pallanwala while the Indians were disorganised and no battalion was holding the area opposite Tawi across Chak Pandit. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade had to cancel the crucial attack till 0100 hours 08 December. Till six the next morning HQ 2 Armoured Brigade failed to locate 4 Punjab or 23 Baluch and no attack was launched! (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-68 and 69). Finally at six in the morning of 08 December Commander 2 Armoured Brigade informed the GOC that it had not been possible to launch the attack. (Refers-IBID Page.69)

Finally the proposed task of attack was given to 111Brigade. The subject attack was to be launched on the night of 08/09 December by 4 Punjab of Mandiala fame and 10 Baluch. By now, however, the Indians were well established. Failure to make use of the critical time span on 07/08 December had doomed the likelihood of success of 23 Division’s bid for Pallanwala. The Indians in the two precious days had brought their complete 68 Brigade forward and had organised their defences as following.

a. 68 Brigade to hold northern half of the east bank of Tawi; while 52 Brigade was to hold the southern half of the east bank of Tawi.

b. 72 Armoured Regiment under Command 68 Infantry Brigade was to cover the Mandiala and Chamb crossings.

c. Deccan Horse under Command 52 Brigade was to cover all crossing places south of Chamb in the 52 Brigade area of responsibility. Squadron Deccan Horse was in reserve in area Khaur near Pallanwala.

Meanwhile on 09 and 10 December GHQ placed restriction on use of 11 Cavalry east of Tawi since they wanted to move 11 Cavalry to Sialkot. Thus practically the only Armoured Regiment left for the Divison was 28 Cavalry which had just 28 tanks left. On the evening of 09 December, General Eftikhar’s helicopter crashed and the general who was mortally wounded was evacuated to Kharian. Officiating command of the division was assumed by Brig Kamal Matin. The planned attack on Palanwala was launched by 111 Brigade and 28 Cavalry. The infantry attack commenced at 0100 hours on night 09/10 December opposite Darh and Raipur ferries. By the afternoon of 1.0 December a Bridgehead which was 4,000 yards wide and 1,000 yards deep (Refers-The Western Front Candeth-page 82). The Indians speedily launched a counter attack employing elements of 7 Kumaon, 5/8 Kurkha, 10 Garhwal and 3/4 Gurkha supported by a squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment under the direct supervision of General Sartaj Singh the Commander 15 Indian Corps. The Bridgehead was contained. As per Lt Colonel Saeed there was misreporting on part of BM 111 Brigade Major Nazar Hussain also; thus the BM gave an incorrect report that 28 Cavalry was down to 4 tanks. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 80). Meanwhile the new GOC General Umar had arrived. At 1400 hours on 10 December HQ 23 Division ordered withdrawal of 111Brigade. The Battle of Chamb was a battle of lost opportunities. But these opportunities came because the indomitable spirit of General Eftikhar who had the burning desire to beat the enemy and commanded his division from the front. Even today he lives in the hearts of many ex-servicemen who saw him from close quarters, always rushing towards the sound of gun fire; in search for the leading tank troop or the first wave of infantry. Alas, had he lived, many cowards may not have prospered.

*ANALYSIS*
*HANDLING OF ARMOUR*

The Battle of Chamb 1971 stands out as the most significant battle in the history of Pakistan armoured corps as a battle in which armour was used in a successful manner in an offensive role. Later on with the benefit of hindsight General Eftikhar’s handling of armour was criticised. The criticism that armour was distributed on too wide a front is often made about 23 Division employment of armour. As a matter of fact armour was used in a concentrated manner and all the reverses suffered by the division were because of lack of infantry at the correct place. Like 11 Cavalry successfully captured Mandiala north and following this complete 4 Punjab was absorbed in holding Mandiala north. The Squadrons of 26 Cavalry were allotted to the 66 and 111Brigade because there was Indian armour supporting 5 Sikh, 4/I Gurkha and 5 Assam. In any case there was hardly any room for manoeuvre in the Mandiala area where the first main attack was launched.

Later on once 28 Cavalry arrived on 04 December armour was used in a concentrated manner. The decision to leave regiment minus of 11 Cavalry in the north of Chamb when 2 Armoured Brigade was a brilliant case of deception rather than dispersal of armour; because presence of tanks opposite Mandiala on 05/06 December convinced the Indians that main effort of 23 Division was still in the north. This led to the successful grand surprise at Chak Pandit which forced the Indian commander to abandon what three brigades of infantry had failed to achieve in three days of fighting.

On the Indian side, however, tanks were under employed. Initially only one squadron was deployed west of Tawi and this squadron was further sub-divided into parts; one troop each in Jhanda Barsala and Munawar and one in reserve. When the artillery shelling started on evening of 03 December two more tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse were sent towards Moel but the Mewa Mandiala approach was totally ignored providing 11 Cavalry a clean sweep to Mandiala. This was an entirely avoidable and inexcusable blunder since firstly the Indians had seven tank Squadrons and secondly the Dewa Mandiala approach had already been used by Pakistani armour in 1965. Four tank troops on this approach in well sited positions were enough to stop 11 Cavalry Group well short of Mandiala. However, when 11 Cavalry was approaching Mandiala there was no Indian armour on this approach and only at 9 O’clock in the morning was the Indian commander 191 Brigade sufficiently alerted to hastily despatch two tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse. One of these tank troops was already deployed opposite Koel Moel while the second was in reserve east of Barsala. In additon in sheer desperation the two RHQ tanks of Deccan Horse were also deployed on Mandiala south to defend the ridge. However, three tank troops were no consolation and 11 Cavalry was easily able to outflank the Indian position by outflanking it by approaching through the bed of Sukhtao Nullah.

By evening of 04 December B Squadron 7 Armoured Regiment was also placed under Command Deccan Horse but Mandiala north had been lost and a dangerous imbalance in the Indian 10 Division position which was entirely avoidable had been created by virtue of 23 Divisions successful capture of Mandiala north.

The Indian commander employed armour in penny packets and to act as a stationary retaining wall rather than a dynamic element which could be swiftly made to change its role as per particular dynamics of a tactical situation. Thus C Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which was given to 191 Brigade was relegated to stationary observation duties on the east bank of Tawi opposite Mandiala and the Sukhtao Nala-Tawi junction. Similarly “A” Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which crossed the Tawi at 1100 hours on 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was in the process of launching its fateful and decisive attack on Chak Pandit was aimlessly divided into two parts; two troops being sent to Jhanda in the south opposite the Pakistani 20 Brigade and two troops being sent to reinforce Point 994 opposite the 111Brigade front, the three reserve tank troops at Chak Pandit were moved to Chamb to act as a reserve. The third squadron of Deccan Horse never crossed the Tawi and stayed to guard the Darh crossings and the area in south. The independent squadron was never moved and guarded the Akhnur Bridge on the Chenab till end of the war.

The Indians can be accused of under employing the armour justly but nothing in 23 Division’s employment of armour warrants the unjust criticism levelled by writers writing books 20 years after the war. It was the balanced distribution of armour by 23 Division which confused the Indians and forced them to divide their armour. The Indians broke the integrity of tank squadrons and grouped tank troops of one regiment with another. This was not done by 23 Division at any stage. The opinion of Indian Armoured Corps historian about employment of armour is worth quoting:-

“Armour available to 10 Division was not properly employed. The inherent flexibility and mobility of armour enables it to switch roles at short notice. Neither the Divisional Commander nor his Armour Advisor appreciated this characteristic of armour. On the first day only two Squadrons out of seven available were employed. One Squadron was left unemployed throughout the war because it was earmarked for the defence of Akhnur Bridge/town which the remotest threat disappeared after our attack on ‘chickens’ neck’. The second armoured regiment was not inducted even after the enemy’s intention became quite clear. When employed its Squadrons were brought in one by one merely to make up losses suffered by the Deccan Horse. The 10 Division’s appreciation of the armour threat from Pakistan and the consequent employment of the Deccan Horse was faulty. Pakistan had used the northern approach in 1965. What justification could be there six years later to ignore this approach and to allot no armour for its defence? It is said that the commanders concerned did not want to employ armour earmarked for the offensive for defensive purposes. But this is not a valid justification because the flexibility of armour enables it to switch roles at short notice; in any case it would appear that there were adequate resources available centainly in armour after 10 December to regain lost territory but no attempt was made: (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page 489)


*AREA**TANK TROOPS*​*INDIAN*​*PAKISTANI*​MANDIALA AND EAST OF TAWI NEAR MANDIALA*12*​*8*​PHAGLA GURHA*4*​*4*​CHAK PANDIT*1*​*17*​JHANDA-MUNAWAR*4*​*4*​DARH-EAST TAWI*3*​*-*​AKHNUR-EAST OF TAWI*4*​*-*​ *28*​*33**​** Troops does not mean all three tanks since many tanks were distributed/inoperational*
*MODIFICATION OF PLANS IN CRISIS SITUATION KEY TO THE ISSUE*

It is regarded as an impossibility in our tactical exercises that plans can fail at divisional and corps level; whereas in actual fact it is at divisional and corps level that plans succeed or fail. Moltke correctly stated that: “It is a delusion, when one believes that one can plan an entire campaign and carry out its planned end ... the first battle will determine a new situation through which much of the original plan will become inapplicable”. (Refers-Military Works-Berlin-E. S. Mitter Und Sohn-1892-1912- Volume Four-pages 70 to 117). Moltke went further and said: “Everything comes to this; To be able to recognise the changed situation and order the foreseeable course and prepare it energetically”. (Refers- Military Works-Moltke-earlier quoted-Volume Four-pages 1, 71-73). The position of 23 Division after the failure in the north on 04 and 05 December was similar to that confronted by the Indian Armour GOC opposite Chawinda in 1965 and the Pakistani Armour GOC opposite Valtoha after failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack. GOC 23 Divison had much less resources than both of the commanders just mentioned. Yet he remained calm, resolute and optimistic and brilliantly modified his plan to once again attack in the south at Chak Pandit.

Thus General Eftikhar was able to pierce the veil of darkness with his rapier like operational vision; overcoming all the stumbling blocks in his way; facing the barrage of conflicting information passed on through the subjective process of distortion of informaiton; as it is passed from the lower to the higher echelons in crisis situation. In Clausewitzian terms General Eftikhar whose generalship and personality comes closest to the Clausewitzian frame of the ideal military commander as far as Indo-Pak sub-continent is concerned “stood like a rock against which the sea breaks. Its fury in vain”. (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-Anatol Rapoport-National Book Foundation-page-163).

John Keegan describes the German definition of operational strategy in the following words:-

“Even higher in the German army’s scale of values than the nature of the warrior spirit in its conscripts stood the cultivation of operational talent in their leaders. Operative is an adjective which does not translate exactly into English military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between “Strategic” and “Tactical”, it describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the strategist does not know, and has been regarded by the German army as the most difficult of the commanders art since it was isolated by the great Moltke in the 1860s. Taught in so far as it can be taught, in his famous staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in practice. In war time it was rewarded by swift promotion”. (Refers-Six Armies in Normandy-John Keegan-Fontana Books-Reprint-1985-Page.238)

*LEADING FROM THE FRONT*

It was leading from the front for which General Eftikhar is remembered even today by the troops who served in 23 Division during the Battle of Chamb. It was this quality which enabled him to arrive at a realisttic appraisal of the actual situation without undue reliance on exaggerated reports from lower echelons.

Absence of this doctrine or system of command due to the British heritage at brigade and divisional level, however, led to certain command failures at the Brigade level. The Pakistan and Indian armies are basically the continuation of the old British Indian army steeped in a system of command in which the GOC and Brigade Commanders rarely left their headquarters; placing full trust in the fighting ability of the battalion commanders fighting the main battle. Eftikhar’s approach was more close to the German way of war. Thus while he himself was leading from the front; others like the brigade commanders were not doing so. On the other hand the staff officer in the British/Indo-Pak system had a lesser mission oriented and independent role than the German General Staff which led to breakdown in command. Staff officers trained in the British way of war were not trained to think independently; thus there were no Westphals or Mellenthin to keep the things rolling while the Pakistani Rommel was moving with the leading tank troop. Similarly there were no Neumann, Silkows and Suemermann among the Brigade Commanders who fought from the front. Thus 4 AK Brigade and 66 Brigade Commanders were not accustomed to the system of exercising command from the front and in turn the Headquarters of 23 Division was unable on 05 and 06 December to make a correct assessment of the situation. Similarly this was the reason why 2 Armoured Brigade Headquarters could not find its infantry units on night 06/07 December to launch the planned attack across Tawi. The flaw was both doctrinal as well as organisational. The executive weakness of the staffs and subordinate headquarters was the principal obstacle and reason for 23 Division failure to capture Pallanwala. The troops fought magnificently, the GOC was a great military commander. But somewhere in the middle there was a gap; created as a result of the colonial legacy of an army which followed an operational philosophy which was orders oriented rather than mission oriented.

It may noted that according to the German doctrine: “A Divisional Commander’s place is with his troops ... During encounters with the enemy seeing for oneself is best ... Commanders are to live with the troops and share with them danger deprivation, happiness and suffering”. (Refers-Truppenfuhrung- Commnd of Troops-Berlin-E.S Mittler und Sohn 1936-page-2-4, 33-34). The spectacular German successes of World War 11 were the direct result of the fact that the German General Officer multiplied the combat effectiveness of his Division by leading from the front. Thus on the average during Second World War one German Corps Commander was killed per three months and one Divisional Commander was killed every three weeks. This calculation is based on the facts that 3 Army Commanders, 23 Corps Commanders and 110 Divisional Commanders were killed in the German army fighting World War 11. (Refers-Die Generale Des Heeres-Friedburg-Frg-Podzun-Pallas Verlag-1983 — This work contains bio notes on all German General Officers of WW 11 and has been translated by US army into English).

*THE POWER OF DEFENCE IS A RELATIVE AND COMPLEX FACTOR*

The Battle of Chamb was a convincing proof that keeping in view comparative equipment resources etc tanks in defence were a much more formidable weapon than in offence. A tank advance even with artillery support was near suicidal when the enemy in front was well entrenched and had sited its defence well. Thus while 11 Cavalry swiftly advanced till Mandiala because no tanks were covering this approach; armour failed to achieve a breakthrough on 04 and 05 December. Some critics condemned this employment of armour; however it was unavoidable. In the first phase wherever tanks were launched there were bound to be casualties and in Chamb due to the dominating ridges the defender was ideally placed. To cause dislocation some attrition in terms of tank casualties was thus inevitable. The Indian commander on the other hand underestimated the power of defence. Thus in the initial discussions before the war General Candeth in his own words advanced the mistaken viewpoint that “Positions west of Tawi were not tactically sound (Refers-Candeth-The Western Front-earlier quoted-page-75). Tactically there was nothing wrong with the Indian positions as amply demonstrated by the performance of Indian 191 Brigade in blocking the advance of four infantry brigades in the first four days of the war. The Indian failure in losing Chamb was entirely a command failure at divisional level and Chamb was not lost by I91 Indian brigade but by 10 Indian Divisional Commander. The tank casualties of 1971 merely hint at a trend in favour of Defence as the stronger form of warfare as witnessed in the limited success of armour attacks even in the 1973 war and in the Iran-Iraq war. The Kuwait war cannot be cited as an example of success of tanks in attack since the contest was one sided.

The dilemma which faced General Eftikhar was that casualties were unavoidable. Someone with some tank squadrons had to move forward and create a dislocation in the Indian defensive posture so as to fix the enemy commanders attention and create conditions which would lead to commitment of reserves finally leading to a situation which offered a vulnerable area through which own armour could breakthrough and paralyse the will of the enemy. The frontal attack on Mandiala and the high tank casualties around Phagla Gurha and Sukhtao Nullah were a pre-requisite for the success later on achieved at Chak Pandit. The relentless attacks of 23 Division in Mandiala area on 04 and 05 December convinced the Indians that the Pakistanis would continue banging their heads against Mandiala. Just like the Indian Armoured Division had done at Chawinda. Thus the sudden appearance of armour at Chak Pandit caused a mental paralysis and the Indians lost the will to fight. General Eftikhar in words of Clausewitz “By strategem made the Indians commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into one result, suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes” (Refers-On War earlier quoted-page.274).

Defence is the stronger form of war and it is extremely difficult to dislodge well entrenched soldiers with similar equipment and weapon systems. The only remedy in such a case is dislocating the enemy commanders mental equilibrium by surprise in terms of force ratio and time and space.

The defender lays down the first laws of war, in words of an author he forces the attacker to establish his plan ... But defence is the weaker form of warfare in short conflicts like Indo-Pak wars where resources are few and it is a nearly impossible task to change posture from defence to offence as was the Indian plan/thus after 10 December though 23 Division was greatly exhausted the Indians could not regain what they had lost. Had they taken their main defence on Tawi rather than west of Tawi as Candeth wanted; they may even have lost Pallanwala. Much more strength of will, intellect and courage is required to fight a successful offensive battle. 10 Indian Division’s initial defensive battle was a masterpiece effort in terms of 191 Indian Brigades conduct in facing four advancing Brigades. Where the Indians failed was in terms of the conduct of battle at the divisional level; placing of reserves; launching of timely counterattacks etc etc.

*THE TERM FLANK*

A great deal of emphasis is placed on the term flank. In the Indo-Pak way of warfare the term “Vulnerable Point” is better than the term “Flank”. Flanks may not necessarily be the best place to attack. In any case ‘Flanks’ are created only after breakthroughs are made. The 11 Cavalry advance to Mandiala was, however, a peculiar operation because it was made in a situation in which no real breakthrough had been achieved; but a penetration had captured the Mandiala north ridge 191 Indian Brigade was outflanked. If this advantage had been immediately exploited a serious defeat would have been inflicted on the Indians. However, since the Indians got one day the gap north of Mandiala and the vulnerable flank created as a result of capture of Mandiala north was undone and a continuous line was once again established once Indians brought 68 Brigade units opposite Mandiala crossing on 05 December.

The Indian Commanders mental fixation with Mandiala led to weakening of Indian defences in the middle. This was well exploited by General Eftikhar vide his Chak Pandit thrust of 06 December, which created another exposed flank for the Indians. There are thus no flanks initially but flanks are created as a result of own offensive action or as a result of enemy’s attention being fixed on one part of the front. There is a great deal of truth in General Wetzell who was General Ludendorf’s Chief of Operations saying that :-The enemy is not necessarily the weakest on his flanks, nor will he make most of his mistakes on the wings, his weakness and his efforts may occur at other places. The main condition of success is to discover weaknesses and errors wherever they are and to attack the enemy wherever he is weak and wherever he has committed an error. “(Refers-Surprise-General Waldemar Erfurth-First Translation-1943-Military Service Publishing Company-Stackpole Books-1974 — page.2 and 3)

It may be noted that the above mentioned quotation exactly describes the Indian position at Chamb. Initially they were strong in the centre south; while in the later part they became the strongest on the northern flank and the weakest in the centre opposite Barsala; it was General Eftikhar’s greatness as a General that he correctly perceived this Indian vulnerability and exploited it by launching the 2 Armoured Brigade opposite Chak Pandit.

Another flank was created on 06/07 December opposite Nageal but since 23 Division could not exploit it; the same vulnerable point was strengthened by 08/09 December when finally the 111Brigade attack was launched.

*THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION FACTOR*

“Suspension of Action” which means a state of action in which an army or any military entity is inactive due to one reason or another is one of the most brilliant and often neglected concept of Clausewitz. The Battle of Chamb offers some very fine instances of application of this concept.

According to Clausewitz; there were three reasons for “Suspension of Action” in a war or a battle. Firstly, “Naturally timidity and want of resolution in the human mind, a kind of inertia in the moral world produced by dread of danger and responsibility” (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-edited by Rapport-National Book Foundation-page.292); Secondly, “The imperfection of human perception and judgment, because a person hardly knows his own position from one moment to another, and can conjecture only on slight grounds that of the enemy” (Refers-ibid-page 292); Thirdly, the “Greater strength of the defensive form” (Refers-ibid-page.292).

Like all other armies in the world 23 Division also at various times went into a state of suspension of action. The foremost reason for this was the third reason, ie, “Greater strength of the defence” and this was true for the various battles at Mandiala, Phagla and Point 994. The other two reasons certainly played a role on 05 and 06 December and golden opportunities were lost to inflict a crushing defeat on the Indians. In an article published in Citadel issue I/91 titled “Do we lack aggressiveness” The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where “The momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer Commanding embraced Shahadat” (Refers-Citadel-issue I/91-page.56). The question raised by this learned author was answered by Clausewitz long ago when he identified suspension of action as an important reality of war. The problem was common to all armies in the world including the great Prussian army to which Clausewitz belonged. But Clausewitz suggested an antidote to “Natural timidity and want of resolution”; it was “The will of the commander ... by the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in others ... whenever that influence ceases, and his own spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of all others ... the spirit of all others sink into the lower region of animal nature, which shrink from danger and knows not shame”. (Refers Clausewitz-On War-page.I45). There is no doubt that General Eftikhar possessed tremendous personal courage both physical courage which enabled himself to expose him-self to fire and thereby act as an example for all under command; and moral courage which enabled him to take sound operational decisions. His appearance at Mandiala while 11 Cavalry was engaged in a life and death struggle with the Indians played a significant role in reducing the suspension of action or inactivity period at Mandiala; similarly his landing at Chanair and spurring of 2 Armoured Brigade to quickly cross the minefield (which later on was proved to be a dummy minefield) played significant role on the fateful 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was advancing towards Chak Pandit. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Colonel Saeed-page 59).

As regards the factor of imperfect human perception; here too the 23 Division enjoyed tremendous advantage by virtue of having the General’s penetrating perception; his penetrating coup de oeil which enabled him to finally switch to the south on 06 December.

In short all armies suffer from the suspension of action paradox; however, it can be countered by resolute leadership. The conclusion is simple; to firstly recognise suspension of action as an important reality in military training and secondly to select resolute commanders who can spur and goad their formations in actual battle by leading from the front.

*PERFORMANCE OF 23 DIVISION*

The 23 Division was the only formation whose performance was appreciated even by the enemy. Thus the following was the opinion of various Indians about the war performance of 23 Division and General Eftikhar:-

“Major General Iftikhar Khan, the Divisional Commander, showed skill and determination in carrying out his misison.”

(K.C Praval- “ Indian Army after Independence” - Page.496)

“The enemy commander showed commendable flexibility. Having achieved surprise by using the northern approach, he switched to the south when he found himself firmly checked at Mandiala crossings”

(Ibid. page.499)

“The permanent loss of tactically and economically valuable territory on the west bank of Munawar Tawi was the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war”

The History of the Indian Armoure Corps-1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Page.488)

In the Second World War one percent of the pilots of the US Air Force were responsible for shooting down in air fights some 40% of enemy war planes. (Refers-The Professional Soldier-Moris Janowitz-The Free Press of Glencoe-USA-1960-page-41). During the decisive battle of Assaye the British Infantry Regiment 74th Foot did bulk of the fighting and its casualties amounted to 501 whereas the other European casualties of all other units were just 143. (Refers-Wellington’s Campaigns in India Intelligence Branch Indian Army-page-176). In 1857 the British casualties at the siege of Delhi exceeded British casualties at all other battles in 1857 totalled by some 200 additional casualties. (Refers-The Indian Mutiny-G.W. Forest-Volume One-page-150 and 151) it is a fact of history that very often bulk of the fighting is done by a qualitatively superior force; as we have seen in the above mentioned instances. For 1971 war also strictly keeping the facts in mind almost half of casualties sustained by the army on the western front were borne by the valiant 23 Division. Thus while the total army casualties on the western front were 4958 (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.280) those of 23 Division alone were 2216 (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-87).

On the other hand at times it has been stated that 23 Division could not have captured Palllanwala since the Indians were too strong east of Tawi. These are writers about whom Clausewitz warned us long go when he said:- “Not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which thirty years later people still wrote and spoke”. (On War- earlier quoted-page.245). There is simply no doubt that 23 Division could have captured Pallanwala on 07 or even 08 December had the 2 Armoured Brigade and 111Brigade been handled with resolution. The Indian writer K.C. Praval admitted this fact when he said:-

“Iftikhar Khan did not pursue 191 Brigade across the Munawwar Tawi straight away. This gave Indian troops the time to strengthen their defences and the enemy lost the chance of establishing itself east of Tawi.” (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-498).

It was not General Eftikhar who paused but the Brigade Headquarters who were not led by individuals like General Eftikhar who fought from the front.

*THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE VERSUS OFFENSIVE PLANS*

The Indian plan lacked integrity and this compromised their dispositions. Their commanders were so obsessed with launching the offensive that they disregarded their prime task of defence of Chamb till an attack was launched. Glaring among these planning errors was disregard for the security of the Mandiala Dewa approach, leaving of the large minefield gap in Barsala Jhanda area.

The Indian commanders assumption that commencement of offensive in Chamb would by itself ensure the defence of Akhnur Chamb sector was a highly erroneous assumption. Thus the bulk of 10 Indian Division troops were not in their defences when the Pakistani attack was launched since they were in concentration areas preparing for the offensive. (Refers KC Praval-page-495)

*PSYCHOLOGICAL DISLOCATION OF HIGHER COMMANDER*

It was psychological dislocation of the Indian Commander which was the crucial factor in the final analysis. In this regard an interview of a senior Indian Staff Officer is highly thought-provoking:-

“Fascinating indeed! you had almost done it. It was a matter of just touch and go. We really did not know what happened to you after you took the spur and did not pursue. We did not have much to stop you at all (Reference to 13 AK attack). God alone knows where you would have stopped that evening if only you had got going. Our situation was really bad”. (Refers: Opinion of Indian Col General Staff Colonel Rege immediately after the war-quoted by Colonel Saeed-Battle of Chamb-page-85)

The Indians were simply psychologically dislocated. With no superiority in troops, on the whole it was superior leadership of General Eftikhar which was 23 Division’s principal asset. It is absence or presence of great leaders which is decisive in the final reckoning.

When General Eftikhar switched south following failure in the north the Indian Commander was simply overwhelmed by complete surprise. The brilliant manner in which Eftikhar shifted the entire Schwerpunkt of the battle from north to south within one night has no parallel at least in the history of Indo-Pak wars. Thus by 5th December once the Indians were finally feeling secure; convinced that the situation had been stabilised; the shocking report received on 6th December that a large tank force was advancing at Barsala on 6th December was traumatic at least for the Indian commander! A counterstroke which in the Indo-Pak scenario may be compared to achievement of a Manstein or Sharon.

Later on elements started destroying talent in our army; Eftikhar’s achievements were down played and Shaukat Raza who was hardly an independent historian writing what the officials in GHQ wanted downplayed Chamb. It is shocking that he did not even mention 13 AK attack or the criminal delay by 2 Armoured Brigade or 111 Brigade on 07 and 08 December. Today the civilians hardly know Eftikhar and all the glory that Chamb was. Instead we are being repeatedly told about soldiers who were warriors more known for dexterity in handling CIA dollars of Afghan wars than guns. Logically these men should not even have been mentioned after they met an accidental end which ended their unsoldierly pursuits in August 1988 by divine design.

The men who led us in 1971 were not as outwardly wise with NDCs and AFWCs as today’s officiers; but they were a finer lot. Inshallah the next war will prove to be the final audit of mediocrity instilled in our army in the period 1977-88.

@PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer @saiyan0321 @Signalian @Mumm-Ra

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## Joe Shearer

Desert Fox 1 said:


> *The Battle of Chamb-1971*​
> 
> *T*he Battle of Chamb of 1971 stands out as the finest display of an offensive battle in the Indo-Pak operational scenario. Symbolically speaking it was this battle which sustained the morale of the army in West Pakistan and provided much needed credibility to sustain and preserve the army’s image in the wake of the traumatic events of December 1971. The Indians justly described it as “the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war”. (refers page.488-the Indian armour history of the Indian Armoured Corps -1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi). It is ironic that Third World countries study Napoleon and Slim when they have great military commanders like Eftikhar, Akhtar and Abrar. The Battle of Chamb of 1971 was an epic feat of arms. Even today it stands out as one of the most instructive battles of all three Indo-Pak wars in terms of operational strategy, small unit actions, handling of armour and above all as a supreme example of the power of personality and leadership in war.
> 
> Any student of the art of war who wishes to understand the Indo-Pak way of war will find the battle complete in terms of valuable insights and thought-provoking lessons connected with leadership, strategy and tactics. Above all the Battle of Chamb convincingly proves that the major part of pitfalls and drawbacks which inhibit many Third World armies are more connected with leadership morale and conceptual hangovers and have little connection with material factors like equipment or simple numerical inferiority or superiority.
> 
> *THE ESSENTIAL FACTS*
> *THE BATTLE GROUND*
> 
> Chamb had become a household name in Pakistan in 1965, thanks to the famous Operation Grand Slam and General Akhtar Hussain Malik’s lightning advance towards Akhnur. In 1965, however, it was a much easier place to enter since its importance had been realised by the Indians only shortly before the war started. Thus in 1965 Chamb was held only by an independent Infantry Brigade while in 1971 it was held by an Infantry Division which had been heavily fortifying and improving its defences since 1965, keeping in view the lightning Pakistani advance in this sector in 1965.
> 
> The sector is bounded by the ceasefire line/international border in the west and south while a range of hills constitutes its northern portion running roughly in an east west line. Some ridges, however, jut downwards from this range of hills and run along a north south alignment, most prominent of these being the Phagla Sakrana Bridge which perpendicularly cuts the main road/approach to Chamb from west and provides good defensive positions like Point 994 etc. Average relative height of Phagla Sakrana Ridge was 60 to 70 feet and it ran south till a place called Jhanda. The most prominent and tactically most important ground in the entire sector were two ridges known as Mandiala North and South. These two ridges dominated Chamb and the bridge over River Tawi 2 miles north of Chamb. No attacker advancing towards Chamb or planning to attack the bridge or to bypass Chamb from the north and cross River Tawi could be successful unless these two ridges were captured. Both the ridges ran in a roughly north west-south west direction and were parallel to each other. Both were 60 to 70 feet high. Mandiala North ran along southern bank of Sukh Tao Nullah from its bend near village Kahni till a round hill near 200 R. The southern ridge dominated the town of Chamb and the Tawi bridge. River Tawi and Sukhtao Nullah were the two main water courses running from north to south. Sukhtao Nullah was a tributary of Tawi and joined it a little north of the Tawi bridge. In the summers River Tawi was a partial tank obstacle with a wide bed steep banks with crossing places at Chhanni Chamb and Mandiala. In the winters, however, tanks could cross the river after recce. There were, however, boggy patches on both sides of the river south of Chamb. (Refers-page. 498-Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C. Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987 and the Indian Armour-Maj Gen. Gurcharan Singh-earlier quoted-page 488).The Tawi was spanned by a bridge built after the 1965 war about 2 km north of Chamb. Average width of Tawi was 150-300 yards (Refers-discussion of the author with various participants of the 1971 operation from 11 Cavalry, 28 Cavalry and 19 Baluch) and was roughly 7 to 8 kilometers east of the ceasefire line/international border. The area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a funnel which is wide at its western entrance and gets progressively narrower by virtue of closer successive proximity of lines of hill on the north and the River Chenab to the south. Thus the defenders’ task became easier as an attacker advanced eastwards from Koil to Jaurian and to Akhnur making any outflanking operation more and more impracticable by virtue of high hills on the north and the unfordable River Chenab to the south. All the ridges in the area followed a north south alignment with a ridge and a nullah (dry water course) alternating each other approximately every 1000 to 2000 metres all the way from the international border till River Tawi making the defenders task easier and the attackers task extremely arduous and time consuming. Most of the area was covered by 8 to 10 feet high grass and wild shrubs and was sparsely populated. The continuous line of hills on the north, however, made the gunners task very easy and this was true specially for area around Chamb Mandiala and Kamali Chappar. Thus a large proportion of casualties were caused by artillery fire. The most dominating and high features in the sector were however in the north i.e. the red hill lalaea etc. These were however away from Chamb and were of local significance. Their loss or possession had no connection with the advance towards Chamb or Palanwala in direct terms. The main metaleed roads in the area were road Koil-Chamb running from Koil on the border till Chamb and two metalled roads east of Tawi i.e., Akhnur-Jaurian) Chamb and Akhnur-Kalit Mandiala which were parallel the former being south of the latter.
> 
> *COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING FORCES*
> 
> In 1965 Pakistan enjoyed technical superiority over the Indian armour by virtue of having technically superior US Patton tanks. In 1971 this was no longer the case since the Indian army possessed the Russian T-54/55 tanks and the Patton was no longer the best tank in the subcontinent. In 1965 the Indians had a squadron of French AMX-13 tanks in Chamb as compared to two Pakistani armoured regiments in the initial phase. Thus the situation in 1971 was radically different from 1965. The Indian 10 Infantry Division had been deployed in Chamb since 1965. The Indian units in Chamb knew the area like the palm of their hand and had made extremely thorough preparations for its defence. In 1965 the newly raised headquarters 10 Indian Infantry Division had arrived in Akhnur from the south on 28 August 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. The Indian Military Historian exhibited great intellectual honesty when he rightly said “In 1965 the Pakistanis had succeeded in capturing Chamb with a surprise attack. There should have been no surprise in 1971 but they succeeded again). (Refers-page 494 the Indian Army after independence -Major K. C. Praval-earlier quoted).
> 
> The Indian 10 Infantry Division had four Infantry Brigades (14 battalions, two regiments of armour i.e. 9 Deccan Horse (T54) 72 Armoured Regiment (T-55), 2 independent armoured squadron ex-Central India Horse (AMX-13), two engineer battalions, six regiments of artillery (two medium, three field, one light). The division also had a para-company and a company of ATGM of entac ATGMs. Two BSF battalions manning the border were also under command 10 Division. The Pakistani 23 Division was a five Infantry Brigade Division, however, its fifth Infantry Brigade i.e. 7 AK Brigade (three battalions) was facing largely the 25 Indian Infantry Division deployed north of 10 Indian Division. Thus against 10 Indian Division the Pakistan 23 Division could field four infantry brigades (13 battalions). The Pakistani artillery consisted of four field regiments, one field battery, two mountain batteries, one medium battery, a section of heavy guns. The most formidable force multiplier for the Pakistan Artillery, however, was Brigadier Naseerullah Khan Babar who compensated for lack of sophisticated Russian guns on part of the Pakistani artillery. The 23 Division had two armoured regiments i.e. 26 Cavalry which was its integral armoured regiment (Sherman 11) 11 Cavalry which was placed under command in October 1971 (T-59) was also placed under command. In addition Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade was also placed under command in end October 1971.
> 
> Outwardly it appears from the above mentioned information that 23 Division was superior only in terms of armour vis-a-vis the 10 Indian Division. However in actual fact it was vice versa. All Indian tanks in both the armoured regiments were T-54/55 which were slightly superior to T-59; whereas only 11 Cavalry and 28 Cavalry possessed T-59 while the 26 Cavalry and 12 independent squadron were equipped with the obsolete Sherman 11/M-36/B-2 tanks of world war vintage. Further 28 Cavalry had just 31 tanks. In total 23 division had 129 tanks out of which 55 Sherman 11/M-36/B2 were largely ineffective in operational terms; leaving some 74 T-59 against some 90 T-54/T-55 tanks. Thus though slightly numerically inferior in numbers i.e. 129 versus 104; the Indians were qualitatively superior as far as armour was concerned. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb- Lt. Col Saeed- (GSO-I 23 Div in 1971- P.13 Army Education Press-1979). In addition the Indian T-54/55 tanks possessed pads ammunition firing capability which was not available as far as the Pakistani T-59 tanks were concerned. The T-54/55 gun had a far superior stabilisation system.
> 
> In artillery there was relative parity; Pakistan having 130 guns of all calibres while the Indians possessed 126 guns which could have possibly been increased to 144 guns if 19 Brigade Artillery of the neighbouring Indian 26 Division also extended fire support to the 10 Infantry Division.
> 
> Three Pakistani battalions i.e. 42 Punjab, 47 Punjab and 33 FF were only 8 to 9 months old. The AK regiments were also not as well trained as the regular infantry. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page.2). On the Indian side the 72 Armoured Regiment was a newly raised regiment having been raised in Ahmad Nagar in July 1971. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page. 412)
> 
> It is significant to note that even General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu has acknowledged the fact that T-59 and M-36 Shermans were far inferior to Indian tanks technically in his history of Indian Armoured Corps. Thus General Gurcharan stated “A major weakness in the Pakistan army at the time was the state of its armour ... The Americans had stopped military aid after 1965 war to both India and Pakistan. The step did not materially affect India’s capability but Pak armour was seriously handicapped ... she had to resort to alternative sources and imported 225 T-59 tanks from China but the number was not large enough to replace her aging fleet ... Sherman tank destroyers etc. were by 1971 becoming obsolescent. Even Chinese T-59, the latest in the Pak inventory were a Chinese version of the Russian T-54 which the Soviets had discarded and replaced by a much improved T-55 version. (Refers-page 425-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted).
> 
> *SIGNIFICANCE OF CHAMB SECTOR*
> 
> The area of Chamb was regarded as territory of crucial significance by both India and Pakistan. For the Indians its defence was of paramount significance since it was the direct approach to the Indian jugular vein of Akhnur Bridge which lay on the main Indian line of communication to the Indian 25 Division holding Poonch and all area west of Pir Punjal Range in Kashmir. Capture of Akhnur by Pakistan could lead to an easy advance towards the Jammu Srinagar Road at least theoretically, although in 1971 the Pakistan army was in no position to carry out such an ambitious offensive. The Indians based on their harsh experience in 1965 i.e. the lightning Pakistani offensive towards Akhnur were firmly resolved to pre-empt any Pakistani move towards Chamb by resorting to an offensive operation into Pakistan territory from Chamb.
> 
> The Pakistani military planners on the other hand perceived the Indian position of Chamb as a springboard from which the Indians could launch a swift counterstroke into the soft underbelly of Pakistan and sever the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road; which was just 35 to 40 miles from the Indian held territory of Chamb. The Pakistani fears about Indian designs were further compounded by the fact that unlike the area south of River Chenab there was no water obstacle in between Chamb and the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road running north to south though the towns of Kharian, Lalamusa and Gujrat; all three of which were within striking range of Chamb.
> 
> *THE BATTLE PLANS*
> *THE INDIAN PLAN*
> 
> There was some difference of opinion among the various Indian commanders at various levels regarding the proposed Indian design of battle in Chamb. The GOC Western Command General Candeth wanted to initially fight a governing troops withdrawal battle from the border till River Tawi to wear down and exhaust the expected Pakistani attack on Chamb; followed by a change of posture and a deliberate Indian counter attack which would push the attacking Pakistani troops backwards. The Indian counter attack was based on employment of a complete Independent Armoured Brigade with three armoured regiments (8th Light Cavalry, Central India Horse, 72 Armoured Regiment) one mechanised infantry regiment (7th Grenadiers) and a fourth Integral Armoured Regiment of 10 Division i.e. the Deccan Horse. The plan visualised having just one infantry battalion west of Tawi assisted by a tank squadron. The plan was based on the assumption that complete surprise would be achieved by rafting all three armoured regiments of the 3rd Armoured Brigade across the Chenab. (Refers-the western front- Lt. Gen. K. P Candeth-Allied Publishers Delhi 1984-page-75). (refers-history of the Indian armoured corps earlier quoted page-483). It appears that by November 1971 the Indian General Headquarters lost the nerve to launch this formidable plan which keeping in view the great Indian numerical superiority in tanks; had the potential to seriously jeopardise 23 Division’s operational position at worst and at best ensure that Chamb stayed in Indian hands. However by November 1971 the Indian GHQ prevailed upon Candeth to not to resort to the initial unorthodox and bold plan and instead follow a typical Indo-Pak compromise plan of holding territory west of Tawi in strength. It appears that both the GOC Western Command Candeth and the Corps Commander 15 Corps General Sirtaj Singh were obsessed with launching an attack and did not take the Indian GHQ’s orders to stand on defensive till ordered otherwise. According to Major K. C. Praval this information reached the HQ 10 Indian Division only on the evening of 01 December; primarily because of lethargy in passing down information (refers-the Indian Army after Independence earlier quoted-page. 495). There is an apparent divergence in the accounts of Candeth and Praval and it is obvious that it was not lethargy in passing down orders but overconfidence in the impregnability of their position on account of superior numbers which led the Indian command to underestimate the offensive potential of the 23rd Division.
> 
> *THE INDIAN PLAN WAS AS FOLLOWING:*
> 
> 1. Area west of Tawi to be initially held by two brigades i.e. the 28 Brigade holding the hill sub-sector i.e. area Dewa Red Hill Laleal etc. The 191 Brigade to hold area west of Tawi and to the south of 28 Brigade in strength with three battalions holding area west of Tawi and one battalion east of Tawi supported by a tank squadron ex-Deccan Horse and ATGM company with the following dispositions:-
> 
> a. 5 Sikh holding area south of Laleali-Dewa and Mandiala.
> 
> b. 4/I Gurkha Rifle in the middle holding area Mole and Phagla.
> 
> c. 5 Assam defending area Barsala-Jhanda-Munawar and the Darh crossings over Tawi.
> 
> d. 10 Garhwal east of Tawi in area Chhati-Tahli Hamirpur.
> 
> (Refers: The Western Front:- Page 76 and History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Page. 483)
> 
> 2. 52 Infantry Brigade east of Tawi in area Kalit Troti with be prepared orders to occupy defences on East Bank of Tawi in case of a Pakistani attack and defend the southern approach i.e. Line Hamir Pur-Chati-Tali which was at the moment thinly held on extended frontage by 10 Garhwal. This brigade was also designated to advance into Pakistan territory along with 68 Indian Brigade in case of an Indian offensive mounted inside Pakistan territory from Chamb.
> 
> 3. 68 Brigade was not deployed fully/partially unlike the other infantry brigades and was held in reserve along with 72 Armoured Regiment to either defend Chamb or Akhnur area as a reserve force or to be prepared to launch the projected Indian offensive inside Pakistan territory.
> 
> 4. According to K.C Praval the 15 Corps plan was to use 10 Infantry Division to advance along the north bank of Chenab river towards Tanda-Gujrat while 26 Infantry Division was to advance south of River Chenab towards Sialkot. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence-earlier quoted-page. 493). It appears that Candeth did have grandiose plans of advancing inside Pakistan as amply seen from Praval’s previously quoted account of 15 Corps plans. However, since Candeth wrote his book more than a decade later he wisely disassociated with his earlier plan and we don’t find any of what Praval stated in his book about 15 Corps plans in Candeth’s book.
> 
> 5. The RHQ of Deccan Horse was located east of Tawi at Kachreal. It’s a squadron was tasked to cover the approaches to Chamb from the south and west and was located west of Tawi River under command 191 Brigade. B squadron was located at Kachreal along with the RHQ, C Squadron was tasked to cover the southern approach and was located in the 10 Garhwal area east of Tawi river. The regiment’s CO was wounded in an accident and the regiment was commanded by its 2/IC during the entire operation. (Refers-The History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page.483)
> 
> 6. The Indians had full intentions of launching an offensive and for this reason had left a gap in between the area Barsala- Jhanda which was only covered by a dummy minefield. They had also left a similar gap in the area south west of the southern crossing places near the 20 Pakistan Brigade area. Later on this gap in between Barsala and Jhanda greatly facilitated the advance of the armoured brigade towards Chak Pandit. (Refers - the History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page-483).
> 
> *THE PAKISTANI PLAN*
> 
> The Pakistani GHQ had given GOC 23 Division the primary task of clearing the enemy held territory up to River Tawi. (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal -i- Muqueem Khan, National Book Foundation - Islamabad-1973-page-197.)
> 
> We have seen that terrain in the northern part of the sector was more hilly and broken than in the south. Before the war started there was a school of thought that the ideal line of advance into Chamb was from the south i.e. from north of Tanda. However, according to General Fazal-i-Muqeem, General Eftikhar had rejected this idea. The General’s rationale for doing so was that although in the north terrain was bad; this fact was balanced by the fact that in the south the enemy was much stronger and there was a greater chance to surprise the enemy. (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.197).
> 
> The key idea of General Eftikhar’s plan was that once Mandiala bridge was captured; the Indians would be forced to abandon Chamb and all area west of Tawi; since the loss of the bridge would outflank their entire position west of Tawi and render it untenable. In brief 23 Division plan was as following:-
> 
> 1. 66 Brigade and 111 Brigade to secure lodgement in the area between Mungawali-Khalabat Jhil in the north and Ghogi in the south. This lodgement would result in the breakup of the main line of Indian forward defended localities and provide own armour with a firm base for breakout at first light. This operation was to commence at 2100 hours 03 Dec and the lodgement established by first light on 04 December 1971.
> 
> 2. 11 Cavalry Group comprised 11 Cavalry, a squadron of 26 Cavalry,
> 
> 4 Punjab, one company 19 Baluch (Recce & Support), 24 field company engineers were to breakout from area Manawanwali in the northern part of the lodgement and advance towards Mandiala cutting road Dewa Mandiala at Kamali Chappar and to secure the home bank of Tawi in Mandiala area on night 4/5 December 1971. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-15). 11 Cavalry Group was theoretically under Command 66 Brigade but practically speaking as we shall see later 66 Brigade HQ had little control if any on the battle fought at Mandiala.
> 
> 3. 111 Brigade to carry out offensive probe towards Chamb and Chak Pandit and draw enemy reserves. On 05 December 111 Brigade was to advance and capture Chamb.
> 
> 4. Following the capture of Chamb; the 66 Brigade and the 111Brigade were to clear the entire salient up to west bank of Tawi.
> 
> 5. Operations across Tawi were planned but no fixed plan was made and the future plan to do so was to be in relation to the operational situation later. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted— page-15).
> 
> 6. 20 Brigade in the south was to hold ground in the south, to make attack demonstrations in area Burjeal-Manawar and Nadala enclave. According to the division’s GSO-I the primary task of the 20 Brigade was to hold ground against a possible counter offensive of the enemy in the southern half of the salient. (Refers-Ibid-Page-15). Later on once the main attack of 66 and 111Brigade in the north had succeeded; the Brigade was to advance northward as far as possible capturing Jhanda Manawar etc.
> 
> 7. In the north opposite what the Indians called hill sub-sector there were two Pakistani brigades i.e. 4 AK Brigade and 7 AK Brigade. The GOC correctly appreciated that no major fighting would take place in this area.
> 
> 8. The HQ 2 Armoured Brigade was assigned 12 Independent Armoured Squadron, 13 AK Battalion, 28 Cavalry (A surprise arrival which joined the division after last light 04 Dec), and a company R & S. It may be noted that 13 AK was Reserve Battalion of 7 AK Brigade but had been ordered to march south on 02 December to be part of the main attack in the south as part of 2 Armoured Brigade.
> 
> *CONDUCT OF BATTLE*
> *THE INITIAL ATTACK AND THE BATTLE OF MANDIALA*
> 
> The initial two days of the Battle of Chamb proved Moltkes famous saying that no plan survives on contact with the enemy. 66 Brigade started its attack after the preparatory bombardment which had commenced at 2020 hours 03 December and by 0200 accomplished its task of capturing an area of 3000 yards depth. Thus a lodgement area wide enough for 11 Cavalry Group to break out was secured. 111 Brigade, however, failed to accomplish its assigned task to capture a similar 3000 yards deep objective south of 66 Brigade. It was held up by an enemy company in Moel area.
> 
> Meanwhile the Indians who had been alerted by the preparatory bombardment took the following counter measures:-
> 
> a. Deployed three tank troops of “A” Squadron Deccan Horse in areas Barsala, Jhanda and Munawar respectively in order to cover the southern approach to Darh crossings on the Tawi.
> 
> b. The fourth troop of the A/M Squadron was kept as reserve in depth.
> 
> c. The RHQ of Deccan Horse moved to Chamb close to 191 Brigade Headquarters from Kachreal. Two troops from “B” Squadron Deccan Horse previously east of Tawi were sent to border posts at Moel Add Paur where Pakistani tanks had been reported on the evening and night of 03 December. Squadron Headquarters of “B” Squadron was deployed along with two troops in depth at Barsala.
> 
> d. One troop of “C” Squadron which was supporting 52 Brigade was detached and sent to defend the Mandiala crossing. (Refers-History of Indian Armour-Page-484)
> 
> These counter measures taken on night 03 December illustrated that the Indians expected the attack in the south, since no armour was sent to cover the Dewa Mandiala approach.
> 
> Meanwhile 11 Cavalry Group had commenced its advance towards Mandiala and by mid-day was reported by Indians in area Gurha on track Mandiala-Dewa. HQ Indian 191 Brigade correctly sensed the threat posed by 11 Cavalry tanks to Mandiala and at 0900 hours ordered Deccan Horse to reinforce the northern axis. Thus two tank troops of Deccan Horse’s “B” Squadron were sent to Phagla and Mandiala ridge respectively. The remaining two RHQ Deccan Horse were sent to take position at Gurha north west of Mandiala. The sheer Indian desperation may be gauged from the fact that the two RHQ tanks were sent to engage the main enemy attack. At mid-day 11 Cavalry appeared in area Gurha and was immediately engaged by the RHQ Tanks Deccan Horse and B Squadron Deccan Horse tanks at Mandiala. The Indian tanks were deployed in extremely dominating positions and within few minutes 11 Cavalry lost 7 tanks. It is best in a battle account to quote the enemy and this is how the Indian historian of the Indian armoured corps described the traumatic but epic battle of Mandiala:-
> 
> “About mid-day 11 Cavalry made its appearance in area Gurha ... RHQ tanks had selected their position well and within a few minutes knocked out 7 T-59 tanks and two recoilless guns ... 11 Cavalry less a squadron had, however, followed a route further north along the bed of Sukhtao Nullah. 191 Brigade must have been unaware of this thrust. Enemy tanks appeared behind Mandiala north and Gujha ridge along the Nala bed and destroyed a “B” Squadron tank in Mandiala. They also shot up the squadrons’ echelons dispersed in the foothills. By three P.M. 11 Cavalry had captured Mandiala north but could not secure the crossing held by a troop of tanks from “C” Squadron, Deccan Horse”. (Refers: History of Indian Armoured Corps-Page-485)
> 
> 11 Cavalry had suffered heavy casualties on 04 December i.e. 5 tanks destroyed and 9 men killed and 7 wounded. In total 11 tanks were hit.4 Punjab occupied Mandiala north.
> 
> Meanwhile 28 Cavalry had been assigned to 23 Division and had reached area Assar on the evening of 03 December. 66 Brigade which was supposed to overall control 11 Cavalry operations was stuck up at Phagla and was in no position to provide any infantry support to 11 Cavalry or to control its operations.
> 
> The 111 Brigade which was supposed to have captured Chamb by 05 December was still near the border many miles from Chamb. A situation entirely unexpected had thus developed. General Eftikhar, however, remained unruffled and resolute and adopted the following modified plan:-
> 
> a. 11 Cavalry to go into Leaguer behind Gura and to rest, replenish and recuperate. Resume attack on Mandiala after replenishment.
> 
> b. HQ 4 AK Brigade along with 6 AK and 13 AK to establish a bridgehead east of Tawi after last light 04 December capturing high ground east of Sahamwan.
> 
> c. 28 Cavalry to breakout from the Bridgehead secured by 4 AK Brigade at first light 05 December to capture Pallanwala and advance as eastwards as possible.
> 
> d. 11 Cavalry to stay in reserve on 05 December 1971.
> 
> e. 66 Brigade to move forward, and follow 11 Cavalry groups advance and close up to River Tawi.
> 
> f. 111 Brigade and 20 Brigade to continue as per initial battle plan.
> 
> Meanwhile by mid-day 04 December the Indian commander was clear about the main direction of Pakistani attack. Thus the Deccan Horse was reinforced by one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which joined Deccan Horse by the evening of 04 December. In addition one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment and 7 Kumaon (68 Brigade) were despatched from Akhnur to launch a counter attack to recapture Mandiala north. The regiment along with C Squadron 72 Armoured Regiment, however, reached the east bank of Tawi after last light 04 December and immediately lost its Commanding Officer due to Pakistani artillery shelling along with 4 other officers of 7 Kumaon’s O Group. Thus the battalion being rendered leaderless could not be immediately deployed. Since it had reached Tawi after last light its mission was changed to take up positions on the east bank overlooking Mandiala crossing. On 04 December only the para company of 9 Commando was guarding Mandiala crossing and Mandiala crossing was only saved, thanks to the tenacious courage of the 5 Sikh and the tank troops of Deccan Horse which were holding Mandiala south.
> 
> It may be noted that by the evening of 04 December the B Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which had been placed under Command Deccan Horse was deployed west of Tawi; two troops on the Phagla ridge facing west and north west and the Squadron Headquarters and two troops in reserve at Chak Pandit.
> 
> *THE 4 AK BRIGADE ATTACK ACROSS TAWI 04/05 DECEMBER 1971*
> 
> 4 AK Brigade was assigned 13 AK and 47 Punjab minus a company for the attack across Tawi. One squadron of 26 Cavalry and 12 Independent Squadron which had only 4 tanks available was also under command 4 AK Brigade. The 4 AK Brigade’s attack plan was as following:-
> 
> a. 6 AK and 13 AK to launch night attack across Tawi; 6 AK on the left and 13 AK on the right. Both the battalions were to capture Spur Feature.
> 
> b. Two companies of 47 Punjab and one squadron 26 Cavalry under command RHQ 26 Cavalry and one company 47 Punjab were to be held in reserve.
> 
> It may be noted that there was literally no enemy in front of 4 AK Brigade, 7 Kumaon still lost due to loss of its CO and O Group and just one Indian para company holding the Chamb Mandiala bridge. At night it appeared that only a miracle could save the Indians.
> 
> 4 AK Brigade had been alerted to launch the attack from 1000 hours 04 December. Later the subject attack was postponed from 1800 hours 04 December to 05 December 0400 hours. Both the 6 AK and 13 AK were well aware about their tasks in the planned attack. However, somehow at the appointed time the CO of 6 AK failed to join the unit to lead it into the approach march to the forming up place since he had lost his battalion. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb Col Saeed-pages 42 and 43). 13 AK, however, launched the planned attack at 0300 hours 05 December. 13 AK ran into the Indian unit 9 Jat and dispersed it and advanced forward to capture its objective i.e. Spur Feature. However, no unit was supporting it and the Indians in its rear reorganised themselves and surrounded the brave battalion in the morning. Elements of 5 Sikh, 9 Jat now surrounded 13 AK organised a breakout back to own lines but lost heavily losing 26 men killed and 50 wounded including its brave CO Col. Basharat Raja who was taken prisoner.
> 
> During this whole confusion 4 AK Brigade HQ passed back the information that both its battalions had captured the Spur Feature and ordered its reserve i.e. elements of 26 Cavalry and companies of 47 Punjab to move forward and consolidate the bridgehead. When these moved forward the Indians who had by now reoccupied their defensive positions.
> 
> Candeth the Indian GOC western command acknowledged 13 AK’s performance in the following words:-
> 
> Pakistan’s 13 AK Battalion had by then succeeded in capturing the bridge (Mandiala) but their attempts to get their tanks across was thwarted by 9 Horse ... Taking advantage of the gap caused by absence of 7 Kumaon 13 AK Battalion got through to the gun positions of 39 medium and 216 medium regiments”.
> 
> Refers-The Western Front-Candeth-Page-79
> 
> As per the Indian account the situation of utter panic caused by 13 AK attack was only checked by personal intervention of Commander Indian 68 Brigade who in words of Praval “reached the scene on the morning of December 5 with a company of 9 Jat mounted on two troops of tanks from 72 Regiment 5 (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-497). Absence or presence of commanders can be decisive in crisis situations. The previously mentioned Indian accounts prove that 4 AK Brigade attack across Chamb had the potential to cause a major crisis in the Indian position, provided 4 AK Brigade Headquarters had exercised control on the battle like fighting from the front like Commander 68 Brigade who joined the battle all the way from Akhnur. Once compared with General Shaukat Raza’s account of the 4 AK Brigade the Indians sound very different; Shaukat Raza had the following to say about 4 AK Brigade:-
> 
> “By first light 5 December Brigade Major 4 AK Brigade confirmed capture of Bridgehead over River Tawi. The information was premature. Enemy positions had been reinforced. As our troops neared Tawi the Indians counter attacked with tanks, our troops hurriedly withdrew”. (Refers-the History of the Pakistan Army-Shaukat Raza Services Book Club-1990-page-182).
> 
> Once the actual situation was discovered by 4 AK Brigade early in the morning of 05 December; a feeble attempt was made to retrieve the situation by sending forward a squadron of 26 Cavalry and parts of 47 Punjab; but by now the Indians had firmly regained their composure and 26 Cavalry Squadron failed to advance suffering three tank casualties in the process. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-45) in the meantime Headquarters 23 Division discovered that 66 Brigade was still in the lodgement area and had not closed on to River Tawi as earlier ordered. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-42). Had 66 Brigade been at Tawi’s west bank near Mandiala 4 AK Brigade’s position could have been saved. It may be noted that HQ 66 Brigade had been ordered on 04 December 1971 to move forward and relieve 11 Cavalry Group i.e. 4 Punjab which was holding Mandiala north. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-46). These orders had been passed at 0900 hours 04 December 1971.
> 
> *MODIFIED PLAN TO CAPTURE CHAMB-05/06 DECEMBER AND ITS EXECUTION*
> 
> The operational situation on the morning of 05 December was as following:
> 
> a. 13 AK was back on west bank of Tawi having failed to hold the Bridgehead due to absence of 6 AK.
> 
> b. 66 Brigade was still in lodgement area west of Phagla.
> 
> c. 111 Brigade had failed to capture Point 994 the crucial feature dominating the approach to Chamb. The Point was captured once by 10 Baluch but lost soon as a result of a resolute Indian counter attack.
> 
> d. 20 Brigade had made no worthwhile progress.
> 
> e. 11 Cavalry had failed to succeed in its probing efforts in Sukh Tao and Tawi river area due to heavy fire from east of Tawi and Mandiala south which dominated the approach to Tawi bridge.
> 
> It was something like failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack in 1965 in Khem Karan. The whole atmosphere was grim and gloomy. General Eftikhar, however, retained his mental equilibrium and was not unnerved by the reverses of 04/05 December. He immediately adopted the following modified plan to carry on the battle:-
> 
> a. Bulk of the armour to be pulled out from area north of Chamb and regrouped in area east of Jaimal Kot for launching a fresh attack on Chamb Salient from the south aimed at Area Chak Pandit south of Chamb with HQ 2 Armoured Brigade comprising 28 Cavalry, one Squadron 11 Cavalry, one Squadron 26 Cavalry, 23 Baluch, one Company R & S.
> 
> b. Pressure to be kept on the Indian position north of Chamb by continuing the attack on Mandiala south using 11 Cavalry minus one squadron, and 4 AK Brigade.
> 
> c. 111Brigade to continue its attack on Chamb. One squadron 26 Cavalry also assigned to 111Brigade for this attack.
> 
> d. 66 Brigade to continue its attack towards Mandiala south.
> 
> 2 Armoured Brigade units started moving towards the forward assembly area east of Jaimal Kot starting from evening of 05 December and the movement continued throughout the night 05/06 December 1971. By 0445 hours the infantry units arrived in the forward assembly area. 23 Baluch commenced the attack at 0530 hours and soon captured Bakan and Paur its objectives. There was hardly any opposition since no attack was expected by the Indians in this area. At 0800 hours 2 Armoured Brigade commenced its advance towards Chak Pandit. Opposition was nil since by 05 December the Indians were convinced that the main Pakistani attack was coming from the north. The intentionally left Indian gap in their minefield between Barsala and Jhanda proved a blessing in disguise for the 2 Armoured Brigade. A few tanks were, however, damaged on the outer fringes of the dummy minefield. The tanks of 2 Armoured Brigade captured Chak Pandit at 1730 hours, in the evening 2 Armoured Brigade captured Pallanwala.
> 
> It may be noted that once 2 Armoured Brigade had first encountered the dummy minefield between Barsala and Jhanda on its way to Chak Pandit; the progress of their advance had become very slow since they had started probing to find a gap in the minefield. It was at this juncture that the GOC flew in his helicopter to Chanir where he met Commander 2 Armoured Brigade and exhorted him to make a frontal rush and cross the minefield. Once this was done the Brigade made an almost clean sweep with the exception of three tanks damaged. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page-58 and page.59) Colonel Saeed in his book surprisingly noted about this incident that surprisingly very few tanks ran over mines” (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-59). It was so because the minefield was dummy and left to enable the Indians to launch their planned offence inside Pakistan!
> 
> Meanwhile Mandiala South was captured by 4 AK Brigade by the evening of 06 December 1971. What the Indians had refused to abandon in three days hard fighting was lost in one evening by means of a brilliant indirect approach as a result of the modified plan of 23 Division i.e. the advance to Chak Pandit. At 1930 hours in the evening of 06 December GOC 10 Indian Division Major General Jaswant Singh decided to give up the western bank of Tawi. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted -page. 487). Orders were given to Headquarters 191 Indian Brigade to withdraw to the eastern bank of Tawi at 1930 hours 06 December 1971. The Indian withdrawal was completed by midnight 06/07 December and the hotly contested bridge at Mandiala was blown up at midnight.
> 
> It is significant here to describe that it was 5 Sikh which was the real obstacle holding 66 Brigade and 4 AK Brigade from capturing Mandiala south. This fact was well acknowledged by GSO-I of 23 Division Lt Col. Saeed in the following words once he described 5 Sikhs crucial role on the two days i.e. 04 and 05 December in the following words:-
> 
> “If the Indian Commander now knows full details of what was coming for him on the morning of 05 December he can rightly congratulate the Commanding Officer of 5 Sikh and the Squadron Commander who held Mandiala south that day with so much grit and determination. They both saved a sad day for him”. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Page.51)
> 
> THE FINAL BID FOR PALLANWALA
> 
> While 2 Armoured Brigade was moving towards Chak Pandit the indomitable General Eftikhar had made up his mind to use 2 Armoured Brigade to attack Pallanwala across Tawi from Chak Pandit. Whatever historians may think the Indians have acknowledged the fact that it was well within 23 Divison’s capability to capture Pallanwala. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence K.C. Praval-earlier quoted-page 498).
> 
> Chamb was captured by 2 Armoured Brigade by the morning of 07 December. This was a foregone conclusion since the Indians had already abandoned it on night 06/07 December 1971.
> 
> General Eftikhar gave his orders for capture of Pallanwala at 1430 hours on 07 December. 2 Armoured Brigade was to cross Tawi east of Nageal. General Eftikhar correctly appreciated that Pallanwala could be captured if an immediate attack was made. A fact which has been acknowledged much later with the benefit of hindsight by Indian historians (Refers-KC Praval Indian Army after Independence page. 498). Thus General Eftikhar wanted that the attack across Tawi on Pallanwala should commence by late evening. When the GOC told Commander 2 Armoured Brigade about his plan. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade felt that the timings were too tight but was firmly ordered by the GOC to carry out these orders. The order to establish the bridgehead could not be implemented since the two battalions who were supposed to establish the bridgehead could not be located by Commander 2 Armoured Brigade as per General Shaukat Raza. (Refers-History of Pakistan Army-1966-71 page.185). Col Saeed the GSO-I of the Division, however, categorically states in his book that 23 Baluch which was supposed to launch the attack and knew about Commander 2 Armoured Brigades O Group for the subject attack did not send any officer to attend the O Group. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 67). Whatever the actual reason the fact is indisputable that 23 Division lost a golden opportunity to capture Pallanwala while the Indians were disorganised and no battalion was holding the area opposite Tawi across Chak Pandit. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade had to cancel the crucial attack till 0100 hours 08 December. Till six the next morning HQ 2 Armoured Brigade failed to locate 4 Punjab or 23 Baluch and no attack was launched! (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-68 and 69). Finally at six in the morning of 08 December Commander 2 Armoured Brigade informed the GOC that it had not been possible to launch the attack. (Refers-IBID Page.69)
> 
> Finally the proposed task of attack was given to 111Brigade. The subject attack was to be launched on the night of 08/09 December by 4 Punjab of Mandiala fame and 10 Baluch. By now, however, the Indians were well established. Failure to make use of the critical time span on 07/08 December had doomed the likelihood of success of 23 Division’s bid for Pallanwala. The Indians in the two precious days had brought their complete 68 Brigade forward and had organised their defences as following.
> 
> a. 68 Brigade to hold northern half of the east bank of Tawi; while 52 Brigade was to hold the southern half of the east bank of Tawi.
> 
> b. 72 Armoured Regiment under Command 68 Infantry Brigade was to cover the Mandiala and Chamb crossings.
> 
> c. Deccan Horse under Command 52 Brigade was to cover all crossing places south of Chamb in the 52 Brigade area of responsibility. Squadron Deccan Horse was in reserve in area Khaur near Pallanwala.
> 
> Meanwhile on 09 and 10 December GHQ placed restriction on use of 11 Cavalry east of Tawi since they wanted to move 11 Cavalry to Sialkot. Thus practically the only Armoured Regiment left for the Divison was 28 Cavalry which had just 28 tanks left. On the evening of 09 December, General Eftikhar’s helicopter crashed and the general who was mortally wounded was evacuated to Kharian. Officiating command of the division was assumed by Brig Kamal Matin. The planned attack on Palanwala was launched by 111 Brigade and 28 Cavalry. The infantry attack commenced at 0100 hours on night 09/10 December opposite Darh and Raipur ferries. By the afternoon of 1.0 December a Bridgehead which was 4,000 yards wide and 1,000 yards deep (Refers-The Western Front Candeth-page 82). The Indians speedily launched a counter attack employing elements of 7 Kumaon, 5/8 Kurkha, 10 Garhwal and 3/4 Gurkha supported by a squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment under the direct supervision of General Sartaj Singh the Commander 15 Indian Corps. The Bridgehead was contained. As per Lt Colonel Saeed there was misreporting on part of BM 111 Brigade Major Nazar Hussain also; thus the BM gave an incorrect report that 28 Cavalry was down to 4 tanks. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 80). Meanwhile the new GOC General Umar had arrived. At 1400 hours on 10 December HQ 23 Division ordered withdrawal of 111Brigade. The Battle of Chamb was a battle of lost opportunities. But these opportunities came because the indomitable spirit of General Eftikhar who had the burning desire to beat the enemy and commanded his division from the front. Even today he lives in the hearts of many ex-servicemen who saw him from close quarters, always rushing towards the sound of gun fire; in search for the leading tank troop or the first wave of infantry. Alas, had he lived, many cowards may not have prospered.
> 
> *ANALYSIS*
> *HANDLING OF ARMOUR*
> 
> The Battle of Chamb 1971 stands out as the most significant battle in the history of Pakistan armoured corps as a battle in which armour was used in a successful manner in an offensive role. Later on with the benefit of hindsight General Eftikhar’s handling of armour was criticised. The criticism that armour was distributed on too wide a front is often made about 23 Division employment of armour. As a matter of fact armour was used in a concentrated manner and all the reverses suffered by the division were because of lack of infantry at the correct place. Like 11 Cavalry successfully captured Mandiala north and following this complete 4 Punjab was absorbed in holding Mandiala north. The Squadrons of 26 Cavalry were allotted to the 66 and 111Brigade because there was Indian armour supporting 5 Sikh, 4/I Gurkha and 5 Assam. In any case there was hardly any room for manoeuvre in the Mandiala area where the first main attack was launched.
> 
> Later on once 28 Cavalry arrived on 04 December armour was used in a concentrated manner. The decision to leave regiment minus of 11 Cavalry in the north of Chamb when 2 Armoured Brigade was a brilliant case of deception rather than dispersal of armour; because presence of tanks opposite Mandiala on 05/06 December convinced the Indians that main effort of 23 Division was still in the north. This led to the successful grand surprise at Chak Pandit which forced the Indian commander to abandon what three brigades of infantry had failed to achieve in three days of fighting.
> 
> On the Indian side, however, tanks were under employed. Initially only one squadron was deployed west of Tawi and this squadron was further sub-divided into parts; one troop each in Jhanda Barsala and Munawar and one in reserve. When the artillery shelling started on evening of 03 December two more tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse were sent towards Moel but the Mewa Mandiala approach was totally ignored providing 11 Cavalry a clean sweep to Mandiala. This was an entirely avoidable and inexcusable blunder since firstly the Indians had seven tank Squadrons and secondly the Dewa Mandiala approach had already been used by Pakistani armour in 1965. Four tank troops on this approach in well sited positions were enough to stop 11 Cavalry Group well short of Mandiala. However, when 11 Cavalry was approaching Mandiala there was no Indian armour on this approach and only at 9 O’clock in the morning was the Indian commander 191 Brigade sufficiently alerted to hastily despatch two tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse. One of these tank troops was already deployed opposite Koel Moel while the second was in reserve east of Barsala. In additon in sheer desperation the two RHQ tanks of Deccan Horse were also deployed on Mandiala south to defend the ridge. However, three tank troops were no consolation and 11 Cavalry was easily able to outflank the Indian position by outflanking it by approaching through the bed of Sukhtao Nullah.
> 
> By evening of 04 December B Squadron 7 Armoured Regiment was also placed under Command Deccan Horse but Mandiala north had been lost and a dangerous imbalance in the Indian 10 Division position which was entirely avoidable had been created by virtue of 23 Divisions successful capture of Mandiala north.
> 
> The Indian commander employed armour in penny packets and to act as a stationary retaining wall rather than a dynamic element which could be swiftly made to change its role as per particular dynamics of a tactical situation. Thus C Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which was given to 191 Brigade was relegated to stationary observation duties on the east bank of Tawi opposite Mandiala and the Sukhtao Nala-Tawi junction. Similarly “A” Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which crossed the Tawi at 1100 hours on 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was in the process of launching its fateful and decisive attack on Chak Pandit was aimlessly divided into two parts; two troops being sent to Jhanda in the south opposite the Pakistani 20 Brigade and two troops being sent to reinforce Point 994 opposite the 111Brigade front, the three reserve tank troops at Chak Pandit were moved to Chamb to act as a reserve. The third squadron of Deccan Horse never crossed the Tawi and stayed to guard the Darh crossings and the area in south. The independent squadron was never moved and guarded the Akhnur Bridge on the Chenab till end of the war.
> 
> The Indians can be accused of under employing the armour justly but nothing in 23 Division’s employment of armour warrants the unjust criticism levelled by writers writing books 20 years after the war. It was the balanced distribution of armour by 23 Division which confused the Indians and forced them to divide their armour. The Indians broke the integrity of tank squadrons and grouped tank troops of one regiment with another. This was not done by 23 Division at any stage. The opinion of Indian Armoured Corps historian about employment of armour is worth quoting:-
> 
> “Armour available to 10 Division was not properly employed. The inherent flexibility and mobility of armour enables it to switch roles at short notice. Neither the Divisional Commander nor his Armour Advisor appreciated this characteristic of armour. On the first day only two Squadrons out of seven available were employed. One Squadron was left unemployed throughout the war because it was earmarked for the defence of Akhnur Bridge/town which the remotest threat disappeared after our attack on ‘chickens’ neck’. The second armoured regiment was not inducted even after the enemy’s intention became quite clear. When employed its Squadrons were brought in one by one merely to make up losses suffered by the Deccan Horse. The 10 Division’s appreciation of the armour threat from Pakistan and the consequent employment of the Deccan Horse was faulty. Pakistan had used the northern approach in 1965. What justification could be there six years later to ignore this approach and to allot no armour for its defence? It is said that the commanders concerned did not want to employ armour earmarked for the offensive for defensive purposes. But this is not a valid justification because the flexibility of armour enables it to switch roles at short notice; in any case it would appear that there were adequate resources available centainly in armour after 10 December to regain lost territory but no attempt was made: (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page 489)
> 
> 
> *AREA**TANK TROOPS*​*INDIAN*​*PAKISTANI*​MANDIALA AND EAST OF TAWI NEAR MANDIALA*12*​*8*​PHAGLA GURHA*4*​*4*​CHAK PANDIT*1*​*17*​JHANDA-MUNAWAR*4*​*4*​DARH-EAST TAWI*3*​*-*​AKHNUR-EAST OF TAWI*4*​*-*​*28*​*33**​** Troops does not mean all three tanks since many tanks were distributed/inoperational*
> *MODIFICATION OF PLANS IN CRISIS SITUATION KEY TO THE ISSUE*
> 
> It is regarded as an impossibility in our tactical exercises that plans can fail at divisional and corps level; whereas in actual fact it is at divisional and corps level that plans succeed or fail. Moltke correctly stated that: “It is a delusion, when one believes that one can plan an entire campaign and carry out its planned end ... the first battle will determine a new situation through which much of the original plan will become inapplicable”. (Refers-Military Works-Berlin-E. S. Mitter Und Sohn-1892-1912- Volume Four-pages 70 to 117). Moltke went further and said: “Everything comes to this; To be able to recognise the changed situation and order the foreseeable course and prepare it energetically”. (Refers- Military Works-Moltke-earlier quoted-Volume Four-pages 1, 71-73). The position of 23 Division after the failure in the north on 04 and 05 December was similar to that confronted by the Indian Armour GOC opposite Chawinda in 1965 and the Pakistani Armour GOC opposite Valtoha after failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack. GOC 23 Divison had much less resources than both of the commanders just mentioned. Yet he remained calm, resolute and optimistic and brilliantly modified his plan to once again attack in the south at Chak Pandit.
> 
> Thus General Eftikhar was able to pierce the veil of darkness with his rapier like operational vision; overcoming all the stumbling blocks in his way; facing the barrage of conflicting information passed on through the subjective process of distortion of informaiton; as it is passed from the lower to the higher echelons in crisis situation. In Clausewitzian terms General Eftikhar whose generalship and personality comes closest to the Clausewitzian frame of the ideal military commander as far as Indo-Pak sub-continent is concerned “stood like a rock against which the sea breaks. Its fury in vain”. (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-Anatol Rapoport-National Book Foundation-page-163).
> 
> John Keegan describes the German definition of operational strategy in the following words:-
> 
> “Even higher in the German army’s scale of values than the nature of the warrior spirit in its conscripts stood the cultivation of operational talent in their leaders. Operative is an adjective which does not translate exactly into English military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between “Strategic” and “Tactical”, it describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the strategist does not know, and has been regarded by the German army as the most difficult of the commanders art since it was isolated by the great Moltke in the 1860s. Taught in so far as it can be taught, in his famous staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in practice. In war time it was rewarded by swift promotion”. (Refers-Six Armies in Normandy-John Keegan-Fontana Books-Reprint-1985-Page.238)
> 
> *LEADING FROM THE FRONT*
> 
> It was leading from the front for which General Eftikhar is remembered even today by the troops who served in 23 Division during the Battle of Chamb. It was this quality which enabled him to arrive at a realisttic appraisal of the actual situation without undue reliance on exaggerated reports from lower echelons.
> 
> Absence of this doctrine or system of command due to the British heritage at brigade and divisional level, however, led to certain command failures at the Brigade level. The Pakistan and Indian armies are basically the continuation of the old British Indian army steeped in a system of command in which the GOC and Brigade Commanders rarely left their headquarters; placing full trust in the fighting ability of the battalion commanders fighting the main battle. Eftikhar’s approach was more close to the German way of war. Thus while he himself was leading from the front; others like the brigade commanders were not doing so. On the other hand the staff officer in the British/Indo-Pak system had a lesser mission oriented and independent role than the German General Staff which led to breakdown in command. Staff officers trained in the British way of war were not trained to think independently; thus there were no Westphals or Mellenthin to keep the things rolling while the Pakistani Rommel was moving with the leading tank troop. Similarly there were no Neumann, Silkows and Suemermann among the Brigade Commanders who fought from the front. Thus 4 AK Brigade and 66 Brigade Commanders were not accustomed to the system of exercising command from the front and in turn the Headquarters of 23 Division was unable on 05 and 06 December to make a correct assessment of the situation. Similarly this was the reason why 2 Armoured Brigade Headquarters could not find its infantry units on night 06/07 December to launch the planned attack across Tawi. The flaw was both doctrinal as well as organisational. The executive weakness of the staffs and subordinate headquarters was the principal obstacle and reason for 23 Division failure to capture Pallanwala. The troops fought magnificently, the GOC was a great military commander. But somewhere in the middle there was a gap; created as a result of the colonial legacy of an army which followed an operational philosophy which was orders oriented rather than mission oriented.
> 
> It may noted that according to the German doctrine: “A Divisional Commander’s place is with his troops ... During encounters with the enemy seeing for oneself is best ... Commanders are to live with the troops and share with them danger deprivation, happiness and suffering”. (Refers-Truppenfuhrung- Commnd of Troops-Berlin-E.S Mittler und Sohn 1936-page-2-4, 33-34). The spectacular German successes of World War 11 were the direct result of the fact that the German General Officer multiplied the combat effectiveness of his Division by leading from the front. Thus on the average during Second World War one German Corps Commander was killed per three months and one Divisional Commander was killed every three weeks. This calculation is based on the facts that 3 Army Commanders, 23 Corps Commanders and 110 Divisional Commanders were killed in the German army fighting World War 11. (Refers-Die Generale Des Heeres-Friedburg-Frg-Podzun-Pallas Verlag-1983 — This work contains bio notes on all German General Officers of WW 11 and has been translated by US army into English).
> 
> *THE POWER OF DEFENCE IS A RELATIVE AND COMPLEX FACTOR*
> 
> The Battle of Chamb was a convincing proof that keeping in view comparative equipment resources etc tanks in defence were a much more formidable weapon than in offence. A tank advance even with artillery support was near suicidal when the enemy in front was well entrenched and had sited its defence well. Thus while 11 Cavalry swiftly advanced till Mandiala because no tanks were covering this approach; armour failed to achieve a breakthrough on 04 and 05 December. Some critics condemned this employment of armour; however it was unavoidable. In the first phase wherever tanks were launched there were bound to be casualties and in Chamb due to the dominating ridges the defender was ideally placed. To cause dislocation some attrition in terms of tank casualties was thus inevitable. The Indian commander on the other hand underestimated the power of defence. Thus in the initial discussions before the war General Candeth in his own words advanced the mistaken viewpoint that “Positions west of Tawi were not tactically sound (Refers-Candeth-The Western Front-earlier quoted-page-75). Tactically there was nothing wrong with the Indian positions as amply demonstrated by the performance of Indian 191 Brigade in blocking the advance of four infantry brigades in the first four days of the war. The Indian failure in losing Chamb was entirely a command failure at divisional level and Chamb was not lost by I91 Indian brigade but by 10 Indian Divisional Commander. The tank casualties of 1971 merely hint at a trend in favour of Defence as the stronger form of warfare as witnessed in the limited success of armour attacks even in the 1973 war and in the Iran-Iraq war. The Kuwait war cannot be cited as an example of success of tanks in attack since the contest was one sided.
> 
> The dilemma which faced General Eftikhar was that casualties were unavoidable. Someone with some tank squadrons had to move forward and create a dislocation in the Indian defensive posture so as to fix the enemy commanders attention and create conditions which would lead to commitment of reserves finally leading to a situation which offered a vulnerable area through which own armour could breakthrough and paralyse the will of the enemy. The frontal attack on Mandiala and the high tank casualties around Phagla Gurha and Sukhtao Nullah were a pre-requisite for the success later on achieved at Chak Pandit. The relentless attacks of 23 Division in Mandiala area on 04 and 05 December convinced the Indians that the Pakistanis would continue banging their heads against Mandiala. Just like the Indian Armoured Division had done at Chawinda. Thus the sudden appearance of armour at Chak Pandit caused a mental paralysis and the Indians lost the will to fight. General Eftikhar in words of Clausewitz “By strategem made the Indians commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into one result, suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes” (Refers-On War earlier quoted-page.274).
> 
> Defence is the stronger form of war and it is extremely difficult to dislodge well entrenched soldiers with similar equipment and weapon systems. The only remedy in such a case is dislocating the enemy commanders mental equilibrium by surprise in terms of force ratio and time and space.
> 
> The defender lays down the first laws of war, in words of an author he forces the attacker to establish his plan ... But defence is the weaker form of warfare in short conflicts like Indo-Pak wars where resources are few and it is a nearly impossible task to change posture from defence to offence as was the Indian plan/thus after 10 December though 23 Division was greatly exhausted the Indians could not regain what they had lost. Had they taken their main defence on Tawi rather than west of Tawi as Candeth wanted; they may even have lost Pallanwala. Much more strength of will, intellect and courage is required to fight a successful offensive battle. 10 Indian Division’s initial defensive battle was a masterpiece effort in terms of 191 Indian Brigades conduct in facing four advancing Brigades. Where the Indians failed was in terms of the conduct of battle at the divisional level; placing of reserves; launching of timely counterattacks etc etc.
> 
> *THE TERM FLANK*
> 
> A great deal of emphasis is placed on the term flank. In the Indo-Pak way of warfare the term “Vulnerable Point” is better than the term “Flank”. Flanks may not necessarily be the best place to attack. In any case ‘Flanks’ are created only after breakthroughs are made. The 11 Cavalry advance to Mandiala was, however, a peculiar operation because it was made in a situation in which no real breakthrough had been achieved; but a penetration had captured the Mandiala north ridge 191 Indian Brigade was outflanked. If this advantage had been immediately exploited a serious defeat would have been inflicted on the Indians. However, since the Indians got one day the gap north of Mandiala and the vulnerable flank created as a result of capture of Mandiala north was undone and a continuous line was once again established once Indians brought 68 Brigade units opposite Mandiala crossing on 05 December.
> 
> The Indian Commanders mental fixation with Mandiala led to weakening of Indian defences in the middle. This was well exploited by General Eftikhar vide his Chak Pandit thrust of 06 December, which created another exposed flank for the Indians. There are thus no flanks initially but flanks are created as a result of own offensive action or as a result of enemy’s attention being fixed on one part of the front. There is a great deal of truth in General Wetzell who was General Ludendorf’s Chief of Operations saying that :-The enemy is not necessarily the weakest on his flanks, nor will he make most of his mistakes on the wings, his weakness and his efforts may occur at other places. The main condition of success is to discover weaknesses and errors wherever they are and to attack the enemy wherever he is weak and wherever he has committed an error. “(Refers-Surprise-General Waldemar Erfurth-First Translation-1943-Military Service Publishing Company-Stackpole Books-1974 — page.2 and 3)
> 
> It may be noted that the above mentioned quotation exactly describes the Indian position at Chamb. Initially they were strong in the centre south; while in the later part they became the strongest on the northern flank and the weakest in the centre opposite Barsala; it was General Eftikhar’s greatness as a General that he correctly perceived this Indian vulnerability and exploited it by launching the 2 Armoured Brigade opposite Chak Pandit.
> 
> Another flank was created on 06/07 December opposite Nageal but since 23 Division could not exploit it; the same vulnerable point was strengthened by 08/09 December when finally the 111Brigade attack was launched.
> 
> *THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION FACTOR*
> 
> “Suspension of Action” which means a state of action in which an army or any military entity is inactive due to one reason or another is one of the most brilliant and often neglected concept of Clausewitz. The Battle of Chamb offers some very fine instances of application of this concept.
> 
> According to Clausewitz; there were three reasons for “Suspension of Action” in a war or a battle. Firstly, “Naturally timidity and want of resolution in the human mind, a kind of inertia in the moral world produced by dread of danger and responsibility” (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-edited by Rapport-National Book Foundation-page.292); Secondly, “The imperfection of human perception and judgment, because a person hardly knows his own position from one moment to another, and can conjecture only on slight grounds that of the enemy” (Refers-ibid-page 292); Thirdly, the “Greater strength of the defensive form” (Refers-ibid-page.292).
> 
> Like all other armies in the world 23 Division also at various times went into a state of suspension of action. The foremost reason for this was the third reason, ie, “Greater strength of the defence” and this was true for the various battles at Mandiala, Phagla and Point 994. The other two reasons certainly played a role on 05 and 06 December and golden opportunities were lost to inflict a crushing defeat on the Indians. In an article published in Citadel issue I/91 titled “Do we lack aggressiveness” The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where “The momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer Commanding embraced Shahadat” (Refers-Citadel-issue I/91-page.56). The question raised by this learned author was answered by Clausewitz long ago when he identified suspension of action as an important reality of war. The problem was common to all armies in the world including the great Prussian army to which Clausewitz belonged. But Clausewitz suggested an antidote to “Natural timidity and want of resolution”; it was “The will of the commander ... by the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in others ... whenever that influence ceases, and his own spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of all others ... the spirit of all others sink into the lower region of animal nature, which shrink from danger and knows not shame”. (Refers Clausewitz-On War-page.I45). There is no doubt that General Eftikhar possessed tremendous personal courage both physical courage which enabled himself to expose him-self to fire and thereby act as an example for all under command; and moral courage which enabled him to take sound operational decisions. His appearance at Mandiala while 11 Cavalry was engaged in a life and death struggle with the Indians played a significant role in reducing the suspension of action or inactivity period at Mandiala; similarly his landing at Chanair and spurring of 2 Armoured Brigade to quickly cross the minefield (which later on was proved to be a dummy minefield) played significant role on the fateful 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was advancing towards Chak Pandit. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Colonel Saeed-page 59).
> 
> As regards the factor of imperfect human perception; here too the 23 Division enjoyed tremendous advantage by virtue of having the General’s penetrating perception; his penetrating coup de oeil which enabled him to finally switch to the south on 06 December.
> 
> In short all armies suffer from the suspension of action paradox; however, it can be countered by resolute leadership. The conclusion is simple; to firstly recognise suspension of action as an important reality in military training and secondly to select resolute commanders who can spur and goad their formations in actual battle by leading from the front.
> 
> *PERFORMANCE OF 23 DIVISION*
> 
> The 23 Division was the only formation whose performance was appreciated even by the enemy. Thus the following was the opinion of various Indians about the war performance of 23 Division and General Eftikhar:-
> 
> “Major General Iftikhar Khan, the Divisional Commander, showed skill and determination in carrying out his misison.”
> 
> (K.C Praval- “ Indian Army after Independence” - Page.496)
> 
> “The enemy commander showed commendable flexibility. Having achieved surprise by using the northern approach, he switched to the south when he found himself firmly checked at Mandiala crossings”
> 
> (Ibid. page.499)
> 
> “The permanent loss of tactically and economically valuable territory on the west bank of Munawar Tawi was the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war”
> 
> The History of the Indian Armoure Corps-1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Page.488)
> 
> In the Second World War one percent of the pilots of the US Air Force were responsible for shooting down in air fights some 40% of enemy war planes. (Refers-The Professional Soldier-Moris Janowitz-The Free Press of Glencoe-USA-1960-page-41). During the decisive battle of Assaye the British Infantry Regiment 74th Foot did bulk of the fighting and its casualties amounted to 501 whereas the other European casualties of all other units were just 143. (Refers-Wellington’s Campaigns in India Intelligence Branch Indian Army-page-176). In 1857 the British casualties at the siege of Delhi exceeded British casualties at all other battles in 1857 totalled by some 200 additional casualties. (Refers-The Indian Mutiny-G.W. Forest-Volume One-page-150 and 151) it is a fact of history that very often bulk of the fighting is done by a qualitatively superior force; as we have seen in the above mentioned instances. For 1971 war also strictly keeping the facts in mind almost half of casualties sustained by the army on the western front were borne by the valiant 23 Division. Thus while the total army casualties on the western front were 4958 (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.280) those of 23 Division alone were 2216 (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-87).
> 
> On the other hand at times it has been stated that 23 Division could not have captured Palllanwala since the Indians were too strong east of Tawi. These are writers about whom Clausewitz warned us long go when he said:- “Not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which thirty years later people still wrote and spoke”. (On War- earlier quoted-page.245). There is simply no doubt that 23 Division could have captured Pallanwala on 07 or even 08 December had the 2 Armoured Brigade and 111Brigade been handled with resolution. The Indian writer K.C. Praval admitted this fact when he said:-
> 
> “Iftikhar Khan did not pursue 191 Brigade across the Munawwar Tawi straight away. This gave Indian troops the time to strengthen their defences and the enemy lost the chance of establishing itself east of Tawi.” (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-498).
> 
> It was not General Eftikhar who paused but the Brigade Headquarters who were not led by individuals like General Eftikhar who fought from the front.
> 
> *THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE VERSUS OFFENSIVE PLANS*
> 
> The Indian plan lacked integrity and this compromised their dispositions. Their commanders were so obsessed with launching the offensive that they disregarded their prime task of defence of Chamb till an attack was launched. Glaring among these planning errors was disregard for the security of the Mandiala Dewa approach, leaving of the large minefield gap in Barsala Jhanda area.
> 
> The Indian commanders assumption that commencement of offensive in Chamb would by itself ensure the defence of Akhnur Chamb sector was a highly erroneous assumption. Thus the bulk of 10 Indian Division troops were not in their defences when the Pakistani attack was launched since they were in concentration areas preparing for the offensive. (Refers KC Praval-page-495)
> 
> *PSYCHOLOGICAL DISLOCATION OF HIGHER COMMANDER*
> 
> It was psychological dislocation of the Indian Commander which was the crucial factor in the final analysis. In this regard an interview of a senior Indian Staff Officer is highly thought-provoking:-
> 
> “Fascinating indeed! you had almost done it. It was a matter of just touch and go. We really did not know what happened to you after you took the spur and did not pursue. We did not have much to stop you at all (Reference to 13 AK attack). God alone knows where you would have stopped that evening if only you had got going. Our situation was really bad”. (Refers: Opinion of Indian Col General Staff Colonel Rege immediately after the war-quoted by Colonel Saeed-Battle of Chamb-page-85)
> 
> The Indians were simply psychologically dislocated. With no superiority in troops, on the whole it was superior leadership of General Eftikhar which was 23 Division’s principal asset. It is absence or presence of great leaders which is decisive in the final reckoning.
> 
> When General Eftikhar switched south following failure in the north the Indian Commander was simply overwhelmed by complete surprise. The brilliant manner in which Eftikhar shifted the entire Schwerpunkt of the battle from north to south within one night has no parallel at least in the history of Indo-Pak wars. Thus by 5th December once the Indians were finally feeling secure; convinced that the situation had been stabilised; the shocking report received on 6th December that a large tank force was advancing at Barsala on 6th December was traumatic at least for the Indian commander! A counterstroke which in the Indo-Pak scenario may be compared to achievement of a Manstein or Sharon.
> 
> Later on elements started destroying talent in our army; Eftikhar’s achievements were down played and Shaukat Raza who was hardly an independent historian writing what the officials in GHQ wanted downplayed Chamb. It is shocking that he did not even mention 13 AK attack or the criminal delay by 2 Armoured Brigade or 111 Brigade on 07 and 08 December. Today the civilians hardly know Eftikhar and all the glory that Chamb was. Instead we are being repeatedly told about soldiers who were warriors more known for dexterity in handling CIA dollars of Afghan wars than guns. Logically these men should not even have been mentioned after they met an accidental end which ended their unsoldierly pursuits in August 1988 by divine design.
> 
> The men who led us in 1971 were not as outwardly wise with NDCs and AFWCs as today’s officiers; but they were a finer lot. Inshallah the next war will prove to be the final audit of mediocrity instilled in our army in the period 1977-88.
> 
> @PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer @saiyan0321 @Signalian @Mumm-Ra



You are a mind-reader; I have been replaying this battle in my mind, and reading about it for the last two weeks! Will read it carefully today. Many thanks.

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## Raja Porus

Joe Shearer said:


> You are a mind-reader; I have been replaying this battle in my mind, and reading about it for the last two weeks! Will read it carefully today. Many thanks.


Sir, its a good thing for us that you are becoming a bit regular on PDF.


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## Joe Shearer

Desert Fox 1 said:


> Sir, its a good thing for us that you are becoming a bit regular on PDF.


Perhaps it is due to a hope that I may get my first shot within the next fortnight (no thanks to our Prime Moron). Meanwhile I have been doing a great deal of reading, and it has led to clarity on some issues.

You do realise that this is a place that, with all its present-day defects, is for me full of knowledgeable, kind and welcoming individuals.

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## PanzerKiel

Desert Fox 1 said:


> *The Battle of Chamb-1971*​
> 
> *T*he Battle of Chamb of 1971 stands out as the finest display of an offensive battle in the Indo-Pak operational scenario. Symbolically speaking it was this battle which sustained the morale of the army in West Pakistan and provided much needed credibility to sustain and preserve the army’s image in the wake of the traumatic events of December 1971. The Indians justly described it as “the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war”. (refers page.488-the Indian armour history of the Indian Armoured Corps -1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi). It is ironic that Third World countries study Napoleon and Slim when they have great military commanders like Eftikhar, Akhtar and Abrar. The Battle of Chamb of 1971 was an epic feat of arms. Even today it stands out as one of the most instructive battles of all three Indo-Pak wars in terms of operational strategy, small unit actions, handling of armour and above all as a supreme example of the power of personality and leadership in war.
> 
> Any student of the art of war who wishes to understand the Indo-Pak way of war will find the battle complete in terms of valuable insights and thought-provoking lessons connected with leadership, strategy and tactics. Above all the Battle of Chamb convincingly proves that the major part of pitfalls and drawbacks which inhibit many Third World armies are more connected with leadership morale and conceptual hangovers and have little connection with material factors like equipment or simple numerical inferiority or superiority.
> 
> *THE ESSENTIAL FACTS*
> *THE BATTLE GROUND*
> 
> Chamb had become a household name in Pakistan in 1965, thanks to the famous Operation Grand Slam and General Akhtar Hussain Malik’s lightning advance towards Akhnur. In 1965, however, it was a much easier place to enter since its importance had been realised by the Indians only shortly before the war started. Thus in 1965 Chamb was held only by an independent Infantry Brigade while in 1971 it was held by an Infantry Division which had been heavily fortifying and improving its defences since 1965, keeping in view the lightning Pakistani advance in this sector in 1965.
> 
> The sector is bounded by the ceasefire line/international border in the west and south while a range of hills constitutes its northern portion running roughly in an east west line. Some ridges, however, jut downwards from this range of hills and run along a north south alignment, most prominent of these being the Phagla Sakrana Bridge which perpendicularly cuts the main road/approach to Chamb from west and provides good defensive positions like Point 994 etc. Average relative height of Phagla Sakrana Ridge was 60 to 70 feet and it ran south till a place called Jhanda. The most prominent and tactically most important ground in the entire sector were two ridges known as Mandiala North and South. These two ridges dominated Chamb and the bridge over River Tawi 2 miles north of Chamb. No attacker advancing towards Chamb or planning to attack the bridge or to bypass Chamb from the north and cross River Tawi could be successful unless these two ridges were captured. Both the ridges ran in a roughly north west-south west direction and were parallel to each other. Both were 60 to 70 feet high. Mandiala North ran along southern bank of Sukh Tao Nullah from its bend near village Kahni till a round hill near 200 R. The southern ridge dominated the town of Chamb and the Tawi bridge. River Tawi and Sukhtao Nullah were the two main water courses running from north to south. Sukhtao Nullah was a tributary of Tawi and joined it a little north of the Tawi bridge. In the summers River Tawi was a partial tank obstacle with a wide bed steep banks with crossing places at Chhanni Chamb and Mandiala. In the winters, however, tanks could cross the river after recce. There were, however, boggy patches on both sides of the river south of Chamb. (Refers-page. 498-Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C. Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987 and the Indian Armour-Maj Gen. Gurcharan Singh-earlier quoted-page 488).The Tawi was spanned by a bridge built after the 1965 war about 2 km north of Chamb. Average width of Tawi was 150-300 yards (Refers-discussion of the author with various participants of the 1971 operation from 11 Cavalry, 28 Cavalry and 19 Baluch) and was roughly 7 to 8 kilometers east of the ceasefire line/international border. The area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a funnel which is wide at its western entrance and gets progressively narrower by virtue of closer successive proximity of lines of hill on the north and the River Chenab to the south. Thus the defenders’ task became easier as an attacker advanced eastwards from Koil to Jaurian and to Akhnur making any outflanking operation more and more impracticable by virtue of high hills on the north and the unfordable River Chenab to the south. All the ridges in the area followed a north south alignment with a ridge and a nullah (dry water course) alternating each other approximately every 1000 to 2000 metres all the way from the international border till River Tawi making the defenders task easier and the attackers task extremely arduous and time consuming. Most of the area was covered by 8 to 10 feet high grass and wild shrubs and was sparsely populated. The continuous line of hills on the north, however, made the gunners task very easy and this was true specially for area around Chamb Mandiala and Kamali Chappar. Thus a large proportion of casualties were caused by artillery fire. The most dominating and high features in the sector were however in the north i.e. the red hill lalaea etc. These were however away from Chamb and were of local significance. Their loss or possession had no connection with the advance towards Chamb or Palanwala in direct terms. The main metaleed roads in the area were road Koil-Chamb running from Koil on the border till Chamb and two metalled roads east of Tawi i.e., Akhnur-Jaurian) Chamb and Akhnur-Kalit Mandiala which were parallel the former being south of the latter.
> 
> *COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING FORCES*
> 
> In 1965 Pakistan enjoyed technical superiority over the Indian armour by virtue of having technically superior US Patton tanks. In 1971 this was no longer the case since the Indian army possessed the Russian T-54/55 tanks and the Patton was no longer the best tank in the subcontinent. In 1965 the Indians had a squadron of French AMX-13 tanks in Chamb as compared to two Pakistani armoured regiments in the initial phase. Thus the situation in 1971 was radically different from 1965. The Indian 10 Infantry Division had been deployed in Chamb since 1965. The Indian units in Chamb knew the area like the palm of their hand and had made extremely thorough preparations for its defence. In 1965 the newly raised headquarters 10 Indian Infantry Division had arrived in Akhnur from the south on 28 August 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. The Indian Military Historian exhibited great intellectual honesty when he rightly said “In 1965 the Pakistanis had succeeded in capturing Chamb with a surprise attack. There should have been no surprise in 1971 but they succeeded again). (Refers-page 494 the Indian Army after independence -Major K. C. Praval-earlier quoted).
> 
> The Indian 10 Infantry Division had four Infantry Brigades (14 battalions, two regiments of armour i.e. 9 Deccan Horse (T54) 72 Armoured Regiment (T-55), 2 independent armoured squadron ex-Central India Horse (AMX-13), two engineer battalions, six regiments of artillery (two medium, three field, one light). The division also had a para-company and a company of ATGM of entac ATGMs. Two BSF battalions manning the border were also under command 10 Division. The Pakistani 23 Division was a five Infantry Brigade Division, however, its fifth Infantry Brigade i.e. 7 AK Brigade (three battalions) was facing largely the 25 Indian Infantry Division deployed north of 10 Indian Division. Thus against 10 Indian Division the Pakistan 23 Division could field four infantry brigades (13 battalions). The Pakistani artillery consisted of four field regiments, one field battery, two mountain batteries, one medium battery, a section of heavy guns. The most formidable force multiplier for the Pakistan Artillery, however, was Brigadier Naseerullah Khan Babar who compensated for lack of sophisticated Russian guns on part of the Pakistani artillery. The 23 Division had two armoured regiments i.e. 26 Cavalry which was its integral armoured regiment (Sherman 11) 11 Cavalry which was placed under command in October 1971 (T-59) was also placed under command. In addition Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade was also placed under command in end October 1971.
> 
> Outwardly it appears from the above mentioned information that 23 Division was superior only in terms of armour vis-a-vis the 10 Indian Division. However in actual fact it was vice versa. All Indian tanks in both the armoured regiments were T-54/55 which were slightly superior to T-59; whereas only 11 Cavalry and 28 Cavalry possessed T-59 while the 26 Cavalry and 12 independent squadron were equipped with the obsolete Sherman 11/M-36/B-2 tanks of world war vintage. Further 28 Cavalry had just 31 tanks. In total 23 division had 129 tanks out of which 55 Sherman 11/M-36/B2 were largely ineffective in operational terms; leaving some 74 T-59 against some 90 T-54/T-55 tanks. Thus though slightly numerically inferior in numbers i.e. 129 versus 104; the Indians were qualitatively superior as far as armour was concerned. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb- Lt. Col Saeed- (GSO-I 23 Div in 1971- P.13 Army Education Press-1979). In addition the Indian T-54/55 tanks possessed pads ammunition firing capability which was not available as far as the Pakistani T-59 tanks were concerned. The T-54/55 gun had a far superior stabilisation system.
> 
> In artillery there was relative parity; Pakistan having 130 guns of all calibres while the Indians possessed 126 guns which could have possibly been increased to 144 guns if 19 Brigade Artillery of the neighbouring Indian 26 Division also extended fire support to the 10 Infantry Division.
> 
> Three Pakistani battalions i.e. 42 Punjab, 47 Punjab and 33 FF were only 8 to 9 months old. The AK regiments were also not as well trained as the regular infantry. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page.2). On the Indian side the 72 Armoured Regiment was a newly raised regiment having been raised in Ahmad Nagar in July 1971. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page. 412)
> 
> It is significant to note that even General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu has acknowledged the fact that T-59 and M-36 Shermans were far inferior to Indian tanks technically in his history of Indian Armoured Corps. Thus General Gurcharan stated “A major weakness in the Pakistan army at the time was the state of its armour ... The Americans had stopped military aid after 1965 war to both India and Pakistan. The step did not materially affect India’s capability but Pak armour was seriously handicapped ... she had to resort to alternative sources and imported 225 T-59 tanks from China but the number was not large enough to replace her aging fleet ... Sherman tank destroyers etc. were by 1971 becoming obsolescent. Even Chinese T-59, the latest in the Pak inventory were a Chinese version of the Russian T-54 which the Soviets had discarded and replaced by a much improved T-55 version. (Refers-page 425-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted).
> 
> *SIGNIFICANCE OF CHAMB SECTOR*
> 
> The area of Chamb was regarded as territory of crucial significance by both India and Pakistan. For the Indians its defence was of paramount significance since it was the direct approach to the Indian jugular vein of Akhnur Bridge which lay on the main Indian line of communication to the Indian 25 Division holding Poonch and all area west of Pir Punjal Range in Kashmir. Capture of Akhnur by Pakistan could lead to an easy advance towards the Jammu Srinagar Road at least theoretically, although in 1971 the Pakistan army was in no position to carry out such an ambitious offensive. The Indians based on their harsh experience in 1965 i.e. the lightning Pakistani offensive towards Akhnur were firmly resolved to pre-empt any Pakistani move towards Chamb by resorting to an offensive operation into Pakistan territory from Chamb.
> 
> The Pakistani military planners on the other hand perceived the Indian position of Chamb as a springboard from which the Indians could launch a swift counterstroke into the soft underbelly of Pakistan and sever the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road; which was just 35 to 40 miles from the Indian held territory of Chamb. The Pakistani fears about Indian designs were further compounded by the fact that unlike the area south of River Chenab there was no water obstacle in between Chamb and the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road running north to south though the towns of Kharian, Lalamusa and Gujrat; all three of which were within striking range of Chamb.
> 
> *THE BATTLE PLANS*
> *THE INDIAN PLAN*
> 
> There was some difference of opinion among the various Indian commanders at various levels regarding the proposed Indian design of battle in Chamb. The GOC Western Command General Candeth wanted to initially fight a governing troops withdrawal battle from the border till River Tawi to wear down and exhaust the expected Pakistani attack on Chamb; followed by a change of posture and a deliberate Indian counter attack which would push the attacking Pakistani troops backwards. The Indian counter attack was based on employment of a complete Independent Armoured Brigade with three armoured regiments (8th Light Cavalry, Central India Horse, 72 Armoured Regiment) one mechanised infantry regiment (7th Grenadiers) and a fourth Integral Armoured Regiment of 10 Division i.e. the Deccan Horse. The plan visualised having just one infantry battalion west of Tawi assisted by a tank squadron. The plan was based on the assumption that complete surprise would be achieved by rafting all three armoured regiments of the 3rd Armoured Brigade across the Chenab. (Refers-the western front- Lt. Gen. K. P Candeth-Allied Publishers Delhi 1984-page-75). (refers-history of the Indian armoured corps earlier quoted page-483). It appears that by November 1971 the Indian General Headquarters lost the nerve to launch this formidable plan which keeping in view the great Indian numerical superiority in tanks; had the potential to seriously jeopardise 23 Division’s operational position at worst and at best ensure that Chamb stayed in Indian hands. However by November 1971 the Indian GHQ prevailed upon Candeth to not to resort to the initial unorthodox and bold plan and instead follow a typical Indo-Pak compromise plan of holding territory west of Tawi in strength. It appears that both the GOC Western Command Candeth and the Corps Commander 15 Corps General Sirtaj Singh were obsessed with launching an attack and did not take the Indian GHQ’s orders to stand on defensive till ordered otherwise. According to Major K. C. Praval this information reached the HQ 10 Indian Division only on the evening of 01 December; primarily because of lethargy in passing down information (refers-the Indian Army after Independence earlier quoted-page. 495). There is an apparent divergence in the accounts of Candeth and Praval and it is obvious that it was not lethargy in passing down orders but overconfidence in the impregnability of their position on account of superior numbers which led the Indian command to underestimate the offensive potential of the 23rd Division.
> 
> *THE INDIAN PLAN WAS AS FOLLOWING:*
> 
> 1. Area west of Tawi to be initially held by two brigades i.e. the 28 Brigade holding the hill sub-sector i.e. area Dewa Red Hill Laleal etc. The 191 Brigade to hold area west of Tawi and to the south of 28 Brigade in strength with three battalions holding area west of Tawi and one battalion east of Tawi supported by a tank squadron ex-Deccan Horse and ATGM company with the following dispositions:-
> 
> a. 5 Sikh holding area south of Laleali-Dewa and Mandiala.
> 
> b. 4/I Gurkha Rifle in the middle holding area Mole and Phagla.
> 
> c. 5 Assam defending area Barsala-Jhanda-Munawar and the Darh crossings over Tawi.
> 
> d. 10 Garhwal east of Tawi in area Chhati-Tahli Hamirpur.
> 
> (Refers: The Western Front:- Page 76 and History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Page. 483)
> 
> 2. 52 Infantry Brigade east of Tawi in area Kalit Troti with be prepared orders to occupy defences on East Bank of Tawi in case of a Pakistani attack and defend the southern approach i.e. Line Hamir Pur-Chati-Tali which was at the moment thinly held on extended frontage by 10 Garhwal. This brigade was also designated to advance into Pakistan territory along with 68 Indian Brigade in case of an Indian offensive mounted inside Pakistan territory from Chamb.
> 
> 3. 68 Brigade was not deployed fully/partially unlike the other infantry brigades and was held in reserve along with 72 Armoured Regiment to either defend Chamb or Akhnur area as a reserve force or to be prepared to launch the projected Indian offensive inside Pakistan territory.
> 
> 4. According to K.C Praval the 15 Corps plan was to use 10 Infantry Division to advance along the north bank of Chenab river towards Tanda-Gujrat while 26 Infantry Division was to advance south of River Chenab towards Sialkot. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence-earlier quoted-page. 493). It appears that Candeth did have grandiose plans of advancing inside Pakistan as amply seen from Praval’s previously quoted account of 15 Corps plans. However, since Candeth wrote his book more than a decade later he wisely disassociated with his earlier plan and we don’t find any of what Praval stated in his book about 15 Corps plans in Candeth’s book.
> 
> 5. The RHQ of Deccan Horse was located east of Tawi at Kachreal. It’s a squadron was tasked to cover the approaches to Chamb from the south and west and was located west of Tawi River under command 191 Brigade. B squadron was located at Kachreal along with the RHQ, C Squadron was tasked to cover the southern approach and was located in the 10 Garhwal area east of Tawi river. The regiment’s CO was wounded in an accident and the regiment was commanded by its 2/IC during the entire operation. (Refers-The History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page.483)
> 
> 6. The Indians had full intentions of launching an offensive and for this reason had left a gap in between the area Barsala- Jhanda which was only covered by a dummy minefield. They had also left a similar gap in the area south west of the southern crossing places near the 20 Pakistan Brigade area. Later on this gap in between Barsala and Jhanda greatly facilitated the advance of the armoured brigade towards Chak Pandit. (Refers - the History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page-483).
> 
> *THE PAKISTANI PLAN*
> 
> The Pakistani GHQ had given GOC 23 Division the primary task of clearing the enemy held territory up to River Tawi. (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal -i- Muqueem Khan, National Book Foundation - Islamabad-1973-page-197.)
> 
> We have seen that terrain in the northern part of the sector was more hilly and broken than in the south. Before the war started there was a school of thought that the ideal line of advance into Chamb was from the south i.e. from north of Tanda. However, according to General Fazal-i-Muqeem, General Eftikhar had rejected this idea. The General’s rationale for doing so was that although in the north terrain was bad; this fact was balanced by the fact that in the south the enemy was much stronger and there was a greater chance to surprise the enemy. (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.197).
> 
> The key idea of General Eftikhar’s plan was that once Mandiala bridge was captured; the Indians would be forced to abandon Chamb and all area west of Tawi; since the loss of the bridge would outflank their entire position west of Tawi and render it untenable. In brief 23 Division plan was as following:-
> 
> 1. 66 Brigade and 111 Brigade to secure lodgement in the area between Mungawali-Khalabat Jhil in the north and Ghogi in the south. This lodgement would result in the breakup of the main line of Indian forward defended localities and provide own armour with a firm base for breakout at first light. This operation was to commence at 2100 hours 03 Dec and the lodgement established by first light on 04 December 1971.
> 
> 2. 11 Cavalry Group comprised 11 Cavalry, a squadron of 26 Cavalry,
> 
> 4 Punjab, one company 19 Baluch (Recce & Support), 24 field company engineers were to breakout from area Manawanwali in the northern part of the lodgement and advance towards Mandiala cutting road Dewa Mandiala at Kamali Chappar and to secure the home bank of Tawi in Mandiala area on night 4/5 December 1971. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-15). 11 Cavalry Group was theoretically under Command 66 Brigade but practically speaking as we shall see later 66 Brigade HQ had little control if any on the battle fought at Mandiala.
> 
> 3. 111 Brigade to carry out offensive probe towards Chamb and Chak Pandit and draw enemy reserves. On 05 December 111 Brigade was to advance and capture Chamb.
> 
> 4. Following the capture of Chamb; the 66 Brigade and the 111Brigade were to clear the entire salient up to west bank of Tawi.
> 
> 5. Operations across Tawi were planned but no fixed plan was made and the future plan to do so was to be in relation to the operational situation later. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted— page-15).
> 
> 6. 20 Brigade in the south was to hold ground in the south, to make attack demonstrations in area Burjeal-Manawar and Nadala enclave. According to the division’s GSO-I the primary task of the 20 Brigade was to hold ground against a possible counter offensive of the enemy in the southern half of the salient. (Refers-Ibid-Page-15). Later on once the main attack of 66 and 111Brigade in the north had succeeded; the Brigade was to advance northward as far as possible capturing Jhanda Manawar etc.
> 
> 7. In the north opposite what the Indians called hill sub-sector there were two Pakistani brigades i.e. 4 AK Brigade and 7 AK Brigade. The GOC correctly appreciated that no major fighting would take place in this area.
> 
> 8. The HQ 2 Armoured Brigade was assigned 12 Independent Armoured Squadron, 13 AK Battalion, 28 Cavalry (A surprise arrival which joined the division after last light 04 Dec), and a company R & S. It may be noted that 13 AK was Reserve Battalion of 7 AK Brigade but had been ordered to march south on 02 December to be part of the main attack in the south as part of 2 Armoured Brigade.
> 
> *CONDUCT OF BATTLE*
> *THE INITIAL ATTACK AND THE BATTLE OF MANDIALA*
> 
> The initial two days of the Battle of Chamb proved Moltkes famous saying that no plan survives on contact with the enemy. 66 Brigade started its attack after the preparatory bombardment which had commenced at 2020 hours 03 December and by 0200 accomplished its task of capturing an area of 3000 yards depth. Thus a lodgement area wide enough for 11 Cavalry Group to break out was secured. 111 Brigade, however, failed to accomplish its assigned task to capture a similar 3000 yards deep objective south of 66 Brigade. It was held up by an enemy company in Moel area.
> 
> Meanwhile the Indians who had been alerted by the preparatory bombardment took the following counter measures:-
> 
> a. Deployed three tank troops of “A” Squadron Deccan Horse in areas Barsala, Jhanda and Munawar respectively in order to cover the southern approach to Darh crossings on the Tawi.
> 
> b. The fourth troop of the A/M Squadron was kept as reserve in depth.
> 
> c. The RHQ of Deccan Horse moved to Chamb close to 191 Brigade Headquarters from Kachreal. Two troops from “B” Squadron Deccan Horse previously east of Tawi were sent to border posts at Moel Add Paur where Pakistani tanks had been reported on the evening and night of 03 December. Squadron Headquarters of “B” Squadron was deployed along with two troops in depth at Barsala.
> 
> d. One troop of “C” Squadron which was supporting 52 Brigade was detached and sent to defend the Mandiala crossing. (Refers-History of Indian Armour-Page-484)
> 
> These counter measures taken on night 03 December illustrated that the Indians expected the attack in the south, since no armour was sent to cover the Dewa Mandiala approach.
> 
> Meanwhile 11 Cavalry Group had commenced its advance towards Mandiala and by mid-day was reported by Indians in area Gurha on track Mandiala-Dewa. HQ Indian 191 Brigade correctly sensed the threat posed by 11 Cavalry tanks to Mandiala and at 0900 hours ordered Deccan Horse to reinforce the northern axis. Thus two tank troops of Deccan Horse’s “B” Squadron were sent to Phagla and Mandiala ridge respectively. The remaining two RHQ Deccan Horse were sent to take position at Gurha north west of Mandiala. The sheer Indian desperation may be gauged from the fact that the two RHQ tanks were sent to engage the main enemy attack. At mid-day 11 Cavalry appeared in area Gurha and was immediately engaged by the RHQ Tanks Deccan Horse and B Squadron Deccan Horse tanks at Mandiala. The Indian tanks were deployed in extremely dominating positions and within few minutes 11 Cavalry lost 7 tanks. It is best in a battle account to quote the enemy and this is how the Indian historian of the Indian armoured corps described the traumatic but epic battle of Mandiala:-
> 
> “About mid-day 11 Cavalry made its appearance in area Gurha ... RHQ tanks had selected their position well and within a few minutes knocked out 7 T-59 tanks and two recoilless guns ... 11 Cavalry less a squadron had, however, followed a route further north along the bed of Sukhtao Nullah. 191 Brigade must have been unaware of this thrust. Enemy tanks appeared behind Mandiala north and Gujha ridge along the Nala bed and destroyed a “B” Squadron tank in Mandiala. They also shot up the squadrons’ echelons dispersed in the foothills. By three P.M. 11 Cavalry had captured Mandiala north but could not secure the crossing held by a troop of tanks from “C” Squadron, Deccan Horse”. (Refers: History of Indian Armoured Corps-Page-485)
> 
> 11 Cavalry had suffered heavy casualties on 04 December i.e. 5 tanks destroyed and 9 men killed and 7 wounded. In total 11 tanks were hit.4 Punjab occupied Mandiala north.
> 
> Meanwhile 28 Cavalry had been assigned to 23 Division and had reached area Assar on the evening of 03 December. 66 Brigade which was supposed to overall control 11 Cavalry operations was stuck up at Phagla and was in no position to provide any infantry support to 11 Cavalry or to control its operations.
> 
> The 111 Brigade which was supposed to have captured Chamb by 05 December was still near the border many miles from Chamb. A situation entirely unexpected had thus developed. General Eftikhar, however, remained unruffled and resolute and adopted the following modified plan:-
> 
> a. 11 Cavalry to go into Leaguer behind Gura and to rest, replenish and recuperate. Resume attack on Mandiala after replenishment.
> 
> b. HQ 4 AK Brigade along with 6 AK and 13 AK to establish a bridgehead east of Tawi after last light 04 December capturing high ground east of Sahamwan.
> 
> c. 28 Cavalry to breakout from the Bridgehead secured by 4 AK Brigade at first light 05 December to capture Pallanwala and advance as eastwards as possible.
> 
> d. 11 Cavalry to stay in reserve on 05 December 1971.
> 
> e. 66 Brigade to move forward, and follow 11 Cavalry groups advance and close up to River Tawi.
> 
> f. 111 Brigade and 20 Brigade to continue as per initial battle plan.
> 
> Meanwhile by mid-day 04 December the Indian commander was clear about the main direction of Pakistani attack. Thus the Deccan Horse was reinforced by one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which joined Deccan Horse by the evening of 04 December. In addition one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment and 7 Kumaon (68 Brigade) were despatched from Akhnur to launch a counter attack to recapture Mandiala north. The regiment along with C Squadron 72 Armoured Regiment, however, reached the east bank of Tawi after last light 04 December and immediately lost its Commanding Officer due to Pakistani artillery shelling along with 4 other officers of 7 Kumaon’s O Group. Thus the battalion being rendered leaderless could not be immediately deployed. Since it had reached Tawi after last light its mission was changed to take up positions on the east bank overlooking Mandiala crossing. On 04 December only the para company of 9 Commando was guarding Mandiala crossing and Mandiala crossing was only saved, thanks to the tenacious courage of the 5 Sikh and the tank troops of Deccan Horse which were holding Mandiala south.
> 
> It may be noted that by the evening of 04 December the B Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which had been placed under Command Deccan Horse was deployed west of Tawi; two troops on the Phagla ridge facing west and north west and the Squadron Headquarters and two troops in reserve at Chak Pandit.
> 
> *THE 4 AK BRIGADE ATTACK ACROSS TAWI 04/05 DECEMBER 1971*
> 
> 4 AK Brigade was assigned 13 AK and 47 Punjab minus a company for the attack across Tawi. One squadron of 26 Cavalry and 12 Independent Squadron which had only 4 tanks available was also under command 4 AK Brigade. The 4 AK Brigade’s attack plan was as following:-
> 
> a. 6 AK and 13 AK to launch night attack across Tawi; 6 AK on the left and 13 AK on the right. Both the battalions were to capture Spur Feature.
> 
> b. Two companies of 47 Punjab and one squadron 26 Cavalry under command RHQ 26 Cavalry and one company 47 Punjab were to be held in reserve.
> 
> It may be noted that there was literally no enemy in front of 4 AK Brigade, 7 Kumaon still lost due to loss of its CO and O Group and just one Indian para company holding the Chamb Mandiala bridge. At night it appeared that only a miracle could save the Indians.
> 
> 4 AK Brigade had been alerted to launch the attack from 1000 hours 04 December. Later the subject attack was postponed from 1800 hours 04 December to 05 December 0400 hours. Both the 6 AK and 13 AK were well aware about their tasks in the planned attack. However, somehow at the appointed time the CO of 6 AK failed to join the unit to lead it into the approach march to the forming up place since he had lost his battalion. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb Col Saeed-pages 42 and 43). 13 AK, however, launched the planned attack at 0300 hours 05 December. 13 AK ran into the Indian unit 9 Jat and dispersed it and advanced forward to capture its objective i.e. Spur Feature. However, no unit was supporting it and the Indians in its rear reorganised themselves and surrounded the brave battalion in the morning. Elements of 5 Sikh, 9 Jat now surrounded 13 AK organised a breakout back to own lines but lost heavily losing 26 men killed and 50 wounded including its brave CO Col. Basharat Raja who was taken prisoner.
> 
> During this whole confusion 4 AK Brigade HQ passed back the information that both its battalions had captured the Spur Feature and ordered its reserve i.e. elements of 26 Cavalry and companies of 47 Punjab to move forward and consolidate the bridgehead. When these moved forward the Indians who had by now reoccupied their defensive positions.
> 
> Candeth the Indian GOC western command acknowledged 13 AK’s performance in the following words:-
> 
> Pakistan’s 13 AK Battalion had by then succeeded in capturing the bridge (Mandiala) but their attempts to get their tanks across was thwarted by 9 Horse ... Taking advantage of the gap caused by absence of 7 Kumaon 13 AK Battalion got through to the gun positions of 39 medium and 216 medium regiments”.
> 
> Refers-The Western Front-Candeth-Page-79
> 
> As per the Indian account the situation of utter panic caused by 13 AK attack was only checked by personal intervention of Commander Indian 68 Brigade who in words of Praval “reached the scene on the morning of December 5 with a company of 9 Jat mounted on two troops of tanks from 72 Regiment 5 (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-497). Absence or presence of commanders can be decisive in crisis situations. The previously mentioned Indian accounts prove that 4 AK Brigade attack across Chamb had the potential to cause a major crisis in the Indian position, provided 4 AK Brigade Headquarters had exercised control on the battle like fighting from the front like Commander 68 Brigade who joined the battle all the way from Akhnur. Once compared with General Shaukat Raza’s account of the 4 AK Brigade the Indians sound very different; Shaukat Raza had the following to say about 4 AK Brigade:-
> 
> “By first light 5 December Brigade Major 4 AK Brigade confirmed capture of Bridgehead over River Tawi. The information was premature. Enemy positions had been reinforced. As our troops neared Tawi the Indians counter attacked with tanks, our troops hurriedly withdrew”. (Refers-the History of the Pakistan Army-Shaukat Raza Services Book Club-1990-page-182).
> 
> Once the actual situation was discovered by 4 AK Brigade early in the morning of 05 December; a feeble attempt was made to retrieve the situation by sending forward a squadron of 26 Cavalry and parts of 47 Punjab; but by now the Indians had firmly regained their composure and 26 Cavalry Squadron failed to advance suffering three tank casualties in the process. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-45) in the meantime Headquarters 23 Division discovered that 66 Brigade was still in the lodgement area and had not closed on to River Tawi as earlier ordered. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-42). Had 66 Brigade been at Tawi’s west bank near Mandiala 4 AK Brigade’s position could have been saved. It may be noted that HQ 66 Brigade had been ordered on 04 December 1971 to move forward and relieve 11 Cavalry Group i.e. 4 Punjab which was holding Mandiala north. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-46). These orders had been passed at 0900 hours 04 December 1971.
> 
> *MODIFIED PLAN TO CAPTURE CHAMB-05/06 DECEMBER AND ITS EXECUTION*
> 
> The operational situation on the morning of 05 December was as following:
> 
> a. 13 AK was back on west bank of Tawi having failed to hold the Bridgehead due to absence of 6 AK.
> 
> b. 66 Brigade was still in lodgement area west of Phagla.
> 
> c. 111 Brigade had failed to capture Point 994 the crucial feature dominating the approach to Chamb. The Point was captured once by 10 Baluch but lost soon as a result of a resolute Indian counter attack.
> 
> d. 20 Brigade had made no worthwhile progress.
> 
> e. 11 Cavalry had failed to succeed in its probing efforts in Sukh Tao and Tawi river area due to heavy fire from east of Tawi and Mandiala south which dominated the approach to Tawi bridge.
> 
> It was something like failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack in 1965 in Khem Karan. The whole atmosphere was grim and gloomy. General Eftikhar, however, retained his mental equilibrium and was not unnerved by the reverses of 04/05 December. He immediately adopted the following modified plan to carry on the battle:-
> 
> a. Bulk of the armour to be pulled out from area north of Chamb and regrouped in area east of Jaimal Kot for launching a fresh attack on Chamb Salient from the south aimed at Area Chak Pandit south of Chamb with HQ 2 Armoured Brigade comprising 28 Cavalry, one Squadron 11 Cavalry, one Squadron 26 Cavalry, 23 Baluch, one Company R & S.
> 
> b. Pressure to be kept on the Indian position north of Chamb by continuing the attack on Mandiala south using 11 Cavalry minus one squadron, and 4 AK Brigade.
> 
> c. 111Brigade to continue its attack on Chamb. One squadron 26 Cavalry also assigned to 111Brigade for this attack.
> 
> d. 66 Brigade to continue its attack towards Mandiala south.
> 
> 2 Armoured Brigade units started moving towards the forward assembly area east of Jaimal Kot starting from evening of 05 December and the movement continued throughout the night 05/06 December 1971. By 0445 hours the infantry units arrived in the forward assembly area. 23 Baluch commenced the attack at 0530 hours and soon captured Bakan and Paur its objectives. There was hardly any opposition since no attack was expected by the Indians in this area. At 0800 hours 2 Armoured Brigade commenced its advance towards Chak Pandit. Opposition was nil since by 05 December the Indians were convinced that the main Pakistani attack was coming from the north. The intentionally left Indian gap in their minefield between Barsala and Jhanda proved a blessing in disguise for the 2 Armoured Brigade. A few tanks were, however, damaged on the outer fringes of the dummy minefield. The tanks of 2 Armoured Brigade captured Chak Pandit at 1730 hours, in the evening 2 Armoured Brigade captured Pallanwala.
> 
> It may be noted that once 2 Armoured Brigade had first encountered the dummy minefield between Barsala and Jhanda on its way to Chak Pandit; the progress of their advance had become very slow since they had started probing to find a gap in the minefield. It was at this juncture that the GOC flew in his helicopter to Chanir where he met Commander 2 Armoured Brigade and exhorted him to make a frontal rush and cross the minefield. Once this was done the Brigade made an almost clean sweep with the exception of three tanks damaged. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page-58 and page.59) Colonel Saeed in his book surprisingly noted about this incident that surprisingly very few tanks ran over mines” (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-59). It was so because the minefield was dummy and left to enable the Indians to launch their planned offence inside Pakistan!
> 
> Meanwhile Mandiala South was captured by 4 AK Brigade by the evening of 06 December 1971. What the Indians had refused to abandon in three days hard fighting was lost in one evening by means of a brilliant indirect approach as a result of the modified plan of 23 Division i.e. the advance to Chak Pandit. At 1930 hours in the evening of 06 December GOC 10 Indian Division Major General Jaswant Singh decided to give up the western bank of Tawi. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted -page. 487). Orders were given to Headquarters 191 Indian Brigade to withdraw to the eastern bank of Tawi at 1930 hours 06 December 1971. The Indian withdrawal was completed by midnight 06/07 December and the hotly contested bridge at Mandiala was blown up at midnight.
> 
> It is significant here to describe that it was 5 Sikh which was the real obstacle holding 66 Brigade and 4 AK Brigade from capturing Mandiala south. This fact was well acknowledged by GSO-I of 23 Division Lt Col. Saeed in the following words once he described 5 Sikhs crucial role on the two days i.e. 04 and 05 December in the following words:-
> 
> “If the Indian Commander now knows full details of what was coming for him on the morning of 05 December he can rightly congratulate the Commanding Officer of 5 Sikh and the Squadron Commander who held Mandiala south that day with so much grit and determination. They both saved a sad day for him”. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Page.51)
> 
> THE FINAL BID FOR PALLANWALA
> 
> While 2 Armoured Brigade was moving towards Chak Pandit the indomitable General Eftikhar had made up his mind to use 2 Armoured Brigade to attack Pallanwala across Tawi from Chak Pandit. Whatever historians may think the Indians have acknowledged the fact that it was well within 23 Divison’s capability to capture Pallanwala. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence K.C. Praval-earlier quoted-page 498).
> 
> Chamb was captured by 2 Armoured Brigade by the morning of 07 December. This was a foregone conclusion since the Indians had already abandoned it on night 06/07 December 1971.
> 
> General Eftikhar gave his orders for capture of Pallanwala at 1430 hours on 07 December. 2 Armoured Brigade was to cross Tawi east of Nageal. General Eftikhar correctly appreciated that Pallanwala could be captured if an immediate attack was made. A fact which has been acknowledged much later with the benefit of hindsight by Indian historians (Refers-KC Praval Indian Army after Independence page. 498). Thus General Eftikhar wanted that the attack across Tawi on Pallanwala should commence by late evening. When the GOC told Commander 2 Armoured Brigade about his plan. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade felt that the timings were too tight but was firmly ordered by the GOC to carry out these orders. The order to establish the bridgehead could not be implemented since the two battalions who were supposed to establish the bridgehead could not be located by Commander 2 Armoured Brigade as per General Shaukat Raza. (Refers-History of Pakistan Army-1966-71 page.185). Col Saeed the GSO-I of the Division, however, categorically states in his book that 23 Baluch which was supposed to launch the attack and knew about Commander 2 Armoured Brigades O Group for the subject attack did not send any officer to attend the O Group. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 67). Whatever the actual reason the fact is indisputable that 23 Division lost a golden opportunity to capture Pallanwala while the Indians were disorganised and no battalion was holding the area opposite Tawi across Chak Pandit. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade had to cancel the crucial attack till 0100 hours 08 December. Till six the next morning HQ 2 Armoured Brigade failed to locate 4 Punjab or 23 Baluch and no attack was launched! (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-68 and 69). Finally at six in the morning of 08 December Commander 2 Armoured Brigade informed the GOC that it had not been possible to launch the attack. (Refers-IBID Page.69)
> 
> Finally the proposed task of attack was given to 111Brigade. The subject attack was to be launched on the night of 08/09 December by 4 Punjab of Mandiala fame and 10 Baluch. By now, however, the Indians were well established. Failure to make use of the critical time span on 07/08 December had doomed the likelihood of success of 23 Division’s bid for Pallanwala. The Indians in the two precious days had brought their complete 68 Brigade forward and had organised their defences as following.
> 
> a. 68 Brigade to hold northern half of the east bank of Tawi; while 52 Brigade was to hold the southern half of the east bank of Tawi.
> 
> b. 72 Armoured Regiment under Command 68 Infantry Brigade was to cover the Mandiala and Chamb crossings.
> 
> c. Deccan Horse under Command 52 Brigade was to cover all crossing places south of Chamb in the 52 Brigade area of responsibility. Squadron Deccan Horse was in reserve in area Khaur near Pallanwala.
> 
> Meanwhile on 09 and 10 December GHQ placed restriction on use of 11 Cavalry east of Tawi since they wanted to move 11 Cavalry to Sialkot. Thus practically the only Armoured Regiment left for the Divison was 28 Cavalry which had just 28 tanks left. On the evening of 09 December, General Eftikhar’s helicopter crashed and the general who was mortally wounded was evacuated to Kharian. Officiating command of the division was assumed by Brig Kamal Matin. The planned attack on Palanwala was launched by 111 Brigade and 28 Cavalry. The infantry attack commenced at 0100 hours on night 09/10 December opposite Darh and Raipur ferries. By the afternoon of 1.0 December a Bridgehead which was 4,000 yards wide and 1,000 yards deep (Refers-The Western Front Candeth-page 82). The Indians speedily launched a counter attack employing elements of 7 Kumaon, 5/8 Kurkha, 10 Garhwal and 3/4 Gurkha supported by a squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment under the direct supervision of General Sartaj Singh the Commander 15 Indian Corps. The Bridgehead was contained. As per Lt Colonel Saeed there was misreporting on part of BM 111 Brigade Major Nazar Hussain also; thus the BM gave an incorrect report that 28 Cavalry was down to 4 tanks. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 80). Meanwhile the new GOC General Umar had arrived. At 1400 hours on 10 December HQ 23 Division ordered withdrawal of 111Brigade. The Battle of Chamb was a battle of lost opportunities. But these opportunities came because the indomitable spirit of General Eftikhar who had the burning desire to beat the enemy and commanded his division from the front. Even today he lives in the hearts of many ex-servicemen who saw him from close quarters, always rushing towards the sound of gun fire; in search for the leading tank troop or the first wave of infantry. Alas, had he lived, many cowards may not have prospered.
> 
> *ANALYSIS*
> *HANDLING OF ARMOUR*
> 
> The Battle of Chamb 1971 stands out as the most significant battle in the history of Pakistan armoured corps as a battle in which armour was used in a successful manner in an offensive role. Later on with the benefit of hindsight General Eftikhar’s handling of armour was criticised. The criticism that armour was distributed on too wide a front is often made about 23 Division employment of armour. As a matter of fact armour was used in a concentrated manner and all the reverses suffered by the division were because of lack of infantry at the correct place. Like 11 Cavalry successfully captured Mandiala north and following this complete 4 Punjab was absorbed in holding Mandiala north. The Squadrons of 26 Cavalry were allotted to the 66 and 111Brigade because there was Indian armour supporting 5 Sikh, 4/I Gurkha and 5 Assam. In any case there was hardly any room for manoeuvre in the Mandiala area where the first main attack was launched.
> 
> Later on once 28 Cavalry arrived on 04 December armour was used in a concentrated manner. The decision to leave regiment minus of 11 Cavalry in the north of Chamb when 2 Armoured Brigade was a brilliant case of deception rather than dispersal of armour; because presence of tanks opposite Mandiala on 05/06 December convinced the Indians that main effort of 23 Division was still in the north. This led to the successful grand surprise at Chak Pandit which forced the Indian commander to abandon what three brigades of infantry had failed to achieve in three days of fighting.
> 
> On the Indian side, however, tanks were under employed. Initially only one squadron was deployed west of Tawi and this squadron was further sub-divided into parts; one troop each in Jhanda Barsala and Munawar and one in reserve. When the artillery shelling started on evening of 03 December two more tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse were sent towards Moel but the Mewa Mandiala approach was totally ignored providing 11 Cavalry a clean sweep to Mandiala. This was an entirely avoidable and inexcusable blunder since firstly the Indians had seven tank Squadrons and secondly the Dewa Mandiala approach had already been used by Pakistani armour in 1965. Four tank troops on this approach in well sited positions were enough to stop 11 Cavalry Group well short of Mandiala. However, when 11 Cavalry was approaching Mandiala there was no Indian armour on this approach and only at 9 O’clock in the morning was the Indian commander 191 Brigade sufficiently alerted to hastily despatch two tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse. One of these tank troops was already deployed opposite Koel Moel while the second was in reserve east of Barsala. In additon in sheer desperation the two RHQ tanks of Deccan Horse were also deployed on Mandiala south to defend the ridge. However, three tank troops were no consolation and 11 Cavalry was easily able to outflank the Indian position by outflanking it by approaching through the bed of Sukhtao Nullah.
> 
> By evening of 04 December B Squadron 7 Armoured Regiment was also placed under Command Deccan Horse but Mandiala north had been lost and a dangerous imbalance in the Indian 10 Division position which was entirely avoidable had been created by virtue of 23 Divisions successful capture of Mandiala north.
> 
> The Indian commander employed armour in penny packets and to act as a stationary retaining wall rather than a dynamic element which could be swiftly made to change its role as per particular dynamics of a tactical situation. Thus C Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which was given to 191 Brigade was relegated to stationary observation duties on the east bank of Tawi opposite Mandiala and the Sukhtao Nala-Tawi junction. Similarly “A” Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which crossed the Tawi at 1100 hours on 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was in the process of launching its fateful and decisive attack on Chak Pandit was aimlessly divided into two parts; two troops being sent to Jhanda in the south opposite the Pakistani 20 Brigade and two troops being sent to reinforce Point 994 opposite the 111Brigade front, the three reserve tank troops at Chak Pandit were moved to Chamb to act as a reserve. The third squadron of Deccan Horse never crossed the Tawi and stayed to guard the Darh crossings and the area in south. The independent squadron was never moved and guarded the Akhnur Bridge on the Chenab till end of the war.
> 
> The Indians can be accused of under employing the armour justly but nothing in 23 Division’s employment of armour warrants the unjust criticism levelled by writers writing books 20 years after the war. It was the balanced distribution of armour by 23 Division which confused the Indians and forced them to divide their armour. The Indians broke the integrity of tank squadrons and grouped tank troops of one regiment with another. This was not done by 23 Division at any stage. The opinion of Indian Armoured Corps historian about employment of armour is worth quoting:-
> 
> “Armour available to 10 Division was not properly employed. The inherent flexibility and mobility of armour enables it to switch roles at short notice. Neither the Divisional Commander nor his Armour Advisor appreciated this characteristic of armour. On the first day only two Squadrons out of seven available were employed. One Squadron was left unemployed throughout the war because it was earmarked for the defence of Akhnur Bridge/town which the remotest threat disappeared after our attack on ‘chickens’ neck’. The second armoured regiment was not inducted even after the enemy’s intention became quite clear. When employed its Squadrons were brought in one by one merely to make up losses suffered by the Deccan Horse. The 10 Division’s appreciation of the armour threat from Pakistan and the consequent employment of the Deccan Horse was faulty. Pakistan had used the northern approach in 1965. What justification could be there six years later to ignore this approach and to allot no armour for its defence? It is said that the commanders concerned did not want to employ armour earmarked for the offensive for defensive purposes. But this is not a valid justification because the flexibility of armour enables it to switch roles at short notice; in any case it would appear that there were adequate resources available centainly in armour after 10 December to regain lost territory but no attempt was made: (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page 489)
> 
> 
> *AREA**TANK TROOPS*​*INDIAN*​*PAKISTANI*​MANDIALA AND EAST OF TAWI NEAR MANDIALA*12*​*8*​PHAGLA GURHA*4*​*4*​CHAK PANDIT*1*​*17*​JHANDA-MUNAWAR*4*​*4*​DARH-EAST TAWI*3*​*-*​AKHNUR-EAST OF TAWI*4*​*-*​*28*​*33**​** Troops does not mean all three tanks since many tanks were distributed/inoperational*
> *MODIFICATION OF PLANS IN CRISIS SITUATION KEY TO THE ISSUE*
> 
> It is regarded as an impossibility in our tactical exercises that plans can fail at divisional and corps level; whereas in actual fact it is at divisional and corps level that plans succeed or fail. Moltke correctly stated that: “It is a delusion, when one believes that one can plan an entire campaign and carry out its planned end ... the first battle will determine a new situation through which much of the original plan will become inapplicable”. (Refers-Military Works-Berlin-E. S. Mitter Und Sohn-1892-1912- Volume Four-pages 70 to 117). Moltke went further and said: “Everything comes to this; To be able to recognise the changed situation and order the foreseeable course and prepare it energetically”. (Refers- Military Works-Moltke-earlier quoted-Volume Four-pages 1, 71-73). The position of 23 Division after the failure in the north on 04 and 05 December was similar to that confronted by the Indian Armour GOC opposite Chawinda in 1965 and the Pakistani Armour GOC opposite Valtoha after failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack. GOC 23 Divison had much less resources than both of the commanders just mentioned. Yet he remained calm, resolute and optimistic and brilliantly modified his plan to once again attack in the south at Chak Pandit.
> 
> Thus General Eftikhar was able to pierce the veil of darkness with his rapier like operational vision; overcoming all the stumbling blocks in his way; facing the barrage of conflicting information passed on through the subjective process of distortion of informaiton; as it is passed from the lower to the higher echelons in crisis situation. In Clausewitzian terms General Eftikhar whose generalship and personality comes closest to the Clausewitzian frame of the ideal military commander as far as Indo-Pak sub-continent is concerned “stood like a rock against which the sea breaks. Its fury in vain”. (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-Anatol Rapoport-National Book Foundation-page-163).
> 
> John Keegan describes the German definition of operational strategy in the following words:-
> 
> “Even higher in the German army’s scale of values than the nature of the warrior spirit in its conscripts stood the cultivation of operational talent in their leaders. Operative is an adjective which does not translate exactly into English military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between “Strategic” and “Tactical”, it describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the strategist does not know, and has been regarded by the German army as the most difficult of the commanders art since it was isolated by the great Moltke in the 1860s. Taught in so far as it can be taught, in his famous staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in practice. In war time it was rewarded by swift promotion”. (Refers-Six Armies in Normandy-John Keegan-Fontana Books-Reprint-1985-Page.238)
> 
> *LEADING FROM THE FRONT*
> 
> It was leading from the front for which General Eftikhar is remembered even today by the troops who served in 23 Division during the Battle of Chamb. It was this quality which enabled him to arrive at a realisttic appraisal of the actual situation without undue reliance on exaggerated reports from lower echelons.
> 
> Absence of this doctrine or system of command due to the British heritage at brigade and divisional level, however, led to certain command failures at the Brigade level. The Pakistan and Indian armies are basically the continuation of the old British Indian army steeped in a system of command in which the GOC and Brigade Commanders rarely left their headquarters; placing full trust in the fighting ability of the battalion commanders fighting the main battle. Eftikhar’s approach was more close to the German way of war. Thus while he himself was leading from the front; others like the brigade commanders were not doing so. On the other hand the staff officer in the British/Indo-Pak system had a lesser mission oriented and independent role than the German General Staff which led to breakdown in command. Staff officers trained in the British way of war were not trained to think independently; thus there were no Westphals or Mellenthin to keep the things rolling while the Pakistani Rommel was moving with the leading tank troop. Similarly there were no Neumann, Silkows and Suemermann among the Brigade Commanders who fought from the front. Thus 4 AK Brigade and 66 Brigade Commanders were not accustomed to the system of exercising command from the front and in turn the Headquarters of 23 Division was unable on 05 and 06 December to make a correct assessment of the situation. Similarly this was the reason why 2 Armoured Brigade Headquarters could not find its infantry units on night 06/07 December to launch the planned attack across Tawi. The flaw was both doctrinal as well as organisational. The executive weakness of the staffs and subordinate headquarters was the principal obstacle and reason for 23 Division failure to capture Pallanwala. The troops fought magnificently, the GOC was a great military commander. But somewhere in the middle there was a gap; created as a result of the colonial legacy of an army which followed an operational philosophy which was orders oriented rather than mission oriented.
> 
> It may noted that according to the German doctrine: “A Divisional Commander’s place is with his troops ... During encounters with the enemy seeing for oneself is best ... Commanders are to live with the troops and share with them danger deprivation, happiness and suffering”. (Refers-Truppenfuhrung- Commnd of Troops-Berlin-E.S Mittler und Sohn 1936-page-2-4, 33-34). The spectacular German successes of World War 11 were the direct result of the fact that the German General Officer multiplied the combat effectiveness of his Division by leading from the front. Thus on the average during Second World War one German Corps Commander was killed per three months and one Divisional Commander was killed every three weeks. This calculation is based on the facts that 3 Army Commanders, 23 Corps Commanders and 110 Divisional Commanders were killed in the German army fighting World War 11. (Refers-Die Generale Des Heeres-Friedburg-Frg-Podzun-Pallas Verlag-1983 — This work contains bio notes on all German General Officers of WW 11 and has been translated by US army into English).
> 
> *THE POWER OF DEFENCE IS A RELATIVE AND COMPLEX FACTOR*
> 
> The Battle of Chamb was a convincing proof that keeping in view comparative equipment resources etc tanks in defence were a much more formidable weapon than in offence. A tank advance even with artillery support was near suicidal when the enemy in front was well entrenched and had sited its defence well. Thus while 11 Cavalry swiftly advanced till Mandiala because no tanks were covering this approach; armour failed to achieve a breakthrough on 04 and 05 December. Some critics condemned this employment of armour; however it was unavoidable. In the first phase wherever tanks were launched there were bound to be casualties and in Chamb due to the dominating ridges the defender was ideally placed. To cause dislocation some attrition in terms of tank casualties was thus inevitable. The Indian commander on the other hand underestimated the power of defence. Thus in the initial discussions before the war General Candeth in his own words advanced the mistaken viewpoint that “Positions west of Tawi were not tactically sound (Refers-Candeth-The Western Front-earlier quoted-page-75). Tactically there was nothing wrong with the Indian positions as amply demonstrated by the performance of Indian 191 Brigade in blocking the advance of four infantry brigades in the first four days of the war. The Indian failure in losing Chamb was entirely a command failure at divisional level and Chamb was not lost by I91 Indian brigade but by 10 Indian Divisional Commander. The tank casualties of 1971 merely hint at a trend in favour of Defence as the stronger form of warfare as witnessed in the limited success of armour attacks even in the 1973 war and in the Iran-Iraq war. The Kuwait war cannot be cited as an example of success of tanks in attack since the contest was one sided.
> 
> The dilemma which faced General Eftikhar was that casualties were unavoidable. Someone with some tank squadrons had to move forward and create a dislocation in the Indian defensive posture so as to fix the enemy commanders attention and create conditions which would lead to commitment of reserves finally leading to a situation which offered a vulnerable area through which own armour could breakthrough and paralyse the will of the enemy. The frontal attack on Mandiala and the high tank casualties around Phagla Gurha and Sukhtao Nullah were a pre-requisite for the success later on achieved at Chak Pandit. The relentless attacks of 23 Division in Mandiala area on 04 and 05 December convinced the Indians that the Pakistanis would continue banging their heads against Mandiala. Just like the Indian Armoured Division had done at Chawinda. Thus the sudden appearance of armour at Chak Pandit caused a mental paralysis and the Indians lost the will to fight. General Eftikhar in words of Clausewitz “By strategem made the Indians commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into one result, suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes” (Refers-On War earlier quoted-page.274).
> 
> Defence is the stronger form of war and it is extremely difficult to dislodge well entrenched soldiers with similar equipment and weapon systems. The only remedy in such a case is dislocating the enemy commanders mental equilibrium by surprise in terms of force ratio and time and space.
> 
> The defender lays down the first laws of war, in words of an author he forces the attacker to establish his plan ... But defence is the weaker form of warfare in short conflicts like Indo-Pak wars where resources are few and it is a nearly impossible task to change posture from defence to offence as was the Indian plan/thus after 10 December though 23 Division was greatly exhausted the Indians could not regain what they had lost. Had they taken their main defence on Tawi rather than west of Tawi as Candeth wanted; they may even have lost Pallanwala. Much more strength of will, intellect and courage is required to fight a successful offensive battle. 10 Indian Division’s initial defensive battle was a masterpiece effort in terms of 191 Indian Brigades conduct in facing four advancing Brigades. Where the Indians failed was in terms of the conduct of battle at the divisional level; placing of reserves; launching of timely counterattacks etc etc.
> 
> *THE TERM FLANK*
> 
> A great deal of emphasis is placed on the term flank. In the Indo-Pak way of warfare the term “Vulnerable Point” is better than the term “Flank”. Flanks may not necessarily be the best place to attack. In any case ‘Flanks’ are created only after breakthroughs are made. The 11 Cavalry advance to Mandiala was, however, a peculiar operation because it was made in a situation in which no real breakthrough had been achieved; but a penetration had captured the Mandiala north ridge 191 Indian Brigade was outflanked. If this advantage had been immediately exploited a serious defeat would have been inflicted on the Indians. However, since the Indians got one day the gap north of Mandiala and the vulnerable flank created as a result of capture of Mandiala north was undone and a continuous line was once again established once Indians brought 68 Brigade units opposite Mandiala crossing on 05 December.
> 
> The Indian Commanders mental fixation with Mandiala led to weakening of Indian defences in the middle. This was well exploited by General Eftikhar vide his Chak Pandit thrust of 06 December, which created another exposed flank for the Indians. There are thus no flanks initially but flanks are created as a result of own offensive action or as a result of enemy’s attention being fixed on one part of the front. There is a great deal of truth in General Wetzell who was General Ludendorf’s Chief of Operations saying that :-The enemy is not necessarily the weakest on his flanks, nor will he make most of his mistakes on the wings, his weakness and his efforts may occur at other places. The main condition of success is to discover weaknesses and errors wherever they are and to attack the enemy wherever he is weak and wherever he has committed an error. “(Refers-Surprise-General Waldemar Erfurth-First Translation-1943-Military Service Publishing Company-Stackpole Books-1974 — page.2 and 3)
> 
> It may be noted that the above mentioned quotation exactly describes the Indian position at Chamb. Initially they were strong in the centre south; while in the later part they became the strongest on the northern flank and the weakest in the centre opposite Barsala; it was General Eftikhar’s greatness as a General that he correctly perceived this Indian vulnerability and exploited it by launching the 2 Armoured Brigade opposite Chak Pandit.
> 
> Another flank was created on 06/07 December opposite Nageal but since 23 Division could not exploit it; the same vulnerable point was strengthened by 08/09 December when finally the 111Brigade attack was launched.
> 
> *THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION FACTOR*
> 
> “Suspension of Action” which means a state of action in which an army or any military entity is inactive due to one reason or another is one of the most brilliant and often neglected concept of Clausewitz. The Battle of Chamb offers some very fine instances of application of this concept.
> 
> According to Clausewitz; there were three reasons for “Suspension of Action” in a war or a battle. Firstly, “Naturally timidity and want of resolution in the human mind, a kind of inertia in the moral world produced by dread of danger and responsibility” (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-edited by Rapport-National Book Foundation-page.292); Secondly, “The imperfection of human perception and judgment, because a person hardly knows his own position from one moment to another, and can conjecture only on slight grounds that of the enemy” (Refers-ibid-page 292); Thirdly, the “Greater strength of the defensive form” (Refers-ibid-page.292).
> 
> Like all other armies in the world 23 Division also at various times went into a state of suspension of action. The foremost reason for this was the third reason, ie, “Greater strength of the defence” and this was true for the various battles at Mandiala, Phagla and Point 994. The other two reasons certainly played a role on 05 and 06 December and golden opportunities were lost to inflict a crushing defeat on the Indians. In an article published in Citadel issue I/91 titled “Do we lack aggressiveness” The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where “The momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer Commanding embraced Shahadat” (Refers-Citadel-issue I/91-page.56). The question raised by this learned author was answered by Clausewitz long ago when he identified suspension of action as an important reality of war. The problem was common to all armies in the world including the great Prussian army to which Clausewitz belonged. But Clausewitz suggested an antidote to “Natural timidity and want of resolution”; it was “The will of the commander ... by the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in others ... whenever that influence ceases, and his own spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of all others ... the spirit of all others sink into the lower region of animal nature, which shrink from danger and knows not shame”. (Refers Clausewitz-On War-page.I45). There is no doubt that General Eftikhar possessed tremendous personal courage both physical courage which enabled himself to expose him-self to fire and thereby act as an example for all under command; and moral courage which enabled him to take sound operational decisions. His appearance at Mandiala while 11 Cavalry was engaged in a life and death struggle with the Indians played a significant role in reducing the suspension of action or inactivity period at Mandiala; similarly his landing at Chanair and spurring of 2 Armoured Brigade to quickly cross the minefield (which later on was proved to be a dummy minefield) played significant role on the fateful 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was advancing towards Chak Pandit. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Colonel Saeed-page 59).
> 
> As regards the factor of imperfect human perception; here too the 23 Division enjoyed tremendous advantage by virtue of having the General’s penetrating perception; his penetrating coup de oeil which enabled him to finally switch to the south on 06 December.
> 
> In short all armies suffer from the suspension of action paradox; however, it can be countered by resolute leadership. The conclusion is simple; to firstly recognise suspension of action as an important reality in military training and secondly to select resolute commanders who can spur and goad their formations in actual battle by leading from the front.
> 
> *PERFORMANCE OF 23 DIVISION*
> 
> The 23 Division was the only formation whose performance was appreciated even by the enemy. Thus the following was the opinion of various Indians about the war performance of 23 Division and General Eftikhar:-
> 
> “Major General Iftikhar Khan, the Divisional Commander, showed skill and determination in carrying out his misison.”
> 
> (K.C Praval- “ Indian Army after Independence” - Page.496)
> 
> “The enemy commander showed commendable flexibility. Having achieved surprise by using the northern approach, he switched to the south when he found himself firmly checked at Mandiala crossings”
> 
> (Ibid. page.499)
> 
> “The permanent loss of tactically and economically valuable territory on the west bank of Munawar Tawi was the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war”
> 
> The History of the Indian Armoure Corps-1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Page.488)
> 
> In the Second World War one percent of the pilots of the US Air Force were responsible for shooting down in air fights some 40% of enemy war planes. (Refers-The Professional Soldier-Moris Janowitz-The Free Press of Glencoe-USA-1960-page-41). During the decisive battle of Assaye the British Infantry Regiment 74th Foot did bulk of the fighting and its casualties amounted to 501 whereas the other European casualties of all other units were just 143. (Refers-Wellington’s Campaigns in India Intelligence Branch Indian Army-page-176). In 1857 the British casualties at the siege of Delhi exceeded British casualties at all other battles in 1857 totalled by some 200 additional casualties. (Refers-The Indian Mutiny-G.W. Forest-Volume One-page-150 and 151) it is a fact of history that very often bulk of the fighting is done by a qualitatively superior force; as we have seen in the above mentioned instances. For 1971 war also strictly keeping the facts in mind almost half of casualties sustained by the army on the western front were borne by the valiant 23 Division. Thus while the total army casualties on the western front were 4958 (Refers-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.280) those of 23 Division alone were 2216 (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-87).
> 
> On the other hand at times it has been stated that 23 Division could not have captured Palllanwala since the Indians were too strong east of Tawi. These are writers about whom Clausewitz warned us long go when he said:- “Not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which thirty years later people still wrote and spoke”. (On War- earlier quoted-page.245). There is simply no doubt that 23 Division could have captured Pallanwala on 07 or even 08 December had the 2 Armoured Brigade and 111Brigade been handled with resolution. The Indian writer K.C. Praval admitted this fact when he said:-
> 
> “Iftikhar Khan did not pursue 191 Brigade across the Munawwar Tawi straight away. This gave Indian troops the time to strengthen their defences and the enemy lost the chance of establishing itself east of Tawi.” (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-498).
> 
> It was not General Eftikhar who paused but the Brigade Headquarters who were not led by individuals like General Eftikhar who fought from the front.
> 
> *THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE VERSUS OFFENSIVE PLANS*
> 
> The Indian plan lacked integrity and this compromised their dispositions. Their commanders were so obsessed with launching the offensive that they disregarded their prime task of defence of Chamb till an attack was launched. Glaring among these planning errors was disregard for the security of the Mandiala Dewa approach, leaving of the large minefield gap in Barsala Jhanda area.
> 
> The Indian commanders assumption that commencement of offensive in Chamb would by itself ensure the defence of Akhnur Chamb sector was a highly erroneous assumption. Thus the bulk of 10 Indian Division troops were not in their defences when the Pakistani attack was launched since they were in concentration areas preparing for the offensive. (Refers KC Praval-page-495)
> 
> *PSYCHOLOGICAL DISLOCATION OF HIGHER COMMANDER*
> 
> It was psychological dislocation of the Indian Commander which was the crucial factor in the final analysis. In this regard an interview of a senior Indian Staff Officer is highly thought-provoking:-
> 
> “Fascinating indeed! you had almost done it. It was a matter of just touch and go. We really did not know what happened to you after you took the spur and did not pursue. We did not have much to stop you at all (Reference to 13 AK attack). God alone knows where you would have stopped that evening if only you had got going. Our situation was really bad”. (Refers: Opinion of Indian Col General Staff Colonel Rege immediately after the war-quoted by Colonel Saeed-Battle of Chamb-page-85)
> 
> The Indians were simply psychologically dislocated. With no superiority in troops, on the whole it was superior leadership of General Eftikhar which was 23 Division’s principal asset. It is absence or presence of great leaders which is decisive in the final reckoning.
> 
> When General Eftikhar switched south following failure in the north the Indian Commander was simply overwhelmed by complete surprise. The brilliant manner in which Eftikhar shifted the entire Schwerpunkt of the battle from north to south within one night has no parallel at least in the history of Indo-Pak wars. Thus by 5th December once the Indians were finally feeling secure; convinced that the situation had been stabilised; the shocking report received on 6th December that a large tank force was advancing at Barsala on 6th December was traumatic at least for the Indian commander! A counterstroke which in the Indo-Pak scenario may be compared to achievement of a Manstein or Sharon.
> 
> Later on elements started destroying talent in our army; Eftikhar’s achievements were down played and Shaukat Raza who was hardly an independent historian writing what the officials in GHQ wanted downplayed Chamb. It is shocking that he did not even mention 13 AK attack or the criminal delay by 2 Armoured Brigade or 111 Brigade on 07 and 08 December. Today the civilians hardly know Eftikhar and all the glory that Chamb was. Instead we are being repeatedly told about soldiers who were warriors more known for dexterity in handling CIA dollars of Afghan wars than guns. Logically these men should not even have been mentioned after they met an accidental end which ended their unsoldierly pursuits in August 1988 by divine design.
> 
> The men who led us in 1971 were not as outwardly wise with NDCs and AFWCs as today’s officiers; but they were a finer lot. Inshallah the next war will prove to be the final audit of mediocrity instilled in our army in the period 1977-88.
> 
> @PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer @saiyan0321 @Signalian @Mumm-Ra


With regards to handling of armor from Pakistan's side during Battle of Chamb, initially it was being handled ineptly in the best traditions of the subcontinent from both sides......that was when Gen Eftikhar had to intervene, he concentrated his armor and shifted the shwerpunkt, something which was unheard of in the subcontinent.....rest is history. You can judge this from another fact as well...that in the history, you will hardly find the name or mention of commander of Pakistani 2 Armored Brigade during Chamb Battle.

We should remember that Gen Eftikhar was a pure infantry officer, however, his handling of armor was in the highest standards which can be expected.

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## khansaheeb

Psychic said:


> Starting with the First Kashmir War. A few thoughts which I would like to share about the *beginning of 47-48 Kashmir war prior to tribal invasion*....
> View attachment 633933
> 
> 
> *Military Assets*
> At the time of partition, Pakistan, in the words of Jinnah was "moth eaten". It also inherited a "moth-eaten" military.
> 
> The distribution of military assets was as follows:
> 
> Pakistan got 7 out of 46 training establishments.
> All three command workshops for service of armour vehicles, radars repair and crystal cutting fell in India(Agra,Kirkee,Secundrabad).
> Out of 40 ordinance depots only 5 small retail depots fell in Pakistan. Main depots were to support military effort in South East Asia during WW2 with major depots in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta.
> 3 out of 12 engineer store depots came in Pakistan.
> 3 out of 17 ordinance factories came in Pakistan.
> In addition, Pakistan depended upon goodwill of the Indian side for transparent transfer of assets. Although Gen Bucher had given strict orders for fair transfer of assets, his subordinates decreased transfer of arms and ammunition and increased innocuous items to make up the tonnage (as per their own admittance).
> 
> *Military Disparity *
> 
> Armor Regiments: Pakistan(6), India(8)
> Infantry Regiments: Pakistan(8), India(9)
> Battalions: Pakistan(33)[mainly of reduced strength], India(88)
> 
> Artillery Regiments : Pakistan(8), India(40)
> India also had Gorkha regiments(not subject to division)
> Total: Pakistan(150,000), India(400,000)
> Apart from British officers, senior level Pakistani officers with field rank were very few. Result was that some had to be promoted without them posessing the required capacity.
> 
> *Disposition of Pakistan Army*
> 
> GHQ at Rawalpindi.
> 7th Division at Rawalpindi
> 8th Division at Karachi/Quetta
> 9th Division at NWFP
> 10th Division at Lahore
> 14th Division at East-Pakistan
> 3rd Armoured at Brigade at Risalpur
> 
> *Poonch uprising*
> 
> When Poonchis revolted against Maharaja's despotic rule, Sardar Ibrahim Khan met colonel Akbar Khan and requested 500 rifiles. Akbar, who was at the Weapons and Equipment Directorate GHQ diverted some 4000 rifles sanctioned for Punjab Police to Kashmiris. It was decided to support the uprising without involvment of Pakistani regulars as the apprehension of Maharaja opting for India grew. Kashmir in Indian hands meant leaving the sovereignty and existence of Pakistan at the mercy of India.
> It was assumed that out of the nine infantry battalions of the Kashmir State Forces, Muslim soldiers (22%) would not oppose their Muslim brothers leaving roughly 7000 Maharaja's forces to contend with. Akbar Khan's plan titled "Armed Revolt in Kashmir" envisaged strengthening the Kashmiris internally and at the same time taking steps to prevent arrival of armed assistance(military or otherwise) from India.
> 
> *Initial Pakistani Plan*
> 
> Following were the major land routes from Pakistan and India to Kashmir:
> 1- Rawalpindi - Muree - Kohala - Muzaffarabad - Baramulla - Srinagar
> 2- Abottabad - Garhi Habibullah - Muzaffarabad - Baramulla - Srinagar
> 2- Sialkot - Jammu - Banihal pass - Srinagar
> 3- Kathua - Jammu - Akhnoor - Beri Pattan - Noashera - Mendhar - Poonch - Bagh
> 
> There were only two main routes that linked India to Jammu and Kashmir:
> 1- Kathua - Jammu road
> * Kathua Jammu road was unmetalled road which could be intredicted by guerilla action all along the present LOC.​2- Srinagar Airport.
> * The airport had to be rendered unuseable.​
> Akbar Khan assigned Col Sher Khan from MI to assess the situation in Kashmir. As per Col Sher Khan's assessment, the maharaja’s decision to accede to India depended on Indian assurances of effective military support. This support, including equipment, ammunition, weapons, rations and supplies, could not be effectively given until the Pathankot-Kathua road became fit for Motorized Transport (MT). The earliest it was expected was towards the end of October, therefore, the declaration to opt for India was expected then.
> The stories of killings in East Punjab and Kashmir were spreading among the Pashtun tribes and it was expected that they will likely be involved.
> It was assessed that in the winter season, with large parts of Kashmir under snow and the locals with their limited food stock and severe weather will not be in a position to stage any serious trouble. It will also be very difficult for the tribesmen to go to their assistance in large numbers. Sher Khan's assesment was that Maharaja was well aware of this situation and thus might delay his announcement until the weather started changing.
> 
> His assesment was accurate.
> 
> Keeping the British officers out of planning, the Pakistani Prime Minister approved a plan for liberation of Kashmir. Akbar Khan assumed overall charge of operations under the alias General Tariq.
> 
> Pakistani leadership also showed a lack of performance by not allowing PA to intervene till it was too late. All the main routes to Kashmir were within striking range of PA. Sure, the political complication of sending regulars without securing accession was already there but was it worth it to lose large chunks of land in Kashmir instead? It was only when the survival of Pakistan itself was threatened did the Pakistan Army half-heartedly intervene, but it did intervene nevertheless, and without invitation of Maharaja. The lack of boldness displayed by PM Liaqat and his associates by limiting the role of regular army and allowing the enemy to consolidate proved to be too expensive for Pakistan.
> 
> Prior to the consolidation of Indians in Kashmir, Pakistan could've delivered a knockout blow by taking advantage of the geography of the region and doing the following: Infiltrating trained regulars to render Srinagar airfield useless coupled with a concentrated attack with ample artillery and air support to cut Jammu road. The geography favored us. However, due to timidity of our leadership, that military simple solution to the problem could not be applied and instead we had to rely solely on Azad forces.
> 
> Then, once the Indian forces were engaged inside Kashmir, the opportunity to secure advantage before ceasefire was squandered; when PM called off Operation Venus and forbade 7th division from attacking Beri Pattan despite the enthusiasm of Iskender Mirza, Gen Tottenham and Habibullah. Further maneuvers around Jammu and Pathankot had the potential to threaten flanks of any force that might've attacked Lahore.
> The plan to take Beri Pattan road with 7th division and sever Indian LC. As per Iskender Mirza, that would have allowed us to destroy or incapacitate at least five Indian Divisions.
> Here is an interesting account from Habibullah Khan who was the GSO of commander 7th division:
> _"Having served as liaison officer to the prime minister, Habibullah knew him and so took the call. ‘I distinctly remember the prime minister telling me: “Habibullah, we are getting Kashmir on a plate and if one Pakistani soldier is killed I would call it murder by you.’” Habibullah retorted with: ‘Sir, in human history how many territories have been given on a plate?’ Nevertheless, Habibullah was asked to call off the attack. Habibullah recalls calling 10 Brigade and 14 Para Brigade (under Sher Ali) to stand down. But ‘some gunner officer told me that the guns were charged and could not be unloaded without firing. I telephoned the GOC and he said, ‘Let the bastard have it!’ Each gun fired the round in its breach and some medium guns fired extra rounds also.’ The result was the blowing up of the Indian dump near the Beri Pattan bridge and damage to the bridge itself. The expected infantry attack that would have followed the artillery attack never materialized because of the government of Pakistan’s instructions. Interestingly, Sinha, who as then a junior officer on the Indian side, notes in his later book on the Kashmir operation that this was a typical Pakistan Army action: artillery fire without infantry attacks!"_



There must have been a reason why PM Liaqat limited the role of the regular army, any opinions as to why?-" The lack of boldness displayed by PM Liaqat and his associates by limiting the role of regular army and allowing the enemy to consolidate proved to be too expensive for Pakistan. "

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## PanzerKiel

khansaheeb said:


> There must have been a reason why PM Liaqat limited the role of the regular army, any opinions as to why?-" The lack of boldness displayed by PM Liaqat and his associates by limiting the role of regular army and allowing the enemy to consolidate proved to be too expensive for Pakistan. "


In hindsight yes, but consider for a moment...you have just managed to carve out a piece of land from the British....no mean feat....then you know that no institution of yours, including the armed forces, was in any shape...meaning thereby there was a credible scare that we may just loose what we have gained after such a long struggle.....then we also got assurances from the UN at that time that this dispute can be solved, possibly in our favor, through their offices...a combination of these factors might have convinced PM to go on this route....afterall, we should not expect some military boldness from PM Liaqat.....

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## PakFactor

khansaheeb said:


> There must have been a reason why PM Liaqat limited the role of the regular army, any opinions as to why?-" The lack of boldness displayed by PM Liaqat and his associates by limiting the role of regular army and allowing the enemy to consolidate proved to be too expensive for Pakistan. "



He was an impotent leader.


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## khansaheeb

PakFactor said:


> He was an impotent leader.


As PanzerKiel said there was rationale behind the decisions. Defending the young nation from the enemy must have been the foremost in their mind and not taking unnecessary risks to take new territory. Civilians act on emotions while the military act on hard facts. So not really fair for name calling.

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## SQ8

PakFactor said:


> He was an impotent leader.


Sadly, based on the memoir of the mother of the nation it seems he like many in ML were self serving putting themselves above Pakistan in many cases. Doesn’t mean they weren’t honest towards Pakistan, just not completely.

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## Raja Porus

PanzerKiel said:


> We should remember that Gen Eftikhar was a pure infantry officer


But fortunately he commanded 6th armd div after 65, right?


PanzerKiel said:


> name or mention of commander of Pakistani 2 Armored


I've been searching for his name for quite some time now.


PanzerKiel said:


> initially it was being handled ineptly in the best traditions of the subcontinent from both sides


On both sides armour was decisive when used in defensive ops (Chawinda for PA and Assal Uttar for IA), counterattacking ( AQ Sher's 22 mobile reserve bde's brilliant counter attacks along the BRBL, an oft overlooked chapter; and Indian Centurions in Khem Kharan) or in offensive ops only when infantry was leading and tanks were supporting (e.g Chamb for PA). Whenever tanks took the lead role, it'd be utter destruction. However for this failure of tanks, armoured Corps is not the only one to be blamed, infantry most often was unable to support the thrusts by armour and like in Assal Uttar tanks had to fight for the same land they faught for the previous day, because of lack of standard infantry. Another particular example is when 1FF failed to support 6 lancers' brilliant outflanking move which would have surely disturbed 4MDs defensive plans and the gains made by 6L had to be given up and in the process 6L was badly bruised.

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## SQ8

PanzerKiel said:


> With regards to handling of armor from Pakistan's side during Battle of Chamb, initially it was being handled ineptly in the best traditions of the subcontinent from both sides......that was when Gen Eftikhar had to intervene, he concentrated his armor and shifted the shwerpunkt, something which was unheard of in the subcontinent.....rest is history. You can judge this from another fact as well...that in the history, you will hardly find the name or mention of commander of Pakistani 2 Armored Brigade during Chamb Battle.
> 
> We should remember that Gen Eftikhar was a pure infantry officer, however, his handling of armor *was in the highest standards* which can be expected.


Yet - also in the traditions for Pakistan, the best people are also the ones lost before the nation can fully benefit from them.

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## The Terminator

notorious_eagle said:


> Your map makes my point, you need two Phalcons to cover Pakistan. This is why PAF's strike package was not intercepted in time before the CAPS could be vectored. Another point i just thought of now, the SU30MKI's were in the sector as per PAF and they have very potent radars. I am curious to see why didn't the BARS pick up PAF's strike package?
> 
> As i said, a lot depends on IAF's C4I coverage. I have been trying to research online but haven't found much on this topic. In addition, if the Western front requires 3 Phalcons for IAF, who's going to be covering the North sector against China?





rockstarIN said:


> First of all, Its not all about the Phalcons or any other platforms in station all the time. It depends upon situations and there are already ground-based radars too for all sectors. Detecting or tracking was not the reason for early slow response. Everything was detected the moment it took off from the bases. it was not considered as a threat. Like @PanzerKiel pointed out, few tricks like switching on IFF systems on the early flights may delay the perception of the threat level. RoEs to be maintained too(though stupid)
> 
> And yes, IAF is very much short of AWACS. The reason for not going immediate purchase was just pointed out by Joe and others above.


I have heard from an Indian journalist that SU-30MKI's subsystems had issue within themselves. The radar and Israeli ECM don't get along well.

Anyways PAF taught a vital lesson to IAF and it costed them almost nothing. After the incident they went straight for Rafale (which was lingering on for more than a decade) and ordered new radios from Israel for their Air force. IAF somehow acknowledged their shortcomings and trying to mend them in their own particular fashion. Virtually a free lesson from the PAF which I am disappointed with. They were delusional about their capabilities and chest thumping about their new and old toys, we opened up their eyes uselessly and they experienced themselves that their mighty Mig21 Bison was in fact unfit to pitch it against 4th gen F-16s and JF-17s (which till that moment they considered to be an inferior Chinese copy of Mig21) when their modern jets were outgunned in BVR capabilities by PAF was a suicide mission. May be next time they won't send their Migs to intercept and hence becoming target practice for PAF


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## The Terminator

VCheng said:


> As someone reduced to mere spectating on PDF, I do look forward to a good discussion even in read-only mode. Military history is important, no doubt, but it must also be analyzed with an eye on the present and towards the foreseeable future as well. Please do carry on!


Exactly


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## The Terminator

PanzerKiel said:


> For Indian 15 Corps only,
> Its a MINIMUM of
> 38 infantry battalions
> 4 PARA SF units
> 20 artillery regiments
> 4 AD regiments
> 5 Engineer units
> 
> Apart from these, Corps troops include
> The Corps Sub Area
> RRF V force
> RRF K force


How do you see General Akhtar Malik's untimely removal from the command there during the operation Grand slam and PAK Army's internal rift (general Akhtar Malik VS Major General Yahya Khan and Brigadier Azmat Hayat) that slowed us down and ultimately caused our failure to disrupt vital Indian supply route (Akhnor) to up north!

What's your take on it?


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## The Terminator

Joe Shearer said:


> On the morning of the 2nd September, this was the situation:
> 
> 3 Mahars and the Gorkhas were sheltered in the foothills; they had had to give way against the assault by 4th Azad Kashmir Brigade and 13 Lancers, and the path forward to Mandiwala was open.
> 9 Punjab were behind them in the foothills.
> 6 Sikh LI had been badly mauled by the combined attacks at Moel and at Burejal on the CFL itself, and the orders had gone out for 191 Brigade elements to fall back on the east bank of the Jammu Tawi. The west bank was no longer tenable, and the 11 Cavalry, with support from engineering, had already crossed over; even the east bank was no longer tenable.
> 191 Brigade itself was asked to fall back to Akhnoor.
> The J&K Militia attached to the Mahars and to the Sikh LI were caught up in the general melee, and were forced along with their attached organisations.
> 15 Kumaon, with its outgunned 105 mm Artillery Regiment, were left perched on the Mandiwala heights, staring down the barrel of a gun; both 13 Lancers, moving east from the CFL with the Azad Kashmir Brigade and 11 Cavalry, moving north to overwhelm the 6 Sikh LI, were closing in on the position.
> At this point, the 41 Mtn. Brigade was deployed, with the usual mountain brigade equipment not including anti-tank weapons, facing the combined might of the two Patton-equipped cavalry regiments.
> 
> 10 Div HQ was perched uneasily in between 41 Mtn. Brigade and 28 Brigade, based on Akhnoor.
> 
> Disaster was imminent.
> 
> Nothing happened on the 2nd.
> 
> Unknown to the Indians, the Pakistani GHQ has decided to replace Maj. Gen. Akhtar Husain Malik, author of the entire operation, with Maj. Gen. Yahya Khan, who arrived to take over the 7th Div. HQ, while General Malik departed. Yahya Khan decided he needed to take stock, and ordered a consolidation on the 2nd. That was all the time that Harbaksh Singh needed to get his own plans in order.
> 
> But that is later, on the 6th. To continue with events in the ongoing battle at Chhamb, the Pakistani 10 Brigade crossed the Tawi. A detachment to the south captured a position well to the south, the left flank, of the Indian 41 Mtn. Brigade, rendering it vulnerable to a flank attack. That was not to be needed.
> 
> On the 4th, the Pakistanis assaulted 41 Mtn. Brigade. During the day, they broke that brigade's defences, and forced its elements to fall back through 28 Brigade's lines to the HQ of 191 Brigade.
> 
> On the 5th, nothing much happened. Now that the road to Jammu, or, at least, to Akhnoor lay open, it was natural that the Pakistani side, that had completely convinced itself that it was performing a sandbox exercise, and that the sandbox was the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, completely ignored other options and possibilities, and airily dismissed the clear warnings of the 5'2" Indian Prime Minister about the right to strike anywhere, any time in response to a Pakistani attack.
> 
> On the 6th, there was a half-hearted attack on the 28 Brigade's position at Akhnoor, during the late afternoon and the night; the energy and enthusiasm was not there, because the news of the Indian XI Corps attack on Lahore had got through.
> 
> And there ended the brilliantly-conceived brilliantly-led Operation Grand Slam, that could have reached Jammu by the 6th, taking away the day of consolidation caused by Yahya's abrupt arrival on the battlefield in mid-battle.


That change in command was the reason why unfortunately Pakistan lost its only chance to paralyze the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Don't know how that same General Yahya Khan managed to be the highest ranking officer in the military and later seized control of the Pakistan and our bad luck continued from failure of operation grand slam to fall of Dhaka.


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## Gripen9

The Terminator said:


> That change in command was the reason why unfortunately Pakistan lost its only chance to paralyze the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Don't know how that same General Yahya Khan managed to be the highest ranking officer in the military and later seized control of the Pakistan and our bad luck continued from failure of operation grand slam to fall of Dhaka.


Some people have a tendency to fail upwards.

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## PanzerKiel

The Terminator said:


> How do you see General Akhtar Malik's untimely removal from the command there during the operation Grand slam and PAK Army's internal rift (general Akhtar Malik VS Major General Yahya Khan and Brigadier Azmat Hayat) that slowed us down and ultimately caused our failure to disrupt vital Indian supply route (Akhnor) to up north!
> 
> What's your take on it?


If things would have gone according to GOC 12 Division desires, 12 Division would have veered towards Jammu, with 7 Division going towards Naushara.......Kashmir would have been more or less cut off from mainland India, road Jammu-Samba-Kathua interdicted.....

Losses in Jura and Bedori were negligible when compared with gains in Munawar gap by Grandslam..These losses were expected due to bad troops to space ratio in 12 Division...
however, these losses were still within the limited laid down by Pak GHQ.

In the end, IA committed more forces against Jura and Bedori, while having nothing to counter any Pak thrust towards Akhnur...Two IA brigades had already been pulled out of Jammu...so IA was playing almost as per the needs of Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division...

In fact, the full value of Gibralter was have been encashed only after capture of Akhnur, once 12 and 7 Division would have veered towards Naushara and Jammu....if this would have happened, there would have been no Operation Nepal by Indian 1 Corps.


After the war, Malik was posted to an advisory commanding position for CENTO in Ankara, Turkey, where he succumbed to injuries sustained in a road accident on 22 August 1969... In the best traditions of conspiracies in our country... Below is the letter he wrote to his brother before he was killed. 


*GENERAL AKHTER HUSSAIN MALIK LETTER TO GENERAL ABDUL ALI MALIK*

My Dear brother,
I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.

b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.

c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.

d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.

e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!

f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.

g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
Please remember me to all the family.
Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik

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## The Terminator

PanzerKiel said:


> Despite the forward placement of PA troops, they still were surprised once IA offensive opened up across the international border.


Our military has the tendency to expect best possible behavior from the enemies while being in active conflict with them. Same happened in 1999. 

On the other hand obviously far superior in numbers. Indians had always the chance to resort back to their numerical advantage and broaden the conflict to international borders or increase the magnitude of force in a local conflict. That shouldn't be so surprising for any person to understand. Expecting from the rival to comply with one's wishes is foolishness at best.

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## PanzerKiel

The Terminator said:


> Our military has the tendency to expect best possible behavior from the enemies while being in active conflict with them. Same happened in 1999.
> 
> On the other hand obviously far superior in numbers. Indians had always the chance to resort back to their numerical advantage and broaden the conflict to international borders or increase the magnitude of force in a local conflict. That shouldn't be so surprising for any person to understand. Expecting from the rival to comply with one's wishes is foolishness at best.


In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.

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## The Terminator

PanzerKiel said:


> he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate,


How much devoted he wasto his cause . It reminds me of our history's legend Hazrat Khalid bin Waleed RA. Rarely seen this kind of sacrifice from a top military officer to give up his command and still fight for the greater cause.



PanzerKiel said:


> If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it.





PanzerKiel said:


> But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians.





PanzerKiel said:


> But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan]



He deserved to lead the military not Yahya Khan. His leadership could have proved to be our savior and may be we wouldn't be chatting about the rest of the conflicts between the 2 sides today. Alas! We ditched a true patriotic and visionary General and no doubt that we had to pay the unimaginable price for that sin we commited for years to come. It's totally unbearable for me to imagine

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## PanzerKiel

The Terminator said:


> We ditched a true patriotic and visionary General and no doubt that we had to pay the unimaginable price for that sin we commited for years to come. It's totally unbearable for me to imagine


List of such people ditched by us is long... apart from Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div), we had Brig Nisar (25 Cav, CHawinda), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 armored division), Brig Amjad Chaudhary, commander of famous 4 Corps Artillery in 65 and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Division at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.

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## The Terminator

PanzerKiel said:


> In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....
> 
> Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.


Typical Failure upon failures from both the sides resulted in a stalemate for better part of the century 

Maybe the end result is better suited for both the countries


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## Raja Porus

PanzerKiel said:


> List of such people ditched by us is long... apart from Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div), we had Brig Nisar (25 Cav, CHawinda), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 armored division), Brig Amjad Chaudhary, commander of famour 4 Corps Artillery in 65 and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Division at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.


Brigadier Amjad Ch, Bde commander IV corps arty; Brig AQ Sher, Bde commander 22 inf bde of 10div, MG Tajammul Hussain in 71 and the list goes on..


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## The Terminator

PanzerKiel said:


> List of such people ditched by us is long... apart from Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div), we had Brig Nisar (25 Cav, CHawinda), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 armored division), Brig Amjad Chaudhary, commander of famour 4 Corps Artillery in 65 and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Division at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.


How could we stop that leadership brain drain? What lessons our military has learnt from those accounts and are there any systems placed to not repeat those mistakes we committed? 

I probably guess that it still happens in present times too!

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## PanzerKiel

The Terminator said:


> How could we stop that leadership brain drain? What lessons our military has learnt from those accounts and are there any systems placed to not repeat those mistakes we committed?
> 
> I probably guess that it still happens in present times too!


Its a vicious cycle, and it still remains...whenever egos come into play and take precedence over greater interests then brain drain and other losses are bound to happen.

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## Raja Porus

Many officers including Sword of honours of Dhera Dhun were not inducted in the army after independence because they had joined INA which dealt a major blow to our military thinking.


PanzerKiel said:


> List of such people ditched by us is long... apart from Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div), we had Brig Nisar (25 Cav, CHawinda), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 armored division), Brig Amjad Chaudhary, commander of famour 4 Corps Artillery in 65 and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Division at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.


MG Shahid Ali Hamid, Sher Ali khan Patudi Brigadier Amjad Ch, Bde commander IV corps arty; Brig AQ Sher, Bde commander 22 inf bde of 10div, Yaqub Khan in 71;MG Tajammul Hussain after 71 and the list goes on..

One of the major reasons why there was so much confusion and shyness in every offensive launched by us in 65 was because of the lack of confidence and determination shown by the GHQ and especially the CinC, an ACR written by the British CO of Musa Khan in Burma sats that he was* Tactically Timid*. Thus no gains could be made due to the sudden change of Commands and objectives, AORs and Ad hocism

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## PanzerKiel

Desert Fox 1 said:


> an ACR written by the British CO of Musa Khan in Burma sats that he was* Tactically Timid*. Thus no gains could be made due to the sudden change of Commands and objectives, AORs and Ad hocism


That ACR was of Ayub Khan, not Musa.

In Friends Not Masters, Ayub Khan gives a very sketchy account of his exploits and role in the Burma front during World War II: he was made second in command of the First Assam regiment -- which fought its way to Mandalay -- and after 18 months was transferred back to India. More information has come to light in recent years. A confidential note --declassified in recent years -- of the British Commonwealth Relations Office on Ayub Khan, prepared after he seized power in 1958, refers to this phase of his career: “He (Ayub Khan) was, according to our record, a failure as a Commanding Officer (Lt. Col.) on active service and had to be relieved.” Details about this episode have emerged from accounts of others. Ayub Khan served in Burma during 1944-45. When the Commanding Officer of the regiment, Lt Col. WF Brown was killed, he was given command but later removed by Maj. Gen. TW Rees, Commander of the Indian 19th Infantry Division, for “tactical timidity”, and replaced by Lt.Col. Hugh Parsons.

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## The Terminator

@PanzerKiel sir, I have a rather bizzare question for you.

Our military has the history of being bold, aggressive, packs a bigger punch than its actual size, doesn't shy away image. But as time moved on specially at the turn of the century our military's tone and perception has gone from aggressive to mere peacekeepers.

Can you please elaborate us what's going on in reality?

As disparity between the 2 forces is concerned, we started of rather poorly in the 40s and 50s but that gap has been shrinking since then. So why our top leadership don't roar like it used to do in 20th century!


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## PanzerKiel

The Terminator said:


> @PanzerKiel sir, I have a rather bizzare question for you.
> 
> Our military has the history of being bold, aggressive, packs a bigger punch than its actual size, doesn't shy away. But as time moved on specially at the turn of the century our military's tone and perception has gone from aggressive to mere peacekeepers.
> 
> Can you please elaborate us what's going on in reality?
> 
> As disparity between the 2 forces is concerned, we started of rather poorly in the 40s and 50s but that gap has been shrinking since then. So why our top leadership don't roar like it used to do in 20th century!


Reality is entirely opposite....the last two decades have rapidly transformed the military as far as fighting capability and AGGRESSIVENESS is concerned....previously finding aggressive guys was an exception, now its the opposite.....
but the last two decades has also seen army taking an ever greater role in the country affairs.....now in these situations, aggressiveness does not pay off.....we have to be a but subtle....

Indians, till late 80s and early 90s had one big fear.....our officers and men were those who had taken part in 1971 war and were burning to avenge that.....that thing almost eroded in late 90s.....but the last two decades has brought it back....this danger will now loom on our eastern neighbour till minimum 2040.

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## Raja Porus

PanzerKiel said:


> He (Ayub Khan) was, according to our record, a failure as a Commanding Office


I read it in Crossed Swords and was searching to copy the exact words. Thanks.


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## The Terminator

PanzerKiel said:


> Reality is entirely opposite....the last two decades have rapidly transformed the military as far as fighting capability and AGGRESSIVENESS is concerned....previously finding aggressive guys was an exception, now its the opposite.....
> but the last two decades has also seen army taking an ever greater role in the country affairs.....now in these situations, aggressiveness does not pay off.....we have to be a but subtle....
> 
> Indians, till late 80s and early 90s had one big fear.....our officers and men were those who had taken part in 1971 war and were burning to avenge that.....that thing almost eroded in late 90s.....but the last two decades has brought it back....this danger will now loom on our eastern neighbour till minimum 2040.


We have a powerful military department which India lacks ie ISPR. ISPR played a vital role by motivating the public and shape the mindset towards war on terror and brutal within borders fight against TTP, BLA etc. We constantly heard the voice of our hearts being propagated through ISPR and the famous phrases of giving surprise to our arch rival and be a dominant side in escalation ladder felt melody to the ears for the general public as their heart's voice was constantly been suppressed by the traditional political leadership.

ISPR wields the power to shake the Earth. But when you try to mixup foreign office with ISPR then matters quickly turn from serious to hilarious. It doesn't suite a uniformed person to say that we don't want to fight or we don't wish for war. Whatever the circumstances may come but when a senior military official globally relaying that message turns lion into sheep, at least in perception.

This is the Era of hybrid warfare where usually perception (either within our own nation or globally) matters a lot, sometimes more than the actual capability. IMHO ISPR should only represent the true defenders and warriors of the nation and let foreign office guys handle the sweet talking and diplomatic conversations.

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## The Terminator

@PanzerKiel sir, as Pakistanis we generally know what Indian military lacks or what blunders they made in the past and they are more open in expressing that publicly than us as their military doesn't carry any political capital.

But there isn't enough material available on mainstream media what the shortcomings or the mistakes committed by our military in the past. What lessons our military have learned from them and improved upon, and how the present and future looks from that perspective?

We have viewed a sh*t ton load of debates about the unceremoniously removal of General Mausharraf, his midflight issues and the subsequent coup détat. Which bears no effect upon our defense capabilities. But we tend to ignore and completely forget to discuss for example, the miscalculations on our part in 99's skirmish and to have a healthy debate on it openly. 

There is some great pieces of work from some extremely knowledgeable members here about India's militarily shortcomings and what they could have done. Good food for thought for indian viewers. 

Would you plz also elaborate the mistakes the Pakistani side committed in the past conflicts, what lessons we learnt from that and how we won't do the same mistakes in the future? Plz, Enlighten duds like me about them too.
Thanks

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## PanzerKiel

The Terminator said:


> @PanzerKiel sir, as Pakistanis we generally know what Indian military lacks or what blunders they made in the past and they are more open in expressing that publicly than us as their military doesn't carry any political capital.
> 
> But there isn't enough material available on mainstream media what the shortcomings or the mistakes committed by our military in the past. What lessons our military have learned from them and improved upon, and how the present and future looks from that perspective?
> 
> We have viewed a sh*t ton load of debates about the unceremoniously removal of General Mausharraf, his midflight issues and the subsequent coup détat. Which bears no effect upon our defense capabilities. But we tend to ignore and completely forget to discuss for example, the miscalculations on our part in 99's skirmish and to have a healthy debate on it openly.
> 
> There is some great pieces of work from some extremely knowledgeable members here about India's militarily shortcomings and what they could have done. Good food for thought for indian viewers.
> 
> Would you plz also elaborate the mistakes the Pakistani side committed in the past conflicts, what lessons we learnt from that and how we won't do the same mistakes in the future? Plz, Enlighten duds like me about them too.
> Thanks


This is exactly what this thread was made for. You start reading it from page 1 and you'll get almost all the answers.

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## Joe Shearer

The Terminator said:


> That change in command was the reason why unfortunately Pakistan lost its only chance to paralyze the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Don't know how that same General Yahya Khan managed to be the highest ranking officer in the military and later seized control of the Pakistan and our bad luck continued from failure of operation grand slam to fall of Dhaka.


 
There was never any doubt that Yahya Khan was a good soldier, as far as that goes. To trace back his political ineptitude during the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 and assume that he was equally incompetent in purely military matters is a gross error.

The failure of Grand Slam is partially due to the hiatus resulting from the replacement of the commanding officer of the 12th Division, but there were other factors as well. Pakistani observers in particular need to look at this and other battles on 1965 with a broader vision than they have demonstrated so far.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....
> 
> Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.


You ignore the constant theme in Indian politics, underlying the self-aggrandising, ultra-jingoistic theme that jars a Pakistani listener (and most sensible Indian listeners as well). That theme has been the theme of strategic caution, of fearing to ask for everything and getting it. 

Should we have overrun all of the former state of J&K in 1947-48, would we have been better off today? Sure, Pakistan would have its sensitive pressure points within howitzer range of Indian lines, but would that have contributed in any way to peace on the LOC? Would that have reduced the zeal to pursue adventures with half-baked irregulars that goes on year in and year out even as we speak?

Should we have thrust at a single point of any of the three that Harbaksh set out to do in 1965, and should we have achieved a thundering success, what then? Would India have seriously held on to territory controlled at the end of the inevitable cease fire - knowing, as we do, with perfect hindsight that Pakistan was scraping the bottom of the barrel in all respects with regard to war resources?

Should we have made a push to rationalise the Chicken's Neck in Jalpaiguri - the infamous Siliguri gap - in that same year? At that time, all that happened was that three battalions of armed policemen, and one battalion of the EFR faced five battalions of the East Pakistani armed forces - let us call it a gendarmerie for lack of a better word - under Brigadier Torgul; instead, if one corps had been diverted to East Pakistan from the committed forces facing China, would the situation for Pakistan have been better? Would the East Pakistani have felt better about the defence of East Pakistan, and would Ayub Khan have succeeded in recovering the 30 or 40 kms of territory in Rangpur that would have been the Indian side's most pressing need? We know from (again) hindsight that even Haji Pir Pass was returned, and it is possible that even this hypothetical gain might have been returned, but who knows? When we spin alternate history scenarios, anything can be made to look plausible.

Should we have dispensed with a poltroon Bewoor, and swiftly acted to replace Khambatta, and countered Eftekhar's successes in the north, would we have gained? I ask in the same spirit as the previous questions.

We can go on in this way. 

The fact is that as events progress, it becomes increasingly more dangerous for India to win any victory of any substantial nature over Pakistan, for two obvious reasons, that apart from the civilian heroes of PDF who launch nuclear wars every day of the week, and twice on Fridays, nobody would like to face an unstable Pakistan that is today crumbling at the edges and is financially at its wits end, not with the spectre of a far worse enemy waiting to sweep aside established Pakistani institutions and put half the population into blue-coloured shuttlecocks; second, it would destroy India if such an event were to take place in today's conditions, because it would confirm and seal in concrete the dreadful destruction of democracy that is taking place in India today, and it would legitimise all the nauseating wounds inflicted on the country by a dangerous set of bigots.

I hope that some sensible souls will tell the utterly obnoxious fanboys who crowd this forum today that India winning a decisive military victory over Pakistan is to be dreaded by the sub-continent almost as much as Pakistan winning a decisive victory over the Indian cricket team today*. 

*Apologies for being unable to resist that piece of pure mischief.

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## SQ8

Joe Shearer said:


> You ignore the constant theme in Indian politics, underlying the self-aggrandising, ultra-jingoistic theme that jars a Pakistani listener (and most sensible Indian listeners as well). That theme has been the theme of strategic caution, of fearing to ask for everything and getting it.
> 
> Should we have overrun all of the former state of J&K in 1947-48, would we have been better off today? Sure, Pakistan would have its sensitive pressure points within howitzer range of Indian lines, but would that have contributed in any way to peace on the LOC? Would that have reduced the zeal to pursue adventures with half-baked irregulars that goes on year in and year out even as we speak?
> 
> Should we have thrust at a single point of any of the three that Harbaksh set out to do in 1965, and should we have achieved a thundering success, what then? Would India have seriously held on to territory controlled at the end of the inevitable cease fire - knowing, as we do, with perfect hindsight that Pakistan was scraping the bottom of the barrel in all respects with regard to war resources?
> 
> Should we have made a push to rationalise the Chicken's Neck in Jalpaiguri - the infamous Siliguri gap - in that same year? At that time, all that happened was that three battalions of armed policemen, and one battalion of the EFR faced five battalions of the East Pakistani armed forces - let us call it a gendarmerie for lack of a better word - under Brigadier Torgul; instead, if one corps had been diverted to East Pakistan from the committed forces facing China, would the situation for Pakistan have been better? Would the East Pakistani have felt better about the defence of East Pakistan, and would Ayub Khan have succeeded in recovering the 30 or 40 kms of territory in Rangpur that would have been the Indian side's most pressing need? We know from (again) hindsight that even Haji Pir Pass was returned, and it is possible that even this hypothetical gain might have been returned, but who knows? When we spin alternate history scenarios, anything can be made to look plausible.
> 
> Should we have dispensed with a poltroon Bewoor, and swiftly acted to replace Khambatta, and countered Eftekhar's successes in the north, would we have gained? I ask in the same spirit as the previous questions.
> 
> We can go on in this way.
> 
> The fact is that as events progress, it becomes increasingly more dangerous for India to win any victory of any substantial nature over Pakistan, for two obvious reasons, that apart from the civilian heroes of PDF who launch nuclear wars every day of the week, and twice on Fridays, nobody would like to face an unstable Pakistan that is today crumbling at the edges and is financially at its wits end, not with the spectre of a far worse enemy waiting to sweep aside established Pakistani institutions and put half the population into blue-coloured shuttlecocks; second, it would destroy India if such an event were to take place in today's conditions, because it would confirm and seal in concrete the dreadful destruction of democracy that is taking place in India today, and it would legitimise all the nauseating wounds inflicted on the country by a dangerous set of bigots.
> 
> I hope that some *sensible souls will tell the utterly obnoxious fanboys *who crowd this forum today that India winning a decisive military victory over Pakistan is to be dreaded by the sub-continent almost as much as Pakistan winning a decisive victory over the Indian cricket team today*.
> 
> *Apologies for being unable to resist that piece of pure mischief.


It is not worth it - better to pander to the crowd and slip in some introspective thought inception disguised as jibes instead of trying to debate with quasi-religious-fascist warrior hellbent on their daily conquest fantasies that distract from the very miserable reality facing them today.

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## Raja Porus

Joe Shearer said:


> is to be dreaded by the sub-continent almost as much as Pakistan winning a decisive victory over the Indian cricket team today*








Sorry couldn't resist; I dwell (≈cope) in the past. 

Btw good to have you back.

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## Joe Shearer

Desert Fox 1 said:


> Sorry couldn't resist; I dwell (≈cope) in the past.
> 
> Btw good to have you back.



They blocked the video! (I could guess what it might have been )

Love to see it, if you can just send a URL.

Nice to hear from you.

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## Raja Porus

Joe Shearer said:


> They blocked the video! (I could guess what it might have been )
> 
> Love to see it, if you can just send a URL.
> 
> Nice to hear from you.


It's a video of Amir's wickets against India


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## Joe Shearer

Desert Fox 1 said:


> It's a video of Amir's wickets against India



Aha! Who won the match? Yesterday, was it?


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## Raja Porus

Z


Joe Shearer said:


> Aha! Who won the match? Yesterday, was it?


I think Pakistan won it. Pakistan was able to chase 151 without any loss; but not before Afridi had bamboozled the Indian top order.

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## Joe Shearer

Desert Fox 1 said:


> Z
> 
> I think Pakistan won it. Pakistan was able to chase 151 without any loss; but not before Afridi had bamboozled the Indian top order.


Serves them right. Time they got rid of Kohli as Captain. He's a little tinpot dictator, pushing his personal favourites at every opportunity.


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## Raja Porus

Joe Shearer said:


> Serves them right. Time they got rid of Kohli as Captain. He's a little tinpot dictator, pushing his personal favourites at every opportunity.


This is what happens when people make men forget their limits.

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## Raja Porus

General Masood Aslam later on commanded the same 23 div during the Indo-Pak standoff of 2001-2

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## PanzerKiel

Joe Shearer said:


> The failure of Grand Slam is partially due to the hiatus resulting from the replacement of the commanding officer of the 12th Division, but there were other factors as well. Pakistani observers in particular need to look at this and other battles on 1965 with a broader vision than they have demonstrated so far.


Replacement of the commander was just one of the reasons...others included the permanent affiliations of brigade commanders with old / new commanders, personal rivalries, old affiliations of PA / IA officers (afterall, they were part of the same army hardly 18 years back)....

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## Raja Porus

PanzerKiel said:


> Replacement of the commander was just one of the reasons...others included the permanent affiliations of brigade commanders with old / new commanders, personal rivalries, old affiliations of PA / IA officers (afterall, they were part of the same army hardly 18 years back)....


I've read somewhere that one particular bde cmdr refused to take any further orders from Gen Akhtar after his outposting (but before handing taking) when one particular objective lay to be captured. Akhtar even begged him but he refused saying he is no more his commander. 
How true it is, I don't know.

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## PanzerKiel

Desert Fox 1 said:


> I've read somewhere that one particular bde cmdr refused to take any further orders from Gen Akhtar after his outposting (but before handing taking) when one particular objective lay to be captured. Akhtar even begged him but he refused saying he is no more his commander.
> How true it is, I don't know.


It is true, unfortunately. Brigadier Azmat Hayat, 10 Brigade.


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## Raja Porus

PanzerKiel said:


> It is true, unfortunately. Brigadier Azmat Hayat, 10 Brigade.


Bde cmdr of Shabbir Shareef.

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## Khan vilatey

This is an amazing thread

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## Raja Porus

Btw isn't it interesting that we went, within a decade from officers like Yahya, Peerzada, Hamid khan, AAK to highly professional and brilliant generals like K.M Arif, Akhtar abdur Rehman, Kallue, Shah Rafi Alam, Shamin Alam and many more who really made India dance to their tune. From Brasstacks to trident and from Afghan Jihad to Nuclear program these man had gained near perfection in National policy making, Diplomatic and strategic affairs, guerilla warfare, operational planning in conventional warfare and nuclear brinkmanship.

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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> Replacement of the commander was just one of the reasons...others included the permanent affiliations of brigade commanders with old / new commanders, personal rivalries, old affiliations of PA / IA officers (afterall, they were part of the same army hardly 18 years back)....



These factors are certainly the printable, admissible factors......perhaps it is best to leave it at that.

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## RAMPAGE

Joe Shearer said:


> These factors are certainly the printable, admissible factors......perhaps it is best to leave it at that.


Please check your mail, Joe.


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## TsAr

Joe Shearer said:


> These factors are certainly the printable, admissible factors......perhaps it is best to leave it at that.


good to see you back Joe..

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## Joe Shearer

TsAr said:


> good to see you back Joe..

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## Joe Shearer

RAMPAGE said:


> Please check your mail, Joe.


Couldn't find anything, sorry about that.


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## RAMPAGE

Joe Shearer said:


> Couldn't find anything, sorry about that.


joe.shearer.2015@gmail.com

This is the one I wrote to. Resending.


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## Joe Shearer

RAMPAGE said:


> joe.shearer.2015@gmail.com
> 
> This is the one I wrote to. Resending.


Strange. I usually get mail there without any trouble. I will check again right away. Sorry for the trouble.


RAMPAGE said:


> joe.shearer.2015@gmail.com
> 
> This is the one I wrote to. Resending.



Got it.

You are absolutely right. Zander is awesome, no doubt about it. More (personal) on that mail.


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## Raja Porus

Found this while reading Sajjad Haider's "Flight of the Falcon"

Ayub Khan’salleged decision to travelto Saidu Sharifafter theISI warning ofan Indian attack and his remaining there during allthecrucial battles
being fought inKashmir maywell have been to stay thefarthestaway fromthe dangers ofthe battle. Such behaviour wasan enigmaeven for Ayub
Khan’scoterie of generalsand hiscabinetmembers but he had madesurethere were no courageousand morally uprightmen around himto advise
himcorrectly. But in reality, thefear ofthe battle ground was not newfor the Field Marshal; rather it was reminiscent of his widely known removal
fromcommand ofthe 1st AssamRegiment fromthe Dagger Division byGeneralTW ReeseinBurmafor wavering to lead his troops. Lt Col
Parsons had been ordered to take over fromAyub Khanwho had,according to Lt ColSteve Parson,“chickened out”fromleading his battalion in
thefamous Battle ofKohima. According to Lt ColSteve Parsons, during his presentation on the‘Battle ofKohima’ in 1984, whichwas reported
by the Press Trust ofIndiaand published in the Daily Telegraph fromCalcuttaas wellas reported in the Daily News fromKarachi(reproduced
inAppendix ‘B’). Ayub Khan had displayed “alack ofcourage”.
In the Battle ofKohima when the 19 British-India Dagger Divisionwas dashing for thecapture ofMandalay, Ayub Khanwas removed fromthe
command ofthe 1st Assambattalion, for dithering to lead his men in theensuing battle, whereafter he had stayed in a‘forty pounder’ (tent) with a
Risaldar Major MAshrafKhan also fromHazara, till he wasevacuated and sent to ShagaiFort near Peshawar to Command 15th Punjab
Battalion group comprising old veterans fromWW-Iand some medically unfitsoldiers fromWW-II
21
. Ayub Khan’s behaviourasajunior
commander on the battlefront wasalso confirmed in aletter byLt ColMohatramwho had been an eye witness to this unflattering dramatic
episode(also reproduced as part ofAppendix ‘C’).
Ayub Khanwas later superseded byBrigadiers Nazir, Iftikharand Nasir,alljunior to him. Ayub Khan’s being superseded was reportedly by the
orders of none other than the Quaid-Azamhimself. Thereason for the Quaid-e-Azamto havetaken such a decision had an explicit basis. Ayub
Khan had been appointed as thesenior officer-in-charge ofthe Pakistanicontingent,a part ofthe Punjab Boundary Force, ironically under the
command ofthesame GeneralReese ofDagger Division inBurma. Ayub Khan’s mandate was to provide protection to the Muslimrefugees
migrating fromAmritsarand nearby areas. The Sikh carnage ofMuslimmen, women and childrenwasachilling horrorand thefailure ofAyub
Khan to protect the victims ofSikh slaughter wereallegedlymaking terrifying headlines in the Nawa-e-Waqt and Pakistan Times . Thesereports
had reached the Quaid-e-Azamwho had reportedly placed it on record that Ayub Khanwas not to be promoted any further. *He would have
retired in that rank had the Quaid lived alittlelonger. That was not to be and Ayub Khan gifted himselftherank ofa Field Marshal as if to defy the
Quaid*, GenReese ofDagger Division and GenMesservy, thefirst C-in-C ofthe PakistanArmywho had also declared himunfit for promotion
22


PanzerKiel said:


> It is true, unfortunately. Brigadier Azmat Hayat, 10 Brigade.


Almost the same case was with Brig Zafar bde cmdr 25 bde?
I've also read that MG Akhtar also begged to act as a subordinate commander of Yahya after change of command so that all the praise (if he desired it) would be Yahya's but Yahya walked out.

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## peagle

PanzerKiel said:


> In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....
> 
> Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.



Is that something inherent within the Indian military mind-set, or have they calculated that besides public declarations, Pakistan has capabilities they respect and recognise, consciously or unconsciously, therefore are unwilling to take their chances by bringing the full force to the field.

They are a professional bunch, they go through all the training, they are educated to a respectable degree, so I find it difficult to believe they are blind to the ground realities. I suppose against a lesser opponent, they could think quality will payoff, without having to rely on quantity. But, perhaps they have concluded at least in private that Pakistan is not a lesser opponent. The resulting conclusion being that rather then start a war they cannot control, and create a situation in which they cannot be certain of a victory, let's rely on quality, if it gets results, great, otherwise play on patriotism to blind the entire nation.


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## peagle

The Terminator said:


> We have a powerful military department which India lacks ie ISPR. ISPR played a vital role by motivating the public and shape the mindset towards war on terror and brutal within borders fight against TTP, BLA etc. We constantly heard the voice of our hearts being propagated through ISPR and the famous phrases of giving surprise to our arch rival and be a dominant side in escalation ladder felt melody to the ears for the general public as their heart's voice was constantly been suppressed by the traditional political leadership.
> 
> ISPR wields the power to shake the Earth. But when you try to mixup foreign office with ISPR then matters quickly turn from serious to hilarious. It doesn't suite a uniformed person to say that we don't want to fight or we don't wish for war. Whatever the circumstances may come but when a senior military official globally relaying that message turns lion into sheep, at least in perception.
> 
> This is the Era of hybrid warfare where usually perception (either within our own nation or globally) matters a lot, sometimes more than the actual capability. IMHO ISPR should only represent the true defenders and warriors of the nation and let foreign office guys handle the sweet talking and diplomatic conversations.



Let's remember, only recently an American general called China to tell them, don't worry, we wont be nuking you. Militaries play the peace maker and the sharp shooter roles all over the world, we just don't hear about it, but it happens.

I do understand your point, but in todays world of public relations with 2 second attention for news, two different branches of the government speaking at the same time, with completely different message is a recipe for disaster. 

Our foreign office also did a good job, but the clearest message came from the ISPR, it was a new style, but it worked, it only worked because the message got through.
As a patriot, you may have heard that message differently to the rest of the world. But, please remember, that message had three audience's, you the citizen, the Indians, and most importantly the World.

The message was clearly understood by all, if you want a fight, OK, let's go, but the choice is yours, India refused to take that option. It was the right message, but that message had to come from a single source, otherwise it would have created confusion. Especially in light of the stupid and misunderstood civil/military drama, the last thing we needed at the time was a confused message of any kind. 

To my memory, it was the first time Pakistan actually won the battle of narratives, which we always seem to lose, irrespective of the facts. Please, let's take away the correct lessons, otherwise we might fail next time. 
Another lesson that many of us seem to forget, the effectiveness of ISPR was magnified by Imran Khan, this is not political, but a grounded fact, anyone else, and I highly doubt the message would have been that effective, not by a mile.


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## The Terminator

peagle said:


> Let's remember, only recently an American general called China to tell them, don't worry, we wont be nuking you. Militaries play the peace maker and the sharp shooter roles all over the world, we just don't hear about it, but it happens.
> 
> I do understand your point, but in todays world of public relations with 2 second attention for news, two different branches of the government speaking at the same time, with completely different message is a recipe for disaster.
> 
> Our foreign office also did a good job, but the clearest message came from the ISPR, it was a new style, but it worked, it only worked because the message got through.
> As a patriot, you may have heard that message differently to the rest of the world. But, please remember, that message had three audience's, you the citizen, the Indians, and most importantly the World.
> 
> The message was clearly understood by all, if you want a fight, OK, let's go, but the choice is yours, India refused to take that option. It was the right message, but that message had to come from a single source, otherwise it would have created confusion. Especially in light of the stupid and misunderstood civil/military drama, the last thing we needed at the time was a confused message of any kind.
> 
> To my memory, it was the first time Pakistan actually won the battle of narratives, which we always seem to lose, irrespective of the facts. Please, let's take away the correct lessons, otherwise we might fail next time.
> Another lesson that many of us seem to forget, the effectiveness of ISPR was magnified by Imran Khan, this is not political, but a grounded fact, anyone else, and I highly doubt the message would have been that effective, not by a mile.


You didn't get my point. I am not talking about a single incident but about a repeated single statement. I have heard may be a hundred times from almost all the DG ISPRs that we don't wanna war. That kind of statement from a uniformed person shouldn't be a norm but rather an exception like what he did after operation swift retort was a clever and right move. 

Requested the enemy to plz stop we don't wanna fight, but in the same sentence, he threatened them by saying that we would keep the escalation ladder. That was a very balanced statement. That's why I love General Asif Ghafoor.

But in the past either under US pressure or our Govt policy, our DG ISPRs acted more like a foreign office spokesperson rather than a military official. You shouldn't shoot olive branches from a barrel of gun or a tank or an artillery piece.

And US saying China anything in terms of military is just time pass. We all know major nuclear powers never fight openly against each other especially the super powers. Not nuking China is as much a joke as Pakistan saying to Canada that we won't occupy you.


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## peagle

The Terminator said:


> You didn't get my point. I am not talking about a single incident but about a repeated single statement. I have heard may be a hundred times from almost all the DG ISPRs that we don't wanna war. That kind of statement from a uniformed person shouldn't be a norm but rather an exception like what he did after operation swift retort was a clever and right move.
> 
> Requested the enemy to plz stop we don't wanna fight, but in the same sentence, he threatened them by saying that we would keep the escalation ladder. That was a very balanced statement. That's why I love General Asif Ghafoor.
> 
> But in the past either under US pressure or our Govt policy, our DG ISPRs acted more like a foreign office spokesperson rather than a military official. You shouldn't shoot olive branches from a barrel of gun or a tank or an artillery piece.
> 
> And US saying China anything in terms of military is just time pass. We all know major nuclear powers never fight openly against each other especially the super powers. Not nuking China is as much a joke as Pakistan saying to Canada that we won't occupy you.



Right, perhaps we have a different point of view, because even in this formulation I have not seen what you are describing, the shooting of olive branches from a barrel of a gun. Please remember, everyone has been at pains to paint the Pakistan army as a rogue element, historically we have been very poor in countering this, but I've not read or heard any such description for the past few years. 

I do not think the people throwing false accusations have changed, but it seems our approach has, that approach may feel different siting within Pakistan, but I can assure you there is a palpable difference in how Pakistan military is viewed abroad, that has come from the change of approach you are describing. Sometimes the right approach can feel wrong, but if it gets you results, then it is the right approach.


"Not nuking China is as much a joke as Pakistan saying to Canada that we won't occupy you."

This is not about equivalence, again please, correct lessons are important. it does not matter if America was going to nuke China or not, this is not about that. 
The point is, he went over the head of his chief executive, and called the enemy. He felt sufficiently confident enough to do that knowing nothing would happen to him. It is about the military over stepping its bounds, safely ignoring the constitution and entering the realm of political authority. These are the lessons, that such things do happen and more, but the world doesn't cry about it like we do, we need to stop our obsession with the military and politics. 

If Bajwa had called India with that same message, it would have been front page news in Pakistan for decades to come, every discussion would have ended with, but Bajwa called India. That incident was barely news in America or anywhere else. and, it has already been forgotten. There are lessons, and we have to, we must learn those lessons.

In that phone call there are so many lessons, so many pointers. The point is that Pakistanis need to get over the obsession will the military and live their lives, this obsession creates an extremely bad image abroad, and it weakens the authority of civilians domestically and abroad, which is also bad for the country. 
Perhaps we should start a new thread because I feel uncomfortable discussing this here, this is a beautiful thread that I do not wish to derail.


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## The Terminator

peagle said:


> Right, perhaps we have a different point of view, because even in this formulation I have not seen what you are describing, the shooting of olive branches from a barrel of a gun. Please remember, everyone has been at pains to paint the Pakistan army as a rogue element, historically we have been very poor in countering this, but I've not read or heard any such description for the past few years.
> 
> I do not think the people throwing false accusations have changed, but it seems our approach has, that approach may feel different siting within Pakistan, but I can assure you there is a palpable difference in how Pakistan military is viewed abroad, that has come from the change of approach you are describing. Sometimes the right approach can feel wrong, but if it gets you results, then it is the right approach.
> 
> 
> "Not nuking China is as much a joke as Pakistan saying to Canada that we won't occupy you."
> 
> This is not about equivalence, again please, correct lessons are important. it does not matter if America was going to nuke China or not, this is not about that.
> The point is, he went over the head of his chief executive, and called the enemy. He felt sufficiently confident enough to do that knowing nothing would happen to him. It is about the military over stepping its bounds, safely ignoring the constitution and entering the realm of political authority. These are the lessons, that such things do happen and more, but the world doesn't cry about it like we do, we need to stop our obsession with the military and politics.
> 
> If Bajwa had called India with that same message, it would have been front page news in Pakistan for decades to come, every discussion would have ended with, but Bajwa called India. That incident was barely news in America or anywhere else. and, it has already been forgotten. There are lessons, and we have to, we must learn those lessons.
> 
> In that phone call there are so many lessons, so many pointers. The point is that Pakistanis need to get over the obsession will the military and live their lives, this obsession creates an extremely bad image abroad, and it weakens the authority of civilians domestically and abroad, which is also bad for the country.
> Perhaps we should start a new thread because I feel uncomfortable discussing this here, this is a beautiful thread that I do not wish to derail.


May be in case of US you would know far better than me. But in Pakistan's case, military establishment is the real Govt and that's a fact no one can't ignore. Why the highest levels of delegations either from US or China meet PAK Army Chief. Because they know, whenever you wanna get something done it's the military you should go to.

I have never heard some senior official from abroad came to US and met with US Army Chief or Naval Chief etc. Because there are people far more important than them. In Pakistan Govt there are many people outranking the services Chiefs constitutionally but they are either dumb puppets, incompetent or don't have any power to do decisions at highest levels.

So in that context our military and statements from DG ISPR are taken far more seriously than say the foreign office or ministry of interior.

US Army Chief might not sleep out of excitement after giving a statement containing nukes and China to poke his head out of his paying grade but Our Army Chief here started military operation Zarb e Azb bypassing the then PM without breaking a sweat.  that's why military is taken obsessively in Pakistan by Pakistanis


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## peagle

The Terminator said:


> May be in case of US you would know far better than me. But in Pakistan's case, military establishment is the real Govt and that's a fact no one can't ignore. Why the highest levels of delegations either from US or China meet PAK Army Chief. Because they know, whenever you wanna get something done it's the military you should go to.
> 
> I have never heard some senior official from abroad came to US and met with US Army Chief or Naval Chief etc. Because there are people far more important than them. In Pakistan Govt there are many people outranking the services Chiefs constitutionally but they are either dumb puppets, incompetent or don't have any power to do decisions at highest levels.
> 
> So in that context our military and statements from DG ISPR are taken far more seriously than say the foreign office or ministry of interior.
> 
> US Army Chief might not sleep out of excitement after giving a statement containing nukes and China to poke his head out of his paying grade but Our Army Chief here started military operation Zarb e Azb bypassing the then PM without breaking a sweat.  that's why military is taken obsessively in Pakistan by Pakistanis



I strongly disagree with your interpretation of the issues you highlighted, but this is not the place to discuss them. Therefore I will not continue this discussion any longer. You're welcome to open a new thread and we can discuss till ours heart content.

I must emphasise that most Pakistanis have a habit of reaching for lazy conclusions, regarding their domestic issues, they play a role in creating an unstable image about themselves, it is truly sad.

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## Waiting

A very long pause, waiting though

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## maverick1977

India will never behave, Pakistan should conscript, 2-4 million youth and create heavy infantry divs, equipped with 85mm mortars, heavy calibre machine guns, 12.7mm along with ATGMs like Baktar Shikar mk2, and 20 sq of drones.
Should liberate kashmir and need be take dehli fort and liberate people of India by eliminating caste system

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## Waiting

maverick1977 said:


> India will never behave, Pakistan should conscript, 2-4 million youth and create heavy infantry divs, equipped with 85mm mortars, heavy calibre machine guns, 12.7mm along with ATGMs like Baktar Shikar mk2, and 20 sq of drones.
> Should liberate kashmir and need be take dehli fort and liberate people of India by eliminating caste system


Thanx, a good start after long pause 🙂

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## PanzerKiel



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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> View attachment 831041


"I deduce this is a married man, Watson. He has not been a gardener; notice the lack of callouses indicating previous use of cultivator, trowel or garden fork. He is also a military professional. Notice his careful disguise of a blue- and green-checked shirt. He may have had an excellent afternoon nap, dreaming of independent armoured brigades; he is quite clearly stretching to ensure that he doesn't pull a muscle reaching for his cup of tea."

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## Joe Shearer

maverick1977 said:


> India will never behave, Pakistan should conscript, 2-4 million youth and create heavy infantry divs, equipped with 85mm mortars, heavy calibre machine guns, 12.7mm along with ATGMs like Baktar Shikar mk2, and 20 sq of drones.
> Should liberate kashmir and need be take dehli fort and liberate people of India by eliminating caste system

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## PanzerKiel

...so...from where we should continue now?


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## Joe Shearer

PanzerKiel said:


> ...so...from where we should continue now?


Dear Sir,

We have the following, in a short while, for your consideration in your role of Observer, so that we may be sure of our submission meeting criteria, prior to submitting them to the simulator management:

location-wise listing of formations at their intended locations after the changes and movements announced - we will be seeking validation of the formations listed, to avoid banning of any unknown or mistaken formation at a later stage;
equipment lists of these formations will be ready by tomorrow; the rates and quantities are ready, but they have to be compiled for each and every formation. We understand that these equipment inventories are needed for the simulator to be loaded and to react - here your approval of quantities for each formation is required;
in view of the time-frame of the events, we shall seek detailed clarification regarding the possibility of (a) modifying the constitution of formations; (b) enhancing the equipment available due to two years of intermediate production and procurement - we would like to use the inevitable production and procurement of the interim period to modify and enhance our formation constitutions;

list of naval vessels and their locations is necessary; we need to know if their armament is required, or merely their types - approval of detail is needed;
list of aircraft, their types has already been submitted in a preliminary manner, and will be submitted finally later this evening - confirmation that nothing else is needed.

Will we be advised of any changes in the opposing ORBAT, as we have advised our changes by way of transfers and re-locations in a series of notes previously?

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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> Dear Sir,
> 
> We have the following, in a short while, for your consideration in your role of Observer, so that we may be sure of our submission meeting criteria, prior to submitting them to the simulator management:
> 
> location-wise listing of formations at their intended locations after the changes and movements announced - we will be seeking validation of the formations listed, to avoid banning of any unknown or mistaken formation at a later stage;
> equipment lists of these formations will be ready by tomorrow; the rates and quantities are ready, but they have to be compiled for each and every formation. We understand that these equipment inventories are needed for the simulator to be loaded and to react - here your approval of quantities for each formation is required;
> in view of the time-frame of the events, we shall seek detailed clarification regarding the possibility of (a) modifying the constitution of formations; (b) enhancing the equipment available due to two years of intermediate production and procurement - we would like to use the inevitable production and procurement of the interim period to modify and enhance our formation constitutions;
> 
> list of naval vessels and their locations is necessary; we need to know if their armament is required, or merely their types - approval of detail is needed;
> list of aircraft, their types has already been submitted in a preliminary manner, and will be submitted finally later this evening - confirmation that nothing else is needed.
> 
> Will we be advised of any changes in the opposing ORBAT, as we have advised our changes by way of transfers and re-locations in a series of notes previously?


Next evening please


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## Joe Shearer

meghdut said:


> Next evening please


#1, #2 and #2.1 are ready; perhaps you are asking for a pause for #3 and #4?

Without putting unnecessary pressure, we were supposed to be on D Day on Friday, and are already 36 hours late.


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## meghdut

Joe Shearer said:


> #1, #2 and #2.1 are ready; perhaps you are asking for a pause for #3 and #4?
> 
> Without putting unnecessary pressure, we were supposed to be on D Day on Friday, and are already 36 hours late.


Fog of War, it’s inevitable 😉

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## Signalian

Joe Shearer said:


> "I deduce this is a married man, Watson. He has not been a gardener; notice the lack of callouses indicating previous use of cultivator, trowel or garden fork. He is also a military professional. Notice his careful disguise of a blue- and green-checked shirt. He may have had an excellent afternoon nap, dreaming of independent armoured brigades; he is quite clearly stretching to ensure that he doesn't pull a muscle reaching for his cup of tea."


Of all the things - you just couldn't read his hand lines even when they are directly in your face. They tell the future and the past.

Elementary, my dear Watson.

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## Joe Shearer

Signalian said:


> Of all the things - you just couldn't read his hand lines even when they are directly in your face. They tell the future and the past.
> 
> Elementary, my dear Watson.


I could, but didn't want to reveal it. There are stars, several of them. I was hoping for a private seance, and a suitably rewarding one. Of course, you had to mess it up. Just imagine, at some date in the future, I might have been paid fortunes for suggesting someone as External Affairs Minister

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## Joe Shearer

Signalian said:


> Of all the things - you just couldn't read his hand lines even when they are directly in your face. They tell the future and the past.
> 
> Elementary, my dear Watson.


Hmm.


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## Raja Porus

@PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer
General K.M Arif(VCOAS and man behind Pak response to Brasstacks) writes in his book, Khaki Shadows that GoP had authorised the raising of a new Corps HQs for Offensive operations. The new Corps would've been compromised of 1st Armd div and 7ID. But when the file was presented before Musa Khan, he rejected if saying: *We don't want another lieutenant general to be lurking around in the GHQ" *!
This means that there were no budgetary constraints as far as this issue is concerned.
Imagine if there was a corps hq to handle the ops in Khem kharan, almost all of the reasons (on PA's side) for the debacle would've been brushed aside...

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## Joe Shearer

Desert Fox 1 said:


> @PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer
> General K.M Arif(VCOAS and man behind Pak response to Brasstacks) writes in his book, Khaki Shadows that GoP had authorised the raising of a new Corps HQs for Offensive operations. The new Corps would've been compromised of 1st Armd div and 7ID. But when the file was presented before Musa Khan, he rejected if saying: *We don't want another lieutenant general to be lurking around in the GHQ" *!
> This means that there were no budgetary constraints as far as this issue is concerned.
> Imagine if there was a corps hq to handle the ops in Khem kharan, almost all of the reasons (on PA's side) for the debacle would've been brushed aside...


Did you have a look at the discussion guided by @PanzerKiel?

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## Raja Porus

Joe Shearer said:


> Did you have a look at the discussion guided by @PanzerKiel?


I spent almost 2-3 months to read the whole discussion very carefully almost a year ago. Has helped alot in maturing of thoughts and clearing of misconception. It was better than any book written on Indo-Pak wars due to brevity and being devoid of emotions.

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## Joe Shearer

Desert Fox 1 said:


> I spent almost 2-3 months to read the whole discussion very carefully almost a year ago. Has helped alot in maturing of thoughts and clearing of misconception. It was better than any book written on Indo-Pak wars due to brevity and being devoid of emotions.


My point was based on that narrative. 

There were two phases to that battle, were there not? One phase where the Indian forces penetrated to Kasur and were very badly bruised. The second was when they fell back behind the border, and took up positions between the Khem Karan road and Amritsar, and were attacked by armour. Do you remember?

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## Raja Porus

Joe Shearer said:


> My point was based on that narrative.
> 
> There were two phases to that battle, were there not? One phase where the Indian forces penetrated to Kasur and were very badly bruised. The second was when they fell back behind the border, and took up positions between the Khem Karan road and Amritsar, and were attacked by armour. Do you remember?


Yes I do.
I will try to post pictures of maps from LTG Mahmud's book tomorrow


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## Joe Shearer

Desert Fox 1 said:


> Yes I do.
> I will try to post pictures of maps from LTG Mahmud's book tomorrow


That would be lovely, but I was coming up to the question you posed.

What, in your opinion, after reading that account, went right at Kasur? What went wrong?

Similarly, what went right at Khem Karan (let us call it that, although events took place a little up the Amritsar road)? What went wrong? 

Looking at these four sets of circumstances might give you a strong foundation from which to consider if the Corps formation might have solved the problem, or not.

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