# BATTLE REPORT #16 Fall Gelb:Blitzkrieg 1940



## AUSTERLITZ

*FALL GELB 1940 : BLITZKREIG IN THE WEST*



​*BACKGROUND:*

*ORIGIN OF THE WORLD WARS* -

_Franco-German Rivalry & French Revanchism _-
The seeds of world war 2 trace back to the *Franco-prussian war of 1871* which resulted in the humiliation of france and *unification of germany* under Bismarck(chancellor) and Moltke(army chief).This was the beginning of an intense franco-german rivalry which would be central to the world wars.
France had been since the reign of Louis XIV(1643-1715) over 200 years ago the _'grande nation'_ of Europe and the prime mover of european politics.Now it had been *challenged and superseded by a new united german colossus *at the centre of europe instead of large numbers of small german states backed by either prussia or austria that it had been used to pushing around.Moreover within 30 years of its unification german industry and population both exceeded france(thus france lost its material and manpower advantage that were the keys to its military supremacy of the past).French pride didn't take being relegated to 2nd place well.

On top this the *prussian army in 1871 had occupied Paris and forced france to cede Alsace and Lorrain*e,2 coal-rich industrially vital areas which had been part of france since Louis's days(bismarck called it his greatest mistake).This *national humiliation* and the *desire to recover the 2 lost provinces* had left deep scars on the french psyche and* calls for* _'revanche'(_revenge) were a common theme of post 1871 french politics.

_Reversal of Foreign Policy-_
Bismarck understood this and *sought to diplomatically isolate france* to prevent her from forming a coalition against germany.To this end he maintained an alliance of the monarchies(austria-hungary,german empire,russian empire) citing republican france as a destabilizing factor and declaring germany had no territorial ambitions.However this changed when the *young ,arrogant and ambitious kaiser Wilhelm dismissed bismarck and set upon an openly aggressive foreign policy.*This was supported by the *astonishing rise of germany* through the industrialization of the ruhr region,massive population growth and superb technological progress(between 1871 and 1914 germany dominated nobel prize on all technical fields,establishing near monopoly in chemistry and physics).The kaiser promoted german nationalism with the slogan _'Our time in the sun'._

_German Militarism -_
Of the 2 great german powers ,*germany was unified by militaristic prussia* and not austria.Prussia,a nation brought to prominence by warrior king frederick the great and was described as_ 'an army with a state'_ was largely *a security state made by war and for war*.Since prussia dominated unified germany and its military,the* legacy of prussian militarism* and its reverance for war was* inherited by and shaped the post-1871 generations of the nascent german nation*.In an age of increasingly extreme nationalism this led several germans,particularly the military sections to believe their nation had a destiny to lead europe.Germany despite its industry and trained human resources *lacked raw materials ,german geostrategists thus dreamt of acquiring these via new conquests or colonies.*(Lebensraum concept origin)




_(Otto Von Bismarck)_​_
Europe in Two Camps:_
*Russia* by 1790 had found the german alliance of increasingly less value.It was further *alienated by germany's alliance with austro-hungarian empire* and refusal to support its claims in the balkans(against austria).When the new kaiser didn't renew the russian alliance,france immediately stepped in(with financial aid for cash strapped czarist govt as a bonus).The* franco-russian 'entente' now countered the german-austrian 'dual alliance'.*

*Britain* had at first remained aloof-its only foreign policy objective being to prevent any one power from dominating continental europe and to maintain its industrial and commercial hegemony.But g*ermany's rapid progress in industry and science soon threatened britain'*s long established position as 'the shopkeeper of europe'.By 1900 *germany outproduced britain*,the birthplace of the industrial revolution in industrial output and was also gaining ground in scientific development.This threatened britain's commercial classes.
Moreover,*bismarck had guaranteed britain germany would never seek colonies or build a navy* to prevent britain joining any coalition against her.The *new kaiser started colonial conquests as well as building up a huge navy *which britain saw as a direct threat to its survival.Thus the *British empire joined France and Russia in the 'Triple Entente'.*

_Wave of Optimism_ - The populations of europe for a century since the end of the napoleonic wars in 1815 had seen no large conflict and were becoming complacent of the horrors of war.The *soldiers of europe ,fired by nationalistic fervour dreamt of glory*,of being the next napoleon.the *common consensus was that the next war would be short and decisive war of manueve*r like the franco russian war 1871 or the campaigns of napoleon.None of them had *any idea of the hell waiting for them called 'trench warfare'.*

All that was needed was a *spark to light the match* ,which came with the balkans crisis that ignited World war I in 1914 when Germany invaded France.(because austria attacked serbia,russia mobilized in support of serbia.Germany supporting her ally austria attacked france-the ally of russia.Britain supported her ally france).


​
The *unprecedented death and destruction* wiped out a whole generation of young europeans and bankrupted all participants.Faced with an immovable french army,a choking british blockade and the entrance of the united states *germany admitted defeat in 191*8 .The resultant peace treaty -The _Treaty of Versailles_ was *heavily punitive on germany *which lost territory,had to pay huge war indemnity and had to shoulder whole responsibility for war.Her army was restricted to 100,000 and aircraft,tanks and battleship production disallowed.WW I reshaped the map of the world and led to the breakup of the austrian,german,russian and ottoman empires.


​
*Europe after WW1*.Germany lost Alsace and Lorraine in the west and territories to the resurrected Poland in the east.(Poland had been partitioned by austria,prussia and russia in the 18th century)Austrian empire collapsed completely into several new nations in the balkans.Russian empire lost finland,the baltic states and areas to poland.(These areas had been ceded to germany -which then had lost to the allies)



*POST-WAR GERMAN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE:*




(Decorated german veteran begging in the streets)​
*Post war germany was bankrupt and full of disillusioned veteran*s and a populace that having suffered through 4 years of blockade now faced severe economic repression.All the *dreams of german glory had also come crashing down*.On top of this emergence of communism,and its new bastion soviet russia was the new boogeyman that introduced an ideological angle to what had till now been a geopolitical struggle.

German *recovery was further hampered by huge allied war reparations*, still efforts were being made mostly through american economic loans.When the great depression hit USA and *global stock markets collapsed* this went up in flames,result was *mass unemployment and hyperinflation in germany*.It was in the backdrop of this that Adolf Hitler rose to power.



​*RISE OF HITLER:*

Adolf Hitler,a former austrian corporal(ethnic german) and his *new National Socialist Party *with radical views was increasingly gaining the support of the desperate and disgruntled german populace.Hitler a brilliant orator and politician ,a* fanatic nationalist with deep seated racial hatred towards non-nordic peoples-especially jews and a violent animosity towards communism told the germans exactly what they wanted to hear.
He promised them economic recovery,employment,end to the versailles treaty,end to war reparations and restoration of german national pride and military glory.He also provided scapegoa*ts that could explain germany's defeat and current condition - The jewish bankers and the communist unions.This came to be known as the '_Stab in the back_' theory that germany had been defeated by sabotage of her war effort from these parties.Despite the fact these were lies,it was what the masses wanted hear - Hope,promise of glory and scapegoats.


​
In 1933 elections in the backdrop of hyperinfaltion and mass unemployment the *Nazi party emerged as the largest in germany*,and *Hitler became chancello*r.Within a year he and his secret police thugs SD had staged a fire attack on the german parliament which he *used as an excuse to arrest,prosecute and eventually ban all other political parties.*Hitler portrayed himself as the messiah(believed it too!)who would lead germany to greatness by crushing all enemies-real and percieved.



​
With the death of president hindenberg in 1934,the last obstacle to hitler's rise to power was complete.He *combined chancellor and president into 1 post -The Fuehrer* .Having obtained the support of the powerful army by promise of rearmament every german soldier was required to swear an oath of loyalty to hitler.



​
As a final act hitler purged the ambitious SD,the very political intimidation police he had used as a tool to come to power and replaced them with the fanatically loyal but even more ruthless SS under himmler.*Adolf Hitler was master of Germany ,and war was now only a matter of time.*



​
*NEXT: ROAD TO WAR :GERMAN REARMAMENT & TERRITORIAL AGGRESSION*

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## Desert Fox

AUSTERLITZ said:


> ​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ​


http://s749.photobucket.com/user/dharabhishek2007/media/Make-the-lie-big.jpg.html

Hitler never said this. There is actually no roof of him ever stating this in Mein Kampf or any of his speeches and private conversations.
​*




AUSTERLITZ said:



RISE OF HITLER

Click to expand...




AUSTERLITZ said:



:

Click to expand...

*


AUSTERLITZ said:


> Adolf Hitler,a former austrian corporal(ethnic german) and his *new National Socialist Party *with radical views was increasingly gaining the support of the desperate and disgruntled german populace.Hitler a brilliant orator and politician ,a* fanatic nationalist with deep seated racial hatred towards non-nordic peoples-especially jews and a violent animosity towards communism told the germans exactly what they wanted to hear.
> He promised them economic recovery,employment,end to the versailles treaty,end to war reparations and restoration of german national pride and military glory.He also provided scapegoa*ts that could explain germany's defeat and current condition - The jewish bankers and the communist unions.This came to be known as the '_Stab in the back_' theory that germany had been defeated by sabotage of her war effort from these parties.Despite the fact these were lies,it was what the masses wanted hear - Hope,promise of glory and scapegoats.



There was a Communist uprising at the end of WW2 in which Marxist Unions went on strikes stalling the German War Industries thus hampering ammo and food deliveries to the front lines. 

Coming to the bankers, one only has too read about the origins of the Balfour Declaration to understand why the Bankers were accused of turning against Germany in favor of acquiring Palestine from Britain in return.





AUSTERLITZ said:


>


​


AUSTERLITZ said:


> In 1933 elections in the backdrop of hyperinfaltion and mass unemployment the *Nazi party emerged as the largest in germany*,and *Hitler became chancello*r.Within a year he and his secret police thugs SD had staged a fire attack on the german parliament which he *used as an excuse to arrest,prosecute and eventually ban all other political parties.*Hitler portrayed himself as the messiah(believed it too!)who would lead germany to greatness by crushing all enemies-real and percieved.
> 
> 
> 
> ​
> With the death of president hindenberg in 1934,the last obstacle to hitler's rise to power was complete.He *combined chancellor and president into 1 post -The Fuehrer* .Having obtained the support of the powerful army by promise of rearmament every german soldier was required to swear an oath of loyalty to hitler.
> 
> 
> 
> ​
> As a final act hitler purged the ambitious SD,the very political intimidation police he had used as a tool to come to power and replaced them with the fanatically loyal but even more ruthless SS under himmler.*Adolf Hitler was master of Germany ,and war was now only a matter of time.*
> 
> 
> 
> ​
> *NEXT: ROAD TO WAR :GERMAN REARMAMENT & TERRITORIAL AGGRESSION*




Germany was bound to the dictates of the Treaty of Versailles meanwhile the Soviet Union was invading all of Eastern and Central Europe a decade and a half before Hitler came to power, and the Western Powers continued to maintain powerful armed forces despite promising to disarm following Germany's disarmament after WW1:


Soviet aggression into Europe *before* Hitler appeared on the political scene:

*Soviet Invasion of Eastern Europe,1919-Wikipedia*

Soviet Westward Offensive Toward Germany, 1919-Wikipedia

*Soviet Invasion of Poland,1920-Wikipedia*

Soviet support for Communist revolution within Germany post WW1:

Communist Revolution in Germany, 1918-1919-Wikipedia

Soviet actions against the local populace of the Baltic states and other countries they annexed between 1938-1941:

*Forced Settlements in the Soviet Union-Wikipedia*
*
Population Transfer in the Soviet Union-Wikipedia*

Soviet Deportations from Estonia-Wikipedia

Soviet deportations from Estonia in 1940s - estonia.eu

Soviet Mass Deportations from Latvia

Soviet Russia's Persecution of Latvia, 1918-1991

Latvia 50 Years

Soviet deportations from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina-Wikipedia

Soviet Liquidation of Polish Officers - Katyn Forest Massacre

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katyn_massacre

Soviet Deportations from Lithuania-Wikipedia

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## LeveragedBuyout

@AUSTERLITZ One thumb up isn't enough, so here's another.

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## AUSTERLITZ

Desert Fox said:


> Hitler never said this. There is actually no roof of him ever stating this in Mein Kampf or any of his speeches and private conversations.
> ​
> 
> There was a Communist uprising at the end of WW2 in which Marxist Unions went on strikes stalling the German War Industries thus hampering ammo and food deliveries to the front lines.
> 
> Coming to the bankers, one only has too read about the origins of the Balfour Declaration to understand why the Bankers were accused of turning against Germany in favor of acquiring Palestine from Britain in return.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Germany was bound to the dictates of the Treaty of Versailles meanwhile the Soviet Union was invading all of Eastern and Central Europe a decade and a half before Hitler came to power, and the Western Powers continued to maintain powerful armed forces despite promising to disarm following Germany's disarmament after WW1:
> 
> 
> Soviet aggression into Europe *before* Hitler appeared on the political scene:
> 
> *Soviet Invasion of Eastern Europe,1919-Wikipedia*
> 
> Soviet Westward Offensive Toward Germany, 1919-Wikipedia
> 
> *Soviet Invasion of Poland,1920-Wikipedia*
> 
> Soviet support for Communist revolution within Germany post WW1:
> 
> Communist Revolution in Germany, 1918-1919-Wikipedia
> 
> Soviet actions against the local populace of the Baltic states and other countries they annexed between 1938-1941:
> 
> *Forced Settlements in the Soviet Union-Wikipedia*
> *Population Transfer in the Soviet Union-Wikipedia*
> 
> Soviet Deportations from Estonia-Wikipedia
> 
> Soviet deportations from Estonia in 1940s - estonia.eu
> 
> Soviet Mass Deportations from Latvia
> 
> Soviet Russia's Persecution of Latvia, 1918-1991
> 
> Latvia 50 Years
> 
> Soviet deportations from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina-Wikipedia
> 
> Soviet Liquidation of Polish Officers - Katyn Forest Massacre
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katyn_massacre
> 
> Soviet Deportations from Lithuania-Wikipedia



1.First one the lie thing -

“In the primitive simplicity of their minds, *they will more easily fall victim to a large lie than a small lie*, since they sometimes tell petty lies themselves, but would be ashamed to tell a lie that was too big. They would never consider telling a lie of such magnitude themselves, or knowing that it would require such impudence, they would not consider it possible for it to be told by others. Even after being enlightened and shown that the lie is a lie, they will continue to doubt and waver for a long time and will still believe there must be some truth behind it somewhere, and there must be some other explanation. For this reason, some part of *the most bold and brazen lie is sure to stick*. - Adolf Hitler,in Mein Kampf.(This huge paragraph is largely shortened and expressed as the quote)

“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie.-Goebbels.(The more accurate version was said by goebbels,hitler's propaganda minister who acted solely on his fuehrer's instructions)

2.On communist in gremany -This was towards the very end and by that time germany had already lost the war,it had negligible effect on german war effort of deciding the war but served as a good excuse.Jews of germany were not involved in treason while the war was ongoing.most served patriotically often compromising their personal reputations eg.fritz haber nor did they sabotage german war effort-there is no evidence for this.The main players of balfour declaration were jews in england and palestine not germany itself.

3.Soviet Union was not party to versailles treaty and thus had no obligations to peace,it saw spreading the revolution as central to its ideaology.When did i say soviet union of stalin was saint?(see last diagram-communist expansiveness)If u read well i already said communist threat and boogeyman was a prime factor behind hitler exploiting that fear to rise to power.With enormous economic hardship throughout europe post-war communist parties began to rise up in many countries,not just germany.They believed nationalism had failed after destruction of the war and communism was the new idea for a better future.(see last diagram-collapse of cultural confidence in european values,institutions)Some but not all were funded by soviet russia,many were genuine.As i said before what had been a purely geopolitical struggle now had become war of ideologies.
The promise of allies disarming after germany was largely done due to pressure from woodrow wilson ,usa president.However after WW1 USA withdrew into isolation away from european affairs and britain and france didn't bother.As i have already staed the treaty was punitive on germany due to vengeance mentality.

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## Desert Fox

AUSTERLITZ said:


> 1.First one the lie thing -
> 
> “In the primitive simplicity of their minds, *they will more easily fall victim to a large lie than a small lie*, since they sometimes tell petty lies themselves, but would be ashamed to tell a lie that was too big. They would never consider telling a lie of such magnitude themselves, or knowing that it would require such impudence, they would not consider it possible for it to be told by others. Even after being enlightened and shown that the lie is a lie, they will continue to doubt and waver for a long time and will still believe there must be some truth behind it somewhere, and there must be some other explanation. For this reason, some part of *the most bold and brazen lie is sure to stick*. - Adolf Hitler,in Mein Kampf.(This huge paragraph is largely shortened and expressed as the quote)
> 
> “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie.-Goebbels.(The more accurate version was said by goebbels,hitler's propaganda minister who acted solely on his fuehrer's instructions)



You didn't provide a source for the Goebbels quote.

And that quote of Hitler's is quoted *out of context*. *Hitler was accusing the Jews of the Big Lie*, not advocating it.

Here is the entire quote *within context*:

*"**But it remained for the Jews, with their unqualified capacity for falsehood*, and their fighting comrades, the Marxists, to impute responsibility for the downfall [of Germany in WWI] precisely to the man who alone had shown a superhuman will and energy in his effort to prevent the catastrophe which he had foreseen and to save the nation from that hour of complete overthrow and shame. *By placing responsibility for the loss of the world war on the shoulders of Ludendorff* they took away the weapon of moral right from the only adversary dangerous enough to be likely to succeed in bringing the betrayers of the Fatherland to Justice. *All this was inspired by the principle -- which is quite true in itself -- that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility;* because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal untruths, and they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Even though the facts which prove this to be so may be brought clearly to their minds, they will still doubt and waver and will continue to think that there may be some other explanation. For the grossly impudent lie always leaves traces behind it, even after it has been nailed down, a fact which is known to all expert liars in this world and to all who conspire together in the art of lying. These people know only too well how to use falsehood for the basest purposes.

*From time immemorial, however, the Jews have known better than any others how falsehood and calumny can be exploited.* Is not their very existence founded on one great lie, namely, that they are a religious community, whereas in reality they are a race? And what a race! *One of the greatest thinkers that mankind has produced has branded the Jews for all time with a statement which is profoundly and exactly true. He (Schopenhauer) called the Jew "The Great Master of Lies." Those who do not realize the truth of that statement, or do not wish to believe it, will never be able to lend a hand in helping Truth to prevail**" *


*On the Goebbels Quotes:*

That Goebbels quote is a fake quote. There is actually no source for it, refer to these sites:

*False Nazi Quotations *

*Hitler and the 'Big Lie'*

*Fraudulent Nazi Quotations *
http://www.historiography-project.com/misc/biglie.html



AUSTERLITZ said:


> 2.On communist in gremany -This was towards the very end and by that time germany had already lost the war,it had negligible effect on german war effort of deciding the war but served as a good excuse.Jews of germany were not involved in treason while the war was ongoing.most served patriotically often compromising their personal reputations eg.fritz haber nor did they sabotage german war effort-there is no evidence for this.



There were millions of Communists in Germany, more than any other country in the world bar Russia. Most of these Communists were factory workers.

All three main leaders of the various Communist Revolutions within Germany were *Jews*:

Jew:
Karl Liebknecht - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jew:
Rosa Luxemburg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jew:
Kurt Eisner - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


These Jews actively participated in subversive activities detrimental to the German state, *including sabotage and receiving military aid from a foreign entity (Bolshevik regime in Soviet Union), that is treason.*



AUSTERLITZ said:


> The main players of balfour declaration were jews in england and palestine not germany itself.



The creation of a Jewish homeland within Palestine was the goal of every influential and wealthy Jew no matter in which country they presided, whether it was influential American, English, or German Jews, they all had one goal and they would achieve that goal even if it was at the expense of their host country.





AUSTERLITZ said:


> 3.Soviet Union was not party to versailles treaty and thus had no obligations to peace,it saw spreading the revolution as central to its ideaology.When did i say soviet union of stalin was saint?(see last diagram-communist expansiveness)If u read well i already said communist threat and boogeyman was a prime factor behind hitler exploiting that fear to rise to power.With enormous economic hardship throughout europe post-war communist parties began to rise up in many countries,not just germany.They believed nationalism had failed after destruction of the war and communism was the new idea for a better future.(see last diagram-collapse of cultural confidence in european values,institutions)Some but not all were funded by soviet russia,many were genuine.As i said before what had been a purely geopolitical struggle now had become war of ideologies.
> The promise of allies disarming after germany was largely done due to pressure from woodrow wilson ,usa president.However after WW1 USA withdrew into isolation away from european affairs and britain and france didn't bother.As i have already staed the treaty was punitive on germany due to vengeance mentality.




Regardless of whether the Soviet Union was a party to Versailles treaty or not, that wasn't my point.

My point was that the Soviet Union had an expansive and aggressive posture towards Eastern and Central European countries. In the face of this threat Germany was expected to remain defenseless and vulnerable to foreign influences detrimental to its National interests and when Hitler did begin to re-arm Germany's military (which were still small compared to Soviet and Western armies) he was accused of having aggressive intentions, etc....



AUSTERLITZ said:


> ​
> *NEXT: ROAD TO WAR :GERMAN REARMAMENT & TERRITORIAL AGGRESSION*




BTW, speaking of aggressions:
British Empire 1939:





French Empire in 1939:

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## AUSTERLITZ

Desert Fox said:


> You didn't provide a source for the Goebbels quote.
> 
> And that quote of Hitler's is quoted *out of context*. *Hitler was accusing the Jews of the Big Lie*, not advocating it.
> 
> Here is the entire quote *within context*:
> 
> *"**But it remained for the Jews, with their unqualified capacity for falsehood*, and their fighting comrades, the Marxists, to impute responsibility for the downfall [of Germany in WWI] precisely to the man who alone had shown a superhuman will and energy in his effort to prevent the catastrophe which he had foreseen and to save the nation from that hour of complete overthrow and shame. *By placing responsibility for the loss of the world war on the shoulders of Ludendorff* they took away the weapon of moral right from the only adversary dangerous enough to be likely to succeed in bringing the betrayers of the Fatherland to Justice. *All this was inspired by the principle -- which is quite true in itself -- that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility;* because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal untruths, and they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Even though the facts which prove this to be so may be brought clearly to their minds, they will still doubt and waver and will continue to think that there may be some other explanation. For the grossly impudent lie always leaves traces behind it, even after it has been nailed down, a fact which is known to all expert liars in this world and to all who conspire together in the art of lying. These people know only too well how to use falsehood for the basest purposes.
> 
> *From time immemorial, however, the Jews have known better than any others how falsehood and calumny can be exploited.* Is not their very existence founded on one great lie, namely, that they are a religious community, whereas in reality they are a race? And what a race! *One of the greatest thinkers that mankind has produced has branded the Jews for all time with a statement which is profoundly and exactly true. He (Schopenhauer) called the Jew "The Great Master of Lies." Those who do not realize the truth of that statement, or do not wish to believe it, will never be able to lend a hand in helping Truth to prevail**" *
> 
> 
> *On the Goebbels Quotes:*
> 
> That Goebbels quote is a fake quote. There is actually no source for it, refer to these sites:
> *False Nazi Quotations *
> 
> *Hitler and the 'Big Lie'*
> *Fraudulent Nazi Quotations *
> 
> 
> 
> There were millions of Communists in Germany, more than any other country in the world bar Russia. Most of these Communists were factory workers.
> 
> All three main leaders of the various Communist Revolutions within Germany were *Jews*:
> 
> Jew:
> Karl Liebknecht - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> Jew:
> Rosa Luxemburg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> Jew:
> Kurt Eisner - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> 
> These Jews actively participated in subversive activities detrimental to the German state, *including sabotage and receiving military aid from a foreign entity (Bolshevik regime in Soviet Union), that is treason.*
> 
> 
> 
> The creation of a Jewish homeland within Palestine was the goal of every influential and wealthy Jew no matter in which country they presided, whether it was influential American, English, or German Jews, they all had one goal and they would achieve that goal even if it was at the expense of their host country.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Regardless of whether the Soviet Union was a party to Versailles treaty or not, that wasn't my point.
> 
> My point was that the Soviet Union had an expansive and aggressive posture towards Eastern and Central European countries. In the face of this threat Germany was expected to remain defenseless and vulnerable to foreign influences detrimental to its National interests and when Hitler did begin to re-arm Germany's military (which were still small compared to Soviet and Western armies) he was accused of having aggressive intentions, etc....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> BTW, speaking of aggressions:
> British Empire 1939:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> French Empire in 1939:



The quote is applied on the masses ,not on who does the lying.Of course he would accuse the jews of doing that in his own autobiography..u expect him to say i'll lie in his own book?
Goebbels accused churchill of lying by the above method in magazine _-Die Zeit ohne Beispiel_.

Germany was one of biggest industrialized nations so yes obviously there would be lot of workers and communism would be popular there.Also Marx and Engles were germans.Communism originated as an idea in germany.
All communist rebellions happened after end of WW1 when germany already defeated,how did they sabotage german effort after war was already over?As for many communist leaders being jews,a communist doesn't believe in god in the first place.
Give proof of jewish sabotage of german war effort to help britain for homeland in palestine during ww1....there is nothing but conspiracy theories.
_'Regardless of whether the Soviet Union was a party to Versailles treaty or not, that wasn't my point.

My point was that the Soviet Union had an expansive and aggressive posture towards Eastern and Central European countries. In the face of this threat Germany was expected to remain defenseless and vulnerable to foreign influences detrimental to its National interests and when Hitler did begin to re-arm Germany's military (which were still small compared to Soviet and Western armies) he was accused of having aggressive intentions, etc....'_

Communist rebellions were crushed by german govt in 1919 itself.He was accused of aggressive intentions because of what he had declared in his speeches openly he would do with a rearmed germany - regain all german territories by war and seize lebensraum in the east by genocide.And the world was proved right.
Did hitler rearm to defend germany?What did he with his army once he had re-armed?History is testament.Was Poland,czechoslovakia,denmark,norway,balkans,netherlands,belgium all planning to destroy germany?Don't be a blind apologist just because u like how badass the waffen-ss and their black uniforms were.

As for aggressions,ur perfectly right both parties here were imperialists -anglo-french colonial imperialists.Churchill was an arch-imperialist.But despite the oppression,they didn't systematically single out whole peoples like this methodically exterminating them in concentration camps and slave labour.Anglo-french-soviets weren't saints ,but hitler was certainly not a good guy,he was much worse than the rest.

Now this topic is not for discussing ideologies,just the campaign..so plz if u answer start a new topic.

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## Desert Fox

AUSTERLITZ said:


> *The quote is applied on the masses* ,not on who does the lying.Of course he would accuse the jews of doing that in his own autobiography..*u expect him to say i'll lie in his own book?
> Goebbels accused churchill of lying by the above method in magazine *_-Die Zeit ohne Beispiel_.



Don't try to play smart now. You were the one who posted a fake quote in the OP without even doing proper research.

That's not what you were trying to convey earlier through this fake quote, perhaps you should have clarified yourself before propagating this historical fallacy:







*And neither did you provide a source for that (fake) Goebbels quote.*







AUSTERLITZ said:


> Germany was one of biggest industrialized nations so yes obviously there would be lot of workers and communism would be popular there.Also Marx and Engles were germans.Communism originated as an idea in germany.



This has nothing to do with what we're discussing.



AUSTERLITZ said:


> All communist rebellions happened after end of WW1 when germany already defeated,how did they sabotage german effort after war was already over?



Coming to the issue about Communist strikes and sabotage, *are you suggesting that the Communists were sitting idle during the war?? *

*"*Strikes erupted in Vienna and Budapest, set off not only by hunger but by Germany's failure to make peace with the new *Bolshevik government in Russia.* *They spread to Germany itself, which had been under virtual military dictatorship for several months, and on Monday, January 28, 1918, workers throughout Germany went out on strike.* Peace was their main demand but they also insisted on workers' representation in negotiations with the Allies, increased food rations, the abolition of martial law, and a democratic government throughout Germany. In Munich, another insurrection broke out. *It was led by Kurt Eisner, a small elderly Jew* wearing a black floppy hat which, large as it was, couldn't contain a shock of wild hair. Epically untidy, he was a living cartoon of the bomb-throwing Red. *He had already spent almost nine months in prison for his wartime strike activities. In Friedrichshafen workers at the Zeppelin plant formed a council. The factory workers in the Stuttgart area, including the vast Daimler motor works, struck and, led by socialists with views similar to Eisner's, made similar demands. Government after government throughout Germany collapsed as workers' and soldiers' councils took control"* - Adolf Hitler: The Definitive Biography



AUSTERLITZ said:


> As for many communist leaders being jews,a communist doesn't believe in god in the first place.


Can you prove that the Leaders of the Communist Revolts in Germany disowned their own Jewish faith?? *Please provide valid sources (Links) and not drivel.* Thanks.



AUSTERLITZ said:


> Give proof of jewish sabotage of german war effort to help britain for homeland in palestine during ww1....



Funny, someone's who posting fabricated quotes is asking for proof. *Could you prove your falsified Hitler & Goebbels quotes with actual sources (Links) and not drivel?? *That would be appreciated.

Nonetheless, powerful Jewish financiers using their influence to assist Britain in her war against Germany in exchange for Palestine:

*"*Malcolm's belief in the Balfour Declaration as a means of bringing the United States into the war *was confirmed by Samuel Landman, secretary to the Zionist leaders Weizmann and Sokolow, and later secretary of the World Zionist Organization*. As

*" the only way (which proved so to be) to induce the American President to come into the war was to secure the cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo contract basis. Thus, as will be seen, the Zionists having carried out their part, and greatly helped to bring America in, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was but the public confirmation of the necessarily secret "gentlemens' " agreement of 1916*, made with the previous knowledge, acquiescence, and or approval of the Arabs, and of the British, and of the French and other Allied governments, and not merely a voluntary, altruistic and romantic gesture on the part of Great Britain as certain people either through pardonable ignorance assume or unpardonable ill-will would represent or rather misrepresent ...[188] *"*- _Great Britain, the Jews and Palestine_ (London, 1936), pp. 4-5, New Zionist Press.

Behind the Balfour Declaration





AUSTERLITZ said:


> Communist rebellions were crushed by german govt in 1919 itself.


So Communist revolutions were crushed within Germany in 1919, *did that prevent the Soviet Union from invading Poland in 1920 in a Westward drive towards a disarmed Germany??* Of course not.

*Soviet Invasion of Poland,1920-Wikipedia*





AUSTERLITZ said:


> Did hitler rearm to defend germany?What did he with his army once he had re-armed?History is testament.Was Poland,czechoslovakia,denmark,norway,balkans,netherlands,belgium all planning to destroy germany?Don't be a blind apologist just because u like how badass the waffen-ss and their black uniforms were.



Nothing to do with my personal interest in the National Socialist era.* If i were blind like you i too would be posting falsified quotes without any proper research on my part.*

Regarding Hitler's invasions of the countries you mentioned, i could easily tear apart your argument, though my post would become too long to read.



AUSTERLITZ said:


> As for aggressions,ur perfectly right both parties here were imperialists -anglo-french colonial imperialists.Churchill was an arch-imperialist.But despite the oppression,they didn't systematically single out whole peoples like this methodically exterminating them in concentration camps and slave labour.Anglo-french-soviets weren't saints ,but hitler was certainly not a good guy,he was much worse than the rest.


If you believe that the British never employed slave labor and deliberate mass extermination then you really have no clue of history. And don't get me started on the Soviets.

*“Indians are the beastliest people in the world next to the Germans"- Winston Churchill*

The Greatest Briton: Essays on Winston Churchill's Life and Political Philosophy - Jeremy Havardi - Google Books

How Churchill Starved To Death 4 Million Indians and Got Away With It

India's Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat - Devendra Panigrahi - Google Books

The Bengal Famine of 1943, how 4 million Indians perished





Can one also label early America's "Manifest Destiny" as a quest for _Lebensraum_ and imperialism?? Without achieving this goal America would not have become the power that it is today.





AUSTERLITZ said:


> Now this topic is not for discussing ideologies,just the campaign..so plz if u answer start a new topic.



I wasn't discussing ideologies. I noticed that fake quote you posted and decided to point that out lest people buy into that lie since more than half of the so called "Think Tanks" on this forum don't do their own research.


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## AUSTERLITZ

Desert Fox said:


> Don't try to play smart now. You were the one who posted a fake quote in the OP without even doing proper research.
> 
> That's not what you were trying to convey earlier through this fake quote, perhaps you should have clarified yourself before propagating this historical fallacy:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *And neither did you provide a source for that (fake) Goebbels quote.*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This has nothing to do with what we're discussing.
> 
> 
> 
> Coming to the issue about Communist strikes and sabotage, *are you suggesting that the Communists were sitting idle during the war?? *
> 
> *"*Strikes erupted in Vienna and Budapest, set off not only by hunger but by Germany's failure to make peace with the new *Bolshevik government in Russia.* *They spread to Germany itself, which had been under virtual military dictatorship for several months, and on Monday, January 28, 1918, workers throughout Germany went out on strike.* Peace was their main demand but they also insisted on workers' representation in negotiations with the Allies, increased food rations, the abolition of martial law, and a democratic government throughout Germany. In Munich, another insurrection broke out. *It was led by Kurt Eisner, a small elderly Jew* wearing a black floppy hat which, large as it was, couldn't contain a shock of wild hair. Epically untidy, he was a living cartoon of the bomb-throwing Red. *He had already spent almost nine months in prison for his wartime strike activities. In Friedrichshafen workers at the Zeppelin plant formed a council. The factory workers in the Stuttgart area, including the vast Daimler motor works, struck and, led by socialists with views similar to Eisner's, made similar demands. Government after government throughout Germany collapsed as workers' and soldiers' councils took control"* - Adolf Hitler: The Definitive Biography
> 
> 
> Can you prove that the Leaders of the Communist Revolts in Germany disowned their own Jewish faith?? *Please provide valid sources (Links) and not drivel.* Thanks.
> 
> 
> 
> Funny, someone's who posting fabricated quotes is asking for proof. *Could you prove your falsified Hitler & Goebbels quotes with actual sources (Links) and not drivel?? *That would be appreciated.
> 
> Nonetheless, powerful Jewish financiers using their influence to assist Britain in her war against Germany in exchange for Palestine:
> 
> *"*Malcolm's belief in the Balfour Declaration as a means of bringing the United States into the war *was confirmed by Samuel Landman, secretary to the Zionist leaders Weizmann and Sokolow, and later secretary of the World Zionist Organization*. As
> 
> *" the only way (which proved so to be) to induce the American President to come into the war was to secure the cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo contract basis. Thus, as will be seen, the Zionists having carried out their part, and greatly helped to bring America in, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was but the public confirmation of the necessarily secret "gentlemens' " agreement of 1916*, made with the previous knowledge, acquiescence, and or approval of the Arabs, and of the British, and of the French and other Allied governments, and not merely a voluntary, altruistic and romantic gesture on the part of Great Britain as certain people either through pardonable ignorance assume or unpardonable ill-will would represent or rather misrepresent ...[188] *"*- _Great Britain, the Jews and Palestine_ (London, 1936), pp. 4-5, New Zionist Press.
> 
> Behind the Balfour Declaration
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So Communist revolutions were crushed within Germany in 1919, *did that prevent the Soviet Union from invading Poland in 1920 in a Westward drive towards a disarmed Germany??* Of course not.
> 
> *Soviet Invasion of Poland,1920-Wikipedia*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Nothing to do with my personal interest in the National Socialist era.* If i were blind like you i too would be posting falsified quotes without any proper research on my part.*
> 
> Regarding Hitler's invasions of the countries you mentioned, i could easily tear apart your argument, though my post would become too long to read.
> 
> 
> If you believe that the British never employed slave labor and deliberate mass extermination then you really have no clue of history. And don't get me started on the Soviets.
> 
> *“Indians are the beastliest people in the world next to the Germans"- Winston Churchill*
> 
> The Greatest Briton: Essays on Winston Churchill's Life and Political Philosophy - Jeremy Havardi - Google Books
> 
> How Churchill Starved To Death 4 Million Indians and Got Away With It
> 
> India's Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat - Devendra Panigrahi - Google Books
> 
> The Bengal Famine of 1943, how 4 million Indians perished
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Can one also label early America's "Manifest Destiny" as a quest for _Lebensraum_ and imperialism?? Without achieving this goal America would not have become the power that it is today.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I wasn't discussing ideologies. I noticed that fake quote you posted and decided to point that out lest people buy into that lie since more than half of the so called "Think Tanks" on this forum don't do their own research.



New thread,plz.Can't u stop ruining the thread?If u want an answer start there.

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## Desert Fox

My post wasn't off topic when it was concerning the fallacies you so proudly posted in the OP.


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## AUSTERLITZ

*ROAD TO WAR:1936-1939 *



*AGE OF DICTATORS -WORLD IN TURMOIL* :

The era between the 2 world wars is characterized by *ideological polarization,radicalization and the need for a 'strongman' *personified by the* rise of dictators in europe and beyond*.Hitler in Germany,Franco in Spain,mussolini in Italy,Stalin in Russia, Tojo in Japan,Chiang Kai shek/Mao Zedong in China.We have already seen the rise of hitler in germany.

*SPAIN:CIVIL WAR*

After 7 years of Spanish dictatorship under General Miguel Primo de Rivera, the Spanish people, as directed by King Alfonso XIII, went to the *polls to determine their political future*. A majority of their votes went to the various Republican (anti-monarchist) parties. The King, accepted the verdict and went into exile. A Republic was created, secular-socialist in character -- much to the great displeasure of those of Spanish society who remained fervently monarchist and Catholic. This latter group was known collectively as the Fascists. The most radical of this latter group were the Falangists, headed by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the son of the former dictator. Like the Fascists of Italy, they were a uniformed paramilitary organization, with a reputation as "toughs."
The elections of 1936 brought in a "Popular Front" government made up of parties of the Left -- including the Communists (who, under the direction of Stalin, were cooperating with the other leftist and centrist secular parties across Europe.) Immediately political conditions in Spain deteriorated -- with on-going street battles running between the Falangists and the equally tough Republican police, the Asaltos. Terror and assassinations became increasingly the order of the day for Spanish politics.



When, in July of 1936, the Asaltos murdered a prominent Fascist politician, all hell broke loose. Soldiers in Morocco loyal to the monarchy, "Nationalists" as they called themselves, revolted against the Republican government in Madrid. This was the signal in Spain itself for the Catholic monarchists in the *military to rise up in revolt against the Republican government* -- in accordance with a plan carefully worked out beforehand by a young general, *Francisco Franco Bahamonde.*

Seeing a fellow Popular Front Government in Spain under threat by Rightist forces, Leon Blum's Leftist Popular Front government in France quickly sent 30 French planes and pilots to help the Republican government crush the rebels. But in turn, *Franco called upon the Nazis of Germany and the Fascists of Italy to come to the aid of the Nationalists' cause*. By the end of July German and Italian planes were arriving in Morocco to assist Franco in his revolt against the Republican government of Spain. Thus the Spanish civil became from the very outset *an international issue.*

The Spanish civil war turns into a test struggle between “Democracy” and “Fascism”: one side (Germany and Italy) supporting Franco’s traditionalist Fascism (winners); the other side (England, France, Russia) supporting industrial Republicanism (losers).With large scale backing from the german and Italians compared to the lukewarm support from england and france, *Franco emerged victorious.*Crucially the *germans had an oppurtunity to test their new tactics and equipment*-particularly tanks and aircraft during this conflict.(eg.Condor Legion).

*MUSSOLINI'S ITALY:*



In March 1919, *Mussolini formed the Fascist Party, galvanising the support of many unemployed war veterans*. He organised them into armed squads known as _Black Shirts_, who terrorised their political opponents. In 1921, the Fascist Party was invited to join the coalition government.
By October 1922, Italy seemed to be slipping into political chaos. The Black Shirts marched on Rome and Mussolini presented himself as the only man capable of restoring order. King Victor Emmanuel invited Mussolini to form a government. *Mussolini gradually dismantled the institutions of democratic government and in 1925 made himself dictator*, taking the title _'Il Duce'_. He set about *attempting to re-establish Italy as a great European power*. The regime was held together by strong state control and Mussolini's cult of personality.(Excellent orator)
Italy was* industrially weak and lacked any modern military tradition*,but mussolini dreamed of recreating the roman empire making italy again the mistress of the mediterranean.In order to hide his economic weakness at home,*Mussolini launched the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.The helpless League of Nations and the western powers merely protested vocally.*

*



*​
*Birth of the Axis - *Mussolini was initially an opponent of hitler and had allied with france against germany to protect austria in 1935.However things changed after italy's invasion of ethiopia.The League's clumsy handling of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (angering Italy for the League's condemnation, but doing little to actually stop Italy) ,The Italian annexation of Abyssinia had *strained relations between Italy and its allies Britain and France*, and Benito Mussolini finally repudiated Italy's alliance with them. Hitler then began planning to draw fascist Italy into an alliance with Nazi Germany.
The Spanish civil war provided the opportunity. In July 1936, Fascist rebels led by General Franco took up arms against the Spanish government, and *Mussolini intervened in support of the rebels *with troops, aeroplanes and arms. As a demonstration of solidarity with Fascist Italy, Hitler also intervened in the Spanish civil war on the side of the Fascist rebels.Hitler followed up his intervention in the Spanish civil war with a warm invitation to the Italian foreign minister to come to Berlin, where on *21 October 1936, Germany and Italy signed a formal alliance which came to be known as the Rome-Berlin Axis*. This alliance contained a protocol committing Germany and Italy to follow a common foreign policy.

Italy and Germany signed a treaty of friendship on October 25, 1936. Mussolini commented that the two countries had created *a Rome-Berlin axis around which all European nations would eventually revolve. Thus the term 'Axis Powers' came into usage.*
The *Anti-Comintern Pact*, entered into by Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936 -- was directed against Communist expansion fostered by Soviet Russia (promising mutual isolation of Russia -- and recognizing Japan's dominion over Manchukuo). On November 6, 1937 Italy joined the Pact.

*JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN ASIA *:




Having lost their traditional status in the Meiji Restoration, the samurai or warrior caste and their descendants resented deeply the intrusion of Western ways – and found various ways to support hyper-nationalist causes in Japan and abroad. They naturally made their way into the *new Japanese army where they became voices supporting the same militaristic ideals *(_bushido_) – which during the 1920s had many traits in common with the rising Fascist spirit within Europe. Central to their political philosophy was State Shinto, with emperor-worship at the heart of this philosophy/religion. Opposed to these bushido militarists were the Japanese who felt deeply that Japan’s future was best assured by adopting the ‘democratic’ and ‘capitalist’ ways of the West. This split reached deep into Japanese society – even within the officer class of the Japanese military.
Although Japan was recognized by the new League of Nations as one of the world’s handful of major powers, efforts by the Japanese representatives in 1920 to get the League to *include a declaration of racial equality into the League Charter failed to get the League’s support, humiliating the Japanese.*

When the *Great Depression hit at the beginning of the 1930s both the image of Western economic superiority and the status of pro-West politicians weakened considerably.* The militarists’ claims of ‘corruption’ and ‘incompetency’ widespread within the ranks of the pro-West group, and their boast that the militarist ways were cleaner, more disciplined, and thus more effective than Western ways, began to seem highly plausible to an increasingly nationalistic Japanese population. When in late 1930 there occurred an attempted assassination of the Japanese Prime Minister by a hyper-nationalist for having agreed to the latest of the international naval limitations agreements (the Japanese were once again allowed slightly smaller numbers of warships than were Britain and America) the *militarists were ready for open defiance of their civilian government. *

*Japanese aggression in Manchuria*

By this time elements of the *Japanese military were ready to move on the basis of their own political agenda *– despite the views of their ‘civilian’ government. In 1931 a small incident (a feeble explosion on some railroad tracks), probably set up by Japanese troops themselves, was used as an excuse by them to *invade the whole of the Chinese province of Manchuri*a – ‘justified’ because this demonstrated how unable the Chinese were to guarantee the safety of Japanese interests in Manchuria. Once in full control of this province, the Japanese *converted Manchuria into a puppet state of ‘Manchukuo’ *– an action which was immediately contested by the Chinese who took their case to the League of Nations. When in 1933 the League officially refused to recognize the state of Manchukuo and demanded the withdrawal of Japan from the conquered territory, *Japan simply resigned from the League.* Subsequently nothing more than moral condemnation was forthcoming from the League – and the Japanese held onto their conquered Chinese territory.
I*mperial Japan extended the conflict into a brutal invasion of central china after the marco polo bridge incident in 1937*.The chinese nationalists under chiang kai shek and communists under Mao fell back as the japanese army made steady inroads.USA was alarmed by growth in japanese power.As a result, the *United States sought to bring the Japanese war effort to a halt by imposing an embargo on all trade* between the United States and Japan. Japan was dependent on the United States for 80 percent of its Petroleum, and as a consequence the embargo resulted in an economic and military crisis for Japan, as Japan could not continue its war effort against China without access to petroleum.In order to maintain its military campaign in China with the major loss of petroleum trade with the United States,* Japan saw the best means to secure an alternative source of petroleum in the petroleum-rich and natural-resources-rich S-E asia.*
The Japanese government justified its actions by *claiming that it was seeking to unite East Asia under Japanese leadership in a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere that would free East Asians from domination and rule by clients of Western imperialism J*apan invoked themes of Pan-asianism and said that the Asian people needed to be free from Western influence




*Japan itself feared the massive communist soviet colossus to its north*.Interest in Germany and Japan in forming an alliance began when Japanese diplomat Hiroshi visited Ribbentrop,german foreign minister in Berlin in 1935. Oshima informed von Ribbentrop of Japan's interest in forming a German-Japanese alliance against the Soviet Union. Von Ribbentrop expanded on Oshima's proposal by advocating that the alliance be based in a political context of a pact to oppose the comintern.The proposed pact was met with mixed reviews in Japan, with a faction of ultra-nationalists within the government supporting the pact while the Japanese Navy and the Japanese Foreign Ministry were staunchly opposed to the pact.*Eventually the hardliners won out in Japan,In germany Hitler ended the sino-german economic co-operation because he recognized that Japan,a superior military power than china would be a more valuable ally*.The Anti-comintern Pact aimed at communist russia was born.Italy joined the pact in 1937.Eventually the 3 axis powers would sign the Tripartite Pact in 1940.The "Axis powers" formally took the name after the Tripartite Pact was signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan on 27 September 1940, in Berlin. The pact was subsequently joined by Hungary (20 November 1940), Romania (23 November 1940), Slovakia (24 November 1940), and Bulgaria (1 March 1941).

*STALIN'S RUSSIA:*



Stalin *carefully orchestrated his rise to power* in the communist party after Lenin's death,eliminating his opponents first subtly and then through* massive brutal purges until he had become all powerful embodiment of the state*.His *Collectivization of agriculture programme caused huge suffering amongst the russian peasantry but the five year plans led to rapid industrialization of the soviet union* which would aid its survival in the second world war.Stalin's reign embodied the 'cult of personality'.
Fears of communism and world revolution had made Soviet russia a pariah state in the international scene.The rise of Hitler alarmed stalin who attempted to reach an agreement with the anglo-french to contain the nazis.This *failed in the face of policy of 'appeasement' at Munich*(where soviet russia was given no representatives) leading to the dismembering of czechoslovakia.The oppurtunistic Stalin,*distrusting further western overtures then made a deal with hitler* leading to the *Non-aggression pact and the partition of poland*(1939),increasing soviet strategic depth,gaining territory(poland and baltic states) and intending to let the anglo-british and germans slaughter each other in the western front like in the first world war.

*NEXT:GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT AND TERRITORIAL AGGRESSION*

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## vostok

In my opinion, it should be mentioned that in those days (pre-War) in Central and Eastern Europe was only one democratic state - Czechoslovakia. All the others were dictatorships.

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## AUSTERLITZ

*ROAD TO WAR -PART II*




​*GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT :*

Hitler came to power on a promise to tear up the versailles treaty and re-arm germany.This henceforth from 1933 became the top priority for the Nazi government.The *architect of german re-armament was Hjalmar Schacht*.Germany was virtually prostrate in the early part of 1933; she was faced with dwindling revenues from taxation and seemingly unable to raise money either through external or internal loans. *Hitler entrusted to Schacht the task of wringing from the depressed German economy the tremendous material requirements of armed aggression, and endowed him with vast powers over every sector of German industry, commerce, and finance to carry out that task*.Schacht would oversee an incredible turnaround and come to be known as_ 'The wizard of the economy'._Germany rearmed covertly from 1933 and openly from 1936 onwards.

Schacht's achievements maybe categorized into 4 headings-

*(a)Armaments Financing* - Initially schacht was presented by a 2 -prong problem.To finance the re-armament he had to secure funds over and above the levels possible through Taxation and Public Loans.However *he also had to do this in a way to conceal the scale of the re-armament *at least in its early stages from the allied powers.Schacht's answer to the problem was the_ "mefo" bills_.
Transactions in "mefo" bills worked as follows: "mefo" bills *were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by a limited liability company* called the_ Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft, m.b.H_. (MEFO). This company was merely a dummy organization; it had a nominal capital of only one million Reichsmarks. "Mefo" bills ran for six months, but provision was made for extensions running consecutively for three months each. The drawer could present his "mefo" bills to any German bank for discount at any time, and these banks, in turn, could rediscount the bills at the Reichsbank at any time within the last three months of their earliest maturity. *The amount of "mefo" bills outstanding was a guarded state secret* .The "mefo" bill system continued to be used *until 1 April 1938, when 12 billion Reichsmarks of "mefo" bills were outstanding*. This method of financing enabled the Reich to obtain credit from the Reichsbank which, under existing statutes, it could not directly have obtained. Direct lending to the Government by the Reichsbank had been limited by statute to 100 million Reichsmarks . Schacht has conceded that his "mefo" bill device "_enabled the Reichsbank to lend by a subterfuge to the Government what it normally or legally could not do"_

In his efforts to draw upon every possible source of funds for the rearmament program, Schacht even *used the blocked funds of foreigners deposits in the Reichsbank.*

Funds for rearmament were likewise *derived from taxation and an increase in public debt* -- channels through which part of national income is ordinarily diverted to public authorities. But what distinguished the program of public indebtedness was the fact that the German capital market was completely harnessed to the expanding needs of the Nazi war machine. By a *series of controls, they reduced to the minimum consistent with their rearmament program, all private issues which might have competed with Government issues for the limited funds in the capital market*. Thus, the capital market was, in effect, pre-empted for Government issues.During the period from 31 December /1932 to 30 June 1938, the funded debt of the Reich rose from 10.4 billion Marks to 19 billion Marks.

_




(The Banker -Schacht had the highest IQ of the nazi leadership -143)_​_
(b)*The New Plan *_- Grandiose armament plans obviously *required huge quantities of raw materials*. Schacht was a proponent of the view that as much of the requisite raw materials as possible should be produced within Germany. At the same time, however, he recognized that large imports of raw materials were indispensable to the success of the conspirators' gigantic armament program. To that end, *he fashioned an intricate system of controls and device*s which he called the _"New Plan._
There were three main features of the _"New Plan"_ as devised by Schacht: (1) *restriction of the demand for such foreign exchange as would be used for purposes unrelated to therearmament program*; (2) increase of the supply of foreign exchange, as a means of paying for essential imports which could not otherwise be acquired; and (3) *clearing agreements and other devices* obviating the need for foreign exchange. Under the "New Plan", economic transactions between Germany and the outside world were no longer governed by the autonomous price mechanism; they were determined by a number of Government agencies whose primary aim was to satisfy the needs of the military economy.

(1)Schacht accomplished the  task of restricting the demand for foreign exchange by various measures suspending the service on Germany's foreign indebtedness, by freezing other claims of foreigners on Germany, by a stringent system of export controls and by eliminating foreign travel and other unessential foreign expenditures.

(2)To increase supply of foreign exchange Schacht *repeatedly requisitioned all existing foreign ex. change reserves of German residents*, required all foreign exchange arising out of current exports and other transactions to be sold to the Reichsbank, and by developing new export markets. Exports were encouraged by direct subsidies and by accepting partial payment in German foreign bonds or in restricted Marks which could be acquired by foreign importers at a substantial discount.

(3)A vast network of organizations was erected to effectuate these various measures. These agencies, which were under Schacht's control as Minister of Economics, *decided whether given imports and exports were desirable; whether the quantities, prices, credit terms, and countries involved were satisfactory; and in short, whether any particular transaction advanced the armament program.*




The principle of the clearing system is as follows: The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country. The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus, if trade between two countries is unequal, the clearing agency of one acquires a claim against the agency of the other. That claim, however, is satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an offsetting claim.
This device was used by *Schacht as a means of exploiting Germany's position as Europe's largest consumer in order to acquire essential raw materials from countries which, because of the world wide economic depression, were dependent upon the German market as an outlet for their surplus products*. Speaking of his system of obtaining materials abroad without the use of foreign exchange, Schacht has stated:
_

"It has been shown that, in contrast to everything which classical national economy has hitherto taught, not the producer but the consumer is the ruling factor in economic life. And this thesis is somewhat connected with general social and political observations, because it establishes the fact that the number of consumers is considerably larger than the number of producers, a fact which exercises a not inconsiderable social and political pressure."_

Schacht's clearing agreements were particularly effective in Southeastern Europe, where agricultural exports had been considerably curtailed by competition from the more extensive and efficient overseas agriculture. The success of Schacht's ruthless use of Germany's bargaining position is indicated by the fact that by August 1937, there had been imported into Germany approximately one half billion Reichsmarks of goods in excess of the amount delivered under the clearing arrangements.Thus, through this device, *Schacht was able to extract huge loans from foreign countries which Germany could not have obtained through ordinary channels.*

*



*
(Aided by schacht's economic miracle,the nazi social measures succeeded in reducing unemployment through various measures)​
*Aski Accounts* - In addition to the clearing agreements, Schacht devised the system which came to be known as the "aski" accounts. This scheme likewise obviated the need for free currency (i.e. Reichsmarks freely convertible into foreign currency at the official rate-U. S. dollars, pounds sterling, etc). The system worked as follows: The German foreign exchange control administration would authorize imports of goods in specified quantities and categories on the condition that the foreign sellers agreed to accept -payment in the form of Mark credits to accounts of a special type held in German banks. These accounts were called "aski", an abbreviation of _Auslander Sonderkonten fuer Inlandszahlungen_ (foreigners' special accounts for inland payments). The so-called "aski" Marks in such an account *could be used to purchase German goods only for export to the country of the holder of the account; they could not be converted into foreign currency at the official rates of exchange*. Each group of "aski" accounts formed a separate _"island of exchange"_ in which the German authorities, under Schacht's leadership, could apply their control as the country's bargaining position in each case seemed to warrant.

Schacht himself boasted of his tremendous success.
_"The success of the New Plan can be proved by means of a few figures. Calculated according to quantity, the import of finished products was throttled by 63 percent between 1934 and 1937. On the other hand, the import of ores was increased by 132 percent, of petroleum by 116, of grain by 12 and of rubber by 71 percent."_

_*(c)Production Controls *_- As an additional means of assuring that the military needs would be met, Schacht *adopted a host of controls over the productive mechanism of Germany, extending, inter alia, to the allocation of raw materials, regulation of productive capacity, use of abundant or synthetic substitutes in place of declining stocks of urgently needed materials, and the erection of new capacity for the production of essential commodities.*The plan to allocate raw materials was carried out through myriad "orders to produce" specifying that certain commodities must or must not be produced; "orders to process or use" prescribing the type and quantity of raw material which could or could not be used in the production of a given commodity; orders specifying that scarce raw materials could be used only as admixtures with more plentiful but inferior products; and other like measures.

*Schacht dominated german economic policy until 1938 and made possible for hitler to **complete germany's rapid re-armament. *

*FRANCE* *BETWEEN WORLD WARS*_ -_* POLITICAL PARALYSIS*




*Post-world war I france was deeply scarred*,it had taken the highest manpower losses of all and a whole generation of young men had been wiped out.The french were haunted by another war of attrition with germany in the future and to safeguard against this policy constructed the impregnable Maginot line fortifications stretching from the swiss border to the ardennes forest-this modern construction wonder ate up bulk of the funds of the defence ministry and reduced an already small budget(due to peace) ,especially the french were badly lagging in anti tank and anti aircraft weaponry and aircraft production.Unlike the germans who started from scratch the french were burdened with weaponry left over from the great war.

To compound all this in the *30s france found herself amidst a severe political crisis,with a series of coalition governments forming and dissolving and unable to agree on anything or of forming a coherent policy.*
In February of 1934 the growing antagonisms between the political Left and the political Right, greatly exacerbated by the Stavisky investment fraud which implicated many Leftist cabinet members, erupted in *Paris riots* which many thought was the prelude to an attempt at a right-wing political coup. Order was restored to France. However, Left-wing suspicions of on-going Fascist plots, and similar suspicions by the Right of Communist plots to take over France, *split the country into deeply hostile political groupings.*

Besides the Left-Right deadlock over the basic political path the country should take, the evolution of the larger world of European politics, especially during the 1930s, made French national politics even more complex. *The French could not decide which rising power to the East, Nazi Germany or Communist Russia, posed the greater danger to Western, or at least French, civilization. Along with this went wide disagreement *on how to respond to Mussolini in Ethiopia and the civil war raging in Spain (1936-1939).

France really was not able to get its act together at a time that it was supposed to be one of the two major enforcers of the Post-World-War-One international status quo (the other being England). *France's late response to german re-armament owing to political chaos and paralysis at home aided hitler in his territorial aggression* and was a major factor behind the 'Appeasement' policy.

*BRITAIN* : *WEAKNESS AND APPEASEMENT*_ 
_



*Stanley Baldwin*​
The british empire on a map had expanded to its greatest extent after ww1.However internally the *british empire was facing huge problems*,the great war had* annihilated a generation of its manhood*,the Royal Navy was no longer the undisputed mistress of the world's seas -being increasingly superseded by the USN in the atlantic and the Japanese Navy in the pacific .Most of all the *economic base of the empire had been undermined.Britain faced enormous national and external debt* and a long road to recovery.Meanwhile all over the british empire,particularly india and the middle east -the *rising tide of nationalism was creating unrest.*

*Baldwin,leader of the conservative party dominated English politics* during much of the inter-war period. 
Baldwin's governance was characterized by a policy of_ peace-at-any-cost_. He understood that the English did not want ever to go to war again; that they expected him to keep them from diplomatic entanglements and any military build-up, viewed at that time as largely responsible for the 'Great War' of 1914-1918; and that his first priority as England's leader was to get England back on sound economic ground. Thus* he cut back tremendously on England's military spending and strength* - at a time that Germany was rebuilding its military power.
He and Winston Churchill were constantly at odds over this issue of England's pacifism in the face of German remilitarization. Baldwin viewed Churchill as a war-monger who wanted to drag England into an arms race and thus another war with Germany. Churchill viewed Baldwin as one who invited German military adventurism by the obvious lack of English resolve to stop Hitler before he became so strong that there would be no way to block his military ambitions
Basically Baldwin was working out of the spirit of the moment, of the times he lived in. Churchill was working out of a longer sense of British history - and its long-standing role as balancer of power on the European continent 




Chamberlain became English Prime Minister in May of 1937 after Stanley Baldwin stepped down.
Whereas Baldwin was a pacifist, Chamberlain was actually rather pro-German. As the 1930s developed, it appeared that Europe was facing a choice of which of the two growing military powers to the East, Communist Russia or Nazi Germany, was the greater threat to European peace. *Chamberlain took the view that it was the Russian Communists that posed the greater danger, and a policy of 'appeasing' Germany's Hitler (and Italy's Mussolini) would bind the nations of West and Central Europe into a broad anti-Communist / anti-Russian front.*

But the logic of his appeasement policy soon developed a life of its own - especially as Churchill continued to challenge Chamberlain concerning the grave Nazi danger (Churchill,an avid anti-Communist, took the view with Hitler's rise to power in Germany that the Nazi's were quickly becoming the greater threat to England's security). 

Promises that each of *Chamberlain's many concessions to Germany would be the last were constantly broke*n - with each retreat by Chamberlain rationalized as necessary steps in pacifying Hitler. Actually, each retreat only made the dictator more greedy for German expansion. Sadly, *Chamberlain talked himself into believing that what he was doing was protecting (rather than undermining) the peace of Europe.*
_
*NEXT:GERMAN TERRITORIAL AGGRESSION -RHINELAND 1936-POLAND 1939*_

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## AUSTERLITZ

vostok said:


> In my opinion, it should be mentioned that in those days (pre-War) in Central and Eastern Europe was only one democratic state - Czechoslovakia. All the others were dictatorships.



In a way,this is correct.France and england were not classic dictatorships.They were democratic at home,but imperialistic abroad.

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## AUSTERLITZ

*ROAD TO WAR-III*




​*GERMAN TERRITORIAL AGGRESSION:1936-1939*

*Re-Militarization Of the Rhineland 1936 *- With the re-armament programme well underway openly by late 1935 ,*Having exposed the weakness of the two great democracies on a matter of principle as important as German rearmament, Hitler decided to test further the resolve of Britain and France to stand up to him*. He had noted the failure of Britain and France to take firm action against Italy, their ally under the Locarno Pact of 1925, when the fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini, launched Italy's army against Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) in 1935. After Mussolini had bombed and gassed that country's poorly armed tribesmen into submission, he annexed Abyssinia as a province of Italy in 1936.Hitler observed with interest that relations between Britain, France and Italy had merely been strained by this outrage against a defenceless country. 
Feeling that he had correctly assessed the spinelessness of the British and French governments at this time, on 1 March 1936, *Hitler ordered German troops to re-enter the demilitarised Rhineland in a further breach of the Treaty of Versailles*. Only a token force of three German battalions actually entered the Rhineland, and they were under strict orders from their nervous generals to withdraw at once if the French responded to this breach of the treaty with military force.
The British were obliged under the Locarno Pact to provide France with military support in such a situation, but when asked by France for that support, the British government refused to honour its treaty obligation. Although entitled to resist entry of German troops to the demilitarised Rhineland with military force, and despite having thirty army divisions at the border in readiness to cross and disperse the three German battalions, the French under a weak coalition government lost their nerve in the absence of support from Britain. When Hitler cynically offered further assurances of peace, the British government seized on this offer as evidence of his good faith.




(German troops enter the Rhineland)​
*Hitler had gambled and won again*. The Nazi leader had shown that he could flout the Treaty of Versailles with impunity. His prestige and popularity soared in Germany, while France's allies in eastern Europe were forced to review the value of their alliances with her. If France had acted firmly in what would have been little more than a police action, and Britain had fulfilled its treaty obligations to France, the German troops would certainly have been instantly withdrawn, and Hitler's prestige would have been dealt a deadly blow from which it might never have recovered.

*Re-organization of the army* - By 1938 *hitler removed all obstacles in army high command to his plans*,Chief General Fritsch being indicted and forced to resign in a false homesexuality case and war minister blomberg by digging up dirt on his wife's past.Hitler now assumed the post of Chief of the Armed forces and set up a paralllel command structure to the traditional army command to concentrate even more powers unto himself.




(OKW command set up parallel to OKH ,reporting only to hitler)​
*Anschluss of Austria 1938 *- In Austria ,Schuschnigg took over the office of Chancellor after Dolfuss's assassination in an attempted nazi coup in July of 1934. In 1935 he was able to disband the Heimwehr, a paramilitary group similar to the Nazis, in an effort to get Austria settled down. 
In January of 1938 Hitler removed members of the German military who were opposed to a military takeover of Austria - and made himself supreme military commander of Germany.With opposition from Mussolini regarding austria(as in 1935)out of the picture by the Rome-Berlin Axis he felt free to move.The next month, February, Hitler invites Austrian Chancellor von Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden where he threatens disaster if the Chancellor does not place Nazis in his cabinet. In particular, *Hitler forced Schuschnigg to accept Arthur Syess-Inquart as Minister of the Interior *(in charge of the national police). This greatly crippled Schuschnigg's ability to control Nazi street agitators - who now increased their activity.
Meanwhile the international community was attempting to get some kind of lineup on this growing issue. Hitler let it be known to the English that if they wanted continuing good relations with Germany they were going to have to back down on their opposition to the idea of an "Anschluss" (absorption) of Austria under the "New Order." Prime Minister Chamberlain seemed unable to take a firm stand against Hitler - which finally brought the resignation of Anthony Eden, Britain's Foreign Minister, who was adamantly opposed to any further English "appeasement" of Hitler.





(German troops entering austria are cheered by viennese crowds)​
At first Schuschnigg seemed ready to back down before Hitler's pressures to literally turn Austria over to the Nazi party - but then announced a decision of a national plebiscite to let the Austrians themselves decide on this matter. But Hitler would not be outplayed. Two days before the scheduled plebiscite *he gave the Austrians an ultimatum demanding, among other things, the resignation of Schuschnigg*. This Schuschnigg did, stating as a cause his inability to rule in the face of such Nazi opposition both from Germany and from within the country.
At this point (March 12, 1938) *Seyss-Inquart took over as chancellor, "inviting" Germany into Austria to take over and "restore order" *(which his own Nazis were largely responsible for.) In fact, the Germans were already over the border into Austria even as the "invitation" was extended. And thus Hitler marches his troops into Austria, has Schuschnigg arrested and seizes control of the Austrian government. Hitler immediately headed for Austria, his homeland, where to his great delight crowds of Austrians came out to cheer him (many, of course stayed home). He was so delighted by the reception that he decided that instead of making Austria a satellite nation, he would simply incorporate it into Germany itself.
Meanwhile, the international reaction was tepid. England was upset, but did nothing-with churchill being the lone voice of dissent. France was paralysed by political chaos and dreaded war.

_*Sudetenland and Munich 1938: *_
_
"Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonour. They chose dishonour. They will have war."_- _Churchill_​
Having siezed Austria, Hitler now turned his attentions to Czechoslovakia, in particular to the* Sudetenland, the mountainous borderlands of Czechoslovakia where a large German-speaking population lived*, but also where all of Czechoslovakia’s national defenses (aimed at Germany) were located.Hitler seized upon a mounting protest by Germans living in the Sudetenland fabricating complaints about their terrible treatment and atrocities being committed upon them as a German minority by the Czech government.September – Sensing a looming catastrophe, British Prime Minister Chamberlain flew to Munich to meet with Hitler and other European leaders – to try to work out a 'peaceful' settlement to the growing 'crisis'.Ultimately Chamberlain signed an agreement in which *Hitler promised that he had no more territorial ambitions towards Czechoslovakia beyond the Sudetenland.and in which Chamberlain promised that he would lean on the Czech president Beneš to peacefully deliver the Sudetenland to Germany*.The czechs were not even consuslted,france in political turmoil refused to move without britain and declared itself unable to break germany's western border defences in time to aid czechoslovakia.
_
''How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel which has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war.'_' -Chamberlian on the Czech Crisis.​*
Chamberlain took the view that it was the Russian Communists that posed the greater danger, and a policy of 'appeasing' Germany's Hitler (and Italy's Mussolini) would bind the nations of West and Central Europe into a broad anti-Communist / anti-Russian front.*Chamberlain congratulated himself on this supposedly brilliant piece of statesmanship because he understood that through this agreement between Hitler and himself he had saved Europe from falling into another horrible shooting match and indeed had secured “peace in our time.”



_"My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is 'peace for our time'... Go home and get a nice quiet sleep."- Chamberlain Announces 'Peace in our time'_
​_*Czechoslovakia 1939 *_- 
_
"All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. We have passed an awful milestone in our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been derailed, and these terrible words have for the time being been pronounced against the Western democracies, 'Thou art weighed in the balance, and found wanting'."-Churchill,after Munich._​
The Munich Agreement *deprived Czechoslovakia of its strong mountain fortifications in the Sudeten districts *which were incorporated into Germany. The loss of its mountain fortifications left the unfortunate country unable to defend itself against Nazi military aggression.The greatly weakened Czechoslovak Republic was forced to grant major concessions to the non-Czechs.renamed Czecho-Slovakia and consisting of three parts: Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia, and Carpatho-Ukraine.*Hitler had no serious intentions of limiting to the Sudetenland his grab of Czechoslovak lands*.He scheduled a German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia for the morning of 15 March. In the interim, he negotiated with the Slovak People's Party and with Hungary to prepare the dismemberment of the republic before the invasion. On 13 March, he invited Slovak leader Tiso to Berlin and on 14 March, the Slovak Diet convened and unanimously declared Slovak independence. Carpatho-Ukraine also declared independence but Hungarian troops occupied it on 15 March and eastern Slovakia on 23 March.Hitler summoned Czech President Hácha to Berlin and during the early hours of 15 March, informed Hácha of the imminent German invasion. *Threatening a Luftwaffe attack on Prague, Hitler persuaded Hácha to order the capitulation of the Czechoslovak army. Hácha suffered a heart attack during the meeting*, and had to be kept awake by medical staff, eventually giving in and accepting Hitler's surrender terms on documents drafted by the nazi govt. Then on the morning of 15 March, G*erman troops entered Bohemia and Moravia, meeting practically no resistance*.On 16 March, Hitler went to Czechoslovakia and proclaimed the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.




No warm welcome - Shocked and angry Czechs look on as the Wehrmacht enters Prague.​
Even after the Germans had occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, Neville Chamberlain's initial response was to blame the Czechs for their misfortune. In the House of Commons, on 15 March 1939, he cynically excused Britain's neglect to honour its undertaking at Munich to protect what remained of Czechoslovakia on the ground that the declaration of independence by Slovakia nullified the Munich Agreement. To Chamberlain's surprise, the *British public and media reacted with outrage to his repudiation of Britain's obligation to Czechoslovakia.* Even more ominously, members of his own cabinet and party were turning against him on his policy of appeasing Hitler. Chamberlain realised that his position as Prime Minister was in jeopardy, and on 17 March 1939, he denounced publicly the complete occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany. He warned Hitler that Britain would not necessarily stand idly by if Germany undertook further aggression. It was only after this speech, that formal protests were lodged by the British and French governments with Germany. The Germans dismissed the protests contemptuously.
Despite a warning from the German ambassador in London that the British warning should be taken seriously, *Hitler now viewed the British and French with contempt*, and felt free to pursue further aggression in Europe.

_*'Who will die for Danzig'?*_

*Hitler next turned his attention to Poland,* and began to make demands on Polish territory which the Poles firmly rejected. Great Britain was finally alarmed, and after secret consultation with the Polish Foreign Minister, the *British government committed itself publicly on 31 March 1939 to the defence of Poland against aggression. *The commitment to Poland was a strange one from a country which had betrayed Czechoslovakia to the Nazis. Britain had no historic ties with Poland, located as it was on the eastern extremity of Europe. However, British public opinion had turned strongly against Neville Chamberlain over his betrayal of Czechoslovakia, and he was prepared to clutch at any means to restore his political image. This British commitment to Poland became a formal treaty on 25 August 1939.Two days earlier the Nazis had in a move of diplomatic daring and genius done the unthinkable -They had signed a non-aggression pact with their greatest Ideological enemy- The Soviet Union.
*



*​
*Molotov-Ribbentropp Non-aggression Pact 1939 -*
As distasteful as the idea was to him, Churchill in April of 1939 advised Parliament that the only hope Europe had at that point was the formation of some kind of alliance with Soviet Russia. To some extent this was in response to feelers put out by the Soviets - probably inspired by the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov who still held out hope for a working relationship with the English (and French).But Chamberlain was appalled at the idea - and did his best to head it off, even though it was beginning to make sense to more and more English, including Chamberlain's military advisors.* After Munich Stalin had concluded western guarantees as useless.*In early May Litvinov was relieved by Stalin of his duties as Foreign Minister.He was replaced by Vyacheslav *Molotov, someone who had come to the conclusion that some kind of arrangement with Hitler was Russia's only hope of security at this point.* The English and French were proving themselves to be rather worthless allies. Molotov felt that the time had come to deal directly with Hitler.
Much to the surprise of the world, on August 23rd a “non-aggression” pact between Germany and Russia was announced. What the world did not know was that as part of this pact Hitler and Stalin had secretly agreed on respective spheres of German and Russian control in Eastern Europe, and in particular had agreed to divide up a conquered Poland between them.
Stalin saw this act as creating something of additional land buffer between Russia and Germany. He hoped that this would satisfy Hitler’s land lust in the East and give Hitler the opportunity to turn his attentions to the West, to France (and even England). He was *hoping that this would lock Germany in a long, protracted war in the West that would take the German pressure off Russia for a very long time*. And if he were very lucky, the Germans, French and English would all destroy each other again, like they had in the First World War.




Hitler felt he had the one last concern, opposition from the Russians, removed. *There would now be no 2-front war* .Hitler was now ready to seize the German-Polish lands to the East that had been assigned to Poland in its re-establishment as a nation. These lands would be united to a Greater Germany Nothing, least of all Chamberlain’s idle threat of war, now stood in the way of Hitler.

_*Poland 1939*_ - 

The decision was quickly made: *Poland would be invaded on September 1st *by a huge array of German divebombers, tanks, and mobile troops. _Blitzkrieg_ was about to get underway.A false flag attack on a german border post was staged as an excuse as hitler unleashed the wehrmacht to smash poland for its refusal over danzig.To hitler's surprise,as soon as it learned of the Nazi dictator's invasion of Poland, the British government acted on its undertaking to defend Poland, and demanded that Hitler halt the attack on Poland and withdraw his troops. When Hitler failed to respond, the *British government declared war (along with france)on Germany on 3 September 1939*. *World war II had begun.*




​*NEXT:Blitzkreig in Poland, Sitzkreig(phoney war) in the west ,september 1939-may 1940.*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*BLITZKRIEG IN POLAND - SITZKRIEG IN THE WEST*





_Fall Weiss(Case White_)-Illustrating a Classic german_ Kesselschlacht _or Pincer Operation that would become the Wehrmacht's trademark.​
*FALL WEISS -POLAND SMASHED*

Hitler launched his powerful war machine against Poland on 1 September 1939. The Poles were taken completely by surprise when* one and a half million German troops poured across* their borders.*60 german divisions spearheaded by the new armoured and motorized formations quickly overwhelmed the half-mobilized 39 polish divisions.*The Polish air force was destroyed by the luftwaffe in the first week. Almost all Polish aircraft were destroyed on their airstrips before they could take off, and thereafter, German bombers were able to roam freely across Poland's undefended skies and strike with impunity at military and civilian targets.
With the collapse of the polish army,on *17th september the soviets attacked according to the secret provisions of the molotov ribbentrop pact* and occupied their part of poland.Poland was thus partitioned for the 4rth time in her history.
While this cynical move by stalin was denounced worldwide,a curious but prophetic remark was made by mussolini-

_''It is a good thing to make use of a small person to kill a large one,but a mistake to use a large one to liquidate a small one.'_'I am_''more than ever convinced that Hitler will regret the day he brought the russians into the heart of europe''_





(A triumphant Hitler in Warsaw)​
The* speed of the german conquest,radically different from the rate of daily progress in world war I *was noted - possibly an american reporter coined the term_ 'Blitzkreig' _or Lightning War and it stuck.On closer look however the operation was more of a traditional german _Vernichtungsgedanke*,*_which essentially means a battle of annihilation,by strategic double envelopment.The panzers acted as vanguard of the pincer wings and under the leadership of bold commanders like guderian exceeded all expectations.The conservative general staff had not as such set out to launch a blitzkrieg operation.Nowhere is this word used in german military manuals,nor were tanks given priority in armaments production.The *concept was still thus in progress and poland demonstrated its potential.*(Not going into details of polish campaign,as that will take a whole thread in itself)

Meanwhile what was happening in the western front?

*PHONEY WAR - SITZKRIEG* *IN THE WEST*

_''Here was the strongest army in the world [the French],facing no more than twenty-six [German] divisions, sitting still and sheltering behind steel and concrete while a quixotically valiant ally was being exterminated!”_- J.F.C.FULLER






Maurice Gamelin -The overcautious and indecisive C-in-C of the French Army.​
According to the Franco-Polish military convention, the french army was to start preparations for a major offensive three days after the beginning of mobilization. The French forces were to effectively gain control over the area between the French border and the German lines and were to probe the German defences. On the 15th day of the mobilisation (that is on 16 September), the French Army was to start a full-scale assault on Germany. The preemptive mobilisation was started in France on 26 August, and on 1 September full mobilisation was declared.A French offensive in the Rhine river valley area (Saar Offensive) started on 7 September, four days after France declared war on Germany. Since the* Wehrmacht was occupied in the attack on Poland, the French soldiers enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage along their border with Germany.* However, the French took no meaningful action to assist the Poles. Eleven French divisions advanced along a 32 km (20 miles) line near Saarbrucken against weak German opposition.The French Army had advanced to a depth of 8 km (5.0 miles) and captured about 20 villages evacuated by the German army, without any resistance. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, 7.8 km2 of heavily mined German territory.

_"If we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions." - 
Alfred Jodl,Chief of Staff OKW at Nuremberg_​
On 12 September, the Anglo French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville. It was *decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately as the French opted to fight a defensive war, forcing the Germans to come to them. *By then, the French divisions had advanced approximately 8 km into Germany on a 24-kilometre long strip of the frontier in the Saarland area.The following day, the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland, informed the Polish—that the major offensive on the western front planned for 17–20 September had to be postponed. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to withdraw to their barracks along the Maginot Line.

_





Franz Halder,Chief of Staff OKH_​_
''The success against Poland was only possible by almost completely baring our Western border. If the French had
seen the logic of the situation and had used the engagement of the German forces in Poland, they would have been able to cross the Rhine without our being able to prevent it and would have threatened the Ruhr area, which was the most decisive factor of the German conduct of the war.'' - Franz Halder,Chief of German General Staff(OKH)_

Meanwhile hitler took full advantage of the situation further encouraging allied passivity.
Hitler issued Directive No. 3 for the Conduct of the War, ordering arrangements to be made for Army and Air Force units to be sent from Poland to the west.But not to fight.
_”Even after the irresolute opening of hostilities by Great Britain . . . and France my express command,must be obtained in each of the following cases: Every time our ground forces [or] . . . one of our planes cross the western borders; [and] for every air attack on Britain''.(none of which happened)._

*Why did the french not attack despite overwhelming superiority?*
_''There were many reasons: the *defeatism in the French High Command, the government and the people;* the *memories of how France had been bled white* in the First World War and a* determination not to suffer such slaughter *again if it could be avoided; the realization by mid-September that the *Polish armies were so badly defeated *that the Germans would soon be able to move superior forces to the west and thus probably wipe out any initial French advances; the *fear of German superiority in arms and in the air*. Indeed, the French government had insisted from the start that the British Air Force should not bomb targets in Germany for fear of reprisal on French factories, though an all-out bombing of the Ruhr, the industrial heart of the Reich, might well have been disastrous to the Germans.'' - William Shirer,historian
_





Sitzkrieg - In defensive power the Maginot Line was far stronger than the Siegfried Line.​
Above all *Maginot philosophy,or the idea that the germans would be allowed to come to attack the huge maginot line fortifications *on the borders where the french could destroy them as pre planned,the creation of the maginot line had dominated french military budgets in the interwar period.Another factor was the lingering anti -communist sentiment,and many members of the french cabinet were of the view - _'Rather hitler than stalin'_.The negative popularity of the war was exemplified by divisions among political factions with many raising the slogan -_'Why die for Danzig?'_
In all the *french had yet not grasped the stakes of the contest,and the fact that they would be fighting for their survival as a sovereign state.*
Even as the German attack on Poland became imminent, the timid French generalissimo *Gamelin was telling his government, that he could not possibly mount a serious offensive ”in less than about two years *. . .in 1941-2” – assuming, he had added, that France by that time had the ”help of British troops and American equipment! ''

_''Operation in the West not yet clear. Some indications that there is no real intention of waging a war . . . French cabinet lacks heroic caliber. Also from Britain first hints of sobering reflection'' - Halder's Diary._​
Result was what was called the 'phoney war 'German force manned the Siegfried Line, their fortified defensive line along the French border. At the Maginot Line on the other side of the border, British and French troops stood facing them, but there were only some local skirmishes while in the air there were occasional dogfights between fighter planes. Each side dropped propaganda pamphlets by air,there was under a* period of uneasy calm that would last for the next seven months.*

Only at sea the battle of the Atlantic had begun.

*RUSSO-FINNISH WINTER WAR :*




A notable event during the Phoney War was the Winter War which started with the* USSR′s assault on Finland on 30 November 1939.*The Soviet Union sought principally to claim parts of Finnish territory, demanding—amongst other concessions—that Finland cede substantial border territories in exchange for land elsewhere, *claiming security reasons, primarily the protection of Leningrad, which was only 30 km (19 mi) from the Finnish border.*
At the beginning of the war, total victory over Finland was expected within a few weeks.
The Soviets possessed more than three times as many soldiers as the Finns, thirty times as many aircraft, and a hundred times as many tanks. The Red army however had just been *crippled by stalin's mass purges*,in the *swampy snow conditions the red army soldiers without adequate trainin*g or winter equipment were bamboozled and ambushed repeatedly by highly motivated Finnish troops well trained and equipped for such conditions riding in skis and armed with tommy guns(sub machine guns) and by snipers.There were no paved roads, and even gravel or dirt roads were scarce; most of the terrain consisted of trackless forests and swamps.

*Finland repelled Soviet attacks for several months*, much longer than the Soviets expected-*causing huge soviet losses by hit and run tactics.*Finns isolated smaller portions of numerically superior Soviet forces. With Soviet forces divided into smaller pieces, the Finns could deal with them individually and attack from all sides.just staying alive was an ordeal comparable to combat. The men were freezing and starving and endured poor sanitary conditions.

*Stalin was furious with the results of the first month of the Finnish campaig*n. The Red Army had been humiliated. By the third week of the war, Soviet propaganda was working hard to explain the failures of the Soviet army to the populace: blaming bad terrain and harsh climate, and falsely claiming that the Mannerheim Line was stronger than the Maginot Line and that the Americans had sent 1,000 of their best pilots to Finland. Chief of Staff Shaposhnikov was given full authority over operations in the Finnish theatre, and he ordered the suspension of frontal assaults in late December. Voroshilov was replaced with Timoshenko as the commander of the Soviet forces in the war on 7 January.





Finnish Sniper Simo Haya -'The White Death',with over 500 kills the most successful in history.​
*The soviet forces switched tactics.Avoiding the northern swamps 75% of the russian forces were concentrated to break through the mannerheim line by brute volume of firepower.*On 1 February, the rejuvenated Red Army began a massive offensive.Soviets began increasing bombardments, wearing down the defenders and softening their fortifications.
By mid-February, it became clear that the *Finnish forces were rapidly approaching exhaustion*. For the Soviets, casualties were high, the situation was a source of political embarrassment to the Soviet regime, and there was a risk of french-british expedition Furthermore, with the spring thaw approaching, the Soviet forces risked becoming bogged down in the forests.Both Germany and Sweden were keen to see an end to the Winter War. The Germans feared losing iron ore fields in northern Sweden and threatened to attack at once if the Swedes granted the Allied forces right of passage.On 9 March, the Finnish military situation on the Karelian Isthmus was dire as troops were experiencing heavy casualties. In addition, artillery ammunition supplies were exhausted and weapons were wearing out. The Finnish government, noting that the hoped-for Franco-British military expedition would not arrive in time, as Norway and Sweden had not given the Allies right of passage, *had little choice but to accept the Soviet terms.*
The finnish war was a debacle for the red army which lost over 325,000 for finnish losses of 70,000-but belatedly the USSR managed to secure its objectives.However the loss of territory during the finnish war was among the prime causes of finland's entry into the axis during barbarossa.

The Winter War had several important consequences.Public opinion, particularly in France and Britain, found it easy to side with Finland, and demanded from their governments effective action in support of the brave Finns against their much larger adversary, the Soviet Union.A proposed french-british expedition was eventually cancelled.It *further revealed the indecisiveness of the western allied council and led to collapse of the Daladier government in france.*

In germany ,the very poor performance of the Red Army encouraged Hitler to think that an attack on the Soviet Union would be successful.*He now viewed russian military capability with contempt*- a mistake that would cost him dear.

The* russians recognized the glaring flaws in the red army* and set in motion reforms.The Supreme Military Soviet command met in April 1940, reviewed the lessons of the Finnish campaign, and recommended reforms.The* role of frontline political commissars was reduced and old-fashioned ranks and forms of discipline were reintroduced*. Clothing, equipment, and tactics for winter operations were improved. However, not all of these reforms had been completed when the Germans began Operation barbarossa 15 months later.Failure of russian light tanks like the BT series *accelerated the development of heavier designs such as the t-34 and KV-1 *with far reaching consequences.

*NEXT : HITLER VS HIS GENERALS.PLANS FOR ATTACK IN THE WEST*

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## jhungary

Well, come upon this article while I am researching WW2 stuff as well. I can say this is one nice read but with one *MAJOR FLAW* only. That is

*Blitzkrieg existed as a term after 1939 but an actual Blitzkrieg battle have not fought until 1941 with the invasion of France.*

Most historian and military tactician alike agrees that Nazi Germany have been using convention divide and conquer method, couple with Manoeuver warfare to conquer Poland in a little more than a month.

Blitzkrieg, as a military tactics was defined to the use of concentration armoured or speed element to punch through the enemy defensive line, which consist of a 3 to 4 fold attacks using tanks, mechanical infantry, and air/ground supporting element.

What generally defined as a Modern Blitzkrieg attack is a use of concentrated armoured force and punch through the enemy, which will then create a gap and confusion to the enemy line and followed by the supporting mechanized infantry to exploit the gap. Often time then not, the use of mobile artillery and aerial bombardment are required for the armoured to make the initial push. Therefore creating a vacuum within the enemy defence and overwhelm the enemy using the supporting element.

When you look at the situation before and after the invasion of Poland in 1939. You will see first, the armoured spearhead is no where near the concentration that needed to mount a concentrated strike.







Immediate before German Invasion in 1939.

Of the Divisions deployed in the North/Western Border of Poland. 39 of those are infantry, and majority of those are not mechanized. Only 6 Armoured Division present in the whole region. Separated with 2 Armoured Divs Northwest (XIX Panzer Corps), 3 Divs West (XVI Panzer Corps) and 1 Div Southwest . This layout would require the Armoured to support the infantry for their engagement and most of the work are done with those 39 Infantry Divisions.

If you look at where the troop movement went during the campaign in the next map





Between Operation, 1- 14 September

What this map tell you is that the XIX corps were tasked to round the enemy back, and possibly a left hook to an overall double envelopment strategy, but when you look closer to the troop movement. There were not much follow up action by the infantry to take advantage of the armoured assault. It is as if the XIX corps are alone in this operation and with only XXI Corps and Wodrig XXVI corps in the vicinity.

While the middle part the XVI Corps were used as an supporting element to the envisioned set piece (Battle of Warsaw) and they neither broke through or exploit any enemy outside the Warsaw area.

To be able to qualify as a Blitzkrieg, the infantry must be the one that is supporting the armoured thrust and you cannot see any resemblance of this tactic with the invasion of Poland. The only thing that invasion of Poland and blitzkrieg have in common is that both ended quite quick in the end, but that was by no mean because of the German's Superior Armour, rather that was because of the polish troop inability to hold their ground.

There are A LOT of similarity between Invasion of Poland and the invasion of Iraq during the first gulf war. Both demonstrate the effectiveness of combine warfare and the ineffectiveness of enemy defences. 

The first Blitzkrieg commonly acknowledge within Military historian and by some tactician is the invasion of France and Holland in the 1940 and 1941. But most tactician would not agree, simply because, we think the German force cheated by using paratrooper to do infantry jobs. Paratrooper unlike infantry, have a series of restriction regarding of their deployment. What if the weather does not allow the deployment of paratrooper? Or what if the landscape hindered the paratrooper movement? Remember that is why and how Market Garden in the 1944 failed. So by using paratrooper to occupied the quick gain is a cheat......

Regardless, most tactician think that the very first example of an True Blitzkrieg is during the Russian Campaign. By then the Nazi's Armoured tactics are mature and they have enough force to mount a concentrated armoured strike into Russia, only to be beaten back by the tactical and strategic depth of the Soviet Army. Majority of the reason is either due to Hilter's own stupidity and the other half would contributed to the environment effect of Russian Winter.

Another good example of true blitzkrieg is the allied "Thunder Run" into Baghdad during the 2003 war. That is a classic playbook blitzkrieg tactics

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## SarthakGanguly

While you are correct that the Poland operation was NOT a blitzkrieg, invasion of France certainly was. Even in Poland the policy of Schwerpunkt was implemented correctly(though it was more of a deep operation on an Armeegruppe level), a Blitzkrieg beta if you say so. On the army level it was a deep operation, but on a local tactical level - each breakthrough was done with a lot of firepower hitting a small part of the front to break the line with all arms support. So locally the blitz was used in Poland as well, albeit not extensively. 

But the breakthrough in the Ardennes in May, 1940 and the dash of the armored spearheads towards the Channel with Stukas storming on its flanks was textbook Blitzkrieg. Also check the 8. Panzer's move ...comanded by Rommel....again textbook blitzkrieg.

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## jhungary

SarthakGanguly said:


> While you are correct that the Poland operation was NOT a blitzkrieg, invasion of France certainly was. Even in Poland the policy of Schwerpunkt was implemented correctly(though it was more of a deep operation on an Armeegruppe level), a Blitzkrieg beta if you say so. On the army level it was a deep operation, but on a local tactical level - each breakthrough was done with a lot of firepower hitting a small part of the front to break the line with all arms support. So locally the blitz was used in Poland as well, albeit not extensively.
> 
> But the breakthrough in the Ardennes in May, 1940 and the dash of the armored spearheads towards the Channel with Stukas storming on its flanks was textbook Blitzkrieg. Also check the 8. Panzer's move ...comanded by Rommel....again textbook blitzkrieg.


 
Agree and disagree.....

While you can say the invasion of Poland is sort of like a mini-blitzkrieg. But to classified as a true blitzkrieg, one army must be able to launch a Armour strike spearhead unsupported (Except for Air support) and using the supporting element to exploit and initial stun of the strike.

In most of the aforementioned situation you listed, there are a substantial infantry element going in with the armoured column mostly due to the German have not even close to mechanised their infantry during 1940 to 1941. If you use armoured attack and infantry together and you roll you tank further, that is not Blitzkrieg but rather a form of manoeuvre warfare - defeat in detail. You simply use you more mobile element to block their enemy supply route/escape route. But the majority of the fighter will still be in the infantry hand at the end of the day. Or the tank was just chasing their objective themselves, but not according to the overall picture.

Many historian think Battle of France and Battle of Holland are the very first example of Blitzkrieg and me, as an infantry officer, I am more inline with military tactician and I will have to say that Battle of France, Holland, North Africa, are "Sort-of" or "Quasi" Blitzkrieg, but not really Blitzkrieg as the dependence of infantry still high in all those battle.

Not really wanted to go in deep and debate what is blitzkrieg, did that a long time ago while I am still in OCS......

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## AUSTERLITZ

*DRAMA IN GERMAN HIGH COMMAND : HITLER BREAKS THE ARMY*




​*HITLER'S 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' -*
Meanwhile,having achieved the destruction of Poland,Hitler changed tack and became a 'peace lover'.In his speech to the Reichstag - 

_”I have no war aims against Britain and France,” he said. ”My sympathies are with the French poilu(infantryman). What he is fighting for he does not know.” And he called upon the Almighty, ”who now has blessed our arms, to give other peoples
comprehension of how useless this war will be . . . and to cause reflection on the blessings of peace.”_​
Again on October 6 speech -

_''Why should this war in the West be fought? For restoration of Poland? Poland of the Versailles Treaty will never rise again . . . The question of re-establishment of the Polish State is a problem which will not be solved by war in the West but exclusively by Russia and Germany . . . It would be senseless to annihilate millions of men and to destroy property worth millions in order to reconstruct a State which at its very birth was termed an abortion by all those not of Polish extraction.''
_​
However these efforts came to nothing,even the appeasers in france and england had finally had enough of hitler's promises.

Even as they peace feelers were being let out,*Hitler prepared to smash the anglo-french.*On September 27 he had asked the general staff for beginning planning on an operation against the west(halder's diary,Brauschitsch testimony).He even set a primary date -* november 12,1939.
German High command was thrown into a panic *at this who didn't believe they could succeed against the superior and larger french army with much greater preparations,Halder,the chief of staff and Brauschitsch,the C in Chief supported by various other *generals attempted to convince him germany wasn't ready*.The tanks from poland would need refitting,there was only ammo for 2 weeks of offensive operations etc,etc.Hitler would have none of it and called a general meeting of the top officers on 10 October to impose his will upon them.He began by reading his directive -

*TOP SECRET*

If it should become apparent in the near future that England, and under England’s leadership, also France, are not willing to make an end of the war, I am determined to act vigorously and aggressively without great delay . . .

Therefore I give the following orders:
1. Preparations are to be made for an *attacking operation . . .through the areas of Luxembourg, Belgium and Hollan*d. This attack must be carried out . . . at *as early a date as possible.*
2. The purpose will be to* defeat as strong a part of the French operational army as possible,* as well as allies fighting by its side, and at the same time to gain as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium and northern France *as a base for conducting a promising air and sea war against England* . . .
I request the Commanders in Chief to give me, as soon as possible, detailed reports of their plans on the basis of this directive and to keep me currently informed.​*The memorandum that followed this directive composed by hitler showed an impressive grasp of the problems facing the germans and potential solutions,it is considered one of hitler's best and is proof that hitler wasn't uniformly a military idiot at all.*






_Walther Brauschitsch,C-in-C,OKH_​_
''The *German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West*, that is, the destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.''_

_*Time was on the enemy’s side*. The Polish victories, were possible because *Germany really had only one front.*
That situation still held – but for how long?
*By no treaty or pact can a lasting neutrality of Soviet Russia be insured with certainty*. At present all reasons speak against Russia’s departure from neutrality. In eight months, one year, or even several years, this may be altered. The trifling significance of treaties has been proved on all sides in recent years. The greatest safeguard against any Russian attack lies . . . in a prompt demonstration of German strength._

As for Italy, the *”hope of Italian support for Germany” was dependent largely on whether Mussolini lived *and on whether there were further German successes to entice the Duce. Here too time was a factor, as it was with Belgium and Holland, which could be compelled by Britain and France to give up their neutrality – something Germany could not afford to wait for. Even with the_ United States, ”time is to be viewed as working against Germany.”_

Germany’s_* ”limited food and raw-material basis” *_would make it difficult to find ”the means for carrying on the war.” The greatest danger, he said, was the vulnerability of the Ruhr. If this heart of German industrial production were hit, it would _”lead
to the collapse of the German war economy and thus of the capacity to resist.”_

The *chief thing, he said, was to avoid the positional warfare of 1914-18. The armored divisions must be used for the crucial breakthrough.*
_''They are not to be lost among the maze of endless rows of houses in Belgian towns. It is not necessary for them to attack towns at all, but. . . to maintain the flow of the army’s advance, to prevent fronts from becoming stable by massed drives through identified weakly held positions''._(an *astonishingly accurate description of the blitzkrieg style*)





_Franz Halder_​
The* conservative generals remained skeptical.*Halder notes in his diary 14 october -
Three possibilities: Attack. Wait and see. *Fundamental changes*.”Here Fundamental changes meaning the removal of hitler.This was to much for Brauschitsch to swallow though as it would be highly difficult to justify such a move to the german people.They decided that none of the three possibilities offered _”prospects of decisive successes.” _The only thing to do was to work further on convincing Hitler.

Brauchitsch saw the Fuehrer again on October 17, but his arguments, he told Haider, were without effect. The situation was ”hopeless.” Hitler informed him curtly, as Haider wrote in his diary that day, that _”the British will be ready to talk only after a beating. We must get at them as quickly as possible. Date between November 15 and 20 at the latest.”_

October 27.Brauschitsch tried to persuade hitler that the Army would not be ready for a month, not before November 26, Hitler answered that this was ”much too late.” The attack, he ordered, would begin on November 12. Brauchitsch and Haider retired from the meeting feeling battered and defeated. That night they tried to console one another. 
_”Brauchitsch tired and dejected,”_ -_ Halder's diary,October 27._

*CONSPIRACY OF ZOSSEN -RESISTANCE IN ARMY HIGH COMMAND*




By early november a *desperate brauschitsch and halder were seriously considering a coup attempt,but neither could make up his mind*.Haider sent word to two of the chief conspirators, to hold themselves in readiness from November 5 on.Zossen, the headquarters of both the Army Command and the General Staff,became a hotbed of conspiratorial activity.

November 5 was a key date. On that day the movement of troops to their jump-off points opposite Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg was to begin. Also on that day, Brauchitsch had an appointment for a showdown with Hitler. *He and Haider had visited the top army commands in the west on November 2 and 3 and fortified themselves with the negative opinions of the field commanders.* _”None of the higher headquarters,” Haider confided to his diary, ”thinks theoffensive . . . has any prospect of success.” _
Thus amply supplied with arguments from the generals on the Western front as well as his own and Haider’s
and Thomas’, which were assembled in a memorandum, and carrying for good measure a ”countermemorandum,” as Haider calls it, replying to Hitler’s memorandum of October 9*,* the Commander in Chief of the German Army drove over to the Chancellery in Berlin on November 5* determined to talk the Fuehrer out of his offensive in the Wes*t. If Brauchitsch were unsuccessful, he would then join the conspiracy to remove the dictator – or so the conspirators understood.

Brauchitsch, as might have been expected, got nowhere with his memoranda or his reports from the front-line commanders or his own arguments. When *he stressed the bad weather* in the West at this time of year, *Hitler retorted that it was as bad for the enemy *as for the Germans and moreover that it might be no better in the spring. Finally in desperation the spineless Army chief informed the Fuehrer that the morale of the troops in the west was similar to that in 1917-18, when there was defeatism, insubordination and even mutiny in the German Army.
At hearing this,* Hitler broke into a vicious outburst of rage*._ 
”In what units,” _he demanded to know, _”have there been any cases of lack of discipline? What happened? Where?”_ He would fly there himself tomorrow._ ”What action has been taken by the Army Command?”_ the *Fuehrer shouted.* _”How many death sentences have been carried out?” The truth was, Hitler stormed, that ”the Army did not want to fight.”_
Enduring the full weight of hitler's fury,*Brauschitsch suffered a nervous breakdown and escaped to the HQ at zossen *nearby,where in his state he was unable to even properly describe the events to his co-conspirators.The conspiracy was paralyzed for the moment.

On the 7th october*,fate intervened to the relief of the german generals.*Hitler suddenly postponed the attack for 3 days after *recieving weather reports and congestion of railway traffic.*Goering,Hitler's right hand man had possibly informed him of the difficulty of employing the luftwaffe(on which hitler placed great stock)in such weather.Also the belgians had sent a secret warning to berlin they *knew exactly of the german build up and plans to invad*e(one of the conspirators in the army intelligence,having passed on the info).After this initial postponement,the date was then continously shifted to late november,with weather given as a formal cause..but also hitler's growing realisation that he needed the co-operation of his generals to actually launch and win his war.
*
HITLER BREAKS THE ARMY - 'destroy the spirit of Zossen'*




On November 23 Hitler *summoned his army chiefs yet again for a final showdown.*
He* chided the generals for their doubts* when he made his ”hard decisions” to leave the League of Nations, decree conscription, occupy the Rhineland, fortify it and seize Austria. ”The number of people who put trust in me,” he said,”was very small.”Having recited his successes he proclaimed himself *'irreplaceable' and a figure of destiny.*

The trouble with the German leaders of the past, Hitler said, including Bismarck and Moltke, was ”insufficient hardness. The solution was possible only by attacking a country at a favorable moment.” Failure to realize this brought on the 1914 war ”on several fronts.
_''Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many internal conditions. Moreover, we have the treaty with Russia. Treaties, however, are kept only as long as they serve a purpose. Russia will keep it only as long as Russia herself considers it to be to her benefit . . . Russia still has far-reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West.''_
Still,time was working for the enemy. _”The moment is favorable now; in six months it might not be so any more.”_

_My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and earliest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is of no importance. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not justify the breach of neutrality as idiotically as in 1914._

Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history.As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people.
_*I shall shrink from nothing and shall annihilate everyone who is opposed to me . . . I want to annihilate the enemy!*_​



Not a single german general dared raise his voice.

A while after this speech was over ,hitler sent for Halder,and after keeping him waiting gave him a savage verbal drubbing.First army high command was ridiculed for _'defeatism'_.The general staff professionals were_ 'stiff necked academics'_.
A broken *Brauschitsch offered to resign,was refused and promptly reminded it was his duty to obey hitler *like every soldier.
Turning to halder,Hitler vowed _'to destroy the spirit of Zossen'_(by which he meant defeatism in army HQ at Zossen,but halder took as the conspiracy) and_ 'annihilate whoever stood in his way'._
He further added *he would crush any resistance to him from the general staff* _'with brutal force'._

This final lesson was* too much for halder.He came to his HQ in a panic* and burned all incriminating papers to the conspiracy reminding himself of hitler's vow to destroy the spirit of zossen and annihilate all opposition.This *meeting signalled the end of the Zossen conspiracy*.Neither brauschitsch nor Halder had any strength to further oppose him.All Halder could manage in his diary - _''A day of crisis''._

Adolf hitler,the former austrian corporal *had broken his generals forever*.This marked the last concrete opposition in the army to hitler until 1944.

*NEXT: MANSTEIN PLAN .FALL WESERBUNG*

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## Koovie

@AUSTERLITZ 

Great insight! Superb work as usual 

I would like to see a Battle Report on a battle that took place in the Pacific. Midway would be a very interesting engagement to analyse

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## AUSTERLITZ

Koovie said:


> @AUSTERLITZ
> 
> Great insight! Superb work as usual
> 
> I would like to see a Battle Report on a battle that took place in the Pacific. Midway would be a very interesting engagement to analyse



Will do.Doing ww2 step by step chronologically.

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## AUSTERLITZ

*THE WEHRMACHT - THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE*






_''An army the likes of which the world has never seen'' -Adolf Hitler,1939_​*END OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN ARMY- BIRTH OF THE REICHSWEHR*

The victorious allies in 1919 abolished the imperial german army and the great general staff as the kaiser abdicated bringing to an end the short lived second reich(1871-1918).The *german empire was replaced by the weimar republic*.The allies stipulated the new german armed forces be no more than 100,000 - a police force incapable of grand warfare.This the new german army was the Reichsheer.(reichswehr for armed forces).Having *prohibited development of tanks,aircraft and heavy artillery,abolished conscription *(main source of building trained manpower) and the german general staff the allies felt confident germany's warmaking potential had been destroyed for a very long time.They were wrong.

'After the armistice, the Reichsheer withdrew into its bases, organized itself, and* began preparing for the next
war. *During the Weimar era (1919–33), the army developed and* existed apart from the rest of German society*. Its Officers’ Corps deliberately separated it and, to a large degree, isolated it from the rest of Germany.
It had its own ideas, legal code, traditions, culture, and manners.As a rule they viewed the Weimar Republic—to which it felt very little loyalty and less subordination—with illconcealed contempt'.The Reichwehr would emerge as a_ 'state within a state'._

*LEGACY OF THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY SYSTEM:*





*Frederick the Great* - Prussia's Warrior King​
This was not surprising given the* history and tradition of the german army*.The legacy and military tradition of what would become the wehrmacht dates back to the mid *18th century prussia*.It was under *Frederick the great* that prussia(its aristocracy being the descendants of the teutonic knights) transitioned from a mid level power to one of the great powers of europe.
He established the reputation of the Prussian Army as the best in Europe, based on *harsh discipline, obedience,
and the courage of its men*, especially its officers. Under Frederick,it fought the first and second Silesian wars, the Seven Years’ War, and the War of the First Partition of Poland with success expanding his domains.Especially in the 7 yrs war the outnumbered prussian army was able to hold out against the french ,austrian and russian empires with modest british help.At the *end of the 18th century the prussian army was considered the best in europe.*Militaristic prussia was described as an _'army with a state'._





*Scharnhorst* -Father of the German general staff.​
This changed sharply and rapidly.Frederick's successors rested on their laurels while a rejuvenated revolutionary france now defied all europe.The army had stagnated and *in 1806 prussia suffered the worst defeat in german history at jena-auerstadt*(until stalingrad 1942)when its army was crushed in 2 weeks and the country overrun by the rampaging gallic hordes of *napoleon**.*Under harsh napoleonic peace terms the prussian army was rebuilt by the reformers gneisenau and scharnhorst from 1807-1812.*Scharnhorst* shifted the emphasis of Prussian military thought and doctrine from a volunteer army obsessed with iron discipline and rigid drill to a conscripted army, stressing technological expertise, operational planning,tactical flexibility, and a highly trained and dedicated professional Officers’ Corps.

Scharnhorst with his assistants *Gneisenau* and *Clausewitz founded the Landwehr*(national militia),The *general staff and the kriegsakademie*(war academy for officer training).Prussia joined all europe against napoleon after the disastrous russian campaign and its new army played vital roles in his defeat at leipzig and waterloo.After the end of the napoleonic wars(where prussia recieved further territory in germany for its contribution)
Prussian Army continued its quiet, steady development under the supervision of the General Staff until it had, in effect, institutionalized the idea of professional military excellence at all levels of the army.





{*Von Clausewitz* -Director of the War academy and Prussia's great military theorist.His famed work is _On War._}​
General Staff training was especially vigorous. Entrance into the War Academy in Berlin (where the officers of the General Staff were trained) was by competitive examination, and well *over three-quarters of the applicants were eliminated at the beginning*. Of the 150 officers who succeeded in gaining admission each year, only about 50 completed the course, which was gradually expanded until it was three years long. The survivors were then assigned to the Great General Staff in Berlin for two years of additional training in topographical mapping, map exercises, and war games. Following this assignment, they participated in the annual Staff Ride, under the personal supervision of the
chief of the General Staff. Finally, the* top three or four candidates were chosen* these candidates usually spent most of their careers alternating between positions with the Great General Staff (Grosser Generalstab), housed in Berlin, and assignments with the field forces .By the 1860s, the great majority of Prussia’s senior commanders had developed through this process.The king was, of course, still the official supreme commander of the army, but by now his role was largely nominal: the *chief of the General Staff was the real leader of the German Army.*





_[*Helmuth Von Moltke the Elder* _-Prussia's grim faced military genius is said to have laughed twice in his life.On being told a fortress was impregnable and on hearing the news of the death of his mother-in-law.]​
This new prussian army was unleashed under the astute diplomacy of Bismarck and the *military leadership of Von Moltke *to devastating effect in the defeat of Denmark(1864),Austria(1866) and shocking the world -France 1871 resulting in the* unification of germany *and the birth of the second reich.Moltke brought several refinements in the staff system,he also perfected the the technique of _'Kesselschlacht'_ or a Decisive annihilation battle by strategic envelopment.A large part of blitzkreig was adopted from this concept.(more on this later).Between 1871 and 1914 the *german general staff was the most feared military organization on the planet* and was widely copied and emulated.








(*Alfred von Schliffen* -Mastermind of the 1914 Schliffen plan) & (*Von Ludendorff* - Germany's premier warlord in WWI)​
In the first world war,the* schliffen plan* masterminded by former chief of the general staff alfred schliffen brought germany to the edge of victory but was repulsed by the indomitable french.The* 4 year brutal trench warfare* saw *germany's eventual defeat to france and england* in a war of attrition(with *america* joining towards the end).Despite its victory against italy and russia the german empire collapsed on the western front.The subsequent peace treaty of versailles abolished the imperial army and birthed the reichswehr.

*NEXT : REICHSWEHR 1919-1933 -PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES.*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*REICHSWEHR 1919-1933 -PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES*





_*Hans Von Seeckt *- Father of the Wehrmacht_​*HANS VON SEECKT AND THE REBIRTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY:*

The provisions of the versailles treaty were thorough in their quest to* emasculate german warmaking potential* .Germany was* permitted only 4000 officers* compared to its pre war 40,000 and its* army restricted to 100,000 *men.She was *forbidden to develop tanks,aircraft,poison gas and artillery pieces above 105 mm.*
To eliminate german strategic manpower reserve - conscription was abolished and the reichsheer Privates and NCOs had to enlist for 12 years and officers 25 years.(otherwise the germans could rotate the men annually or biannually-training large numbers over time).
The* general staff,war academy and cadet academies were banned*.Ammunition supply was restricted to prevent stockpiling.The german fleet was also restricted and no submarines allowed.*Germany was not allowed an air force*.The german military was subject to regular inspections by the allied war commission.

*Hans von seeckt,one of the great german staff officers of ww1* emerged as the new leader of the reichswehr.Since formally reichwehr couldn't have a commander in chief acc to treaty terms,Seeckt set up a apparently harmless administrative office -_ the army command_.It was divided into _personnel office,troop office,administrative office and ordnance office_._*The troop office*_ was a disguised general staff headed by Seeckt,a prussian nobleman and an enigmatic character known in the army as _'The sphinx with a monocle'_.Seeckt got to work quickly on finding ways to circumvent the limitations.
Seeckt’s Troop Office was the chief planning agency for the army and consisted of several departments, including T 1 (operations), T 2 (organization), T 3 (statistics and intelligence), T 4 (training), and T 7 (transportation). These departments were further subdivided into office groups (Amtsgruppen), branches (Abteilungen), and sections (Gruppen).The lowest level of the General Staff was the Referat (desk). Each of these subdivisions dealt with various tasks, including a number forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Group L of the operations department, for example, *handled Germany’s clandestine air forces* and kept up with developments in aviation and military aviation.

*THE OFFICERKORPS:*

_"We must become powerful, and as soon as we have power, we will naturally take back everything we have lost"-
Von Seeckt_​
From 1920-26 Seeckt was virtual dictator of the german armed forces.He used this* unique oppurtunity to build up the army in accordance with his own ideas*.First he dealt with the problem of his minute army and its very small officer cadre of 4000.He picked these* elite 4000 from among 270,000 german officers who had served* in the great war.Their selections were based on high professional accomplishments and demonstrated efficiency; intelligence and high standards of educational achievement; ‘‘correctness’’ in both professional and private life; a strong sense of tradition.*General Staff officers received preference* in selection over non–War Academy graduates, and *younger officers were preferred to older ones.*
Seeckt and his staff drew their officers from three general categories:
(1) General Staff officers; (2) Hardened veterans; and (3) the junior officer ranks of the pre-1914 Imperial Army.
*Almost all of the best leaders of the Wehrmacht in World War Two were men that Seeckt retained in 1919–20.*




Apart from the 4000 retained the annual intake of officers(to replace those retiring and a small unnoticed increase covertly) was very small and the* standards extremely high *due to the number limit.
Preference went to those under 21 years of age with a higher education. They served 15 months in their regiments as enlisted men and, if still considered suitable,took their Fahnenjunker examination. Prior to World War I, other
officer candidates (those coming straight out of schools or universities) entered the ranks as Fahnenjunkern (officer cadets). They ate in the officers’ mess (but were not allowed to speak unless spoken to) and could
sleep in private accommodations after six weeks’ service. Then they went on to a war school (Kriegschule). The procedures were similar during the Reichswehr era, but the standards were much higher. If the Reichsheer candidate passed his Fahnenjunker exam, he was promoted to Faehnrich (senior officer cadet or officer candidate) and* sent to the corporals’ course at the infantry school at Dresden, regardless of his branch.*(german air force,armor,navy officers all had infantry training) Then he took the* officers’ examination*. If he passed, he waspromoted to Oberfaehnrich (roughly equivalent to ensign or senior candidate) and joined the officers’ mess of his regiment.
Seeckt understood the value of military aviation,Overruling the recommendations of his own personnel staff, *Seeckt insisted that at least 180 of the officers of the new Reichsheer be former Air Service officers.*These would form the core of the future luftwaffe.
Seeckt's motto for the new officers was -
_‘‘Great achievements, small display; more reality than appearance’’_​
*ENLISTED MEN AND NCOs:*
After the initial selections, the *decision *on which officers to choose for the regimental and company-level appointments usually* fell to the colonel* involved. As one might expect, this man almost invariably selected candidates whom he believed to have* outstanding leadership potential*, largely because it was in his own best interests to do so.
About 400 exceptionally talented NCOs were retained this way.

To man the 100,000 men apart from initial retainments twice a year the recruitment of enlisted men took place. A successful volunteer had to be single, between 17 and 21 years of age, with no criminal record, and in excellent physical condition. The choice concerning* who to accept was left to the company, battery, or troop commanders*, who functioned as their own recruiting officers. *They thus had a great deal of interest in only choosing the best men available*.The Reichwehr was designed to be an army capable of extremely rapid expansion,*all its men trained to assume command of the unit above their own.*Its sergeants were trained to be platoon leaders, its lieutenants were fully qualified as company commanders, and its captains were perfectly capable of commanding battalions. *Its field maneuvers,staff study and training problems were the best in the world.*

The creme de la creme was the disguised general staff.
By 1933, for example, all officers who reached 10 years service were required to take the Wehrkreis exam, which measured their professional ability. Only those in the* top 15 percent* were considered for General Staff training. Of those selected,* only about a third passed* the rigorous course and became General Staff officers. Their training, of course, could not be conducted at the Kriegsakademie (War Academy), which had been closed in March 1920, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Under Seeckt and his successors, it was carried on in the provincial military districts and by special courses . Other than that, however, little had changed. The *course was just as rigorous* as it had ever been.
Seeckt and his men became experts at hiding stockpiles of equipment and ammunition.The police and paramilitary services were also looked upon as a source of strategic manpower.
*
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE:*
_''Mass can't manuever,and thus it can't win'' -Von Seeckt._​
One week after the dissolution of the General Staff, von *Seeckt started a programme to collect and analyse the experiences of the First World War* and to create a new military doctrine for the Reichswehr.Seeckt stated:
_
"It is absolutely necessary to put the experience of the war in a broad light and collect this experience while the impressions won on the battlefield are still fresh and a major portion of the experienced officers are still in leading positions"_




The* new programme consisted of 57 committees *which would study tactics, regulations, equipment and doctrine.
The output of the committees was to be short, concise studies on the newly gained experiences and in particular -
(a) what new situations arose that had not been considered before;
(b) how effective were pre-war views in dealing with these situations; 
(c) what guidelines were developed for new weaponry during the war; 
(d) which new problems put forward by the war have not yet found a solution.

This *programme covered diverse topics* from military justice and questions of troop morale to river crossings, flame throwers and the military weather service. Military leadership was a key focus with seven committees covering different levels and aspects. In order to cover these areas experienced officers were appointed to serve on the committees. These *officers were often ex-General Staff but specialist experts were included* even if they were not. The T4 section's job was to collect and review the committee outputs and to recommend changes to the committee structure, to military regulations and to doctrinal manuals. Seeing the* intense effort being made by the Army, the Air Service* within the Troop Office embarked on a similar programme and by mid-1920 the manpower that made up all these committees was over 500 officers.
Whilst all the big nations revised their tactics post-World War I, it is a notable contrast that Germany put its experienced General Staff officers of Captain and above to the task whilst others put juniors of limited experience.

Hans von Seeckt considered the *mass armies of 1914 obsolete*. They were, he said, unmaneuverable, poorly trained, and far too expensive.The next war, he predicted, *would be won by smaller, mobile armies* with superior training and equipment. He attached the* greatest value to training* and also emphasized the* importance of mechanization, motorization, and air power.*




Seeckt,a cavalry officer realized that economically the Reichsheer (German Army) was a spent force that could not fight any future war as it had done the last.It* couldn't sustain itself in a war of attrition *when even the mighty imperial army had failed in such an endeavour.Seeckt had served in the eastern front in WW1 and had participated and masterminded thus not in static trench warfare but highly mobile operations-this influenced his thinking.
To avoid the tremendous losses incurred by the return to medieval siege tactics of 1914—18, he realized that *military strategy had to be based on mobility*.He had longed to loose the cavalry into the enemy's rear after a breakthrough of the frontline enemy trenches. More perceptively, however, he also saw that such *breakthroughs were not easily achieved once the enemy had time to dig in and fortify*. He had *noted the successes of the Sturmgruppen *(storm groups) —dedicated assault forces specializing in mobile attacks — who had made such progress in 1918. What he emphasized was that such breakthroughs had to be supplied, and then resupplied with men, weapons, food and all the other prerequisites of warfare if they were to maintain their momentum.
The essence of his teaching was that_ 'tactics depend upon co-operation between arms'_ and that _the next war would be one of manoeuvre'._This doctrine of *flexibility,mobility and individual initiative was promoted throughout the reichswehr during the seeckt years*.The real strength of this new army would lie in its mobility, which would be provided by a large contingent of cavalry, physically well-conditioned infantry and a full complement of motorized or mechanized units, machine guns and artillery.*Seeckt's weakness towards cavalry was his one drawback*,one which his* successors corrected by replacing cavalry with armoured cavalry -the panzer divisions*.His philosophy of mobile warfare remained intact.

*CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION *:



Seeckt's troop office set about reshaping the new army to fit its treaty constraints and its new doctrinal approach*.*The *'triangular' infantry division replaced the 'square division'*, with no brigade level staff and three regiments instead of four. Support forces such as artillery, reconnaissance, transport and signals were all increased and* control in many cases pushed down the organisation and decentralized*. All of this related to the new manuever warfare doctrine that had been adopted. The Wehrmacht infantry division in 1939 showed very few changes from that outlined in 1921. The cavalry division was similarly reinforced with support arms and armoured cars making it capable of independent operations deep behind enemy lines.
The very limited number of officers forced it to rethink the roles at headquarters and this dovetailed with their doctrine of decision at the front by those who can see the enemy. Correspondingly, despite a Versailles limit of 33 officers in a divisional HQ, the Germans planned to have 30 which was in stark contrast to a US divisional staff of 79. Again, this fitted with a force who would be attacking and making many more decisions outside of the headquarters(that is decentralized decision making by encouraging lower unit initiative) which could therefore be leaner. The Versailles treaty placed no limitations on NCO numbers and by *1922 the Reichswehr had over 50% of enlisted manpower at NCO ranks, leaving only 36,000 privates.* The high quality of German soldiers, made possible by the much reduced numbers forced by the treaty, meant that the Reichswehr could employ NCOs at junior officer roles such as platoon leaders. This had two effects, *when the Germans rearmed in 1933-34 they could easily promote these NCOs to officers as the army expanded*, also it established a tradition of much greater leadership, responsibility and capability below the officer level which fitted with the delegated authority doctrine necessary for bewegungskrieg or the war of movement where use of independent judgement and fast local decision making is necessary.

This increased demand upon NCOs required them to be treated differently in this army than the old Imperial one in order to support them in their efforts. Hence all NCOs were now to have a barracks room of their own and all soldiers were to be much better accommodated and trained than before. In the 1920s, the soldiers were often distributed throughout the country at battalion and regimental size only forming into larger units for occasional exercises. This was part of the Truppenamt's(Troop office) plan to train squads, platoons and companies in the new regulations and doctrines and when ready then combining them in battalion and regimental exercises. These* battalion and regimental exercises started to happen in 1924 and the first divisional exercises in 1926*. During this time, it was the Truppenamt's role to ensure that old 'trench warfare' and 'positional warfare' tactics did not creep back into use. Cross training regimes were reviewed, long length operational order writing was eliminated, attack styles that took too long to prepare were eliminated. Innovation and flexibility for mobile warfare were stressed over carefully planned methods used in static warfare.

*TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT:*





(Dummy tanks used for armor training)​
Seeckt felt the need to establish training bases for the two skill areas he felt would be most needed in a future war: mobile (especially panzer) operations and military aviation. For this reason, he *advocated an alliance of convenience with the other outcast nation of Europe: the Soviet Union.* Seeckt thought it entirely possible to set up tank and aviation schools in Russia, far from the prying eyes of the Allies. After extended negotiations, he was able to *establish a major German flying base at Lipetsk, north of Voronezh, in 1924*. It had two runways and a large complex of hangars, repair shops, administrative and living quarters, and service facilities, including a modern hospital.The Reichsheer was thus able to keep abreast of advances in military aviation, to conduct experiments in land-ground communications and close air support, to test new equipment, and to produce skilled pilots, observers, and aerial gunners (who could later train others), as well as technical and support personnel. The fact that the Luftwaffe (the German Air Force) had a trained nucleus of professionals in 1935 was largely due to the efforts Seeckt had made in the early 1920s.
General von Seeckt was *also able to secure Soviet agreement to allow the Germans to open a tank school at Kama (near Kazan).*

Despite Seeckt's departure from the helm in 1926,until 1933 his *philosophy more or less predominated* in and prepared the Reichswehr for its coming transformation.*The foundation had been laid for the resurgence of the german war machine and the stage was set for the entry of Adolf hitler and the rise of the wehrmacht.*

*NEXT: 1933-1939 -RISE OF THE WEHRMACHT*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*RISE OF THE WEHRMACHT*




​*REARMAMENT AND SECRET EXPANSION:1933-1935.*

Secret Expansion of the reichswehr began with hitler's accession to power in 1933.The original plan was modest ,it called for creating 21 infantry divisions from the existing 7- An* increase in strength from 100,000 to 300,000* in 5 years by 1938.But hitler was not satisfied and the army was forced to revise its timetable to 1935.Meanwhile hitler continued his double game of false promises of peace.The expansion was carried efficiently.The seven existing infantry divisions were broken up,each of their three infantry regiments serving as the veteran core around which two more recently raised regiments were formed to create the new 3 regiment division.The artillery regiments of the previous7 infantry divisions were distributed in a similar manner with more being raised.A cavalry corps was also raised which would eventually be converted into the first panzer divisions.
By 1935 ,*21 full infantry divisions with their artillery compliment had been formed and equipped* and the first phase of the expansion had been completed.

*OPEN RE-ARMAMENT:1935-1938*

Starting late 1938 hitler began to test the waters of european politics.First he declared the existence of the luftwaffe.Then using france's increase of service time length as a pretext announced the *repudiation of the armaments clause of the versailles and re-introduced conscription with a one year service period*.He declared to foreign correspondents the size of the new german army would be* 550,000* and it would 'defend against the belligerence of her war-like neighbours'.He followed this up with a vigorous peace speech at the reichstag and the allies fell for it.
This goal of* 36 infantry divisions* was achieved by retraining 4 divisions of Land police militia from the recently re-occupied rhineland and raising 11 further divisions by the recently adopted conscription,to add to the existing 21,along with 3 panzer divisions by 1936.(development of panzer arm described later).
Here the german planners faced great difficulty at this rapid expansion.



_Officer shortage -_

When Hitler took power on January 30, 1933, Germany had an army of around 4,000 officers and slightly more than 100,000 enlisted men in seven divisions. By the beginning of 1936, the German Army had more than half a million
men. This meant it needed at least 20,000 more commissioned officers, plus 10,000 above that to put the army on
a wartime footing. About 1,500 Reichsheer NCOs were commissioned directly, as were about 2,500 police officers. Another 2,000 or so Imperial Army officers were allowed to return to active duty, and the training time required to produce a second lieutenant was cut from four years to two and a half years. This, coupled with the output of the four
Kriegsschulen (War Schools or Officer Training Schools), increased the number of officers commissioned each year from 180 in 1933 to more than 3,000 by 1937, but* demand still far exceeded supply*.Finally, *older supplementary officers were reactivated *to fill clerical /administrative or department positions.They were still restricted to certain positions and their promotions were slower than regular officers, but, by 1939, they made up more than one-quarter of all officers on active duty.Despite this there was high officer shortage by the end of 1936.

_Mobilization of Manpower -_

'The last class to be inducted by conscription into the Imperial Army was the class of 1900 (that is, men born in that year).This gave Germany a sizable reserve of men above the age of 35 who already had considerable military training and experience. These were rapidly organized into two paper reserves: the* Landwehr* (men up to age 45) and the *Landsturm* (men over age 45). Both groups were required to register and were subject to recall to active duty or mandatory refresher courses under the defense decree of May 21, 1935.'

'The first class subject to Hitler’s draft was that of 1914. It was originally conscripted for one year, but its *term was extended to 24 months* before the first draftees were discharged. In this way, the army brought in 300,000 men a year for training, except for the classes of 1916, 1917, and 1918, which provided only 250,000 a year—an indirect result of
World War I. When these conscripts were discharged, they were automatically transferred to the *Class I Reserve* (i.e., the reserve of men who had recently completed active duty)'

'The *Class II Reserve *was formed by the men of the ‘‘white years’’ of 1901 through 1913, who had not been subjected to the draft when they were young, and who were now untrained and considered too old to draft for two full years. It was planned to call them up for three months each year for three years. Then, after finishing nine months’ training over a three-year period, they were to be transferred to the Class I Reserve. In practice, however, few of the Class II Reservists were fully trained when the war began, because so much of the training establishment had to be used for other purposes that had a higher priority.'



_
1937 -The Mobile Divisions_ :

No new infantry divisions were activated in 1937.However *3 Corps Headquarters* were formed.These would direct germany's mobile divisions.In addition to the already raised 3 panzer divisions(which came under one of these HQs),in 1937,* 3 experimental Light divisions*(under one HQ) and* 4 Motorized Infantry Divisions*(another HQ) were formed.

*29 Reserve infantry divisions* were formed out of the previously mentioned retrained Landwehr and Landsturm militia.The *1st mountain division*(Gebirsjaeger) was also raised.

_1938-1939 : Overexpansion_ -

By 1938 through rapid expansion,the quality and homogeneity of the Officers’ Corps had been significantly reduced by the inclusion of police officers, older (formerly inactive) officers, and NCOs, and even these measures had not been enough to meet the rapidly growing demand for officers.Original goal was 7% of the army to be officers.This was first reduced to a minimum 3%.Despite the reduced time required to graduate from the officers’ training courses, and the subsequent reduction in the quality of the new second lieutenants. (This loss of quality was not viewed as a particularly serious problem, however, because the *German company-grade officer was still outstanding* and his training was greatly superior to any opponent he was likely to face.) By October 1935, active officers totaled only 1.7 percent of the army, and even the addition of the supplementary officers (the E officers) brought this figure only to 2.4 percent.Officers and NCOs became increasingly difficult to replace. It became* common to find sergeants commanding platoons,lieutenants commanding companies, and majors directing battalions*.Fortunately the superb training sytem of the reichswehr period paid off here.

_Material Shortage :_

The army was also *short on reserves and equipment of every description*. In 1937 alone, 45 percent of the army’s material requirements had to be postponed until 1938, and perhaps later. By the end of 1937, the General Staff estimated that the army could not be ready for war until 1943.It was only *slowly that these deficiencies were being addressed*.A huge aid to the wehrmacht was the* huge cache of munitions,war material and tanks *along with the famed Skoda industrial plants that fell into its hands in the *unoppossed takeover of Czechoslovakia*.All these were immediately presssed into service.Without czech tanks there would be no blitzkrieg in 1940.


*NEXT:* *WEHRMACHT COMMAND STRUCTURE*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*WEHRMACHT COMMAND STRUCTURE*




​The Wehrmacht's high command in 1940.Previously the Head of the German army or OKH (_Oberkommando Des Heer_) along with his Chief of General staff served as the leader of the german armed forces and answered to the president.Hitler concentrated more and more power in his hands gradually.To prevent an army conspiracy he* created a parallel command structure*.OKH as well as Goering's Luftwaffe and the German navy answered to a higher command designated OKW or_ Oberkommando Der Wehrmacht_.OKW had its own commander-in-chief and chief-of staff - *Kietel* and *Jodl* ,both of whom were blindly loyal to hitler and owed their position to his favour.They directly answered to hitler.OKW was responsible for the* conduct of german grand strategy* acc to the fuhrer's wishes.

_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht :_

OKW was created in 1938 after the purge of the army generals under trumped up charges.Hitler dissolved the previous war ministry and replaced it with OKW.Nonetheless he *made sure all the army chiefs had direct access to him* and could circumvent OKW control.Hitler manipulated the bipolar system to keep ultimate decisions in his own hands.Rivalry with the armed services branch commands, mainly with (OKH), prevented the OKW from becoming a unified Joint General Staff in an effective chain of command. However it did *coordinate operations among the three services.*In practice, the OKW acted as* Hitler's personal military staff*, translating his ideas into military orders, and issuing them to the three services while having little control over them.





(The Command structure of OKW itself)​The above diagram represents OKW organization late war,so in 1940 structure was slightly different.The Nazi party guidance staff was absent.OKW until 1944 had an armed forces intelligence branch,but was dissolved by hitler for conspiring against him and put under Himmler.The main four sections were -
_The Central Office(WZA)_ - Dealt primarily with logistics
_The Operations Staff_ _Office_ - Headed by Jodl.the most important office.Dealt with war planning.
_The General Office_ - Miscellaneous affairs ranging from science,pensions, education to POWs.
_The Economic Office_ - Very important branch.Dealt with wartime armaments production,munitions and raw material stockpiles.All important for fighting an industrial war.
The conscription,recruitment and replacement branch was cosmetic.These duties were handled by the OKH in detail.
The_ Inspector of motor transportation _supervised the new mobile mechanized and motorized formations and answered directly to hitler.After 1943 this post was superseded by inspector of panzertroops(guderian) though it remained in existence formally.

_Oberkommando des Heeres : _

The *supreme high command of the german army* or land forces - it was the most important german organizational unit for war planning.Its commander until december 1941 was brauschitsch,after that Hitler himself became head of OKH.During the war OKH had the responsibility of strategic planning of Armies and army groups, while the General Staff of the OKH managed operational matters.(campaign plans).During the first years of the world war (til moscow 1941)OKW needed Adolf Hitler's approval for giving orders to OKH.





_(Late war Organizational Structure OKH-click to enlarge)_​The above diagram represents a *late war structure* with Hitler having already replaced brauschitsch as chief of the army.1940 several other sections were absent - note the 3 sections that answered directly to supreme commander hitler above the heads of OKH on the extreme right of the chart -The nazi party ideological guidance staff,the inspector of panzer troops and hitler's own history/propaganda section.

The main functional body of the OKH was divided into 4 main sections -from Left to right on the chart

_1_._The Army General Staff _ -
*Brain of the german army* with a long and proud tradition.Most important branch.Subdivided into six sections - _Operations_,_Field army training_,_Supply and administration_,_Intelligence_,_Organization _and _Military history_.(The organization and development of the general staff will be found in detail in later post).Headed by Franz Halder in 1940.

2_.Chiefs of Branches attached to The General Staff - _
The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Chief of the Army General Staff have at their disposal in wartime a group of *general officers representing the various combat arms* who serve as the principal advisers on the organization, training, equipment, and tactical employment of their respective arms in the field. They usually have no actual command authority but may issue instructions and suggestions to the troops based on the evaluation of experience in the field. For the publication of technical manuals and the like they collaborate with the inspectorates of their branches in the General Army Office. They may also recommend changes in the organization or equipment of the troops to the Organization Branch of the General Staff _(Gen St d H/Org Abt)_ for forwarding to the inspectorates.Eg._Chief of Infantry_,_Chief of Artillery_,_Chief of Signals Troops_ etc.

_3.Army Personnel Office - _
This office is independent of both the General Staff and the Home Command and comes under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. It is responsible for all appointments, transfers, promotions, and other matters concerning all types of officers in the German Army. It therefore has been a powerful instrument in exercising control over the officer corps. The order for the promotion of an officer to the rank of colonel or above is issued by Hitler himself on the recommendation of the Personnel Office. In lower ranks it makes the promotions on its own responsibility.
The authority to transfer various types of specialist officers (medical, veterinary, ordnance, motor maintenance, and Special Troop Service) is delegated by the Personnel Office, so far as the lower ranks are concerned, to the technical branches which deal with these services; for the upper ranks, the Personnel Office orders the transfers on the recommendation of the technical branches.While the bulk of the Personnel Office is normally stationed in wartime with the rear echelon of the High Command, each of its branches also has a forward echelon at field headquarters, where the major decisions in personnel matters are made.

_4. Chief of army equipment and Replacement Army _-
This officer is the wartime deputy of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army charged with all the functions of the Zone of the Interior. These are primarily the *conscription, training, and replacement of personnel*; the procurement, storage, and issue of equipment; and territorial administration. He controls all the principal offices of the High Command which are left behind as the rear echelon on mobilization, with the exception of the Personnel Office.Divided into 5 sub-sections.
_a} General army office -_ Miscelleneous army matters.
_b} Training in Replacement Army - _He controls all training conducted within the Replacement Army, using as his representatives the inspectors of arms and services. Through these inspectors he utilizes the facilities of the inspectorates of the corresponding arms and services in the General Army Office for working out the details of training programs and methods, the issuance of directives and manuals, and other paper work. The Chief of Training is not responsible for the specialized training of the medical, veterinary, ordnance, and motor maintenance troops, as this is handled by the inspectorates of these branches in the General Army Office operating under the direct control of their own independent inspectors_.
c}_ _Ordnance Office _- This office is responsible for the *design, testing, development, and acceptance of all ordnance* equipment. It works in very close collaboration with the Ministry of Armament and War Production(under OKW economic office)
_d}_ _Army administration Office_ - Its responsibilities include mainly the procurement of rations, billets, pay, and clothing for the Army on the front.(The supply & administration section of the general staff deals with the actual supply procedure at the front)
_e}Inspector General for Officers and NCOs -_ Responsible for recruitment and training of officers to be supplied to the army.Controls the cadet schools.

Apart from these there were also the Veterinary inspector and Chief medical Inspectors of the army who answered to the army chief.



_
Procedure for Campaign Planning:_

Hitler after consideration of diplomatic and domestic conditions *assigns an objective to chief of OKW*(Kietel).He examines the problem in detail with his operations staff(jodl) and issues a directive.The *chiefs of the three branches are called to a meeting where the operation is discussed* and a commander nominated.After renewed consultation Hitler appoints the commander.Commander is now subordinate directly to his superior high command(OKH if land) as well as OKW(until 1941,OKW can't direct OKH on operational matters without hitler's order).
New commander selects his own staff and prepares -
1.General plan of operation
2.List of material requirements

This is submitted to OKH/OKW for acceptance.*Selected units become a task force*.Commander of Operation prepares training directive for all the units in task force and a *specified training period* is allocated for the operation.Meanwhile his *staff prepares detailed plans.*(For a large land campaign the commander selected is usually the head of OKH then the staff means general staff of the army,or it could be a lower level operation like rommel in afrikakorps or norway operation)If the task force is one of many as is usual in a grand campaign then overall strategic planning is done by OKH general staff and the sub-ordinate task force commanders and their own staff prepare for the planning of the operations in their sectors only with co-ordination of taks forces conducted by OKH headquarters.
A time and date is set for the operation.*Commander of Operation goes over all the details with his sub-ordinates*.Finally operation begins.

*NEXT: GERMAN GENERAL STAFF;THE MILITARY DISTRICTS;RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION;CHAIN OF COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*THE GERMAN GREAT GENERAL STAFF*






_''If we arrrest and shoot every german general staff officer we will have peace for 50 years'' - Winston Churchill_​
In the late 19th and early 20thcenturies there was a running joke that there existed five perfect institutions in europe(meaning they perform their function exactly as intended) - The french opera house(paris),the british parliament(london),the papal curia(vatican),the russian ballet(st petersburg) and the german great general staff(berlin).
''For Germany's enemies, the Prussian-German General Staff was an object of fear and revulsion, an organization which was considered to represent the kernel of professional militarism in which a selected group of officers worked in monkish isolation on the preparation of war plans.They suspected the German General Staff to be one of those "dark forces," which was weaving the threads of the destiny of nations behind the scenes.''

The *German General Staff*, originally the *Prussian General Staff* and officially *Great General Staff* (_Großer Generalstab_), was a full-time body at the head of the Prussian army and later, the german army, responsible for the *continuous study of all aspects of war, and for drawing up and reviewing plans for mobilization or campaign*. It existed unofficially from 1806, and was formally established by law in 1814, the* first modern general staff in existence*. It was distinguished by the formal selection of its officers by intelligence and merit rather than patronage or wealth, and by the exhaustive and rigorously structured training which its staff officers undertook. Its rise and development gave the German armed forces a *decisive strategic advantage over their adversaries* for nearly a century and a half.

_''Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz created the General Staff and gave this instrument its objective and direction; the great Chiefs of Staff, Moltke and Schlieffen, developed the General Staff to high perfection; their successors Seeckt, Beck and Halder preserved their heritage. They personified the typical General Staff officerwho is the first adviser of his commander, the 'Fuehrergehilfe.'' - General Brandt_​
*DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF:*

_*CREATION - SCHARNHORST,GNEISENAU AND CLAUSEWITZ*_

Before the nineteenth century, success on the battlefield was largely the result of the military competence of whichever king was in power. While frederick the great brought success in battle to Prussian arms, his successors did not have his talent, and this led to an inevitable decline in the generalship of the Army. Without competent operational and logistical planning, no amount of individual soldierly discipline or battlefield bravery could save the army from the combination of superior generalship and staff work of a talented adversary.
The need for a trained body of General Staff officers was the result of the *increase in the size of the 19th century armies* and their organization into separate divisions and corps. For both logistical and strategic reasons these formations usually marched separately and united only to do battle. The* complex management of these forces required professionally trained General Staff officers*.The country could no longer afford to wait until a war started to gather military staff talent. One carefully selected professional staff would do the work of planning logistics and training the Army in peace as well as in war.
In 1807 prussia was crushed by napoleon in a national humiliation,in the aftermath of this the prussians cleared house. King Frederick william III appointed Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,Stein and several promising young officers to his Military Reorganization Commission.





(Advice hitler didn't bother to follow in ww2)​
*Scharnhorst created the general staff*.Himself coming from a humble background and having advanced on merit alone,he wanted to open up all positions within the renewed Prussian Army for scientifically trained officers, without regard to their social background.However, he was realistic enough to realize that it was not possible in Prussia to
do away with a system that continued to select military leaders according to class and birth,and were consequently not trained for their tasks.Scharnhorst wanted to* diminish the weakness of this system by providing these army commanders with General Staff officers as their advisers.* This, then, served as the decisive root to support the need for a "commander's first adviser,"Although Prussian commanders of forces were still appointed by rigid seniority or royal patronage, each Army, Korps and Division commander had a staff-trained officer assigned as his Adjutant. Scharnhorst intended that they_ "support incompetent Generals, providing the talents that might otherwise be wanting among leaders and commanders"_.The unlikely pairing of the erratic but popular Blucher as Commander in Chief with Gneisenau as his Chief of Staff showed this system to its best advantage in the final years of the napoleonic wars.This succesful example institutionalized the general staff officer's role as the commander's first advisor.
That is, to* advise their commanders and assume joint responsibility for their actions*. This resulted in joint responsibility for commanders' decisions and the exercise of command and control of General Staff chiefs from army corps level upwards. Up to 1938, it was an unwritten law that army corps Chiefs of General Staffs were permitted to enter in the war diaries their opinions when they differed from the responsible commander's decision.

As part of its measures, *introductory military schools* in Berlin, Königsberg and Breslau, and the *Academy for Young Officers (later kriegsakademie), open to all applicants of merit*, were founded for the intellectual training of staff officers. In most non-Prussian military academies of the time, the emphasis of the training syllabus was the preparation of junior artillery and engineering officers, not strategic planners and as such this marked an important development.

Scharnhorst died in 1813,but his creation lived on and expanded.One of the early directors of the _Kriegsakademie_ was Clausewitz, a Reformer on the Military Reorganization Commission. From his studies and experiences of the , he provided a syllabus which became the central doctrine from which the staff worked. This standardisation of doctrine (which itself was an attempt to grasp the philosophy underlying warfare, rather than a narrow prescribed set of rules or tactical directives) was one of the distinguishing features of the Prussian General Staff model.

In 1816, the staff organised the Staff into the Eastern (Russia), Southern (Austria) and Western (France and possibly West German states) Divisions, which continually planned for likely and unlikely scenarios. As early as 1843, when Europe had been largely at peace for nearly thirty years and most major nations had no plans for war, observers noted sheaves of orders at the Prussian War Ministry, already made out to cover all foreseeable contingencies and requiring only a signature and a date stamp to be put into effect.




*EXPANSION - MOLTKE*​
Moltke was chief of the general staff for 31 years.He oversaw a massive expansion of it and 3 succesful wars against denmark,austria and france.These* successes elevated the the general staff to an autonomous body on par with the war ministry and independent of it*.
Moltke further streamlined the officer selection process.Each year, the Prussian Army's top 120 junior officers were selected by competitive examination to attend the _Kriegsakademie_. The academic standards at this institution were so high that fewer than half the entrants graduated successfully. From this elite, *Moltke selected the best twelve for his personal training as General Staff officers.* They attended theoretical studies, annual manoeuvres, "war rides'' (a system of tactical exercises without troops in the field) under Moltke himself, and war games and map exercises.Although these officers subsequently alternated between regimental and staff duties, they could be relied upon to think and act exactly as Moltke had taught them when they became the Chiefs of Staff of major formations. Moltke himself referred to them as the* "nervous system" of the Prussian Army*.Moltke needed only to issue brief directives to the main formations, leaving the staffs at the subordinate headquarters to implement the details according to the doctrines and methods he had laid down, while the Supreme Commands of his opponents became bogged down in a mountain of paperwork and trivia as they tried to control the entire army from a single overworked headquarters.
_''Build railroads ,not fortresses'' - Moltke._​
Moltke's wide experience also prompted the General Staff to consider fields of study outside the purely military, and rapidly adapt them to military use. Immediately upon his appointment, he established the _Abteilung_ (section or department) which studied and *promoted the development of railway networks* within Prussia and incorporated them into its deployment plans. He also formed telegraphic, and other scientific and technical departments within the General Staff and a Historical division, which analysed past and current conflicts and published accounts of them and lessons learned.The General Staff reformed by Moltke was the* most effective in Europe, an autonomous institution dedicated solely to the efficient execution of war*, unlike in other countries, whose staffs were often fettered by meddling courtiers, parliaments and government officials_._



_
*FIRST WORLD WAR - Deficiencies exposed*_

Already in Prussia under Moltke, the General Staff had achieved a special political significance. Since 1883, its head (and the commanding generals and commanders-in-chief) had the right of access to the Emperor, and it could therefore effectively make military decisions without the oversight of the Chancellor or the Reichstag. This was one of the seeds of the mass destruction of the First World War, as * military planning was not subject to political control. *
Thus, the Schlieffen Plan developed into the only war plan and into a kind of dogma, without many of the leading politicians being informed. Nor was the German Navy's high command informed.To an extent, the General Staff became obsessed with perfecting the methods which had gained victory in the late nineteenth century.The Schlieffen Plan committed Germany to an early outright offensive against France while Russia was still mobilising(so as soon as russia mobilized in response to austrian actions in the balkans,germany had to implement the schliffen plan before russia could finish it-thus locking germany into a single solution with* no flexibility*), and also required an unprovoked invasion of neutral Belgium, to make it possible to rapidly surround and annihilate the French army. *The rigidity of the plan, based around a minutely detailed mobilisation schedule and railway timetable, prevented any political moves which might have averted hostilities*, as Kaiser discovered on the eve of the war when he considered not invading France in order to avoid Great Britain joining Germany's enemies.
_
''War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means .... war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different .... war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense .... if war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief (ie. 'he Chief of the General Staff in the German system) a member of the Cabinet, so that the Cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.'' - Von clausewitz.
(Failure to heed this advice cost the general staff dear in WW1)

_
Additionally, it *failed to take adequate account of logistics*.Nor had the General Staff, before the war, considered the use of potential allies such as Turkey, or dissident factions within the French, British and Russian empires, to distract or weaken the Allied war effort._ "A swift victory over the main armies in the main theatre of war was the German General Staff's solution for all outside difficulties, and absolved them from thinking of war in its wider aspects."_,Typical napoleonic thinking though it was the same combination of* failure at grand strategy/realpolitik and logistics* that had proven to be napoleon's downfall.

The General Staff was divided between the central Großer Generalstab in Berlin and the general staffs of the corps and division HQs. The head of the Großer Generalstab was the "Chief of the General Staff" and was also the technical superior of all general staff officers.The General Staff under Schlieffen, and subsequently under Moltke, did not compensate for logistic flaws nor provide contingencies in case of the failure of their original plan to achieve quick success. Although superior German staff work at division, corps and army level throughout the First World War contributed to their continuous run of successes until very near the end of the war, the German Homefront collapsed under the strain.Thus the German General Staff* lost the war of attrition *against the allies in part due to logistical/material reasons. Focusing exclusively on military aspects of the war, the General Staff ignored political needs.*Sheer military virtuosity cannot compensate for the lack of political direction and national strategic objectives.*




Another serious deficiency of the ww1 era was the excess of the 'chief system'.
In the course of the First World War, the General Staff became the strongest political power in Germany.Supreme Army Command under Field Marshal von Hindenburg and his first General Staff officer,Ludendorff, not only directed the operations at all fronts, but also increasingly determined the political destiny of the German Empire relegating the kaiser and the reichstag to figureheads.
Prussian German General Staff system encourages a powerful adviser to the responsible superior. It was necessary to appoint strong personalities as Chiefs of the General Staff of World War I army commanders of high nobility.They in fact commanded the armies of the princes.
Generals von Falkenhayn and Ludendorff extended the powers of the Chiefs of General Staffs and* increasingly dealt directly with them, and not with their responsible commanders*. The Supreme Army Command increasingly called the first advisers to account for mistakes in the command and control of major formations, and not the commanders in chief of the army groups and armies.

_*REICHSWEHR : RESURRECTION.*_

We have already seen how seeckt resurrected the german army in secret.He further strengthened the training procedure into by far the most difficult in the world.
Every Reichwehr officer had to take part in military district examinations. The best 10 candidates then underwent a 2-year training course for "commander's staff officers" in the group commands.In the third year of training, the officers attended an obligatory training course in Berlin. Applied tactics was regarded as the most important subject of the military district examination. It also included papers on tactical theory, weapons, field craft, engineering and eight general subjects including a foreign language. Three or four problems had to be answered in a period of 6 to 10 hours. They were usually based on the tactics of an infantry regiment reinforced with elements of other arms, and involved the presentation of the regimental commander's estimate of the situation and his orders to follow. Together with his examination results, the character of each candidate was assessed from the annual reports of his superiors.
The process of selection extended throughout the 3 years of training. Of approximately 70, only some 15 went to the third year's course. It ended with a 2-week tactical field exercise which was passed finally by 8 to 10 students. The objective of the program was to train assistants for the senior field commanders and the central command structure, and to produce officers to be advisers, assistants and executors of leaders' decisions. The curriculum was much broader in scope than in the prewar War Academy.
_
*HITLER YEARS : *_

The years leading upto the war saw a* gradual decline in the power of the 'demigods' of the general staff*.First the luftwaffe and kriegsmarine created their own general staffs.Then the new OKW general staff emerged as a parallel command structure to the army general staff(OKH).Hitler curtailed the power of the army once he had consolidated his position by purges.Beck,the chief of staff resigned and was succeded by Hlader in 1938,who remained one of the most important german war planners till late 1942 when he was forced to step out,from the on OKW gradually came to eclipse the general staff -both being controlled by hitler who was now supreme commander and army chief.Halder made one significant change to the general staff.With noble commanders no longer an issue after ww1,
*Halder, explicitly dropped the joint responsibility of General Staff officers for command and control when the new manual for the General Staff in Wartime was written*. He decreed that the commander alone was responsible externally and internally, and that the General Staff officer had to take a share in everything and deal with the problems as if he had to bear the responsibility himself. However, the General Staff officer would only be internally responsible.While the traditional German staff administration and planning was to contribute greatly to the early German successes, many of these triumphs were the result of the initiative of comparatively junior officers who were opposed to the restraint of the General Staff.




(Von Manstein - a product of the general staff)​*ORGANIZATION:*

*The General Staff was divided between the central Großer Generalstab in Berlin and the general staffs of the corps and division HQs.* The head of the _Großer Generalstab_ was the "Chief of the General Staff" and was also the technical superior of all general staff officers.
The field staffs were responsible for operations,mobilization plans,logistics,transportation,exercises and intelligence for their respective divisions and corps and acted on broad objectives set from the great general staff in berlin.

The Chief of the General Staff's chief deputy held the title of _Generalquartiermeister_. Beneath them were the five _Oberquartiermeisters_, *who supervised the heads of the General Staff departments*. The Railroad Department had the largest number of officers assigned, while the Second Department(Operational planning) was the most important.(Some small changes were made during war)


Chief of the General Staff
Central Department
6th Department: Annual Maneuver
Military History Department II: Older wars

Oberquartiermeister I
2nd Department: Operations
Railroad Department
4th Department: Foreign Fortifications

Oberquartiermeister II
3rd Department: France and Great Britain
9th Department: Netherland, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy

Oberquartiermeister III
5th Department: Operational studies
8th Department: Kriegsakademie

Oberquartiermeister IV
1st Department: Scandinavia, Russia, Turkey
10th Department: Austria-Hungary,Poland and the Balkans

Oberquartiermeister V​
Military History Department I: Recent wars
Archives and Library

*UNIQUE FEATURES** :*




_Powerful Role of Staff Officer :_

He has a dual responsibility; specifically, as is the case in other armies, the *General Staff officer relieves his commander from the technical details of staff work*.However, in the German system, *his main task is to advise his commander in all matters, and he is entitled to the commander's attention*. The General Staff officer bears the shared responsibility for the relevance of his advice. Thus the General Staff officer has a position that makes him stand out from the rest of the staff officers. While all staff officers give advice to their senior officers, the General Staff officer additionally provides advice to his commander in all relevant matters. *He has the right to urge the commander to make a decision, and the commander must listen to him*. The General Staff officer is entitled to articulate diverging opinions. * he bears joint responsibility* because he is accountable for the relevance of his advice. The first General Staff officer of a major unit or command has an especially elevated position. He *actively participates in all stages of command and control.* Together with his commander, he evaluates the mission, estimates the situation and develops the decision. After this process it is no longer possible to say who made the individual contributions. The commander alone, however, has the authority to make decisions on his own. *Once a decision has been made, the General Staff officer loyally carries out his orders.*

_''The decision is taken in private, and when the two men come out,there is only one decision. They have amalgamated it; they share one mind with each other. Should the opinions have differed, in the evening of this happy day in a military marriage the two halves will no longer know who gave in.The competence of command and control is based on this fusion of the two personalities. It does not matter if the order bears the commander's signature, or if the Chief of Staff has signed it for the High Command (today 'For the commander') according to our old custom. The commander always issues his orders through his Chief of Staff, and even the most senior subordinate leader must submit himself to his orders without objection, because his orders will always be given on behalf of the supreme commander'' -Von Seeckt_​The* powerful role of the staff officer in the german system was unique*.In anglo-american armies of the era the commander was supreme and staff officers largely concerned themselves with technical and logistical details and had no institutionalized right to give advice.The french system was closest.
But even the French General Staff system does not provide for a jointly responsible adviser.
The general devises and directs his operations with his cosast advisers including one or several tactically trained officers who take up his thoughts and cooperate in the closest way. (In France, these officers are called 'adjoints'.) The Chief of Staff is responsible for feeding resources to the battle. He immediately directs all supply operations and issues orders to the respective agencies.
The adjoints in the French staff system are integrated in the organization of the French commander's Cabinet. They work exclusively for him. They are personal staff officers who supply original ideas to their commanders and fulfill functions which are done within the German General Staff System by the General Staff officers. They are, however, not advisers to their commanders in the German sense.However this powerful role of the staff officer had inherent potential for weakness as well as seen in ww1.

_Superior Training Procedures:_

The training procedure of the german system was the *most extensive and exhaustive in the world* as already described.It also followed an* open staff system*,meaning.After passing the gauntlet and entering actual general staff service an officer was* alternated between field staffs with the corps and divisional HQs,academic service with the actual great general staff in berlin and regimental command in districts for practical experience.*
The total number of german general staff officer active rarely exceeded 200-300.This small elite cadre just enabled unity of thought and could quickly disseminate new doctrinal practices throughout the army.



_
Mission Oriented Command & Control :_

_''Resolute action is a must in war.... Commanders who merely wait for orders cannot seize favorable opportunities. They must always keep in mind that indecision and the failure to act might be just as fatal as action based on a wrong decision'' - Moltke.
_​The cornerstone of the* German leadership philosophy* in peace and war was mission-oriented command and control(Auftragstaktik) keeping in line with Moltke's maxim 'no plan survives contact with the enemy'..It is described thus -
_'Mission-oriented command and control is the first and foremost command and control principle in the Army of relevance in war even more than in peace. It affords the subordinate commander freedom of action in the execution of his mission, the extent depending on the type of mission to be accomplished. The superior commander informs his subordinates of his intentions, designates clear objectives and provides the assets required. He gives orders concerning the details of mission execution only for the purpose of coordinating actions serving the same objective. Apart from that, he only intervenes if failure to execute the mission endangers the realization of his intentions. The subordinate commanders can thus act on their own in accordance with the superior commander's intentions; they can immediately react to developments in the situation and exploit favorable opportunities''._
The principle of mission-oriented command and control *grants commanders at all levels a maximum of freedom of action* and was a *major cause for german success at tactical and operational levels particularly in fast flowing mobile warfare against rigid centralized enemies .*

*NEXT: WEHRKRIES -THE MILITARY DISTRICTS & MANPOWER MOBILIZATION *​

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## AUSTERLITZ

*RECRUITMENT,REPLACEMENT & MOBILIZATION*






*(German wartime Military Districts)*​
*REGIONAL ORGANIZATION: WEHRKREISE*
Germany had a system of Military districts(_Wehrkreis_) to *relieve field commanders of as much administrative work as possible and to provide a regular flow of trained recruits and supplies to the Field Army*. The Field army was separate from the Home Command. The responsibilities of* training, conscription, supply, and equipment were entrusted to the Home Command*. In peacetime, the _Wehrkreis_ was the home to the Infantry Corps of the same number and all subordinate units of that Corps. The corps commander also commanded the _Wehrkreis_.

The three branches of the Armed Forces submit to the Armed Forces High Command, their personnel requirements on the 15th of each month for the second month, following. According to the demands and the general replacement situation the various _Wehrkreis_ headquarters then receive orders specifying how many men are to be inducted for each branch of the Armed Forces..* Every unit in the Field Army is affiliated for personnel replacement purposes with a specific unit of the Replacement Training Army, located in its own original Wehrkreis and known as an Ersatz unit*. The function of the latter is to induct recruits, to provide for their training, and to see that they are held in readiness to be sent off to the field unit in batches or individually as required.
Each infantry regiment which took to the field at the beginning of the war left behind at its home station a battalion cadre bearing its own number and known as its _Ersatz_ battalion. The primary purpose of this battalion was to* receive recruits, train them, and dispatch them as replacements* to the field regiment.The replacement training units are subordinate to the local _Wehrkreis_ Headquarters.

Each Military districts is subdivided into local recruiting sub-areas.In all, the efficient wehrkreis regional military district organization ensured that a group of recruits were usually from the same region and thus had *greater cohesion* and also that the* field army only needed to concern itself with frontline military campaigning *while the home command dealt with the secondary logistical issues.





(Organization of an wehrkreis)​*MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT:*

Military service was compulsory in germany from 1814-1918.The treaty of versailles forbade conscription but this was resumed in 1935 by hitler.Except for regular personnel in active field duty all german manpower was divided thus -

_Reserve I:_ Those under 35 who have completed their regular period of active service and been discharged
_Reserve II:_ Those under 35 who have had short training.(usually meaning the 'lost classes' -those that would have had military training between 1919-1934 if conscription had been active and later hastily retrained)
_Ersatzreserve I:_ Fit men under 35 who have not been trained.
_Ersatzreserve II:_ Unfit and limited-service men under 35 who have not been trained.
_Landwehr I:_ Trained men between 35 and 45
_Landwehr II:_ Untrained men between 35 and 45
_Landsturm I:_ Trained men between 45 and 55
_Landsturm II:_ Untrained men between 45 and 55


The german mobilization of 1939 was streamlined and drew lessons from the clumsy act of 1914.In 1914 the entire trained male manpower of germany was mobilized in a single week expanding the army from 800,000 to 4 million men and causing *massive disruption to german agriculture and industry* from which the homefront never fully recovered.The german general staff studied and modified this approach in 1939 and *mobilization was carried out in 'waves'*.Additionally each man was called up by mail,not by public proclamation calling up classes(meaning eligible males born in a certain year) by which method selective call-ups spared critical personnel in heavy industry and agriculture.

_Wave 1 _was activated on the first day of mobilization.It consisted of *51* *regular professional active divisions*.These were the spearhead of the wehrmacht.
_Wave 2_ was activated on the 3rd day.It consisted of* 16 fully trained reserve divisions* of Reserve I category.
_Wave 3_ was activated on the 6th day.Consisted of* 21 *reserve divisions of Landwehr i category largely.These were mostly* word war 1 veterans* with a small refresher course.They were generally used for only defensive purposes.
_Wave 4_ was also activated on day 6.Consisted of *14 partly trained reservists* still undergoing training.They mostly amde up the numbers.

In all at the outbreak of war in 1939. *780,000 regular german army was reinforced by 1.1 million reservists*.After the first week,the home army took over the responsibility of raising new units and replacing lost personnel in active duty ones through the wehrkreise.Before the french campaign several new units were created to add to this initially mobilized force.

*NEXT:CHAIN OF COMMAND - FROM ARMY GROUP TO COMPANY*

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## LowPost

AUSTERLITZ said:


> The Red army however had just been *crippled by stalin's mass purges*,in the *swampy snow conditions the red army soldiers without adequate trainin*g or winter equipment were bamboozled and ambushed repeatedly by highly motivated Finnish troops well trained and equipped for such conditions riding in skis and armed with tommy guns (sub machine guns) and by snipers.​


​Strictly speaking I wouldn't consider the term Tommy Gun synonymous to SMG. In fact, the Finns were equipped with the domestically-designed Suomi KP/-31.

Suomi KP/-31 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Keep it going though, mate. I'm looking forward to an account of the Burma campaign, the battles in North Africa as well as the Battle of the Bulge. ​

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## AUSTERLITZ

*WEHRMACHT CHAIN OF COMMAND*




​The chain of command of any modern army including the wehrmacht begins with the squad-platoon-company-battalion-regiment-division-corps-army-army group.Below is a graphic representation of the modern us army structure which is very similar ,however *wehrmacht used regiment instead of brigade*and the number of personnel per unit differed slightly which we will see.





(Modern us army-wehrmacht used regiment for brigade)​*OVERALL FIELD ORGANIZATION:*

_Principles of Organization_* - *
The german army's basic principle of organization is the_ Einheit Principle._That is,*standard types of small units with standard organization,training and equipment are the building blocks upon which larger organizations are built*.Thus platoons are built on squads,companies on platoons.Battalions on companies.Regiments on battalions and divisions on regiments.And so on.
Second principle is the* tactical and administrative self-sufficiency of units.*
Third principle is the ease with which a* german unit maybe broken up into 2 or more self-sufficient all arms combat groups for specific missions on a temporary basis.*An infantry division may allocate one infantry regiment,plus artillery and antitank units9a battalion of light artillery a company of anti tank guns) from its divisional reserve to form a combat group.Once mission is accomplished the assets return to the divisional reserve.




*Army Group-*

Above represents the organization of wehrmacht field forces,which is divided in wartime into several army groups(above pic depicts only 1 scenario-number is never fixed).An *army group controls several armies and is responsible for a whole theatre of war.*It by itself is not a permanent organization,but an HQ of officers directing the battle from the rear and co-ordinating the movements of the armies with only a few security units and signal battalions as its own forces.The armies it commands are permanent administrative entities.Given the scope of an operation an army group may also hold in reserve seperate corps or powerful divisions as an armygroup reserve for exploitation or counterattack which are directly subject to its command and not to any of the subordinate armies.Armygroups in the wehrmacht were led by Field marshals or rarely generals.





(Types of organizational entities in the wehrmacht)​_Example_ - An example is the german order of battle for france in 1940.(discussed more in detail later)




​Here the wehrmacht forces were divided into 3 armygroups which controlled the armies which in turn commanded the divisions-Divisions being the basic large building block of modern armies and the benchmark of its quantitative strength.

_*Field Army -* _

A field army is a* large permanent combined-arms military formation*(usually under a colonel general) that is both tactically and administratively self-sufficient.It is composed of several (2-5) army corps with each corps commanding (2-7) divisions.Apart from the sub-ordinate corps an army also commands -its own security,supplies and signals personnel.
*Plus individual divisions as an army reserve* seperate from the corps.Plus *additional army level assets allocated from the army high command*(GHQ) pool including heavy artillery(seperate from the organic artillery present in every field division),special armoured formations(seperate from individual panzer divisions),engineer troops etc.*Germany also had a practice of attatching a luftwaffe air fleet*(consisting of fighter and bombers) to an army for close co-operation between the 2 services on and above their common designated battle area.
German Armies were of 2 types -
General armies
Panzer Armies(controlling several corps of predominantly mechanized/armoured elements)

Army level assets allocated from GHQ pool -
For example,An army artillery regiment (Artillery regimental HQ,3 heavy artillery battalions - 2 of 240mm guns,1 of 150 mm guns),plus observer balloon company and a meteorological platoon.
An army engineer regiment(Engineer regimental HQ,2 engineer battalions,4 bridge building battalions)
Plus a mapping company etc.
Army HQ may employ these assets at critical locations requiring special attention or expertise.(a large river crossing operation for ex)

Army headquarters troops -
The army headquarters itself has few security units.For example.
One infantry company.(100-150 men)One anti tank platoon.One armoured car company.

Army Staff -



The* brain of the army*.It assists the army commander in communicating and co-ordinating with the corps,operational planning,supplies and administration.The army staff is divided into 5 sections(ignore section 6-introduced late in war for propaganda purposes).

Section I is the* most vital called the Generalstaff section*.It is staffed exclusively by general staff officers.Divided into -
1.Operations
2.Supply & Administration
3.Intelligence
4.Training
All the chief officers of each branch report directly to the Chief of staff of the army who is also a general staff officer.*The chief of staff is second -in-command to the Commander of the army*(who may or may not be an officer with generalstaff training) and his first advisor.
The* operations officer (Ia)is second-in-command to the chief of staff and acts in his stead in his absence*.The logistics officer is Ib and the intelligence officer Ic.(If faced with officer shortage only the Ia and Ib were general staff officers)Id training.
​*Section II* -Routine administration(of rear areas),headed by a general staff officer .If generalstaff personnel shortage otherwise.

*Section III* - Legal branch with civilian officials

*Section IV* - Supply,medical,veterinary service representatives.

*Section V *- Chaplain(priest) service(civilian).

Functionally the army staff were divided into 3 groups.As can be seen below -Tactical Group.Supply and administration group and services group.



*Tactical Group* comprises of Operations Officer_*(Ia)*_ and Intelligence officer_* (Ic)*_ of section I.
*Supply and Administration group* comprises Logistics Officer_*(Ib)*_ of section I and whole of section IV.
*Services Group* comprises Sections II,III AND V.
The tactical and supply groups are the* forward echelon* of the army staff(meaning they are situated close to the frontline) while services group is *rear echelon*(rear area).

Apart from this each army staff has 4 specialist officers - Artillery,Signals,Antitank and Engineer.These act as technical advisors to the army commander in the employment of their respective arms.

*Army Corps - *

An army corps is a* large combined arms military formation of 2 or more divisions grouped for tactical purposes*.The first formal corps were used by the french in the napoleonic wars and was rapidly adopted by all european armies.A german army corps had several divisions plus its own permanent staff,corps HQ troops(for security and communication) and corps level assets allocated from GHQ pool.Several corps make up an army.

Corps level assets allocated from GHQ pool.
For example,2 Artillery regiments with their regimental HQs including-
2 Medium artillery battalions(105mm)
4 Medium artilery battalions(150 mm)
4 Heavy artillery battalions(210 mm)
2 artillery observation battalions(fire co-ordination)
Plus Engineer Bridging battalions.
1 infantry battalion(maybe special purpose troops)
1 Heavy antitank battalion
1 Antitank battalion.
(Note *corps level asset allocation is very strong compared to army*,this is because corps is immediate higher command to division-the basic fighting unit,much closer to the action and requires strong reserve units to react to situations.The antitank battalions especially form a blocking force reserve for any armoured breakthrough from the enemy)

Corps HQ troops 
More or less same as army.A few signals and security units.

Corps Staff -
The staff of a german corps designed to assist its commander is headed by a generalstaff officer(chief of staff) who acts as the commander's first advisor.Below him the *corps staff is an exact replica of the army staff* divided into 5 sections and functionally seperated into tactical group,supply group and services group.The most important staff officer after the chief of staff is again the operations officer (Ia).Corps was generally commanded by a general.

Apart from this a corps staff has 3 specialist officers acting as technical advisors in the branches - Signals ,Antitank troops and Engineers.They are also responsible for field training of the troops in their respective arms and command the corps level assets of their respective branches.

German army corps were of several types -
1.Infantry Corps(consisting of infantry divisions)
2.Panzer Corps(Panzer,motorized or mechanized divisions)
3.Mountain Corps(Mountain divisions largely)
4.Reserve Corps(Reserve/garrison divisions)




_*Division -*_

A *division* is a large military formation, usually* consisting of between 10,000 and 30,000 soldiers*(depending on type and organization). In most armies, a division is composed of several regiments or brigades; in turn, several divisions typically make up a corps.A division *tends to be the smallest combined arms unit capable of independent ops*, this is due to its self-sustaining role as a unit with a range of combat troops and suitable combat support forces, which can be divided into various organic combinations.A division is both a* tactical and administrative unit*.Commanded by a Generallieutnant or Generaloberst(majorgeneral) in the wehrmacht.A division was composed of several regiments of its corresponding type plus organic combined arms assets and its own staff.
There were several types of wehrmacht divisions -
1.Infantry Division
2.Panzer Division(Armoured)
3.Motorized Division(Infantry in trucks)
4.Mechanized Division/Panzergrenadier Division(infantry in halftracks largely)
5.Gebirsjager Division(mountain division)
6.Light Division(Experimental type combining armoured cars,foot infantry,self propelled artillery and AT)
7.Cavalry division
8.Security Division(Protection of Lines of Communication,anti-partisan warfare)
9.Reserve division(occupation and training)
*Organization and strength of these vary greatly* and the foremost combat types will be described seperately in detail later.

*GHQ doesn't provide any assets at divisional level.Each division has its own organic assets* which vary according to division type but usually always contain artillery,antitank,antiaircraft and reconssaince elemnts.
The staff structure is exactly same as in corps and army but there is no chief of staff.The operations officer acts as the chief of staff in wehrmacht divisions.
Also attatched to the divisional staff is a divisional artillery,antitank,signals and engineer officer.They are not only advisors but command the units in field.

*NEXT:ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY:*
*GERMAN INFANTRY -DEVELOPMENT.ORGANIZATION.TYPES,EQUIPMENT.TACTICS*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY*




​Often overshadowed by the glamour of tactics and technical comparison of weapons,supply and administration are vital to maintainence and survival of an army in the field.Logistics was also often one of the flaws in the german war machine.

On the outbreak of war, all the parts of Europe and its adjacent waters which might be the scene of operations became, from the German point of view, the* Theater of War* _(Kriegsgebiet)._ Within this area the Germans distinguish between the *Theater of Operations* and the* Zone of the Interior*_._Since, in the German concept, wars should be conducted as far as possible beyond their own frontiers, the military nomenclature also provides for an intermediate area known as the* Zone of Military Administration* or Occupied Territory
Much of occupied europe came under the designation of zone of the interior during the course of the war.Its administration was under the command of the Replacement/Home army chief.

*REAR AREA ADMINISTRATION:*




The Theater of Operations itself is divided into the *Combat Zone* and the *Communications Zone*. The latter may be entirely taken up by the Army Rear Areas.Within the Communications Zone, the Army Group Rear Area (when it exists) is placed under the authority of a Commander of Army Group Rear Area _,_ who has the status of a corps commander and is responsible to the Commander of the Army Group. His main tasks are to provide for the military administration of the area and to protect the security of the lines of communication so that the army group commander can devote himself entirely to combat operations. Similarly, the Army Rear Area is controlled by a Commander of Army Rear Area with the status of a division commander. The rear area commanders have at their disposal security units and police troops and set up various types of administrative headquarters.

*LOGISTICS:*

The german logistical system was complex and often inefficient(at the grand strategical level),*mostly due to political reasons leading to overlap of authority between the powers and responsibilities of competing offices from different organizations*.Economic production in Germany is highly centralized and under complete governmental control.The Ministry for Armament and War Production controls production of war material and ammunition; the Ministry for Economic Affairs controls all other industrial production; the Ministry for Food and Agriculture controls food production. Among them these *three ministries control production of the supplies for the Wehrmacht*.

Regarding the estimate of needs the general staff,on the basis of High Command directives, the* detailed estimates of the number or quantity of each article of supply are worked out by the technical branches* concerned; they must be adjusted to the industrial, labor, and raw material potentialities of the nation.The three branches of the Armed Forces and the _Waffen-SS_(which has seperate logistical chain,leading to more confusion) establish their procurement policies on an interservice basis and coordinate the use of railways, canals, and roads for military traffic. In addition, for a number of particularly critical items, the Armed Forces High Command has created special depots which are at its exclusive disposal.

The Army High Command (_OKH_) has the direct responsibility for a well functioning army supply system. Its wartime supply functions are divided into two distinct phases. The first phase, centering in the Zone of the Interior, is supervised by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army(Home command) _ and _ *who organizes the procurement of supplies, their storage in suitably placed depots, and their distribution to home and field units*. It is his duty to interpret high command directives on an over-all nationwide basis. He determines what proportion of supplies is essential for use by garrison and training units, what amount can be sent to the front, and which areas are in the best position to issue supplies. The second phase, the *Field Army (Feldheer) supply system, is controlled by the Chief of Field Army Supply and Administration who administers the sending of requisitions to depots established by the Chief of Army Equipment and the receipt, storage, and distribution of supplies in the field*.





(The messy supply distribution system of the german army,large number of competing agencies create inefficiency.Note chief of army equipment is head of home army.Corps area means wehrkreis.)​
_Supply Chain -_

After acceptance at the factories, the flow of equipment and ammunition to field and home units may take a number of routes:
By way of equipment and ammunition depots.
By way of equipment parks.
Direct from the factory.
Through _SS_ depots.
Through special Armed Forces High Command (_OKW_) depots.

*1*.*Army Equipment Depots* The agencies responsible for most of the* storage, issue, and repair of equipment* and for the* storage, issue, and salvaging of ammunition* belong to a separate branch of the Army, the Ordnance Branch.Army Equipment Depots controlled by the Ordnance Headquarters, handle weapons, tanks, tank spare parts, motor transport, assault boats, radio apparatus, anti-gas equipment, bridge materials, special clothing, concrete mixers, and manuals, as well as many other articles. They do not furnish ammunition, fuel, rations, clothing (other than special types), medical and veterinary equipment, horses, or most types of individual equipment.
*Army Ammunition Depots* are the main German centers for the *storage and issue of ammunition*. Frequently they concentrate upon particular types of ammunition

*2*.The *Wehrkries parks *complement the equipment depots in the handling of motor transport, engineer equipment, and anti-gas equipment, and form the principal centers for the distribution of horses, veterinary equipment, and medical equipment. Requisitions for repairs reach the parks from both home and field units. Primarily, a park is responsible for servicing its allotted area; usually it also is charged with the supply and maintenance of designated units of the Field Army.There are seperate motor transport and medical parks.

*3*.There are *seperate clothing,fuel depots which directly supply the army.*The waffen ss takes its share.(increasing role from 1943)

_Supply to Field Army Units :_

The supply system of the Field Army is simple and flexible. Its *main objective during combat is to replace all supplies used during one day of combat by the beginning of the next day*. Rules and regulations are not mandatory; much discretion therefore remains with the supply officers who are encouraged to move supplies as far forward as possible without reloading, to salvage all usable materiel, and to limit expenditure of supplies as far as possible.
Supplies are transported by rail from home depots to army railheads where they are picked up by army supply columns and transported to army dumps and parks. Division supply columns receive rations, fuel, and ammunition at army dumps, and equipment at army parks. They carry the rations, fuel, and ammunition to division distributing points, and the equipment to division collecting points. At these points, supplies are transferred to battalion supply columns and carried to battalion or company supply points where the supplies are turned over to the troops.




The *supply situation is controlled at every stage by the general staff officers of various units* headed by the_ Ib_(from army group to division each have their own Ib -as shown earlier in general staff post)_._When the_ Ib_, acting in the name of his commander, issues supply directives, their execution usually falls to the following:
(1) Arms and Equipment Section
(2) Intendance Section, dealing with rations, clothing, and pay.
(3) Medical Section (IVb).
(4) Veterinary Section (IVc).
(5) Motor Transport Section (V).
(6) Supply Troop Commander, commanding the organic or attached supply troops.

The staff officers concerned with supply in the Field Army and their duties are as follows: (1) At Field Army headquarters, the* Chief of Field Army Supply and Administration* is directly responsible to the Chief of Staff of the Field Army and constantly is kept informed of the supply situation of the various armies. One of his main functions is *forwarding the requirements of the armies to the Chief of Army Equipment*. He regulates the evacuation of prisoners and wounded, and the use of communications in the theater of operations. Large stocks of materials, including captured materials and mobile supply trains, are under his control. Important repair centers are also maintained under his control.
At army group headquarters, the Army Group _Ib_ intervenes only when a critical situation requires action,* since army groups are not in the normal chain of supply*. Normally his most important function is the supervision of security units which safeguard supplies in the communications zones. Units attached to an army group are supplied through the army in whose area they are located.
At army headquarters, the Army _Ib_ administers the collation and forwarding of requisitions, *the receipt of supplies from Zone of the Interior depots, the distribution of supplies to lower echelons, and the maintenance of important dumps and repair centers.*
At corps headquarters, the Corps _Ib_, who always has been a link in the chain of requisitioning, although the* larger proportion of supplies still pass direct from army dumps to divisions.* In addition to handling the supply of organic corps troops, the Corps _Ib_ supervises the distribution of supplies from corps dumps to lower echelons.
At division headquarters, the Division _Ib_ makes his requisition to the Corps _Ib_ on the basis of requisitions and reports from the troop units. He controls the division services of supply and provides a systematic supply of reserves of all kinds for the troops. Like the Army _Ib_, he is in the *normal chain of supply*.

*NEXT: GERMAN INFANTRY*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY*







_''The decisive factor in our successes was the self-sacrifice,devotion to duty and valour of the frontsoldaten,the willingness of commanders at all levels to assume responsibility that are the hallmarks of the german soldier''_
- _Von Manstein_​Although the panzer divisions reaped most of the glory,the core of the wehrmacht remained the horse drawn foot infantry- The _Frontsoldtaen_ or _Landser_,without whom no successes would have been possible.German infantry fought in western europe,russia,the balkans,italy and north africa and in every theatre earned a *reputation for tactical flexibility,efficiency and extreme tenacity*.Time after time despite tremendous odds these qualities beat back far larger numbers of enemy troops .While the allies surpassed the germans on grand strategic and operational levels in the late war period,*in tactical prowess german soldiers remained formidable opponents right till the very end*.German infantry were opponents that could be hated or feared,but whose fighting qualities were universally respected on all fronts.In 1940 the german infantry was the best in the world.The *secret lay not only in its leadership philosophy and doctrine,but also its training*.

*BASIC INFANTRY TRAINING:*

_Hitleryouth and RAD:_
We have seen how the recruitment took place by call-ups in 'waves' through the wehrkreise.Military service was compulsory,all german youths that entered the wehrmacht moreover had come through service in 2 paramilitary organizations before joining the army.The* Hitler youth* and the* RAD*(German Labour Service).
The HJ(Hitlerjugend) was responsible for training between 14 to 18 years age.The labour service was compulsory as a six month service between 18 and 24 immediately before the army call-up.RAD thus served as middle ground between HJ and Wehrmacht.Training was based on hard physical exercise, foot drill, map reading,field craft and weapon training with small bore weapons.HJ also served as a platform for ideological indoctrination.

_Training Depots:_
Basic training for german infantrymen was carried out in the training depots.Throughout the war *german basic training remained the most effective* and rigorous of all armies and was able to churn out dependable soldiers almost to the end,even when the proper requirements in the quality and age of manpower declined from late 1942 onwards.*Training period of 16 weeks* was planned in detail to put all available time to good use.Aim was to produce a self-sufficient soldier comfortable with his equipment,able to endure hardship of campaigning, obedient to his superiors but possesing enough initiative and tactical skill to be able to command one rank above his own.The basic motto of the training programme was -
_''Sweat saves blood''_



*
The Training programme - *
The recruits were divided into sections(lowest sub-unit 9-10 men),and met their section leader or Gefreiter(usually a veteran).Each section was allotted a room in the barracks.They were then issued personal uniform and equipment and given a haircut.The *training day would begin at 5:00 am* when they would be thrown out of their beds.They then had to clean the room,lockers,tidy up the beds,shave and dress.A small period of running exercise may or maynot be added.At 6:45 breakfast of coffee and bread given to be finished in 15 minutes.This breakfast would often be made unavailable on purpose to replicate battlefield conditions.Each day was divided into morning and afternoon square.*Typically morning training would include lecture and drill on the barracks square*.Lectures would be made by platoon commander regarding the soldier's objective and place of the german army in society etc.Tactical lectures were not given at this stage,german method emphasised introducing tactical methods by practical example in the field.Lunch would be at 12:30.At 1:30 all members of a platoon would be assembled and inspected and given notices on personal development(if necessary) by the gefreiter or platoon sergeant.*Afternoon training would typically include hours of physical exercise and field training or weapons training at the firing range*.Evening meal was taken at 6:30PM.Rest of the evening hours would be spent in cleaning uniforms,kit,weapons,the room and miscellaneous activity which increased as training period advanced.
The training itself was divided into - _Barracks Training_ & _Field Training_

*I.Barracks Training - *

Barracks training involved* personal cleanliness* (which was heavily stressed), as well as *weapons cleaning*, and the inevitable chores of floor polishing,bed making and general household duties with which all armies concern themselves.
Barracks training* fostered team spirit and created the bonds of friendship* in sections that lasted into battle
Boots had to be carefully maintained,foot damage caused by badly fitting boots was a serious offence.
Recruits also had to strip back their beds every morning to allow them to air as hot, sweaty soldiers have never been renowned for their personal hygiene.Lockers, too, were subject to the basic rule of tidiness, although the German Army
at this time did not make a fetish of'spit and polish' like some other armies.
*Punishment *for error was swift and *were also regarded as training events*, and so polishing dustbins and painting grass green were not among the prescribed sanctions. Instead, men would be made to go on a long run in full field gear, or made to practise field movements, especially crawling through muddy sumps and wading through streams
and rivers. On many occasions the punishment was physically very demanding.One soldier wrote:
_''I had to put on the punishment pack ... which weighed nearly eighty pounds... After two hours my helmet was burning hot from the sun, and by the end I needed all my willpower to keep my knees from buckling... I learned that a good
soldier does not cross the barracks square with his hands in his pockets.''_​



_*II.Field Training -* _

Few hours a day was devoted to *Rifle drill on the barracks square*.This was mainly to* foster discipline and obedience.*However, rifle drill in the German Army was not limited to parade handling: it also* included tactical handling *— loading, unloading, making safe and cleaning.

_1.Weapons Training_ - 

_Rifles_ -Core of field training was weapons training.Recruits were issued with the standard german army rifle -The reliable and accurate* Mauser 98*.Rifle cleaning and maintenance were heavily emphasized.Throughout 16 week period the recruit endured 398 instructional periods on rifle drill,familiarity and cleaning/loading and 234 periods on shooting practice.On average a recruit spent as many as 40 sessions per week with his rifle and fired over 300 rounds.This made the weapon second nature to him.German army doctrine however neglected bayonet training as it viewed riflemen in a supporting fire role to the squad LMG than in an independent assault role.This would cause problems in cases of hand to hand fighting(especially in russia).

Training in rifle skills went on throughout the soldier s life in the German Army, and his *marksmanship was under constant review*. The training began with 'dry' aiming (no cartridge in the weapon and using tripods and an aiming disk) under the strict supervision of an NCO. Once he had learned the basics of holding and aiming his rifle properly, the soldier progressed to the training tables. Each trainee fired a few rounds from different positions from the training tables, with an NCO constantly at his side to correct faults and to improve technique.The first shooting position was lying down with the rifle supported, then soldiers practised shooting while sitting.Trainees progressed to unsupported firing lying, kneeling,sitting and (most difficult of all) standing. Every round fired was recorded by the company clerk, and the platoon NCOs were always willing to increase the required training if necessary. *The essence of the training was to make every recruit utterly familiar with his rifle and its capabilities on the range*. Field firing with live ammunition camelater, but only when the trainee was well versed in safety procedures and was known to be able to exercise common sense.As soon as the *best shots in each section were recognized, these men were instructed intensively on the MG 34*, naturally in addition to their other tasks.

_Machine Guns _-The German Army *based its infantry sections on the firepower of the machine gun*.The machine gun had proved its value in both defence and attack during World War I,and Von Seeckt recommended that every infantry section should consist of a machinegun to win local firefights, with a number of riflemen acting as support for thein defence, and as the assault party in the attack.This principle meant that every section now had the firepower of a platoon of riflemen (at least), and was able to lay down defensive, interdictory or suppressing fire as the situation required_._In 1940 the mg34 was the standard machine gun of the german infantry -the first all-purpose general machine gun in history.All recruits received initial training on the weapon, but anyone who showed aptitude for the gun was given extra training in all its aspects. No doubt this was sometimes regarded as a curse by those chosen, for they now had additional duties to perform,and they had to carry the gun and its ammunition in the field. *Initial training totalled 68 hours, including six hours on the range*.Pistols like the famous Luger were only issued to officers,vehicle crews and machine gun crews.At least five hours a week were devoted to training on the machine gun, which included loading, unloading, clearing stoppages, aiming techniques and fire plans. As the weeks went by, the machine-gun section and the rifle section were slowly integrated into their battle sections.




​_Hand Grenades - _In World War I, the German Army had probably the most effective hand grenade of the era, which
became the Type 24 stick grenade(also called 'potato masher')and was still on issue in 1935. Its long handle allowed it to be thrown far further, and with greater accuracy, than any contemporary grenade.The weapon was so simple to use that *only three hours* were needed to make recruits basically proficient in its use.

_Sub-machine guns_ - The first sub machine guns were developed by the germans as* close quarter assault weapons for clearing trenches*.They had short range with low accuracy,but this pray and spray method was highly effective in enclosed trenches as the smg firing pistol ammunition in fullauto could lay down a good volume of firepower quickly.The MP38 was the standard wehrmacht SMG,soon to be supplemented by the more easy to manufacture MP40.This weapon was allotted to section leaders and *10 hours were devoted *to training on this weapon in all,being extremely easy to clean and use.

_Mortars_ - An infantry mortar was issued to every platoon(3 sections). It was 5cm calibre, and fired high-explosive(HE), smoke and illumination bombs.* All infantry were trained in its use, but in basic training only familiarity training was given. *The role of the mortar was to give short-range area support to attacking infantry with its HE bombs, and to provide cover for movement via smoke bombs. It also fired illumination shells equipped with a delaying parachute, which were of great value during night defensive operations. Although the HE bomb was only of limited power, it had a good effect on morale, and the 5cm(51mm) mortar was hampered by an extremely complex levelling mechanism , which delayed action times. Though this problem was later solved ,the platoon mortar slowly fell into disuse from 1942-due to manpower shortages and lack of explosive killing power of the round and was supplemented by the deadlier 81mm at the company level.



_
2.Miscellaneous Training -_

_Ballistics training - _German soldiers were also *instructed in the classroom on the basic technical aspects of ballistics, learning about the components of their rifle and the cartridge it fired*. They learnt about which type of cartridge they were firing, and what its purpose was.The German Army used a standard 7.92mm rimless rifle and machine-gun cartridge with 4 bullet types available.(standard lead core,heavy steelcore,tracer,incendiary)

_Map reading -_ Each individual German infantryman, for example,* had to be able to use a map*. This was a reflection of the basic concept that every soldier had to be able to do the job of his superior. He was trained in the use of the compass and square, and was able to give eight-figure grid references, to assess dead ground from a map (by drawing a section), and learnt how to orient his map and navigate with it.Troops also had to be able to recognize and name land forms, and to evaluate the cover that terrain might afford them in attack and defence. They were* taught to do this partly by map reading and partly by practical exercise*.The recruit had to be able to work out the best route for crossing country both in attack and defence. He could get some help from the map, but* frequent practical exercises drove home the lesson that cover was essential when moving.*

_Range Estimation - _The skill of range estimation was also important, for although at battalion level the machine-gun company had a portable range-finder, it was vital for every soldier to be able to estimate range so that effective fire orders could be given. The* lectures in ballistics helped infantrymen to judge distances accurately*, so that the effective 'beaten zone' of bullets at the end of their trajectory was where it needed to be — on top of the enemy.

_Mortar and Artillery fire control -_ All infantry were also given *basic instruction in issuing fire orders to mortar teams
at battalion level and above*, and to the regimental artillery. When the artillery observation officer was not on site, any infantry unit could call for fire from the regimental guns, in addition to fixed 'SOS' fire tasks. The co-operation between infantry in the line and mortars and artillery was good at all times, meaning that fire support was usually effective
and timely.Those who showed a particular aptitude with a specific heavy weapon could expect further training with it, and might be transferred to the relevant platoon when capable of carrying out the duties required to fight with the weapon.Excellent infantry/mortar co-ordination ensured that german mortar teams caused heavy casualities on the allied side on all fronts especially with the later 81mm and 120mm calibres despite no great technological superiority.

_Infantry/Tank Co-operation _- In the new German Army, infantry/armour co-operation had become an essential
element of training during the 1930s. The men were *introduced to mock tanks during their 16 weeks' training, until such time as the real thing was available*. Very few of the infantry regiments were given any in-depth familiarization with the new weapon,however, as the Panzer divisions were expected to work on their own, with the infantry coming up behind to consolidate the tanks' territorial gains. Not enough thought or effort had gone into motorizing the infantry, and the German Army began to suffer asthe war went on; tanks unprotected by infantry are vulnerable to anti-tank weapons,
and infantry on their own cannot break through well-defended frontlines.



_3.Tactical Field Training -_

*Tactical field training was at the heart of all German infantry skills*. German soldiers learned to be aggressive above all else, and were* drilled in vigorous movement both before the attack and during it*.Training began once every man in the section was conversant with the use of the rifle and the LMG. The emphasis was always upon *learning by practice*,and only a few classroom periods were devoted to the infantryman's battle skills.These skills were considered by all instructors to be best acquired in the field, not at a desk. Field training was designed to be as *realistic as possible*, and a German officer commented that
_'We have considerable losses in battle training, but this is unavoidable',because 'machine guns fire ball ammunition over the heads of attacking troops, with a very small safety margin, and mortars support the infantry to within 50 yards of the objective'._
Every soldier was* trained almost incessantly by his NCOs in how to move across country*. A primary aim was to ensure that men got into battle without being killed.The section tactics for moving across country were only taught after each man knew how to move himself, whether in open country, woods and trees, or in a built-up area.Tacticalexercises filled half the training time. Within six weeks new recruits were taking part in field manoeuvres that involved units as large as a division, and that included all arms.The Germans profited from the lessons ofWorld War I, when they found that half-trained troops accomplished less and sustained greater losses.

Many hours were spent both on tactical training in field craft, and in survival on the battlefield. Not every meal could be guaranteed to come up to the front in a steaming food container. Sometimes, often frequently, the *men had to cook for themselves*. The Esbit personal cooker could be used to heat both food and water for coffee. Unless troops were
trained in the careful use of cooking fires, they would invite retribution from artillery or aircraft for their folly. Hence recruits were taught to dig trenches for their fires and to make sure that the flames were fully extinguished before nightfall to avoid observation by the enemy from either ground or air. They were also *taught how to use their shelter
quarter to make a waterproof coverall for themselves*, and how to erect a weather shelter.Such skills were particularly important in periods of rain or cold, as troops soon lose morale and fighting spirit if they cannot keep dry and relatively warm.
There was also practical training in the use of *camouflage*. The German Army was not particularly good at camouflage, and even in the early part of the war it was a failing noted by many observers and participants. Things really only improved when they lost their air dominance in Russia in 1942.
The German Army prided itself on the *ability of its men to march long distances with full loads*. In training, distances and loads were increased during the first 16 weeks until by week 13 they were expected to march 28km in full battle order and with battleammunition issues, which added a significant 9kg to their load. As they made this march they were also expected to exercise security measures front and rear and to the flank, and to carry out forward reconnaissance. Such training would stand them in good stead in the years to come.March was also used as punishment.

_After Training:_
Finally after 16 weeks the *recruits passed out from basic training and joined the active duty regiments*.There they continued further training on duty.





(Section Leader)​*NCO TRAINING -*

_General categories._ The two basic categories of noncommissioned officers are the ones enlisting for either 12 or 41/2 years, called active or professional NCOs , and the conscripts promoted to NCO's rank, called reserve NCOs . The active NCOs may either serve in ordinary NCO's functions in the various arms and services or they may receive specialized training as technicians. *Typical training establishments for ordinary NCOs are the Army NCO schools*, for technicians the specialist training schools and the special-service schools of chemical warfare troops, engineers, and signal troops. *The reserve NCOs receive special training in NCO courses*, which may be conducted in the Field Army as well as in the Replacement Army.

(1) _Ordinary NCOs._ _
(a) Selection._ The German High Command considered the* possession of a highly qualified NCOs corps as of vital importance for the effectiveness of the Army* .For the professional NCO corps two sources were open:
*Volunteers* for the NCO career may apply at the age of 161/2 years and, if accepted by a selection center for potential Army officers and NCOs, enter the Army at the age of 17 as NCO applicants .Some of these may have had pre-Army training for this career as junior cadets in Army NCO preparatory schools.




(2) _Reserve NCOs_.
*Conscripts already in service* who wish to enlist for either 12 or 41/2 years* must have a good record as leaders in combat, instructors, and disciplinarians*. They can enlist only after one year's service and are finally accepted only after 2 years' service. Only those are accepted for a 12-year term who will be not over 38 years of age at the end of their service period; the age limit for men enlisting for 41/2 years is 28 years. If acceptable, these men are* appointed NCO applicants by their battalion commanders.*

_(b) Training of NCO applicants._ The NCO applicants belonging to units of the Replacement Army are normally educated and trained at the Army NCO schools. The training period of a NCO applicant volunteer at an Army NCO school was 10 months. The first *4 months were devoted to basic training, and during the remaining 6 months the applicant received training as a squad leader in his particular branch of service.*
Men enlisting for long-term service while serving in the Field Army may take part either in a NCO applicant course conducted by a field headquarters, especially in a divisional combat school, or in a course at a field noncommissioned officer school.
There are similar courses for NCO technicians.

*NEXT: GERMAN INFANTRY ORGANIZATION*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY : ORGANIZATION*




​*THE INFANTRY DIVISION *- 
The heart of the wehrmacht,the horse drawn(rail transported) foot infantry organized in divisions which acted as the lowest *standard tactical and administrative all arms unit*.Above depicts the *standard organization of a 1939 infantry division*.The core of the division consists of* 3 infantry regiments* -each infantry regiment having 3 infantry battalions,and artillery company and an anti-tank company to deal with the full spectrum of threats on land.
Apart from this a heavy anti tank battalion,signals battalion,a full artillery regiment,a reconssaince battalion(of armored cars) and an engineering detatchment form the* divisional reserve*(independent of the core 3 regiments) for employment in crucial sectors when needed by the divisional commander.The wehrmacht followed the* trilinear model *on a division,usually a divisional commander may employ 2 of his regiments -one in defense,other offense(or one in a pinning role,other flanking) while keeping the third in reserve(divisional assets being allocated to whichever force needed it).
*Note:* In above diagram the divisional heavy anti tank battalion is given 36 anti tank guns of 75mm(pak40).This gun was only available in quantity from 1942 onwards(where captured russian 76 mm was also used).In the french campaign even the divisional anti tank battalion usually had 37mm guns and a few pak38 (50mm guns).In crisis supporting Luftwaffe field units could supply their formidable 88 mm Flak36 AT/AA gun.




​*Germany mobilized over 300 infantry divisions *during the course of the war in 'waves'.The basic organization remained the same from 1939-1942.Until changes were made in 1943 and 44 to address germany's critical manpower shortage problems.The first 39 divisions had a *strength of 17,000 men* per division.Later divisions until 1943 were around the region of *15,000 on paper strength.*





(_Breakdown of an infantry division -Click to enlarge_)​The *composition of a regiment*.Composition of its support artillery and anti tank units and the 3 battalions of the regiment down to its company and squads(gruppe).In 1940 a german platoon(zug) had 4 squads of 10 man each(gruppe) plus a light mortar section.(5cm mortar).3 zugs(platoons) plus a anti tank rifle section(soon to be discarded due to obsolete performance) made up an infantry company.*3 such companies* plus a *heavy weapons company with Heavy machine guns and 81 mm heavy mortars*(acting as battalion reserve) made up the battalion.
Also detailed is the composition of the divisional level artillery regiment and anti tank battalions held in reserve independently from the individual infantry regiments.





*Standard military symbols* depicting unit types.Remember these for those unaware.





*Graphical diagram of a german infantry division* using symbols.See the infantry,artillery,anti-tank and support elements are clearly seperated.




​The* firepower of a german infantry division*.Above diagram depicts the *integral artillery and mortars *of the division which provide it with considerable indirect fire capabilities.The LMG in every 10 man squad,the light mortar at platoon level and the heavy machine gun and mortars at battalion level provide incremental levels of fire support.At regimental level 75 mm infantry support field guns are available for another step up.The divisional level posseses 105 mm and 150mm artillery support for a well structured model.
In terms on *anti-tank assets*.at company level an anti tank rifle section is present(soon to prove worthless largely and discarded).An anti tank company at regimental level and heavier AT gun(when available) battalion at divisional level.

*Overall Divisional Strength -*

*Divisional HQ:*
_Map Reproduction Section
Military Police Section
Total Personnel & Equipment:
158 Personnel
2 LMG's
17 Motorcycles
31 Motor Vehicles_
*
Reconnaissance Battalion:*
_Battalion HQ
Communications Platoon
Horse Troop
Bicycle Troop
Heavy Weapons Troop_
_1 Panzerjäger Platoon
1 Armored Car Section (3 armored cars)
1 Infantry Support Gun Section (2-75mm guns)
Light Reconnaissance Column_
_Total Personnel & Equipment:
625 Personnel
25 LMGs
8 HMGs
3 37mm, 50mm, or 75mm AT guns (up gunned as new guns
became available.)
3 20mm AA guns (1943-45 only)
3 50mm Mortars
4 81mm Mortars
2 75mm Infantry Support Guns
45 Motorcycles
30 Motor vehicles
3 Horse Drawn Vehicles
213 horses_
*Signal Battalion:*
_Battalion HQ
Radio Company
Telephone Company
Light Signals Column
Total Personnel & Equipment:
474 personnel
17 LMGs
32 Motorcycles
103 Motor vehicles
7 Horse drawn vehicles
52 horses_
*
1st Infantry Regiment:*
_Regimental HQ
Regimental HQ Company_
*1st Infantry Battalion*
_3 Infantry Companies (12 LMGs, 3 50 Mortars)_
_1 Heavy Support Company (12 HMGs & 6 81mm Mortars)_
_1 Cavalry Platoon( later discarded)_
*2nd Infantry Battalion*
_Same_
*3rd Infantry Battalion*
_Same_
*(Infantry Close Support Howitzer) Company
(AT) Panzerjäger Company*
_Light Infantry Column_
*Total Personnel & Equipment:*
_3,250 Personnel_
_123 LMGs_
_36 HMGS_
_27 7.92mm Anti-tank Rifles_
_12 37mm, 50mm, or 75mm AT guns (up gunned as new guns_
_became available.)_
_27 50mm Mortars_
_18 81mm Mortars_
_6 75mm Infantry Support Guns_
_2 150mm Infantry Support Guns_
_47 Motorcycles_
_73 Motor Vehicles_
_210 Horse drawn vehicles_
_683 Horses_
*2nd Infantry Regiment:*
_Same_
*3rd Infantry Regiment:*
_Same_

_*Divisional Artillery Regiment:*_
_Regimental HQ_
_Regimental HQ Battery_
_*1st Light Artillery Battalion*_
_1 Staff Company_
_Calibration Section_
_3 Batteries (3 105mm lFH & 2 LMGs)_
_*2nd Light Artillery Battalion*_
_same_
_*3rd Light Artillery Battalion*_
_same_
_*4th Medium Artillery Battalion*_
_1 Staff Company_
_3 Batteries (4 150mm sFH & 2 LMGs)_
_*Total Personnel & Equipment:*_
_2,500 Personnel_
_32 LMGs_
_36 105mm lFH field howitzers_
_4 105mm guns_
_8 150mm sFH field howitzers_
_40 Motorcycles_
_105 Motor Vehicles_
_229 Horse drawn vehicles_
_2,274 horses_

_*Divisional Panzerjäger (Anti-Tank) Battalion:*_
_Battalion HQ_
_Communications Platoon_
_1st Panzerjäger Company(12-37mm AT guns & 6 LMGs)_
_2nd Panzerjäger Company(12-37mm AT guns & 6 LMGs)
3rd Panzerjäger Company(12-37mm AT guns & 6 LMGs)
*Total Personnel & Equipment:*
550 Personnel
18 LMGs
36 37mm, 50mm, or 75mm AT guns (up gunned as new guns
became available.)
45 Motorcycles
114 Motor vehicles
*
Engineer Battalion:*
Battalion HQ
Engineering Company (Partly Motorized)
Engineering Company (Partly Motorized)
Heavy Company (Motorized)
Bridging Column (Motorized)
Light Engineering Column
*Total Personnel & Equipment:*
843 Personnel
34 LMGs
9 7.92mm AT rifles
20 Flamethrowers
44 Motorcycles
87 Motor vehicles
19 Horse drawn vehicles
52 horses
_
_*Divisional Services:*_
_*Divisional Supply*_
_10 Supply Columns_
_1 Light POL Supply column_
_1 (mot) Maintenance Company_
_1 Light (mot) Supply column_
_*Administration*
1 Bakery Section
1 Butcher Section
1 Quartermaster Section
*Medical Units*
1 Field Hospital
2 Ambulance Companies
2 Medical Companies
Veterinary Company
*Field Post Office
Total Personnel & Equipment:*
2,300 personnel
30 LMGs
8 20mm AA/AT guns (only in 1944/45)
88 Motorcycles
253 Motor vehicles
245 Horse drawn vehicles
735 Horses
_



_*The Infantry Regiment - *_Already discussed in detail above.The above diagram is a schematic representation of its organization.We can see the breakdown of the 3 individual battalions of a regiment,plus its artillery and anti tank support units and its staff/logistics train.



_*The Infantry Battalion(abeitelung) and Company(kompanie) -*_ Already discussed before.Above is a schematic diagram in detail.You can see the breakdown of the 3 individual infantry companies and the heavy weapons company of a battalion.Plus the battalion staff/logistics train.More detail in tactics section later.




_*The Infantry Platoon(Zug)*_ - Already given earlier*.Platoon command staff,a 5 cm mortar* and its crew for fire support and* 4 squads of 10 men each make up a german platoon*.In poland the germans used 3 squads of 13 men each,but they *found this organization too cumbersome.Hereafter organization was changed to 4 squads of 10 men *each.3 platoons and an anti tank rifle section formed a company's strength.More detail in tactics section later.




_*The Infantry Squad(Gruppe) - *_The *10 man german infantry squad* was the lowest tactical sub-unit and the *heart of german fire and manuevre tactics*.Reduced from the cumbersome 13 men organization of the polish campaign after staff study,this unit was lean and efficient.Contrary to other armies who viewed riflemen as the main force of an infantry squad and the machine gun as support,*germans viewed the machine gun as the centrepiece of infantry tactics*.The job of the riflemen was to protect and cover the Machine gun's deployment into firing position and ensure its security,and exploit any openings provided by the hail of lead laid down by the machine gun.
By this time all armies employed a light machine gun for fire support in their squads.*Germans went a step forward to create the first true general purpose machine gun -The Mg34*.This gun could be fired from the hip on the assault during a squad attack.Acted as an lmg if mounted on a bipod at squad level for a stable fire support platform laying down suppressive fire.At battalion level mounted on a tripod for range and accuracy and perhaps a scope it would operate as an heavy machine gun(HMG).Other armies still employed different machine guns for LMG and HMG role.The *german standard ammunition for both riflemen and machine gun was the 7.92mm* and this standardization was also very useful in logistics.
The gruppe itself was divided into an* assault group and fire group*.The squad leader usually was armed with a Sub-machine gun(MP38/MP40).There was the *assistant leader,5 riflemen with bolt action rifles and a 3 man machine gun crew.One gunner and 2 assistant loader and ammunition carrier*.In total this compact 10 man unit allowed for a set of flexible options.Either leader or assistant leader would stay with the machine gun crew and direct its fire.The rest of the 6 men led by the ***.leader/leader(usually armed with the SMG)could attack the enemy position either from one flank(while supported by cover fire of other rifles/mg) or both,going grenade and smg first and rifle thereafter.In defense their main role was to keep the machine gun safe and firing and prevent enemy flanks.More detail in tactics section later.

*Other types of infantry divisions - Mountain division,Motorized infantry division,Light division.*
*Infantry Equipment*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GEBIRGSJAGER -GERMAN MOUNTAIN INFANTRY*​



_Gebirgsjager_ or mountain infantry of the german army were* specialized light infantry with additional training*.
8 mountain divisions were raised by the wehrmacht throughout the war.Some were german army divisions and other previously austrian army formations.The men were largely recruited from the bavarian and austrian alpine region.Along with the Panzergrenadiers(motorized infantry),the Fallschirmjager(paratroopers) the_ gebirgsjager_ were considered elite infantry by the german army.




The organization was largely same with that of an infantry division.An example -
*1st Gebirgs (Mountain) Division*: Formed on 9 May 1938.
1/,2/,3/98th Gebirgsjäger Regiment(1,2,3 representing the 3 battalions)
1/,2/,3/99th Gebirgsjäger Regiment
1/,2/,3/100th Gebirgsjäger Regiment
1/,2/,3/,4/79th Gebirgs (Mountain) Artillerie Regiment
44th Panzerjäger Battalion(anti tank)
54th Reconnaissance Battalion
54th Pioneer Battalion
54th Signals Battalion
54th Division Support Units
Only difference was the *artillery was usually mountain artillery/pack howitzer*-easily transportable in rough terrain.The soldiers were equipped with skis,climbing equipment,winter clothing etc.




A _gebirgsjager_ squad LMG gunner.The machine gun remained central to german infantry tactics throughout all formations.You can see the rope and climbing equipment on his backpack.At the time of Fall Gelb all the german mountain divisions were in norway occupying that country,save the elite 1st mountain division.

Now there also existed an intermediate type of division -the* light division*.Of this experimental type -only 5 were raised and 4 of those converted to panzer divisions before the french campaign.Another was converted too in africa.So id didn't bother.Ignored security/garrison units.

_Fallschirmjager_,the *elite german paratroopers* played a vital role in the french campaign.But these were under the control of the Luftwaffe,the german air force and will be explained later in the thread.

Finally the *motorized infantry*(mechanized infantry div didn't exist in 1940)will be discussed along with panzer division later.Here is a final roundup of the organization of a german infantry division of the standard type.




*NEXT :GERMAN INFANTRY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS.*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY -WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT*




​*German infantrymen* were equipped with a *wide variety of heavy and small arms* throughout the second world war and the standard types were largely in service by 1940.Rifles,pistols,grenades,mortars,bayonets.sub-machine guns,anti-tank rifles,mines and light and heavy machine guns largely formed an infantryman's arsenal upto the battalion level above which they recieved artillery and anti-tank guns support also.




​*BATTLE RIFLE : THE KARABINER 98 KURZ*

The *standard service rifle of the wehrmacht* throughout world war 2,the K98K was the last in a long line of famous mauser bolt action rifles dating back to the late 19th century.It served in all theatres over the course of world war 2.It was a* bolt action rifle with a 7.92mm cartridge* chamber -*accurate,reliable and powerful*.The german soldiers nicknamed it '_The pup_' or the _'Bow and arrow'._





(German industrialist-designer _*Paul Mauser*_ patented the *gewehr 98*)​*
Origin :*
Tracing its roots to the Lebel Model 1886, the Karabiner 98k was *most directly descended from the Gewehr 98* (Model 1898) which first introduced an internal, metallic five-cartridge magazine.The new mauser rifle made a *spectacular debut* in the first decade of the 20th century in the* colonial boer war* where afrikaan and dutch settlers armed with these shot down and sniped british infantry and artillery gunners at ranges well over 500 yards with frequently devastating results forcing several changes on the british lee enfield.The original mauser 98(Gewehr 98 as it was designated) had several revolutionary features and* inspired all contemporary rifle designs* such as the american springfield,the soviet mosin nagant,the japanese arisaka as well as *being adopted by militaries of many nations worldwide*.The mauser is in many ways the *grandfather or king of all bolt action rifles*,with possible competition only from the british Lee enfield.





(The mauser 98 first introduced the internal rimless 5-cartridge magazine)​
The gewehr98 saw *massive scale service in the first world war* where it served as germany's standard battle rifle.A *modified shorter carbine version K98* was built for the cavalry,and during world war 2 another K98b was produced for use in trench fighting where the long length of the gewehr proved unwieldy.In 1923, the Karabiner 98b was introduced as the primary rifle for the post-World War I German military. As the Treaty of Versailles prohibited the Germans from producing rifles, the Karabiner 98b was labeled a carbine despite the fact that it was essentially an improved Gewehr 98.



In 1935, Mauser moved to *upgrade the Karabiner 98b* by altering several of its components and shortening its overall length. The result was the Karabiner 98 Kurz (Short Carbine Model 1898), better known as the Karabiner 98k (Kar98k).One change was the shift to using laminated stocks rather than single pieces of wood, as testing had shown that plywood laminates were better at resisting warping.* Entering service in 1935*, over* 14 million Kar98ks were produced by the end of World War II.*








*SPECIFICATIONS:**

Cartridge: 7.92 x 57 mm (8 mm Mauser) 
Capacity: 5-round stripper clip inserted into internal magazine 
Muzzle Velocity: 760 m/sec 
Effective Range: 547 yards, 875 yards with optics 
Weight: 8-9 lbs. 
Length: 43.7 in. 
Barrel Length: 23.6 in. 
Attachments: Knife Bayonet S84/98, rifle grenades
*The mauser was very *simple to maintain,extremely reliable,very accurate and powerful*.The stopping power of its bullet was higher than other bolt action rifles giving it good efficiency at ranged combat.Its* rate of fire however was slightly lesser than the british enfield*,and certainly much lesser than semi-automatic designs of the late war era like the american M1 garand.It also had a 5-cartridge stripper clip magazine compared to the british 10.




When issued the* Karabiner 98k came accompanied with assorted accessory items* including a *sling*, a* protective muzzle cover*, and for field maintenance a _Reinigungsgerät 34_ (*"Cleaning Kit 34"*) or RG34 kit. Introduced in 1934, the _Reinigungsgerät 34_ consisted of a flat 85 mm (3.3 in) wide by 135 mm (5.3 in) long sheet metal container with two hinged lids carried on the person, which held an oiler, a take down tool for removing the floorplate and cleaning the receiver of the rifle, an aluminum barrel pull-through chain, a cleaning and an oiling brush, and short lengths of tow used as cleaning patches.
The K98 could be equipped with a *Rifle grenade launcher*- a concept dating back to the trench fighting days of the great war.In 1942, the attachable launcher called the _Gewehrgranatengerät_ or Schiessbecher ("shooting cup") was introduced that was developed based on rifle grenade launcher models designed during World War I. The 30 mm _Schiessbecher_ cup-type rifle grenade launcher could be mounted on any Karabiner 98k and was intended to replace all previous rifle grenade launcher models. The rifle grenade launcher could be used against infantry, fortifications and light armored vehicles up to a *range of 280 m (306 yd)*. For these differing tasks, several specialized grenades with accompanying special propelling cartridges were developed for the 1,450,113 produced _Schiessbecher_ rifle grenade launchers. The rifle grenade-propelling cartridges fired a wooden projectile through the barrel to the rifle grenade that, upon impact, automatically primed the rifle grenade.​



Germany also developed also *one of the first silencers*.The HUB-23 suppressor attatchment was visually identical to the rifle grenade launcher more or less,could suppress around 75% of the noise.It was *employed by snipers and special operations troops*.When scoped the kar98k's accuracy,range and stopping power made it a solid sniper rifle with ranges upto 900 yards.A* bayonet could be attatched for close assault action* -a frequent occurence in the eastern front.​



Though the Allies moved towards using semi-automatic rifles, such as the M1 Garand, the *Wehrmacht retained the bolt-action Kar98k *with its small five-round magazine. This was largely due to their tactical doctrine which emphasized the light machine gun as the basis of a squad's firepower. In addition, the Germans frequently preferred to use submachine guns, like the MP40, in close combat or urban warfare.In the final year and a half of the war, the Wehrmacht began *phasing out the Kar98k in favor of the new Sturmgewehr 44* (StG44) assault rifle. While the new weapon was effective, it was never produced in sufficient numbers and the Kar98k remained the primary German infantry rifle until the end of hostilities.*Following World War II*, millions of Kar98ks were captured by the Allies. In the West, *many were given to rebuilding nations* to rearm their militaries and served for years.It is again in production as the* most popular bolt action hunting and sports rifle* as well as a collector's item for gun collectors.

*NEXT: PISTOL,GRENADES,MINES .*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY WEAPONS - II*




​*SIDEARM : PISTOL P-08 LUGER*

The *Pistole Parabellum 1908*—is a toggle-locked recoil operated semi-automatic pistol that entered german service in 1898 and served in both world wars.*One of the first semi-automatic pistols,the luger's sleek and compact design ,accuracy,exacting standards of manufacture*(made to last) made it a prized weapon for collectors and an effective pistol overall.


*Austrian designer George Luger* patented the Luger in 1898.The pistol derives its iconic name from him.The original version was chambered for 7.65mm cartridge,but the more common 1928 version had the 9mm round.

*SPECIFICATIONS:*

*Weight *- 871 grams (1.92 pounds)
*Length *- 222 mm (8.74 in)
*Cartridge* - 7.65mm/9mm
*Action* - Toggle Locked,short-recoil
*Rate of Fire* Semi-automatic
*Muzzle Velocity* 350–400 m/s (1148–1312 f/s; 9mm, 100 mm barrel)
*Effective firing range* 50 m (9mm, 100 mm barrel; short barrel)
*Feed system* 8-round detachable box magazine, 32-round detachable drum
*Sights* - Iron Sights.





Mechanics of the Luger Pistol.The luger was *extremely reliable,but costly and difficult to manufacture*.The demands of industrial war necessisated a more simpler design.Luger production thus ran until 1942 when it was replaced by the P38 walther.Allied troops often called both pistols the luger.Luger has seen several limited production runs after the war due to its *prized iconic status*.




​*WALTHER P38 PISTOL :*
Designated the* succesor to the complicated and expensive luger*,the P38 was to be the *standard service pistol* for the wehrmacht,though both versions remained in widespread use.The pistol was a* last ditch close quarter weapon and was issued to officers ,machine gun and vehicle crews and pilots.*About a million P38s were produced.



*
SPECIFICATIONS:
*
*Weight* 800 g (1 lb 12 oz)
*Length* 216 mm (8.5 in)
*Barrel length* 125 mm (4.9 in)
*Cartridge* 9mm
*Action* -Short Recoil , locked breech
*Muzzle velocity* -365 m/s (1,200 ft/s)
*Effective firing range* Sights set for 50 m (55 yd)
*Feed system*- 8-round detachable single-stack Magazine
*Sights* - Rear Notch and Front Blade Post

*COMBAT HELMET : STAHLHELM M1935 & M1940*




​The* infamous german 'coal scuttle' helmet the stahlhelm* emerged first in the cauldron of the trench warfare of the great war.All the combatants went into world war one with leather caps which offered no protection from modern weapons or artillery shrapnel and fragments.The french were first to note the huge casualities to head wounds and issue their soldiers with steel helmets.Britain and germany followed suit.

The design of the Stahlhelm was carried out by* Dr. Friedrich Schwerd of the Technical Institute of Hannover*. In early 1915, Schwerd had carried out a study of head wounds suffered during trench warfare and submitted a recommendation for steel helmets, shortly after which he was ordered to Berlin. Schwerd then undertook the task of designing and producing a suitable helmet broadly based on the 15th century sallet, which provided good protection for the head and neck.It made an *impressive debut at verdun in 1916 leading to a dramatic drop in head wound related deaths.*




(The* british brody helmet*)​
This basic design was *refined over the years*. German military planners preparing for the next war in the 1930s knew that the conflict would be different and that modern infantryman would need to move faster and be more mobile. As a result the* M17/18 was replaced with the M35 or model 1935 helmet*. This stahlhelm utilized a newly designed M1931 helmet liner that further aided in making the protective device comfortable to the wearer. The rounded dome, neck guard and visor were shortened when compared to the WWI varieties, but the helmet retained the same basic look of the earlier models. The overall silhouette and profile of the* M35 was drastically smaller but the familiar shape still offered excellent protection to the wearer’s head. * Once war broke out the German stahlhelm underwent the first of a few minor changes beginning in 1940. The first was mostly a cosmetic change in the end result* but actually reduced the number of procedures in the production*. The vent brushings were omitted and instead a punched embossed vent hole was incorporated into the design. At a quick glance the helmets are almost identical. 





(*French adrian helmet*)​The stahlhelm design was superior to both the french and british helmets and *offered much better coverage of the neck area*.This feature* influenced post ww2 american and nato designs *who modified their helmets and today the modern NATO helmets have a marked resemblance to this design.

*NEXT: HAND GRENADES AND MINES*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY WEAPONS -III*




*HAND GRENADE :STIELHANDGRANATE MODEL 24*

*Grenades had existed in the 16th and 17th century*,but these were crude explosive devices with a very short range and dangerous for the user.The original grenadiers meant for sieges,soon turned into musket armed elite infantry.It was the* trench warfare of world war 1 that brought the grenade back with a vengeance*-the fregmentation HE blast capable of clearing trenches quickly.The basic grenade consists of a metal casing containing an explosive charge. This is detonated by a time delayed fuse activated when the safety device is disengaged. This* gives the operator approximately four seconds before detonation, in which time he has to break cover, throw the thing and, perhaps most importantly, get back into cover before the ensuing explosion*. Because of the uncontrolled nature of the explosion, fragments of the casing are just as likely to reach his position as they are the target.
This unfortunate side effect lead to the development of 'offensive' grenades, in which the segmented metal casing designed to produce shrapnel was eliminated. Instead, the *concussion effect of the explosion, which would disorientate the victim at least for a few seconds became itself a weapon*. It dictated that a swift follow up with rifle and sub machine gun be made though, as the advantage would only be fleeting.
The grenade in all its forms saw its greatest use during the war and remains every bit as important as the rifle and bayonet to the modern soldier. The *sheer scale of the fighting in streets and cities guaranteed the grenade would become the standard 'calling card' before entering a known or simply suspected enemy building.* Yet it was a double edged weapon. Many ill trained or unthinking men fell victim to the blast of their own grenade, following up before it had gone off. Casualties also racked up during the supposedly simple operation of inserting the detonators, a task only undertaken prior to action where circumstances permitted. Experienced men took to securing the often exposed safety lever with tape to prevent accidental removal, which they occasionally neglected to remove in the heat of combat.



Grenades that were developed of 2 types - The *stick grenade and the egg grenade*.The german army used both types but prefered the former.While the allies settled on the egg grenade,the unique shaped german stick grenade became synonymous with the german infantryman.The German Model 24 _Stielhandgranate_ was a *concussion grenade introduced in 1915* and the design developed throughout World War I. A *friction igniter *was used; this method was uncommon in other countries but widely used for German grenades.
The basic world war one german hand* grenade design was so good it remained in service as the standard german hand grenade throughout both world wars.*The german stick grenade's unique lever attatched to the head allowed it to be thrown double the distance of the allied egg grenades - *40 yds compared to allied 15-20yrds*.*The stick design also reduced the risk of the grenade rolling back towards the thrower. *A german grenadier holds the record for hand throw at 77 yrds.It was however larger in size and thus lesser could be carried.Each german infantryman had a compliment of grenades and used them regularly in assault or close quarter combat where it was a much more fearsome weapon than the rifle.
The Model 24 grenade (popularly known as the "potato masher") becoming one of the most easily recognized of all small arms, and synonymous with the German soldier.It was replaced from 1943 by the* simpler to produce Model 43.*




​*MODEL 39 EIHANDGRANATE :*

The* Model 39* was a German hand grenade *produced in 1939*. This grenade used the same fuse as the Model 43 Stielhandgranate ,which was screwed into the top. In order to start the fuse the cap had to be unscrewed and the pull cord tugged. The grenade's colour on the cap indicated the time of the fuse. A delay of 4 seconds was typically used. If the grenade was going to be a fixed booby-trap ,then an instantaneous fuse was used. When enemy soldiers attempted to use discarded grenades they would be blown up when they tugged on the pull-cord. They could also attatch it to a door-frame in a building with the pull-cord attached to the door. When an enemy soldier kicked the door open the grenade would detonate. It had a *much lower range,but could roll in close quarter fighting and more could be carried.*




​*BUNDLE GRENADE :*

German ingenuity found the basic model 24 grenade could be used in an improvised "bundle" style with another six explosive heads (without their sticks) wired around the central stick grenade. These were known as _Geballte Ladung_ ("baled charge").*For antitank, and antipillbox demolition the heads of six model 24 or model PH 39 stick grenades were removed from their handles and tied together around a seventh stick grenade with a handle intact. This could serve as an ad-hoc solution to early ww2 tanks.

Why stick grenades fell out of favour after world war 2?*

Despite the range advantage stick grenades* couldn't roll,and also a soldier could carry double the amount of egg grenades*.In modern combat,often urban range is less of a factor.Moreover during world war 2 grenade launchers were rare weapons.Today the grenade launcher,both dedicated* automatic versions as well as the under barrelled one* are capable of *hurling grenades at far greater distances* and take care of the range factor.Thus stick grenades have not seen use.

*MINES : ANTI-PERSONNEL S-MINE 35*




​The German S-mine was the *most feared and lethal anti-personnel mine of world war two*.A highly innovative design it was used extensively by the german army in all theatres and over 2 million were produced.The S-mine entered production in 1935 and served as a key part of the defensive strategy of german land forces.These mines inflicted heavy casualties and slowed, or even repelled, drives into German-held territory throughout the war. The *design was lethal, successful and much imitated. The S-mine remains one of the definitive weapons of World War II.*







​The s-mine was placed in the ground with only it's three pronged top exposed. After it was triggered the *mine jumped into the air between 3 to 5 feet.* A second later it would detonate sending ball bearings, steel rods, and metal pieces in all directions. It was an anti-infantry mine and had a* lethal range of 22 yds and a casualty range of 110yds. 
*
*SPECIFICATIONS:*
*-Height:* 127 mm 
* -Diameter: * 102 mm 
* -Weight: * 4.l kg 
* -Explosive charge: * 182g TNT




​The S-mine was* normally triggered by a three-pronged pressure fuse*. It could also be modified to be triggered by a tripwire. The steel tube that held the fuse was threaded to accept any standard German ignition or trigger, allowing the sensor to be removed and the mine to be deliberately triggered by a human operator. When triggered, the mine functioned in two stages (see diagram).


First, the mine was fired 0.9 to 1.5 meters (3 to 5 ft)* upwards* by a small propellant charge.
Approximately a half-second later, the main charge* detonated at the optimum height* to kill or severely injure anyone in the immediate area.
The* main charge of the mine was surrounded by roughly 360 steel balls*, short steel rods, or scrap metal pieces. These became metal shrapnel that sprayed horizontally from the mine at high velocity.
The time between triggering and ignition of the propelling charge varied between 3.9 and 4.5 seconds, depending on the age and condition of the mine. According to German documentation, the S-mine was lethal within 20 meters (66 ft) and could inflict casulaities within 100 meters (330 ft).
The french first encountered this weapon during the phoney war and it *immediately built up a reputation*.The allied soldiers nicknamed the weapon _'Bouncing Betty'_ and it was among the most hated of all german weapons due to its tendency to maim rather than kill.The design was much imitated post-war.

*TELLERMINE 35 ANTI-ARMOUR LANDMINE* :




The* standard anti-tank mine of germany* during this period the *Tellermine 35*,nicknamed the mushroom was a *reliable and effective anti-tank mine* used in large quantities.
The mine's case is made of sheet steel, and has a slightly convex pressure plate on the top surface with a central fuze well. Two secondary fuze wells are located on the side and bottom of the mine for anti-handling devices.
For use on beaches and underwater the *mine could be deployed inside a specially designed earthenware or concrete pot*, which acted as a waterproof jacket for the mine.
Pressure of 400 pounds (180 kg) on the center of the mine or 200 pounds (90 kg) on its edge deforms the pressure plate compressing a spring, and breaking a shear pin which holds back the spring-loaded striker. Once the striker is released it flips downwards into a perscussion cap which fires the adjacent detonator followed by the booster charge and then the main explosive filling of TNT. *Tellermine43 was a later variant for simplified production*

*SPECIFICATIONS :*
*-Height:* 102 mm 
* -Diameter: * 324 mm 
* -Weight: * 9.l kg 
* -Explosive charge: * 5.5 kg TNT 
* -Trigger weight: * 100 to 180 kg 

Other mines entered service from 1942 are not given

*NEXT: SUB-MACHINE GUNS -MP38/MP40*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY WEAPONS -IV*




​*SUB-MACHINE GUNS : MP-38 & MP40*

What became known as the "submachine guns" had its genesis in the early 20th Century and developed around the concepts of infiltration and fire and movement, specifically for the* task of clearing trenches*(nicknamed _'Trench broom'_) of enemy soldiers, an environment within which *engagements were unlikely to occur beyond a range of a few feet*.In 1915, the German Rifle Testing Commission at Spandau decided to develop a new weapon for trench warfare.The Commission determined that a completely new kind of weapon was needed.*Hugo Schmeisser* designed the world's first practical sub-machine gun -*The MP18 .*(Machine Pistole 18)





(The german MP18 - The first of the sub-machineguns)​
This went into action in 1918 for germany's last great offensive of world war one.*German Stormtroopers armed with submachine guns* and other specialized equipment made great early progress before lack of reserves and allied firepower stalled the offensive.The MP 18 proved to be an excellent weapon. Its concept was well proven in trench fighting. Its* basic design directly influenced later submachine gun designs and showed its superiority over the regular infantry rifle in urban, mobile, and guerrilla warfare.*

_Concept of Sub-machine gun -_
In the early 20th century ,powerful, heavy and lengthy bolt-action rifles like the German mauser and the British Enfield were dominant among an infantry still wedded to the idea that every soldier was a longrange marksman, picking off targets at the extremities of the battlefield.Between the beginning of World War I and the early 1940s,* combat experience yielded new data about the realities of small-arms actions*. A fundamental conclusion was that in the real world soldiers rarely engaged targets at more than 300m, even though they were equipped with weapons capable
of reaching out to well over double that distance. In actual fact, *any human-sized target beyond 400m was difficult enough to see, let alone to shoot.*Furthermore, many battlefield encounters involved small-arms exchanges at ranges of less than 100m.




(Hugo Schmeisser -Father of the MP18/28 and STG44)​
''The dynamics of combat shooting change profoundly at close ranges when compared to long-range engagements. Targets appear briefly between areas of cover, particularly in urban or forested areas. Considered aim is rarely possible, the *soldier resorting instead to snap-shooting*, often without the weapon properly mounted in the shoulder. Bolt-action rifles are poorly suited to this performance. Their length makes them unwieldy in confined terrain, and the need to operate the bolt mechanism means that quick follow-up shots are problematic, if not impossible. *SMGs, by contrast, are at their best at close ranges and in small spaces.''*
'By* firing pistol-calibre rounds*(rifle rounds having too much recoil), *SMGs trade range (effective range is little more than 150m) for controllable full-auto fire,putting as many rounds as possible onto the target area* in a fleeting window of time. The rapid fire they deliver compensates for imperfect aim.The ripples of fire are not only intrinsically suppressive, but they can also* allow an individual soldier to engage multiple targets simultaneously and successfully.* Shooting from the hip is more than just a ‘spray and pray’ approach. A *high magazine capacity *(30-100 rds)compared to 5-10 round stripper clip magazines on rifles, depending on the weapon and magazine type – ensures that there are usually plenty of rounds left for follow-up shots, as long as the soldier exercises some discipline with ammunition consumption and makes intelligent magazine changes.' The *compact design of SMGs also allow better manuverability and agility* as well -keys to battlefield survival.

In the interwar years the sub-machine gun gained steam.Versailles treaty didn't allow rifles for germany,but a small number of sub-machine guns were allowed for the police forces.2 sub-machine gun designs competed and were popular - Schmeisser's modified MP18 - The* MP28* and Vollmer's(another famous gun designer)* ERMA EMP.*





*MP-38( MACHINE PISTOLE -38)*

*The M.P. 38 submachine gun *started its life under requirements from German Army Weapons Office, which saw the need for a compact submachine gun, *suitable for use by armored vehicles crews and paratroopers*. German arms-making company _Erfurter Maschinenfabrik Gmbh_,better known under its trade name _Erma_, began the development of a new weapon under army specifications. The new submachine gun was not built from the scratch; instead, it was just an *evolution of a rarely known prototype weapon, provisionally known as Erma MP-36*. MP-36 was a compact version of the better known ERMA EMP, but fitted with now-familiar underfolding metallic shoulder stock and bottom-feed magazine, which was slightly canted forward to accommodate EMP magazines. MP-36 was a selective-fired weapon, and in fact the improved *MP-38 was a simplified version of its little known predecessor,* adapted for different magazine. Therefore, it took only few months before the new weapon was ready for official adoption and mass production.* Manufacture* of a new submachine gun,designated as MP-38, *commenced in summer of 1938*.Though both the MP38 and its successor were called 'schmeisser' by allied troops,Hugo schmeisser had in fact nothing to do with these designs.




Both MP 38 and MP 40 submachine guns are *open bolt,blowback-operated automatic arms*. Fully automatic fire was the only setting, but the *relatively low rate of fire allowed for single shots with controlled trigger pulls*. The bolt features a telescoping return spring guide which serves as a pneumatic recoil buffer. The cocking handle was permanently attached to the bolt on early MP 38s, but on late production MP 38s and MP 40s, the bolt handle was made as a separate part.One unique feature found on most MP 38 and MP 40 submachine guns was an aluminum or steel resting bar or support under the barrel. This was used to steady the weapon when firing over the side of open-top APCs(armoured personnel carrier).
The MP38 *featured the folding butt*,which when collapsed reduced length by 8 inches,a new design feature taken from the MP36 prototype and first introduced in any mass produced weapon worldwide.The *unloaded gun weighed under 9 pounds and was fed by a 32 clip magazine*.The detatchable bar magazine also acted as a forward handgrip.The MP38 was *all-metal* contrary to previous guns and *made completely from machined parts* -a beautiful piece of engineering.

_Limitations - _MP38 production run was ended after 1940 despite the excellent performance of the weapon - 40,000 to 50,000 guns having been manufactured.The primary reason was that it was *simply too costly and inefficient to manufacture due to german shortage of war-time quality steel and machine parts.*
A serious problem associated with the open-bolt system of the MP 38 was its safety or lack thereof. When the bolt was jarred out of the sear it would slam forward and fire the gun. The fitting of a positive bolt lock in the form of a lock on the bolt handle, which was then fitted into a notch in the receiver, apparently fixed the problem. This simple modification to the MP 38 was then utilized by German ordnance workshops with parts supplied by ERMA. These* improvements led to further modifications, and to the development of the next version of this iconic SMG – the MP 40.*




*MP-40 (MACHINE PISTOLE-40)*

The MP 38 receiver was made of machined steel, but this was a time-consuming and expensive process. To save time and materials, and thus increase production, construction of the MP 40 receiver was simplified by using stamped steel and electro-spot welding as much as possible. The MP 38 also features longitudinal grooving on the receiver and bolt, as well as a circular opening on the magazine housing. These features were eliminated on the MP 40.
The* MP 40 benefited from certain cost-saving alterations*, notably in the more extensive use of stamped-steel rather than machined parts. Producing a milled receiver and its components results in a lot of wasted steel; it costs more in terms of machine time, as well as making the weapon a bit heavier. In comparison a stamped-steel construction takes less time and minimizes the amount of waste in milling steel components – it is *also less costly*.

*SPECIFICATIONS:*

*Caliber:* 9x19mm Luger/Para
*Weight:* 4,7 kg loaded, 4,03 kg empty
*Length (stock closed/open):* 630/833 mm
*Barrel length:* mm
*Rate of fire:* 500 rounds per minute
*Magazine capacity:* 32 rounds
*Effective range:* ca. 180 meters(200 yds)




The MP 38 and MP 40 also had a forward-folding metal stock, the first for a submachine gun,resulting in a shorter overall weapon when folded; however, this stock design was at times insufficiently durable for hard combat use.Although the MP 40 was generally reliable, a* major weakness was its 32-round magazine*. Unlike the double-column, dual-feed magazine insert found on the american thompson smg, the MP 38 and MP 40 used a double-column, single-feed insert. The single-feed insert resulted in increased friction against the remaining cartridges moving upwards towards the feed lips, occasionally resulting in feed failures; this problem was exacerbated by the presence of dirt or other debris.Another problem was that the magazine was also sometimes misused as a handhold. This could cause the weapon to malfunction when hand pressure on the magazine body caused the magazine lips to move out of the line of feed, since the magazine well did not keep the magazine firmly locked. German soldiers were trained to grasp either the handhold on the underside of the weapon or the magazine housing with the supporting hand to avoid feed malfunctions.



*BATTLEFIELD PERFORMANCE :*
The MP40 served throughout WW2 as the *standard service sub-machine gun of the german army*.Around *1.1 million were manufactured *and it was seen in action on all theatres-from the deserts of africa to the snows of russia.
The combination of* portability, firepower and reliability* offered by the MP 40 endeared the weapon to its users and
impressed those who faced it at close quarters.It was *compact and very easily handled*,compared to many SMGs the MP 40 was* quite accurate*. The 9mm Parabellum has very low recoil characteristics,particularly when fired from a gun that weighed 4kg, so the levels of recoil were manageable.Originally the MP38 was to be issued to armoured troops and paratroopers(many armies like the british considered smg's 'gangster weapons')but battlefield experience increased demand greatly.The MP series sub-machine guns were* issued to company and platoon commanders, and to at least one member of each section, in all infantry units; to tank and vehicle crews; to parachute troops; and, as a special-purpose weapon*. A typical World War II German infantry company was issued 16 SMGs, 78 rifles and 12 LMGs.They were excellent for assault,urban,guerilla and close quarter combat.
​The distribution of MP40s in the german army would change after the invasion of the soviet union.Compared to the french and british who had very few sub-machine guns in service in 1940,forced the *Germans to confront the threat of an army heavily armed with SMGs*, particularly once distribution of the PPSh-41 and PPS-43 became very widespread from 1942 and 1943. German forces were stunned at the massive volumes of firepower the Soviets could generate during infantry engagements, not least because the ubiquitous PPSh-41 had a 900rds/min rate of fire.





This experience informed a significant change in *German divisional organization* in October 1943, which had an impact on the squad composition. The ten-man squad was reduced to nine men, but the weapons carried by the squad were six rifles,* two SMGs*, a machine gun and a pistol. In late 1944 and 1945, the movement towards automatic weapons at the squad level intensified further. *One advantage of SMGs is that they take less time to train someone in their effective use when compared to a bolt-action rifle.*Furthermore, the battles were pushing through the major cities of Western and Eastern Europe, and the SMG was king in the close-range urban duel .*Towards the end the germans copied the soviet practice of arming whole platoons with SMGs* - while purely for short range combat,if they did get within range they could overwhlem an enemy(even better trained) by brute volume of firepower.On the defense,just two or three of the SMGs could make life problematic for an entire attacking platoon of enemy soldiers.
*Compared with its counterparts in british and russian service the sten and the ppsh*,the MP40 had advantages and disadvantages.Many german soldiers prefered the russian ppsh-41 whenever captured.A PPSh-41 had a* far higher rate of fire* than the MP 40 (900rds/min as opposed to 500rds/min).PPSh-41s, in their unloaded state, were *nearly 0.25kg lighter* than an MP40.The PPSH was *also more reliable*,and much more tolerant to dust and mud,and also had a *selector switch* between auto and single shot.Only in terms of *accuracy and controllability* did the MP40 score.However in terms of all important production soviets answered 1.1 million MP40S with 6 million PPSHs.Overall the *soviet PPSH proved to be a superior practical weapon.*
The british sten in comparison was a* crude and ugly weapon*.Similar rate of fire,but prone to jamming and misfire.Also less accurate though as reliable.However the simple design enabled a production run of *4 million vs 1.1 million of the MP40.*



*INFLUENCE & POST-WAR :*
The MP40 is one of iconic german weapons of ww2 and in 1940 was a* formidable weapon for its french and british adversaries*.The evident success of the MP 40 urged the Western Allies to begin work on their own versions of similar inexpensive sheet-metal weapon designs.*Several features of the MP40 are visible in post war designs* such as the Russian Kalashnikov,Portugese FBP and the Israeli Uzi.Massive amounts of leftover MP40s after ww2 served in militaries of several nations.However even from the *late war period the decline of the sub-machine gun had been apparent.*The StG 44,the first assault rifle offered fullauto fire, just like the MP 40, but with better range (up to 600m), superior penetration and stopping power. In essence, the* assault rifle offered the best of the rifle and SMG in one unit*.With the proliferation of assault rifles,particularly the soviet kalashnikov,sub-machine guns in modern times have been limited to police and special forces -the two widepread designs being the israeli uzi and the german MP-5,a worthy succesor to the MP40.

*NEXT: LMG 34 - THE MACHINE GUN*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY WEAPONS-V*




​*GENERAL PURPOSE MACHINE GUN : MASCHINENGEWEHR 34 or MG34*

_Origin - 
_In world war I ,the machine gun emerged as the most effective killer amongst all small arms- with both suppression and slaughter well within its capabilities.The *grandfather of all machine guns was the Maxim machine gun* - among the standard heavy machine gun designs of WW1,the german MG08,the british Vickers and the russian PM1910 - All three were basically copies or modified versions of the maxim.The maxim derivatives were reliable and with a rate of fire of 300-450 Rounds per minute(RPM),the infantry destroyer par excellence of the day.However The gun weighed 26 kgs and its carriage 32 kgs..mobile transport was highly problematic.One obstacle encountered by great war infantry was the* inability to carry forward heavy firepower of the machine guns when an advance was effected* and thus the *momentum of an attack was stalled* and it was also vulnerable to rapid counterattacks.Out of this need the light machine gun concept was born.The british produced the best LMG of world war one in the Lewis gun -12kg in weight and with 550RPM firing rate(though with reliability issues).Germany was late to grasp the concept and settled on a modified MG08 minus the carriage-the MG08/15.While a workable weapon it was still very heavy at 21kgs.*Germany ended the war without a true LMG.*





(*MG08/15*)​_Development _-
This shortcoming was not unnoticed by the german war planners - a bold idea had been proposed in 1916 itself - not only to build a true Light machine gun,but an *universal machine gun* - One machine gun capable of fulfilling the role of both HMG and LMG and also be installed on vehicles and fortifications as well as anti-aircraft duty.The idea was revived during the 1920s.The versailles treaty limited germany to 2,000 machine gusn in active service and no further development.Germany's first interwar period Light machine gun was the MG13 ,it introduced a *rocking trigger selection *fire mechanism between singleshot and auto fire.This gun would eventually be modified for use in german aircraft.
A further development was the emergence of the* MG30*.Designed by Rheinmetall(German arms company),it couldn't be produced in germany due to treaty limitations,though the german army rejected the design Rheinmetall licensed the gun to austrian and swiss companies which it had bought covertly.This gun entered service with both austria and switzerland.It had the rocking trigger mechanism and a* quick barrel change process* -both features would be available in the Mg34.A few more experimental prototypes also proved subtle stepping stones to the emergence of the MG34.





(*Heinrich Vollmer* -A notable german firearms designer)​
'' In 1932 the *Reich Ministry* ordered several companies, including Rheinmetall, to develop a new _Einheitsmaschinengewehr_(Universal Machine gun). This new weapon had to be able to fulfill the duties hitherto allocated to the specific classes of weapons known as the _Heavy Machinegun_, the_ Light Machinegun_, the_ Armoured Pillbox Machinegun_, and_ Anti-Aircraft Machinegun_. The following specifications were set:* light weight;* *simplified operation; quick-change barrel; single-shot capability as well as two [fast and slow] cyclic rates.*The development of this weapon set the standard for co-operation in the German armament industry, and the task at hand was completed through the professional guidance of the Weapons Procurement Office. The result, the MG34, wherein Rheinmetall’s Sömmerda plant had a significant influence, reflected the Reichsministry's specifications in all respects.''

It was designed primarily by *Heinrich Vollmer* from the Mauser Werke Co., based on the recently introduced MG30. Changes to the operating mechanism improved the rate of fire to between 800 and 900 rpm.The gun entered service in 1934 -hence the designation,and continued to be developed.It *first saw service in the spanish civil war* where it performed superbly.It was designed to* replace all existing machine guns in field service* -something it would accomplish largely only by the end of 1941.The german army finally had its universal machine gun.




The MG34 is a* recoil-operated air-cooled machine gun*,generally considered the* first true general purpose machine gun in history.*It fires the *standard 7.92mm Mauser cartridge*.The versatile MG 34 was arguably the most advanced machine gun in the world at the time of its deployment.Its combination of *exceptional mobility *- being light enough to be carried by one man - and *high rate of fire *(of up to 900 rounds per minute) was unmatched.The MG 34 was the mainstay of German Army support weapons from the time of its first issue in 1935 until 1942, when it was supplanted by the next generation MG42 . Although the 34 was* very reliable and dominant on the battlefield*, its dissemination throughout the German forces was *hampered due to its precision engineering*, which resulted in high production costs and a relatively slower rate of production. For its successor, the MG 42, the Germans instead used mass production techniques similar to those that created the MP40.The MG 34 was used as the primary infantry machine gun during the 1930s, and remained as the primary tank and aircraft defensive weapon. It was to be replaced in infantry service by the related Mg42, but there were never enough quantities of the new design to go around, and* MG 34s soldiered on in all roles until the end of ww2.*



*SPECIFICATIONS:*

*Principle of operation * - Short recoil 
_*Caliber* _ - 7.92 mm
*Type of feed -*
1. Nondisintegrating metallic-link belts, which hold 50 rounds and may be *connected together* to make longer belts.
2. *75-round double, or saddle-type, drums* used in antiaircraft or light ground versions of the gun.
3. *50-round belts* contained in a metal drum attached to the feed block of the gun in tank or antiaircraft versions of the gun.
4. Canvas containers holding *100-round belts* are also used in tanks.

*Weight:*
As light machine gun (bipod) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ *26 pounds.*
As heavy machine gun (tripod) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ * 68 pounds.*

*Sights:  *
Standard sights Rear *vertical leaf sight* with open V notch, graduated from 200 to 2,000 meters (219 to 2,187 yards). There is a folding peep sight on the rear sight that is used with the antiaircraft ring sight.
Auxiliary The antiaircraft* ring sight*, kept in the maintenance kit, fits its base on the barrel jacket. When used on the tripod as a heavy machine gun, a *telescopic sight *is mounted on the tripod. This telescopic sight is graduated up to an effective range of 3,500 meters (3,827 yards).

*Muzzle velocity* - 2,500 to 3,000 feet per second, depend in on the type of ammunition used.

*Range: *
Maximum - * 5,000 yards *(heavy or light).
Effective - * 3,827 yards* (heavy, with tripod and telescopic sight), *2,000 yards *(light). 

The above data illustrates the extreme versatility of the MG34 employed as both heavy and light machine gun,the basic *gun remained the same* in all the different roles.*Only the sights/optics and mounts were changed*.It was reliable,accurate and had a lethal rate of fire.




*WORKING MECHANISM :*

The* MG 34 fires from an open bolt* which improved the airflow through the barrel allowing it to cool faster. The firearm was designed with a rotating bolt operated by short recoil aided by a muzzle booster. When the firearm is ready to fire the bolt is pulled back to the rear and is held back by the sear. With the pull of the trigger the sear disengages sending the bolt forward under pressure from the recoil spring. A cartridge is stripped from the magazine or belt and the round is pushed into the chamber. As the bolt moves forward into battery the bolt rotates engaging the locking lugs and chamber locking the bolt to the barrel. The striker strikes and ignites the primer and the round is fired. The recoil causes the barrel and bolt to move backwards a short distance. The rearward movement of the barrel causes the rotating bolt to rotate back disengaging the locking lugs and unlocking the bolt from the barrel. The barrel returns to its forward position while the bolt recoils to its rear position. The empty casing is ejected and the cycle can begin anew.




​The *MG 34 could use both magazine-fed and belt-fed 7.92 mm ammunition*. Belts were supplied in a fixed length of 50 rounds, but could be linked up to make longer belts for sustained firing. A* 250 round belt* was also issued to machine guns installed in fixed emplacements such as bunkers. Ammunition boxes contained 250 rounds in five belts that were linked to make one continuous 100 round belt and one 150 round belt. The *assault drums* held a 50-round belt, or a 75-round "double drum" magazine could be used by replacing the top cover with one made specially for that purpose. A gun configured to use the 75-round magazine could not be returned to belt-feed mode without changing the top cover again. 




​The MG 34 came with a *standard iron sight* consisting of a notched 'V' sight mounted to a post in the rear and a single blade at the front. The sight came *calibrated for ranges between 200 meter to 2000 meters* in 100 meter increments.
(b) _Telescopic sight._—The *telescopic sight is used with the tripod mount *for aiming the machine gun in either direct or indirect fire.




*Cross section of trigger, recoil, and feed mechanism of M.G. 34*.A unique feature of the MG34 is the double crescent trigger which allows *selective fire* between semi-automatic and full-automatic fire.



The wehrmacht manuals *recommended barrel change after 250 rounds firing,400 for emergency*.Like most machine guns, the MG 34's barrel is designed to be easily replaced to avoid overheating during sustained fire. During a barrel change, the operator would disengage a latch on the left side of the receiver which held the receiver to the barrel sleeve. The entire receiver section could then pivot off to the right on its latitudinal axis, allowing the operator to pull the barrel out the back of the sleeve. A new barrel would then be put in the back of the sleeve, and the receiver rotated back in line with the barrel sleeve and latched. The *entire process took just a few seconds when performed by a well-trained operator, causing minimal downtime in battle*.

*CONTINUED-MG-34.**..*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY WEAPONS-V(B)*




​*MG34 : THE UNIVERSAL MACHINE GUN *

_''The M.G. 34, machine gun, model 34, is not directly comparable to any U.S. weapon. It can be fired without a mount, or it can be mounted on a bipod for use as a light machine gun,on a tripod for use as a heavy machine gun, and on a special antiaircraft mount or on the standard tripod mount with adapter and special sight for use as an antiaircraft gun, as well as on numerous other types of mounts on tanks and other vehicles. Consequently, this all-purpose gun is the most common German automatic weapon in use by the German armed forces. Every infantry squad,5 and many other types of small German units, can be expected to be armed with the M.G. 34.'' - U.S Army Report.
_
While the* allies used seperate machine guns for heavy and light roles*,the mg34 performed both jobs commendably by just switching sights and mounts.




(Using a tripod in heavy/medium machine gun role)​
In the light-machine gun role, it was used with a bipod and weighed only *12.1 kg* (26.7 lb). In the medium-machine gun role, it could be *mounted on one of two tripods*, a smaller one weighing 6.75 kg (14.9 lb), the larger 23.6 kg (52.0 lb). The* larger tripod*, the MG 34 _Lafette_, included a number of features, such as a telescopic sight and special sighting equipment forindirect fire. The legs could be extended to allow it to be used in the anti-aircraft role, and when lowered, it could be placed to allow the gun to be fired "remotely" while it swept an arc in front of the mounting with fire, or aimed through a periscope attached to the tripod. Mounted to the Lafette the effective range of the MG 34 could be extended out to 3,500 meters when fired indirectly.


*Legs of tripod extended for use as an anti-aircraft weapon*.When used with the tripod for range and accuracy and the telescopic sight the MG34 in a heavy role could cut to pieces enemy infantry at *very long ranges* beyond the ability of rifles to retaliate.Its high rate of fire enabled it to dominate rival machine guns.




​MG34 employed as* top gunner of a panzer.*TheMG34 remained in exclusive use for hull mounted mg until the end of the war due to the inabilty of mg42 to perform this role.The top and hull gunners formed the main close quarter anti-infantry firepower of a panzer.


An MG34 using the *drum magazine*.A bipod is used above.In the field, the weapon could operate in offensive or defensive applications. The offensive model, with a mobile soldier, used a drum magazine that could hold either 50 or 75 rounds of ammunition. In a* stationary defensive role, the gun was mounted on a bipod or tripod *and fed by an ammunition belt.


Detail of a *drum magazine container*.Of the 3-man machine gun crew,when using a drum magazine-the ammunition carrier would have 2 or more of these at hand.Or ammo belts could be used.




​The very light weight of the LMG34 *allowed it to be fired from the hip on the assault *and formed a key segment of the mobile firepower of a german infantry squad.Each german infantry squad of 10 men had an LMG.A motorized infantry squad(later panzergrenadier) may have 2.Each *german infantry battalion heavy weapons had 12 MG34s tripod-mounted in heavy role.*




The machine gun* could also be fired from the shoulder.*This allowed height and range ,plus a relatively stable platform,minus the time consuming process of setting up the tripod(or in case it was absent).

The german army considered the machine gun the *centrepiece of its infantry tactics*,the main arbriter of an infantry firefight.The rest of the squad would cover the MG's deployment and attack under its withering fire.German tactical understanding* emphasized maximum possible rate of fire* -this was to maximize kills in the first few seconds of opening fire,when tactical surprise exists and before the enemy hits the ground for cover.This Lethality INdex concept found expression in the MG34's high rate of fire,and would be taken to the extreme in its succesor -the MG42.




*COMPARISON :*
*In1940 the revolutionary MG34 was the best machine gun in the world* and it retained its effectiveness as a lethal weapon right till the end of the war.When compared to its rivals the mg34 exceeded all of them in *Rate of fire*(900 rpm).The british *Vickers HMG*(450-500 rpm) and* Bren LMG*(500 rpm),the french *FM24/29 LMG*(450rpm) & *Hotchkiss*(450 rpm) were heavily outgunned at half the ROF of the 34.They also had *smaller magazines at 25-30rds to the mg34's 50-75 rd magazines.*
Comparably the soviet *DP LMG*(550 rpm) had better rate of fire and a magazine of 30rds -60rds,it however took very long to reload.The soviet *maxim HMG* at 600 rpm was better but very heavy.The* MG34 was lighter ,had nearly double the rate of firepower of its adversaries and was more versatile*.What this practically meant was that it was perfectly suited to the german infantry 'fire and movement' tactics.Its mobility allowed it to *come into action and reposition swiftly* and its heavy firepower allowed it to both suppress enemy infantry and *dominate infantry firefights,as the enemy machineguns couldn't match the volume of firepower* unleashed by the german machine gun.Though the later mg42 recieves greater accolades(justifiably) ,the mg34 would be germany's machine gun of the blitzkrieg years.The allies nicknamed it _Spandau_.(as all german machine guns were called)

*LIMITATIONS:*




(The *MG42* and* MG34*)​
Despite outstanding battlefield performance,it was not a perfect weapon.The *complex mechanisms and the production method,which relied principally on expensive machining processes, were not ideal for rapid production* under pressure, nor for the best utilization of stretched supplies of raw materials. Furthermore, the MG 34 was* not at its best in very dirty environments*, of which North Africa and the Eastern Front offered plenty of examples, and was therefore prone to jamming unless kept scrupulously clean.A new gun with rationalized mass-production techniques and a extreme ROF would replace it - the *even more terrifying MG42*.However it remained the standard vehicle mounted machine gun until the end of the war.Total mg34 production run stood at *450,000 units* and it saw service in several post-ww2 conflicts.The universal machine gun concept was widely adopted by many armies.
​*NEXT : LIGHT AND HEAVY MORTARS.*

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## AUSTERLITZ

Are these long weapon descriptions necessary?Or should i shorten them into 1-2 posts and speed up?Feedback needed.


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## Lord ZeN

AUSTERLITZ said:


> Are these long weapon descriptions necessary?Or should i shorten them into 1-2 posts and speed up?Feedback needed.


I don't think there is any need for really long descriptions about various weaponry, especially the rifles. It would be better if you stick to the historic analysis.

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## LeveragedBuyout

AUSTERLITZ said:


> Are these long weapon descriptions necessary?Or should i shorten them into 1-2 posts and speed up?Feedback needed.



I find this ultra-detailed description of the Nazi war machine to be fascinating, and was hoping you would similarly describe the Allied side for comparison (i.e. why these weapons, combined with German tactics and doctrine, played a decisive role vs. the inferior weapons/doctrine of the Allies). This is a level of detail I've never been privy to before, certainly not from documentaries. But if it's too much of a time sink, then of course you should concentrate on the narratives that interest you most. It's your thread, and I am certain I will read and enjoy whatever you write.

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## AUSTERLITZ

LeveragedBuyout said:


> I find this ultra-detailed description of the Nazi war machine to be fascinating, and was hoping you would similarly describe the Allied side for comparison (i.e. why these weapons, combined with German tactics and doctrine, played a decisive role vs. the inferior weapons/doctrine of the Allies). This is a level of detail I've never been privy to before, certainly not from documentaries. But if it's too much of a time sink, then of course you should concentrate on the narratives that interest you most. It's your thread, and I am certain will read and enjoy whatever you write.



I will do for all sides ofcourse.The reason i am doing this so detailed is because i only have to do it once...this thread will take months ,but once this thread is done on all subsequent ww2 threads i won't have to describe again..i'll just refer to this thread..add any updates for the particular campaign and skip straight to the proceedings.This will do until i have to introduce soviets and usa/japan which again will result in a long thread.Similarly all future napoleonic threads will be quick because armies section is done.Only prussia and britain remaining.
I thought about what to do now on this thread with the weapons ,and i decided that i won't bother with the weapon mechanics -how it works,the technical stuff.I'll get the specifiactions,its advantages and disadvantages vis a vis enemy weapons,doctrine behind the design concept,impact and how it was deployed/used.This will shorten unnecessary detail increasing the pace while keeping the overview interesting.

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## Koovie

AUSTERLITZ said:


> Are these long weapon descriptions necessary?Or should i shorten them into 1-2 posts and speed up?Feedback needed.



Not really  

More interested in the combat doctrines, unit organization and stuff like that

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY WEAPONS -VI*




​*FIELD MORTARS - 5cm leGrW 36 & 81mm GrW34*

_Origin -_
A mortar is a weapon that fires explosive projectiles known as (mortar) *bombs at low velocities, short ranges, and high-arcing ballistic trajectories*.Huge mortars were in use in the early gunpowder era,for use against stone and earth fortifications as siege weapons.By the napoleonic era however they had fallen into disuse.The *modern infantry mortar was born out of the necessities of trench warfare* in world war one.The inventor was englishman_ Wilfred Stokes_.The Stokes mortar was a simple weapon, consisting of a metal tube fixed to a base plate (to absorb recoil) with a lightweight bipod mount. When a mortar bomb was dropped into the tube, an impact sensitiveprimer in the base of the bomb would make contact with a firing pin at the base of the tube, and detonate, firing the bomb towards the target.The weapon proved to be extremely useful in the muddy trenches, as a mortar round could be aimed to fall directly into trenches, where artillery shells, due to their low angle of flight, could not possibly go.This design was refined and largely modified to become the standard infantry mortar used worldwide.The* mortar gave the infantryman his own private artillery* and a quick solution to dealing with a enemy strongpoint.




​For a period after world war one it seemed the mortar might fade away due to its specialized trench role.However on study of world war one engagements it was observed many advances had been stalled and rendered inconclusive because the infantry outran their artillery support,which was too heavy to go along.Germans tried to remedy the issue by providing light infantry guns .But these where costly and manpower/logistics intensive and could only be provided at the regimental level.From *battalion level thus every army equipped itself with much cheaper and simpler mortars*.The fast rate of fire of the mortar,which contributed to its usefulness in using gas or smoke rounds was another factor.




*LIGHT MORTAR -* *5* cm _leichter Granatwerfer_ 36

The german army envisaged mobile operations in the next great war,and a* light mortar easily transportable by a single man and able to support squad level operations was deemed useful.*adopted for service in 1936. Its intended role was to engage pockets of resistance that were beyond a hand grenade's throwing range.The mortar was *employed at a platoon level*,each german platoon having one with its crew.It proved popular due to its portability ,but lacked effectiveness.By 1941, the _Granatwerfer_ 36 was seen as *too complex* for its intended role. It *fired too light a shell and had too short of a range*. It was used as a platoon mortar and operated by a 3-man team. Production was terminated in 1941. By 1942, it had been *gradually withdrawn from front line service*. However, it remained in use with second-line and garrison units until the end.



​*SPECIFICATIONS:*

*Designer- Rheinmetall
Entered Service - 1936.
Crew - 2
Weight- 14 kg (31 lb)
Shell - 0.9 kg (2 lb) TNT filled
Elevation - 42° to 90 °
Traverse- 33° 45'
Rate of Fire - 15-25 rpm
Muzzle Velocity - 75 m/s *(246 ft/s*)
Effective Firing Range - 50 m (*54.7 yd*) min
510 m (*557.7 yd*) max
Maximum Range -520 m (*568.7 yd*)
Sights -Telescopic, later none*




​Above: Light mortar firing from a *mortar pit in defensive role*.The small 2 lb round and the inability to mass the mortars into batteries(due to being employed single pieces at platoon level)led to them being partially ineffective.Eventually the* german army did away with platoon mortars altogether.*




​The light mortars of the era.The *italian brixia* was complex and had a even lighter round,but very accurate though with a bad rate of fire(8-10rpm).Distributed 3 per company.The* japanese type89/model 10* had high rate of fire(25rpm),cheap and at 5kgs very light,but with a range of only 120m - a fifth of the german one.However it could be used in jungles and was thus a specialized weapon.The *british 2 inch* was a succesful design,very light at 5 kgs with a comparable shell and range,a bad ROF(8rpm).However crucially it could use both smoke,illuminating as well HE rounds.The *smoke rounds used for screening movement* were a integral part of british infantry fire and movement tactics.Stayed into service till the 80s.

*MEDIUM MORTAR* - 81mm _Granatwerfer34_




​The *standard german medium mortar* -the 8 cm _Gr34_ was a german favorite throughout the war and one of the iconic german weapons of world war 2.Largely derived from a french mortar,Rheinmetall produced a solid ,reliable but highly conventional design.It gained a *reputation fro extreme accuracy and high rate of fire*.Germany employed 81mm *mortars at the battalion level *(6 per heavy weapons company).They could either be parcelled out 2 mortars per company or made into a single/double battery for concentrated fire effect.The mortars proved so crucial to german success at lower level that after the 1943 reorganization,the german heavy weapons company had 10 instead of 6 mortars.6 81 mm and 4 of the 120mm _Gr42_.




​The *weapon's design was conventional *and it broke down into three loads (smooth bore barrel, bipod, baseplate) for transport.the arsenal of the _Gr34_ included *HE shells,smoke,illumination rounds as well as a bouncing round.*

*SPECIFICATIONS:*

*Weight - 62 kg* (136.6 lbs)
*Shell 3.5 kg* (7 lb)
*Elevation - 45° to 90°*
*Traverse - 10° to 23°
Rate of Fire - 15-25 rpm.*
*Muzzle velocity174 m/s *(571 ft/s)
*Maximum firing range 2,400 m* (2,624 yds)




​The_ Gr34_ made life hell for the allied troops at normandy and *earned an enduring reputation* in line with the fearsome 88 mm,the Mg42,the S-mine and the Tiger tank.Among allied front-line soldiers this mortar was dreaded for its accuracy and rate of fire. Captured 34s were eagerly employed against the Germans.Yet there was nothing outstanding about the design,which was reliable,solid and conventional.The mortar's reputation had little to do with innovation. Its *high status was primarily the result of through training of German mortar crews -the german trained their mortar crews twice as long* as the western allies and perhaps 3-4 times than the soviet . They were *experts at their craft.* German mortar crews always seemed to possess the ability to engage in and out of action rapidly. They paid careful attention to pre-registration and other fire control aids. The enterprising *German veteran mortar crews were able to bring fire down rapidly on their adversary.*




​Overall the 81 mm and its crew was a *highly respected adversary* on all fronts.Excellent co-operation and trained mortar crews was the key.The german machine guns with their high rate of fire *could pin down enemy troops and these in turn were vulnerable to bombardment*.A small battery of just 4 mortars as a quick reaction force could setup,and un the hands of trained crews* saturate a target area *with 80-100 shells within a minute for a devastating barrage that would* shatter the enemy infantry advance*.Illuminating rounds were useful for night fighting and smoke in offensive screening of german infantry.A mobile haltrack version was developed.

*NEXT: ANTI-TANK WEAPONRY*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY WEAPONS VII - ANTI TANK WEAPONRY*





​*ANTI-TANK RIFLE *: _Panzerbuchse 38/39_

The german army *created the first anti-tank rifles in 1918* in response to the british tank threat.These enjoyed moderate success.German development resumed in the late 1930s in an effort to *provide infantry with a man-portable lightweight anti-tank rifle*.The result - *Panzerbüchse 38* (PzB 38) was a manually loaded single-shot weapon with a recoiling barrel. When fired, the barrel recoiled about 9 cm (3.5 in), which opened the breech and ejected the spent cartridge casing.Employed in the polish campaign it was soon replaced by a simplified and easier to produce* PzB 39 *which became the standard anti-tank rifle of the wehrmacht.A section of 3 AT rifles were allotted at company level.The rifles would *prove inadequate from 1940 itself against any but the lightest enemy armor* and cars with insufficient armor penetration.They did have some utility vs pillboxes however.Starting 1942 the wehrmacht converted the existing rifles into rifled grenade launchers.A total of around *40,000 *were made and due to their poor performance they have been largely relegated to obscurity.The *era of anti-tank bolt action rifles was over.*

*SPECIFICATIONS:*
*Weight* -11.5 kg.
*Cartridge* - 7.92×94 mm
*Rate of Fire* - 10 rounds/min (practical rate)
*Muzzle Velocity* -1210 m/s
*Effective firing range* - 300 m (330 yd) (for *penetration of 25 mm armor*)*
Sights* - Hooded front post, rear "V" notch 




*ANTI -TANK GUN*  : _37 mm Panzerabwehrkanone 36 _(_PaK.36_)

The* standard anti-tank gun of the wehrmacht in 1940* was the ubiquitous Pak35/36.Every german infantry regiment had a company of 12 x Pak36 37 mm AT guns.In addition to each of the 3 infantry regiments having their own anti tank company,the divisional reserve had an anti-tank battalion with a further 3 anti-tank companies ,each with 12 Pak.36s.
In total a *german infantry division in 1940 had an authorized strength of 72 pak36 anti-tank guns*.The tank gun towing carriages were mechanized for excellent mobility.The wehrmacht entered 1940 with thousands of pak36s -the basis of its infantry's anti-tank power.



_
Origin - _Design of a horse-drawn, 3.7 cm anti-tank gun (designated *3.7 cm Pak L/45*) by Rheinmetall commenced in 1924 and the first guns were issued in 1928. By the early 1930s it was apparent that horse-drawn artillery was obsolescent, and the gun was modified for motorized transport.Re-designated the *3.7 cm Pak 35/36*, it began to replace the 3.7 Pak L/45 in 1934 and first appeared in combat in 1936 during the *Spanish civil war with excellent success*.The design of two-wheeled split-trail carriage was efficient and highly maneuverable, and the *basic layout was widely copied in other countries*, notably in the USA and Japan. Its penetrative performance could have been better, but it was sufficient and it was more than compensated for by its mobility.




Above -general specifications of a pak36.The stats will vary based on type of ammunition used.
It formed the *basis for many other nations' anti-tank guns* during the first years of World War II. The *KwK 36 L/45* was the same gun but was used as the main armament on several tanks, most notably the early models of the Panzer III. The american M3 37 mm and the japanese type 94 borrowed heavily,the Soviets used the PaK 36 carriage design for their 45mm M1937 AT gun.




The Pak36 gave* excellent performance against the lightly armored polish tanks* and tankettes ,knocking them out at ranges over 1000 m.Its small size made it *easily concealed,it had a high rate of fire and was very mobile requiring a minimum crew of just 2.*However the first rude awakening would come in the french campaign of 1940.During the May 1940 campaign, the *Pak 36, being a small-calibre weapon, was found to be inadequate against allied tanks like the British Matilda and the French Char B1and Somua S35 heavy and medium tanks* and on several occasion germans had to resort to desperate measures such as employing the luftwaffe 88 or caling in luftwaffe stuka support.Still, the gun was effective against the most common light tanks, such as the renault R35 during the battle for france, where the Char Bs and Matildas represented but a small fraction of the total number of AFVs.




​In June 1941, the Soviet forces consisted of 10,661 T-26, 2,987 T-37/38/40/50s, 59 T-35, 442 T-28, 7,659 BT, 957 T-34, and 530 KV for a combined total of approximately 23,295 tanks. Thus, during the initial phases of Barbarossa the* Pak 36 could still penetrate the armor of the majority of Soviet AFVs *at ranges up to 1000m from the front, with the notable exception of the T-28s and T-35s which it could only penetrate at under 100m. The* Pak 36 could not penetrate the armor of the T-34s and KVs at all.*The tank panic in the german infantry in 1941 led to the pak36 being derisively nicknamed _'The army's doorknocker'_ in reference to the *practice of pak36 shells bouncing off the armor of t-34s and KV-1s.*

The Pak 36 began to be *replaced by the new 5cm Pak38* in mid-1940. The* addition of tungsten-core shells *(_Pzgr. 40_) added slightly to the armour penetration of the Pak 36. Despite its continued impotence against the T-34, it remained the standard anti-tank weapon for many units until 1942. With tungsten core rounds, the Pak 36 crews could finally achieve kills on T-34s, but only via a direct shot to the rear or side armour from point-blank range, an unlikely and rather suicidal scenario.s the *Pak 36 was gradually replaced*, many were removed from their carriages and added to halftracks to be used as light anti-armour support. The guns were also passed off to the forces of Germany's allies fighting on the Eastern Front,. This proved particularly disastrous during the Soviet encirclement at Stalingrad when the Romanian forces, already demoralized and understrength, bore the brunt of the main Soviet armored thrust, and were unable to stop the Soviet advances due to their grossly inadequate anti-tank weaponry.




​Above - *Comparison of german and british tank rounds and anti-tank ammunition* throughout the war.From left to right.German pak36/basic panzer 3 armor piercing(AP)ammo,5 cm (panzer 3 upgunned),5 cm long barrel(pak38),75 mm HE (Panzer 4 short barrel),75 mm AP(Panzer 4 long barrel),75 mm AP advanced(Panther),88 mm (8.8 cm Flak,Tiger ),88 mm advanced(King tiger).*In this diagram you can see the rapid advancement in calibre and size of armor piercing rounds due to increasing armor of tanks that made the pak36 obsolete from 1941*.
To the right,47 mm(3pdr hotchkiss),2pdr AP(2 pdr AT gun,matilda tank,cruiser tanks,light tanks),57 mm(6 pdr AT gun,churchill,cromwell etc),75 mm HE,76 mm (17 pdr APDS -sherman firefly,17pdr AT gun),77 mm Comet TD,rest howitzer rounds.




_Ammunition - _
The performance of an anti tank gun largely depended upon its calibre,sights,barrel and ammunition.The normal ammunition was of two types; a *steel AP shell with a small explosive charge which detonated after penetration, and a tungsten cored shot.*
_Panzergranate 39_ standard ammunition -

*Projectile weight*: 0.685 kg
*Muzzle velocity*: 745 m/s
 Hit probability versus 2.5 m x 2 m target 

*Range Penetration* * in training* * in combat *
100 m 34 mm 100 % 100 %
500 m 29 mm 100 % 100 %
1000 m 22 mm 100 % 85 %
1500 m 19 mm 95 % 61 %

Penetration figures given for Pzgr 39 and an armoured plate 30 degrees from the horizontal.

_Panzergranate 40_ tungsten core ammunition -
This was tungsten cored ammunition, lighter and with a higher muzzle velocity, produced in small quantities.


*Projectile weight*: 0.368 kg
*Muzzle velocity*: 1,020 m/s
Hit probability versus 2.5 m x 2 m target
*Range* *Penetration* *in training* *in combat*
100 m 64 mm 100% 100%
500 m 31 mm 100% 100%
1000 m 22 mm 100% 85%
1500 m 20 mm 95% 61%

Penetration figures given for Pzgr 40 and an armoured plate 30 degrees from the horizontal.




Starting from 1943 the pak36 got a renaissance of sorts,in the hope of providing the thousands of existing Pak36s with a suitable anti-tank performance the 'Stick Bomb' or _'Stielgranate 41'_ was introduced.This was a *large hollow charge bomb of 19lbs weight mounted on a stick, with a perforated tail boom carrying fin*s. The stick was loaded into the muzzle so that the tail boom and fins surrounded the gun barrel. A special blank cartridge was then loaded and used to fire the stick bomb to a maximum range of 800 metres. Due to its *low velocity the normal engagement range was restricted to 300 metres, and the massive hollow charge could penetrate enormous 180mm of armor. *
It is believed that large numbers of these were used with good effect against Soviet tanks, and certainly some were used against British and American armor in Normandy in 1944; where the close country favored the short range of this weapon.

Note:The infamous 88 mm was employed by artillery and airforce units,and not shown under infantry weapons.

*NEXT: Infantry regimental and divisional artillery.Infantry Tactics -part 1.*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY WEAPONS VIII - INFANTRY GUNS*




​*REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY :* *LIGHT INFANTRY GUN *_7.5 cm leichtes Infanteriegeschütz 18 (i.g 18)_

Except and above mortars at battalion level,the german infantry division had 2 more incremental levels of indirect fire support available to it.*Light and heavy infantry support guns at regimental level*.And proper* large calibre artillery pieces at divisional level*.(Here only infantry guns to be shown,divisional artillery under artillery section).




​*Each german infantry regiment had its own canon company with 6 light infantry guns of 75 mm calibre and 2 heavy infantry guns of 150 mm calibre.*Battalion or regimental guns is a *very old concept* that was the first type of artillery in use along with siege artillery.Until the napoleonic era when artillery emerged as a seperate powerful arm,infantry field guns were the predominant type.Modern era weapons of this class were designed and used to *increase the firepower of infantry units they are intrinsic to; offering immediate tactical response to the needs of the unit's officer.*The designs are typically with short low velocity barrel, and light construction carriages allowing them to be more easily manoeuvred on the battlefield.




​The _german ig18_ was the *75 mm *light infantry support gun *present at the regimental level* in every german infantry division built upon the same concept.There were* 18 guns of this type in a german infantry division*.(6 per regiment)Development of the gun began in 1927, by rheinmetall.The crew was protected by an armored shield.At *880 lbs* it was not a lightweight piece and required a crew of five plus a towing carriage.It fired a *13 lb shell *with a shotgun block-breech mechanism out to a maximum range of 3800 metres.

*SPECIFICATIONS:*
*Calibre:* 7.5 cm
*Length:* 884 mm
*Weight:* _400 kg(without full load)_
*Breech:* shotgun pattern, percussion fired
*Carriage:* box trail
*Elevation:* -10° to +75°
*Traverse:* 12°
*Rate of fire:* _8-12 rounds_ per minute
*Muzzle velocity:* 260 m/s
*Effective range:* _3,795 m_
*Shell Weight:* 3.00 kg(hc)6.00 kg(HE)




​The weapon's* relative lightweight,low profile and good hitting power* meant it stayed in production throughout the war -*12.000 being manufactured*.It was reliable and an overall good design useful for smashing enemy strongpoints holding up an advance.However it was manpower intensive and somewhat heavy.
A* mountain version was developed*.For transport, The mountain variant could be broken down into six to ten packs, the heaviest weighing 74.9 kg. The Germans would typically assign two of these to each mountain battalion.*7.5 cm Infanteriegeschütz L/13* which was designed as a replacement for the le.IG 18, this gun could be broken into four to six loads. However though prototypes were tested the German army felt that it did not improve on the existing design sufficiently to merit introduction and the army stayed with the earlier gun.




*HEAVY INFANTRY GUN :* _Schweres InfanterieGeschutz 33 (SiG 33)_

The bigger cousin of the 75 mm, The 15 cm _schweres Infanterie Geschütz 33 _was the *standard German heavy infantry gun used in the war with 2 per regiment and 6 per division.*It was the largest weapon ever classified as an infantry gun by any nation.Sources differ on the development history, but the gun itself was of conventional design. Early production models were horse-drawn, with wooden wheels. Later production models had pressed steel wheels, with solid rubber tires and air brakes for motor towing. The sIG 33 was rather heavy for its mission and it was redesigned in the late 1930s to incorporate light alloys in an effort to save weight.

_



_​The design itself was very faithful to the concept.It provided the infantry with their own artillery at regimental level -a 150 mm calibre gun which in the last great war would have been found at the corps level.It was relatively light,a third of the weight of a german divisional 150 mm heavy howitzer.It *packed a powerful punch* .It wasn't without problems however,even its *relative light weight came at 1800 kgs* -very difficult to manhandle into position,was* manpower intensive* requiring a towing carriage and a 6 man crew,and it had a* range of 4.7 kms only*.The german divisional light howitzer* LeFH18 weighed almost the same but had twice the range and rate of fire*,thus from 1943 onwards germans often used it as regimental artillery as well as divisional,leaving the short range duty to the new 120 mm heavy mortars supported by 81 mm mortars which were far less manpower intensive,more mobile,easier to produce,logistically simpler and less vulnerable to air attack.The sig 33 didn't go out of service either and soldiered on till the end(especially late war ,when germany lost air superiority need for ground based fire support was felt).*4600 were manufactured* in all.




​*SPECIFICATIONS:*

_*Weight* 1,800 kg (4,000 lb) _
_
*Length* 4.42 m (14 ft 6 in)
*Barrel length* 1.65 m (5 ft 5 in) L/11
*Width* 2.06 m (6 ft 9 in)
*Shell* cased separate-loading (6 charges)
*Caliber* 149.1 mm (5.87 in)
*Breech* horizontal sliding block
*Recoil* hydropneumatic
*Carriage* box trail
*Elevation* 0° to +73° or -4° to +75°
*Traverse* 11.5°
*Rate of fire* 2-3 rounds per minute
*Muzzle Velocity* 240 m/s (790 ft/s) (HE)
*Effective firing range* 4,700 m (5,100 yd) 
_






_​_The sig 33 could* fire HE(high explosive),smoke,hollow charge and demolition rounds*(steilgranat).
Most of the shells used by the sIG 33 were unexceptional in design, but the _Stielgranate 42_ was different in fundamental ways from ordinary shells. The driving rod was loaded into the muzzle so that the finned projectile remained in front of, and outside, the barrel entirely. A special charge was loaded and would propel the projectile about a 1,000 metres (1,100 yd) downrange. At about 150 metres (160 yd) distance the driving rod would separate from the projectile. Unlike the _steilgranate 41_, this version was not intended for anti-tank use, but rather for the demolition of strongpoints and clearing barbed-wire obstacles and minefields by blast effect.The sig 33 was thus a *moderately succesful design overall,a self propelled version was developed*(in armored vehicles section).





_Infantry guns - the end?_​
*Infantry guns have fallen out of favor* in all armies by and large after world war 2.This is because they are manpower intensive,logistically troublesome requiring carriages and spares plus a trained crew and quite heavy.
The range advantage they used to offer can be compensated by today's grenade launchers ,rocket propelled grenades,heavy mortars,missiles and anti-fortification rifles at less cost,logistical burden,lower risk, weight and better rate of fire.Thus such weapons have not been developed post war in any significant way.

_*NEXT: GERMAN INFANTRY TACTICS -I*_

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN PIONIERS - WEHRMACHT'S COMBAT ENGINEER*




​Just one last type of german infantry left before moving onto tactics - the ubiquitous wehrmacht pionier.Without combat engineers mobile warfare in modern age is very difficult,and static defensive warfare too is reduced in effectiveness.The *engineer is an integral part of every modern army*.Germans divided their engineers into 4 groups -
1_.Combat Pioniers_
2._Construction troops_(field fortifications etc)
3._Railway troops_
4._Technical specialists troops_




The first category were *active elite assault troops thought of as infantry first,engineers second*.The other 3 categories were largely logistics and support troops.Combat pioniers were *present as an integral divisional sub-unit - each division had a pionier battlion*.These were expensive,irreplaceable ,well trained troops employed cautiously on important objectives.Larger formations like armies and corps might have bigger engineer* units attatched from the GHQ pool.*




Pioneers were crucial to the wehrmacht's battlefield tactics and performance.On the offensive they cleared obstacles,repaired bridges.In river crossings assisted in crossing,water obstacles with portable bridging, pontoon ferries, assault boats, and inflatable boats. In the attack they breached obstacles and supported the infantry as specialist assault troops when attacking fortified positions with demolitions, flame-throwers, and smoke. In the defence they constructed fortifications and shelters, erected obstacles-barbed wire,tank traps etc, laid minefields, planted booby traps, cleared fields of fire, erected camouflage, and maintained supply routes. In retreat they planted mines and booby traps, erected hasty obstacles, and destroyed bridges.




Pionier recruits *recieved specialized additional training* in addition to the already thorough 16 week basic training described earlier for an infantryman.Over this they learned a wide variety of skills from experienced NCOs and officers: erecting various types of barbed-wire entanglements and fences, planting and erecting anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, constructing squad bunkers, machine-gun bunkers and other small fighting positions, use of inflatable boats, assembling pontoon and float bridges, erecting small timber bridges for light vehicles and personnel, building corduroy roads, repairing roads and small bridges, learning how to use hand tools and the limited types of power tools, camouflage techniques, road reconnaissance, rigging electrically and non-electrically initiated demolition charges, and more.For assault,breaching barbed-wire obstacles with various types of demolition charges and wire-cutters, employing smoke candles and grenades to blind the enemy and screen their own movements, use of supporting weapons, particularly the machine gun and flame-thrower, and use of different types of demolition charges to destroy enemy bunkers.



Pioniers were *expert at demolitions *and were adept at usage of several types of explosives,mines and charges.The *flamethrower,extremely useful in urban combat and in clearing bunkers and trenches* was also used exclusively by pionier troops.Pioniers were the actual river crossing assault infantry that would play a key role in the battle of france.*When heavy defences were expected,the attacking sections of german infantry in a division would be reinforced by a pioner squad per infantry platoon from the divisional pioneer battalion.*Their specailized demolitions,flamethrowers,obstacle clearing equipment and training supported the basic infantry in the assault.




Pioneers employed the *same equipment as the infantryman*.Mauser rifles,Mg34 machine guns,MP40 SMGs,stick grenades,bundle grenades.They *also laid tellermies and s-mines*.The flamethrower -first employed in the trenches of world war one by the germans was used exclusively by pioneer troops.They also* carried wire cutters,electric igniters and mine detectors.Satchel charges,Pole charges for bunkers,tube charges were common equipment.*




​*NEXT:* *GERMAN COMBAT DOCTRINE -BLITZKRIEG CONCEPT*.*Infantry tactics -I*

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## Penguin

AUSTERLITZ said:


> The *unprecedented death and destruction* wiped out a whole generation of young europeans and bankrupted all participants.Faced with an immovable french army,a choking british blockade and the entrance of the united states *germany admitted defeat in 191*8 .The resultant peace treaty -The _Treaty of Versailles_ was *heavily punitive on germany *which lost territory,had to pay huge war indemnity and had to shoulder whole responsibility for war.Her army was restricted to 100,000 and aircraft,tanks and battleship production disallowed.WW I reshaped the map of the world and led to the breakup of the austrian,german,russian and ottoman empires.
> 
> 
> ​
> *Europe after WW1*.Germany lost Alsace and Lorraine in the west and territories to the resurrected Poland in the east.(Poland had been partitioned by austria,prussia and russia in the 18th century)Austrian empire collapsed completely into several new nations in the balkans.Russian empire lost finland,the baltic states and areas to poland.(These areas had been ceded to germany -which then had lost to the allies)


INteresting, the Netherlands was neutral in WW1 i.e. not a belligerent. Yet, in the above pic, has the color green, which is associated with the label 'key country winners'.



> The Great War kept the Netherlands on the side again, military that is.
> 
> The war itself did not involve the small country in the northwest of Europe, but the conflict did have a devastating effect on the economy of the Netherlands. Apart from the fact that the conscript army had to remain mobilised for the entire duration of the war - excluding many soldiers from their regular work - the import and export came almost to a complete stop. In those days the Netherlands was also depending on huge import of basic agriculture products for its daily meals and as such poverty and near starvation were common matters - especially in the last year of the war when the blockade of the Dutch merchant fleet was hard felt.


Holland: 1914-1918 [War over Holland - May 1940: the Dutch struggle]

Battle of the Netherlands - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (ww2: may 1940)
During the May 1940 invasion of the Netherlands by Germany, they lost HALF their available Ju-52 transports in action, something that significantly impacted German para actions on Crete a year later in May 1941.

The attack upon the Netherlands included the majority of the 7th Flieger Division in cooperation with 22nd Luftlande-Infanterie Division. Most of FJR1 and part of FJR2 saw action. There were approximately 4000 FJs used in Holland. Many Fallschirmjäger of the 1st Kompanie of Fallschirmjäger Regiment 1 were captured in Holland in May 1940, transported to England and not released until after the war was over. (total 1200 POW shipped, mostly FJ i.e. about 900 i.e. almost 1 in 4 para's dropped) .
Fallshirmjager.Biz - Home German Paratrooper Fallschirmjager & Militaria WWII

4.000 para's dropped (7e Fliegerdivision, FJR1 en FJR2.)
7.500 airbornes (landed with transports or gliders) (22e Luftlande Infanteriedivision, IR47 en IR65.)
430 transports employed
242 fighters employed
186 bombers employed
Vliegveld Valkenburg 10 mei 1940, 1/5

English historical narrative http://www.flamesofwar.com/Portals/0/Documents/Briefings/Early-war/Netherlands-1940.pdf.



> German losses were enormous. 22 German airborne division lost 42 percent of its officers and 28 percent of other staff. A battalion of the 65th regiment even lost 50 percent of its total strength. German radio messages indicated that many planes were not returned from their mission and the many wrecked plane wrecks were silent witnesses of the German defeat. About 200 transport planes were shot down over and around The Hague or destroyed on the ground and 1,600 German soldiers were taken prisoner. The reconquest of the airports in the German troops would remain unique in the Second World War.
> ...
> During the invasion of the Netherlands was available to the Germans about 430 transport aircraft. This large number was necessary because the Germans would make large-scale use of airborne troops in order to get to conquer the Dutch airfields. Upon review of the attack on the Netherlands than three important data come forward. First 220 German transport aircraft were shot down by the Dutch army or destroyed on the ground. Secondly, most of these devices were not governed by ordinary pilots, but by instructors, as there were available at the time of the attack is not enough trained pilots. Many of them were killed when their aircraft are shot down and others were arrested after landing by the Dutch army and immediately deported to England. Thirdly, the Dutch army had the German airborne troops inflicted heavy losses. Of the 11,075 troops deployed about 4,000 soldiers were off. Twelve hundred of them were shipped as a prisoner to England.
> So the losses were enormous, but what consequences came from this? The recently deceased Dutch historian Dr. Louis de Jong, in his work The Kingdom of the Netherlands following the Second World War: "Finally the Germans themselves have acknowledged that their loss was to transport aircraft in any case above half; with the loss of elite troops and skilled instructors so that was a loss for several years was long felt. "If the losses were so high that it was felt for years, it was a raid on England in 1940 completely unthinkable. The statement of De Jong receives support from German corner. After the war, declared the German General Kesselring, who was commander of the 2nd German Air Fleet, the Germans loss throughout the war no longer be recovered. His chief of staff, General Speidel added that the losses are "many years" made us feel. The Study Gruppe Geschichte des Luftkrieges sees a connection between the high losses in the battle in the Netherlands and later invasion plans. In a report, the study group writes that "the high losses of men and material that the action Hague labeled a failure, the high command warned to reaching intentions in subsequent plans as Operation Sealion, Malta, Gibraltar etc. 'explains in her Opinion The study thus a clear link between the German losses in the actions around The Hague, who also were labeled as a failure, and subsequent invasion plans. Regarding the relationship between the German losses and the consequences for operation Sealion says the English historian David Lampe this: "Many people in England thought at that time that the Germans would try to launch an invasion from the air, but the reports Intelligence indicated that this was excluded because Hitler no longer had the surgery required for such aircraft and -geoefende- airborne troops. "A German raid on England at the end of 1940 not only unlikely but not impossible, due to the losses incurred in The Netherlands.


Translate from Neergeschoten boven Nederland - Historiën

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## AUSTERLITZ

Sorry for the delay ,real life issues.Will be resuming shortly.

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN MILITARY DOCTRINE -MANUEVER WARFARE*




​Finally resuming this after a long break.Earlier *we have seen the general organization,supply services of the german land forces and organization,types,training procedures and equipment of german infantry.*Before going into german infantry tactics first we take a look at german military doctrine of this era and the role of the infantry in it.The german way of war in this period is generally termed _Blitzkrieg._

*EVOLUTION OF THEORY OF WARFARE :OPERATIONAL CONCEPT*
Until the late 18th century wars were usually decided by *2 single opposing armies limited in size by logistics confronting each other on a battlefield(immediately visible to the commanders)using tactics.*These were set-piece encounters.(Another way was continous raiding and manuevering by 2 armies for capture of fortresses,though this rarely provided decisive results).Thus battles at this time were tactical battles.The french revolution brought about a change in this approach.The* french republic imposed universal conscription* that brought mass conscript armies on a national scale into the picture.This was accompanied by agrarian revolution which eased supply problems for armies on the march.*Napoleon and his corps system became the prototype of modern operational warfare*.He used his corps -each one a miniature army like the old single armies but used in a co-ordinated manner mutually supported fashion directed by a staff to decide a battle.The development was still only halfway there however because wars were still decided by setpiece big battles,but the setting up of these battles was now done by manuevering of multiple armies not directly controlled by the commander instead of 2 single armies.This new level of warfare between traditional strategy and tactics came to be called during this era -_*grand tactics.*_
The* invention of telegraph for better communications,universal conscription and finally the industrial revolution*(of 1850s) made it possible for enormous national armies based on conscription numbering in millions and armed by armaments mass produced from factories(which was not available earlier).Wars could no longer be decided by single big battles -nations had much more manpower available and *could sustain such losses.Neither could commander immediately see the battlefield which could now stretch hundreds of kilometres*.A professional staff was needed to control logistics and planning movement and carry out commander's orders via telegraph,warfare became more decentralized.*Wars were decided by series of battles fought for an overall strategic objective rather than one big battle.*
This new development was noticed by all armies -the soviet military theorists *Tukhachevsky *and* Triandafilov* were the first to officially coin the term _Operations_ and describe it in detail.

At first, the operational level of war was to describe the movement and logistics necessary for the coordinated concentration of many units for an offensive. *Operational warfare is considered on a large enough scale that the tactical factors, such as line of sight and th time of day, are not recognizable, but smaller than the strategic scale, where production,politics, and diplomacy come into play*.Formations are of the operational level if they are able to conduct operational movement on their own, that is operating independently, and are of sufficient size to be directly handled or have a significant impact on the enemy's decision-making at the strategic level.During world war 2 this would mean an army or a corps,in modern times a brigade.

*DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN MILITARY DOCTRINE * -

_''Fortresses are monuments to human stupidity''-Moltke_​
German military doctrine evolved from that of its predecessor -prussia.Prussia from the time of frederick the great(when she became a major power) had followed the doctrine of mobile warfare (_Bewengungskrieg_),quick decisive battles to swiftly decide a war requiring a trained disciplined army and a competent officer korps.Necessity of this doctrine was rooted in* prussia's geographic position at the centre of europe* -russia to the east,france west and austria south-potentially facing war on multiple fronts.Being the weakest of the major powers in terms of manpower and economic resources she couldn't sustain herself in a war of attrition,she needed to defeat her enemies quickly in short decisive battles before moving to the next one.This doctrine of mobility proved its worth in the seven years war.Stagnation followed fredericks' death,the prussian army was only reformed(described in detail earlier) after its defeat to napoleon in 1806 and returned to its philosophy of mobile warfare and the creation of the first modern general staff.

_''Mistakes in the initial deployment cannot be repaired''- Moltke._​
The great prussian chief of staff Von moltke,a proponent of manuever warfare introduced some particular concepts which had a great effect on german military philosophy._*Aufsmarch*_(Initial deployment) - Decisive, swift orders by a competent staff,an efficient mobilization of forces and rapid,proper positioning of forces before the beginning of a campaign was vital to its success.

_*Kesselschlacht*_(Cauldron battle).This is in many ways the predecessor of the blitzkrieg.Moltke made* flanking the standard german way of attacking an enemy position both on strategc and tactical levels*.Frontal attacks were futile and only useful for pinning an enemy in place.After a succesful aufsmarch had concentrated the prussian armies in a manner so as to gain them a positional advantage or numerical one,preferably both.Part of the forces pinned the enemy in place ,other encircled it.Used to devastating effect in wars of german unification.





Moltke's Kesselschlacht -Sedan Campaign 1870.​A very basic outline,above u can see part of the prussian forces pin the enemy in place frontally,prussian left wing swings round and envelops it from the flank then descending on rear.French tried to retreat but were caught up with and surrounded at sedan to the northwest(french retreat arrows not shown).Here one the main reasons of success was the prussian mobilization.Due to her modern staff,the first one in the world at this time.Prussians mobilized at unprecedented speed using railways( a new technological innovation) in a pre-planned manner allowing moltke to concentrate his whole force on the border while french deployment was incomplete and gaining a numerical advantage in the battle area(despite overall numerical inferiority- very slight)that allowed the flanking manuever.As u can see french mobilization is still ongoing with 2 armies scattered -one to the south and one in paris still assembling(paris army makes a failed relief attempt later).

_''No plan survives contact with the enemy'' -Moltke_​
Another principle introduced by moltke for manuever warfare was* decentralized leadership* -_ Aufragstaktik_(mission oriented tactics).In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the *planning initiative and a freedom in execution* which allows a high degree of flexibility at the Operational and Tactical levels of command. Mission-type Orders* free the higher leadership from tactical details.*
This radically shortens the decision cycle and reaction time for german forces in fluid mobile warfare environment.




*ENTER SCHLIEFFEN* - After bismarck,the 1890s saw a radical change in the diplomatic sphere and europe divided into 2 camps.Russia allied with france(later joined by england) to counter germany-austria's dual alliance.The *germans were once again confronted by the threat of a 2-front war *and a british blockade.A war of attrition against such of forces would bring defeat.Schlieffen the german chief of staff devised his famous schlieffen plan to deal with this problem.His solution was annihilate one opponent speedily so that it could then throw its weight completely against the other.A massive gigantic knockout blow against france to knock her out of the war in 6 weeks and then redeploy all available forces against the slower mobilized russians(due to distance and infrastructure problems in eastern europe)- a classic implementation of the napoleonic central position strategy on a grand scale.
His inspiration was hannibal's great victory at cannae -the perfect annihilation battle.An enemy army will not allow itself to be annihilated if it possesses any means of escape and the *only way to deny the enemy a means of escape is through encirclement.*




At cannae hannibal used a weak centre to lure in the romans and annihilated them in a double envelopment.Like hannibal at cannae he would keep a weak centre luring the french army to attack it through the alsace-lorraine provinces that france wanted to recover.(Lost 1870).Meanwhile the bulk of the german army would swing in a great wheel,creating an open flank by going through neutral belgium,sweep behind paris and descend on the flank and rear of the french armies annihilating them.The plan greatly resembles napoleon's _maneuver sur les derrires _at Ulm 1805,and is also a execution of moltke's kesselschlacht principle with emphasis on flanking,pinning enemy frontally with lesser forces and enveloping him.However the plan failed due to several reasons.
1.Unlike in 1870 french had both a modern staff system and proper mobilization plan.
2.Russia mobilized ahead of time,and original schliffen plan was not adhered to.
3.Plan underestimated supply issues,projected huge mass of divisions of the overloaded right wing couldn't be effectively supplied through limited number of railroads.
4.Excessive emphasis on envelopment and flanking meant the wheel had to cover a large distance in a arc,the french railway system allowed the french to redeploy forces.Germans couldn't disrupt this redeployment.(could only be done by airpower,a key component of future blitzkrieg).Marching foot infantry couldn't maintain speeds necessary to keep momentum going.
5.The invention of machine guns and barbed wire had changed the advantage completely to the defensive from moltke's time.
The plan almost succeeded but lost momentum at the last phase,unable to knock france out of the war germany was forced into the war of attrition on 2 fronts it had dreaded.

*THE BUTCHERY OF THE GREAT WAR - IMPACT ON DOCTRINE*

After the initial mobile warfare of 1914.1915-1916 was characterized by classic trench warfare.Both sides* attempted to break the deadlock by sheer weight of shell,*enormous artillery concentrations seen at verdun,ypres,somme etc.But these all were costly failures,the combination of barbed wire and dug-in machine guns plus enemy artillery proved too much,shelling just tangled up the barbed wire and if even a couple of machine guns survived in the enemy trenches they could halt upto a whole battalion(usually using line/column-typical napoleonic age human wave formations) until reinforcements arrived.The failure of artillery alone and the catastrophic human price led to a desperate need for a solution.The static trench warfare negated german aufragstaktik.
The *allies arrived at a technological solution - The tank*.It made its debut in 1917 but was only used in numbers in the last months of the war in a co-ordinated manner and broke through the german defenses when massed in hundreds.The germans themselves neglected the tank,but the last months had shown them well the breakthrough potential of armour(panzer).The allied plan of 1919 drafted by British military theorist Fuller,called for co-ordinated offensive with tanks and aircraft but was never used due to the german surrender.

The germans arrived at a *different solution- a philosophical one.The stormtrooper and 'Infiltration tactics'.*
Instead of massive lengthy artillery preparation lasting days,short artillery bombardment, featuring heavy shells mixed with numerous poison gas projectiles, to neutralize the enemy front lines, and not try to destroy them.

Under a creeping barrage, _Stoßtruppen_ (armed with smgs,grenades,flamethrowers for trench clearing at close quarters) would then move forward, in dispersed order. They would avoid combat whenever possible, infiltrate the Allied defenses at previously identified weak points, and destroy or capture enemy headquarters and artillery strongpoints.
Next, infantry battalions with extra LMGs,mortars and flamethrowers would attack on narrow fronts against any Allied strongpoints the shock troops missed. Mortars and field guns would be in place to fire as needed to accelerate the breakthrough.
In the last stage of the assault, regular infantry would mop up any remaining Allied resistance.
The new assault method had men rushing forward in small groups using whatever cover was available and laying down Suppressive fire for other groups in the same unit as they moved forward. The new tactics, which were intended to achieve tactical surprise, were to attack the weakest parts of an enemy's line, bypass his strongpoints and to abandon the futile attempt to have a grand and detailed plan of operations controlled from afar. Instead, junior leaders could exercise initiative on the spot. Any enemy strong points which had not been overrun by stormtroopers could be attacked by the second echelon troops following the stormtroopers*.The modern infantry squad and fire and manuever squad tactics has its origins from this period.*
These new tactics won spectacular successes early on in germany's last offensive of 1918,but eventually were unable to maintain their momentum being bled try through exhaustion after repeated advances.(limited numbers of stormtroopers acting as spearhead).Nonetheless the *new method of use of infantry was now established.*





(Different types of attack in german doctrine)​
*INTERWAR PERIOD - VON SEECKT AND RETURN TO MOBILITY*

*Hans von Seeckt*, the army chief from 1921 to 1926, would become the father of the new German Army which was designed not on masse but mobility.(earlier in thread).A committee was created that dealt with the lessons learned from the last war.The outcome of this committee was the new “Combined Arms Leadership and Battle” report which would become the new Doctrine and Training Manual for the Reichswehr in 1921.Seeckt rejected the overwhelming emphasis on mass and encirclement of schliffen and moltke and advocated speed and penetration.Penetration would allow flanking if the gap could be held and widened.He however greatly expanded the aufragstaktik principle.All reichswehr men were trained one level above their rank.The small elite body of men became the base for the expansion of the wehrmacht.The* whole infantry of the reichswehr were trained in stormtrooper methods *which were modified to become standard infantry tactics.The Reichswehr was influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, in particular the infiltration tactics which at the end of the war had seen some breakthroughs in the Western Front's trench war, and the maneuver warfare which dominated the eastern front of world war one.Germans had first-hand *experience of the potential of tanks to change the battlefield *and were eager to study and master this new technology.Aircraft and tanks were both banned by versailles,but seeckt made secret agreements with soviet russia to keep up with such developments.After hitler germany openly began re-armament.The tank idea was popularized in germany(much more on this in tanks section later,guderian's role etc) and hitler supported it.The first panzer divisions were created in 1936 while the luftwaffe was also being expanded.*The combination of the stormtrooper infantry,the concentration of tank and the aircraft ,combined with german command philosophy of mission tactics and emphasis on speed,flanking and established traditions of encirclement would generally blend to form what is called blitzkrieg.*

*BLITZKRIEG*_ -
Blitzkrieg or 'Lightning war' - describing a method of warfare whereby an attacking force spearheaded by a dense concentration of armoured and motorized/mechanized infantry formations with close air support, breaks through the opponent's line of defense by short, fast, powerful attacks and then dislocates the defenders, using speed and surprise to encircle them. Through the employment of combined arms in manuever warfare, blitzkrieg attempts to unbalance the enemy by making it difficult for them to respond to the continuously changing front and defeating them in a decisive strategic annihilation battle._
In its strategic means is associated with a series of quick and decisive short battles to deliver a knockout blow to an enemy state before it could fully mobilize its full resources.This prevents an drawn out attritional struggle.

The word is not german military term,it was coined by a journalist later picked up by nazi propaganda.*There was no pre-planned blitzkrieg blueprint as such.It evolved from practice*.Most traditional german commanders doubted the capability of tanks until the french campaign.If blitzkrieg is seperated into the three levels -_the tactical,operational and strategic_.At the tactical level the highly trained and organized german army conducted 'blitzkrieg' well in the french campaign.Co-ordination between arms was excellent.Aufragstaktik,combined arms,flanking and mobility were established principles.On a operational level it depended on the commanders at this stage -ones like guderian and rommel employed themselves in true blitzkrieg fashion,other were classic commanders.At this level it wasn't until; the russian campaign that blitzkrieg fully matured*.At the strategic level there was no blitzkrieg.*There was no blitz economy,germany didn't undergo total economic mobilization until 1943,tanks were not given absolute priority,navy got a substantial amount of budget for battleships,large amounts were spent on fortifications.The* germans themselves never believed it would be so successful until it was implemented.*



*METHOD OF BLITZKRIEG* - 

*SCHWERPUNKT *- A important principle in blitzkrieg,german doctrine_ Schwerpunkt_ as a center of gravity or point of maximum effort, where a decisive action could be achieved. *Ground, mechanised and tactical air forces were concentrated at this point of maximum effort whenever possible to achieve a local superiority even if inferior overall*. By local success at the _Schwerpunkt_, a small force achieved a breakthrough and gained advantages by fighting in the enemy's rear.To achieve a breakthrough, armoured forces would attack the enemy's defensive line directly, supported by motorized infantry, artillery fire and aerial bombardment, in order to create a breach in the enemy's line. Through this breach, the tanks and motorised units could break through without the traditional encumbrance of the slow logistics of infantry on foot. In the opening phase of an operation, air forces sought to gain superiority over enemy air-forces by attacking aircraft on the ground, bombing their airfields, and seeking to destroy them in the air. The principle of _Schwerpunkt_ enabled the attacker to *win numerical superiority at the point of the main effort, which in turn gave the attacker tactical and operational superiority even though the attacker may be numerically and strategically inferior along the front overall.*

_*PURSUIT *-_Having achieved a breakthrough of the enemy's line, units comprising the schwerpunkt were not supposed to become decisively engaged with enemy frontline units to the right and left of the breakthrough area. *Units pouring through the hole were tasked to drive upon set objectives in the rear areas of the enemy front line.* In World War II, German Panzer forces, for example, utilized motorized mobility, attempted to paralyze the enemy's ability to react. Moving faster than enemy forces, mobile forces exploited weaknesses and acted before opposing forces could formulate a response. Central to this is the decision cycle. Every decision made by German or opposing forces required time to gather information, make a decision, disseminate orders to subordinates, and then implement this decision through action. *Through superior mobility and faster decision-making cycles, mobile forces could take action on a situation sooner than the forces opposing them*. Rather than receiving an explicit order, a commander would be told of his superior's intent and the role which his unit was to fill in this concept. The exact method of execution was then a matter for the low-level commander to determine as best fit the situation. Staff burden was reduced at the top and spread among commands more knowledgeable about their own situation. In addition, the encouragement of initiative at all levels aided implementation. As a result, significant decisions could be effected quickly and either verbally or with written orders a few pages long.




_*MISSION-ORIENTED TACTICS *- _
Aufragstaktik is defined in german military handbooks as -
'_'The military leader informs what his intention is, sets clear achievable objectives, and provides the required forces and resources. He will only order details regarding execution if measures which serve the same objective have to be harmonized, if political or military constraints require it.''_
A* comparative example* of the era -
'American company commander would get the order to attack and secure a certain village. He would be told to use first platoon to flank the village and third platoon to attempt a frontal assault. Four tanks would be attached to his company to support the frontal assault which would be the main effort. After several hours the company succeeded and the commander radioed back for further orders, the company commander all the while observing the actions from behind.
A German company commander would get the order to secure the village by 1600 hours period. Before the attack he would ensure that even a private knew what was expected of him during the attack. If his platoon commander and sergeant would fall, the enlisted man had to take over. The German company commander might put the allocated tanks on the heights adjacent to the village to provide covering fire or might drive them around the settlement to block the escape of the village defenders. He might take the village by frontal assault, infiltration or pincer attack — whatever he saw fit the situation best and he would lead the attack that he had devised. After he secured the village he would pursue the remnants of the defenders and push forward with those of his elements who would not be immediately needed because he knew the overall idea of his superior was to attack and within the idea of Aufragstaktik all his actions were covered by the simple order to take the village at 1600 hours. Because of his training a German officer simply did not require detailed instruction.'

*DESTRUCTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE -*
An operation's final phase, was the *destruction of the pockets* which were enveloped by the initial stages of an operation. The _Kesselschlacht_, ("cauldron battle"), was a *concentric attack on encircled forces earlier bypassed by the Schwerpunkt attack*(s). It was here that most losses were inflicted upon the enemy, primarily through the capture of prisoners and weapons.




Summary of a classic blitzkrieg operation.Concentrated panzer forces supported by mechanized infantry and close air support converge and breakthrough at designated schwerpunkt in points on the enemy line,The accompanying mechanized infantry defends the breach made,while panzers surge further to the rear and link up encircling the defending forces.The ring amde is defended for a small period until slow moving foot infantry comes and relieves the motorized infantry and panzers,consolidating and expanding the ring and eliminating any relief attempts.The surrounded forces are reduced by artillery,airpower and infantry while panzers reorganize for next attack and repel enemy attacks on the outer ring.This combination of breakthrough tactics by blend of stormtrooper/tank attack supported by airpower with kesselschlacht concept is represented in blitzkrieg in its classic offensive form.
The speed of panzers reduce reaction time to move up enemy reserves,airpower disrupts redeployment of reserves.

*USE OF AIRPOWER -*
First objective of air force was to knock out enemy air force if possible and *achieve air superiority* over the battlefield,at least over friendly forces.Close air support to be provided for advancing panzers on demand,acting as flying artillery and also for breakthrough operations in the schwerpunkt and for reducing the encircled forces in a kessel.(cauldron)*Interdiction* to be provided by medium bombers,destroying enemy transportation infrastructure,communications and command centres,hindering movement of reserves.Supply planes would also s*upply panzers from air* if they outran their supply train.

*LIMITATIONS OF BLITZKRIEG -*
The philosophy was not without limitations which would only be fully exposed in the russian campaign.
1.*Adverse environment *such as mud,heavy snow affected mobility and urban warfare restricted combined arms elements.
2.*Air superiority *was a key factor of early blitzkrieg successes.For this type of attack to succeed it was essential to have air superiority over its own forces at least,particularly the vulnerable advancing panzer forces and ideally over enemy airspace too.In later years allied superiority destroyed german mobility and effectively neutralized bliztkrieg.
3.Blitzkrieg is vulnerable to an enemy that is robust enough to weather the shock of the attack and* that does not panic at the idea of enemy formations in its rear area*. This is especially true if the attacking formation lacks the reserve to keep funneling forces into the spearhead, or lacks the mobility to provide infantry, artillery and supplies into the attack. If the defender can hold the shoulders of the breach they will have the opportunity to counterattack into the flank of the attacker, potentially cutting off the vanguard.*Defense in depth *with mobile reserves can neuter blitzkrieg,effectively shown at kursk.
4.Strategies based on maneuver have the inherent danger of the attacking force *overextending its supply lines*, and can be defeated by a determined foe who is willing and able to sacrifice territory for time in which to regroup and rearm, as the Soviets did on the Eastern Front (as opposed to, for example, the Dutch who had no territory to sacrifice).In the underdeveloped infrastructure and vast spaces of russia,mechanized warfare faced serious problems.
5.Finally it *requires a well trained and disciplined army* adept at combined arms and fire and maneuver tactics ,with *competent junior leadership* capable of initiative .


*German manuever warfare concept thus visualized series of smaller fluid encounter battle along a shifting front keeping the enemy off-balance based on speed and maneuver,compared to french philosophy of static continous front and massive set piece battles decided by firepower and material.*

*NEXT - INFANTRY TACTICS PART I*

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## LeveragedBuyout

AUSTERLITZ said:


> *GERMAN MILITARY DOCTRINE -MANUEVER WARFARE*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ​Finally resuming this after a long break.Earlier *we have seen the general organization,supply services of the german land forces and organization,types,training procedures and equipment of german infantry.*Before going into german infantry tactics first we take a look at german military doctrine of this era and the role of the infantry in it.The german way of war in this period is generally termed _Blitzkrieg._
> 
> *EVOLUTION OF THEORY OF WARFARE :OPERATIONAL CONCEPT*
> Until the late 18th century wars were usually decided by *2 single opposing armies limited in size by logistics confronting each other on a battlefield(immediately visible to the commanders)using tactics.*These were set-piece encounters.(Another way was continous raiding and manuevering by 2 armies for capture of fortresses,though this rarely provided decisive results).Thus battles at this time were tactical battles.The french revolution brought about a change in this approach.The* french republic imposed universal conscription* that brought mass conscript armies on a national scale into the picture.This was accompanied by agrarian revolution which eased supply problems for armies on the march.*Napoleon and his corps system became the prototype of modern operational warfare*.He used his corps -each one a miniature army like the old single armies but used in a co-ordinated manner mutually supported fashion directed by a staff to decide a battle.The development was still only halfway there however because wars were still decided by setpiece big battles,but the setting up of these battles was now done by manuevering of multiple armies not directly controlled by the commander instead of 2 single armies.This new level of warfare between traditional strategy and tactics came to be called during this era -_*grand tactics.*_
> The* invention of telegraph for better communications,universal conscription and finally the industrial revolution*(of 1850s) made it possible for enormous national armies based on conscription numbering in millions and armed by armaments mass produced from factories(which was not available earlier).Wars could no longer be decided by single big battles -nations had much more manpower available and *could sustain such losses.Neither could commander immediately see the battlefield which could now stretch hundreds of kilometres*.A professional staff was needed to control logistics and planning movement and carry out commander's orders via telegraph,warfare became more decentralized.*Wars were decided by series of battles fought for an overall strategic objective rather than one big battle.*
> This new development was noticed by all armies -the soviet military theorists *Tukhachevsky *and* Triandafilov* were the first to officially coin the term _Operations_ and describe it in detail.
> 
> At first, the operational level of war was to describe the movement and logistics necessary for the coordinated concentration of many units for an offensive. *Operational warfare is considered on a large enough scale that the tactical factors, such as line of sight and th time of day, are not recognizable, but smaller than the strategic scale, where production,politics, and diplomacy come into play*.Formations are of the operational level if they are able to conduct operational movement on their own, that is operating independently, and are of sufficient size to be directly handled or have a significant impact on the enemy's decision-making at the strategic level.During world war 2 this would mean an army or a corps,in modern times a brigade.
> 
> *DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN MILITARY DOCTRINE * -
> 
> _''Fortresses are monuments to human stupidity''-Moltke_​
> German military doctrine evolved from that of its predecessor -prussia.Prussia from the time of frederick the great(when she became a major power) had followed the doctrine of mobile warfare (_Bewengungskrieg_),quick decisive battles to swiftly decide a war requiring a trained disciplined army and a competent officer korps.Necessity of this doctrine was rooted in* prussia's geographic position at the centre of europe* -russia to the east,france west and austria south-potentially facing war on multiple fronts.Being the weakest of the major powers in terms of manpower and economic resources she couldn't sustain herself in a war of attrition,she needed to defeat her enemies quickly in short decisive battles before moving to the next one.This doctrine of mobility proved its worth in the seven years war.Stagnation followed fredericks' death,the prussian army was only reformed(described in detail earlier) after its defeat to napoleon in 1806 and returned to its philosophy of mobile warfare and the creation of the first modern general staff.
> 
> _''Mistakes in the initial deployment cannot be repaired''- Moltke._​
> The great prussian chief of staff Von moltke,a proponent of manuever warfare introduced some particular concepts which had a great effect on german military philosophy._*Aufsmarch*_(Initial deployment) - Decisive, swift orders by a competent staff,an efficient mobilization of forces and rapid,proper positioning of forces before the beginning of a campaign was vital to its success.
> 
> _*Kesselschlacht*_(Cauldron battle).This is in many ways the predecessor of the blitzkrieg.Moltke made* flanking the standard german way of attacking an enemy position both on strategc and tactical levels*.Frontal attacks were futile and only useful for pinning an enemy in place.After a succesful aufsmarch had concentrated the prussian armies in a manner so as to gain them a positional advantage or numerical one,preferably both.Part of the forces pinned the enemy in place ,other encircled it.Used to devastating effect in wars of german unification.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Moltke's Kesselschlacht -Sedan Campaign 1870.​A very basic outline,above u can see part of the prussian forces pin the enemy in place frontally,prussian left wing swings round and envelops it from the flank then descending on rear.French tried to retreat but were caught up with and surrounded at sedan to the northwest(french retreat arrows not shown).Here one the main reasons of success was the prussian mobilization.Due to her modern staff,the first one in the world at this time.Prussians mobilized at unprecedented speed using railways( a new technological innovation) in a pre-planned manner allowing moltke to concentrate his whole force on the border while french deployment was incomplete and gaining a numerical advantage in the battle area(despite overall numerical inferiority- very slight)that allowed the flanking manuever.As u can see french mobilization is still ongoing with 2 armies scattered -one to the south and one in paris still assembling(paris army makes a failed relief attempt later).
> 
> _''No plan survives contact with the enemy'' -Moltke_​
> Another principle introduced by moltke for manuever warfare was* decentralized leadership* -_ Aufragstaktik_(mission oriented tactics).In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the *planning initiative and a freedom in execution* which allows a high degree of flexibility at the Operational and Tactical levels of command. Mission-type Orders* free the higher leadership from tactical details.*
> This radically shortens the decision cycle and reaction time for german forces in fluid mobile warfare environment.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *ENTER SCHLIEFFEN* - After bismarck,the 1890s saw a radical change in the diplomatic sphere and europe divided into 2 camps.Russia allied with france(later joined by england) to counter germany-austria's dual alliance.The *germans were once again confronted by the threat of a 2-front war *and a british blockade.A war of attrition against such of forces would bring defeat.Schlieffen the german chief of staff devised his famous schlieffen plan to deal with this problem.His solution was annihilate one opponent speedily so that it could then throw its weight completely against the other.A massive gigantic knockout blow against france to knock her out of the war in 6 weeks and then redeploy all available forces against the slower mobilized russians(due to distance and infrastructure problems in eastern europe)- a classic implementation of the napoleonic central position strategy on a grand scale.
> His inspiration was hannibal's great victory at cannae -the perfect annihilation battle.An enemy army will not allow itself to be annihilated if it possesses any means of escape and the *only way to deny the enemy a means of escape is through encirclement.*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> At cannae hannibal used a weak centre to lure in the romans and annihilated them in a double envelopment.Like hannibal at cannae he would keep a weak centre luring the french army to attack it through the alsace-lorraine provinces that france wanted to recover.(Lost 1870).Meanwhile the bulk of the german army would swing in a great wheel,creating an open flank by going through neutral belgium,sweep behind paris and descend on the flank and rear of the french armies annihilating them.The plan greatly resembles napoleon's _maneuver sur les derrires _at Ulm 1805,and is also a execution of moltke's kesselschlacht principle with emphasis on flanking,pinning enemy frontally with lesser forces and enveloping him.However the plan failed due to several reasons.
> 1.Unlike in 1870 french had both a modern staff system and proper mobilization plan.
> 2.Russia mobilized ahead of time,and original schliffen plan was not adhered to.
> 3.Plan underestimated supply issues,projected huge mass of divisions of the overloaded right wing couldn't be effectively supplied through limited number of railroads.
> 4.Excessive emphasis on envelopment and flanking meant the wheel had to cover a large distance in a arc,the french railway system allowed the french to redeploy forces.Germans couldn't disrupt this redeployment.(could only be done by airpower,a key component of future blitzkrieg).Marching foot infantry couldn't maintain speeds necessary to keep momentum going.
> 5.The invention of machine guns and barbed wire had changed the advantage completely to the defensive from moltke's time.
> The plan almost succeeded but lost momentum at the last phase,unable to knock france out of the war germany was forced into the war of attrition on 2 fronts it had dreaded.
> 
> *THE BUTCHERY OF THE GREAT WAR - IMPACT ON DOCTRINE*
> 
> After the initial mobile warfare of 1914.1915-1916 was characterized by classic trench warfare.Both sides* attempted to break the deadlock by sheer weight of shell,*enormous artillery concentrations seen at verdun,ypres,somme etc.But these all were costly failures,the combination of barbed wire and dug-in machine guns plus enemy artillery proved too much,shelling just tangled up the barbed wire and if even a couple of machine guns survived in the enemy trenches they could halt upto a whole battalion(usually using line/column-typical napoleonic age human wave formations) until reinforcements arrived.The failure of artillery alone and the catastrophic human price led to a desperate need for a solution.The static trench warfare negated german aufragstaktik.
> The *allies arrived at a technological solution - The tank*.It made its debut in 1917 but was only used in numbers in the last months of the war in a co-ordinated manner and broke through the german defenses when massed in hundreds.The germans themselves neglected the tank,but the last months had shown them well the breakthrough potential of armour(panzer).The allied plan of 1919 drafted by British military theorist Fuller,called for co-ordinated offensive with tanks and aircraft but was never used due to the german surrender.
> 
> The germans arrived at a *different solution- a philosophical one.The stormtrooper and 'Infiltration tactics'.*
> Instead of massive lengthy artillery preparation lasting days,short artillery bombardment, featuring heavy shells mixed with numerous poison gas projectiles, to neutralize the enemy front lines, and not try to destroy them.
> 
> Under a creeping barrage, _Stoßtruppen_ (armed with smgs,grenades,flamethrowers for trench clearing at close quarters) would then move forward, in dispersed order. They would avoid combat whenever possible, infiltrate the Allied defenses at previously identified weak points, and destroy or capture enemy headquarters and artillery strongpoints.
> Next, infantry battalions with extra LMGs,mortars and flamethrowers would attack on narrow fronts against any Allied strongpoints the shock troops missed. Mortars and field guns would be in place to fire as needed to accelerate the breakthrough.
> In the last stage of the assault, regular infantry would mop up any remaining Allied resistance.
> The new assault method had men rushing forward in small groups using whatever cover was available and laying down Suppressive fire for other groups in the same unit as they moved forward. The new tactics, which were intended to achieve tactical surprise, were to attack the weakest parts of an enemy's line, bypass his strongpoints and to abandon the futile attempt to have a grand and detailed plan of operations controlled from afar. Instead, junior leaders could exercise initiative on the spot. Any enemy strong points which had not been overrun by stormtroopers could be attacked by the second echelon troops following the stormtroopers*.The modern infantry squad and fire and manuever squad tactics has its origins from this period.*
> These new tactics won spectacular successes early on in germany's last offensive of 1918,but eventually were unable to maintain their momentum being bled try through exhaustion after repeated advances.(limited numbers of stormtroopers acting as spearhead).Nonetheless the *new method of use of infantry was now established.*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (Different types of attack in german doctrine)​
> *INTERWAR PERIOD - VON SEECKT AND RETURN TO MOBILITY*
> 
> *Hans von Seeckt*, the army chief from 1921 to 1926, would become the father of the new German Army which was designed not on masse but mobility.(earlier in thread).A committee was created that dealt with the lessons learned from the last war.The outcome of this committee was the new “Combined Arms Leadership and Battle” report which would become the new Doctrine and Training Manual for the Reichswehr in 1921.Seeckt rejected the overwhelming emphasis on mass and encirclement of schliffen and moltke and advocated speed and penetration.Penetration would allow flanking if the gap could be held and widened.He however greatly expanded the aufragstaktik principle.All reichswehr men were trained one level above their rank.The small elite body of men became the base for the expansion of the wehrmacht.The* whole infantry of the reichswehr were trained in stormtrooper methods *which were modified to become standard infantry tactics.The Reichswehr was influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, in particular the infiltration tactics which at the end of the war had seen some breakthroughs in the Western Front's trench war, and the maneuver warfare which dominated the eastern front of world war one.Germans had first-hand *experience of the potential of tanks to change the battlefield *and were eager to study and master this new technology.Aircraft and tanks were both banned by versailles,but seeckt made secret agreements with soviet russia to keep up with such developments.After hitler germany openly began re-armament.The tank idea was popularized in germany(much more on this in tanks section later,guderian's role etc) and hitler supported it.The first panzer divisions were created in 1936 while the luftwaffe was also being expanded.*The combination of the stormtrooper infantry,the concentration of tank and the aircraft ,combined with german command philosophy of mission tactics and emphasis on speed,flanking and established traditions of encirclement would generally blend to form what is called blitzkrieg.*
> 
> *BLITZKRIEG*_ -
> Blitzkrieg or 'Lightning war' - describing a method of warfare whereby an attacking force spearheaded by a dense concentration of armoured and motorized/mechanized infantry formations with close air support, breaks through the opponent's line of defense by short, fast, powerful attacks and then dislocates the defenders, using speed and surprise to encircle them. Through the employment of combined arms in manuever warfare, blitzkrieg attempts to unbalance the enemy by making it difficult for them to respond to the continuously changing front and defeating them in a decisive strategic annihilation battle._
> In its strategic means is associated with a series of quick and decisive short battles to deliver a knockout blow to an enemy state before it could fully mobilize its full resources.This prevents an drawn out attritional struggle.
> 
> The word is not german military term,it was coined by a journalist later picked up by nazi propaganda.*There was no pre-planned blitzkrieg blueprint as such.It evolved from practice*.Most traditional german commanders doubted the capability of tanks until the french campaign.If blitzkrieg is seperated into the three levels -_the tactical,operational and strategic_.At the tactical level the highly trained and organized german army conducted 'blitzkrieg' well in the french campaign.Co-ordination between arms was excellent.Aufragstaktik,combined arms,flanking and mobility were established principles.On a operational level it depended on the commanders at this stage -ones like guderian and rommel employed themselves in true blitzkrieg fashion,other were classic commanders.At this level it wasn't until; the russian campaign that blitzkrieg fully matured*.At the strategic level there was no blitzkrieg.*There was no blitz economy,germany didn't undergo total economic mobilization until 1943,tanks were not given absolute priority,navy got a substantial amount of budget for battleships,large amounts were spent on fortifications.The* germans themselves never believed it would be so successful until it was implemented.*
> 
> 
> 
> *METHOD OF BLITZKRIEG* -
> 
> *SCHWERPUNKT *- A important principle in blitzkrieg,german doctrine_ Schwerpunkt_ as a center of gravity or point of maximum effort, where a decisive action could be achieved. *Ground, mechanised and tactical air forces were concentrated at this point of maximum effort whenever possible to achieve a local superiority even if inferior overall*. By local success at the _Schwerpunkt_, a small force achieved a breakthrough and gained advantages by fighting in the enemy's rear.To achieve a breakthrough, armoured forces would attack the enemy's defensive line directly, supported by motorized infantry, artillery fire and aerial bombardment, in order to create a breach in the enemy's line. Through this breach, the tanks and motorised units could break through without the traditional encumbrance of the slow logistics of infantry on foot. In the opening phase of an operation, air forces sought to gain superiority over enemy air-forces by attacking aircraft on the ground, bombing their airfields, and seeking to destroy them in the air. The principle of _Schwerpunkt_ enabled the attacker to *win numerical superiority at the point of the main effort, which in turn gave the attacker tactical and operational superiority even though the attacker may be numerically and strategically inferior along the front overall.*
> 
> _*PURSUIT *-_Having achieved a breakthrough of the enemy's line, units comprising the schwerpunkt were not supposed to become decisively engaged with enemy frontline units to the right and left of the breakthrough area. *Units pouring through the hole were tasked to drive upon set objectives in the rear areas of the enemy front line.* In World War II, German Panzer forces, for example, utilized motorized mobility, attempted to paralyze the enemy's ability to react. Moving faster than enemy forces, mobile forces exploited weaknesses and acted before opposing forces could formulate a response. Central to this is the decision cycle. Every decision made by German or opposing forces required time to gather information, make a decision, disseminate orders to subordinates, and then implement this decision through action. *Through superior mobility and faster decision-making cycles, mobile forces could take action on a situation sooner than the forces opposing them*. Rather than receiving an explicit order, a commander would be told of his superior's intent and the role which his unit was to fill in this concept. The exact method of execution was then a matter for the low-level commander to determine as best fit the situation. Staff burden was reduced at the top and spread among commands more knowledgeable about their own situation. In addition, the encouragement of initiative at all levels aided implementation. As a result, significant decisions could be effected quickly and either verbally or with written orders a few pages long.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _*MISSION-ORIENTED TACTICS *- _
> Aufragstaktik is defined in german military handbooks as -
> '_'The military leader informs what his intention is, sets clear achievable objectives, and provides the required forces and resources. He will only order details regarding execution if measures which serve the same objective have to be harmonized, if political or military constraints require it.''_
> A* comparative example* of the era -
> 'American company commander would get the order to attack and secure a certain village. He would be told to use first platoon to flank the village and third platoon to attempt a frontal assault. Four tanks would be attached to his company to support the frontal assault which would be the main effort. After several hours the company succeeded and the commander radioed back for further orders, the company commander all the while observing the actions from behind.
> A German company commander would get the order to secure the village by 1600 hours period. Before the attack he would ensure that even a private knew what was expected of him during the attack. If his platoon commander and sergeant would fall, the enlisted man had to take over. The German company commander might put the allocated tanks on the heights adjacent to the village to provide covering fire or might drive them around the settlement to block the escape of the village defenders. He might take the village by frontal assault, infiltration or pincer attack — whatever he saw fit the situation best and he would lead the attack that he had devised. After he secured the village he would pursue the remnants of the defenders and push forward with those of his elements who would not be immediately needed because he knew the overall idea of his superior was to attack and within the idea of Aufragstaktik all his actions were covered by the simple order to take the village at 1600 hours. Because of his training a German officer simply did not require detailed instruction.'
> 
> *DESTRUCTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE -*
> An operation's final phase, was the *destruction of the pockets* which were enveloped by the initial stages of an operation. The _Kesselschlacht_, ("cauldron battle"), was a *concentric attack on encircled forces earlier bypassed by the Schwerpunkt attack*(s). It was here that most losses were inflicted upon the enemy, primarily through the capture of prisoners and weapons.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Summary of a classic blitzkrieg operation.Concentrated panzer forces supported by mechanized infantry and close air support converge and breakthrough at designated schwerpunkt in points on the enemy line,The accompanying mechanized infantry defends the breach made,while panzers surge further to the rear and link up encircling the defending forces.The ring amde is defended for a small period until slow moving foot infantry comes and relieves the motorized infantry and panzers,consolidating and expanding the ring and eliminating any relief attempts.The surrounded forces are reduced by artillery,airpower and infantry while panzers reorganize for next attack and repel enemy attacks on the outer ring.This combination of breakthrough tactics by blend of stormtrooper/tank attack supported by airpower with kesselschlacht concept is represented in blitzkrieg in its classic offensive form.
> The speed of panzers reduce reaction time to move up enemy reserves,airpower disrupts redeployment of reserves.
> 
> *USE OF AIRPOWER -*
> First objective of air force was to knock out enemy air force if possible and *achieve air superiority* over the battlefield,at least over friendly forces.Close air support to be provided for advancing panzers on demand,acting as flying artillery and also for breakthrough operations in the schwerpunkt and for reducing the encircled forces in a kessel.(cauldron)*Interdiction* to be provided by medium bombers,destroying enemy transportation infrastructure,communications and command centres,hindering movement of reserves.Supply planes would also s*upply panzers from air* if they outran their supply train.
> 
> *LIMITATIONS OF BLITZKRIEG -*
> The philosophy was not without limitations which would only be fully exposed in the russian campaign.
> 1.*Adverse environment *such as mud,heavy snow affected mobility and urban warfare restricted combined arms elements.
> 2.*Air superiority *was a key factor of early blitzkrieg successes.For this type of attack to succeed it was essential to have air superiority over its own forces at least,particularly the vulnerable advancing panzer forces and ideally over enemy airspace too.In later years allied superiority destroyed german mobility and effectively neutralized bliztkrieg.
> 3.Blitzkrieg is vulnerable to an enemy that is robust enough to weather the shock of the attack and* that does not panic at the idea of enemy formations in its rear area*. This is especially true if the attacking formation lacks the reserve to keep funneling forces into the spearhead, or lacks the mobility to provide infantry, artillery and supplies into the attack. If the defender can hold the shoulders of the breach they will have the opportunity to counterattack into the flank of the attacker, potentially cutting off the vanguard.*Defense in depth *with mobile reserves can neuter blitzkrieg,effectively shown at kursk.
> 4.Strategies based on maneuver have the inherent danger of the attacking force *overextending its supply lines*, and can be defeated by a determined foe who is willing and able to sacrifice territory for time in which to regroup and rearm, as the Soviets did on the Eastern Front (as opposed to, for example, the Dutch who had no territory to sacrifice).In the underdeveloped infrastructure and vast spaces of russia,mechanized warfare faced serious problems.
> 5.Finally it *requires a well trained and disciplined army* adept at combined arms and fire and maneuver tactics ,with *competent junior leadership* capable of initiative .
> 
> 
> *German manuever warfare concept thus visualized series of smaller fluid encounter battle along a shifting front keeping the enemy off-balance based on speed and maneuver,compared to french philosophy of static continous front and massive set piece battles decided by firepower and material.*
> 
> *NEXT - INFANTRY TACTICS PART I*




Another impressive analysis, @AUSTERLITZ , and welcome back. Out of curiosity, what does modern military theory dictate as the response to blitzkrieg, in order to counter its effects? In other words, can it be stopped during execution, or are the weaknesses you illustrated above (e.g. defense in depth, cutting supply lines, etc.) the main strategies to counter blitzkrieg?


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## AUSTERLITZ

LeveragedBuyout said:


> Another impressive analysis, @AUSTERLITZ , and welcome back. Out of curiosity, what does modern military theory dictate as the response to blitzkrieg, in order to counter its effects? In other words, can it be stopped during execution, or are the weaknesses you illustrated above (e.g. defense in depth, cutting supply lines, etc.) the main strategies to counter blitzkrieg?



Mostly air superiority,if u attack the enemy armoured spearheads from the air it can have a devastating effect.Thus any blitz operation needs at least air superiority over its own forces and ideally also enemy.
Best land response is defense in depth.Light cordon type screen so there is no concrete schwerpunkt to attack as main forces are held back,followed by second defensive zone of mutually supporting fortified strongpoints which are instructed to keep fighting even if bypassed and surrounded for a while,lots of minefields to delay.Finally armored reserves ready to counterattack the pincers ,ideally from the flank.
Also blitzkrieg is difficult to pull off,because german command philosophy was unique.Second ATGMs available to infantry have reduced shock power of tanks alone.In modern times israel has succesfully used this tactic in arab-israeli wars,with a similar command system based on low level initiative and combined arms.

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY TACTICS - GENERAL METHODS*




​*INTRODUCTION:*

The german army followed a *triangular organization structure from platoon upto divisional level*.3 squads =1 platoon,3 platoons plus support=1 company,3 companies plus support=1 battalion,3 battalions plus support=1 regiment,3 regiments plus support=division.All support was organic,meaning integrated from the beginning into the structure..thus frequent support attachments from higher levels for missions were unnecessary.This was the result of *the Einheit principle standardized in the german army*.It provides that any given arm or service will develop a number of standard unit groups, each with standard organization, leadership, training, and equipment. The *unit group is an organic entity, capable of operating independently and self-sufficient both for tactical and administrative purposes*. Within a given branch or service, each basic type of unit group will represent a different combination of the various components (or weapons) of that branch or service.The _Einheit_ principle of organization has several advantages. Obviously the supply and replacement of equipment can be more readily geared to a few standard types of units. The training and tactical employment of a given type of unit can be standardized, and directed with uniformity. Above all, the existence of these basic type-units, each so composed as to serve a different function,* permits easy organization of any desired type of larger unit.*This principle also applies to the infantry naturally.(scroll back pages to see infantry organization from squad to division in detail in this thread)

The triangular model was* flexible as it gave each level of command 2 units to commit to a battle while holding one in reserve as a manuever element to be used at a critical juncture *as the battle developed.German doctrine at this era placed an overwhelming emphasis on the offensive as the only means of achieving decisive victory.First we get an overview of general german tactical methods of recon,attack and defense before going into detail from battalion down to squad tactics.

*RECONNAISSANCE:*

*PRINCIPLES* - The German doctrine stresses aggressiveness, attempt to obtain superiority in the area to be reconnoitred, and strive for continuous observation of the enemy. They believe in *employing reconnaissance units in force as a rule. *They expect and are prepared to fight to obtain the desired information.

Only enough reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure superiority in the area to be reconnoitred. *Reserves are kept on hand to be committed *when the reconnaissance must be intensified, when the original force meets strong enemy opposition, or when the direction and area to be reconnoitred are changed. The Germans encourage aggressive action against enemy security forces. When the reconnaissance units meet superior enemy forces, they fight a delaying action while other units attempt to flank the enemy.Reconnaissance is classified by the Germans as _operational, tactical_, and_ battle_ reconnaissance.

*METHODS* -
*Operational reconnaissance*, penetrating over a large area in great depth, provides the basis for strategic planning and action. This type of reconnaissance is intended to determine the location and activities of enemy forces, particularly *localities of rail concentrations, forward or rearward displacements of personnel, loading or unloading areas of army elements, the construction of field or permanent fortifications, and hostile air force concentrations*. Identification of large enemy motorized elements, especially on an open flank, is important. Operational reconnaissance is *carried out by the* Air Force and by motorized units.Operational air reconnaissance units are generally limited to the observation of important roads and railroads .The motorized units employed for operational reconnaissance have only directions and objectives assigned.




_Storch_,tactical reconssaince aircraft​*
Tactical reconnaissance*, carried out in the area behind the operational reconnaissance, provides the basis for the commitment of troops. Its mission embraces identification of the enemy's organization, disposition, strength, and antiaircraft defense; determination of the enemy's reinforcement capabilities; and terrain reconnaissance of advanced sectors. *Air Force reconnaissance units and motorized and mounted reconnaissance battalions* are employed for tactical reconnaissance. Their direction and radius of employment are based upon the results of the operational reconnaissance.Sectors of responsibility are assigned to ground tactical reconnaissance battalions(the support units-motorcycles,armored cars,cavalry etc in divisions and regiments)The width of a sector is determined by the situation, the type and strength of the reconnaissance battalion, the road net, and the terrain. In general, the width of a sector assigned to a motorized reconnaissance battalion does not exceed 30 miles.
Divisional reconnaissance battalions seldom operate more than one day's march (18 miles) in front of the division, covering an area approximately 6 miles wide.

*Battle reconnaissance *as a rule is begun when the opposing forces begin to deploy. *All troops participating in battle carry out battle reconnaissance* through patrols, artillery observation posts, observation battalions, and air reconnaissance units. The information obtained on the organization and strength of the enemy provides the basis for the conduct of the battle.Can be conducted by several means -
If a panzer/motorized division is nearby,armored car will be dispatched._Armored Car Patrols_ normally are composed of three armored reconnaissance cars, one of which is equipped with radio. An artillery observer often accompanies the patrol so that in an emergency fire can be brought down quickly. This type of patrol usually is organized for missions lasting one to two days.Patrol never splits up. If enemy forces are met, action is avoided unless the force is so weak that it can be destroyed without diverting the patrol from its main task. If enemy action is anticipated, the patrol is reinforced with self-propelled guns and occasionally with tanks. Engineers and motorcyclists are often attached to the patrol to deal with road blocks and demolitions.While scouting a woods, a favorite German ruse is to drive the leading car toward its edge, halt briefly to observe, and then drive off rapidly, hoping to draw fire that will disclose the enemy positions.




Motorcycle Recon Unit.​
The Germans send out_ reconnaissance patrols_, consisting of a *NCO and three or four men, to get such information as the location of enemy positions and minefields*. They generally avoid contact and retreat when fired on.

_Combat patrols_ consist of at least one NCO officer and eight men, but are usually much stronger. As a rule the combatpatrol is commanded by a sergeant who has under him 15 to 20 men, organized in two equal sections, each commanded by a section leader. These are *raiding patrols, and their mission often includes bringing back prisoners of war.*
Emphasis placed on_ terrain reconnaissance_, realizing the influence terrain has upon the conduct of operations. Most of the usual reconnaissance missions include terrain reconnaissance tasks. Terrain may be so important at times as to require reconnaissance by special units. Ground and air reconnaissance units give special attention to the road net--its density, condition, road blocks, mines, and demolitions--as well as to the terrain itself, particularly tank country.

*THE ATTACK: GENERAL)*
​The fundamental principle of German offensive doctrine is to encircle and destroy the enemy. The objective of the combined arms in attack is to bring the armored forces and the infantry into decisive action against the enemy with sufficient fire power and shock.Even the most formidable forces are never sufficient for overwhelming superiority on the entire front. They therefore select a point of main effort (_Schwerpunkt_) for a breakthrough, allotting narrow sectors of attack to the troops committed at the decisive locality. Here is massed the bulk of the heavy weapons and reserves. The other sectors of the front are engaged by weaker, diversionary forces. In selecting the point of main effort, the der weaknesses in the enemy's defensive position; suitability of the terrain, especially for tanks and for cooperation of all arms; approach routes; and possibilities for supporting fire, especially artillery are considered. Although the Germans would select a point of main effort in all attacks, they would usually also make plans for shifting their main effort if they meet unexpected success elsewhere. To allow such shifts, sufficient reserves and a strong, unified command are organized.An attack on a narrow front, according to German doctrine, must have sufficient forces at its disposal to widen the penetration while maintaining its impetus, and to protect the flanks of the penetration. Once the attack is launched, it must drive straight to its objective, regardless of opposition.




​*TYPES OF ATTACK :*

'The _frontal attack_ strikes the defender at what is usually his strongest point, and therefore* requires absolute superiority in men and materiel*. In theory, frontal attacks should only be made across terrain that allows the attacking force to break through and quickly get into the depths of the enemy position. To tie down the enemy on the flanks of the breakthrough, the frontage of the attack is usually set wider than the actual _Schwerpunkt_ within it. *Adequate reserves necessary to counter the certain employment of the enemy's reserves*.Viewed the most difficult to execute'.

An_ Wing attack_ directed at one or both of the defending "wings" was considered to have a better chance of success than a frontal attack. *Only a portion of the defenders' weapons would be faced, and only one flank of the advancing force was exposed to enemy fire during the approach.* Often the forcing back of one wing would provide opportunities to develop a wing attack into a flank or envelopment attack.

The _flank attack,_considered the *most effective attack*. The flank attack develops either from the approach march--sometimes through a turning movement--or from flank marches. It attempts to* surprise the enemy and permit him no time for counter-measures. Since mobility and the deception of the enemy at other positions are required, the flank attack is most successfully mounted from a distance*; the troop movements necessary for the maneuver can be executed in close proximity to the enemy only with unusually favorable terrain or at night. Attacks are launched on both flanks only when the Germans consider their forces clearly superior.

The _enveloping attack_ was actually a combination of the frontal and flank techniques, and was especially favored by the Germans. The enveloping forces would be directed against either or both the defenders' flanks, and was accompanied by a *simultaneous frontal attack aimed at fixing in place their main forces*. The success of an envelopment depended on the extent to which the enemy was able to redeploy his units in the threatened direction(s). Of course, the deeper that enveloping forces drove into the enemy's flanks,greater became the danger they would themselves be counter-enveloped. The Germans therefore emphasized the necessity of strong, experienced reserves, coupled with the organization of the enveloping forces in depth.

In an _encirclement _the enemy was not attacked at all along his front (or perhaps only by light diversionary forces), while the* main attacking force passed entirely around him with the objective of completely maneuvering him out of position. *This was a particularly decisive form of attack, but at the same time one usually more difficult to execute than a flanking or enveloping attack, and *one requiring extreme mobility and deception.*


*PENETRATION AND BREAKTHROUGH:*

*Penetrations *and* breakthroughs *were not actually separate forms of attack by themselves, but rather were terms used to describe the exploitation of a successful frontal, wing or flank effort.
A penetration was said to have occurred when the *continuity of the enemy front was first broken.* The broader that initial penetration, the deeper the wedge that could be driven. It was considered important to have strong reserves available to block enemy attempts to counterattack (usually on the flanks) the penetration.
German units were trained to exploit penetrations to the maximum, leading to a full breakthrough before effective enemy countermeasures could be taken. The deeper and more swiftly the attacking force penetrated, the more effectively frustrated would be the defenders' attempts to close their front again by withdrawal toward the rear. The *Germans didn't consider a penetration successfully and entirely evolved into a breakthrough until the attack had overrun the defenders' artillery positions*. Once that was done, reserve units would be committed to turn and roll up the remainder of the enemy's line from the newly created flanks of the penetration/breakthrough. This maneuver was referred to as ''wedge and cauldron."

*Pursuit *was considered to have begun when the defender was no longer able to maintain his position and abandoned the combat area with the bulk of his force. The objective of the pursuit was nothing less than the complete annihilation of the retreating and routed enemy. Accordingly, it was conducted across as broad a front as possible .Effective pursuit efforts required great initiative from the commanders at all levels of the operation. To be successful pursuits usually had to be started the instant the enemy retreat was seen to be under way, even though the attacking troops might already be exhausted from their initial effort. The idea was to deny the enemy any quiet time to pause and reconstitute his defense. Naturally, then, the fastest moving, most mobile, forces were the ones selected for pursuits, usually tank and armored infantry units well supported by aircraft.




*MEETING ENGAGEMENTS:*
In meeting engagements the *advantage lay with the side that first succeeded in completing effective preparations for an attack*, thereby depriving the enemy of his freedom of action. The advance guard of any advancing German force was always tasked with quickly using fire and maneuver in such a way as to secure that freedom of action for their side. When both sides attacked immediately from march columns, the decisive factors were then the initiative of the junior officers and the overall efficiency of the troops they led.

Overall,german offensive tactics always aimed at outflanking or encircling the main area of the enemy defense with motorized and mechanized formations. The *straight-leg infantry was intended for use in rolling up the enemy defenses in the rear, or participating in the penetration/breakthrough with the tanks to develop the wedge and cauldron*.

*ORGANIZING AN ATTACK:*
The attack order (_Angriffsbefehl_) generally contains the objective of the attack, the disposition of the infantry, unit sectors and boundaries, disposition and support missions of the artillery, location of reserves, and the time of attack. The order is not drawn up in accordance with any stereotyped form, but as a rule follows this pattern:

Estimate of the situation (disposition of hostile and friendly troops).
Mission.
Assembly areas for the forward companies; objective; sector boundaries; orders for the continuation of combat reconnaissance.
Instructions for the preparation of the heavy-weapons fire support, especially for massed fire.
Orders to the artillery for fire preparation and coordination.
Assembly areas for the reserves.
Time of attack.
Instructions for rear services (medical service and supplies).
Location of command posts.
_Sectors of Attack_ - The width of a sector assigned to an infantry unit in the attack *depends on the unit's mission and battle strength, on terrain conditions, on the available fire support of all arms, and on the probable strength of enemy resistance.* Normally the sector assigned to a platoon is between 165 and 220 yards. A company attack sector is about 330 to 550 yards. A battalion sector is 440 to 1,100 yards, while a division sector may be 4,400 to 5,500 yards. These sectors also provide the boundaries for the other arms, especially for the artillery in support of the infantry, although the artillery may utilize favorable observation positions in neighboring sectors. This also applies to the heavy infantry weapons.For large units the sectors are determined from the map; for smaller units, from the terrain.

_Fire Plan - _*Fire superiority is achieved through coordination of the infantry and artillery weapons*. The basis for the fire plan is the regulation of the commitment of all weapons.
The fire plan includes the following:


Assignment of combat missions.
Distribution of observation sectors and fields of fire for the infantry and the artillery.
An estimate of capabilities of the artillery for effective execution of the combat mission.
Orders for the commencement of fire and fire schedules.
Orders for the preparation for massed fire.
Instructions for ammunition supply. The Germans stress the coordination of flat and high trajectory weapons so that all dead spaces are covered by fire. Lack of signal equipment, however, often hinders the application of this principle.
*THE DEFENSIVE (GENERAL)*

In German doctrine the object of the defense is to halt the hostile attack, or to gain time pending development of a more favorable situation for resumption of the offensive.They *favored an elastic defense wherein great importance was placed on the idea of immediate and violent counterattacks as the best way of defeating an attacking enemy.*The Germans divided their defensive battlefields into four positions: the _advanced position, the outpost position, the main line of resistance, and the reserve position._They *apply the principle of selecting a point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) to the defense as well as to the attack. *This principle necessarily is applied in reverse order in the defensive, the main effort being made opposite the point where the enemy is making his main attack.
The width and depth of a German defense area depend upon the terrain and the proportional strength of friendly and hostile forces. In general, however, the width of a defensive sector assigned to a unit is approximately twice the width of the sector when the same unit attacks. Normal sectors are: platoon, 220 to 550 yards; company, 440 to 1,100 yards; battalion, 880 to 2,200 yards; regiment, 2,200 to 3,300 yards; division, 6,600 to 11,000 yards.





*ZONES OF RESISTANCE:*
_
The Advanced position_ was closest to the enemy line and was usually set up five kilometers in front of the German main line of resistance, thus staying within range of their own medium artillery. Advanced positions were selected on the basis of good defensive terrain that provided observation points for friendly artillery and, if possible, also worked to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main line farther back. The troops manning the advanced position* operated so as to make an attacking enemy deploy his troops from march prematurely and in the wrong directions*
German troops in the advanced position were not expected to hold at all costs. In the face of superior enemy numbers or firepower they were to retreat along predetermined routes under the cover of friendly artillery. The forces selected for the advanced position were therefore usually mobile reconnaissance detachments, made up mostly of armored cars, mobile infantry, assault guns .Units that had both the firepower and mobility to make them suitable for such deployment.

_The Outpost position _was usually *established two kilometers in front *of the main line of resistance. Its location would therefore* always be in range of both medium and light friendly artillery* As long as the troops manning the advanced position remained in front of it, the outpost position would be only lightly occupied. Ordinarily, individual strongpoints within the overall outpost position would be manned by no more than an infantry platoon supported primarily by the fire of close-support weapons such as mortars and infantry guns. Anti-tank guns were often also assigned to the outpost position to repel hostile armored reconnaissance units. The *main defensive weapon of this area, however, was the heavy machinegun*, which could fire out to a range of about one kilometer.
Good fields of fire were considered mandatory for all positions within the outpost area. Firing positions were usually selected at the forward edges of woods, villages, hedgerows and hills. Numerous decoy positions would also be constructed. Guards were posted, particularly at dusk and dawn, to provide warnings of enemy advances. Small, prepared counterattacks with limited objectives were often launched from outpost positions, with the aim of disrupting enemy preparations and gaining information.
Firing positions within the outpost area were also selected on the basis of facilitating unobserved withdrawal of those defenders to the main line of resistance once enemy pressure grew too strong. Several alternate positions would be prepared for each weapon, and shifts were made day and night to make it more difficult for the opposition to detect and dislodge the defenders. When an outpost position was abandoned, the withdrawal was likely to be covered by carefully registered fire from heavy weapons intended to discourage the enemy from immediately advancing.





(An improvised field machine gun bunker)​_
Main Line of Resistance - _The Germans organized their *main battle line in depth, with individual strongpoints connected to form uninterrupted belts*. These strongpoints, constructed to allow for all around defense, and surrounded by barbed wire obstacles and minefields, contained one or more heavy weapons, including machineguns, mortars, infantry guns, and riflemen. The smallest strongpoints constructed were intended to be occupied by reinforced squads. Such squad positions were normally incorporated into platoon strongpoints, company strongpoints, and so on up the organizational scale.
The Germans always attempted to make *maximum use of reverse slopes* in their defensive positions. Forward-slope positions were avoided whenever possible, since they could be detected early on by an approaching enemy, and were likely to be attacked by mass fire.Wherever they defended the Germans adhered to the principle of "effect over protection." For example, though cutting and removing underbrush might increase the enemy's ability to spot defending troops, the enhancing effect such removal had on those same defenders' firing lanes was considered worth the increased risk.
A *detailed fire plan was prepared in advance by the infantry officers*,and then coordinated with the artillery. The mass of the available artillery would be used to lay concentrated fire both close to and well in front of the main battle line, and was sited to cover the spaces between the effective fire zones of the frontline units.
German defense of their main battle line was based on stubborn resistance at individual strongpoints, local counterattacks against areas of immediate enemy penetration, and larger-scale counter attacks carried out by mobile reserves. Defenders in strongpoints were taught to continue their resistance even after they were surrounded, since their perseverance impeded the attackers' advance and facilitated counterattacks. German doctrine therefore prescribed that intact portions of a breached main battle line continue to fight, regardless of the immediate situation, until the appropriate higher command ordered a readjustment of the line.
*Immediate local counter thrusts by the infantry at hand and whatever support elements happened to be near* the enemy penetration endeavored to hurl back the enemy before he had a chance to establish himself. These small counterattacks were directed at the flanks of the enemy penetration whenever possible.





(A typical battalion strongpoint,3 companies in defensive strongpoints with heavy weapons company in rear and available artillery,usually heavy mortars or infantry guns -in detail later)​
_The reserve position_ was constructed *far enough to the rear of the main battle line to compel the enemy artillery to move forward to bring it under fire.* Mobile reserve units were also normally kept there. Troops in the main battle line would retire to the reserve position only under the heaviest pressure.

_Anti Tank Defenses_ - At first the Germans tended to construct anti-tank ditches well forward of their main battle line. But experience showed that such construction merely served to offer good jump-off positions for the enemy's infantry while also revealing the location of the main battle line, increasingly, then, during the last two years of the war they more often dug anti-tank ditches in the area between the main battle line and their artillery positions. They were built in an uninterrupted line to avoid leaving any complete passage *German anti-tank guns were always dispersed in depth, with some In placing them they preferred positions in enfilade, or even on reverse slopes.* Normally two to four anti-tank guns were deployed in each position, with light machineguns located around them to protect against enemy infantry assault. Considerable effort was often made to conceal anti-tank guns to prevent the enemy from discovering the location and strength of the anti-tank defense prior to his attack. Though single anti-tank guns sometimes engaged enemy armor at ranges up to one kilometer, they usually opened fire at about 250 meters.

_German artillery_ - attempts to disrupt a hostile attack before it reaches the defensive positions. German manuals state it is invaluable to *install observation posts simultaneously in the main line of resistance, in the advanced position, and in the immediate vicinity of the gun position. Thus to keep a hostile force constantly under observation and fire even when it achieves a penetration*. The divisional level artillery regiment commander controls the fire as long as possible, although requests for artillery barrages may be made by unit commanders as low as platoon leaders. Capabilities of German heavy mortars, which like all other support weapons usually are sited on reverse slopes, are exploited.

When the enemy succeeds in making a large penetration or breakthrough, the German higher echelon commander decides whether a general counterattack should be launched to restore the position or whether the main battle position
should be reestablished farther to the rear. The counterattack is directed against the hostile flank, where possible, and is prepared thoroughly. Assembly area, time, objective, zone, artillery support, and employment of tanks, self-propelled artillery, assault guns, and air units are controlled by one commander.

(The above strongpoints and zones will be detailed with pics in coming posts at battalion,company and platoon levels).

*NEXT: BATTALION LEVEL TACTICS -OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE*

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## The_Sidewinder

Blitzkrieg or the lightning war was start of modern warfare. Although Germans lost eventually I have always been fascinated by German battleplans & warmachines.


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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY BATTALION TACTICS*




Above,a *german infantry regiment 1939-42*.(organization discussed earlier in detail).It also depicts in detail the composition of one of the 3 infantry(rifle) battalions of the regiment.An infantry battalion is composed of 3 infantry companies and 1 heavy weapons company..A typical description of the battalion - _''The battalion is the basic tactical unit of Infantry. It usually operates as an element of the infantry regiment. Its mission is assigned by the regimental commander, and its actions are coordinated with those of other units of the regiment. Exceptionally the battalion may be detached from the regiment to perform an independent mission.'_An infantry battalion paper strength was nominally 850 men.

*GERMAN BATTALION ATTACKS :*

German battalion attacks were conducted on narrow fronts of 400 m to 1 km in width,and with a predetermined point of *main effort or schwerpunkt within that space*.Assaults could be of the types already described above,front attack,wing attack,flank attack or envelopment attack.Encirclement with pure infantry were generally not possible without motorized support due to mobility requirements.Envelopments required terrain features to obscure the turning move.The wing attacks were conducted in oblique order.Flanks were obvious points to attack, and
even where none existed at the start they could be created by manoeuvre,or by picking out a weak point from an otherwise continuous enemy line.Attacks could be made directly from the line of march, 'shaking out' into aggressive formations from the columns of advance.




The Germans carry out deployment in two stages. They call the first stage _Entfaltung_ or "shaking out", which is equivalent to the development of a march column.Above a battalion in its shaking out phase.*2 companies advancing upfront with a third company behind in reserve*.(the boxes with 3 dots above them indicate a platoon,3 platoons form a company).You can see boxes with single perpendicular line this represents a company,in above diagram it represents not a troop formation but company HQ and support weapons.In the upper attack sector we can also see the regimental command platoon with 3 dots added to the attack.The box with 2 dots lower indicates the battalion HQ to the rear of the second company supervising the attack.The H arrows indicate the heavy machine guns of the heavy weapons company of the battalion distributed amongst the companies for support.50AT refers to AT guns from the anti tank company of the regiment attatched to support the battalion's attack.75 refers to 75 mm infantry support guns attatched from howitzer company of regiment to support the battalion attack.(both are regimental level assets attatched temporarily for a specific mission).The box with wheels to the rear indicates the mobile reconnaissance battalion(possibly regimental or divisional level which has now fallen back).The Germans often placed only one company forward, the main strength of the battalion being kept under control of the battalion commander as long as possible so that he may employ it in the most advantageous direction for attack.




​Deployment complete.*2 companies have deployed into forward positions for the attack*(boxes with one short line ..this time representing the full company strength).Third company in reserve,battalion HQ and reg command platoon are to the rear.The heavy weapons company has its weapons distributed for support.Most of the hmgs on flanks for the attack.81 mm mortars for fire support.T*he companies deploy in depth as soon as they come within range of artillery fire.*When the rifle companies are deployed, they exploit all possible cover as they advance, employing column-of-file formations with irregular distances. The leading elements are not extended until they are to engage in a fire fight. The elements that follow continue advancing in file.


The attacks followed a 3 phase development -
*Phase I *- Working forward by stealth or fire and movement until within range for the 'break in'.
*Phase 2* - Breaking into the enemy position.
*Phase 3* - Fighting in the deep zone', within the enemy position.

Winning the Feuerkampf or fire fight was an integral part of both attacking and defensive action, which demanded use of terrain and fieldcraft. The fire fight could itself be divided into three major phases:
_Niederhalten_, or *pinning down the enemy *with the lead elements, up to a company in strength, with support from machine guns and mortars, while reconnaissance was completed and assault units were deployed.
_Blenden_, or *'dazzling' the defenders with shooting and smoke*, denying them observation, and hampering their firing.
_Niederkampfen_, or* winning the fire fight and beating down the enemy,culminating in the actual assault* into the enemy position.

The infantry attack on prepared positions is made in the same sequence as that of the _Panzer_ division, namely penetration, breakthrough, exploitation by the reserves. In the infantry attack, however, the first phase is a series of local attacks by so-called assault detachments (_Stosstrupps_) with the aim of overcoming key points in the enemy defenses, so that wedges into the enemy's forward positions can be established from which the attack can be driven forward into the depth of the enemy position, or rolling up the positions on either flank of the wedge.
Assault detachments normally are composed of infantry with engineers attached. A typical assault detachment consists of the following: one officer; obstacle clearing party, consisting of two to six men for each lane to be cleared, equipped with small arms, wire-cutters, and bangalore torpedoes and other explosives; embrasure-blasting party consisting of three or four men equipped with grenades and demolition or pole charges. This party may also include, though it may work independently, a flame-thrower party, consisting normally of two men; covering parties, normally two or three parties of varying size from three men with one light machine gun to full platoons; smoke party consisting of two or three men equipped with smoke candles or grenades; supply party, carrying reserves of equipment and ammunition, their strength depending on the size of the assault detachment.




Attacks most often are made at dawn, and are preceded normally by heavy artillery preparation, one purpose of which is to make shell holes which afford cover for the advancing assault detachments as they move forward. When the latter reach the wire obstacles surrounding the enemy position, Very signals are fired, calling for available artillery fire to be brought on the position to seal it off from flanking positions. If, by reason of proximity of the assault detachment to the artillery's danger zone, the former cannot be protected by covering fire, the smoke party may lay a smoke screen. The obstacle-clearing party then cuts one or more lanes through the wire, using wire cutters or bangalore torpedoes. The embrasure-blasting party passes through and attacks the embrasures.
Antitank guns may be used to give close support , being manhandled from cover to cover. They will attack the embrasure with armor-piercing ammunition and also give protection against possible tank-supported counterattacks.

It is probable that *several such operations will be in progress on any one sector at any one time before an attack, in the first place to probe for weak spots, and in the second place to keep the enemy in uncertainty as to the final point of main effort of the attack.* German feint attacks had often been delivered in such intensity or with such violence as to be indistinguishable from the main attack.

Once a wedge has been firmly established in the enemy positions, the* second phase of the attack begins*. Troops so far held in their assembly area, or slowly making headway under cover of the artillery fire supporting the first phase of the attack, advance to cut the enemy position in two and to roll up the positions flanking the wedge.

German tactics anticipate enemy defenses organized in depth, and because these are unlikely to be fully disclosed until after the beginning of the attack,and does not make detailed plans for close-support covering fire, which would be hard to work out in advance, but tend to decentralize the support weapons and artillery for the second phase of the assault, in which reinforced battalions, companies, or platoons fight their own way forward, independently of their flanking units, until they have gained their final objective.Here junior level initiative is of much importance.

*GERMAN BATTALION DEFENSIVE :*




​As described in detail in the last post german defensive tactics though neglected till 1941-42 was developed from experiences of world war one based on *defence in depth with 4 zones*.The battalion was viewed as the building block as basis of a division's combat power.A battalion deployed *2 companies forward *on its defensive frontage (800 m-2km width) on defensible terrain with good field of fire and observation.The* third company was to the rear as a reserve to launch an immediate counterattack if the forward ones were pushed back or if forward position were partially penetrated it would serve as a blocking detatchment to prevent further gains and maneuver itself to plug the hole*.The defensive setup would be laid out in 4 zones as already pointed out.If the enemy was nearby,front stable or the force lacked mobile reconaissance assets,the advanced zone may or may not be employed.




​A typical earlywar german infantry battalion defence.The *dotted lines divide sectors of responsibility*.The dotted lines numbered II and III denotes the division of defensive sector with the neighbouring battalion of the regiment on the defense.The middle dotted line divides the defensive sectors of the 2 forward deployed companies of the battalion itself.





(The *military symbols* in the diagram)​The position is preceded by an observation post concealed in wooden terrain to the left with scouts.There is *no large advanced zone due to lack of motorized assets*.This observation post(usually a watchtower on a tree)will provide targets for the artillery and HMGs.

_*The Left sector*_ is defended by the 1st company with its 3 platoons (I/I),(2/I) and (3/1).Here 3rd platoon(3/1) mans the left flank of the observation zone on the north bank of the stream ahead of the main line of resistance.Its concealed by wooded terrain and supported by 2 heavy machine guns detatched from the battalion's heavy weapons company.(see first pic-has 12 hv.mgs and 6 medium mortars).The MLR on the 1st company's sector is defended in strength by 2 platoons(I/I & 2/I) in strongpoints that guard the main road from 2 flanks ready to pour interlocking enfilade fire.Note that each platoon strongpoint means 3-4 squads with 3-4 LMGs and a 50 mm mortar plus barbed wire booby traps etc.

The main road is is defended by road blocks on both banks as well as a minefield on the observation platoon's open flank.A minefield protects the flat area of approach to the wooded strongpoint area of 1st platoon of 1st company.(I/I).4 HMGs support the 2 main platoons in the MLR,with one of them covering the minefield from the flank in a concealed wooded position on the extreme left forward of 1st platoon's main strongpoint area.
Now if 3rd platoon faces overwhelming enemy pressure it retreats along predetermined path through its company sector(1st Co.)it will pass through 2nd and 3rd platoons and take up position as a reserve platoon behind the 2 on the reverse slope covering the main road(3/1).This is what the (3/1 res) in the diagram means..its not another platoon.It signifies the platoon having redeployed from the observation zone to its reserve area.
​*The Right sector* is defended by the 2nd company with its 3 platoons(I/2,2/2,3/2).The 3rd platoon(3/2) is forward deployed to the right flank of the observation zone and deployed on a elevated position overlooking the stream.If driven from this position it will retreat to a prepared secondary position ahead of the MLR on a reverse slope.(This is what is shown in the diagram where two 3/2 are depicted,doesn't mean both deployed at the same time..it depicts the alternate positions.If driven from even this position it will shelter itself behind the other 2 platoons of 2ns company,though this redeployment not shown in diagram.The Main line of Resistance(MLR) on the right sector is defended by 1/2 and 2/2,the first 2 platoons of 2nd company on a elevated forested terrain feature.On the flat terrain leading upto this position is dug an anti tank ditch to slow down any tank attack.2nd company has also been allotted 3 HMGs to defend its main line apart from the integral LMGs in its squads.

Behind the 2 forward companies to the rear is the reserves area with 3rd company and its 3 platoons.

_*The Distribution of Heavy weapons *-_ The HMGs of the heavy weapons company(HMGs are mounted on tripods with telescopic sight and can fire much further and more accurately than LMGs) are distributed throughout the forward deployed companies for support.The platoons have their integral LMGs and 50 mm mortar.The 6 81 mm medium mortars are deployed behind reverse slopes ,2 forward with 2nd company and 4 in reserve with the heavy weapons company HQ.The 1st and 2nd company HQ(flag) directing the battle are deployed with their companies,as is third.The medical and ammunition posts are located nearby to a company command post.
4 anti-tank guns(possibly 1 company from the regimental AT support) are detatched to support this battalion.Two cover the left sector and 2 right.All 4 guns can cover the main road,and they are sited so as to cover the minefield and AT ditch on both sides,any tank that is slowed or immobilized by either will be easy pickings for the AT guns.
Finally the 2 75 mm infantry guns ,supporting the 1st company from the reverse slope.
The regimental commander as a rule detatches one of his 2 light howitzer platoons(each with 2 75 mm guns) from his regimental cannon company to each of his 2 forward deployed battalions.Thus we see here 2 guns supporting this battalion.He keeps his heavy cannon platoon (2x150mm guns) and his third battalion in reserve.





(A *battalion strongpoint*-note how machine guns provide interlocking fields of fire all around)​
*STRONGPOINT DEFENCE (HEDGEHOG DEFENCE) :*

This tactic *came to be used widely from late 1941 in russia* and is beyond this campaign's timeframe,so just a small summary.German doctrine used the strongpoint concept upto battalion level even before russia but focus was exclusively on offensive.However the desperate conditions of 1941 russian winter counteroffensive led to the large scale use of this tactic with strongpoints of divisional level.It was an economy of force effort to use smallest number of troops to defend the largest possible area.*Due to massive manpower losses in barbarossa and the huge open spaces to be defended*(3 to 5 times normal frontages with half manpower),there were simply not enough troops to maintain any multi zonal continous linear defensive front.
The defenders deployed in heavily fortified positions suitable for all round defence.There are open spaces between the strongpoints,the attackers can penetrate between these 'hedgehogs', but each position continues to fight on when surrounded. This keeps large numbers of attacking troops tied up, attacking the well-defended strongpoints, while allowing the defenders to* successfully counterattack against the units that bypass these strongpoints with their own armored reserves* by cutting them off from their supporting elements.Strongpoints were constructed around villages to control the roads and as shelter from the russian winter.The strongpoint defence saved the wehrmacht in 1941 winter,however it *required 2 factors for success - aerial resupply to the strongpoints surrounded and mobile reserves to counterattack and relieve them.*Hitler's attempt to turn stalingrad into a massive strongpoint in 1942-43 winter failed miserably,because luftwaffe couldn't supply so many troops and german relief attempt was a failure.Late war strongpoint defence generally failed as in Operation bagration 1944 because germans lost control of the air and had little armor reserves.
​*NEXT: COMPANY LEVEL -OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE.*

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## jhungary

Hey @AUSTERLITZ 

I am free after this week end, want to go ahead with the refight thing?

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## AUSTERLITZ

jhungary said:


> Hey @AUSTERLITZ





jhungary said:


> I am free after this week end, want to go ahead with the refight thing?​




Sure.​


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## AUSTERLITZ

*COMPANY TACTICS*




​Company is a military unit,the* lowest standard tactical and administrative unit* usually ranging from 100-250 men in number.The german infantry company comprised from 1939-42 in paper strength of 150-190 men.It had 3 infantry platoons (each with 4 infantry squads and a light mortar~50 men.) plus an anti-tank section as well as company staff.
The company commander couldn't lead the number of elements spread across a frontage measured in the hundreds of metres directly. He had to exercise command and control as much through delegation to subordinates.The Company Commander* needed to brief his subunit leaders on the mission in hand and ensure each understood his role within it, including any attached assets.* Once his force deployed, his attention needed to focus on the overall progress of the battle, determining where success was being made and where efforts were faltering. He had then to decide how to best exploit or reinforce these areas. Simultaneously, *he would be in touch with his Battalion superiors*, who would be demanding updates and monitoring progress. He would also be acutely aware of developments on his flanks, where the fortunes of neighbouring troops could demand his men intervene in aid, or find themselves exposed by a sudden reverse.
In german practice often either the Co.commander or his second in command would be at the command post while the other would be at the _schwerpunkt_ directing operations personally.

*
Company on the Offense -* In the last post we have seen how companies are employed within battalion tactics.Being allotted sectors for both offensive and defensive operations.The different types of attack prescribed by german doctrine(flank attack,wing attack,envelopment etc) have already been described and hold true for large formations(armies) as well as small-troop formations like a company .A company generally operated within the framework of battalion tactics which have been described above.Nonetheless there were some typical company deployments in offensive posture.

_*The V shape* _was one of the most common.It ensured a reserve that would constitute at least one third of the force available.* 2 platoons upfront parallel to each other advancing with the 3rd one held back to the rear in the centre* ready to reinforce any flank,preform a flanking manuever or block any enemy penetration of the juncture of the 2 forward companies. The lead Platoons would observe a boundary between themselves to prevent Squads becoming mixed up, but their commanders would still seek to maintain contact with their flank protection.
The third platoon could also be employed for exploitation and rapid pursuit by fresh troops after the enemy line is broken.Another employment would be as a fire platoon,providing suppressive fire for the lead 2 platoons to attack.

*The Arrowhead or Wedge *was the reverse of the V-shape .It placed* 1 company upfront and 2 in reserve on flanks*.This formation espoused a strong reserve to await developments before deploying in strength as if 2 companies are deployed forward and reconnaissance was mistaken they could get pinned down in a firefight quickly.The lead platoon itself could deploy in an arrowhead placing just 1 squad in the vanguard and making a cautious probing advance with minimal casualities a priority.The formation was *ill-suited for a rapid swift assault as it deployed in stages,but very useful against an enemy defence in depth*.

The_ line formation_ was not generally used as it placed all strength on the frontline without a reserve unless company was severely understrength.The _column formation_ was using for moving quickly but very vulnerable to massed firepower in combat.




_*Company on the Defense*_ - The company defensive tactics was integrated into the standard german 3-4 zone defense(explained in detail last posts).Above u can see a company in its allotted defensive sector with a observationzone,main line of resistance and reserve zone.Here 3rd platoon is originally deployed in observation zone,with reserve position to the rear of the MLR prepared when it falls back.Arrows with L represent the squad LMGs.3-4 HMGs from battalion heavy wpns Co. are alos usually allotted.This diagram hwoever shows AT guns and mortars allotted.



[A *hilltop company strongpoint*,these would require some time to build and exemplifies late war (1941 onwards) stable front,example in russia or italy rather than early blitz campaigns.This would be a *good example of a strongpoint/hedgehog defense doctrine fortification*,rather than the standard 4 zone mobile defense with temporary strongpoints.]

A Company would normally* occupy a frontage of at least two Platoons, with the third held as reserve*. When defending vast frontages sometimes a commander had to deploy all 3 in line thereby having no reserves. It hamstrung the commander in his ability to respond to an enemy penetration.
In a normal defensive position though, the Company would adopt a *horseshoe style stance*, with two Platoons placed forward, and the third again adopting a reserve role. It would be placed between and to the rear of the forward units. Conducting the defence in depth gave the Company a greater chance of repelling the assault. As always, the Commander would place his Platoons to give them the greatest possible advantage from the terrain. He would want a clear field fire for his forward line. In a well established position, time could be taken to remove obstructions from the ground, fell trees, uproot bushes, level anything that could be used as cover by an advancing foe. In their place would be set obstacles, barbwire, landmines and even tank traps. Guns and mortars would be sited on predetermined points where it was felt the enemy would form up for the assault, and where they would be slowed down by the obstacles.

If the defensive positions were extensive, the forward lines would be linked to the rear area by communications trenches or at the least routes concealed from enemy observation.The outpost would usually consist of only a small number of men drawn from the Squads of the Company, perhaps provided with a light machine gun.,or occasionally a whole platoon.

*Company in the Vanguard -* The Battalion would *nominate one Company to lead the advance*. This unit would normally be reinforced with detachments of mortars, machine guns and anti-tank weapons where necessary. Dedicated reconnaissance troops, such as horsed or mechanized cavalry, could also be added.The advance would be lead by a single Squad, itself preceded by several scouts. A short distance behind the Squad would follow the rest of its Platoon. A further distance behind that would follow the remaining two Platoons. The units would be linked together by individual soldiers, or 'files', who could quickly pass reports either way along the chain.The main job would b*e battle reconnaisance,overcoming enemy outposts and discovering enemy ambushes.*

*PLATOON TACTICS -SQUAD TACTICS.*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*PLATOON TACTICS :*




​The* wehrmacht rifle platoon of 1940* composed of 4 squads(gruppe) of 10 men each.Each squad had a mg34 light machine gun and a sub-machine gun.Apart from 4 squads there was a 50 mm light mortar and stretcher bearers/runners and the platoon commander and his second -in command.Around 50 men.From 1943 structure was changed to 3 squads per platoon.
*
Platoon Offensive Tactics :*
The standard german offensive formations were the _arrowhead or wedge formation_ and the _V shape or broad wedge_ that acted on the same principles as the formations of the company,whereas the company had 3 manuever elements in 3 platoons when using this formation the* german platoon had 4 squads to manuever.(till 1943)*




Above shows a platoon d*eploying its 4 squads in wedge formation on the left and into a V-shape formation*( broad wedge ) on the right.On terrain where observation is difficult, and when the enemy situation is comparatively vague, the forward platoon leader will often use only one squad initially as a leading element and will form a wedge. The remainingsquads follow, ready to be shifted quickly later as the situation develops with 2 on flanks and one to the rear.On *simpler terrain or desiring a fast paced assault the v-formation will be used*.The 4 squad model often allowed the germans to split their platoon into 2 combatgroups of 2 squads each attacking a target from 2 flanks- each grp led by the platoon commander and vice-commander.The v-shaped formation allowed a quick transition to this mode of attack.

The manner in which the squad advances in deployed formation depends on the terrain, the proximity of the enemy, and the enemy fire action. In rough terrain, the squad column is usually the best formation by which the squad advances, taking advantage of depressions and any available cover. The squad advances at a walk when it is under cover and receives no fire. Under fire, the squad rushes as a unit or by individuals, takes cover where the
terrain permits, or opens fire.




​Above is a* typical german platoon attack on a enemy position,the platoon is acting as the vanguard of the company and has been reinforced by support weapons.*A,B,C,D denote positions held by an enemy platoon.A,B,C are in an outpost position with main strength of 2 sections held back at position D.German platoon was advancing with 3 squads in line and 1 in reserve - a highly aggressive formation.The forward squad moving along the road in the centre is subjected to heavy fire from enemy high positions in A and B and is halted.It spreads out and assumes defensive posture around position 3 in diagram.Meanwhile the squad's LMG answers with its own firepower from position 4,to the left of the squad- but an elevated position.Now platoon commander who was behind his centre squad moves to position 7 and issues his orders-
His *right squad* will attack the enemy positions on A and B from the flank starting from its current position at 1.This squad's LMG will provide fire support for assault from position 2.The centre squad under fire will also provide additional firepower with its riflemen and LMG from positions 3 and 4,diverting enemy attention and resources from the flanking move.
His* left squad* will attack enemy position at C from the other flank from startoff position 5,supported by the squad's LMG firing from position 6.The *platoon's light mortar* at position 8 will fire smoke to cover the movement of the 2 flanking squads.The* final rear squad *will remain in reserve.
If the flanking squads use red flare requiring fire support on encountering heavier resistance than expected,*2 heavy machine guns* (a detatchment from battalion heavy wpns Co.Usually a battalion divides 4 HMGs per company,and the company provides its advance platoon with a section of 2 )will move to position 9 to provide further firepower.They will directly support the taking of position C.A medium mortar if available will fire smoke from position 10 on smoke target position 1 and may support the attack on A and B with HE shells.*Regimental 75 mm guns* will give interdiction fire on enemy's main position D to soften it up and prevent reinforcements.After the flanking squads have taken their objectives,the support weapons will move up to A,B,C line and set up for assault on main position D.If any squad has taken heavy casualities,the reserve 4th squad will replace it on the frontline for the main assault on the position D.

_*Platoon Defensive Tactics:*_




The platoon itself would fall within the *overall 4 zonal defence* already described.The peculiarities of the terrain involved would always dictate the exact placement of the Squads. Generally speaking, a Platoon Commander would not want to commit more than two of his Squads to the main line, placing his third/fourth to provide cover fire or deal with any breach of the position. He would need to site his weapons and rifle pits to provide an unbroken field of fire over the approach to his position. In particularly exposed positions, he may detach a small group to man an outpost.*Commanders could normally expect to receive an allotment of landmines and or barbed wire to fortify their location* in a prepared defence.

Above diagram represents an *earlywar german platoon in defence.with 3 squads in line deployed to cover more frontage.(4th squad in reserve to the rear not shown or maybe lacking a 4th squad)*.2 denotes the three squad light machine guns(mg34),1 denotes two man rifle pits -improvised field fortifications.4 denotes light mortar's position.5 the 37 mm anti tank gun(pak36) .6 denotes 2 heavy machine guns detatched for support.7 is an anti-tank rifle.8 is a barbed wire fence covering flanks and front to keep the enemy beyond hand grenade range.10 and 11 denote the platoon commander and his second in command's positions.12 is an observation post.Generally 1-2 squads would always be held in reserve.*German defensive tactics heavily relied on firepower of machine guns* rather than rifleman.The machine gun is clearly described as the main killer,while the riflemen are tasked to protect it and keep it from being taken out /flanked.

*NEXT: SQUAD TACTICS PART I*
​

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY SQUAD TACTICS*





​The s*tandard german infantry squad*_(Gruppe) _ from 1940-1943 numbered *10 men*.It was the basis of german infantry tactics and the main staying power of the wehrmacht.The infantry squad evolved around 1916-1917 during the first world war and matured into its 10 man form after the initial 13 man one was found unwieldy in the polish campaign.In 1943 due to manpower shortage ,one rifleman was reduced and gruppe shortened to 9 men,but in 1940 wehrmacht was reaching its peak and squad numbered 10 men.

*GRUPPE COMPOSITION :*

_Squad leader(Gruppenfuhrer) _- Equipped with *Sub-machine gun *and 6 magazines,hand grenades.Plus *field glasses,pocket compass,signal whistle,searchlight* and utility.He commands the squad ,his main job is to position and direct the fire of the squad's light machine gun and if possible the riflemen.Responsibility of the Squad Leader was to *husband the ammunition resources of the unit*,as the instinctive tendency for men in combat to loose off as many rounds as possible, irrespective of whether there is any target to hit.Is expected to be aggressive but composed and lead by example whenever possible.

_Machine Gunner I _- 1 *Mg34 light machine gun* and a spare drum magazine of 50 rounds.Plus a *pistol*.He is usually the best/steadiest shooter in the squad and is responsible for maintaining the weapon.He operates the vital weapon on the field.

_Assistant Machine Gunner _- *Spare barrel*,1 *ammunition belt* usually 250 rds,1 *ammunition box* of 300 rounds,4 50 round *drum magazines*.*Pistol*.Ensures supply of ammunition,positioning of machine gun and change of barrel.Can replace primary gunner if killed.

_Ammunition Carrier_ - Spare barrel,Ammo belt,1 ammunition boxes.*Rifle*.*Carries and inspects ammunition,stays to the rear and keeps a close watch on Machine gun's flanks*.Extra man if any of first 2 killed also required to reload fired belts; to search for ammunition left behind during a position change and to act as a close defence rifleman when the situation requires.

_6 x Riflemen _ - *Mauser Bolt action rifle*,2 ammo pouches,spade,hand grenades.When required explosive charges,machine gun tripod mount,smoke grenades and extra ammunition.Provide steady long range fire with rifles while protecting the light machine gun and using fire and movement.Assault in final phase under LMG coverfire with grenades and bayonet.*Most experienced rifleman serves as second-in-command* serving as leader in his absence,maintaining liason with platoon and serving as a link while leader concerned himself with tactics.




​*GERMAN TACTICAL PHILOSOPHY : ROLE OF THE MACHINE GUN *
More or less all major armies had a simple recipe for squad combat..*neutralize enemy with fire superiority by squad machine gun and manuever to assault him close up with riflemen.*The main difference lay in implementation.

*The British*_* doctrine *_divided the squad nominally into a *3 man gun group with a Bren LMG* including Assistant Squad leader and a *7 man rifle group including the Squad leader*.The Gun Group provided the base of fire, targeting known or suspected enemy positions. This enabled the Rifle Group to break cover and advance towards the enemy line.After revealing its position Gun grp had to change position often.During this time, the riflemen were not idle. If the distance to the enemy line was too great to cross in a single bound, they would seek a defensible position. Once reached, this would enable the gun team to make their switch. Now it became the turn of the riflemen to provide cover fire, ideally directed against the enemy position of the greatest threat to their now vulnerable gun team. Once the light machine gun had reached its secondary position, the crew could recommence fire, this time from a different angle, thus forcing the return fire to be redirected. The riflemen could now attempt to move forward again, either to a new firing location or to assail the enemy line directly. The gun team was continual seeking new locations which allowed them to lay fire down for as long as possible before the advancing riflemen risked crossing their path. This process could be repeated as many times as was necessary to put the riflemen into a position for them to make the final assault.Often the platoon mortar would fire smoke for initial rifle group movement.
This *'deliberate' methodical repeatable formula was simple and easy to employ.*It had some* drawbacks *however.
*1]*It required patches of cover along the route of advance to make the switch from position to position .Continous switch on terrain devoid of cover would be very difficult execute*.2]*Need of gun group to swap fire positions continously may delay the advance,allowing enemy to react and inflict casualities on rifles which in turn will weaken the cover fire for LMG switching.*3]*If gun group gets pinned down rifles have to advance alone.Alternatively if rifle group comes under fire from unexpected angle and gets stranded,it can't help LMG reposition and itself will have to conduct a costly withdrawal.

_*The American doctrine* _held to long established traditions of markmanship and the *rifleman as the decider of the firefight.*The 12-man squad itself was divided into 3 distinct parts - a 2-man scout team, a 4-man support team including the BAR(Browning automatic rifle), a 5-man assault team, and the squad leader. The system was supposed to work like this: the squad leader advances with the scout team to locate the enemy, then direct the fire of the support team on their positions before joining the assault team in order to lead them in to wipe them out.However the BAR was not a real LMG and incapable of sustained fire.The US doctrine thus depended heavily on the spirit and prowess of the G.I rifleman and his superb semi-automatic M1 garand -the best infantry rifle of the war until the german sturmgewehr44 assault rifle.All men except BAR man carry rifles.However theory didn't often translate to practice.
*First problem was loss of unit cohesion* -''Here's what often happened to the squad in combat: the squad leader gets pinned down or hit with the scout team; the support team blasts away in the general direction of the origin of enemy fire without any real idea of where their positions really are; the leaderless assault team then makes the attack alone, that is if they didn't need the influence of their NCO to do it under fire in the first place.''
*Second problem was that BAR was incapable of achieving fire superiority* against an enemy machine gun.
This problem was not exposed in paratrooper,marine and rangers units which had their squad LMGs.UAmerican standard infantry thus often required allotments of HMGs from higher command levels or artillery support to dislocate a german position.




_*German doctrine* _was directly opposite of the american one.German military thinkers after experience of WW1 *envisioned the machine-gun, not the rifle, as the primary killing weapon on the battlefield*. This is one reason that they continued to equip their riflemen with the outdated Mauser bolt-action or the short-ranged machine-pistol late into the war, the machine gun was the weapon that mattered not the rifle.Now just as the americans concentrated on designing the best rifle,the germans focused on the machine gun.Their 2 products the mg34 and mg42 were the best designs of the war.
To add to this unlike the us or british system in german practice,the *squad leader stays with the machine gun and directs its fire where he wants it *until the last moment.Also the *Gunner is picked beforehand to be the steadiest man in the squad* and also a good shooter ensuring an accurate continous hail of lead on correct enemy positions even under fire.The squad leader also had a short range SMG useful only for close assault,the philosophy was better lose one man from the fire fight to direct the efforts of the remainder, than have all the Squad engaged in an undisciplined free for all.

German tactics was based not on deliberate advance but on* firepower and speed.*The Squad was handled as an indivisible unit, with little distinction between rifle and machine gun groups. In the assault, the light machine gun would lead the advance, under the personal direction of the Squad Leader. It was regarded as the primary arbiter of the fire fight. The fire of the individual riflemen was not deployed until the assault stage, when it was thought to prove more effective.Keeping the riflemen back till the late phase allowed co-ordination with machine guns of other squad/platoon to fire over their heads and support the attack.Movement would be covered by smoke grenade/mortar smoke.
These tactics went something like this: the squad leader advances with his whole unit until contact is made; the *MG then opens up on the enemy to achieve "fire superiority".*The mg34(900 rpm) and 42(1200rpm) usually had 1.5-2 times the rate of fire of allied machine guns which allowed them to dominate a firefight by volume of lead poured out in a short time.Meanwhile the *whole squad would leapfrog forward in short rushes*(showing later how) until the they get into grenade range. The squad leader in all this was better able to control the actions of his unit since his training decreed that during combat he be in the center of the squad.The machine gun itself can act in suppression mode or join the assault itself firing from the hip on the move.
The concept is based on *marching fire*.Squad advanced as a single entity. All arms were brought to bear on the enemy during the advance. The key to success lay in overwhelming supporting fire delivered from artillery, mortars, machine guns and ideally accompanying tanks. There was no subtlety involved whatsoever. The advantage was speed.

*Red Army tactics* were simpler.(until 1943).*11 man squads with a 2-man LMG squad,2 SMGs and 7 rifles including leader.*Squads would move in a ‘chain’, a single-file column, each man separated from the next nearby by one or two paces (or up to eight paces in open order).For *attack the column would manuevre into a skirmish line and then assault as one, with no leapfrogging or fire-and-manuevre tactics, fire support coming from other squads or platoons.*Within 40–50 yardsof the enemy positions they shouted the Russian battle cry, a deep drawn out Urra!.They fired on the move and, when within range of enemy positions, threw grenades. They closed in rapidly for close combat with point-blank fire, bayonets, weapon butts, entrenching tools, and fists.
These tactics reflected the red army's composition-mainly peasant conscripts incapable of complex manuevers and officers centrally controlled with only nominal initiative encouraged.While these may have been effective against unsteady opponents who lose their nerve, against* veteran german troops early war in most cases the attacks degenarated into massed linear human wave attacks without proper fire support* incurring devastating losses from german machine guns.*It was from 1943 that red army formations began to use fire and manuever in their own way.*Red army *focused on sub-machine guns* ,perfect weapons at short range and very easy to use for conscripts by 'spray and pray ' technique.If they could get within range under artillery fire support(which soviets provided enmasse) and by using cover they could overwhelm any position by brute volume of firepower.They were also kings of urban firefights .*Late war whole soviet platoons were armed solely with sub-machine guns*.



*USE OF TERRAIN WHILE MOVING :*
In order to *reduce the impact of enemy fire and to reduce the availability of targets*,soldiers should aim to make use of terrain features. This includes terrain and cover, which will serve to protect from aerial observation and/or attack.
Above recommends that when moving along the edge of a wood, soldiers should walk slightly inside the wood, in order to take advantage of the protection provided by shadows*.*
Likewise, *soldiers should avoid the highest point of a ridge or hill,* as they will be visible against the sky (‘sky-lining’).


When moving across open areas against a light-coloured background, *soldiers will be more visible than if moving against a darker background.*
​*GERMAN INFANTRY SQUAD FORMATIONS :*



​_The Reihe _- The common formation for movement was the* loose file or squad column*,the _reihe_ formation.Above we see a reihe formation advancing using terrain cover to protect flanks from sudden enfilade fire.The squad leader with field glasses takes the lead ,followed by machine gunner and his assistants allowing the enemy detected to be brought under fire of the main firepower unit of the squad the LMG as early as possible and under the direction of the squad leader.Riflemen follow.*Assistant squad leader is in the rear* to prevent any confusion.The formation is *easy to control,and suited to navigating narrow tracks or difficult terrain and presents a small target from front.*If engaged the machine gun sets up begins the firefight while riflemen are sometimes held back till its deemed appropiate.




​_The Schützenkette - _The 'skirmish chain' formation is the *basic formation to be adopted for a firefight*.Above shows how on contact with enemy squad adopts this loose linear(small zig zag)formation for skirmish firefight.*Machine gun acts as the firebase around which the squad revolves* under direct command of squad leader.Forward half of riflemen moves to the right of the deployed machine gun,the rear half rifles move to its left.The Schützenkette is the most appropriate formation for engaging the enemy, as it *provides a broad frontage and enables all of the troops to fire.* In addition, the formation.This formation is also* to be adopted instead of reihe when moving through an open field without cover*(because without terrain cover the _reihe_ column might take enfilade fire from concealed enemy mg from the flank decimating the squad)




​Where terrain/neighbouring unit closed off a flank reihe could extend to one flank as well but this was less common.
*Alternatively occasionally a british style deliberate advance could also be adopted* by seperating the gun and rifle group.Orders like this -_‘Gruppe A: MG Team – Direction single pine tree – 6 paces spacing – Schützenkette!
Rifle troop follows at 50 paces distance!_’Such a formation is useful when moving through broken terrain or forests, especially on reconnaissance missions, as the entire Gruppe will not fall victim to an ambush. Instead,
the riflemen can cover the lMG Team or act as a reserve.Or it could be reverse -
_‘Gruppe A: Rifle troop – direction bullet tree – 8 paces spacing – link man Müller –Schützenkette! MG Team follows under command of the machinegunner at 50 paces distance!’_
Such a formation is useful when advancing through unclear terrain, as it serves to protect the MG Team from an ambush.However the *Reihe and Schutzenkette were the 2 dominant formations.*

*NEXT :OFFENSIVE TACTICS - SCHUTZENKETTE AND FIREFIGHT- ADVANCE UNDER FIRE-ASSAULT ETC.*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN INFANTRY SQUAD TACTICS - OFFENSIVE*




​*SQUAD ON THE ATTACK :*
A typical attack consists of the following stages:

*(I) Entfaltung or  Development Stage* - The *deployment by the Kompanie from its marching formation* into its ordered individual platoon formation and the platoons separate into their individual _Gruppen_ in accordance with the platoon commander's orders. This typically occurs at least *800m from the enemy*.Any allotted heavy support weapons will set up to the rear.

_*(II) Entwicklung or Deployment stage * -_This is a continuation of the previous stage and refers to the adoption of open-order formations(_Reihe_ usually) by the_ Gruppen_ in accordance with the situation and terrain. This occurs when the_ Gruppenführer_(squad leader) considers the situation requires it. The recommended formation is the _Schützenreihe._
The enemy should not be engaged by the_ Gruppe_ when at distances in excess of 800m and expose its position unless strictly necessary. Instead, the *Gruppen should rely upon the Kompanie’s supporting weapons to suppress the enemy*.

_*(III) Angriff or the Attack* _- It consist of the* firefight and the advance under fire *to close enough distance for the last assault phase to begin.The_ Gruppe_ should advance for as long as possible using the cover of the terrain and/or
support weapons. However, when it is no longer possible to advance unseen, the _Angriff_ commences.The gruppe assumes usually the_ schutzenkette_ formation for the firefight.It is at this stage that the Gruppe begins to engage the enemy with its own weapons.However, the* first opening of fire by the Gruppe should be ordered* by the _Gruppenführer_,except where unavoidable.Typically, the _Gruppenführer _positions the lMG immediately following him after recon with his field glasses and *directs its fire against targets which will most impede the advance* of the riflemen.Now lets see the development of the firefight in stages.

While choosing a position to move into before the firefight commences and while conducting fire and movement,though usually whatever cover available was used there were some general principles regarding choice of position.
• The position must be entered and exited out of sight of the enemy;
• The position should *provide both cover for the soldier and a clear field of fire*;
• Notice must be taken of use of terrain avoiding sky lines and making use of shadows.
• Stones or boulders should be avoided unless required due to splinters.
Moving into position out of sight of the enemy is necessary to catch the enemy by surprise when the_ Gruppe_ opens fire – where possible, a position should enable the LMG to fire into the enemy’s flank.





_(Squad leader directs LMG fire in urban area)_​
_Principles of the Firefight -_ 

*>*In the attack the fire fight is conducted initially by the heavy weapons. The* destruction or neutralization of enemy strongpoints is largely the mission of infantry guns,mortars and heavy machine guns*. At effective ranges the squad light machine gun is employed. The riflemen participate in the fire fight in the early phases only when good results may be expected,or when they have insufficient cover. But it is not the task of the riflemen to engage in fire fights of long duration in order to gain fire superiority.Leadership on the part of the squad leader consists in bringing his riflemen into contact with the enemy using terrain with fewest losses.
*>*The light machine gun *opens the firefight and at the most threatening enemy target*,its fire controlled by the squad leader.
*>*When a squad is operating under hostile fire, the breadth and depth of its deployed formation often render control of the entire squad by one person very difficult.Therefore, the riflemen assist in the fire fight of the squad by conducting their fire independently, unless the squad leader concentrates the fire of his riflemen upon one target. Volley fire will be employed on occasions(usually to cover LMG redeployment if necessary).
*>*The *selection of the aiming point is left to the rifleman*. In the case of small targets, the aim should be at the bottom; in the case of large ones, at the middle. If a target is moving to one side, the rifleman must aim ahead of, or move his sights with, the target.
*>*Unless the command fire at will has been given, the rifleman will not fire except at targets that suddenly appear at close range.*Tactical surprise to be preserved *as long as possible.
>Squad leader must *supervise ammunition expenditure* carefully.
*>*It is essential for the squad leader to ensure as far as possible that when the whole squad is in action,that* every man is participating actively in the firefight.*Not merely frozen behind cover unwilling to expose himself to fire(natural instinct) or firing blindly without aiming.Inexperienced troops are most prone to doing this.
*>*Firefight must be conducted vigorously rather than in a deliberate fashion,and be kept short.*Victory comes to the one who fires the largest number of well-aimed shots against his opponent in the shortest time.
>*After a fire action of brief duration, or as soon as the purpose of the fire is attained, the light machine-gunners
and the riflemen take cover. If necessary, they move to another position.
*>Surprise fire is one of the main ways of gaining fire superiority*.The main way to conduct this is to get the LMG in position without enemy detection and open fire at the most threatening target preferably from a flanking angle.




_Advance Under Fire - _

*>*The light machine-gun group usually forms the spearhead of the attack within the squad. The longer the riflemen are able to follow the light machine gun in squad column, the longer may rearward, supporting machine guns fire safely past advancing squads through existing gaps.
*>Fire and movement must always be closely coordinated.* The terrain must be used in a skillful manner.
*>*If possible,* areas covered by enemy artillery fire are avoided or circumvented *insofar as the terrain and mission permit; otherwise, quick rushes are made during a pause in the firing.
*>*If the situation and enemy fire permit, the squad leader takes advantage of the support of adjacent units or heavy infantry weapons in order to permit the entire squad to rush forward simultaneously.
*>*The normal procedure is - *In working forward the men advance as a group or singly, by bounds*(run with leaping strides or advance by leaps from crawling position) called _Sprung_ or by crawling whichever is suited.The nature of the advance and the length of the bounds will depend on friendly fire support, the enemy fire action, and the terrain.




When advancing in combat, the German soldier was taught to advance using the Sprung (bound or leap). A *Sprung can occur on an individual basis or as a whole Gruppe*.Commands would go like - _‘Prepare to change position!
Next bound to the defile! _*or *_‘Make ready to leap to the barbed wire!’._LMG should be firing when a sprung is made to cover it or smoke used from platoon mortar or grenade.*Above picture shows an advance by leaps from crawling position*,used primarily on terrain devoid of cover making short rushes from cover to cover impractical.




​*Above denotes the proper readiness stances for a movement by bounds*(short rush to next cover).Soldiers take their rifle in their left hand, support themselves with their right hand and move their right knee as close as possible to their body without raising their upper body. The Schütze 1 holds the LMG by the sling in his right hand and supports himself with his left. The right knee is moved inwards.When the Schütze 1 is ready to move, he shouts . The Schütze 2 and 3 (***.mg gunner & ammo carrier)place their ammunition boxes flat on the ground in front of them.On the command: _‘Auf! Marsch! Marsch!’_, the soldiers rise up quickly and rush forwards towards next cover.

The objective of the German soldier is to gain ground as rapidly as possible and to take the enemy’s position. Hence, a _Sprung_ should be made without orders when:•Artillery fire, heavy weapons fire, or fire of neighbouring troops suppresses theenemy • the enemy ceases fire to reload(especially enemy Machine gun) • Friendly tanks/assault guns suppress the enemy • Aircraft or artillery destroy the enemy’s forward positions • smoke blinds the enemy.

*Some Examples. a)* Hostile artillery fire covers a bridge which must be crossed by squad.
_Solution: _Long bounds, with the squad closed up, are made during each pause in fire.
*(b) *High ground which is under hostile observation and which is being strafed by enemy machine-gun fire has been ordered captured._Solution:_ Advance as close to the hill as possible under cover, and then the entire squad will rush forward in a bound to the next cover.
*(c)* The effective fire of friendly artillery compels the enemy to take cover.
_Solution:_ The entire squad will advance in long bounds, to utilize fully the support afforded by the artillery.
*(d)* A squad is fired upon at close range by an enemy located in a strong defensive position. There is little fire
support by other arms._Solution:_ The riflemen advance individually by bounds or by crawling; short bounds only are possible.
​_*(IV) Einbruch or Penetration*_ - The *final assault phase* of a squad attack.Typically *occurs 100 m from enemy *position.A signal for heavy support weapons to lift their fire will be given.In penetration, the *whole group rushes or fires as a unit.*The platoon leader employs several squads advancing from various directions against the objective.
In this way the defensive fires of the enemy will be scattered.*This form of attack is not carried out by solitary squad, but by the platoon*-the squad acting as a vital component of the whole.

The riflemen should prepare for the assault by loading weapons, fixing bayonets and preparing grenades.The *hand grenade is the key weapon* for the assault.Where possible, the lMG should be positioned so that it is able to fire into the enemy position without risk of hitting the riflemen in order to ensure that the enemy position is suppressed for as long as possible. If this is not possible, the lMG should be prepared for‘firing from the hip’ and will assault the position along with the riflemen.

Neighbouring troops should engage the enemy position with an increased weight of fire to enable the riflemen to move as close as possible to the position.* When the riflemen have approached as closely* as they are able, the grenade throwers should, on the command of the _Gruppenführer_ (typically, on a whistle),* throw their grenades* at the enemy. *The riflemen should then storm the position under the cover of the detonating grenades*. The _Gruppenführer_ should* lead the final assault *by the riflemen.



Above depicts a penetration assault on a enemy strongpoint trench line from german trench area.
• *Friendly mortars* bombard the trench immediately behind the enemy position.
•* One Gruppe* (the “Deckungstrupp”) fires on the enemy position from the front and on the enemy trench (“1.fdl.Graben”).
• *Two assault Gruppen* (Stoßtrupps 1 & 2) have positioned themselves in advanced positions to either side of the enemy position.
• The LMGs of the assault Gruppen have been positioned to fire on the enemy position.If such positions were not available they would join the assault firing on the move.
• Under the cover provided by the Deckungstrupp and their own LMG the assault Gruppen storm the enemy position.
• Stoßtrupp 1 attacks the enemy position directly.
• Stoßtrupp 2 moves to the rear of the enemy position to cut off reinforcements.

Once the enemy position has been taken, *preparations should be made for an enemy counter-attack. *The Gruppe should then prepare to either advance further or consolidate the position in accordance with the orders of the Platoon commander(Zugfuhrer).

*GENERAL SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES OF ATTACK :*​



​*1*.If at all possible, the *squad works forward under cover without actually firing as long as possible*, taking advantage of areas where there is little fire and where there is strong fire support by the heavy weapons.*Co-ordination with heavier assets is essential.*

*2.The* *squad leader is not restricted to any given position*. His place is at decisive points in the action,and where there exists the most responsibility. Until the squad has started the fire fight, he always* moves out rapidly at the head of his men and reconnoiters personally* in order to determine by what routes, formations,and methods he can advance his squad with the greatest possible protection and cover. The squad leader seeks out elevated points from which he can observe the enemy and the terrain. He leaves his squad under cover and directs them by calls and signals.

*3*.When covered advance is no longer possible, *fire by the squad is usually opened first with the light machine
gun optimally as surprise fire*.First, the target which most hinders accomplishment of the mission should be engaged.Light machine gun forms the *spearhead of attack* by the squad, so that if necessary it can immediately support the squad by fire under direct direction of squad leader -if, for example, the squad suddenly comes under fire.

*4*.In* covered terrain*, if there is the possibility of a sudden appearance of the enemy, the squad leader has the *riflemen move out ahead* of the light machine gum, thus providing better protection of the machine gun against surprise.
*
5.*Every *forward movement within sight of the enemy should be covered by fire* from the rear or adjacent weapons;otherwise, there will be heavy casualties.




*6.*If the squad suddenly runs into artillery fire, the men at once throw themselves to the ground and take cover from the splinters. Then they rush forward to the nearest cover against fire or observation,or, if necessary, they rush obliquely forward. By running quickly forward they can best escape the enemy artillery fire. The *squad must never try to escape such fire by going to the rear.* Areas under heavy fire are avoided by promptly turning aside. If this is not possible,then the squad runs through such areas as fast as possible in one long rush.

*7.*Whether the members of the squad rush forward together or individually depends upon the distance to the
enemy, the effect of enemy weapons, and the terrain (the nearest cover).- At longer distances, the members of the
squad may often make one long bound together. As the distance to the enemy becomes shorter, the bounds must
usually be proportionately decreased. *As a general rule,the bounds should be short enough so that the fire aimedat the men rushing forward will arrive too late in other words*, so that they will not be hit during the bound.
Thus, at 700 to 800 yards, the bound should be about 40 paces, at 400 to 500 yards, about 15 to 20 paces. The
more the bound is characterized by surprise, the smaller will be the losses. If the opposing enemy is held down by
the fire of heavy weapons, then advantage should be taken of this fire support for longer bounds.

*8.Moving the LMG on uncovered terrain and under enemy fire is useless*, because the gun would be neutralized while changing position. If there is no cover in the vicinity to which it can be withdrawn temporarily, the gun must endure the enemy fire and defend itself as best it can.

*9*.*Fire discipline and control *are vital to winning a firefight.Squad leader must to the extent possible make sure all squad members are engaging in firefight and regulate ammunition usage.

*10*.For the penetration, the squad leader must take his squad very firmly in hand, because his* personal example is of
utmost importance* at this critical moment to lead his men forward to a vigorous assault.

*NEXT : SQUAD ON THE DEFENSE - ANTI-TANK TACTICS- RIVER ASSAULT TACTICS*

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## Penguin

In Holland, 1940. they were particularly good at using captured troops as shields. There are more than a few documented accounts.


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## AUSTERLITZ

Penguin said:


> In Holland, 1940. they were particularly good at using captured troops as shields. There are more than a few documented accounts.



Those tactics were more by paratroops/brandenburgers.Local improvisations,not standard doctrine.


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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN OFFENSIVE SQUAD TACTICS - SIMULATED EXAMPLE*




​*PHASE I : DEVELOPMENT* (*Entfaltung)*

The enemy has occupied "A" village and the heights to the north.The 2d Company, reinforced by one heavy mortar
squad, is located in the woods just south of the banks ofthe brook, prepared to attack. The *1st Platoon* is on the right, the* 2d on the left*, and the *3d 200 yards in the rear of the center.* The front of each of the leading platoons extends about 200 yards.As soon as the 2d Company reached the edge of the woods, a reconnaissance patrol was sent to reconnoiter the positions in "A" village. The leader of the right platoon receives the order to send a squad(stutz's squad), together with a company antitank rifle, to Hill 133 to protect the company's assembly area.*(arrows represent machine guns)*

_Stutz's Responsibility -_ _Gruppenfuhrer_ Stutz's Orders - Two rifles, come with me We are going to that hill (133).Second in command follow me at 50 paceswith the rest of the squad until you are under cover on this side of the hill.
Upon arrival at the hill, the squad leader orders the two riflemen to crawl up to the crest of the hill so that they can just see over it to observe the area beyond. He points out places to be particularly observed. He himself, also under cover, *reconnoiters for a position for the LMG and the AT rifle. *These will be positions from which as large an area to the front as possible can be brought under fire. For the AT rifle, he will seek a position close to the road. He has the rest of the squad take cover on the rear slope of the hill, and there makes the LMG ready for fire. The machine gun is not yet put into the selected firing position: first, because the squad leader and the two observers are able to see the entire area to the front and there does not appear to be any immediate danger; second, because he does not want to disclose to the enemy any movement on the hill.The squad leader himself observes the entire terrain before him with his field glasses. He immediately communicates his observations to his platoon leader.

​_Possible Scenarios - _
1.The squad leader Stutz sees* 3 enemy riflemen emerge from two bushes* about 300 yards to the right oblique and
start running back over an open field.He at once has both riflemen open rapid fire,but not disclose the position of his LMG by firing as target is not valuable enough.An enemy rifleman is hit and falls. While the two observers continue to fire vigorously, the squad leader sends two men from the remainder of his squad forward along the brook to the right in order to find out the troop unit to which the fallen enemy belongs.

(2) An *enemy patrol about 500 yards* to the right front is seen advancing along the brook.
The leader lets the patrol continue to advance.At the same time, he has the light machine gun and riflemen come closer to the crest of the hill, points out what he. has seen, and makes several estimates of ranges in the direction of the patrol. He has the squad take up positions and open fire with the light machine gun and all rifles (surprise fire) only when the patrol has come within close range, or when it appears that the patrol is aware that the hill is occupied, or when his company's preparations for the advance have been made and the company is about to move forward.

(3) A *friendly heavy machine-gun platoon goes up the hill to the left *of the squad, to protect the assembly area, and later to support the advance.Stutz contacts him at once and communicates all of his observations. Preparations of the company for attack are now completed. The platoon leader orders the squad to withdraw to the right in the vicinity of the brook and to rejoin the platoon, following along as the rear squad during the advance.

*PHASE II : DEPLOYMENT AND ATTACK* ( _*Entwicklung* *&* *Angriff *)_




​The enemy has occupied "B" woods and the heights west of "B" woods (distance about 1,000 yards). The 2d Company, advancing north, has contact on both flanks. It has reached Hill 202 and the wooded area east of the
hill, and is preparing for attack.A reconnaissance patrol has been sent forward by the company along the brook,
through the Trumpeter Woods, toward the west edge of "B" woods.

_Platoon Commander's Orders - _For the attack, the leader of the 1st Platoon gives the following order to the 4 squad leaders who have assembled about him near the crest of Hill 202.
(1)*The company will attack the enemy in "B" woods and on the left of the woods, at the point where the birch-lined avenue can be seen. The 2d Platoon on the right, 1st Platoon on the left, 3d Platoon to the rear center.*

(2)The Ist Platoon with 3 squads, deployed in front, will initially advance to the rise in the ground, about 300 yards in front of us where you see a hedge and wire fence. *Becker's squad *will immediately send two scouts out.
(Pointing) Becker's squad, to the right along this brook, as far as the willow bushes on the bank of the brook.
*Einhart's Squad * to the right around this hill (202), as fa ras the cluster of bushes on the right slope of that rise on the
ground.*Mueller's squad,* to the left around this hill on which we are lying, initially up to the next rise in the ground.
*Schneider's squad *follows Einhart's squad at a distance of about 150 yards until the sand pit is reached.
The light mortar detachment will remain with Schneider's squad.

(3) We have a reconnaissance patrol in the area before us.
(4)I shall be with Einhart's squad.
Squad leaders, repeat my orders! (Each leader repeats only the instructions applying to his ovwn squad.)POSTS!
The squad leaders return to their squads, repeat the situation and orders to the men, and proceed to their
posts.



_
Squad Leader Becker's Orders_ - 2 riflemen, move out ahead of us as scouts by 200 yards. In the direction of the small woods, some 600 yards in front of us!The squad will follow me in _Schutzenreihe._
The orders of the other squad leaders are similar.Under the* fire protection of the heavy machine guns*(detatched from battalion heavy weapons company and generally allotted 2-4 per infantry company,company then allots these to their forward platoons) on Hill 202 and to the west, the squads now work their way forward to the indicated positions.
As they advance, they keep the platoon leader in sight. Upon arrival at their new forward positions, the squad leaders, noting that there are covered routes to the right and left still available, join the platoon leader. For the purposes of
protection, the squads may avail themselves of suitable cover in the adjoining sector. However, bunching up must be avoided. The important thing about the advance is that the squads should utilize cover. There will often be gaps between the squads through which the machine guns may fire.




_Further Advance - _
The* platoon leader, having made a personal reconnaissance,* now decides to move the squads forward up to the next areas.For the advance to this second forward area, he issues appropriate orders, as he did for the first advance. Whenthe men reach the positions shown above it becomes more difficult to advance under cover and out of sight.
Areas, such as that around e, which are exposed to the enemy's observation, must be crossed in double-time.
In any further advance the platoon is now within effective range of the enemy light machine guns (600 to 800 yards).
From this area on, therefore, the squad leader and the other members of the squad must exercise particular caution in order to avoid heavy casualties.As soon as they have drawn enemy fire and are no longer able to advance under cover, the scouts join the squad which has been following behind them.

Becker leading squad B, in the advance from the south side of the Trumpeter Woods on, *must under all circumstancesavoid coming again into the line of sight.* From the Trumpeter Woods to the next rise in the ground (north of the Trumpeter Woods) it will still be possible to advance under cover. The high ground at f should be reached in one bound.Should the Trumpeter Woods be under artillery fire, so that it is impossible to pause there, the squad should immediately continue on to the elevation at 'f in one bound. If necessary, the squad may move around the woods in advancing to f.
The platoon leader finds very difficult the further advance, at this stage, of Einhart's squad(E) andSchneider's squad(S). He decides that the next objective for E squad should be the steep rise of g. But the intervening area offers no cover.
Enemy fire from the neighborhood of the tree clumps by the birch-lined avenue is certainly to be expected. In order to keep the enemy down, Einhart prepares his light machine gun for action. In addition,the light machine gun of Becker undertakes to protect the advance of Einhart's from the position at f. In its further advance, Einhart's squad is protected
by the fire of the squad at f. Supporting fires of the heavy machine guns, the light infantry cannon, and the artillery will also be utilized to assist the advance.Schneider's squad(S) moves to the area evacuated by B squad.

The distance to the enemy is still too great for the employment of the light mortar detachment. Nevertheless,the platoon leader now brings up this detachment.The squads continue to work their way forward, toward the positions i and h, under the fire protection of all the heavy infantry weapons, and under their own mutual fire support - Fire and manuever now fully underway as the* firefight reaches its height*,the _schutzenkette_ formation will be used often if necessary. At distances under 500 yards, the platoon leader employs the light mortar to combat particularly stubborn resistances.




*PHASE III : PENETRATION * *(Einbruch)*

It is difficult to simulate penetration into an enemy's position so that it conforms to the realities of war.The 1st Platoon, an interior unit, has worked its way forward in the attack under the strong fire support of all the weapons, until it is within assaulting distance (about 200 yards) of the enemy. The squads are disposed as indicated above.(*Names now generic A,B,C,D as particular squad leader names not necessary)*
The enemy, strongly shaken by heavy artillery preparation and infantry-cannon and heavy machine-gun fire, still holds a few positions on the opposite hill. Enemy artillery is striking immediately behind the platoon.The fire of an enemy heavy machine gun is passing over the squad into the terrain beyond.Friendly artillery fire has been directed at the hill in front of the platoon. Now, as directed by flare, it shifts to the area behind the hill. (This fire may be represented by sound or smoke explosives.) 
Squad A's light machine gun is in position near the group of bushes and fires at the enemy opposite the squad.The riflemen have worked their way forward to the banks of the brook and are also firing. The squads to the left and right
have advanced to about the same general line. The platoon's light mortar is also firing on the enemy strongpoint
opposite Squad A.

_Storming the Enemy Position - _
The *squad leader is in the midst of his riflemen.* He has them fix bayonets. (If the riflemen are lying under cover, they will all fix bayonets simultaneously.If they are in the line of fire, some will fix bayonets while the others continue to fire.) The enemy opposite is now firing only sporadically (umpire's decision). The light mortar is firing heavily and very effectively upon him. The squad leader decides upon an assault. He gives his light machine gun the prearranged signal (this might be done by repeatedly raising his rifle perpendicularly in the air) to join him as quickly as possible and to go
forward in the assault with the riflemen.The squad leader is the first to spring up for the assault, shouting encouragement.*Remaining enemy resistance is broken by close-in fighting*- grenades first ,rifles moving in under the explosions. After the assault, the squad leader at once scatters his squad, which had tended to concentrate during the assault. He has them occupy positions on the captured hill. All the riflemen fire vigorously upon the retreating or counterattacking enemy.




*PHASE IV :CONSOLIDATION*

As the leader of Squad A is giving new orders, one of his men cries out, pointing out that some 10 or 15 riflemen are advancing for counterattack, having just emerged from the clump Of bushes and from behind the high ground to the left oblique some 120 or 150 yards away. Simultaneously, a light machine gun directly opposite opens fire on the squad.
The platoon leader is with the adjacent squad on the left. This squad is now approaching the west end of the
captured hill.


_
Solution._-The leader of Squad A at once orders:1. ENTIRE SQUAD, 2. POSTS, 3. RIFLEMEN LEFT OBLIQUE,4. FIRE AT WILL. (No sight adjustment is necessary, since the last firing was done with battle sights.) The machine gun and all the riflemen fire upon the advancing enemy riflemen, since the latter present the most immediate danger. The squad leader fires with his machine pistol. The *enemy counterattack may lead to the loss of the hill just captured, as well as to heavy casualties in the squad,unless the squad leader immediately and energeticallyemploys his entire squad-his riflemen and machine gun*.Even the No. 2 and No. 3 fire on the enemy with pistols or rifles.



_
Neutralizing Enemy Machine Gun Nest - _
We shall now *assume that the counterattack was repulsed*, and that the enemy had retreated with heavy losses
under the fire of Squad A and Squad B, the latter meanwhile having reached the hill. The rest of the enemy
(about four men) have disappeared into the creek bottom behind the high ground. Two men of Squad A have been
wounded by enemy machine-gun fire. They are still able to take part in the fight. The enemy machinegun has been firing continuously on Squad A, without itself receiving any fire. The squad leader now subjects the enemy light machine gun to the combined fire of his entire squad. The platoon leader orders Squad A to pin down the enemy machine-gun group by fire while he attacks it with the other squads. He orders the light mortar detachment.
to follow the platoon. He fires a green rocket to notify the artillery and the light infantry-cannon platoon that their fire, which is now directed about 150 'yards beyond the platoon, must be raised farther ahead.

The leader of Squad B follows the platoon leader, with his men following him in _schutzenreihe_. The second-incommand
follows at the rear of the coltumn. Now crouching, now rushing from cover to cover, they advance along the creek bottom. The squad leader succeeds in reaching the clump of bushes without loss. When he starts to advance farther, another enemy machine gun joins the action and begins to fire at his squad He halts the advance, brings his light machine gun at once into position, and opens fire on the new enemy machine gun. The riflemen take cover in the clump of bushes, while the squad leader and one man observe the area to their front. It is now assumed that a heavy machine-gun squad (flag) is with the platoon leader. He at once has it fire upon the enemy light machine gun near the brook, and orders Squad A to* surround and attack the machine-gun nest by circling around *Hill 127. The platoon leader advances to the attack with the rest of the squads along the creek bottom to the left. He takes the light mortar along with his platoon for use against any objective which might suddenly appear.

*NOTE : *Above is an idealized exercise scenario,but important in understanding the general methods applied.

*NEXT: SQUAD TACTICS - DEFENSIVE - ANTI-TANK -RIVER ASSAULT- OUTPOST DUTY -PATROL DUTY*
​

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN SQUAD TACTICS -DEFENSIVE *




​*INTRODUCTION :*
Until the russian campaign ,*defensive tactics recieved minimal attention* in german manuals so coverage here is limited.The germans modernized and reintroduced trench warfare and strongpoint system in the eastern front in the later years but this campaign covers their early war approach which 'detested' trench warfare.When defending, the defender aims to balance his weakness in numbers and/or equipment through his choice of a position and the coordination between his supporting arms. However, the *position should be such that the enemy is forced to attack and cannot merely by-pass it and attack somewhere else weaker*.The terrain, defensive works, supporting units and observation should all be taken into consideration when selecting a position. Inter-locking and mutually supporting fire (especially from lMG’s) of the Gruppen is of great importance at the platoon level.When looking into squad defensive tactics its important to understand that it operates as a cog in wheel,a part of the whole defensive system based on 4 zonal defence which we have already described from battalion level.The *squad is a part of that whole,rather than using independent special tactics.*

*GENERAL PATTERN :*

_*German squad defensive tactics*_ stressed the importance of integration with larger plans and the principle of posts scattered in depth. The individual _Schützengruppe_ (squad) was expected to dig in on a* frontage 30 or 40 meters*, this being the maximum that a squad leader could effectively oversee in a defending battle. Major landmarks, such as single trees or crests were best shunned as too attractive to enemy fire. During the digging, one member of the squad was to stand sentry, preventing surprise from ground or air. Gaps between squads might be left, although covered by fire. Key to the defense was the location of the machine gun, which would be given several alternative positions, perhaps 50 or more meters apart, that were identified from the outset. It would cover longer range targets, while the riflemen, who might well be held further back, were concerned mainly with sweeping the terrain at close and very close range.

*The usual deployment would see the men of the squad in pairs in foxholes, trenches, or ditches*, posted close enough to communicate with their partner. These little sub-section nests would be slightly separated, echeloned, or at different levels, thus decreasing the effect of enemy fire. In the event that the enemy attack did not materialize immediately, the second phase of construction would see the digging of trenches behind the main line in which much of the squad could be kept back under cover until needed. *Good camouflage* was complemented by the avoidance of any obvious movement to attract enemy observation. The defensive fire fight was initiated by the machine gun at effective range, riflemen remaining concealed until the enemy assault, at which all were to open fire regardless of cover. Hand grenades falling on the position were to be dealt with either by the men diving away into cover, or by picking up the grenade and throwing it back.

In the latter part of World War II, there was particular emphasis on resistance to armor. Ideal defensive positions were therefore on a tank-proof obstacle, equipped with at least one anti-tank weapon, capable of all round defense, and having artillery support directed by a forward observer. Active patrols with anti-tank weapons, as small as a single squad, were to be encouraged to intercept enemy tanks probing a defense.

*TYPES OF DEFENSE:*

The _Zugführer_(Platoon Commander), together with the_ Gruppenführers _should, where possible, visit each Gruppe and give the following information in his battle orders:
• The route of the main battle line;
• The depth of friendly positions;
• Indicate overlapping fire sectors;
• The placement of the Gruppe’s foxholes/riflepits (Schützenlöchern) and their field of fire;
• Rules of engagement for opening fire on enemy troops and armoured vehicles.

Defensive operations can be divided into either sustained or delaying actions.

*SUSTAINED DEFENCE :*

In a sustained defence, the *Main Line of Resistance* or _Hauptkampflinie_ (HKL) is established and represents the forward point of the advance. Should the position be lost, the* defender must re-take it*, in order to ensure the integrity of the frontline. Therefore, the position *must be defended to the last man*. For a sustained defensive position, the defence is staggered(Zig-Zag) and in-depth so that the effect of enemy fire is lessened. Also, should the forward positions be taken, the enemy is engaged by rearwards lying positions as well as by flanking positions. This serves to wear down an enemy assault and to minimise friendly losses.



​The* lMG should be placed first* and be positioned so that it commands the best field of fire and can support neighbouring Gruppen through flanking fire. The Gruppenführer should then position the riflemen to either one or both sides of the lMG and oversee the camouflage and preparation of the position (otherwise known as a Gruppenest).
Each position should contain 2 or 3 riflemen and should be spaced at irregular intervals 4-8m apart staggered towards the rear. If time allows, the _Schützenlöchern_ should be connected by a shallow trench (Kriechgraben). The Gruppenest should be no wider than 30m.Alternative positions should also be selected and prepared. If time allows, a rear position
should be prepared that will protect the Gruppe from observation and enemy artillery fire.The *Gruppenführer should position himself such that he is able to direct and control his Gruppe, especially the MG.*
​Once the position has been prepared, camouflage is of utmost importance and note should be taken of the earth from the digging activities. Unnecessary movement should be avoided.
*Observation posts* (or Vorposten) should be positioned ahead of the main position, in order to observe the enemy or to break up an enemy assault. Typically, *Vorposten are composed of 1-2 men with a communication link to the main position*. The position should be well camouflaged and offer good possibilities for observation. The occupants should be rotated at regular intervals and be aware of their task, especially whether to engage the enemy or not. It is recommended that a sketch map be drawn and a Meldung, or log of enemy activity be kept and reported to the Gruppenführer. When attacked, the enemy should be primarily engaged by support weapons and the lMG should hold its fire until the last moment, in order that it remains hidden. The Riflemen should avoid firing unless necessary and be held ready for counter-attacks.

*DELAYING ACTION :*
In a delaying action there is no defined HKL. Instead the Gruppenführer should aim to force the enemy to commit as many resources as possible whilst maintaining the strength of his Gruppe. Unlike a sustained defence, the lMG should engage the enemy as soon as possible along with other supporting weapons.The route(s) for a safe withdrawal should be reconnoitred beforehand, as it is intended that the defensive position is to be abandoned. During the withdrawal, the riflemen should withdraw under the cover of the lMG-Trupp. Once in the next position, the riflemen should cover the withdrawal of the lMG. The Gruppenführer should remain with the lMG.




*FIELD FORTIFICATIONS :*

_1.Schutzenmulde & Schutzenloch_ - 
Where there is* little time for preparation* of the position, the riflemen would dig a _Schützenmulde _which essentially consists of a hole about 0.4-0.5m deep for a rifleman to lie down in and offers additional protection for the prone soldier.
This would typically be dug where speed is of the essence or when under fire, as it is possible to dig it whilst lying down.Where more time is available, a* rifle-pit *or_ Schützenloch _would be dug.Typically, for* 2-3 soldiers to either stand or kneel in dependent upon the depth,* it offers more protection than the _Schützenmulde _against artillery and mortar fire. The Schützenloch can be covered by a shelter-quarter for camouflage.Above You can see _schutzenloche_ dug for riflemen 

_2.Gruppenneste -_
For defence on a more permanent basis s*quad trench networks or strongpoints would be constructed.*These Gruppenneste.(Squad nests) were to be a part of the whole platoon and company strongpoints,which in turn would be part of the whole battalion strongpoint.The gruppenneste themselves could include rifle-pits.




​*Above depicts a forward line squad trench*(_Kampfgraben_).The _Schutzenloch fur 2 schutzen_ denote 2 man rifle-pits incorporated into the trench system._Stitchgraben_ is the main body of the slit trench(narrow,shallow).Schutzennischen denote fire steps(So that soldiers in front-line trenches could fire through the parapet, a fire-step was dug into the forward side of the trench. The fire-step was 2 or 3 ft high. It was on this that the sentries stood. It was also used by the whole unit when standing-to (an anticipated enemy attack)._M.G Feure Stellung_ are machine gun firing positions with alternate ones available dependent on angle of enemy advance and fire and for switching._Unterstand _is the squad bunker to the rear.It is connected to the main forward trench by the _Annaherungsgraben_ or approach trench by which squad can also withdraw to the rear.




​_3.Reinforced Squad Strongpoint -_
When faced with the need to defend wide frontages where a continous defensive front was impractical due to manpower limitations like in russia or the african desert germans often built self-contained,scattered,reinforced squad strongpoints.Above is an ideal example.
1 represents* 2 man rifle pits* or _schutzenloch_ with firing steps.
2 is a light or *medium mortar.*
3 would either be an *Anti-tank gun *or a* 20mm flak AA* gun also useable vs infantry and light vehicles.
4 and 5 denotes *light machine gun* positions - a strongpoint can have 1 or 2 depending on its strength.If a flak gun is lacking one of the machine guns would be provided with a tripod mount for anti-aircraft duty (it could also then serve as an HMG with greater range).Such a strongpoint is thus capable of limited all-round defense.
6 represents *dugouts or small bunkers* where squad can take shelter.
7 is a* barbed wire fence* erected to prevent enemy infantry from closing into grenade range.
8.*Anti-armour mines* mixed with anti-personnel mines to prevent approach with impunity.
9.*Forward observation post *connected to main trench by communications trench,used by sentries at night to prevent infiltration.

Such a *strongpoint would be sited on high ground with a good field of fire and manned by 16-24 men*.When under attack various colour combinations from flare pistols would be used to signal other strongpoints or command posts of its situation.
The construction of such a strongpoints begins when the commander selects 3 nearby positions each with good fields of fire -the central position will hold the AT gun/flak gun the flanking positions the machine guns,they are then connected by communications trenches.The trenches will be covered with boards and stones in order to make them splinter-proof and difficult to recognize from the air.Strongpoint will then be wired and mines laid.




*GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SQUAD DEFENSE : *

*1.*By skillful disposition of forces (organization in depth, security of flanks) and strong organization of the position on suitable ground (camouflage, natural obstacles, artificial barriers, etc., before the front) a force numerically inferior, but equal or superior in morale and equipped with the modern strong defensive power of many automatic weapons may stop, either temporarily or indefinitely, an attacking force which is greatly superior in numbers and weapons.
*
2*.Good observation posts, as well as favorable firing conditions (fields of fire) for the heavy and light machine guns,
are the chief factors in determining the framework of the position, because *heavy weapons constitute the backbone
of every defensive position.* The machine guns must be located so that they can cover the entire area in front of the position with effective frontal and flanking fire.

*3*.In the defense the main line of resistance is* established in an integrated manner*, The forward light machinegun
nests and rifle strongpoints are located in that line. By the combined fire of all arms the enemy attack must be
broken up in front of the main area of resistance.

*4.*In the *sector assigned *to him by the platoon commander, the squad leader, after personal reconnaissance, *assigns the riflemen their places in the position and supervises the organization and the camouflage.*Front of the squad is about 30 to 40 yards. If the squad occupies greater frontage, the squad leader cannot control his squad in combat. The front of the platoon is about 200 to 300 yards. Gaps between the squads must definitely be covered by fire. The position is organized hastily or thoroughly (by foxholes, joining of foxholes, obstacles, etc.) depending on the time available (proximity of the enemy).





(Squad leader directs LMG fire on russian human wave attacks)​*
5*.The squad leader* first finds the most suitable location for the light machine gun* within his squad, a position providing the most effective field of fire and also insuring a good opportunity to support adjacent units with flanking fire. Several alternate firing positions are reconnoitered at once and chosen, and they are organized later.*Alternate firing positions must not be located too close to other positions.* They should be at least 50 yards apart; otherwise the machine gun will not evade the hostile fire. Furthermore, it should always be possible to occupy alternate firing positions well concealed from enemy observation.

*6.*Next, in compliance with the platoon leader's orders the *squad leader posts the riflemen as a reserve or establishes them in the front line.* In the latter case the riflemen are located so that the whole forward terrain can be swept with fire, principally at close range and very close range. As a rule,* two riflemen are grouped together,* usually 'in a small trench or ditch sufficiently close so that they can easily understand each other even in combat. In order to decrease the effectiveness of enemy fire, these separate nests or groups should not be on the same level but should be echeloned. If sufficient time is available after the squad groups (units) have been established, the platoon leader may order the squad members to dig foxholes or trenches somewhat to the rear of their firing positions. The foxholes should be concealed from ground observation and, if,possible, from air observation.The men may remain under such cover until the squad is employed in the fire fight.

*7*.During the reconnaissance of the position and the construction of the trenches* a member of the squad is always designated to observe and warn against the approach of the enemy troops and airplanes*.

*8.Conspicuous terrain features*, such as solitary trees, bushes, the highest point of an elevation, the edge of woodsetc., *should be avoided in occupying a position*.They offer the enemy a good landmark and quickly draw fire. If there is sufficient time, clear away conspicuous trees, bushes, etc., for they facilitate the fire of the enemy's heavy infantry weapons and artillery.

*9*.The *trench work is almost always betrayed by the fresh excavated earth *(either lighter or darker in color), by sharp edges, and by the shadows of the holes which have been dug. Sharp corners and straight lines should therefore be avoided.





(To the right,two riflemen in _schutzenloch_ firing while ammo carrier brings up ammo for LMG)​
*10*.Do not reveal the position to enemy scout patrols by *premature firing*. If possible, allow them to come so close that they can be taken prisoners or shot with comparative safety.
*
11*.At long ranges the* fire fight *is first carried on by artillery and heavy machine guns. In the meantime the squad leader keeps his squad under cover and concealment so that it will not be discovered prematurely.The squad leader opens fire with the light machine gun at effective range only. Light machine-gun fire is directed particularly against targets which cannot be effectively engaged by the artillery and heavy infantry weapons.When the enemy attacks, every rifleman, without regard to cover, must use his rifle. If an enemy hand grenade falls into the position, he springs quickly into cover, or he seizes the hand grenade and throws it out. The squad leader fires the submachine gun only at very close range. Otherwise *he directs the fire of his squad, principally that of the light machine gun.*

*12*.In the *presence of enemy tanks* the squad members take temporary shelter in rifle pits, in holes made specifically for protection against tanks, or, when necessary, by jumping into any available depression. *Running away means certain death. *Rifle and machine-gun fire has no effect against the armor of the tanks.The most important targets for the squad are the enemy infantrymen following close behind the enemy tank attack. They must be subjected immediately to concentrated fire by all the rifles. If they cannot be seen because of a smoke screen laid down by the tanks, then fire into the smoke*.Objective is to seperate the armor from its infantry and then have the anti-tanks weapons in reserve and rear pick them off.*

*13*.If the *squad is placed to the rear of the main line of resistance*, it entrenches itself just as the other squads do. The orders of the platoon leader determine its action. Often it will join in the fire action and contribute to the volume of fire in front of the MLR by firing through a gap. Surprise fire (though avoid opening fire prematurely) must prevent the enemy from engaging the squad before the latter's fire effect has had time to operate. The squad leader must establish the position so that his men can bring flanking fire upon an enemy who has broken into the position of an adjacent unit. In preparing for the delivery of a counterblow, the leader must reconnoiter in advance to determine the route for such an attack.
*
14*.If the *enemy has penetrated the position of an adjacent unit, the squad must hold its position under all circumstances, until rear squads have driven the enemy back. *The enemy is stopped by bands of fire. If the situation to the immediate front permits, the enemy who has made a penetration must be hurled back by a quick counterblow conducted by local reserves kept in readiness for that purpose. After the enemy is driven back, the squad again organizes for defense.

*NEXT : SQUAD ON PATROL DUTY -SQUAD ON OUTPOST DUTY -RIVER ASSAULT TACTICS *

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## AUSTERLITZ

*GERMAN SQUAD TACTICS -OTHER DUTIES*




​*GERMAN SQUAD AS COMBAT OUTPOST :*

In the defense, *combat outposts* are usually located in advance of the main line of resistance. They are generally posted close enough so that they can still be seen by the artillery observers and so that they can be supported by the fire of the light artillery located in the main defensive position. They defend themselves, or, if the situation requires, they discontinue the defense and fall back to resume defensive action farther to the rear. When there is a temporary lull in the fighting, the attacker may also provide security for his combat position by means of outposts. Usually such outposts consist of pickets, reconnaissance patrols, and observation or listening posts.
The combat outposts provide close-in security. They have the following missions:
(a) To *make the enemy's approach difficult*.
(b) To* deceive the enemy* as to the nature of the defense, as well as the location of the main line of resistance.
(c) To* protect the forces in rear *by retarding the enemy advance until the rearward forces are ready for combat.
(d) To *carry out battle reconnaissance* and to maintain contact' with the enemy if and when contact is established.

*One or more squads, often reinforced by heavy machine guns and antitank rifles, are employed as outposts in the sector of the platoon or company*. In open terrain permitting unrestricted observation, combat outposts are placed under a designated leader from within the company in order to insure coordinated action and control, especially when they are far advanced. In the lattercase, the company commander takes personnel for outposts from platoons in the front line; he will usually reduce correspondingly the forward area of the platoon sectors.
When they are posted, the outposts must know whether they are to defend themselves, or if (and when) they are to withdraw to the position before strong enemy attacks and where they are to take position in line. Furthermore, they must know what friendly reconnaissance patrols or advanced security detachments are before them. *The outposts must have orders whether or not they are to withdraw fighting, or whether or not they are to withdraw at one bound.* If in the intermediate terrain there are still some sectors that are favorable for defense, they will often occupy these. They *must always withdraw in such a way as not to obstruct the fire from the main positions*. They must be given information as to passages over streams and marshes, through barbed-wire entanglements, minefields, etc.The outposts are grouped in individual nests, which are echeloned in depth so that the rear nests can later give fire protection for some time in case the forward elements must withdraw. The battle outposts must energetically prevent the enemy scout patrols from getting through their line. By means of patrols, and at times by small advances, they themselves reconnoiter the enemy.

After the organization of their positions, the* outposts must prepare dummy positions in order to give the appearance of a stronger force*. This deception may be made still more effective by changing positions from time to time. In this way they also make more difficult the enemy's minor thrusts against individual nests of the outposts. Such changes are particularly desirable at night if the enemy has had an earlier opportunity to detect the location of individual nests.




When the outposts of his squad go into position, the squad leader goes quickly out ahead with two men to reconnoiter the position. Through the second-in-command he has had the squad either follow at a certain distance or advance to a designated point. While those accompanying him provide security in the direction of the enemy, the squad leader first looks for the most suitable position for his light machine gun (the best field of fire, the best camouflage, and the best means for going into and leaving the position under cover). With the same considerations in mind, he picks out several
suitable alternate firing positions. *By firing the machine gun from different positions, the outposts can simulate a'
stronger force, and their machine guns may also avoid effective enemy fire.* After doing this the squad leader locates positions for his riflemen (arranged in nests of two or three men each)so that by observation and fire they can give each other mutual support, as well as aid adjacent units. The squad usually does not extend over 200 yards. All positions must be selected so that it is possible to enter and leave them under cover. Conspicuous .features, such as isolated bushes, are to be avoided. Immediately after his squad arrives at the position, the squad leader provides local security during the organization of the ground by putting the machine gun in a temporary position. He then organizes the position and the dummy works. Next, he establishes communication with the adjacent unit, visually or by sending out several men. As a rule, each squad establishes communication toward the right. If definite signals (flares, flag signals, etc.) for the evacuation of the position have not been specified, before starting out from the main line of resistance the squad leader reaches an agreement with units adjacent to his position in order to insure coordinated withdrawal. He determines distances to various points on the terrain where the enemy is expected to appear first and notes them on a sketch. In preparation for the night, he and his men study the terrain and the avenues of approach available to the enemy and select a suitable position for the night.




*SQUAD ON OUTGUARD DUTY :*
*Troops at rest and exposed to contact with the enemy provide security against attack by means of outguards*.The outguards are under the outpost commander. The outposts have much the same mission as the advance guard on the march, namely:
(1) to *reconnoiter in the direction of the enemy*, so far as is necessary for the security of the troops at rest;
(2) to *prevent disturbance* by the enemy;
(3) in case of enemy attack, to* give the troops in rear time to get ready for march or combat*; and
(4)To* prevent the enemy from observing the resting troops(strength, organization, or shelter).* Preparation must always be made for defense against tanks.

No more troops should be assigned on outpost duty than are absolutely necessary for the security of the troops at rest
(in order to spare the men). Hence, at a considerable distance from the enemy and behind sectors which are easy to defend (narrow passes, etc.), only a weak outpost is necessary. Closer to the enemy, and when there are less favorable defensive positions, a stronger protective force is needed.

First of all, the outposts provide security along the roads and highways leading from the enemy, *using stronger units (companies) reinforced by heavy infantry weapons for the main march roads*, and often only outguards or advanced sentinels for the byroads. On the most important roads or highways, use antitank barriers, mine barriers, and antitank guns.For security, outguards are posted by the company. Their distance will generally depend on the road net andthe defensive possibilities (bridges, road crossings, hills). Usually they will not be over 1,600 yards away.

*Its strength will vary from a squad to a platoon.* To outguards of platoon strength,* one or two antitank rifles and possibly one or two heavy machine guns should be assigned.* They may also be reinforced by antitank guns. Advanced sentinels will often suffice on the less important roads.Stronger outguards in turn provide for their own security by means of advanced sentinels, reconnaissance patrols, and observation or listening posts. In addition, every outguard provides security for itself directly by means of a sentry. The outguard constitutes the reserve of its own sentinels.The harder the intervening terrain is to observe, and the closer the enemy, the more often must visiting and reconnaissance patrols be sent within the chain of sentries.



_
Outguard on Contact_ -The outguard* allows an enemy patrol* to approach as close as possible if it appears that it has not recognized the outguard. It is then either cut off all at once or destroyed by fire at close range (which is important for
determination of the troop unit). After closing the barrier, the outguard takes cover from *enemy armored scout cars*. The car or tank is engaged by the antitank rifle. Its appearance is reported to the rear by means of signal pistols in order that the company antitank guns can go into action in good time. *If a strong enemy force comes up*, all the riflemen begin a heavy fire at once, in order, first, to slow up his advance and, second, to notify the company of the attack. Oneman is sent back immediately with the report, on a bicycle if possible. The outguard then withdraws to the company over the route which has already been reconnoitered, without, however, restricting the field of fire of rear elements.
​*SQUAD IN THE ADVANCE GUARD* :

As security for the main body, about* one-third to one-sixth of the entire infantry force marches at a considerable distance ahead as an advance guard.* The advance guard is organized into a support and an advance party. For security the latter sends an infantry point ahead about 500 yards.Because of the continual danger of enemy air attacks, long continuous columns are seldom possible in daytime.The advance guard commander is not bound to any one place. If an encounter with the enemy is possible, then he stays with the advance party. of the advance guard. The main body follows at a distance of 2 to 4 miles.
The advance guard has the following mission:
(1) To *insure the unmolested march* of the entire force.(It quickly removes potential causes of delay and brushes
aside weak enemy resistance.)
(2) To* protect the main body from a surprise attack.*
(3) To give the *main body time and space for deployment in case of an encounter with a strong enemy force.*




The distances between individual parts of the column for example, between the infantry point and the advance party-are sufficient to insure that the next largest unit will not be involved at once by the combat of the smallerformation, and yet such that the smaller formation can receive timely support from the following unit.
Liaison between the various elements in the column is maintained by connecting files (at times also by cyclists, cavalrymen, motorcyclists, and motorists). In daytime the distance between the connecting files is about 100 yards. At night, and in operation over terrain which restricts visibility, distances between elements are reduced.Similar to the organization of the advance guard is that of the rear guard, which protects withdrawing troops against the confusion caused by sudden attack. The rear guard withdraws by stages.

_Infantry Point - _*About 1,000 yards ahead of the infantry point, the mounted point marches by bounds from one observation point to another.*
(1) _Mission of the infantry point.--T_he infantry point protects the advance party following behind, and drives
away weaker enemy forces by quick attacks. If strong enemy forces are met, it gives the elements following time
and space for deployment, and at the same time it reconnoiters the enemy positions until the company appears.
By employing heavy fire, it stops the advance of the enemy as long as possible.
*The infantry point consists of about one to four squads* (usually two squads) under an officer (platoon leader), *accompanied usually by one antitank rifle and a cyclist. One light mortar detachment may also be attached.*



_
(2) Formation of the advance - _The formation in which the infantry point advances depends on the proximity of the enemy and on the terrain.* If there is no danger of an immediate encounter with the enemy*, then the infantry point marches along the road, usually one squad in column to the right under the trees, and the other to the left under
the trees. The leader of the infantry point is at the head with the command group. The light mortar detachment
and one or two antitank rifles of the company are at the tail of the column.
Two intelligence men are sent out as scouts about 100 to 200 yards ahead, each equipped with field glasses and
trained as gas detectors. One is equipped with a pistol in order to signal promptly to the rear announcing the approach of enemy tanks.
*In the infantry point some men are detailed to observe to the front, others to the right, and others to the left and to the rear (toward the company) or toward the connecting files and air scouts*. When approaching a defile, the scouts go around both sides in order to preclude surprise. Hills close to the road are used by the point leader for observation, but he must not delay on them too long.In terrain over which cannot be seen (for example, forests), it is best to have the squad riflemen march in front of the machine gun in order to insure protection of the machine gun from surprises.
*When the enemy is near, *the point often moves in ditches alongside the road, in extended echelon or in line of skirmishers. Any observation of the enemy should be reported through messengers (cylists) by prearranged signals or by oral transmission through the connecting files. The transmission of long messages from one file to the next is not to be recommended, because by repeated transmission from file to file the message is usually incorrectly stated. In the advance the infantry point does not allow itself to be held up by hostile fliers, but uses the shade of trees or advances in the ditches alongside the road.



_
(3)In Contact with Enemy_ -
If the infantry point advances against a village or a woods in which the enemy is thought to be (by report of mounted point or cyclists), then it deploys and goes forward on a broad front_(Schutzenkette)_. On passing through villages, buildings and grounds are quickly searched for enemy troops.
*If the infantry point encounters a weak enemy force *for example, a few riflemen or a light machine gun (forward
security)-then it immediately brings its light machine gun (or light machine guns) into position and opens fire. The point leader leads the riflemen in attack upon the enemy, taking advantage of cover and usually working quickly around to outflank the enemy, so as not to delay the advance of the troops following. The light mortars are brought into position at once; they are immediately assigned a target (a light machine gun).Quick action is imperative when the enemy holds animportant point: for example, a defile or a commanding height.
*Enemy scouts and reconnaissance parties must be fired upon and driven away at once. *They must not be allowed to get even a glance at the marching column. If the point* encounters a sizable enemy force*, one that surpasses it in strength, then it initially takes full cover until friendly, rear heavy machine guns arrive and are put in position, and supporting troops come up from the rear. In the meantime the point leader, using his field glasses, determines the extent of the enemy and the location of his machine-gun positions, and, if a covered,approach is possible, sends out a patrol for close reconnaissance of the enemy positions (to determine frontage, flanks, and composition) and reports to the company.
*If the enemy attacks, *then the leader at once commences a heavy fire with the machine gun and all rifles, in order to bring the attack to a standstill. If in terrain offering cover to the enemy the infantry point is suddenly fired upon at very close range (somewhere under 100 yards), then there is no time to open fire. With a shout of "Hurrah!" it rushes at the enemy. If at this close range the men should throw themselves to the ground in order to open fire, they would suffer heavy losses before they had time to fire.
*By means of prearranged light signals and bugle signals, tanks are immediately reported to the rear* so that the defensive weapons there (antitank guns and antitank rifles) may act in due time. When there is a strong wind or fog, or when in covered terrain (for example, woods), the prearranged warning may also be to detonate a hand grenade as a signal of approaching tanks. In the presence of tanks the point takes full cover close to one side of the road, if possible in ditches, because in such a position the men are usually in a dead space, under cover from enemy tank fire.

*GENERAL USE OF DECEPTION **:*

*1. *Divert the enemy's attention in the opposite direction, so that you can approach him silently from the rear and make your kill, or so that you bypass him unnoticed. Make a noise by throwing stones. Use small parties to attract attention while the main body carries out the envelopment.

*2*. Draw mines across the road just in front of a hostile vehicle, and kill the crew from ambush as they climb out.

*3. * Noise-making devices in the vicinity of wire obstacles, as well as the use of dummies, can induce Allied soldiers to open fire. In this way the number and location of hostile weapons can be determined.

*4.* If it is necessary for you to pretend to be dead, lie down as close as possible to enemy dead until the danger is past or until night has fallen. A helmet pierced by small-arms fire will lend added realism when you are feigning death.

*5.* Mine deserted trenches.

*6*.Cut telephone cables at night, and draw one end into an ambush so that hostile linesmen can be killed or captured.

*7.* By using single rounds from a 20-mm machine gun in an armored car, you can make the enemy think you have a heavy antitank gun.
*
8.*By warming up your vehicle engines, you can imitate the sound of vehicles approaching and departing, and thus can simulate troop movements.

*9. *Put up boards with "Danger Mines!" and a death's head painted on them. Fence off the area with wire. Make tracks around the resulting dummy minefield, and mine them.

*10*.Patrols using captured vehicles often can achieve surprise. Captured vehicles also can be useful when you are trying to lure hostile soldiers into an ambush.





*11.*When your patrols approach populated places, they may find it profitable to stop suddenly, fire a few shots in the direction of the village, turn, and make a getaway. The opposition is likely to disclose itself by firing.

*12.*Patrols operating behind the enemy's front lines should turn sign posts and notice boards to face the wrong direction or to lead into an ambush.(aka trolling)
*
13.* If a reconnaissance or combat patrol is observed by the enemy and finds it necessary to withdraw, the members of the patrol should hang jackets on the wire or place helmets with the tops showing, to hold the enemy's attention.

*14.*Cover weapon positions with boards, and camouflage them to resemble the surrounding terrain. The occupant of a position then can push the board up with his helmet, fire at hostile personnel at close range, and duck back into his hidden position again.
*
15*.Place piles of straw or wood around gasoline cans in the vicinity of your positions. If the enemy approaches you at night, fire on these materials and thus illuminate the attackers.

*16.*In a system of defense based on strongpoints, build a dummy position between the strongpoints. At night fire light signals to give the impression of a continuous line of defense. Put up artificial cover for the enemy in front of such a position and mine it. Or else arrange that the exits lead him into your field of fire.

*17*. Prepare dummy fuel dumps out of old cans and barrels, so as to lure hostile air attacks. Prepare dummy bivouacs and other concentrations by using tents, wooden crates, and derelict vehicles.

*18.* At night, leave lights in partly blacked-out houses -- or keep small fires burning -- in areas well away from genuine bivouacs.

*19*.Deflect bombing attacks by displaying swastika flags prominently on knocked-out vehicles at a safe distance from your own positions.

*20.*Leave behind hand grenades with the delay fuze removed when withdrawing under enemy attack.When enemy troops attempt to use the captured grenades, pulling the friction wire causes the grenades to explode immediately without the usual 4 to 5 second delay.

*NEXT : RIVER ASSAULT TACTICS - THE PANZER DIVISIONS*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*RIVER ASSAULT TACTICS *




*GENERAL SUMMARY - *

*The* *assault crossing of a defended river line was one of the most difficult tactical offensive operations *conducted in World War II.All *major armies had 3-4 engineer companies at divisional level.* Regardless of the scope of the operation – divisional, corps, or army-level – the initial assault crossing was very much a tactical operation. Usually no more than a reinforced battalion or regiment, supported by considerable artillery, was committed to conduct the actual assault and to establish a foothold on the far bank. This* initial assault was usually made by means of small manpaddled or powered assault boats*. Once this was accomplished, follow-on forces would be shoved across as rapidly as possible to clear and* secure a bridgehead;* footbridges, ferries, and rafts were used for this phase, while larger pontoon bridges were being hurriedly emplaced for heavier equipment to cross. The troops landed on the far bank had to be prepared to meet immediate heavy counterattacks, and to* hold the bridgehead until sufficient breakout forces were in place*.The river crossing operations were crucially important in the french campaign.The general tactics followed by the major armies for river crossing operations were largely similar.

One of the* most desirable objects for an advancing army is to seize bridges intact over major rivers*.This was largely the task of small mobile reconnaissace forces  advancing far ahead of the main body,aiming to take the bridge by surprise and speed.If the bridges had been demolished beforehand a river assault had to be conducted.​




_(Above - German large inflatable paddle boats capable of carrying 18 men)_​
_*Selecting Crossing Sites -* _
Crossing sites would have to be selected based on enemy positions,river width .*Larger the width of a crossing site,longer the duration of vulnerability to enemy fire.However the narrower the crossing site,the greater the current which would make anchoring and controlling boats difficult.*Water depth would also determine the speed of current.Regarding enemy dispositions on the other side,the assault unit’s initial and follow-on objectives, exits from the shore, and access to the road system were critical. The* location of the objectives was the foremost factor in the selection of crossing points*, and every effort was made to select undefended or lightly defended sectors.
*Road access into the assault area* was important in order to deliver boats, troops, supplies, and bridging equipment. Dumps were established, and units moved into assembly areas. Closer to the river were the assault positions or forming-up points from which the infantry and engineers would move the boats to launch points.These dumps and areas had to be concealed from ground and air observation, as did the troops’ approach routes to the crossing sites. The steepness of the bank and the ground conditions had to allow infantry carrying boats to reach the water’s edge. Suitable positions for supporting weapons covering the far side were essential. *Likewise, the far banks had to be climbable and/or offer exit trails. The exits from the landing sites had to ideally provide firm ground, cover and concealment, and allow access to roads. *It would be a real problem for one bank to be at or near water level, and the opposite side higher, since whichever side the higher bank was on required considerable engineering work to provide access/exit points at bridge level. Pre-existing ferry crossing sites were ideal for pontoon bridges since they had existing access and exit roads, and ferry landings on both banks were suitable for supporting bridge ends as they were at the same level.
*Current speed had to be considered*: if it were too fast, it would carry even powerboats downstream before they could reach the far shore.
*Multiple landing sites might be selected to provide for multiple toeholds to be gained, with the most successful of these receiving the follow-on forces.*​



_(German powered motor assault boats under smokescreen,these were operated by 250 men special companies and famously employed at sevastopol by von manstein to telling effect)_

*PHASE IA - RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANNING*
By studying maps and aerial photographs of the selected crossing and bridge sites  the division or corps engineer commander could forecast the needs for assault boats and bridging equipment. He would request these from higher echelons in good time, so there would be no delay in their delivery.If possible, rehearsals were conducted on another river, or at least “dry” rehearsals. At the same time the assault boats, ammunition, supplies, bridging equipment and materials were delivered and stockpiled close to the assault positions. Assault units might have been selected from the reserve of the division/regiment that had reached the river Assault positions were selected, and troops issued ammunition, rations, etc. Deception efforts might occur during this phase. Artillery would be registered.

*PHASE IB - FIRE PREPARATION *​Artillery and mortar fire would be placed on known enemy defensive positions, reserves, artillery positions, command posts, etc. Fires would be preplanned to engage deploying reserves and counterattacks. Dive bombers and ground attack aircraft would attack enemy reserves and other positions and facilities. Normally bridges on subsequent streams/rivers on the far side would not be attacked, to retain them for breakout, but selected bridges not used to advance the main attack might be destroyed to protect the flanks. Artillery and mortars would often fire smoke to blind enemy positions and observers.​



_(Ferries -In use since Greek and Roman times)_​
*PHASE II - ASSAULT CROSSING *
The actual crossings were often conducted at *first light*.River mist and fog might be present, offering a degree of concealment, though also a risk of confusion.Ideally, the assault would occur when the rising or setting sun was shining​across the river into the defenders’ eyes. The artillery would concentrate on enemy defensive positions, obstacles, and artillery. Smoke generators or smoke pots might be used to screen the assault boats if the wind was blowing from the near side; if it was blowing from the far bank, the artillery would fire smoke on that shore to drift back across the river. On the other hand, while potentially providing lifesaving cover for the assault boats, smoke might hamper the attack, especially in finding the proper landing sites. Rommel, when commanding 7. Panzer-Division in France in spring
1940, used artillery to set fire to a riverside village, and the resulting smoke screened troops crossing by inflatable boats.* Supporting direct-fire weapons on the near side would also cover the assault.*
At the appointed time the boats were picked up and the troops crossed the line of departure, this usually being the last concealment. From here the boats were carried upright. There would be no increase in covering fire, in order
not to alert the defenders. Clambering down the riverbank and crossing boggy ground and vegetation was difficult. If launching from a steep bank boats could not be pushed into the water bow-first, as they would ship water;they had to be launched sideways. A squad automatic weapon was often placed in the bow. Artillery preparation would only begin a short time before the assault was launched, and for night assaults it might be withheld to ensure surprise, until the assault was discovered and the enemy reacted. Once the boats were committed, then even if they were receiving heavy casualties it was better to keep going rather than turn back still exposed to fire. Moving rapidly to the enemy bank might mask the boats from fire from weapons further back. Troops were told not to return fire from the boats; this was ineffective, and risked hitting men in their own or other boats. Covering weapons on the near bank (AT guns, machine guns, mortars) would open fire. *Once they disembarked, boat teams would not halt to organize into platoons, but press inland to their objectives and establish toeholds, no matter how tenuous.* Engineers would return the boats, taking wounded with them, and ferry across subsequent waves until rafts and footbridges were in place.





_(Heavy bridge carriers of the armies,lowest one is german.Present at divisional engineer detatchement)_​
*PHASE III - ESTABLISHMENT OF BRIDGEHEAD *
If the immediate enemy defences overlooking the crossing had been silenced,*the assault force had to establish a viable short-term defense on the first defendable terrain, termed the bridgehead*.Enemy forward observers were driven off, defensive fires established, and AT mines laid on avenues of approach, covered by AT guns. The flanks of the bridgehead had to be secured as soon as possible, at least with screening forces.* This allowed time for the improved ferries and bridges to be emplaced so that additional forces and logistics could cross and prepare for the breakout.* Typically, a substantial force including armor had to be built up inside the bridgehead to ensure the success of the breakout; piecemeal attacks by units as they trickled across the river might not succeed. The sooner the breakout from a bridgehead occurred the better, in order to prevent the defenders from reinforcing the containing force.





_(Pontoon bridge allowing reinforcement of bridgehead)_​
*PHASE IV - CONSOLIDATION AND REINFORCEMENT *
Pontoon footbridges would be emplaced first, to rush infantry reinforcements across to make up for the losses among the assault waves. *Ferries and barges would carry AT guns, tanks, artillery, and other support*. Casualties would beevacuated at the same time.Unless enemy resistance was light and disorganized, or they possessed inadequate mobile reserves, the assault force had to build up strength and resources before it could conduct a breakout. Even if unable to break out, such bridgeheads were often maintained to tie down enemy defenders while breakouts from other bridgeheads were launched. Additional pontoon bridges, ferry services, and boat relays would be established. More infantry and supporting weapons would be delivered, to include the forces designated for the breakout, along with more supplies and ammunition. The bridgehead might be physically enlarged during this phase.

*PHASE V - BREAKOUT *
Like the assault crossing itself, the breakout would commence with artillery and air support. The breakout would most likely be conducted by* fresh troops*, while the original assault troops held the bridgehead. Follow-on units and supply transport would be ready to exploit the breakout.

Apart from large river crossings small bands of troops could cross streams or rivers on rope bridges or by ,swimming,wading,fording.But these were for raiding,reconnaisance.As a bridgehead on the other hand couldn't be sustained with heavy reinforcements unable to be carried accross by such means.​
*NEXT : GERMAN PANZER DIVISIONS -GERMAN MOTORIZED INFANTRY(SCHUTZEN/PANZERGRENADIERS)*

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## LowPost

This doesn't seem to be the right topic to post this but I've got a film recommendation for you. I just watched 1944 today with English subs, an Estonian WWII film which came out this year and it deals with Estonians fighting in the Waffen-SS and their compatriots from the Red Army. It is set during the Battle of Tannenberg Line and the Battle of Tehumardi.

It is meant to be understood as an anti-war film because the Estonian people, being part a little country, were portrayed as victims of a conflict fought between two European major powers. At one point Estonians were killing each other and it also deals with the conflicting loyalties and opinions the individuals on whom the movie focuses have. There are Estonians who strongly believe in the Nazi racial ideology and carry out the Hitler salute without question and there are also Estonian Waffen-SS soldiers who apparently hate "the Reds" but they don't hold Hitler in high esteem and they even make fun of him. On the other hand we've got a Red Army officer who is undoubtedly to Stalin and loathes the "fascists", whilst his subordinates are unwilling to kill their Estonian brothers fighting for the other side.

Even with a low budget of €1.9 mln the producers have made the most of it. There are intense fighting scenes and much drama, so this is surely one of the best WWII films I've ever watched.


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## AUSTERLITZ

*THE PANZERWAFFE *




​*ORIGINS : DEVELOPMENT OF THE PANZER ARM*
*
INFLUENCE OF VON SEECKT -*
Germany, constrained by the terms of the *Versailles Treaty, was not allowed to produce tanks* of any kind and only a few armoured cars.However from early in the interwar period ,she sought to sidestep these limitations.German theorists had recognized their complete neglect of tanks in world war one as a cause of their defeat.The chief of the Reichsheer,*Von Seeckt* assessed the reasons for the defeat of the Schlieffen Plan and concluded that it failed for three main reasons: (1) the German *failure to interfere with French mobilization;* (2) their *failure to prevent French redeployment* after the initial German victories; and (3) the German failure to recognize the* limitations of foot-bound and horse-drawn armies for carrying out encirclement maneuvers*. Seeckt concluded that the German experience of the Great War proved that the regular army must meet three demands for the next one. First, it must attain a higher degree of mobility by making maximum use of motor transportation. Second, the logistical system must be strengthened, again by motorization. Finally,dependence on mass conscripted forces must be reduced in favour of a *more smaller,professional force capable of rapid mobile operations* to serve as a core around which conscription could increase numbers if necessary.According to his blueprint, the air force would give initialpriority to the destruction of the enemy’s air forces by surprise attack, followed by German aerial attacks against major enemy troop concentrations to disrupt the enemy’s mobilization. Then, the disorganized enemy would be attacked by rapidly moving forces, which would break through on narrow frontages and penetrate far into the enemy’s rear, causing further disorganization and,hopefully, a total collapse.





_Von Seeckt _​
Seeckt's vision changed the emphasis from mass to mobility (as discussed earlier too),seeking to return the manuever warfare espoused by moltke.The advance of firepower had proven in the first world war that mass attacks of the napoleonic style ,effective in the 19th century were no longer practical.The advantage had decisively turned to the defensive.*Nor could germany afford a war of attrition* against enemies with greater strategic resources over the long term as had been proven in the great war.Moreover the germany of the interwar period was far weaker than imperial germany.Thus* Seeckt's vision reflected the strategic reality for germany* where only a return to war of manuever could bring germany success.However there was little consensus on how this would be achieved,(except for the infantry arm which was being retrained wholly in the model of the infiltration tactics of late 1918.)Seeckt,himself a cavalry officer had been *greatly influenced by his successes in the eastern front where mobile warfare had prevailed(*unlike trench warfare in west) and cavalry had saw use.Thus despite his advanced ideas,even while he encouraged motorization,he firmly believed in the outmoded notion of the place of cavalry in future operations.(Thus in 1932 germany still had 18 cavalry regiments -15 ,000 out of 100,000 reichsheer) and by 1939 still 14.When war broke out they were finally divided amongst the various corps and divisions as recon units .)By the late 1920s the reichswehr was already experimenting with armour in secret.Dummy tanks were used for training at home.A *clandestine pact with the soviet union allowed for a tank school at kazan* where several german officers visited for observation.Amongst them later wehrmacht luminaries like Model,Blomberg,Von thoma and one Heinz Guderian.

_'' In Germany the elements of modern armoured warfare had already crystallized into a doctrine before the war—thanks mainly to the work of General Guderian—and had found practical expression in the organization and training of armoured formations.'' - Rommel's Diary
_


*
ROLE OF GUDERIAN :*
*Heinz Guderian* was to become one of the *main proponents* of the nascent panzer branch and one of its pioneers.Though his reputation as _'The Father of Blitzkrieg' _is partly to self-promotion after the war,he played a vital role in the development of the german panzerwaffe.Guderian served as a signals officer in WW1,and joined the motor transportation branch of the reichsheer in 1922.Here he soon became the outstanding advocate for formation of tank units and conversion of the motor transportation branch into an armed force.O*utspoken and difficult to work *with he made several enemies and faced entrenched opposition from conservative sections in the army,especially the cavalry arm which led to several transfers.*Guderian kept track of writings and developments on armor* in england and france and also visited the tank school in russia.Between 1930-39 Guderian would spearhead the development of german tank doctrine and organization.Being a signals officer he insisted on each german tank to be equipped with radio sets.His ideas on armoured warfare were fully explained in his work _Achtung Panzer!._It reviewed the state of armoured development in the European nations and Soviet Russia, and presented Guderian's theories on the effective use of armoured formations and combined-arms warfare ideas of other general staff officers. The book included the importance of airpower in support of the panzer units for future ground combat.*Germany's panzer forces were created largely along the lines laid down by Guderian* in_ Achtung - Panzer!_



*MECHANIZATION 1929-1935 :*
After Blomberg became chief of staff,the pace of mechanization was increased.From late 1929 the formation of the first motorcycle and mechanized reconaissance companies began.The first major step was in 1931 with the *creation of the post of Inspector of Motor Troops* -with *Oswald Lutz* as head and *Guderian as his chief of staff*.This year *German General Staff accepted a plan for two types of tank*, a medium tank with a 75 mm short barreled gun(Later Panzer 4) and a lighter vehicle with a 37 mm gun(later Panzer III).While german industry would need time and experience to build these machines,the German army used a variety of light tanks based on the British Carden Loyd tankette chassis. The early tanks were code-named _Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper_ (La S, "agricultural hauler").The Panzerkampfwagen I was the evolution of this light tankette design concealed under designation of tractor and became germany's first post-war tank.It was intended as a *stopgap training model* with just 2 men as crew,weighing 5.4 tonnes and armed with 2 machine guns and very thin armor.Under Lutz and Guderian the panzer branch was finally making headway,but complete panzer divisions were still some distance off due to* heavy opposition to such revolutionary concepts in the army*.



The decisive breakthrough came in early 1934 when Guderian was allowed to demonstrate the basic components of the panzer division he envisioned: motorcycle units, an anti-tank platoon, reconnaissance vehicles and a panzer platoon, equipped with experimental tanks*.Hitler was won over* -_ ''That is what i want,that is what i''l have''._With Hitler's support in 1935 the post of inspector of panzer troops was created and the* first 3 Panzer divisions formed.*The Panzerwaffe had been born.

*THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR INFLUENCES :*
The spanish civil war gave the germans the *chance to test the panzer in combat*.The experience showed the limitations of these light tanks ,especially compared to the soviet supplied republican tanks.However in spain the germans learned to employ their AA gun 8.8 cm in an anti-tank role aggressively,a trend that was to become a staple tactic.Both sides employed tanks in infantry support role.A few times radical attempts at employing the tank in the old 'cavalry charge' style met with disaster.The germans present on the ground recognized this,the british and french didn't.It was in 1936 that Achtung Panzer was published.Spain reinforced in guderian the *view that for tanks to be succesful they had to be supported by infantry and supporting arms*.Other lessons learnt in spain were -
_I._*Dive bombing to support mobile operations*,and thus the genesis of close support aircraft as _'Flying artillery'.
II._*Necessity of radios* for command and control in tanks.This was largely accomplished by guderian's insistence,being a former signals officer.This decision was to pay great dividends later.
_III._The *debate on the manner of use of armor was finally settle*d in the army manuevers of 1937.Here one army corps defending a sector was to be attacked by 2 ,each with 300 tanks.The tanks made a *massed frontal cavalry style *assault moving out of range of supporting infantry and artillery and were* decimated.*

The army chief,Ludwig beck was however concerned with the increased influence of the Panzer arm and had guderian 'promoted' to divisional commander of 2nd panzer division and thus away from his former post.Now the conservative elements each wanted a share of the motorization process,One tank brigade was set aside for Infantry support.3 'Light divisions' were created by converting cavalry divisions with mechanized elements and motorized infantry.The infantry took its share by forming 4 motorized infantry divisions.The artillery arm recieved mechanized anti-tank companies in the divisions.While some of these were sound measures,result was a* fragmentation of the motorization effort* which was already constrained by severe resource limitations.The fuel,manpower,maintainence cost for a mechanized infantry unit was largely the same as that of an armoured division ,but with lesser combat power.




*PANZER ARM 1938 CHANGES:*
Definitive changes came in 1938,when in the anschluss of austria though not a single shot was fired - Guderian commanding the 2nd panzer gained personal experience of the capabilities and the *shortcomings of these new formations.* His division was able to cover some 700km in just two days, but it lost many tanks on the march due to *mechanical breakdowns.*Scrutinizing this,new measures were* adopted for better maintainence and logistical procedures.*The bloodless takeover of czechslovakia a few months later proved the sound application of these measures.Czechoslovakia was a real coup for the german panzerwaffe in other ways.The Wehrmacht got its hands on *hundreds of Czech built light tanks and the world famous Skoda factories*.These tanks-much superior to the Pz I and Pz II were assimilated into german service as the Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t).They served as a enormous boost to the panzerwaffe's numerical strength and would form a* full quarter of german panzer strength* in the invasion of france Without czech tanks there would have been no 'blitzkrieg' in 1940.

1938 saw 2 other decisive changes.With Beck's resignation,Guderian was in december *appointed Inspector of Mobile troops*,answerable directly to the army chief and now the definitive influence on development of german panzer tactics and doctrine.
The second was the *formation of Motorized Corps Commands* - XVI armeekorps (responsible for 3 panzer divisions),XIV armeekorps(responsible for 4 motorized infantry divisions) and XV armeekorps(the 3 light divisions).All 3 corps commands were subordinated to Guderian in his new post.The consolidation of mechanized forces in unified commands* ensured they would not be parceled out piecemeal* and also they would recieve uniform doctrinal training.

*POLAND 1939 to MAY 1940 :*
By September 1939,when war began the Panzerwaffe had been *expanded from 3 to 6 panzer divisions*.Apart from 1-3 existing ones Numbers 4,5,10.Panzer Divisions had been formed.Made possible by ramping up of german tank production and the czech vehicles.1939 saw the beginning of the* mass production of the 2 iconic medium tanks* of the blitzkrieg years - *The Panzer III *and The* Panzer IV.*The Polish campaign didn't see the panzers employed in a concentrated manner,being dispersed under different commands.Panzers didn't form seperate panzerkorps but were paired with infantry divisions in corps and armies,where though intended as support forces they* ended up serving as spearheads -exceeding expectations*.The Polish campaign led to organizational changes in the structure of the divisions(next post) as well as revealing the ineffectiveness of the 'light divisions' *.4 of these were thus converted to panzer divisions*.By may 1940 thus the Wehrmacht possesed 10 Panzer divisions and 5 motorized infantry divisions which were to serve as the steel tip of the german lance .





(Panzers in Poland)

_''Smash with Fist,Don't feel with Fingers '' - Guderian_​*
DIFFERENCES WITH ALLIED INTERWAR DEVELOPMENT :
1.*Most other armies of the era organized their tanks into "tank brigades" requiring additional infantry and artillery support. *Panzer divisions had their own organic infantry and artillery support.* This led to a change in operational doctrine: instead of the tanks supporting operations by other arms, the tanks led operations, with other arms supporting them. Since the panzer divisions had the supporting arms included, they could *operate independently from other units.**

2.*French and british were earliest pioneers of armour,but they gradually let their lead dissolve in the 30s.The *british *experimented with an all-arms mechanised force but *disbanded it *after entrenched opposition from the higher echeleons of the army.The* USA never went beyond 2 small armoured regiments*,not even a brigade.The French formed the first unit similar to an armoured division -The_ Light Mechanized Division i_n 1934.(DLM)The* french produced large quantities of well armed and armoured tank*s.They outnumbered the germans in 1940 and were better quality.However the achilles heel was organization and doctrine.The *soviets emphasized armour development the most of all armies in the interwar period* spending enormous amounts and building up the world's largest tank fleet.Soviets focused on refining methods of mass production and reliable powerful tanks -these would be enormously helpful in their survival in WW2.Doctrinally 'the deep battle' advocated during 1930s was abandoned after the purges and much of the leadership lost.Organization and training however remained weak.

*3.*The main french problem despite possesing more and better tanks in 1940,was that while *germany concentrated all its tanks in 10 panzer divisions with uniform doctrine* -French tanks* were split up* into 3 Light mechanized Divisions,4 Armoured divisions,5 half mechanized cavalry divisions and no less than 38 independent tank battalions for infantry support.Moreover all *4 armoured divisions and 1 DLM were raised in 1940 with little time for training* as a panic move after the german success in poland.They would further erode the divisions they actually had by *dividing them piecemeal to 4 armies and the reserve.*





*(Panzer IV)*​
*4*.Finally for the allies there was a problem of doctrine.While the* Panzer division was designed for breakthrough and exploitation* -independent operations,the *Anglo-french armour forces were designed for infantry support *to break a 1918 style front.Motorization being an advantage in defence as a strategic reserve.Due to division of the tanks into seperate branches there was no uniformity of doctrine or training.

*5*.The *french tanks also lacked radio*s in general.Another design flaw was that the *commander was also the gunner *which reduced combat effectiveness,response time and rate of fire.Lacking recent experience of mobile operations prior to 1940 like the germans,the french armour would also face* logistical issues.*

In conclusion the *2 armies that focused most on development of the tank force were the 2 that were defeated in world war one - Russia and Germany*.Both started from scratch.In both cases dictators imposed their will to decisively speed up the process whereas the *victorious anglo-french sat on their laurels and stuck to what had worked.They felt no great incentive for radical changes,*nor could the conservative military opinion be overcome by the will of a dictator.Germans were determined not to repeat the trench warfare of 1914 -the tank offered a possible way out.(Though nobody dreamt of the magnitude of success they would achieve at that time)
*
NEXT: ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF PANZER DIVISIONS 1-10*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*PANZERWAFFE : PART II*




​*ORGANIZATION OF THE PANZER DIVISION 1940 :*

The panzer divisions of 1940 had* no uniform organization*.Indeed the whole situation was somewhat chaotic.The main reasons behind this were -
1.*Hasty raising of multiple divisions* in the last 2 years.
2.Experimentation on different types of organization structure.(no consensus yet)
3.Most of all* inability of german industry to produce enough tanks to standardize on equipment.*

Thus most divisions were a mix of* 6 types of tanks*,earlier light tankettes such as Panzer I and II,czech light tanks Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t) and the latest german designs Panzer III and Panzer IV.





Above : Symbols for Unit types(For reference)​Germany entered the French campaign in 1940 with *10 Panzer divisions*.Divisions 1-3 were the original ones raised in 1936.Numbers 4,5,10 were raised during 1938-1940 period.Numbers 6-9 were originally Light divisions,but after the failure of this experimental type in poland were converted to panzer divisions by adding a panzer regiment.These* 3 types had seperate organization structures* -however the basic layout (components) and lowl level unit organization within the division was consistent in keeping with the german army's einheit principle.




​_Panzer Divisions 1-3 : _Above is the Organization of the first 3 panzer divisions.Raised in 1936 these were the *senior armoured units *of the wehrmacht.The core components are -
>Panzer brigade(of 2 panzer regiments each with 2 battalions)
>Motorized Infantry Brigade(Schutzen later renamed Panzergrenadiers from 1942) with a Krdschutzen(Motorcycle)battalion and a Motorized Infantry regiment(with 3 battalions)
>Motorized Artillery Regiment(with 3 battalions)
>Tank Destroyer(Panzerjager) Battalion.
>Reconaissance Battalion(With armoured cars)
>Motorized Pioneer Battalion( Combat Enginners)
>Supply and Signal services plus Staff.




​_Panzer Divisions 4,5,10 _: The organization of the Panzer divisions 4,5 and 10.Identical to earlier organization except that it has *2 motorized infantry regiments each with 2 motorized infantry battalions.Motorcycle battalion removed*.This additional infantry made the ratio of panzer battalion: Mot.infantry battalion as 1:1,probably influenced by combat experience.





​_Panzer Divisions 6-9 :_ These divisions were *converted from the light divisions* and thus have different organization.Instead of 2 panzer regiments with 2 battlaions each,there is a *single panzer regiment with 3 panzer battalions.*The motorized component is identical to that of divisions 1 to 3.1 motorized infantry regiment with 3 battalions and motorcycle battalion.The ratio of mot infantry battalions to panzer battalions is kept 1:1.





​_The Command staff _was the *nerveous system of the Panzer division* and co-ordinated its actions with objectives set by high command.The operations officer was the key subordinate to the division commander and acted in many cases as co-commander.The *whole staff was mobile* on vehicles with a tank escort.Details of german staff system have been discussed earlier. - BATTLE REPORT #16 Fall Gelb:Blitzkrieg 1940 | Page 2





​Working Mechanism of a Panzer Division.The Reconaissance,Combat,Direct fire and indirect fire,support,supply and communications elements clearly depicted along with their relationship with the divisional staff(fuhrungs abteilung).Abteilung word means Battalion or Detatchment.





​Strength of The Panzer Divisions on the eve of the invasion.The Panzerwaffe* fielded 3505 panzers in 10 divisions*.Above is breakdown of the strengths of each division.Army Group A under Rundstedt was to carry out the main central thrust into france and was allocated 7 panzer divisions in 3 panzerkorps(Hoth,Guderian,Reinhardt).The feint attack in belgium and netherlands under Army Group B (Von bock)was to be spearheaded by 3 panzer divisions.Army Group C guarding the french opposite the maginot line had no panzer divisions and used in defensive role.Pz .Bef denotes command tanks.
In total *~500 Panzer I, 550+ Panzer II, 400 Panzer III, 300 Panzer IV, 350+ czech tanks plus command vehicles took part in the attack.*

*NEXT: COMPONENTS OF THE PANZER DIVISION IN DETAIL *

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## AUSTERLITZ

*PANZERWAFFE : PART III*




​*COMPONENTS OF A PANZER DIVISION :*

*(A) THE PANZER REGIMENT - *
The panzer regiment was basic armoured component of a panzer division.As we have seen last post *2 types of organization existed in 1940*.Panzer divisions 1,2,3,4,5 and 10 having* 2 Panzer regiments* brigaded together.Each of the panzer regiments having* 2 panzer battalions*. The 2nd type of organization in divisions 6-9(converted from light divisions) saw a *single panzer regiment but with 3 panzer battalions*.
*Above diagram shows a Panzer regiment with 2 panzer battalions*(which means it would have belonged to a pz div with 2 such regiments).Main Combat units of the regiment are the 2 Panzer battalions(Abteilung) each with their own staff.The regimental staff has a light panzer zug(platoon) as escort plus there are mobile supply and communications services.Nachr Zug means *communications platoon*.Le Colonne *Transport column* and Workstatt Kompanie represents *Mobile workshop for maintainence and repair *of vehicles.A panzer regiment with 3 battalions would have same basic layout except the increased battalion number.




​Above diagram is a graphic representation of a 2 battalion panzer regiment.The components described are depicted -equipment may vary in 1940 from regiment to regiment due to scarcity.The* basic tactical small-arms unit is the zug* or platoon of 5 tanks.Of the *2 panzer battalions each has 3 panzer kompanies.(2 light panzer and 1 medium panzer) *plus battalion staff ,staff escort detatchment and a light panzer platoon(zug).Regimental staff have their own command section and escort.The* Panzer kompanies themselves are divided into 4 platoons or zugs of 5 tanks each *plus 2 tanks of the kompanie troop.Basic regimental and battalion layout remained same from 1939-1943.




_*(i)* The Panzer Abteilung(Battalion) - _
The basic tactical unit is the panzer battalion.2 or 3 panzer battalions made up a panzer regiment in 1940.(From late 1941 germans standardized on 3 battalions in one regiment per panzer division,but in 1940 the 2 battalion regiment was majority).The *organization of panzer regiment may vary,but organization of panzer battalion is uniform in all divisions*.Above depicts the main components -
*2 Light Panzer Companies*(With a companie troop and 4 platoons or zugs)
*1 Medium Panzer companies*.(,, ,,)
*Battalion Staffel Tank* Detatchment
Staff Kompanie with Escort platoon,support elements(motorized pioneers,anti aircraft or flak platoon etc)
Transportation and supply Services.(Under Light Colonne)
​The main difference between light and medium panzer companies is light companies are armed with Panzer I,II,III and czech tanks.Medium companies have 1 platoon of light tanks(Panzer II) and 3 platoons of medium tanks (Panzer 4).




​Representation of a panzer abteilung.The medium company zugs often had 4 tanks.German basic panzer battalion organization throughout the earlywar years(1939-1942)remained at 2 light companies and 1 medium companies each of 4 zugs.From 1943 with light tanks obsolete ,standard 4 medium companies were employed ,each with 3 zugs.(Panzer 4 and Panther).Heavy tanks like Tiger were deployed in seperate Heavy Tank battalions allocated at army level to priority theatres from the GHQ pool.




*(B)THE SCHUTZEN/MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT :*
The Schutzen Regiment(Later renamed Panzergrenadiers) formed the* infantry component *of the panzer divisions.As seen earlier* 2 basic types of organizational structure* existed -
*1 motorized Infantry regiment with 3 battalions plus a Kradschutzen(Motorcycle) battalion brigaded together* in Panzer divisions 1,2,3,6,7,8,9.
*Alternatively*,In Pz divisions 4,5,10 there were* 2 Schutzen regiments each with 2 battalions each brigaded together.*Moorcycle battalion in this type was dropped.
Above diagram *depicts a 2-battalion schutzen regiment *.The basic support elements are an Infantry gun company(75mm or 150mm guns),a anti-tank or PAK kompanie(pak36 guns with mechanized tractors),a motorcycle platoon.The core element are 2 schutzen battalions.Normally each schutzen battalion would have 3 infantry(mot) companies each -here however in second battalion 1 companie seems to have been replaced by a motorcycle company.This is a ad-hoc measure unique to this regiment and not standrad organization which is 3 schutzen companies each battalion.The battalions also have a Machine gun company(Heavy machine guns and mortars for fire support).
*Motorized infantry were carried in trucks and lorries*,in 1940 a few motorized infantry regiments had converted 1 company in their battalions to halftracks making them true mechanized infantry,but *due to lack of halftracks* this would still be a distant process before barbarossa in 1941.




​Above is a *Schutzen regiment with 3 battalions.*Each battalion has 3 schutzen companies,an anti tank platoon(PAK),a machine gun company and a motorized pioneer platoon(motorized assault engineers).The regimental support is largely similar except the anti-tank company has been broken up and assigned to each of the battalions in 2nd type.There is also no motorcycle component because kradschutzen in this type were concentrated in a seperate kradschutzen battalion with which this 3-battalion regiment would be brigaded to form the Panzer division's schutzen brigade.

The *organization of the motorised infantry companies were identical to that of the normal infantry companies*.A _Schützenkompanie_ contained a command element (one officer, 12 men) and three Schützenzuge (rifle platoons).A _Schützenzug_ (one officer, 48 men), led by a Leutnant with a Feldwebel as his second in command, was made up of four ten-man Schützengruppen and a three-man section manning a 5cm GrW 36 mortar.However the *firepower of a motorised infantry battalion was much superior to a foot infantry* one.It had *normally 1.5 to 2 times the amounts of machine guns and mortars allocated to a foot infantry battalion* and was thus much more capable in both offensive and defensive action.In all a schutzen regiment mustered around* ~2400 (2 battalions) or ~3400(3 battalion) men.*
The wehrmacht eventually switched over to the 3-battalion model for its motorized infantry regiments from 1941 as it was more nimble.




_(b)Kradschutzen Battalion - _
The* Schutzen brigades with 3-battalion single schutzen regiments also had a motorcycle battalion of around 800-1000 men.*As we have seen these schutzen regiments didn't have smaler motorcycle companies or platoons in them(which is the case for 2 -battalion model with no kradschutzen battalion) and all motorcycle components were amlgamated into this kradschutzen battalion.The *speed and quick redeployment capability made it the natural spearhead of the Schutzen Brigade, and it was often used in offensive reconnaissance missions.*
Above depicts a kradschutzen battalion organization in 1939 and changes in 1940 with motorcycle companie reduced.It had a machine gun and schwere(heavy) weapons company.The unit was mobile and very well armed.
22 light and 14 heavy MGs, 7 light (50mm) and 6 heavy (81mm) mortars, three 37mm PAK 35/36 AT and 2 light InfanterieGeschutz 75mm guns for 1940 organization.
*Kradschutzen battalions didn't exist in Pz divisions 4,5,10.*




*NEXT : CONTINUED COMPONENTS - pz div artillery and support*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*PANZERWAFFE : PART IV*




​*COMPONENTS OF A PANZER DIVISION (CONTINUED) - *

*(C)AUFKLARUNGS ABTEILUNG: RECONAISSANCE BATTALION)*
This *divisional level support element was of uniform organization and present in all 10 panzer divisions*.It represented the* 'eyes and ears' of a panzer division*,often operating 24 hrs ahead of the main body.The Aufklarungs Abteilung's overall strength layat 753 (26 officers, 4 Beamte, 116 NCOs and 607 other ranks) and its weaponsinventory comprised 427 rifles, 16 light and 2 heavy MGs, 3 light mortars, three 37mm AT guns and two 75 mm light Infanterie Geschiitz.
The mortars,HMG,Anti-tank and Infantry guns were part of the Schwere Company(Heavy weapons Co.).There was the motorcycle battalion.But the *main core of the force was in the 2 Panzerspah(Armoured car) Companies.*
Each of these had a a section of command cars,1 zug of heavy armoured cars and 2 zugs of light armoured cars.
Overall Aufklarungs Abteilung was equipped with 60 armoured cars, 119 motorcycles, 34 staff cars and 68 lorries.




​*(D)DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY REGIMENT :*
The artillery regiment formed the crucial* fire support element* of the division.The regiment had originally 2 battalions.
Every battalion had its own staff and a calibration detachment, as well as three four-gun batteries, giving a total of
24 guns per regiment.(105 mm leFH18)However *after the Polish campaign,a 3rd heavy artillery battalion was added *to all divisions with identical organization to the light artillery battalions(12 guns in 3 batteries).It employed usually 150 mm sFH18 guns.Thus *regiment in total mustered 36 guns.*




*These guns were towed pieces on motorized tractors for mobility.*They were not self-propeled artillery pieces on tracked chassis.In 1940 germany deployed its first Self-propelled artillery piece(Sturmpanzer I Bison) mounting the 150 mm infantry gun barrell on a panzer I chassis.36 were available for the campaign in france.Six of the Panzer divisions recieved one company of six guns each from the GHQ pool sperate from their divisional artillery component.​


*(E)PANZERJAEGER ABTEILUNG: ANTI-TANK BATTALION)*
The divisional anti-tank component.*3 companies each with* *12 pak 36 guns*(with motorized tractors) plus a mg company for defence.The Pak 36 was to prove insufficient in france and then russia.The wehrmacht did possess about a 100 tracked self-propelled tank destroyers(47 mm czech gun mounted on panzer I chassis)but they served in independent tank destroyers battalions allocatted by GHQ pool.Only from 1942 would the panzerjager abteilung of the panzer divisions get true tracked tank destroyers like marder and jagdpanzers.




​*(F)ARMOURED PIONEER BATTALION :*
The divisional Pioneer battalion was a vital component -*containing both sappers and assault engineers.*Strength was ~800.By May 1940 all the Panzer Divisions' Panzer Pionier Bataillon had their *usual three companies, one of which was now fully armoured *and equipped with six MTW SdKfz 251/5 (a modified version of the SdKfz 251 which carried only eight men instead of ten, the extra space being used to carry engineer equipment), five PzKpfw I'Ladungsleger' (demolition charge layers) modified to carry demolition charges, and four 'Bruckenleger' (bridge layers), which comprised PzKpfw II or IV tanks with their turrets removed and their hulls equipped as bridge layers. All the Panzer Pionier Bataillone also had a Bruko B column.





(Sturmpioneers with flamethrower)​
*NEXT : EQUIPMENT OF THE PANZER DIVISIONS -THE TANKS,ARMOURED CARS,GUNS ETC.*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*THE EQUIPMENT OF THE PANZER DIVISIONS *​



_Panzerkampfwagen I : _
Originally designed as a *stopgap training tank*,this light tankette entered production in 1934 and production had already ceased in 1937.By 1940 it was clearly obsolete,but due to numbers as manyas 500 participated in Fall Gelb.Many were used in barbarossa as well.They saw heavy service in the spanish civil war and poland where their armour proved insufficient against any determined resistance.Total *1493 were produced* from 1934-37.
It weighed just *5.4 tonnes and was armed with 2 machine guns*.Armor was a mere* 7-13 mm*.Only enough to withstand small arms fire.It was vulnerable to 20 mm cannons,anti-tank rifles,anti-tank guns and even 12.7 mm HMG(from rear).
Its advantages were *very simple production and maintainence,high speed(50kmph) and great range(200 km)*.
These panzers were increasingly used as reconaissance and escort tanks.The chassis was also used to mount improvised anti-tank guns and artillery in earlier self-propelled pieces(_Panzerjager I & Sturmpanzer I)_



_
Panzerkampfwagen II : _
Another* stopgap vehicle*,built as an upgrade to the Panzer I after the experience of the spanish war showed need for shell proof armour.It had *14 mm fontal armour*(later reinforced with spaced armour in many cases) -still largely helpless against anti-tank guns.Weighed *9 tonnes with a 3 man-crew*.Armament was a* machine gun and a 20 mm autocannon* allowing it to engage lightly armoured targets.Like its predecessor had excellent mobility(40kmph) and range(200 km).*Over 500 *took part in the invasion of france by which time it was* already obsolescent *,making it the most numerous german tank.Variants continued to serve until 1943 when production had ceased.From late 1941 it was *employed as a reconaissance tank*.Panzer IIs served in the liechte kompanies,the escort platoons as well as light platoons of medium companies in a panzer battalion*.Nearly 1900 were built *over the course of the war,the chassis serving as platform for self-propelled variants like _Marder II Tank destroyer_ & _Wespe SPG_ once the tank itself became obsolete.




_Panzerkampfwagen 35(t) :_
Originally *czech built light tanks* from the famous skoda factories.The *wehrmacht acquired* 244 of these in the takeover of czechslovakia and pressed it into service.They *added radios and increased the crew to 4 from 3*(reducing load on commander who had to previously load and fire as well as command).These 10.5 tonne machines were capable vehicles in 1940 with *25 mm riveted armour ,good speed(34 kmph) and satisfactory range(120km)*.The main bonus except the added armour was in armament-
A 37 mm cannon - Penetration of plate inclined at 30° from the vertical _37 millimetres (1.5 in) thick at 100 metres (110 yd), 31 millimetres (1.2 in) thick at 500 metres (550 yd), 26 millimetres (1.0 in) thick at 1,000 metres (1,100 yd), and 22 millimetres (0.87 in) thick at 1,500 metres (1,600 yd)_
And 2 x 7.92 mm machine guns.

The vehicle served well in france and in the early stages of barbarossa.By 1942 however most had been transfered to the axis allies such as romania,slovakia,hungary.




_Panzerkampfwagen 38(t) :_
*Another Czech light tank design*,this was a superior design to the 35(t).Originally developed by a emigre russian engineer in czechslovakia for the shah of persia it gained export successes and was after the takeover of czechslovakia introduced to german service.It had riveted armour of upto *25 mm*(later after french campaign further bolt-on ramour added for 40-50mm protection).Weighing around *10 tonnes* it had excellent speed(42kmph) and range(250km).The germans added radios to the* 4-man crew.*
Armament was* 2 x7.92 mm machine guns and a czech 37 mm cannon*.The cannon had superior performance to the wehrmacht's pak36 anti tank gun.-_40 mm at 100 yds,35 mm at 500 yds,29 mm at 1000 yds and 24 mm at 1500 yds.
_
While this was an improvement over the earlier designs,the tank still depended largely on its mobility.
The pz 38t performed well in 1940 where notably it formed the *bulk of Rommel's 7th Panzer 'Ghost' division*.Production continued in czech factories until 1942.After that* remaining vehicles were transfered to axis allies or relegated to training and anti-partisan duty.*The chassis was popular as platform for assault guns and tank destroyers like the _Hetzer Tank Destroyer _and the_ Flakpanzer 38._




​_Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf E/F :_
The wehrmacht envisaged* 2 types of tanks* as the core of the panzer arm - *One for direct combat against other tanks and other armoured vehicles, requiring the tank to fire armour piercing (AP) shells.The second use was protecting other tanks against anti-tank guns and infantry, firing high explosive shells at such soft targets.*The Panzer III was built to be the main tank of the first type ,while the short barrelled Panzer 4 was to be the infantry support tank.They were to be paired together in the panzer divisions(ideally 2 light companies of Panzer IIIs and 1 medium company of Panzer IV per battalion).*Designed By Daimler-Benz* during 1935-37 the tank entered production in 1939 and continued till 1943.Around *400 were available* for the battle of france -with Ausf E and Ausf F being the main production variants. *5800 Panzer IIIs were produced throughout the war.*
A distinct feature of the Panzer III, influenced byBritish Vickers tanks (1924), was the* three-man turret*. This meant that the commander was not distracted with another role in the tank (e.g. as gunner or loader) and could fully concentrate on maintaining awareness of the situation and directing the tank. *Most tanks of the time did not have this capability*, providing the Panzer III with a combat advantage versus such tanks.Not only all the further German tank designs inherited it, but also, later into the war, most Allied tank designs either quickly switched to the three-man turret.
_Weight : 20 Tonnes Speed :40kmph Range :165 kms. Armour : 30 mm 
Armament: 37 mm Cannon plus 3x 7.92mm MG34 machine guns._

The *armour was later increased* to 50 mm from Model Ausf J (1941 onwards) and finally to 70mm by addition of applique armour in Ausf M(1942).However these were not available in 1940.




The main gun of Ausf F was the same as in the Pak36 Anti-tank gun with penetration -_34mm at 100 yds,29mm at 500 yds,22mm at 1000 yds and 20mm at 1500 yds._Sufficient for light tanks this proved incapable of piercing heavy french somua and Char-B.

Even at the beginning of the french campaign,*new late model ausf F were being fitted with a new 50 mm L/42 cannon*.(though almost none took part in france).Hitler instructed after the french campaign the installation of a *high-velocity 50mm L/60 cannon*,though this was not present in quantity during barbarossa leading to a crisis versus the soviet armour.From Ausf J the L/60 was fitted as standard and early models upgunned which restored some balance in the east,while in the north african desert gave Rommel's Afrika Korps a short lived period of edge in armament over british tanks .While the mainstay of the panzer divisions during 1940-42 its *turret ring couldn't accomodate heavier anti-tank guns above 50mm calibre* needed to defeat newer enemy tanks,but the panzer 4 could.Thus the panzer 4 was upgunned and became the main medium tanks and panzer III rendered to support with production ending in 1943.After the heavy losses in stalingrad and kursk surviving tanks were* relegated to support role from late 1943.*The most famous variant was the infantry support/tank destroyer turretless_ Sturmgeschutz StuG III _assault gun- the most succesful self-propelled piece of the war built on its chassis.The Panzer III remains a *quintiessential tank of the Blitzkrieg.*




_Panzerkampfwagen IV - _
The *sturdy workhorse of the panzer divisions*,and the only panzer to remain in constant production throughout the war the Panzer 4 is THE Panzer of World War II.Designed by* Krupp*,between 1937 - 1945 nearly* 8600 tanks were built *making it the most mass-produced tank of the wehrmacht.*Remarkably versatile and reliable* it evolved from an infantry support tank with short barrel gun to the main medium tank of the wehrmacht with a high velocity cannon.In 1940 the Infantry support variant was present.*~300 Panzer IVs of this type were available for the french campaign*-all concentrated in the Medium companies of the Panzer abteilungs(battalion).The main production variants in france were Ausf C and Ausf D.The specifications are given in above diagram.Armor in these early models was only 30 mm.The* HE 75 mm cannon was not meant for anti-tank duty* but was nonetheless capable of *penetrating 43 mm armor at 700 yds* when firing anti-armour ammunition.It had a 5 man crew.




The shock of the soviet t-34 led to crash programmes,leading to *upgunning Of the Panzer IV Ausf F2 with a high velocity 75 mm gun from 1942 *and on all later versions.This reversed its roles vis a vis the Panzer III.From 1943 Up-gunned Panzer IV and Panther became the 2 main medium tanks.It *served till the end of the war *and remained in production.Its a*rmour was gradually increased* from 30mm to 50mm and finally to 80mm with spaced armour and side Skirts.Measured over the entire war it comprised 30% of the Wehrmacht's total tank strength.The chassis was used for some notable variants like the_ Wirbelwind Flakpanzer_,_Brumbarr ,JagdpanzerIV_ Tank destroyer and the _Sturmgeshcutz IV (StugIV)_ assault gun.

*NEXT: OTHER EQUIPMENT - PANZER TACTICS*

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## Blue Marlin

AUSTERLITZ said:


> *THE EQUIPMENT OF THE PANZER DIVISIONS *​
> 
> 
> 
> _Panzerkampfwagen I : _
> Originally designed as a *stopgap training tank*,this light tankette entered production in 1934 and production had already ceased in 1937.By 1940 it was clearly obsolete,but due to numbers as manyas 500 participated in Fall Gelb.Many were used in barbarossa as well.They saw heavy service in the spanish civil war and poland where their armour proved insufficient against any determined resistance.Total *1493 were produced* from 1934-37.
> It weighed just *5.4 tonnes and was armed with 2 machine guns*.Armor was a mere* 7-13 mm*.Only enough to withstand small arms fire.It was vulnerable to 20 mm cannons,anti-tank rifles,anti-tank guns and even 12.7 mm HMG(from rear).
> Its advantages were *very simple production and maintainence,high speed(50kmph) and great range(200 km)*.
> These panzers were increasingly used as reconaissance and escort tanks.The chassis was also used to mount improvised anti-tank guns and artillery in earlier self-propelled pieces(_Panzerjager I & Sturmpanzer I)_
> 
> 
> 
> _
> Panzerkampfwagen II : _
> Another* stopgap vehicle*,built as an upgrade to the Panzer I after the experience of the spanish war showed need for shell proof armour.It had *14 mm fontal armour*(later reinforced with spaced armour in many cases) -still largely helpless against anti-tank guns.Weighed *9 tonnes with a 3 man-crew*.Armament was a* machine gun and a 20 mm autocannon* allowing it to engage lightly armoured targets.Like its predecessor had excellent mobility(40kmph) and range(200 km).*Over 500 *took part in the invasion of france by which time it was* already obsolescent *,making it the most numerous german tank.Variants continued to serve until 1943 when production had ceased.From late 1941 it was *employed as a reconaissance tank*.Panzer IIs served in the liechte kompanies,the escort platoons as well as light platoons of medium companies in a panzer battalion*.Nearly 1900 were built *over the course of the war,the chassis serving as platform for self-propelled variants like _Marder II Tank destroyer_ & _Wespe SPG_ once the tank itself became obsolete.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _Panzerkampfwagen 35(t) :_
> Originally *czech built light tanks* from the famous skoda factories.The *wehrmacht acquired* 244 of these in the takeover of czechslovakia and pressed it into service.They *added radios and increased the crew to 4 from 3*(reducing load on commander who had to previously load and fire as well as command).These 10.5 tonne machines were capable vehicles in 1940 with *25 mm riveted armour ,good speed(34 kmph) and satisfactory range(120km)*.The main bonus except the added armour was in armament-
> A 37 mm cannon - Penetration of plate inclined at 30° from the vertical _37 millimetres (1.5 in) thick at 100 metres (110 yd), 31 millimetres (1.2 in) thick at 500 metres (550 yd), 26 millimetres (1.0 in) thick at 1,000 metres (1,100 yd), and 22 millimetres (0.87 in) thick at 1,500 metres (1,600 yd)_
> And 2 x 7.92 mm machine guns.
> 
> The vehicle served well in france and in the early stages of barbarossa.By 1942 however most had been transfered to the axis allies such as romania,slovakia,hungary.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _Panzerkampfwagen 38(t) :_
> *Another Czech light tank design*,this was a superior design to the 35(t).Originally developed by a emigre russian engineer in czechslovakia for the shah of persia it gained export successes and was after the takeover of czechslovakia introduced to german service.It had riveted armour of upto *25 mm*(later after french campaign further bolt-on ramour added for 40-50mm protection).Weighing around *10 tonnes* it had excellent speed(42kmph) and range(250km).The germans added radios to the* 4-man crew.*
> Armament was* 2 x7.92 mm machine guns and a czech 37 mm cannon*.The cannon had superior performance to the wehrmacht's pak36 anti tank gun.-_40 mm at 100 yds,35 mm at 500 yds,29 mm at 1000 yds and 24 mm at 1500 yds.
> _
> While this was an improvement over the earlier designs,the tank still depended largely on its mobility.
> The pz 38t performed well in 1940 where notably it formed the *bulk of Rommel's 7th Panzer 'Ghost' division*.Production continued in czech factories until 1942.After that* remaining vehicles were transfered to axis allies or relegated to training and anti-partisan duty.*The chassis was popular as platform for assault guns and tank destroyers like the _Hetzer Tank Destroyer _and the_ Flakpanzer 38._
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ​_Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf E/F :_
> The wehrmacht envisaged* 2 types of tanks* as the core of the panzer arm - *One for direct combat against other tanks and other armoured vehicles, requiring the tank to fire armour piercing (AP) shells.The second use was protecting other tanks against anti-tank guns and infantry, firing high explosive shells at such soft targets.*The Panzer III was built to be the main tank of the first type ,while the short barrelled Panzer 4 was to be the infantry support tank.They were to be paired together in the panzer divisions(ideally 2 light companies of Panzer IIIs and 1 medium company of Panzer IV per battalion).*Designed By Daimler-Benz* during 1935-37 the tank entered production in 1939 and continued till 1943.Around *400 were available* for the battle of france -with Ausf E and Ausf F being the main production variants. *5800 Panzer IIIs were produced throughout the war.*
> A distinct feature of the Panzer III, influenced byBritish Vickers tanks (1924), was the* three-man turret*. This meant that the commander was not distracted with another role in the tank (e.g. as gunner or loader) and could fully concentrate on maintaining awareness of the situation and directing the tank. *Most tanks of the time did not have this capability*, providing the Panzer III with a combat advantage versus such tanks.Not only all the further German tank designs inherited it, but also, later into the war, most Allied tank designs either quickly switched to the three-man turret.
> _Weight : 20 Tonnes Speed :40kmph Range :165 kms. Armour : 30 mm
> Armament: 37 mm Cannon plus 3x 7.92mm MG34 machine guns._
> 
> The *armour was later increased* to 50 mm from Model Ausf J (1941 onwards) and finally to 70mm by addition of applique armour in Ausf M(1942).However these were not available in 1940.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The main gun of Ausf F was the same as in the Pak36 Anti-tank gun with penetration -_34mm at 100 yds,29mm at 500 yds,22mm at 1000 yds and 20mm at 1500 yds._Sufficient for light tanks this proved incapable of piercing heavy french somua and Char-B.
> 
> Even at the beginning of the french campaign,*new late model ausf F were being fitted with a new 50 mm L/42 cannon*.(though almost none took part in france).Hitler instructed after the french campaign the installation of a *high-velocity 50mm L/60 cannon*,though this was not present in quantity during barbarossa leading to a crisis versus the soviet armour.From Ausf J the L/60 was fitted as standard and early models upgunned which restored some balance in the east,while in the north african desert gave Rommel's Afrika Korps a short lived period of edge in armament over british tanks .While the mainstay of the panzer divisions during 1940-42 its *turret ring couldn't accomodate heavier anti-tank guns above 50mm calibre* needed to defeat newer enemy tanks,but the panzer 4 could.Thus the panzer 4 was upgunned and became the main medium tanks and panzer III rendered to support with production ending in 1943.After the heavy losses in stalingrad and kursk surviving tanks were* relegated to support role from late 1943.*The most famous variant was the infantry support/tank destroyer turretless_ Sturmgeschutz StuG III _assault gun- the most succesful self-propelled piece of the war built on its chassis.The Panzer III remains a *quintiessential tank of the Blitzkrieg.*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _Panzerkampfwagen IV - _
> The *sturdy workhorse of the panzer divisions*,and the only panzer to remain in constant production throughout the war the Panzer 4 is THE Panzer of World War II.Designed by* Krupp*,between 1937 - 1945 nearly* 8600 tanks were built *making it the most mass-produced tank of the wehrmacht.*Remarkably versatile and reliable* it evolved from an infantry support tank with short barrel gun to the main medium tank of the wehrmacht with a high velocity cannon.In 1940 the Infantry support variant was present.*~300 Panzer IVs of this type were available for the french campaign*-all concentrated in the Medium companies of the Panzer abteilungs(battalion).The main production variants in france were Ausf C and Ausf D.The specifications are given in above diagram.Armor in these early models was only 30 mm.The* HE 75 mm cannon was not meant for anti-tank duty* but was nonetheless capable of *penetrating 43 mm armor at 700 yds* when firing anti-armour ammunition.It had a 5 man crew.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The shock of the soviet t-34 led to crash programmes,leading to *upgunning Of the Panzer IV Ausf F2 with a high velocity 75 mm gun from 1942 *and on all later versions.This reversed its roles vis a vis the Panzer III.From 1943 Up-gunned Panzer IV and Panther became the 2 main medium tanks.It *served till the end of the war *and remained in production.Its a*rmour was gradually increased* from 30mm to 50mm and finally to 80mm with spaced armour and side Skirts.Measured over the entire war it comprised 30% of the Wehrmacht's total tank strength.The chassis was used for some notable variants like the_ Wirbelwind Flakpanzer_,_Brumbarr ,JagdpanzerIV_ Tank destroyer and the _Sturmgeshcutz IV (StugIV)_ assault gun.
> 
> *NEXT: OTHER EQUIPMENT - PANZER TACTICS*


hi did you write all this, or are you getting this from journals?


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## AUSTERLITZ

Blue Marlin said:


> hi did you write all this, or are you getting this from journals?



I write everything in my own way.I get the info from net sources and military books.Then make a gist.Its no biggie because this is exactly what i have to do in my history majors ,to answer questions consult several sources then amalgamate.

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## Blue Marlin

AUSTERLITZ said:


> I write everything in my own way.I get the info from net sources and military books.Then make a gist.Its no biggie because this is exactly what i have to do in my history majors ,to answer questions consult several sources then amalgamate.


love your work man, keep it up.

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## asad71

@
*AUSTERLITZ*

Very impressive collection / collation. Keep it up.

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## AUSTERLITZ

*EQUIPMENT OF THE PANZER DIVISIONS - II *





​
_Sdkfz 251 Halftrack - _
While trucks could carry infantry quickly into the battlefield,they were not armoured and very vulnerable to enemy action which forced the infantry to dismount quite a bit to the rear.The halftrack was a hybrid ,*regular wheels at the front for steering and tracks at the back* to propel the vehicle and carry most of the load. The purpose of this combination is to produce a* vehicle with the cross country capabilities of a tank and the handling of a wheeled vehicle*.The main disadvantage is the increased maintenance to maintain track tension, and the reduced life span of tracks (up to 10,000 km) compared to tires (up to 80,000 km).The initial idea was for a vehicle that could be used to* transport a single squad of infantry to the battlefield protected from enemy arms fire, and with protection from artillery fire fragments and shrapnel*.In addition, the standard mounting of at least o*ne MG34(later mg42) allowed the vehicle to provide fire support for the infantry squad *once they had disembarked in battle.Halftracks gave the wehrmacht true mechanized infantry -halftracks were used as armoured troop carriers as well as support combat platforms,and as tractors for towing heavy vehicles and guns.

_Weight -7.8 tonnes Designer - Hanomag Armament -2 machine guns or variants_
_Speed -52 kmph   Range -300kmph_
_Crew - 2 + 10 infantry Armour - 6-15mm_




The 251 halftrack was germany's *standard infantry halftrack* throughout the war.Capable of carrying a *full 10 man squad fully protected from enemy small arms fire* it was perfect for supporting the advance of tanks.Highly reliable,it remained in production from 1939-45 with excelelnt cross-country ability.More than *15,000 were built*.In *1940 however only one company of the motorized infantry battalions(of the motorized infantry regiment/s of the panzer division) generally were equipped with halftracks due to production shortage*.

The basic design was used for as many as *22 variants as the war progressed*.Notable amongst these are -
The_ Walking stuka(Stuka Zu Fuss)_ mounting 6 rocket tubes on the sides -an artillery platform
The_ Flammenpanzerwagen 251/16_ with 2 flamethrowers on the sides
The _Stummel 251/9_ with mounted 75 mm infantry gun howitzer
Several anti-tank gun mounted versions -Mounting Pak36,pak40 etc.
Mortar halftrack version,Command hafltrack version etc.

*Positive aspects of the open top* included greater situational awareness and faster egress by the infantry, as well as the ability to throw grenades and fire over the top of the fighting compartment as necessary while remaining under good horizontal cover.The *downside was a major vulnerability to all types of plunging fire*,this included from mortars and field artillery as well as depressed-trajectory small arms fire from higher elevated positions, lobbed grenades or molotov cocktails and strafing by enemy aircraft.




_Sdkfz 231/232 Heavy Armoured Car - _
In the German Army, *armoured cars were intended for the traditional cavalry missions of reconaissance and screening *They* scouted ahead and to the flank of advancing mechanized units to assess enemy location, strength and intention*. Their primary role was to observe and assess, rather than engage in extended fire fights, but they would *engage enemy reconnaissance elements,probedefences and at times attempt to capture enemy patrols.* Armoured Cars were concentrated in the *Divisional reconaissance battalion *attatched to every panzer division(usually with upto 60 armoured cars).The battalion had 2 companies of armoured cars -and company had 2 zugs(platoons) of light armoured cars and 1 zug of heavy armoured car plus the kompanie trupp.In effect there were around 12 heavy armoured cars in the 1940 panzer division.

_Weight -8.3 tonnes Designer - Bussing-NAG Armament - 20mm autocannon + 1x 7.92 mm Mg34_
_Speed -85 kmph   Range - 300kmph  Ammunition - 180 x 20mm, 2100 x 7.92mm rounds_
_Crew - 4 Armour - 8-15mm_

The _Sdkfz-231 _series of heavy armoured cars entered service back in 1932,but the 6 wheelers were deemed to have insufficient cross-country performance and replaced from 1937 by the *standard 8 -wheeled version*.This became the basis of all german hevay armoured cars.during the war.The 20 mm cannon was not designed to defeat enemy tanks,Using high explosive ammunition, the* 20 mm autocannon was highly effective against infantry and unarmoured vehicles*.The role intended was for the car's armour to protect the crew from small arms fire during reconnaissance missions.During the early war in the western campaigns and africa the wehrmacht made excellent use of such light vehicles.The _Sdkfz 232 w_as a modified variant.The 232 carried a Fu.Ger.11 SE 100 medium range and a Fu.Spr.Ger.A short range radio and was often used by the kompanie trupp.Late war these 2 types were gradually being replaced the 234 series 'Puma' heavy armoured cars.




​_Sdkfz 221/222/223 Light Armoured Car - _
The light armoured car of the reconaissance battalions,this series of *4-wheeled vehicles *were produced from 1935-44 with* total production exceeding 2400 units* of all types.The 222 was the most produced type with~1000 built.
The _Sdkfz. 221 _was armed with a single Mg34,manned by a two man crew, and had 4-wheel drive.
Sdkfz 222 was *armed with a 20mm autocannon and a 7.92 mm Mg34.* The crew was increased to three by the addition of_ a gunner, relieving the commander of that task.(In picture above).
Sdkfz223 _armoured car with similar features to the Sd. Kfz. 221, but with the addition of a raisable frame antenna and a 30-watt FuG 10 medium-range radio set. Later versions of the vehicle were equipped with an improved 80-watt FuG 12 radio set. Mg34 only armamenr,crew increase dto 3 buy addition of radio operator.

_Weight -4.8 tonnes Designer - Eisenwork Armament - 20mm autocannon + 1x 7.92 mm Mg34_
_Speed -70 kmph   Range - 200kmph Ammunition - 180 x 20mm, 1050 x 7.92mm rounds_
_Crew - 3 Armour - 8-15mm_

Front and sides were made of 8 mm thinner 5 mm (0.2 in) plates protected the top, rear, and bottom. Cast vision ports later replaced ports cut into the armour. The* open-topped turret was fitted with wire mesh anti-grenade screens. *Beginning in 1939, the front armour was increased to 14.5 mm (0.6 in). In 1942, the Ausf. B chassis was introduced; this had 30 mm of frontal armour, as well as a more powerful engine.this class of vehicle was hampered by its* relatively poor off-road performance*. In those theaters, it gradually found itself replaced in the reconnaissance role by later model halftracks.




​_BMW R12 & R75 Motorcycles - _
The Kradschutzen troops were equipped on motorcycles -with a* sidecar and a mg34*,both manufactured by BMW.The mission of these type of units was, to* surprise and outflank the enemy far ahead of own forces*, using superiority in movement and speed.
Motorcycle infantry units are especially capable of performing the following tasks:
> *Fast taking of important areas*,
> Securing of narrow terrain features,
> Fighting against weak enemy forces,
> Surprising attack against enemy flank and rear,
> Pursuit, securing and covering own movements of motorized forces."
*Mainly organized within the kradschutzen battalions ,or by companies within the motorized regiment*.The divisional reconaissance battalion also had a kradschutzen detatchement.Produced until 1944 when over *20,000* had been produced.Superb speed(95kmph),cheap cost and maintainence,low fuel consumption and high mobility made them good reconaissance units.The panzers were always proceeded by the arrival of these troops,and they remain *iconic of the blitzkrieg era.*




​_Sdkfz 7/8/9/10/11 Halftracks -_
These halftracks were the *motorized skeleton of the panzer divisions.Each division required hundreds of these to operate* and thousands were produced.
_Sdkfz 7 -_ 11.5 tonne vehicle with 1 crew and 11 passengers.Used as* tractor for 88 mm Flak gun or 150 mm heavy howitzer.Secondary role troop transport and armoured recovery vehicle*.Also employed as platform for AA light flak gun in variants.*12,000 built* from 1938-44.
_Sdkfz 8_ - 14.7 heavy prime mover.Used for* towing large artillery pieces *150mm or 210 mm.*4000 built.*
_Sdkfz 9_ - 18 tonne heavy mover.Used for towing* heavy artillery* early war,240mm pieces and as *armoured recovery vehicle* for tiger and panther later.*2500 built.*
_Sdkfz 10_ - 4.9 tonne light halftrack Its main role was as a *mover for small towed guns* such as the 2cm Flak, the 75mm infantry gun, or the 37mm pak36 anti-tank gun. It could carry eight troops in addition to towing a gun or trailer.*14,000 built.*
_Sdkfz 11_ - 7.2 tonne *medium halftrack for medium towed guns* ranging from the 37 mm flak up to the 105mm Lefh18 field howitzer. It could carry eight troops in addition to towing a gun or trailer*.9000 produced*.

These* large varieties* of Towing halftracks while individually reliable and effective machines often* overlap in roles,*are *symptomatic of the lack of german mass production strategy* or attempts at standardizing on types that would hamper its prospects in what would be an industrial war.




​_Opel Blitz Truck - _
The* real backbone of german mechanized strength* the opel 3-tonne utility truck was employed as the* main troop carrier for the motorized infantry(due to lack of halftracks),main cargo and supplies truck to maintain mobility of operations*.However thousands of other trucks were also pressed into service ,especially after the french campaign when french trucks/lorries confiscated in thousands aided the formation of new panzer divisions for the invasion of russia.Opel remained the dominant type throughout the war,serving on all fronts*.130,000 were built.*






​_2 cm Flak 30/38 - _
Panzer divisions also* had a small anti-aircraft section of light anti-aircraft flak guns -the flak30/38 of 20 mm calibre *which was also very effective against infantry and light armoured targets.The original flak30 had low rate of fire which was rectified in the flak38.with 280–450 rpm (cyclic) &120–180 rpm (practical).Range was 2200 metres.An ingenious variation was mounting of 4 flak38 barrels together for the_ Flakverling 38 quadruple mount._*144,000 flak 30/38 were produced*.They served the army units,the luftwaffe defence units,the kreigsmaine.The heavier 37mm ,88mm and 105 mm flak guns were operated exclusively by Luftwaffe.They were very* often used in anti-infantry role,*particualrly in the eastern front against soviet human wave attacks.

_Infantry weapons & Artillery_ - BATTLE REPORT #16 Fall Gelb:Blitzkrieg 1940 | Page 3
*Page 3 and 4 of this thread describe in detail weapons used by german infantry*.Same weapons employed by motorized infantry.They also used same infantry guns and anti-tank guns.The divisional anti-tank battalion at this stage also used pak36 gusn described in pg4.The *artillery weapons of the panzer divisions (non-infantry guns) will be described later under german artillery section.*

*NEXT : PANZER CREWMAN: PANZER SMALL UNIT TACTICS: PANZERGRENADIER SMALL-UNIT TACTICS*

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## AUSTERLITZ

*PANZER CREWMAN*




​*THE RECRUITMENT :*
The men of the Panzerwaffe were from the start concieved as a *select bunch*.Though the personnel from the cavalry branch formed the initial core this didn't last.The r*ecruitment was done on the regional Wehrkries system *basis(discussed earlier).Due to the lavish propaganda afforded to this branch,good terms of service and pay and the stylish black uniforms it had no shortage of applicants.
Following is general overview of the first 10 panzer divisions that took place in the 1940 campaign.

*Division Home Base Composition*

*Pz.Div I- Weimar - Saxons & Thuringians*
*Pz.Div II - Vienna - Austrians*
*Pz.Div III - Berlin - Prussians*
*Pz.Div IV - Wurzburg - Bavarians*
*Pz.Div V - Oppeln - Silesian/Sudetenlanders*
*Pz.Div VI - Wuppertal - Westphalians*
*Pz.Div VII - Gera - Thuringians*
*Pz.Div VIII - Cottbus - Prussians*
*Pz.Div IX - * *Vienna - * *Austrians * 
*Pz.Div X - Stuttgart - Mixed*



 (Driver Training) 
​*TRAINING *:
The panzer training programme envisaged by guderian was phased into -*Individual training fo the crew members & Training of the crew as a combat team.*Once a crew was trained they would first take part in small unit exercises and finally in large scale manueveres.Officers and NCOs had seperate training schools.The T*ank commanders were selected from the best of the trained crews and the Zugfuhrer or Platoon leader(leading 5 tanks) taken from the best of the commanders.*The Driver was trained in usually obsolete Panzer I hulls with the turret removed.The idea was to familiarize him with the technique of manuevering a tracked vehicle.*Gunnery training was done in special ranges*.The whole crew was required to familiarize itself with the basic maintaience procedures of the vehicle.*Basic training overlap was done*,so that one member could substitute another in vital operations temporarily.



*THE CREW :*
All the main german panzers (except the older pzI and II) had a* 5-man crew.*The germans identified this number early and stuck to it,this gave them a *huge advantage early on in the war* where british,french and russian tanks had a 2 man turret.The 5 man crew of Commander,Gunner,Loader,Driver and Radio operator/machine gunner ensured *maximum command and control and situational awareness* by freeing the commander of other duties and *high rate of fire*.All german tanks also had radios and intercom between the crew ensuring superb co-ordination both within the crew and with other panzers.*Headsets and throat microphones were standard equipment* for the crew.Survival of the panzer depended on teamwork.The commander and the gunner(no fire control system back then) were the 2 most important members of a crew.




The *Driver sat forward on the left side of the hull* and manuevered the tank with a combination of steering levers,steering wheels and foot pedals.His seat could be raised so his head would be out of the hatch for easy visibility in safe areas,in combat with closed hatches his vision was limited to a nrrow view port and he was dependent on directions from the commander for smooth operation.

The *Radio operator sat to the right of the driver on the hull*.He also operated the hull machine gun which deterred enemy infantry from getting close.This was the least demanding job.

The* Loader sat to the right of the turret*,he served the main gun as well as the co-axial machine gun.Being a loader was *physically demanding* requiring rapid manhandling of heavy shells continously in combat in a cramped space,as well as being responsible for correct selection of rounds.It requires both physical strength and stamina.





(Telescopic Gunsight of Pz.III)​
To the* left of the turret was the Gunner *who aimed and fired the main gun at the commanders orders through monocular sights.German optics was he best in the world.A *good gunner* able to take out targets accurately at range was a *vital asset* for the crew.He also operated the co-axial machine gun by a foot pedal.The *co-axial machine gun was often used in combat to determine range *by the gunner.

To the* rear of the turret the Commander sat *on his elevated seat.He would stand at safe distances expsoing his upper body and observe the enemy with binoculars.In close combat the hatch would be closed and he would view the enemy through episcopic ports/holes in the cupola.He was the *tactical leader of the tank*.The crew were armed with pistols and MP40 submachine guns.




*UNIT MORALE AND ETHOS :*
Life of a panzer crew was not luxurious.The interior of the panzer was cramped and rough,*crew comfort was minimum.*In hot climates the tank would become an oven,in cold ones -a freezer.Sweating and choking in battle conditions was common.Above all loomed the prospect of a agonozing death in a metal tomb.The training and morale was to overcome these natural problems.
*Conscious attempt was made to foster unit pride and ethos*.The *dashing black leather uniform and beret* ,the skull and bones symbol on the collar,the unique divisional cuffbands were all attempts at establishing an identity and sense of belonging.Rewards were also distributed liberally.Apart from the Iron cross(first and second grade) and the Knights Cross(Several grades) available to all german servicemen,panzer crews were awarded the special Panzer Assault Badge(In 3 grades).First grade requiring active participation in atleast 3 armoured engagements.Overall german panzer crews produced all the top tank aces of the war,a fact in which many factors played a role amongst which crew training was also one.German crew training declined only from 1944 onwards due to the strains of war.




​*NEXT: PANZER -SMALL UNIT TACTICS*

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## Psychic

AUSTERLITZ said:


> *PANZER CREWMAN*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ​*THE RECRUITMENT :*
> The men of the Panzerwaffe were from the start concieved as a *select bunch*.Though the personnel from the cavalry branch formed the initial core this didn't last.The r*ecruitment was done on the regional Wehrkries system *basis(discussed earlier).Due to the lavish propaganda afforded to this branch,good terms of service and pay and the stylish black uniforms it had no shortage of applicants.
> Following is general overview of the first 10 panzer divisions that took place in the 1940 campaign.
> 
> *Division Home Base Composition*
> 
> *Pz.Div I- Weimar - Saxons & Thuringians*
> *Pz.Div II - Vienna - Austrians*
> *Pz.Div III - Berlin - Prussians*
> *Pz.Div IV - Wurzburg - Bavarians*
> *Pz.Div V - Oppeln - Silesian/Sudetenlanders*
> *Pz.Div VI - Wuppertal - Westphalians*
> *Pz.Div VII - Gera - Thuringians*
> *Pz.Div VIII - Cottbus - Prussians*
> *Pz.Div IX - * *Vienna - * *Austrians *
> *Pz.Div X - Stuttgart - Mixed*
> 
> 
> 
> (Driver Training)
> ​*TRAINING *:
> The panzer training programme envisaged by guderian was phased into -*Individual training fo the crew members & Training of the crew as a combat team.*Once a crew was trained they would first take part in small unit exercises and finally in large scale manueveres.Officers and NCOs had seperate training schools.The T*ank commanders were selected from the best of the trained crews and the Zugfuhrer or Platoon leader(leading 5 tanks) taken from the best of the commanders.*The Driver was trained in usually obsolete Panzer I hulls with the turret removed.The idea was to familiarize him with the technique of manuevering a tracked vehicle.*Gunnery training was done in special ranges*.The whole crew was required to familiarize itself with the basic maintaience procedures of the vehicle.*Basic training overlap was done*,so that one member could substitute another in vital operations temporarily.
> 
> 
> 
> *THE CREW :*
> All the main german panzers (except the older pzI and II) had a* 5-man crew.*The germans identified this number early and stuck to it,this gave them a *huge advantage early on in the war* where british,french and russian tanks had a 2 man turret.The 5 man crew of Commander,Gunner,Loader,Driver and Radio operator/machine gunner ensured *maximum command and control and situational awareness* by freeing the commander of other duties and *high rate of fire*.All german tanks also had radios and intercom between the crew ensuring superb co-ordination both within the crew and with other panzers.*Headsets and throat microphones were standard equipment* for the crew.Survival of the panzer depended on teamwork.The commander and the gunner(no fire control system back then) were the 2 most important members of a crew.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The *Driver sat forward on the left side of the hull* and manuevered the tank with a combination of steering levers,steering wheels and foot pedals.His seat could be raised so his head would be out of the hatch for easy visibility in safe areas,in combat with closed hatches his vision was limited to a nrrow view port and he was dependent on directions from the commander for smooth operation.
> 
> The *Radio operator sat to the right of the driver on the hull*.He also operated the hull machine gun which deterred enemy infantry from getting close.This was the least demanding job.
> 
> The* Loader sat to the right of the turret*,he served the main gun as well as the co-axial machine gun.Being a loader was *physically demanding* requiring rapid manhandling of heavy shells continously in combat in a cramped space,as well as being responsible for correct selection of rounds.It requires both physical strength and stamina.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (Telescopic Gunsight of Pz.III)​
> To the* left of the turret was the Gunner *who aimed and fired the main gun at the commanders orders through monocular sights.German optics was he best in the world.A *good gunner* able to take out targets accurately at range was a *vital asset* for the crew.He also operated the co-axial machine gun by a foot pedal.The *co-axial machine gun was often used in combat to determine range *by the gunner.
> 
> To the* rear of the turret the Commander sat *on his elevated seat.He would stand at safe distances expsoing his upper body and observe the enemy with binoculars.In close combat the hatch would be closed and he would view the enemy through episcopic ports/holes in the cupola.He was the *tactical leader of the tank*.The crew were armed with pistols and MP40 submachine guns.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *UNIT MORALE AND ETHOS :*
> Life of a panzer crew was not luxurious.The interior of the panzer was cramped and rough,*crew comfort was minimum.*In hot climates the tank would become an oven,in cold ones -a freezer.Sweating and choking in battle conditions was common.Above all loomed the prospect of a agonozing death in a metal tomb.The training and morale was to overcome these natural problems.
> *Conscious attempt was made to foster unit pride and ethos*.The *dashing black leather uniform and beret* ,the skull and bones symbol on the collar,the unique divisional cuffbands were all attempts at establishing an identity and sense of belonging.Rewards were also distributed liberally.Apart from the Iron cross(first and second grade) and the Knights Cross(Several grades) available to all german servicemen,panzer crews were awarded the special Panzer Assault Badge(In 3 grades).First grade requiring active participation in atleast 3 armoured engagements.Overall german panzer crews produced all the top tank aces of the war,a fact in which many factors played a role amongst which crew training was also one.German crew training declined only from 1944 onwards due to the strains of war.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ​*NEXT: PANZER -SMALL UNIT TACTICS*


The panzer commander had a very good all round view even in hatch closed position unlike the periscoped Russian tanks.


​Above is the front view from commander's seat. These small windows had armored glass to protect the commander.


Gunner's seat









Driving was done with the help of levers but in later models like the tiger, a steering wheel replaced the levers.

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## meghdut

Damn @AUSTERLITZ that's the whole WWII German encyclopedia there. Well add some French and British too if you could. I got reminded of Company of Heroes while reading the stuff.

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