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Iranian Missiles | News and Discussions

this one exposed the alot about who is running program,
i think Uzi Rubin prediction is coming true
what to remember not to confuse this one with Emad, Emad is more davance
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@yavar

is NK in liquid fuel not more advanced than Iran?
Iran is leading in solid fuel systems i thought....
 
The technology necessary to master a MaRV for the Emad and a SCUD class BM are very different indeed.

Just one detail: The Emad has retro boosters to let the booster stage fall down within the borders of Iran. The reason is not anti-collision purposes but anti-ABM. They want that just the MaRV of the Emad appear on the ABM radar not the whole missile body.
Expect the Emad MaRV to have very low RCS with strong absorbing RAM coating. This goes as far that the steering fins are most likely a carbon-carbon composite RAS, virtually invisible. Early warning about what the target of the missile launch is, thus might be only available at very terminal stage.
Technologically it's a whole different beast.
 
ALCON,

Firstly, there actually is a "winged" variant of the Scud in Iran's inventory, Just not sure if it has been officially named yet.

http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets/Specials/Scud/Shahab-1_4big.jpg

It is similar to the new NK Scud variant in having 4 extra control surfaces on the warhead section but this warhead section looks a bit different than NK's.

The Emad on the other hand is an improved variant of the Shahab-3/Ghadr family and thus its flight performance is going to be on a different scale.

PeeD,

I would have to disagree with your thinking behind the separation mechanism of the Emad. From my understanding, the boost phase section of the missile will "fall short" of the warhead section even without some kind of thruster mechanism to force them farther apart. Assuming the separation occurs around apogee, the body would follow the same basic trajectory as the warhead until it re-enters and as the air density increases, the drastic differences in aerodynamics would cause the boost section to be slowed down much more so (or perhaps even become unstable and tumble), which would change it's eventual trajectory.

Further, if you're trying to defeat ABM tech, you would WANT the boost section to continue along the same basic trajectory as the now-separated warhead section, as it increases the number of perceived targets and given it's larger RCS, will be more likely to get hit by an interceptor. This is exactly how many Iraqi-modified Scuds made it past the Patriots in Saudi Arabia back in 1991. When the poorly fabricated Al-Hussein/Al-Abbas missiles started to partially break apart upon re-entry, the Patriot interceptors ended up hitting the main body instead of now unintentionally detached warhead sections. Thus increasing the warheads survivability, though by accident.
 
@eagle2007

What you basically said is right and not different from what I said.

Here are the differences:

The Qiam is a example for what you described. It has a spring seperation system for the RV in the later ascend phase.

The Emad is different. It could as well use the Qiam like spring separation system but does not.
It likely seperates right after boost phase in the early ascent phase. So the missile body don't get too high and is still far away, some 1500km from any ABM radar. Only the MaRV alone goes on with the journey.

What your said about the usefulness of the missile body is right for obsolete ABM systems. New systems have increased their resolution and discrimination capability to just find out what is the body and what the RV, they are even accurate enough to identify crude decoys. Hence in 1991 what you described made sense but not anymore.

This all tells that the Emad is even more of a ani-ABM asset.
 
Draco.IMF,

When it comes to solid-fuel ballistic missiles, up until a year or so ago, there was no doubt that Iran was ahead in this field.

However, with the testing of the Pukguksong-2 (or just PK-2 for short), that gap seems to have closed a bit. According to most estimates, the PK-2 has less range than the Sejil but has much more compact dimensions (Only ~0.1 meter larger in diameter and half the length!). So clearly, North Korea is investing in solid-fuel designs, perhaps as the new standard for their short-to-medium range ballistic missiles, while their longer range designs will continue to use liquid fuel.

For Iran, while we haven't see anything "new" in terms of range performance in many years, that could be due to a number of factors, most involving improving the Sejil's other performance factors (especially accuracy).
 
PeeD,

Concerning the Emad, here is the problem I have with your theory: burntime. We know the burntime for the Emad, like it's predecessors is likely in the range of ~110 seconds. While it does take some time for the missile to reach max velocity, by the time the engine finally burns out at the end of this ~110 seconds, it's going to be very close to apogee. Even if this final burnout is slightly before reaching apogee, the thin atmosphere at such a high altitude (likely >100km) will allow the boost phase to continue unimpeded along the original ballistic trajectory and thus land (in the case of the Emad) well over 1000km downrange.

The only way you can cause the boost section to fall dramatically shorter of its original trajectory is to either to fire it at a unusually high apogee (which would reduce the missile's overall range, see the last few NK missile tests) or put a thruster mechanism on the BOOST section to push it away from the original trajectory.

It's the application of Newton's Law of Inertia:

An object at rest stays at rest and an object in motion stays in motion with the same speed and in the same direction unless acted upon by an unbalanced force.

A thruster on the warhead section (the possible unbalanced force) will certainly push against the boost section to some degree but unless it's quite powerful (aka the power of an actual rocket motor stage), I highly doubt it will cause it to change it's trajectory. While it's a more effective mechanism than the usual explosive squibs or springs, it's not THAT much more force.

The only way I see your mechanism working the way you think it will is if we were talking about a true multistage missile, in which the trajectory of the 1st stage will be much shorter than the 2nd stage because of the 2nd stage's motor pushing the warhead section to a higher velocity, thus to a higher final apogee, and finally to a greater eventual range.
 
The discussion about MARV maneuverability for anti-ABM purposes might create a wrong impression:

Irans (conventional) missile force has such a high access denial potential, that this has been the reason why neither Americans, Israelis, Saudis or any other neighbor has attacked Iran yet.

Basically the Shahab-3 was enough to create such a access denial scenario. It is cheap and its CEP might be up to a kilometer.
But if it is equipped with a submunition warhead, it not only increases its destructive power, it also becomes immune against almost all ABM systems. The scenario is a 1998 vintage Shahab-3 upgraded with a warhead section that contains 10 sub munitions with cost effective ablative thermal shielding and release just after mid-point apogee reached.
Neither THAAD nor Arrow-2/3 nor PAC-2/3 could effectively intercept that payload.

Such a submuntion Shahab-3 is very cost effective and it's useful against large targets like airbases, even if they are hardened.
Another scenario: each of the 20 major enemy airbases around Iran in a belt between 1000km to 1500km need to be shut down to deny effective employment of airpower by the enemy. For 24 hours a day randomly at about 1 missile every 30 minutes each of the bases are attacked. So every day of such a intense scenario 1000 Shahab-3 are spent on access denial purposes of enemy airpower. If this is done for one week, 7000 Shahab-3 are spent and each of the 20 bases and 3500 100kg submuntions have impacted the 3x3km target, every square kilometer of this hardened target has been attacked by around 350, 100kg high velocity warheads.

The airbases will receive early warning about incoming missiles if the radar systems are still working and otherwise satellite sensors can provide coarse data on what might be the target. But operating aircraft in such a continuous attack condition that will involve operation limiting damage and necessary repair work, will have very bad impact on morale. The whole idea of airpower is at risk and this also means that the engaging ground based missile force can't be engaged in return effectively. Bases beyond the 1500km belt become much less relevant for the enemy airpower, because the ranges are outside what tactical aircraft are capable to operate from. This means special assets like F-22 or land based F-35 can't be effectively used.

The number to get that job done, the 7000 basic Shahab-3 might sound too high but how much would one cost and how much budget is needed over lets say 15 years for that? Is this capability worth such a investment?

The situation gets better as the airbases come closer. At Qiam and Shahab-2/1 range the engagement of airbases which project enemy airpower will become cheaper or much more intense. At twice the intensity --> 4 missiles every hour operation might become completely impossible and all short-legged aircraft thus fall out of the war equation.

This is real situation beyond MARV equipped missiles and this is why I disagree with baradar Yavar: IRGC-ASF conventional missile force, is very well useful in a non-nuclear conflict.
It can also be confidently said that Israel was never in a position to attack Iran. Israeli bases, around 10, are very well hardened but after the initial attack the IRGC missile force could badly maul their airpower within a few day long operation --> Israelis would need to use nuclear warheads and this was no option for such a limited operation.
Now Israelis have the nuclear card beside airpower but Saudis with their 10 super bases and 110mrd $ more F-15 would still face the same fate of the described scenario. Iranian missile bases are too well hardened to destroy their fighting capability with a preemptive strike by 1000 Saudi F-15 (plus the still fresh airdefences which will let the missile force start the access denial chain).

However once Iran would become an official nuclear power, this concept of conventional anti-access ballistic missile would become obsolete: A single Shahab-3 launch would trigger a nuclear response by Israelis and Americans.

PS: After reading this you might realize why it was the best idea in modern Iranian military history to dismiss airpower and renovation of the IRIAF and invest everything on the ballistic missile force.
It is still a limited deterrent in cases like the following:

Underground Airfields: The DPRK

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact nations erected numerous hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) to protect their multi-million dollar combat aircraft during wartime. Over time, this practice spread throughout the world's conflict zones, with similar structures being found in many Middle Eastern and Asian nations. Some nations, however, took this practice one step further: they began building full underground facilities (UGFs) to store aircraft.

UGFs are commonly used in many nations to store and protect military hardware, but only a few nations have used them to protect their combat aircraft. These nations include the DPRK, China, and Taiwan in Asia, and Albania, the FRY, Sweden, and Switzerland in Europe. In this feature, the facilities used by the DPRK will be examined.

THE DPRK

Twenty major airfields in the DPRK feature significant UGFs for storing combat aircraft. In addition, two locations feature unique runway layouts incorporating UGFs, and seven airfields feature no UGF storage facilities. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below. The airbases incorporating UGFs are marked in red, those lacking UGFs are marked in blue/white, and those incorporating hardened airfields are marked in yellow.
UGF DESIGN

There are two basic UGF layouts employed by the DPRK to protect and house combat aircraft. These facilities are either positioned close to the main runway, facilitating ease of movement between the UGF and the operations area, or further afield, suggesting their use primarily for long-term storage. In addition, they are connected to their assigned facilities using two different taxiway styles. Some UGFs are connected by simple taxiways which wind their way through bulidings and terrain to reach the runways, while others appear to have a more interesting purpose, that of a backup launching strip for concealed assets. This information, combined with an analysis of the types stationed at each location, can give an indication as to the employment strategy or readiness level of aircraft contained within. Three airbases will be examined in detail to provide an overview of the DPRK's UGF design, layout, and potential use.

Sunchon AB

Sunchon AB is arguably the DPRK AF's most important installation. Situated approximately 40 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang, it is home to the most advanced combat aircraft in the DPRK. Sunchon AB is home to the DPRK's MiG-29 (FULCRUM) and Su-25 (FROGFOOT) fleets. The MiG-29 represents the DPRK's only true modern, 4th generation fighter aircraft. The Su-25 is likewise the only true survivable, modern ground attack aircraft in the DPRK. Sunchon's MiG-29 unit also makes up roughly half of the BVR-capable combat aircraft in the DPRK, with Pukchang's MiG-23 (FLOGGER) unit being the only other BVR shooters in the AF's inventory. Despite widely published claims to the contrary (including a thoroughly ludicrous Wikipedia article), whereby the MiG-29 fleet is believed to be based at a host of other locations, Sunchon is the only facility where the MiG-29 has been imaged inside of the DPRK.

An overview of Sunchon AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
Sunchon's UGF is situated in close proximity to the airfield itself. There are three main entrances, with two entrances likely leading to the storage area for operational aircraft. The third entrance may be for long-term storage of derelict or obsolete aircraft, or for entrance into a dedicated maintenance or GSE storage area. Sunchon's UGF is connected by a series of taxiways to the main apron area.

An overview of the UGF at Sunchon AB can be seen in the image below:
Sunchon AB has ramp space for roughly 34 combat aircraft, with HASs for four more aircraft. There is also an alert or arming/dearming pad at the north end of the runway which can easily park two aircraft. Open ramp space is therefore provided for at least 38 aircraft. 66 modern aircraft, discounting possible attrition since delivery, are based at Sunchon AB, indicating that at least half of them are stored in the UGF at any point in time. 36 Su-25s and 24 MiG-29s were delivered from the USSR, including 4 UB/UBK training versions of each type, as well as 6 MiG-29S (FULCRUM-C) SKD kits assembled in the DPRK. It was the MiG-29S that was used to intercept a USAF RC-135 in 2003.

Analysis of imagery of Sunchon AB provides insight into a number of factors. First, while between 19 and 29 Su-25s are visible depending on the date, only 5 to 9 MiG-29s are visible. This may indicate a much lower readiness level in the far more technologically complicated MiG-29 fleet. Second, it would appear that aircraft are moved from the UGF to the parking ramps for operations, before being re-stored. The image below depicts an open UGF, and an Su-25 being towed from the apron back to its underground hangar:
Furthermore, analyzing the layout of Sunchon AB in relation to the UGF illustrates an interesting feature. A 1350 meter taxiway extends from the UGF to a point beyond the main parking aprons. This taxiway may in fact be an auxiliary runway, allowing aircraft to be prepared for flight while concealed within the UGF and then launched with little or no warning for a strike against the ROK. While the MiG-29 would likely be employed to defend the skies above Pyongyang, the Su-25 is certainly a credible platform for use in this capacity given its relative survivability (compared to other available air to ground platforms in the inventory) and its high payload. Alternatively, this may facilitate the storage of armed, combat-ready MiG-29s in an alert status, protecting them from the elements while other airframes are removed for training flights as needed.

Sunan AB

Sunan AB, situated just north of Pyongyang, is the primary home to the DPRK AF's air transport assets. Assigned aircraft include the DPRK's Il-76 (CANDID) fleet. It also serves as the major international air terminal for the DPRK.

An overview of Sunan AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
There are no identified combat aircraft at Sunan AB, but the UGF can be used to illustrate a different layout than that of Sunchon AB. In the case of Sunan AB, the UGF is situated a much greater distance from the main operating area, likely indicating that aircraft stored therein are not operational or are being held in storage. Also, the UGF is not connected by a taxiway suitable for use as an auxiliary runway, reducing the chance that assets contained in the UGF are suitable for rapid deployment.

An overview of the UGF at Sunan AB can be seen in the image below:
Hwangju AB

Hwangju AB, approximately 40 kilometers south of Pyongyang, is home to a DPRK AF MiG-21 (FISHBED) unit.

An overview of Hwangju AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
Hwangju's overall layout is similar in many respects to that of Sunchon AB. Hwangju features three ramp areas and four HASs for housing its assigned aircraft. It also features a UGF complex for storing MiG-21s, which is connected to the main facility by an auxiliary runway similar to that found at Sunchon AB. The primary difference in the two facilities is the distance. Sunchon AB features a UGF in relatively close proximity to the main airfield, suggesting that combat aircraft may be stored there on a regular basis. Analysis of the available imagery would seem to validate this theory. In contrast, the UGF complex at Hwangju AB is much further removed from the main airbase. Imagery indicates that a consistent number of MiG-21s, around 20, is parked on the main ramp space of the airfield. This suggests that the UGF is not used for primary storage of aircraft, as it appears to be for Sunchon AB's MiG-29 fleet. This illustrates the relationship between UGF location and storage activity in the DPRK AF.

An overview of the UGF at Hwangju AB can be seen in the image below:
HAS Use

As operational fighter bases, both Sunchon AB and Hwangju AB possess four HASs in close proximity to the main runway. These facilities are likely employed for alert aircraft, enabling them to be protected to a degree from a preemptive strike. While aircraft parked on open ramp areas are soft targets, those contained in HASs would potentially be available for airbase defense or counterstrike sorties in cooperation with aircraft retained within the UGFs.

HARDENED RUNWAYS

Onchon airbase in the west and Kang Da Ri airfield in the east feature unique hardened facilities. These airbases incorporate large UGFs for storage, maintenance, and operations work, with runway surfaces exiting the UGFs in multiple directions. No information is available as to the purpose for, use of, or units assigned to these facilities. The most probable use for these unique airbases is as dispersal sites for combat aircraft. They represent very survivable hardened structures, and could potentially house a significant number of aircraft. The only drawback is that deploying a significant number of aircraft to each facility would be a potential identifiable indicator of forthcoming hostile action. To mask such activity, the DPRK would likely establish routine training deployments to each location.

An alternative use for the hardened airbases has nothing to do with aircraft and at this time represents pure speculation. Given that air activity at either location has never been publicly disclosed or identified in imagery, an interesting concept would be to employ the facilities as hardened SSM bases. The facilities resemble airfields in their layout, but a concrete SSM launch pad is little different from a runway surface. Ergo, the DPRK could stockpile SSMs in these facilities, using the "runways" as mass launching areas. In this scenario, transporting SSMs to the facilities would be far easier to mask than the deployment of combat aircraft. The facilities could represent logical storage and mating points for nuclear or chemical warheads, allowing them to remain protected prior to use. Furthermore, what better way to hide an SSM base than by designing it as an airfield? The only serious additional expense would be the additional concrete used to create a "runway" rather than a number of SSM launch pads. In this vein, given the security and survivability of these facilities, they could also represent launch points for UAVs or drone conversions of obsolete aircraft armed with nuclear warheads. At this point in time, however, the facilities are assumed to be exactly what they appear to be: hardened airfields.

Onchon AB

Onchon AB is unique in the DPRK as it possesses both a traditionally designed airfield and a separate hardened airbase facility. The airfield itself is home to a number of old, outdated combat aircraft including the MiG-19/J-6 (FARMER).

An overview of Onchon AB depicting its location relative to the hardened airbase can be seen in the image below:
The hardened airbase at Onchon consists of a single massive UGF with multiple entrances, and three runway surfaces. The facility was noted as being complete in January of 2004. The two primary runway surfaces lead directly into the massive UGF. A third surface useable as an auxiliary runway is connected to the main facility through a taxiway leading to one of the primary runways and to two secondary, secured UGF entrances. These secured entrances may lack the clearance for combat aircraft to use them to gain access to the UGF, but may provide entrance and exit points for GSE or other necessary equipment. A small exterior parking ramp is also provided, possibly for alert aircraft.

Details of the Onchon AB hardened airfield can be seen in the image below:
Kang Da Ri AB

As of 2007, Kang Da Ri AB was still under construction. It is a hardened airbase similar in concept to that found at Onchon. Kang Da Ri AB consists of a large UGF with two separate entrances leading directly to runway surfaces. There is a separate external runway surface, but unlike Onchon it does not lead directly to a UGF portal. Instead, it leads to one of the main runway surfaces via a taxiway still under construction in the latest imagery.

Details of the Kang Da Ri hardened airfield can be seen in the image below:
STRIKE OPTIONS

Employing UGFs to store aircraft does not necessarily mean they will remain viable combat assets. There are numerous options available for negating the impact of these facilities. While penetrating weapons may not be able to access the UGFs themselves from above, PGMs could be used in an attempt to destroy the access doors to the facilities, collapsing the entrances and sealing the aircraft inside for a period of time. Taxiways and auxiliary runways could also be cratered and seeded with bomblets from cluster munitions. The value of the UGFs therefore depends on the ability of DPRK personnel to clear and repair runway and taxiway surfaces and gain access to the facilities to allow the assets held within to be deployed.

CONCLUSION

The DPRK employs a number of UGFs throughout the nation to house various types of military equipment. The DPRK's Air Force is no exception, and the employment of UGFs will ensure that a portion of the air element remains viable after a first series of strikes by the ROK or USA.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

http://geimint.blogspot.ca/2010/07/underground-airfields-dprk.html
 
PeeD,

Concerning the Emad, here is the problem I have with your theory: burntime. We know the burntime for the Emad, like it's predecessors is likely in the range of ~110 seconds. While it does take some time for the missile to reach max velocity, by the time the engine finally burns out at the end of this ~110 seconds, it's going to be very close to apogee. Even if this final burnout is slightly before reaching apogee, the thin atmosphere at such a high altitude (likely >100km) will allow the boost phase to continue unimpeded along the original ballistic trajectory and thus land (in the case of the Emad) well over 1000km downrange.

The only way you can cause the boost section to fall dramatically shorter of its original trajectory is to either to fire it at a unusually high apogee (which would reduce the missile's overall range, see the last few NK missile tests) or put a thruster mechanism on the BOOST section to push it away from the original trajectory.

It's the application of Newton's Law of Inertia:

An object at rest stays at rest and an object in motion stays in motion with the same speed and in the same direction unless acted upon by an unbalanced force.

A thruster on the warhead section (the possible unbalanced force) will certainly push against the boost section to some degree but unless it's quite powerful (aka the power of an actual rocket motor stage), I highly doubt it will cause it to change it's trajectory. While it's a more effective mechanism than the usual explosive squibs or springs, it's not THAT much more force.

The only way I see your mechanism working the way you think it will is if we were talking about a true multistage missile, in which the trajectory of the 1st stage will be much shorter than the 2nd stage because of the 2nd stage's motor pushing the warhead section to a higher velocity, thus to a higher final apogee, and finally to a greater eventual range.

I think you are not aware of the retro boosters of the Emad:

EMAD_2.jpg


Burnout and separation could be around 100km altitude and 100km range distance while apogee is around 400km.

All this effort can only be for the purpose to hide the missile body from the radar.

@The SC

Very hardened airbases like those North Koreans could prove as a counter to thats concept yes. However no one in the region has such airbases and the runways (runway damage + fod) would remain vulnerable in the described continuous attack scenario.
 
PeeD,

Fair enough, from how I read your original post, I got the impression you were talking about thrusters on the warhead section, not the main body.

But if the purpose to hide the missile body from radar, that's seems to be something of a losing fight. Over the next few years, there are going to several AN/TPY-2 radars near Iran's borders. This will be in addition to any Aegis BMD-equipped vessels in the Persian Gulf AND the elevated twin TPY-2 radars in Israel's Negev desert, reported to have a range of 2400km (stretching 800-900km into Iranian territory). Soon they will be deployed just across the Persian Gulf. All this means, as time goes on, the odds of Iranian missile launches going undetected locally is pretty low.
 
Yes when TPY-2 are around Iran some day the early warning portion of the concept will diminish. It is already diminished due to US satellite IR early warning system.

The goal would rather be to prevent useful trajectory prediction by the adversary. So you know that a Emad, Ghadr or Shahab-3 is launched but don't know its exact target, they could be up to several hundert km away.
A more extreme case is a modified trajectory where the Emad goes up very straight, disappears and the MaRV moves to the real target trajectory. Anything from Tel Aviv to Riyad or Istanbul could be the target of the stealth MaRV.
The TPY-2 has great discrimination and gain for a radar, plus a impressive range. But against a RAM coated small RV it will face the problems all X-band assets face. Something between 100-200km detection range is a good estimate for what it would be capable of against such a MaRV.
 
@PeeD
Sir, do we have any anti satellite program for our future missile? Are we even capable of developing such interceptor systems?
Can F-14 Tomcats carry ASM missiles?
 
@mohammad45

Well baradar, nothing has been officially reported on these topics. I only discuss what has been shown or reported by Iran. Baradar yavar and maybe Soheil seem to have more information than officially released, maybe they feel ready to talk about.
 
@PeeD
Sir, do we have any anti satellite program for our future missile? Are we even capable of developing such interceptor systems?
Can F-14 Tomcats carry ASM missiles?

I can say for sure Iran isn't going to use the F-14 for ASM. While such a thing is feasible it isn't realistic to me, primarily because Iranian F-14s are nearing retirement with their 40 year old age and developing this new capability for them is short sighted.

The light and powerful F-15A (even lighter than the more common F-15C/D/E) with the ASM-135 ASAT did do such a thing, and probably an F-14B/D with the powerful engines could but I'm not sure Iran's heavy, underpowered 40 year old F-14A could.

0e2bd566-c93c-450b-8f21-41fb93d12f8e.jpg


On 13 September 1985, Maj. Wilbert D. "Doug" Pearson, flying the "Celestial Eagle" F-15A 76-0084 launched an ASM-135 ASAT about 200 miles (322 km) west of Vandenberg Air Force Base and destroyed the Solwind P78-1 satellite flying at an altitude of 345 miles (555 km). Prior to the launch the F-15 flying at Mach 1.22 executed a 3.8g zoom climb at an angle of 65 degrees. The ASM-135 ASAT was automatically launched at 38,100 ft while the F-15 was flying at Mach .934.[7] The 30 lb (13.6 kg) MHV collided with the 2,000 lb (907 kg) Solwind P78-1 satellite at closing velocity of 15,000 mph (24,140 km/h).
 
I can say for sure Iran isn't going to use the F-14 for ASM. While such a thing is feasible it isn't realistic to me, primarily because Iranian F-14s are nearing retirement with their 40 year old age and developing this new capability for them is short sighted.

The light and powerful F-15A (even lighter than the more common F-15C/D/E) with the ASM-135 ASAT did do such a thing, and probably an F-14B/D with the powerful engines could but I'm not sure Iran's heavy, underpowered 40 year old F-14A could.

0e2bd566-c93c-450b-8f21-41fb93d12f8e.jpg


On 13 September 1985, Maj. Wilbert D. "Doug" Pearson, flying the "Celestial Eagle" F-15A 76-0084 launched an ASM-135 ASAT about 200 miles (322 km) west of Vandenberg Air Force Base and destroyed the Solwind P78-1 satellite flying at an altitude of 345 miles (555 km). Prior to the launch the F-15 flying at Mach 1.22 executed a 3.8g zoom climb at an angle of 65 degrees. The ASM-135 ASAT was automatically launched at 38,100 ft while the F-15 was flying at Mach .934.[7] The 30 lb (13.6 kg) MHV collided with the 2,000 lb (907 kg) Solwind P78-1 satellite at closing velocity of 15,000 mph (24,140 km/h).
Thanks for the reply
As a conclusion Amir, we really need a new fighter in that class. Heavy and capable of carrying out such missions. Su-30 SM using heavy turbo jet engines is the best option between foreign sources. If the current government agrees with raising military budget to the level of 7-8 years ago, we can see a heavy turbo jet engine produced locally. Importing Su-30 SM and manufacturing a homemade one just like S300-Bavar story can make us able to bring ASM into our defensive arsenal, hopefully ofcourse :-)
USA's low altitude spying satellites especially Space-X are a great danger to our military intelligence, that was why i asked about it.
 

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