Iranian Missiles | News and Discussions

[PeeD]

Back on what I said about the Zolfaghar missile.

The calculation method I used and its computer integration was made by someone else, a quite complicated formula. I benchmarked it against real test values and found out that the results had a error which was identified and corrected by me.
__________________________________
First we have to define methods to defeat ABM systems.

One method would be continuous low G maneuvering to force course corrections upon the ABM interceptor. This is a method to reduce the range/altitude/speed capability of a ABM interceptor because the interception/rendezvous positions changes more and more over the time.

Another method are a limited number of higher G evasive maneuvers. The goal is to evade the interceptor because it's max. G capability is reached. Depending on the speed difference of target and interceptor for a sufficiently high probability of kill there must be a difference of G maneuvering capability as already said. Sources vary for SAM/AAM vs. aircraft scenarios, its said that the interceptor must have a 3-5 times higher G maneuvering capability (the state of the art limit is 50G).


Now I will present the updated data and add the Emad missile to the discussion.
__________________________________

First some assumptions were made to get the calculation as close to the reality as possible and not beyond it. Certain angle of attacks are assumed, certain weights for the RVs are assumed.

I will define several altitudes for different anti-ABM system purposes:

60km --> altitude at which a pure MRBM like the Emad can start aerodynamic maneuvering. This is also the max. altitude of the Arrow 2 (the highest known endo-atmospheric ABM system in service). Exo-atmospheric ABM systems such as the Arrow-3 and THAAD are already a threat here, hence only a potent gas steering system could counter them (we have no information that Zolfaghar or Emad are equipped with one)

37km --> altitude where a depressed trajectory quasi-ballistic missile with gliding RV like the Zolfaghar would enter the range envelope of a ABM system (below the range of the THAAD and likely Arrow-3 and SM-3).

25km --> altitude where endo-atmospheric ABM systems such as the Patriot PAC-2/3, SM-2/3 are still within operational regime with useful probability of kill.

__________________________________

So the question is what the performance of Zolfaghar and Emad would be at those altitudes (excluding any potential gas system).

Here are the results:

60km: Zolfaghar's MaRV is out of the game because it's a depressed trajectory BM with a proposed intentional low apogee of 50km.
Emads MaRV has a G maneuvering capability of 0,2G. This is enough for continuous course change anti-ABM tactic. An Arrow-2 has an similarly low maneuvering capability at those altitudes, but needs a higher one for successful interception.

37km: Zolfaghar in it's descent phase has a G maneuvering capability of 1,3, enough for continuous course change anti-ABM tactic (against Arrow-2 and SM-6).
Emad has a G maneuvering capability of 4,3G, enough for higher G evasive maneuvers (against Arrow-2 and SM-6).

25km: Zolfaghar has a G maneuvering capability of 7,7G, enough for higher G evasive maneuvers (against Arrow-2, SM-6, SM-2, Patriot PAC-2).
Emad has a G maneuvering capability of 25,2G, enough for max. G evasive maneuvers, 20G should be the limit possible by the airframe.

__________________________________

The numbers have changed but the concluding statement of my last post about the Zolfaghar remains the same.
As for the Emad, it is likely already beyond Arrow-2 capability as the numbers show and certainly beyond that of the Patriot PAC-2/3 and SM-2/6. Well possible that the Israelis knew that something like the Emad was coming and countered it with the Arrow-3 (IOC 2017). The great unknown is a possible gas steering system for both of them that could improve their capabilities.

PS: Here is the book on which the calculations are based for those interested: *************/view/jeofkq9csiu7fss/%28AIAA_Education%29_E._Fleeman-Tactical_Missile_Design%2C_Second_Edition-AIAA_%282006%29.pdf

 

[BHarwana]

Back on what I said about the Zolfaghar missile.

The calculation method I used and its computer integration was made by someone else, a quite complicated formula. I benchmarked it against real test values and found out that the results had a error which was identified and corrected by me.
__________________________________
First we have to define methods to defeat ABM systems.

One method would be continuous low G maneuvering to force course corrections upon the ABM interceptor. This is a method to reduce the range/altitude/speed capability of a ABM interceptor because the interception/rendezvous positions changes more and more over the time.

Another method are a limited number of higher G evasive maneuvers. The goal is to evade the interceptor because it's max. G capability is reached. Depending on the speed difference of target and interceptor for a sufficiently high probability of kill there must be a difference of G maneuvering capability as already said. Sources vary for SAM/AAM vs. aircraft scenarios, its said that the interceptor must have a 3-5 times higher G maneuvering capability (the state of the art limit is 50G).


Now I will present the updated data and add the Emad missile to the discussion.
__________________________________

First some assumptions were made to get the calculation as close to the reality as possible and not beyond it. Certain angle of attacks are assumed, certain weights for the RVs are assumed.

I will define several altitudes for different anti-ABM system purposes:

60km --> altitude at which a pure MRBM like the Emad can start aerodynamic maneuvering. This is also the max. altitude of the Arrow 2 (the highest known endo-atmospheric ABM system in service). Exo-atmospheric ABM systems such as the Arrow-3 and THAAD are already a threat here, hence only a potent gas steering system could counter them (we have no information that Zolfaghar or Emad are equipped with one)

37km --> altitude where a depressed trajectory quasi-ballistic missile with gliding RV like the Zolfaghar would enter the range envelope of a ABM system (below the range of the THAAD and likely Arrow-3 and SM-3).

25km --> altitude where endo-atmospheric ABM systems such as the Patriot PAC-2/3, SM-2/3 are still within operational regime with useful probability of kill.

__________________________________

So the question is what the performance of Zolfaghar and Emad would be at those altitudes (excluding any potential gas system).

Here are the results:

60km: Zolfaghar's MaRV is out of the game because it's a depressed trajectory BM with a proposed intentional low apogee of 50km.
Emads MaRV has a G maneuvering capability of 0,2G. This is enough for continuous course change anti-ABM tactic. An Arrow-2 has an similarly low maneuvering capability at those altitudes, but needs a higher one for successful interception.

37km: Zolfaghar in it's descent phase has a G maneuvering capability of 1,3, enough for continuous course change anti-ABM tactic (against Arrow-2 and SM-6).
Emad has a G maneuvering capability of 4,3G, enough for higher G evasive maneuvers (against Arrow-2 and SM-6).

25km: Zolfaghar has a G maneuvering capability of 7,7G, enough for higher G evasive maneuvers (against Arrow-2, SM-6, SM-2, Patriot PAC-2).
Emad has a G maneuvering capability of 25,2G, enough for max. G evasive maneuvers, 20G should be the limit possible by the airframe.

__________________________________

The numbers have changed but the concluding statement of my last post about the Zolfaghar remains the same.
As for the Emad, it is likely already beyond Arrow-2 capability as the numbers show and certainly beyond that of the Patriot PAC-2/3 and SM-2/6. Well possible that the Israelis knew that something like the Emad was coming and countered it with the Arrow-3 (IOC 2017). The great unknown is a possible gas steering system for both of them that could improve their capabilities.

PS: Here is the book on which the calculations are based for those interested: *************/view/jeofkq9csiu7fss/%28AIAA_Education%29_E._Fleeman-Tactical_Missile_Design%2C_Second_Edition-AIAA_%282006%29.pdf

The method you are trying to use to defeat ABM system is one way but using other approaches will help more.

 

[PeeD]

Sure and other means are almost certainly part of the two missiles. These are just the maneuvering methods yes.

 

[BHarwana]

Sure and other means are almost certainly part of the two missiles. These are just the maneuvering methods yes.

First you have to understand how ABM system works. The first detection is done by Infrared Sat detecting the heat signature. than the ground Radar comes into play. there is a lot of space junk that also effects the ABM systems accuracy MIRV is one way it uses decoys and delivers a war head but good systems can also differentiated between decoys and actual war heads. Then Interceptor missiles can also maneuver and lock on to a maneuverable war head. There are many thing that come into play. If you really want to learn how to defeat ABM system keep a watch of Houthi missile they have been beating ABM system in some cases.

 

[AmirPatriot]

Back on what I said about the Zolfaghar missile.

The calculation method I used and its computer integration was made by someone else, a quite complicated formula. I benchmarked it against real test values and found out that the results had a error which was identified and corrected by me.
__________________________________
First we have to define methods to defeat ABM systems.

One method would be continuous low G maneuvering to force course corrections upon the ABM interceptor. This is a method to reduce the range/altitude/speed capability of a ABM interceptor because the interception/rendezvous positions changes more and more over the time.

Another method are a limited number of higher G evasive maneuvers. The goal is to evade the interceptor because it's max. G capability is reached. Depending on the speed difference of target and interceptor for a sufficiently high probability of kill there must be a difference of G maneuvering capability as already said. Sources vary for SAM/AAM vs. aircraft scenarios, its said that the interceptor must have a 3-5 times higher G maneuvering capability (the state of the art limit is 50G).


Now I will present the updated data and add the Emad missile to the discussion.
__________________________________

First some assumptions were made to get the calculation as close to the reality as possible and not beyond it. Certain angle of attacks are assumed, certain weights for the RVs are assumed.

I will define several altitudes for different anti-ABM system purposes:

60km --> altitude at which a pure MRBM like the Emad can start aerodynamic maneuvering. This is also the max. altitude of the Arrow 2 (the highest known endo-atmospheric ABM system in service). Exo-atmospheric ABM systems such as the Arrow-3 and THAAD are already a threat here, hence only a potent gas steering system could counter them (we have no information that Zolfaghar or Emad are equipped with one)

37km --> altitude where a depressed trajectory quasi-ballistic missile with gliding RV like the Zolfaghar would enter the range envelope of a ABM system (below the range of the THAAD and likely Arrow-3 and SM-3).

25km --> altitude where endo-atmospheric ABM systems such as the Patriot PAC-2/3, SM-2/3 are still within operational regime with useful probability of kill.

__________________________________

So the question is what the performance of Zolfaghar and Emad would be at those altitudes (excluding any potential gas system).

Here are the results:

60km: Zolfaghar's MaRV is out of the game because it's a depressed trajectory BM with a proposed intentional low apogee of 50km.
Emads MaRV has a G maneuvering capability of 0,2G. This is enough for continuous course change anti-ABM tactic. An Arrow-2 has an similarly low maneuvering capability at those altitudes, but needs a higher one for successful interception.

37km: Zolfaghar in it's descent phase has a G maneuvering capability of 1,3, enough for continuous course change anti-ABM tactic (against Arrow-2 and SM-6).
Emad has a G maneuvering capability of 4,3G, enough for higher G evasive maneuvers (against Arrow-2 and SM-6).

25km: Zolfaghar has a G maneuvering capability of 7,7G, enough for higher G evasive maneuvers (against Arrow-2, SM-6, SM-2, Patriot PAC-2).
Emad has a G maneuvering capability of 25,2G, enough for max. G evasive maneuvers, 20G should be the limit possible by the airframe.

__________________________________

The numbers have changed but the concluding statement of my last post about the Zolfaghar remains the same.
As for the Emad, it is likely already beyond Arrow-2 capability as the numbers show and certainly beyond that of the Patriot PAC-2/3 and SM-2/6. Well possible that the Israelis knew that something like the Emad was coming and countered it with the Arrow-3 (IOC 2017). The great unknown is a possible gas steering system for both of them that could improve their capabilities.

PS: Here is the book on which the calculations are based for those interested: *************/view/jeofkq9csiu7fss/%28AIAA_Education%29_E._Fleeman-Tactical_Missile_Design%2C_Second_Edition-AIAA_%282006%29.pdf

Your posts are, as usual, highly appreciated.

So the Emad should be able to defeat PAC-3, and Zolfaqar the THAAD. Interesting that the high altitude, high capability THAAD can be defeated by a SRBM but not by a MRBM. It's all the trajectory and altitudes I guess.

How would you think the capability of a Sejjil-2 missile with the Emad warhead fitted would be?

It's possible that the Zolfaghar RV has a gas control or sustainer engine with TVC in its read part. If so, this has to be added to the stated aerodynamic maneuvering capability. If it has such a system, its performance is very close to the Russian Iskander-M, in aerodynamic maneuvering even above it.

Can you please elaborate on the bold part?

 

[PeeD]

@AmirPatriot

We can't really say one system can defeat another one, but we can say what the physical capabilities are. ABM systems and Iranian BMs are highly classified. There are many mays about their strategies and technologies.

The reason why the Zolfaghar might be able to defeat the THAAD is that it may try to stay outside its engagement envelope. This strategy is claimed for the Russian Iskander and the Zolfaghar has everything necessary to do the same.
The THAAD can't go below 40km altitude at the moment, it's kill vehicle without the protective shroud can't operate in the denser air of let's say 37km at the speed it has. Just staying outside it's envelope is a good and easy strategy for defeat.

The Emad is just so fast that it reach high G levels which would be very hard to defeat by all the endo-atmospheric interceptors.

The Sedjil with a Emad RV would be just more tactical useful, the Ghadr has very similar range performance. The Emad RV can provide all Iranian MRBM's with better anti-ABM capabilities and higher precision (which is of highest importance for conventional missiles).

Can you please elaborate on the bold part?

Basically Zolfaghars aerodynamic maneuvering capability is very similar to that of the Iskander-M. It all depends on RV and burn-out masses of them about which nothing is known. With some assumptions, Zolfaghar is somewhat, negligible more maneuverable. But the calculations show that the operating model of Iskander and Zolfaghar have to be very similar and hence both are likely to operate in the same way. The known difference in maneuvering capability now is that the Iskander has a gas steering system which has not yet been seen in the Zolfaghar,

 

[AmirPatriot]

The Sedjil with a Emad RV would be just more tactical useful, the Ghadr has very similar range performance.

But wouldn't it also be faster to intercept? (correct me if I'm wrong but I think by tactically useful you are talking about its advantages in launch time and preparation). The Shahab-3/Ghadr is speculated to have a speed around Mach 7, whereas there have been specifications shown on posters saying the Sejjil can go up to Mach 13. Would this higher speed trouble more advanced ABMs, or is it still vulnerable to exoatmospheric interceptors unless fitted with gas steering?

The known difference in maneuvering capability now is that the Iskander has a gas steering system which has not yet been seen in the Zolfaghar,

Is this to enable better manoeuvring at high altitudes, or have low drag, or both?

What are the implications of a Zolfaqar AShBM variant? And does the Emad RV offer enough precision for this role?

 

[PeeD]

@AmirPatriot

Yes I meant that by tactical advantage,

The Ghadr has the same speed as the Sedjil if their ranges are 2000km as stated, both around mach 13,3.
Such high speed is good to reduce the range (i.e protected area) of a ABM system, more so if a gas steering system is present for exo-atmospheric course changes. If there is no such system present it is vulnerable to systems like THAAD and Arrow-3.

Is this to enable better manoeuvring at high altitudes, or have low drag, or both?

Better high altitude maneuvering and exo-atmospheric course changes for the Emad. For the Zolfaghar (if gas system present) and Iskander which are assumed to have a depressed glide trajectory, a gas system improves it's high altitude evasive maneuvering capability.

What are the implications of a Zolfaqar AShBM variant? And does the Emad RV offer enough precision for this role?

Zolfaghar AShBM is easily possible, its terminal agility and maneuverability would be higher than that of the Khalije Fars missile --> better anti-ABM capability. With 700km range, any carrier and it's fighters can be keep sufficiently far away to greatly reduce their fighting capability.
The Emad RV would need a shrouded terminal guidance to survive the high thermal loads due to it's high speed. Also a mid-course guidance update could be necessary. The Ghadr and Sejil are a little too high range for such a task, but well since the Chinese are working on the DF-26 it might be a good anti-access capability to have,

 

[AmirPatriot]

If there is no such system present it is vulnerable to systems like THAAD and Arrow-3.

Do you think Iran will equip its MRBMs with gas steering? After all, they are intended for deterring Israel, and only the MRBMs can reach Israel.

better anti-ABM capability

Seeing as it flies below the SM-3, how is the Zolfqar equipped to take on the SM-6?

The Emad RV would need a shrouded terminal guidance to survive the high thermal loads due to it's high speed. Also a mid-course guidance update could be necessary. The Ghadr and Sejil are a little too high range for such a task, but well since the Chinese are working on the DF-26 it might be a good anti-access capability to have,

I'm aware of the range issue, the primary being with detection and guidance. I was just curious if the Emad RV had the necessary accuracy and control authority to hit a moving AC.

Just some food for thought, Zolfaqar range if used as an anti-ship weapon. Covering the entirety of the Gulf of Oman, and including the Northern Indian Ocean.

 

[PeeD]

@AmirPatriot

Do you think Iran will equip its MRBMs with gas steering? After all, they are intended for deterring Israel, and only the MRBMs can reach Israel.

Hard to say. Gas steering systems have limited maneuvering capability due to limited fuel (same for opposing ABM missiles), if Iranian designers conclude that a course changing strategy would work against system like THAAD and Arrow-3, they may implement it.
Aerodynamic maneuvering on the other hand can use the excess speed a mach 13 missile has for a good amount of maneuvering.

Seeing as it flies below the SM-3, how is the Zolfqar equipped to take on the SM-6?

Good. The SM-6/-2 need G pulling capability which is above the Zolfaghars limit. It's G pulling capability is at best similar, its speed slower and being slower against a maneuvering target is a bad thing here.

I'm aware of the range issue, the primary being with detection and guidance. I was just curious if the Emad RV had the necessary accuracy and control authority to hit a moving AC.

Its current system should be sufficient to bring it close enough to the target ship and a potential terminal guidance sensor will do the rest (like on any AShBM). It is certainty maneuverable enough to hit a large target like a ship.

 

[AmirPatriot]

@AmirPatriot



Hard to say. Gas steering systems have limited maneuvering capability due to limited fuel (same for opposing ABM missiles), if Iranian designers conclude that a course changing strategy would work against system like THAAD and Arrow-3, they may implement it.
Aerodynamic maneuvering on the other hand can use the excess speed a mach 13 missile has for a good amount of maneuvering.



Good. The SM-6/-2 need G pulling capability which is above the Zolfaghars limit. It's G pulling capability is at best similar, its speed slower and being slower against a maneuvering target is a bad thing here.



Its current system should be sufficient to bring it close enough to the target ship and a potential terminal guidance sensor will do the rest (like on any AShBM). It is certainty maneuverable enough to hit a large target like a ship.

I'm just bombarding you with questions, I promise I'm nearly done

Is it conceivable to use the Zolfaqar and/or to take out THAAD and PAC-3 radar sites? We know that Iran has an anti-radiation seeker for the Hormuz missiles, though it would be a whole lot more useful if we knew if, say, the Saudis, didn't bother to move their radars around very often and therefore these radars could be taken out by standard GPS guided missiles.

 

[PeeD]

You'r welcome to ask.

Well the depressed trajectories and glide phase for Iskander and Zolfaghar (an Fateh series) remains unconfirmed.

THAAD could be modified in future to cover the gap between 40-25km, although this could be a harder task than it may sound.

PAC-3 is very strong up to 15km altitude but its range or the protected area is small, its somewhat like the point defense system of a ABM system. It might be able to intercept the less agile Fateh series but the Zolfaghar is possibly to hard to intercept due to it's higher maneuverability.

This all still makes the Zolfaghar a very useful anti-ABM missile, especially with a passive radar homing seeker as you said.

 

[yavar]

US Tillerson Iran put end to missile test, Rouhani response تیلرسون آزمایش موشکی متوقف و پاسخ روحانی

روحانی: برای تست موشک‌هایمان منتظر اجازه آمریکایی‌ها نخواهیم بود
http://www.espadananews.com/node/3520

تیلرسون: روحانی آزمایش موشکی را متوقف کند
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13960230001317
Tillerson calls on Rouhani to stop Iran’s ballistic missile tests
US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has called on Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to end the country’s ballistic missile tests in what is Washington’s first reaction to his re-election. Tillerson made the remarks during a joint news conference with his Saudi counterpart on Saturday following Rouhani’s landslide election victory and winning a second term in office through presidential polls held on Friday.He repeated a Western accusation that Iran supports terrorism, saying, "What I would hope, is that Rouhani... use that (new) term to begin a process of dismantling Iran's network of terrorism, dismantling its financing of the terrorist network, dismantling the manning and the logistics and everything that they provide to these destabilizing forces that exist in this region."
"We also hope that he puts an end to their ballistic missile testing," Tillerson said on the first day of a visit by President Donald Trump to Saudi Arabia where he signed a whopping $110 billion weapons deal with the Saudi kingdom.
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/05/21/522640/US-Rex-Tillerson-Iran-Hassan-Rouhani-Saudi-Arabia/

Iranian president: We don't need anyone's permission to test ballistic missiles
http://uk.businessinsider.com/r-rou...ile-program-will-continue-tv-2017-5?r=US&IR=T
Iran's Rouhani: We will not wait for US's permission to test ballistic missiles
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/0...ss-permission-to-test-ballistic-missiles.html

 

[eagle2007]

PeeD,

It was my understanding that the Ghadr/Shahab-3 family have never reached the same kind of velocity the Sejil has.

I've seen reports of the early tests back in the early 2000s achieving velocities of ~1.9-2.0 km/s, which is 35% more than the R-17/Scud missiles can achieve.

This compares to somewhat vague "Mach 10-12" reports of the Sejil (which translates to ~3.5-4.0 km/s I believe).

While there have no doubt been improvements to its speed in later variants (thanks to extended burn times, mixture changes, lighter warheads), the kind of improvement needed to match the Sejil's would seem to me at least, a bit much for the original engine to achieve. You can only improve rocket engine performance so much.

It's not to say the Shahab-3/Ghadr family is "slow" by any means, just not quite as capable as the Sejil.

Concerning the PAC-3 vs Fateh/Zolfaqar missiles. While the PAC-3's range is limited (by design), the fact it has 4x the ready-to-fire missiles as its predecessors greatly increases the odds of getting a hard-kill.

Consider this, if you look at Patriot sites in Saudi Arabia and other nations, you'll see 4-6 launchers per radar unit (usually located quite close to said radar unit). That's 64-96 ready-to-fire missiles located in a very small area. This is very ideal of defending an air base, as a single "battery" could provide excellent coverage.

But it is also correct to say the PAC-3 is definitely NOT meant to be a stand-alone system, nor is it advertised as such.

 

[AmirPatriot]

It was my understanding that the Ghadr/Shahab-3 family have never reached the same kind of velocity the Sejil has.

I've seen reports of the early tests back in the early 2000s achieving velocities of ~1.9-2.0 km/s, which is 35% more than the R-17/Scud missiles can achieve.

That's what I always thought too.

This compares to somewhat vague "Mach 10-12" reports of the Sejil (which translates to ~3.5-4.0 km/s I believe).

Does this help? It gives the range at 2000 km and the maximum flight time at 835 seconds. Though a ballistic missile travels its fastest at the terminal phase and its slowest at the launch phase, so I'm not sure how we can calculate the Sejjil's terminal speed.

Consider this, if you look at Patriot sites in Saudi Arabia and other nations, you'll see 4-6 launchers per radar unit (usually located quite close to said radar unit). That's 64-96 ready-to-fire missiles located in a very small area. This is very ideal of defending an air base, as a single "battery" could provide excellent coverage.

A very good point. Assuming the PAC-3 batteries are static, an attempt to destroy each site would be a major operation, probably including MRBMs, lots of Zolfaqars and even LACMs in order to overwhelm the system.

On that thought, is it possible to overwhelm the MPQ-65 radar the PAC-3 uses? The MPQ-53 used in the PAC-2 can engage 9 targets simultaneously, and according to armyrecognition the maximum target speed is 3 km/s - though, in my experience, armyrecognition is not a good source for information. However the MPQ-65 is quoted as being able to engage more targets than the MPQ-53.