Aamir Hussain
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
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- Jan 28, 2007
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My narration is purely on historic performance of PN in light of the subject of the thread. Going forward, I have explicitly explained in my earlier posts in various other threads, the need for increasing the strength of subs from the present five to atleast twelve boats. Therefore, I agree with you observation on the usefulness of subs as a sea denial instrument.
As far as the battle groups are concerned, yes they have an advatage of projecting air power over long ranges. At the same time, one must appreciate that the use of carrier based airpower was only used sucessfully when there was no offensive capabiltiy of the enemy against them. Predominantly, US has used this tool effectively against weak opposition. UK had a tough time trying to project airpower over Falklands and lost a number of surface units despite operating on the extreme edge of the mission ranges of Argentine a/c.
There are pros and cons of all types of weapons systems. At the height of the cold war, the biggest threat to US Carrier groups were from long range land based supersonic Backfire bombers of Soviet Union and not the subs. They had calculated that their ASW screens would in time detect and eliminate the sub surface threat. The game changer was the supersonic platform and the cruise missile (ALCM) carried by the Backfires. Enough a/c launched against a carrier group would eventually overwhelm the defensive screens -- that was the calculation by the Americans. I am sure you know this quite well -- I mean the cold war;-)
It all boils down to how desparate the war time situation is for Pakistan in the event of a Naval Blockade by Indian carrier group(s). To mitigate this risk PN has done the following:
1. Activating Gawader as an alternative commerical port (There is no stopping PN to base assets there in the time of hostilities). And to hedge against a Naval blockade of both Karachi and Port Qaism.
2. Activate Ormara as the second Naval Base and start housing some of the subs there.
3. Induct airlaunched long range Anti ship missiles (Harpoons)
4. Increase the range of its strike a/c with the induction of Air refueling Tankers.
5. Increase airborne survailance with the induction of Chinese AWACS (specifically based in Southern Command)
6. Plan to induct air launched cruise missiles (Underway)
7. Increase the patrol range of its subs (Also equipped with Harpoons) with AiP.
Steps have been taken -- these are more long term in nature and might not suit the time frame or appetite of our younger audience on this forum -- hence this thread.
As far as your question, yes I do recollect "Brasstacks" and also know fully what dividend India got out of it after spending millions of dollars on deploying assets that far out to the sea, for such a long time.
As far as the battle groups are concerned, yes they have an advatage of projecting air power over long ranges. At the same time, one must appreciate that the use of carrier based airpower was only used sucessfully when there was no offensive capabiltiy of the enemy against them. Predominantly, US has used this tool effectively against weak opposition. UK had a tough time trying to project airpower over Falklands and lost a number of surface units despite operating on the extreme edge of the mission ranges of Argentine a/c.
There are pros and cons of all types of weapons systems. At the height of the cold war, the biggest threat to US Carrier groups were from long range land based supersonic Backfire bombers of Soviet Union and not the subs. They had calculated that their ASW screens would in time detect and eliminate the sub surface threat. The game changer was the supersonic platform and the cruise missile (ALCM) carried by the Backfires. Enough a/c launched against a carrier group would eventually overwhelm the defensive screens -- that was the calculation by the Americans. I am sure you know this quite well -- I mean the cold war;-)
It all boils down to how desparate the war time situation is for Pakistan in the event of a Naval Blockade by Indian carrier group(s). To mitigate this risk PN has done the following:
1. Activating Gawader as an alternative commerical port (There is no stopping PN to base assets there in the time of hostilities). And to hedge against a Naval blockade of both Karachi and Port Qaism.
2. Activate Ormara as the second Naval Base and start housing some of the subs there.
3. Induct airlaunched long range Anti ship missiles (Harpoons)
4. Increase the range of its strike a/c with the induction of Air refueling Tankers.
5. Increase airborne survailance with the induction of Chinese AWACS (specifically based in Southern Command)
6. Plan to induct air launched cruise missiles (Underway)
7. Increase the patrol range of its subs (Also equipped with Harpoons) with AiP.
Steps have been taken -- these are more long term in nature and might not suit the time frame or appetite of our younger audience on this forum -- hence this thread.
As far as your question, yes I do recollect "Brasstacks" and also know fully what dividend India got out of it after spending millions of dollars on deploying assets that far out to the sea, for such a long time.
