What's behind the decision to revoke the status of Indian administered Kashmir? | Inside Story

[padamchen]

I'm SO sorry - clean forgot. Tomorrow....

Go to sleep man.

Cheers, Doc

 

[El Sidd]

I'm SO sorry - clean forgot. Tomorrow....

Go to sleep man.

Cheers, Doc

Go to sleep as perpetual darkness descends upon India as a plague

 

[padamchen]

Go to sleep as perpetual darkness descends upon India as a plague

You too go to sleep man.

We are old men wasting time on an internet forum on a Saturday night.

I thought you and I were young studs with big biceps.

Cheers, Doc

 

[El Sidd]

You too go to sleep man.

We are old men wasting time on an internet forum on a Saturday night.

I thought you and I were young studs with big biceps.

Cheers, Doc

Times of wise men are over. Times of young blood is here

 

[padamchen]

Times of wise men are over. Times of young blood is here

Young blood is always there to be spilled.

By wise men.

When young nations are young men heavy, it usually means they are either fuking a lot or not warring enough.

Or both.

Cheers, Doc

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Starlord

Thank you for re-posting the programme.

A very balance debate over the recent Developments of Kashmir .

@waz @Oscar @Joe Shearer @Kaniska @Horus @Khafee @war&peace @Areesh @American Pakistani @Rusty @araz @Irfan Baloch @Armchair @Salza @Mrc

I was a little disappointed.

What Art. 370 did (or does; it has not been abolished yet) was grossly misrepresented in detail, although the essence was captured. The roots of Art. 35A and the current context of its removal are worth a longer analysis. On the whole, it would seem to be at best a remote and slightly confused point of view.

 

[niaz]

I am an old man and hence can recall the Terms & Conditions included in The instrument of Accession thru which Raja Hari Singh of Kashmir had agreed to join India on October 27, 1947. This was the real reason why Articles 35a & 370 were included in the Indian Federal Constitution written by B R Ambedkar and ratified by the Indian parliament on Nov 26, 1949.

Kindly take time to read the articles 5, 6 & 7 of the actual document. Which are:


"5. The terms of this my Instrument of accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 unless such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to this Instrument.

6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this state authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in this state deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India.

7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future constitution."

Obviously, Indian gov’t has broken the basic agreement under which Kashmir State had agreed to join the Indian federation.

http://jklaw.nic.in/instrument_of_accession_of_jammu_and_kashmir_state.pdf

I suppose Indians will justify this as ‘Realpolitik’.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I am an old man and hence can recall the Terms & Conditions included in The instrument of Accession thru which Raja Hari Singh of Kashmir had agreed to join India on October 27, 1947. This was the real reason why Articles 35a & 370 were included in the Indian Federal Constitution written by B R Ambedkar and ratified by the Indian parliament on Nov 26, 1949.

Kindly take time to read the articles 5, 6 & 7 of the actual document. Which are:


"5. The terms of this my Instrument of accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 unless such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to this Instrument.

6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this state authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in this state deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India.

7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future constitution."

Obviously, Indian gov’t has broken the basic agreement under which Kashmir State had agreed to join the Indian federation.

http://jklaw.nic.in/instrument_of_accession_of_jammu_and_kashmir_state.pdf

I suppose Indians will justify this as ‘Realpolitik’.

Sir, please do not take this as quibbling; I wish to point out the fundamental difference that was made.

There cannot be partial sovereignty, or a division of sovereignty, unless there is a general agreement on that. The example of Andorra is the exception that proves the rule. Sir Hari Singh entered into an agreement to accede to the Indian Union on these terms, and two matters arise out of this: first, were the terms followed? Second, were the terms challenged by a legal contestant of the agreement, and, if so, does the agreement hold good?

Regarding the terms, section 5 was not violated; there was no change made to the India Independence Act.

Regarding section 6, that applies to the application of the legal principle of Eminent Domain. That has never, to my knowledge, been applied anywhere within Kashmir. The repeal of Art. 35A of the Indian Constitution does not relate to this, but to the individual right to own property, not to the rights of the state.

Regarding section 7, there too nothing was done to compel any acceptance of the Constitution of India by the sovereign. Hari Singh having handed over his sovereignty to the state legislature through the promulgation of the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, to accept or not to accept the over-arching jurisdiction of the Indian Constitution was left to the Constituent Assembly concerned, and to the Constitution that they formed. There the matter is clear. There is no ambiguity.

Those of us who object to what has been done do so on different grounds. I would not like to explain that stand in this forum, as there has already been enormous controversy within my own country over the role of those of us opposed to these actions. I have come to abjure adjectives and adverbs in my writing for fear of the multitude.

The second point I seek your permission to leave for the consideration of @M. Sarmad; I acknowledge the mischievous element in my request, but he has bested me so often in our discussions that it gives me great pleasure to contemplate handing him a grenade with the pin extracted. If, of course, you permit this graceful gesture.

 

[niaz]

Sir, please do not take this as quibbling; I wish to point out the fundamental difference that was made.

There cannot be partial sovereignty, or a division of sovereignty, unless there is a general agreement on that. The example of Andorra is the exception that proves the rule. Sir Hari Singh entered into an agreement to accede to the Indian Union on these terms, and two matters arise out of this: first, were the terms followed? Second, were the terms challenged by a legal contestant of the agreement, and, if so, does the agreement hold good?

Regarding the terms, section 5 was not violated; there was no change made to the India Independence Act.

Regarding section 6, that applies to the application of the legal principle of Eminent Domain. That has never, to my knowledge, been applied anywhere within Kashmir. The repeal of Art. 35A of the Indian Constitution does not relate to this, but to the individual right to own property, not to the rights of the state.

Regarding section 7, there too nothing was done to compel any acceptance of the Constitution of India by the sovereign. Hari Singh having handed over his sovereignty to the state legislature through the promulgation of the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, to accept or not to accept the over-arching jurisdiction of the Indian Constitution was left to the Constituent Assembly concerned, and to the Constitution that they formed. There the matter is clear. There is no ambiguity.

Those of us who object to what has been done do so on different grounds. I would not like to explain that stand in this forum, as there has already been enormous controversy within my own country over the role of those of us opposed to these actions. I have come to abjure adjectives and adverbs in my writing for fear of the multitude.

The second point I seek your permission to leave for the consideration of @M. Sarmad; I acknowledge the mischievous element in my request, but he has bested me so often in our discussions that it gives me great pleasure to contemplate handing him a grenade with the pin extracted. If, of course, you permit this graceful gesture.

Honorable Joe Shearer,

I always value & welcome your opinions as these always have a sound basis. I would also not deny that 'Partial Sovereignty' is unheard of under normal circumstances.

IMO. the circumstances under which the Instrument of Aggression was signed were abnormal. Raja Hari Singh wanted to remain independent; however, his army had been kicked out of Gilgit & Baltistan region. Additionally, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, Secretary of the Jammu & Kashmir Conference, had distanced himself from Sh. Abdullah and demanded the affiliation of Kashmir with Pakistan as early as July 1947. Raja's forces had also lost ground to the forces of Sardar Abdul Qayyum (a native of Poonch) & the Afghan tribals.

Raja, therefore, asked Lord Mountbatten (Gov Gen of India) for help. He was told that India could not help unless Kashmir had joined the Indian Federation.

Under these circumstances, the Raja agreed, but he still kept partial sovereignty. There was no change until 1954 when thru a Presidential Order Pundit Nehru extended several provisions of Indian Constitution over Kashmir. This was just after Pundit Nehru had replaced Sh Abdullah with Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed. Two years later in 1956, Nehru managed to get J&K Constituent Assembly under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed (CM of J&K until 1964) pass a resolution making Kashmir an integral part of India. In 1957, J& K Constituent Assembly was also dissolved and replaced by a Legislative Assembly after an election. Narendra Modi, however, has gone a step too far and even bifurcated the Indian held Kashmir into two parts.


You would recall that Kashmir was largely peaceful until the disputed 1987 elections which gave rise to the formation of J&K Liberation Front. It also hard to deny that the insurgency received support from the Pakistan based organizations. Nevertheless; as late as 2010 the insurgency was not out of control.

Current unrest, however, started after the killing of Burhan Wani on 8th July 2016 during an anti-insurgency operation. I cannot but empathize with the people of the valley who; for whatever be the reason; have been suffering badly ever since. I am however a realist and fully understand why no Indian; no matter how unbiased & rational, would agree with my point of view.

I am of the view that this action was unjust and in effect, goes against the very basis of the Instrument of Accession. The right of non-Kashmiris to buy property in Kashmir would enable Narender Modi to alter the demographics of the valley.

This is, however, is a very touchy subject for both India & Pakistan and no political leader can afford to give way. The resolution of the Kashmir problem is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Honorable Joe Shearer,

I always value & welcome your opinions as the same always a sound basis. I would also do not deny that 'Partial Sovereignty' is unheard of under normal circumstances.

IMO. the circumstances under which the Instrument of Aggression was signed were abnormal. Raja Hari Singh wanted to remain independent; however, his army had been kicked out of Gilgit & Baltistan region. Additionally, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, Secretary of the Jammu & Kashmir Conference, had distanced himself from Sh. Abdullah and demanded the affiliation of Kashmir with Pakistan as early as July 1947. Raja's forces had also lost ground to the forces of Sardar Abdul Qayyum (a native of Poonch) & the Afghan tribals.

Raja, therefore, asked Lord Mountbatten (Gov Gen of India) for help. He was told that India could not help unless Kashmir had joined the Indian Federation.

Under these circumstances, the Raja agreed, but he still kept partial sovereignty. There was no change until 1954 when thru a Presidential Order in 1954 Pundit Nehru extended several provisions of Indian Constitution over Kashmir. This was just after Pundit Nehru had replaced Sh Abdullah with Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed. Two years later in 1956, Nehru managed to get J&K Constituent Assembly under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed (CM of J&K until 1964) pass a resolution making Kashmir as an integral part of India. In 1957, J& K Constituent Assembly was also dissolved and replaced by a Legislative Assembly after an election. Narendra Modi, however, has gone a step too far and even bifurcated the Indian held Kashmir into two parts.


You would recall that Kashmir was largely peaceful until the disputed 1987 elections which gave rise to the formation of J&K Liberation Front. It also hard to deny that the insurgency received support from the Pakistan based organizations. Nevertheless; as late as 2010 the insurgency was not out of control.

Current unrest, however, started after the killing of Burhan Wani on 8th July 2016 during an anti-insurgency operation. I cannot but empathize with the people of the valley who; for whatever be the reason; have been suffering badly ever since. I am however a realist and fully understand why no Indian; no matter how unbiased & rational, would agree with my point of view.

I am of the view that this action was unjust and in effect, goes against the very basis of the Instrument of Accession. The right of non-Kashmiris to buy property in Kashmir would enable Narender Modi to alter the demographics of the valley.

This is, however, is a very touchy subject for both India & Pakistan and no political leader can afford to give way. The resolution of the Kashmir problem is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Sir,

It is perhaps an index of bias and irrationality to agree with your point of view, with all that you have said until that sentence. It is better not to comment in great detail on what you have said beyond that point, following the dictum that discretion is the better part of valour.

As always, your narration is illuminating. You will forgive your sincere adherent for remarking, however, that the internal dynamics of what we have seen happening is fascinating, even rivetting, but in considering the broader sweep of events, we would do well to concentrate on the ultimate legally binding result.

My country's official position is that the Kashmir problem has been resolved. It is increasingly difficult to dissent, and I am no intention of seeking martyrdom. Without, therefore, specific comment on your last sentence, it may suffice to express my personal distress at the suffering that the people of the Vale have undergone over the last seventy years; all the people, including the unfortunate Pandits. May Providence deal kindly with these gentle, docile, peaceful people.

 

[niaz]

An article published in the Washington Post written by the notable Indian journalist Burkha Dutt. One may not agree about many of her remarks, but the conclusion she is drawing is based on rational thinking. I leave it to the readers to decide about what to make of it. IMO it is always prudent to know what the other side thinks.

By Barkha Dutt
August 14 at 8:12 AM
Pakistan has been in a state of apoplectic hysteria ever since India scrapped Article 370, a part of the Indian constitution that gave constitutional autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. Prime Minister Imran Khan has compared Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government to Hitler and Nazism and has spoken, entirely without evidence or context, of an “impending genocide.” A minister in his cabinet has even gone so far as to call for a mutiny in the Indian army.

The hyperbole has been accompanied by drastic action: India’s envoy to Pakistan has been sent home; diplomatic relations have been downgraded; trade, such it was, has been halted; and Bollywood (without which no Pakistani wedding is complete) has been banned from domestic screens.

Pakistan has painted itself into a corner, with no road map to make its way back. It says it will reconsider the decision to downgrade diplomatic ties if India reverts its Kashmir move. Since that is not about to happen — short of a legal ruling by India’s Supreme Court — how will Pakistan backpedal its way from the dead end?

Its response has been knee-jerk, unfathomable — and, above all, ironic. Every outburst and flailing against India only validates the Modi government and rallies Indian public opinion behind it. In other words, while claiming to lash out at him, Pakistan is only making Modi look better, even among those Indians who do not agree with the prime minister’s handling of Kashmir.

First, there is the mystery of why Pakistan would get so publicly agitated over a provision of the Indian constitution. For decades, its deep state has run “training camps” for Kashmiri militant groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen and nurtured terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Before 9/11, when the world was still more indulgent of such nomenclatures, Pakistan called them “freedom fighters.” Pakistan’s entire Kashmir policy is based on the patronage of those who want secession from India and are prepared to kill or die for it. That it is now tying itself in knots over Article 370 would mean that it intrinsically accepts the terms on which Jammu and Kashmir negotiated its accession to India. Is Pakistan really fighting for Indian constitutionalism? In that case, even the parts of the erstwhile kingdom that it holds in its control since its raiders invaded India in 1947 — the area that India calls Azad Kashmir — should be looked at through the prism of the same constitutional framework.



Pakistan’s allegation is that by withdrawing Kashmir’s special status, the Bharatiya Janata Party wants to alter the demographics of what has been India’s only Muslim-majority state. But, in fact, Indian historians are reminding Pakistan that in the areas of Gilgit and Baltistan — parts of the former princely kingdom that came into Pakistan’s control after the defection of British military officers — tinkering with religious composition was very much part of Pakistan’s strategy. India has pointed out that in the 1970s it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who changed the state subject rules so that Sunnis could be pushed into an otherwise Shiite-majority area. This was followed by military dictator Zia-Ul-Haq, whose aggressive Islamization drive across Pakistan is well documented; on his watch, sectarianism in Gilgit was consciously fueled, including the notorious massacre of hundreds of Shiites in the region by a religious militia.

The Modi government’s actions in Kashmir have led to a robust debate within India. While the prime minister appears to have scored points on domestic politics, his government has also had to face vocal criticism about the extended communication clampdown in Kashmir, the detention of mainstream Kashmiri politicians and the unilateralism with which such a big decision was made. It will take several months before we are able to determine how this impacts the three-decade-old insurgency in the region.

But the moment Pakistan frames its conversation in terms of internationalizing the Kashmir issue, or its leaders make patently untrue and ludicrous statements, Indians will close ranks. Even Kashmiris who have been scathing about the decision to take away Article 370 realize that Pakistan is doing them no favors. Shah Faesal, a civil servant turned Kashmiri politician, told me Pakistan’s response “only vindicates the Modi government and helps them tighten the screws on us.“

No Indian, not even the most anti-establishment citizen, wants to be seen as reinforcing Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.

And on the world stage there are few takers for Pakistan’s position, something its foreign affairs minister even admits. Russia has already endorsed the Indian position. Pakistan’s main benefactor, China, is the most likely to be unhappy with India — not so much on behalf of Islamabad but because of its own boundary disputes with India. But how much attention can it afford to expend on this given the battle it faces in Hong Kong?

And President Trump? The U.S. leader perhaps triggered India into taking an earlier decision than intended with his unthinking offer to mediate on Kashmir. But his 2020 reelection bid is tied in part to delivering on his promise to bring U.S. troops home from Afghanistan. For this, he needs Khan and the Pakistani army to focus on the endgame. Would he really want another military conflagration to erupt between India and Pakistan?

Yet, in India, there is an expectation that Pakistan will not draw the line at proclamations, denunciations and downgraded diplomatic relations. There is talk in the highest levels of the military about Pakistan escalating its asymmetric warfare against India by unleashing more terrorist attacks, either within Kashmir or elsewhere in India. In February this year, an attack in Kashmir, which India linked to the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-E-Mohammed, took the two nations to the brink of war. Khan has more than alluded to the fact that similar attacks could take place, even though he denies Pakistan’s responsibility for them.

If there were to be a violent response from Pakistan in the form of a terrorist strike, you can be sure that any domestic disagreement on Modi’s Kashmir doctrine would be buried.

Pakistan’s interference is only making the Indian prime minister stronger. The biggest favor it could do for the Kashmiri people at this stage would be to stay out.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin...-should-stay-out-this/?wpisrc=nl_popns&wpmm=1

 

[Psychic]

An article published in the Washington Post written by the notable Indian journalist Burkha Dutt. One may not agree about many of her remarks, but the conclusion she is drawing is based on rational thinking. I leave it to the readers to decide about what to make of it. IMO it is always prudent to know what the other side thinks.

By Barkha Dutt
August 14 at 8:12 AM
Pakistan has been in a state of apoplectic hysteria ever since India scrapped Article 370, a part of the Indian constitution that gave constitutional autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. Prime Minister Imran Khan has compared Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government to Hitler and Nazism and has spoken, entirely without evidence or context, of an “impending genocide.” A minister in his cabinet has even gone so far as to call for a mutiny in the Indian army.

The hyperbole has been accompanied by drastic action: India’s envoy to Pakistan has been sent home; diplomatic relations have been downgraded; trade, such it was, has been halted; and Bollywood (without which no Pakistani wedding is complete) has been banned from domestic screens.

Pakistan has painted itself into a corner, with no road map to make its way back. It says it will reconsider the decision to downgrade diplomatic ties if India reverts its Kashmir move. Since that is not about to happen — short of a legal ruling by India’s Supreme Court — how will Pakistan backpedal its way from the dead end?

Its response has been knee-jerk, unfathomable — and, above all, ironic. Every outburst and flailing against India only validates the Modi government and rallies Indian public opinion behind it. In other words, while claiming to lash out at him, Pakistan is only making Modi look better, even among those Indians who do not agree with the prime minister’s handling of Kashmir.

First, there is the mystery of why Pakistan would get so publicly agitated over a provision of the Indian constitution. For decades, its deep state has run “training camps” for Kashmiri militant groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen and nurtured terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Before 9/11, when the world was still more indulgent of such nomenclatures, Pakistan called them “freedom fighters.” Pakistan’s entire Kashmir policy is based on the patronage of those who want secession from India and are prepared to kill or die for it. That it is now tying itself in knots over Article 370 would mean that it intrinsically accepts the terms on which Jammu and Kashmir negotiated its accession to India. Is Pakistan really fighting for Indian constitutionalism? In that case, even the parts of the erstwhile kingdom that it holds in its control since its raiders invaded India in 1947 — the area that India calls Azad Kashmir — should be looked at through the prism of the same constitutional framework.



Pakistan’s allegation is that by withdrawing Kashmir’s special status, the Bharatiya Janata Party wants to alter the demographics of what has been India’s only Muslim-majority state. But, in fact, Indian historians are reminding Pakistan that in the areas of Gilgit and Baltistan — parts of the former princely kingdom that came into Pakistan’s control after the defection of British military officers — tinkering with religious composition was very much part of Pakistan’s strategy. India has pointed out that in the 1970s it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who changed the state subject rules so that Sunnis could be pushed into an otherwise Shiite-majority area. This was followed by military dictator Zia-Ul-Haq, whose aggressive Islamization drive across Pakistan is well documented; on his watch, sectarianism in Gilgit was consciously fueled, including the notorious massacre of hundreds of Shiites in the region by a religious militia.

The Modi government’s actions in Kashmir have led to a robust debate within India. While the prime minister appears to have scored points on domestic politics, his government has also had to face vocal criticism about the extended communication clampdown in Kashmir, the detention of mainstream Kashmiri politicians and the unilateralism with which such a big decision was made. It will take several months before we are able to determine how this impacts the three-decade-old insurgency in the region.

But the moment Pakistan frames its conversation in terms of internationalizing the Kashmir issue, or its leaders make patently untrue and ludicrous statements, Indians will close ranks. Even Kashmiris who have been scathing about the decision to take away Article 370 realize that Pakistan is doing them no favors. Shah Faesal, a civil servant turned Kashmiri politician, told me Pakistan’s response “only vindicates the Modi government and helps them tighten the screws on us.“

No Indian, not even the most anti-establishment citizen, wants to be seen as reinforcing Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.

And on the world stage there are few takers for Pakistan’s position, something its foreign affairs minister even admits. Russia has already endorsed the Indian position. Pakistan’s main benefactor, China, is the most likely to be unhappy with India — not so much on behalf of Islamabad but because of its own boundary disputes with India. But how much attention can it afford to expend on this given the battle it faces in Hong Kong?

And President Trump? The U.S. leader perhaps triggered India into taking an earlier decision than intended with his unthinking offer to mediate on Kashmir. But his 2020 reelection bid is tied in part to delivering on his promise to bring U.S. troops home from Afghanistan. For this, he needs Khan and the Pakistani army to focus on the endgame. Would he really want another military conflagration to erupt between India and Pakistan?

Yet, in India, there is an expectation that Pakistan will not draw the line at proclamations, denunciations and downgraded diplomatic relations. There is talk in the highest levels of the military about Pakistan escalating its asymmetric warfare against India by unleashing more terrorist attacks, either within Kashmir or elsewhere in India. In February this year, an attack in Kashmir, which India linked to the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-E-Mohammed, took the two nations to the brink of war. Khan has more than alluded to the fact that similar attacks could take place, even though he denies Pakistan’s responsibility for them.

If there were to be a violent response from Pakistan in the form of a terrorist strike, you can be sure that any domestic disagreement on Modi’s Kashmir doctrine would be buried.

Pakistan’s interference is only making the Indian prime minister stronger. The biggest favor it could do for the Kashmiri people at this stage would be to stay out.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin...-should-stay-out-this/?wpisrc=nl_popns&wpmm=1

Barkha has always been a supporter of Indian occupation. Anyone who justifies Indian colonialism and state terror, is not credible to begin with.

Freedom can never be achieved through stone pelting but through the barrel of gun. The sooner this fact is realized the better.

Pakistan’s allegation is that by withdrawing Kashmir’s special status, the Bharatiya Janata Party wants to alter the demographics of what has been India’s only Muslim-majority state. But, in fact, Indian historians are reminding Pakistan that in the areas of Gilgit and Baltistan — parts of the former princely kingdom that came into Pakistan’s control after the defection of British military officers — tinkering with religious composition was very much part of Pakistan’s strategy. India has pointed out that in the 1970s it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who changed the state subject rules so that Sunnis could be pushed into an otherwise Shiite-majority area. This was followed by military dictator Zia-Ul-Haq, whose aggressive Islamization drive across Pakistan is well documented; on his watch, sectarianism in Gilgit was consciously fueled, including the notorious massacre of hundreds of Shiites in the region by a religious militia.

Bunk