the information that you provided regarding the cancellation,s or sanctions is completely wrong i think the pressler amendment sanction was put in the early 1990's while the nuclear test's were done on may 28th/30th 1998. nearly the end of the 1990,s
sir muradk
salaam sir, can you please tell us more about the pressler amendment regarding the time and sale of the F-16's
thank you
A simpler way to explain what Pressler Amendment is
On March 28, 1984, this Committee adopted an amendment offered by Sen. Cranston providing that no assistance shall be furnished and `no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan' unless the President could first certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, is not developing a nuclear device, and is not acquiring goods to make such a device. On April 3, 1984, the Committee narrowly voted to reconsider this amendment and adopted instead a substitute offered by Senator Pressler, Mathias and Percy, which tied the continuation of aid and military sales to two certification conditions:
(1) That Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device.
(2) That new aid `will reduce significantly the risk' that Pakistan will possess such a device. This text, which was enacted on another bill in August 1985, has come to be called the `Pressler amendment.'
the following was also discussed after the delivery of F-16s.
Are Pakistan's F-16's `Nuclear-Capable'? It Depends on Who You Ask
[Sen. Glenn]--`How about delivery systems? Is there any evidence that Pakistan converted F-16s for possible nuclear delivery use?
[Gates]--`We know that they are--or we have information that suggests that they're clearly interested in enhancing the ability of the F-16 to delivery weapons safely. But we don't really have--they don't require those changes, I don't think, to deliver a weapon. We could perhaps provide some additional detail in a classified manner.'
`Assessing ballistic missile proliferation and its control,' report of Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, November 1991:
`Pakistani F-16 aircraft could be effective nuclear-delivery vehicles even if Pakistan's nuclear warheads are large and heavy.'
`Western intelligence sources' cited in U.S. News & World Report, 12 February 1990:
`The sources say Pakistan, in violation of agreements with Washington, is busily converting U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter planes--60 more are scheduled to be sent this year--into potential nuclear-weapons carriers by outfitting them with special structures attached to the plane's underwing carriage. The structure allows the mounting of a dummy under one wing of the F-16 to balance the weight of the bomb under the other wing.'
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes, testimony before House Subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
`In order to deliver a nuclear device with any reasonable degree of accuracy and safety, it first would be necessary to replace the entire wiring package in the aircraft. In addition to building a weapons carriage mount, one would also have to re-do the fire control computer, the stores management system, and mission computer software to allow the weapon to be dropped accurately and to redistribute weight and balance after release. We believe this capability far exceeds the state of the art in Pakistan and could only be accomplished with a major release of data and industrial equipment from the U.S.'
[Rep. Solarz]--Now, in your testimony, Mr. Hughes, I gather you've said that the F-16s which we have already sold them are not nuclear capable?
[Hughes]--That's right, sir.
[Rep. Solarz]--And the planes we're planning to sell will not be configured in such a way that they could deliver nuclear ordnance?
[Hughes]--That's right, Mr. Chairman.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Schaffer, testimony before House Subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
`None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery. Pakistan, moreover, will be obligated by contract not to modify its new acquisitions without the approval of the United States.'
Views attributed to German Intelligence Agency (BND), in Der Spiegel, 24 July 1989:
`The Pakistanis have secretly planned to use the fighter aircraft as a delivery system for their bomb. According to a report by the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), relevant tests have already been successfully concluded. The BND has reported to the Chancellor's Office that, using an F-16 model, the Pakistanis have made wind tunnel tests and have designed the shell of the bomb in a way that allows them to install it underneath the wings. At the same time, the detonating mechanism has been improved, so that the weapon can now be used. According to the BND report, the Pakistanis long ago found out how to program the F-16 on-board computer to carry out the relevant flight maneuvers in dropping the bomb. According to the report from Pullach [BND headquarters], they also know how to make the electronic contact between the aircraft and the bomb.'
Sen. John Glenn, letter to President Ronald Reagan, 5 March 1987:
`And I believe we should continue to try to provide assistance to the Afghans. But if the price that must now be paid is acceptance of Pakistani nuclear weapons production along with the continued provision of a `made in the U.S.A.' delivery system (F-16s), a combination certain to ultimately erode the national security of the United States and some of its closest allies, then the price is too high.'
Undersecretary of State James Buckley, testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 November 1981:
[Sen. Hayakawa]--`Do the F-16's provide Pakistan with a delivery system for nuclear device?'
[Bukcley]--`Yes they would. But by the same token, that is not the only aircraft that would have that capability. My understanding is that the Mirage III currently possessed by Pakistan, would have the capability of delivering a small nuclear device.'
E.F. Von Marbod, Director of Defense Security Assistance Agency, testimony before two House subcommittees, 16 September 1981:
[Solarz]--`I gather the F-16's are technically capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Will the F-16's supplied Pakistan be able to carry nuclear weapons?'
[Von Marbod]--`Mr. Solarz, all nuclear capabilities will be deleted from these F-16's. All wiring to the pylons, all computer software programs that manage the hardware stores and all cockpit controls that are nuclear-related.'
Remember that the American have been implementing the above when ever they want.
From Myth to Reality: Evidence of Pakistan's `Nuclear Restraint'
Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.
Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-grade enriched uranium from China.
1980--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Reexport via Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge enrichment activities).
1981--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: New York, zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).
1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State Department cable stating `We have strong reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives capability * * * Pakistan is conducting a program for the design and development of a triggering package for nuclear explosive devices.'
1981--Publication of book, Islamic Bomb, citing recent Pakistani efforts to construct a nuclear test site.
1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire bomb parts (13-inch `steel spheres' and `steel petal shapes').
1983--Recently declassified US government assessment concludes that `There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program * * * We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear weapons.'
1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a `very modest' uranium enrichment capability for `nothing but peaceful purposes.'
1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of `grave consequences' if it enriches uranium above 5%.
1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has `successfully tested' a `firing mechanism' of an atomic bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US krytrons `have been acquired' by Pakistan.
1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Texas, krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).
1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: US cancelled license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.
1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US.
1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged DIA report saying Pakistan `detonated a high explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5% level.
1986--Press reports cite U.S. `Special National Intelligence Estimate' concluding that Pakistan had produced weapons-grade material.
1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General Zia tells interviewer, `It is our right to obtain the technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us.'
1986--Recently declassified memo to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states, `Despite strong U.S. concern, Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability * * * If operated at its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material to build several nuclear devices per year.'
1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture and bomb components).
1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant in Pakistan.
1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist states in published interview that `what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct.'
1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for `at least 93% enrichment' of uranium; blueprints of uranium enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.
1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: California, oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon R&D).
1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK government official tells German counterpart on European nonproliferation working group that he was `convinced that Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.'
1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan due to an export control violation; in his formal certification, he confirmed that `material, equipment, or technology covered by that provision was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.'
1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.
1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability `that is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.'
1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence service.
1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meets `nuclear-capable' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.
1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that `Clearly Pakistan is engaged in developing a nuclear capability.'
1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and tritium facility from West Germany in mid-1980's.
1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to missile program in Pakistan.
1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iraq.
1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States has issued `about 100 specific communiques to the West German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations;' exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery facility.
1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states `sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.'
1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West German magazine Stern reports, `since the beginning of the eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons program.'
1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms control authority, claims US has turned a `blind eye' to proliferation developments Pakistan in and Israel.
1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's democratically elected government after a year in office; Glenn concluded, `There simply must be a cost to non-compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.'
1989-1990--reports of secret construction of unsafeguard nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.
1990--US News cites `western intelligence sources' claiming Pakistan recently `cold-tested' a nuclear device and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.
1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German government document citing claim by UK official that British government believes Pakistan already possesses `a few small' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.
1990--London Sunday Times cites growing U.S. and Soviet concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16 aircraft are being modified for nuclear delivery purposes; claims US spy satellites have observed `heavily armed convoys' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at Kahuta and heading for military airfields.
1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed `model' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.
1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports `US officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear weapons technology.'
1990--Dr. A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives `Man of the Nation Award.'
1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear and missile applications.
1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-capable M-11 missile from China.
1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, `Last July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear Pakistan warheads. And they've still got them.'
1991--Time quotes businessman, `BCCI is functioning as the owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.'
1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses Pakistan's possession of `cores' of nuclear devices.
Something very Interesting:
Shockingly, testimony by Secretary of State James Baker this year revealed that the Ragen / Bush administration has continued to allow Pakistan to purchase munitions through commercial transactions, despite the explicit, unambiguous intent of Congress that `no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan.' These sales may have included spare parts for F-16 aircraft.
Pakistan US Relation
Pakistan - US relations can be divided into three distinct phases: The Cold War period; the years of crisis in the relationship from 1990 to 1993; and the current phase of repairing, rebuilding and redefining relations in the post-Cold War era. To review the latter, it is necessary to place the current phase in its historical context.
The foreign policy of Pakistan, from the very inception of the country
over half a century ago, was driven by the quest for security. Pakistan's geographical location and historic legacy confronted the country with a grave threat to its security and territorial integrity. The Kashmir dispute, bequeathed by British colonial rule, and India's hegemonic ambitions placed us in a perpetual state of confrontation with New Delhi. To make matters worse, India's relations with the then Soviet Union, a power with expansionist designs in the region, compounded Pakistan's security dilemma. The partnership between Pakistan and the US can therefore be described as a strategic necessity during the Cold War.
Throughout the four decades of the Cold War, the two countries forged a partnership to contain Soviet expansionism, and for Pakistan by extension, Indian hegemonic impulses backed by Moscow. As a result, South Asia became deeply enmeshed in the structure of superpower rivalry, while Pakistan's membership of military pacts like SEATO and CENTO earned it the pejorative designation of the most allied ally' of the US.
This Cold War relationship was in many ways a subset of the two countries' other strategic concerns. Pakistan's being India, while for the Americans it was the containment of communism. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 however, brought a convergence of Pakistan and US interests and concerns.
The Soviet invasion placed Pakistan in a tenuous two-front situation: between the Kremlin's allies to its east and west. The close partnership forged between Pakistan and the U.S. helped the Afghans resist Soviet occupation of their country, eventually leading to the rollback of communism. It was no accident that in the very year that the Soviets were forced to retreat from Afghanistan, the Berlin war crumbled in Europe. The Afghan war, therefore, turned out to be an event in the chain of events that led to the end of the Cold War.
But the end of the Cold War did not leave South Asia in a state of peace and stability. Indeed Pakistan was left on its own to clear the debris of the last of the Cold War conflicts, in the shape of over two million Afghan refugees, proliferation of sophisticated weapons and the profusion of narcotics which spread from the uncontrolled areas of Afghanistan to parts of Pakistan.
The end of the Cold War also persuaded the US to re-evaluate and downgrade its relationship with Pakistan on the ground that the new global environment did not warrant the old strategic partnership. An immediate and far reaching consequence was the emergence of differences between the two countries on the nuclear issue. In October 1990, economic and military sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under the
Pressler Amendment, a country-specific law that singles out only one nation on the nuclear issue. One consequence of the Pressler sanctions was the US decision to withhold Pakistan military equipment contracted prior to 1990, worth about $1.2 billion, even though Pakistan had paid for this.
In Pakistan's perception it was no accident that the application of sanctions coincided with the end of the Cold War. The Pressler sanctions were applied when Pakistan's co-operation was no longer needed following the demise of the Soviet Union.
At any rate, this punitive action triggered the crisis phase in relations, thus also rendering more difficult the task of making a smooth transition to a post-Cold War relationship 1990-1993 became crisis-ridden years. Instead of the two countries directing their energy and focus to craft a new relationship geared to embracing the future, both became bogged down in fire-fighting one crisis after another in their ties - over the nuclear issue, terrorism and also narcotics. Relations sunk to an all-time low when Washington threatened in 1992/93 to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. Then in the summer of 1993 additional sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) for allegedly receiving missile technology from China.
As a result, the bilateral interaction became virtually confined to crisis-management or damage-limitation efforts. The relationship seemed to be a state of free fall. The only silver lining in this downslide was Pakistan-US collaboration in international peace-keeping operations, notably in Somalia.
The irony about U.S. non-proliferation policy in South Asia was that
while the impetus for proliferation at every step came from India, it was Pakistan, and not India, that was subjected to penalties, embargoes and sanctions.
Perversely Pakistan became the victim of penalties for what India had
done in 1974 with its explosion of a nuclear device. US nonproliferation laws such as the 1976 Symington Amendment which was later modified by the 1977 Glenn Amendment, called for halting economic or military assistance to any country which delivered or acquired after 1976 nuclear enrichment materials or technology, unless it accepted fullscope safeguards. This meant that India which had already acquired a reprocessing capability was excluded from the ambit of American non-proliferation laws.
The Pressler Amendment enacted in 1985, specifically prohibited U.S. assistance or military sales to Pakistan unless annual Presidential certification was issued that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. This certification was denied in October 1990, triggering wideranging sanctions against Pakistan.
In those crisis years, Pakistan maintained that despite differences over the nuclear issue, the two countries should act to limit further damage to their relations. Bilateral ties, Islamabad argued, ought not be viewed though the single and exclusive prism of nuclear proliferation and that a second track should be evolved to make progress in areas of convergence. Pakistan and the US shared a number of goals, at the regional and global levels, that made it essential not to allow relations becoming hostage to a single issue.
Pakistan also argued that the goal of nuclear nonproliferation could only be advanced in the region on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis and not by the imposition of penalties on one country, while overlooking the nuclear conduct of the country that started this race in the first place. Pakistan's security concerns vis-a-vis India, which had already demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability in 1974, and which enjoyed a conventional military force ratio of three to one, warranted the pursuit of a regional approach to nonproliferation. Pakistan could not, therefore, be expected to make unilateral concessions. While the US accepted this logic in principle, the continued application of Pressler sanctions was at variance with this declared policy.
Against this troubled backdrop, efforts to normalise ties got underway
in the Fall of 1993. The efforts to repair ties were the cumulative result of a variety of factors which included a new appreciation in Washington Ñ on the part of both the US Executive and Legislature Ñ of the security concerns that drove Pakistan's nuclear programme, as well as recognition of the counterproductive outcome of the sanctions approach.
A significant factor that contributed to the efforts to re-engage, was Pakistan's economic liberalisation programme. The moves towards a
market-based economy provided the impetus to efforts to chart new areas of collaboration in promoting trade and investment. Economic liberalisation became the vehicle for significant re-engagement and helped to extricate the relationship from the undimensional nonproliferation groove it had long been stuck in.
Defence Secretary William Perry's visit to Pakistan in January 1995 was another step forward in the process to mend ties in the defence and security sphere. During this visit, the Pakistan-US Defence Consultative
Group on security issues, which had not met since 1990, was revived.
Secretary Perry returned to America to also publicly declare that Pressler had become a blunt instrument, that had not achieved the policy goals of its supporters. He also concluded that Pressler was hindering rather than helping to avert a nuclear race in the subcontinent.
This appreciation, in the context of the Clinton Administration's promise of evenhandedness towards South Asia, set the stage for the progress achieved in the highest level exchange between the two countries since the end of the Cold War: the meeting in April 1995, between former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and President Bill Clinton.
Referring to the unfairness of the Pressler approach, and specifically to the embargoed military equipment, President Clinton indicated his desire to take corrective action to put relations back on a normal course. In acknowledging that a broad subcontinental and regional approach was required to pursue US nonproliferation objectives in South Asia, the American President signalled a shift away from the punitive approach that had been pursued thus far by the Washington. In the joint statement issued at the conclusion of this visit, President Clinton declared his intention to work with Congress to revise the Pressler Amendment.
A critical dimension of the efforts to restore normalcy in relations was the lead role played by the US Congress. Indeed it can even be said that what encouraged President Clinton to take the public stance that he did, and his Administration to undertake subsequent steps, was the growing recognition on Capital Hill that the Pressler issue needed to be re-visited, so that a fraying relationship could be restored and revitalised.
In May 1995, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted by a near unanimous, bipartisan vote, an amendment moved by Republican Senator, Hank Brown to ease Pressler sanctions. This sought to remove from the purview of Pressler all non-military assistance. In the House of Representatives, a similar effort was spearheaded by the newly elected Republican Chairman of the House International Relations Sub-Committee on South Asia, Doug Bereuter, who proposed an amendment to remove Pressler restrictions on all forms of non-military assistance.
These actions proved to be vital building blocks in the laborious process of American law making leading to the adoption, later in the year, of the Brown Amendment. The amendment, sponsored by a Republican Senator and promoted by a Democratic Administration, reflected a bipartisan consensus in Washington to repair the bilateral relationship by taking the first significant step towards ending the inequitious treatment meted out to Pakistan under the discriminatory Pressler Amendment.
This modification of the Pressler law removed from its ambit all non-military assistance, as well as provision of IMET (International Military Education Training), while providing, in a one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment, the release of embargoed military equipment worth about $368 million. Not released under this law were the 28 F-16s for which President Clinton made a good-faith pledge to reimburse Pakistan the money it had paid for the fighter aircraft.
From Pakistan's point of view, more important than the material benefits of the Brown Amendment was its symbolic significance and political message. It marked the first concrete step taken by the United States in five years to remove a major obstacle in the conduct of Pak-US relations. The amendment did not condition improvement of relations with Pakistan on any nuclear quid pro quo. And it indicated a desire on the part of both Congress and the Administration to normalise ties with a country deemed to be strategically important.
The potential for this relationship to evolve is considerable. But it is apparent that there are significant divergences between Pakistan and the US on a range of issues, especially nuclear and missile proliferation in the region and Washington's India and Kashmir policies.
An impression gaining ground in Pakistan in recent years is of the US tilting its position on Kashmir towards India by tacitly endorsing the status quo. However, if Washington advises Pakistan to accept the unjust status quo, this would be short-sighted policy. The Kashmiri people will continue to resist Indian occupation at varying levels of intensity. Kashmir will remain an open wound in relations between India and Pakistan unless a serious and concerted effort is made to resolve this problem.
Pakistan has suggested a genuine dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue.
In this dialogue the APHC (All Parties Hurriyat Conference) should be associated. Simultaneously there should be a de-escalation in Indian repression and the gradual withdrawal of Indian troops. But genuine negotiations rather than just the facade of bilateral talks need to be pursued on Kashmir. To be durable, a settlement will have to be based on the wishes of the Kashmiri people.
On nonproliferation, the need is for the US to adopt an evenhanded approach, in words and in deeds. The lack of evenhandedness has encouraged Indian nuclear escalation. Unless an evenhanded approach is adopted, India will continue its nuclear escalation and Pakistan will be obliged to respond.
How Kashmir, India's nuclear ambitions and security issues are addressed and the positions that the US takes on these will not determine the future course and substance of Pakistan-US relations. For the moment, the bilateral relationship having moved out of the crisis mode, remains in search of substance.
The Article is no way or any Insult our Indian members on PFF.
MK
BTW, the IAF still hasn't upgraded their MiG-29 and Mirage 2000s' ECM/EW systems; thus meaning, our F-16A/Bs are still very modern in South Asia.
