Al Qaeda in Iran, Why Tehran is Accommodating the Terrorist Group?

[al-Hasani]

but the same BS you posted about iran is right ?
its like i'm talking to the wall

that much logic u have

Bullshit?It is a well-known fact. Go read the letter of Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi or read about the Al-Qaeda members who speak about this connection or who lived under Iranian protection in Iran.

Farsnews is a propaganda channel.

@Resurrection5782 is the biggest troll in the history of this forum. Double user and he is the one constantly making lies about KSA and trolling. Thank him.

You still don't understand the difference between state founded support and some private individuals. Besides all that is exaggerated. "Al-Qaeda" in Iraq for instance survive on corruption, intimidation and internal support.

Anyway the fact is that your Mullah's are hosting Al-Qaeda members and giving them a safe heaven. As the only country on earth.

 

[Ostad]

guys we can use some explanation here you know.

HOW IRONIC: Osama's family to built world's tallest tower

Bin Laden Family To Build World’s Tallest Skyscraper | Nosey Parker

Bin Laden Family Poised to Build World's Tallest Building in Saudi Arabia | Fox News

 

[al-Hasani]

guys we can use some explanation here you know.

HOW IRONIC: Osama's family to built world's tallest tower

Bin Laden Family To Build World’s Tallest Skyscraper | Nosey Parker

More Farsi idiots.

You do know that the Bin Laden families own the biggest construction company in the world right? They are a huge family. They don't account for one family member.

Saudi Binladin Group - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

@al-Hasani , Look at his comment please. As I told you before, when they cannot provide any logical answer, as they most do, they start to troll and tell nonsense.
BTW, he has mentioned one of my Azeri friends to show him that my support for Azerbaijan against Armenia is wrong.
BTW, I am very willing to know why his beloved regime, and consequently himself is supporting Armenia?

I know. He seems like a special case.

Brother, If some one does not believe in any morality and allow himself to be hypocrite, You cannot have any healthy discussion with him.
I agree about your post. Only one note about AQ, As I have heard before, the leaders brought their family in Iran as well. But the regime changed its behavior after a while and captured them as hostages. That's what I have heard, I am not 100% sure about it.
Mullahs are extremely hypocrite, I am not saying that every other regime in the world has not any hypocrite behavior at all, but they have reached the peak. Can you explain to me that how a "Religious Based Shia Regime With 1/4 Azeri population" can support an internationally recognized occupier regime(Armenia) against the second Shia country of the world(Azerbaijan is the 2nd based on the Shia population percentage)? Russians have slaughtered and exiled and tortured many caucasians, including muslim circassians, Chechens, .... which most of these groups have strong cultural, historical, ethnical, .... connections to Iran. But mullahs are supporting Russia. The same is going on in the East Turkestan in China.
The list is very long ....

Those Mullah's are really giving a bad name to Iran and Iranians. I wish for the Iranian people to topple them.

 

[ResurgentIran]

Mods, close thread.

 

[haman10]

I know. He seems like a special case

HELL I AM :LOL:

Those Mullah's are really giving a bad name to Iran and Iranians. I wish for the Iranian people to topple them.

Exact opposite goes to saudi family ......

why in gods creation should a country be named after a family ?

 

[BLACKEAGLE]

Iran and al Qaeda might seem like strange bedfellows. But their relationship goes back years.

The U.S. Treasury Department's designation last week of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) as a terrorist supporter is only the latest ratcheting up of pressure against Tehran, and it seems like background noise compared with all the talk of oil boycotts and military strikes. But the designation also highlights one of the most important -- and one of the most mysterious -- partnerships of our time: Iran's relationship with al Qaeda.

It is easy to caricature Tehran's ties to Ayman al-Zawahiri's organization. Believers in the relationship point out that they are natural friends because both endorse an extreme anti-U.S. agenda and seek to spread radical Islam. Skeptics contend that Iran's Shiite regime is anathema for Sunni jihadists, making cooperation prohibitive. Both sides have a point: Shared enemies drive Iran and al Qaeda together, but mutual suspicion keeps the partnership tactical and gives both sides reasons to play it down.

Unclassified data on Iran's relationship with al Qaeda are scarce, but enough can be gleaned or inferred from open-source materialto get a sense of the scope of and reasons for the relationship. Last week's designation accuses the MOIS of "facilitat[ing] the movement of al Qa'ida operatives in Iran and provid[ing] them with documents, identification cards, and passports." It continues: "MOIS also provided money and weapons to al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), a terrorist group designated under E.O. 13224, and negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives." Earlier designations have highlighted specific tactical links between al Qaeda and Iran, but the connection goes back years.

Iran's ties to terrorists are undisputed, but its closest relationships are with groups, like the Lebanese Hezbollah, that are composed of Shiite Muslims who embrace Iran's revolutionary Shiism and feel an affinity toward Tehran as the leader of the Shiite world. Al Qaeda, of course, rejects both. Yet while Iran's heated rhetoric leads many analysts to focus on its revolutionary ideology, strategic thinking often dominates the clerical regime's policies toward terrorist groups.

Iran is often more pragmatic than many think. It backed terrorist and militant groups against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, and other enemies even though it had little in common with some of its proxies. In the 1990s, Iran began to forge strong relationships to Palestinian Islamist groups, particularly Palestinian Islamic Jihad but also, to a lesser degree, Hamas. Such relationships weakened Iran's adversary, Israel, and undermined the U.S.-led effort to isolate Iran. They also served the broader Iranian goal of bridging the Shiite-Sunni divide to build a pan-Islamic, anti-American front. (In a recent Friday sermon, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei hinted at this ecumenical approach. "We will continue to support any nation or group that fights or confronts the Zionist regime, and we are not afraid of saying this," he said.

Tehran's relationship with al Qaeda grew from these seeds. In 1991 and 1992, Sudan's chief ideologue, Hassan al-Turabi, made Sudan a home to Sunni militants from around the world, including al Qaeda from 1992 to 1996. During this time, al Qaeda and Iranian officials met in Sudan, though it is unclear how fruitful these meetings were. And when al Qaeda left Sudan for Afghanistan in 1996, Iran became a route for fighters to go to and from Afghanistan (though a much less important one than Pakistan).

After the 9/11 attacks, Iran's role grew more important. Facing the loss of its haven in Afghanistan and pressure (albeit fitful) in Pakistan, some of al Qaeda's leadership fled to Iran. The regime there both welcomed and limited them, not stopping all their activities, but placing some leaders under a form of house arrest. However, the relationship seemed rocky. After the United States went to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan following 9/11 -- when Iran at first tacitly cooperated with U.S. efforts -- Zawahiri publicly blastedTehran for siding with the United States. "All of a sudden, we discovered Iran collaborating with America" and that "Iran stabbed the Muslim ummah [community, in this context] in its back," he said.

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq put Iran and al Qaeda on the same page again. Both wanted to make sure the United States was bloodied. Both organizations usually backed different -- and opposed -- groups in Iraq, but both their local allies often opposed the United States. The lesson is clear: Although Iran and al Qaeda often have wildly different goals, they both want to weaken and hurt many of the same adversaries. Both are willing to fight and cooperate at the same time.

With al Qaeda members and their families under its control, Iran can loosen its restrictions on al Qaeda operatives in the country and facilitate their travel if it wants to stir the pot in Afghanistan or Iraq (or against the United States generally); on the other hand, it can constrain their mobility or even surrender them if it wants to improve relations with Washington or al Qaeda's Arab foes. In particular, Iran also seeks the return of members of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), an anti-Iran group that was long based out of Iraq. Although the United States considers the MEK a terrorist organization, it granted the MEK's members in Iraq the status of "protected persons" under the Geneva Conventions and did not send them to Iran when it controlled Iraq. Since then, it has pressed Baghdad to let the MEK stay in Iraq.

Iran has successfully used the al Qaeda members resident in Iran to ensure good behavior from the broader Sunni jihadi movement. In 2005, Zawahiri, in internal correspondence with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then leader of al Qaeda of Iraq, urged the leader not to target the Shiites in Iraq and Iranian assets, reminding him that in Iran "we have more than 100 prisoners -- many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries" and thus vulnerable to Iranian pressure.

Ties to al Qaeda and other jihadists, like ties to terrorist groups in general, give Iran options for possible or even unforeseen contingencies. In its relationship with Saudi Arabia today, for example, Tehran is no longer calling for the overthrow of the Al Saud leadership, but remains a rival to Riyadh. Should the relationship worsen, Iran would like the option of working with anti-regime Sunni jihadists. Iran could also use its ties to Sunni jihadists to retaliate for a strike on its nuclear facilities.

From al Qaeda's point of view, the logic of Iranian help is even more straightforward. Although al Qaeda remains a formidable terrorist organization, it lacks the resources of a major state like Iran. Having the ability to transit via Iran is exceptionally useful for fights in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Some degree of a haven is also vital for al Qaeda, as it needs respite from U.S. and allied efforts to arrest and kill its members. As the U.S. drone campaign has taken its toll on al Qaeda's senior leadership, having a place where senior leaders can at least survive makes Iran more important than ever.

Despite their common goals and needs, Iran and al Qaeda have had a contentious relationship at times. Many Sunnis, particularly within the jihadi wing, see Shiites as apostates. At times this sentiment has led to massacres and other abuses of Shiites who are unfortunate enough to live under or come across Sunni jihadists. Some groups that share some of al Qaeda's goals, like Jundallah, a relatively small Sunni group based out of Pakistan's Baluchistan province, have even attacked Iran itself.

And though Iraq offered a common enemy, it also created new frictions. Al Qaeda's Iraqi branch went on a murderous rampage against Iraqi Shiites while Iranian-backed groups carried out bloody raids of their own against Iraqi Sunnis. Tens of thousands died in this sectarian fighting.

For both sides, this sort of antagonism leads them to keep their relationship quiet. Al Qaeda would suffer considerably if potential recruits and donors learned it had a close relationship with the hated Shiite Iranians. For Iran, the incentives for keeping the relationship quiet are different but no less profound. Many of al Qaeda's enemies are countries Iran wants as friends -- like Russia -- or at least doesn't want to alienate further, like those in Europe. In addition, many Iranians abhor the Sunni jihadi community for its anti-Shiite words and deeds, and as such any alliance would be unpopular at home.

The United States is already going full-bore against al Qaeda and, appropriately, is putting Iran's nuclear program front and center in formulating policy toward Tehran. But highlighting Tehran's ties to al Qaeda, as the Treasury designation quietly does, is a valuable form of pressure. Because Iran and al Qaeda both have an interest in keeping their relationship hidden, making it public may undermine it -- or at least stop the ties from getting stronger.

- See more at: The Odd Couple

 

[Ostad]

More Farsi idiots.

You do know that the Bin Laden families own the biggest construction company in the world right? They are a huge family. They don't account for one family member.

Saudi Binladin Group - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



I know. He seems like a special case.



Those Mullah's are really giving a bad name to Iran and Iranians. I wish for the Iranian people to topple them.

so they are wealthy terrorist family.
and can buy more airplanes right?
great thanks. i feel secure now.

 

[al-Hasani]

so they are wealthy terrorist family.
and can buy more airplanes right?
great thanks. i feel secure now.

Farsi logic at its best.

The family has over 1000 members. One of them was a bad apple. Does not make the whole family "terrorists". They are a wealthy and respected family across the world that own the biggest construction company in the WORLD with branches in Europe, Northern America, Oceania etc.

By your logic then you are a terrorist since your leadership (fake wannabe Arab Mullah's) are recognized as the world's biggest terrorism supporter.

Iran and state-sponsored terrorism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Ostad]

Iran and al Qaeda might seem like strange bedfellows. But their relationship goes back years.

The U.S. Treasury Department's designation last week of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) as a terrorist supporter is only the latest ratcheting up of pressure against Tehran, and it seems like background noise compared with all the talk of oil boycotts and military strikes. But the designation also highlights one of the most important -- and one of the most mysterious -- partnerships of our time: Iran's relationship with al Qaeda.

It is easy to caricature Tehran's ties to Ayman al-Zawahiri's organization. Believers in the relationship point out that they are natural friends because both endorse an extreme anti-U.S. agenda and seek to spread radical Islam. Skeptics contend that Iran's Shiite regime is anathema for Sunni jihadists, making cooperation prohibitive. Both sides have a point: Shared enemies drive Iran and al Qaeda together, but mutual suspicion keeps the partnership tactical and gives both sides reasons to play it down.

Unclassified data on Iran's relationship with al Qaeda are scarce, but enough can be gleaned or inferred from open-source materialto get a sense of the scope of and reasons for the relationship. Last week's designation accuses the MOIS of "facilitat[ing] the movement of al Qa'ida operatives in Iran and provid[ing] them with documents, identification cards, and passports." It continues: "MOIS also provided money and weapons to al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), a terrorist group designated under E.O. 13224, and negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives." Earlier designations have highlighted specific tactical links between al Qaeda and Iran, but the connection goes back years.

Iran's ties to terrorists are undisputed, but its closest relationships are with groups, like the Lebanese Hezbollah, that are composed of Shiite Muslims who embrace Iran's revolutionary Shiism and feel an affinity toward Tehran as the leader of the Shiite world. Al Qaeda, of course, rejects both. Yet while Iran's heated rhetoric leads many analysts to focus on its revolutionary ideology, strategic thinking often dominates the clerical regime's policies toward terrorist groups.

Iran is often more pragmatic than many think. It backed terrorist and militant groups against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, and other enemies even though it had little in common with some of its proxies. In the 1990s, Iran began to forge strong relationships to Palestinian Islamist groups, particularly Palestinian Islamic Jihad but also, to a lesser degree, Hamas. Such relationships weakened Iran's adversary, Israel, and undermined the U.S.-led effort to isolate Iran. They also served the broader Iranian goal of bridging the Shiite-Sunni divide to build a pan-Islamic, anti-American front. (In a recent Friday sermon, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei hinted at this ecumenical approach. "We will continue to support any nation or group that fights or confronts the Zionist regime, and we are not afraid of saying this," he said.

Tehran's relationship with al Qaeda grew from these seeds. In 1991 and 1992, Sudan's chief ideologue, Hassan al-Turabi, made Sudan a home to Sunni militants from around the world, including al Qaeda from 1992 to 1996. During this time, al Qaeda and Iranian officials met in Sudan, though it is unclear how fruitful these meetings were. And when al Qaeda left Sudan for Afghanistan in 1996, Iran became a route for fighters to go to and from Afghanistan (though a much less important one than Pakistan).

After the 9/11 attacks, Iran's role grew more important. Facing the loss of its haven in Afghanistan and pressure (albeit fitful) in Pakistan, some of al Qaeda's leadership fled to Iran. The regime there both welcomed and limited them, not stopping all their activities, but placing some leaders under a form of house arrest. However, the relationship seemed rocky. After the United States went to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan following 9/11 -- when Iran at first tacitly cooperated with U.S. efforts -- Zawahiri publicly blastedTehran for siding with the United States. "All of a sudden, we discovered Iran collaborating with America" and that "Iran stabbed the Muslim ummah [community, in this context] in its back," he said.

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq put Iran and al Qaeda on the same page again. Both wanted to make sure the United States was bloodied. Both organizations usually backed different -- and opposed -- groups in Iraq, but both their local allies often opposed the United States. The lesson is clear: Although Iran and al Qaeda often have wildly different goals, they both want to weaken and hurt many of the same adversaries. Both are willing to fight and cooperate at the same time.

With al Qaeda members and their families under its control, Iran can loosen its restrictions on al Qaeda operatives in the country and facilitate their travel if it wants to stir the pot in Afghanistan or Iraq (or against the United States generally); on the other hand, it can constrain their mobility or even surrender them if it wants to improve relations with Washington or al Qaeda's Arab foes. In particular, Iran also seeks the return of members of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), an anti-Iran group that was long based out of Iraq. Although the United States considers the MEK a terrorist organization, it granted the MEK's members in Iraq the status of "protected persons" under the Geneva Conventions and did not send them to Iran when it controlled Iraq. Since then, it has pressed Baghdad to let the MEK stay in Iraq.

Iran has successfully used the al Qaeda members resident in Iran to ensure good behavior from the broader Sunni jihadi movement. In 2005, Zawahiri, in internal correspondence with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then leader of al Qaeda of Iraq, urged the leader not to target the Shiites in Iraq and Iranian assets, reminding him that in Iran "we have more than 100 prisoners -- many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries" and thus vulnerable to Iranian pressure.

Ties to al Qaeda and other jihadists, like ties to terrorist groups in general, give Iran options for possible or even unforeseen contingencies. In its relationship with Saudi Arabia today, for example, Tehran is no longer calling for the overthrow of the Al Saud leadership, but remains a rival to Riyadh. Should the relationship worsen, Iran would like the option of working with anti-regime Sunni jihadists. Iran could also use its ties to Sunni jihadists to retaliate for a strike on its nuclear facilities.

From al Qaeda's point of view, the logic of Iranian help is even more straightforward. Although al Qaeda remains a formidable terrorist organization, it lacks the resources of a major state like Iran. Having the ability to transit via Iran is exceptionally useful for fights in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Some degree of a haven is also vital for al Qaeda, as it needs respite from U.S. and allied efforts to arrest and kill its members. As the U.S. drone campaign has taken its toll on al Qaeda's senior leadership, having a place where senior leaders can at least survive makes Iran more important than ever.

Despite their common goals and needs, Iran and al Qaeda have had a contentious relationship at times. Many Sunnis, particularly within the jihadi wing, see Shiites as apostates. At times this sentiment has led to massacres and other abuses of Shiites who are unfortunate enough to live under or come across Sunni jihadists. Some groups that share some of al Qaeda's goals, like Jundallah, a relatively small Sunni group based out of Pakistan's Baluchistan province, have even attacked Iran itself.

And though Iraq offered a common enemy, it also created new frictions. Al Qaeda's Iraqi branch went on a murderous rampage against Iraqi Shiites while Iranian-backed groups carried out bloody raids of their own against Iraqi Sunnis. Tens of thousands died in this sectarian fighting.

For both sides, this sort of antagonism leads them to keep their relationship quiet. Al Qaeda would suffer considerably if potential recruits and donors learned it had a close relationship with the hated Shiite Iranians. For Iran, the incentives for keeping the relationship quiet are different but no less profound. Many of al Qaeda's enemies are countries Iran wants as friends -- like Russia -- or at least doesn't want to alienate further, like those in Europe. In addition, many Iranians abhor the Sunni jihadi community for its anti-Shiite words and deeds, and as such any alliance would be unpopular at home.

The United States is already going full-bore against al Qaeda and, appropriately, is putting Iran's nuclear program front and center in formulating policy toward Tehran. But highlighting Tehran's ties to al Qaeda, as the Treasury designation quietly does, is a valuable form of pressure. Because Iran and al Qaeda both have an interest in keeping their relationship hidden, making it public may undermine it -- or at least stop the ties from getting stronger.

- See more at: The Odd Couple

Origins of the 19 hijackers
NationalityNumber

Saudi Arabia
15
United Arab Emirates
2
Egypt
1
Lebanon
1

Hijackers in the September 11 attacks - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

i dont see any Iranian.do you?

 

[Jzaib]

Well the establishment is always busy in scaring people ... to justify invasions and war crimes

 

[al-Hasani]

Iran is the world's biggest terrorism supporter and is a terror regime.

Iran and state-sponsored terrorism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Ostad]

Farsi logic at its best.

The family has over 1000 members. One of them was a bad apple. Does not make the whole family "terrorists". They are a wealthy and respected family across the world that own the biggest construction company in the WORLD with branches in Europe, Northern America, Oceania etc.

By your logic then you are a terrorist since your leadership (fake wannabe Arab Mullah's) are recognized as the world's biggest terrorism supporters.

Iran and state-sponsored terrorism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

but as far as i know there was not just one bad apple maybe you should check.

 

[HAIDER]

So who is going to disown Alkaida groups in Syria and Iraq ? .

 

[al-Hasani]

but as far as i know there was not just one bad apple maybe you should check.

They are more influential and respected than your Mullah leadership. One family in KSA. LOL. At least they are not sanctioned and poltiically isolated.

 

[rmi5]

I know. He seems like a special case.
Those Mullah's are really giving a bad name to Iran and Iranians. I wish for the Iranian people to topple them.