I don´t know why you Chinese repeat such nonsense over and over again.
where and when did you ever learn and adopt guerrilla warfare in China?
Guerrilla warfare was not in use in the battle of Dien Bien. It was fought in a classical way, men vs men, all-out assault, a WW I style, similar when the German and France armies clashed on battle fields,
or when the German and Russians devisions fought in the battle of Stalingrad.
Guerrilla warfare is actually "hit and run".
Man, I'm getting tired of you trying to undermine us in every possible ways. Do us a favor and try to learn about the Viet Minh!
The First Indochina War
General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Viet Minh’s military leader in the First Indochina War.
The First Indochina War, fought between December 1946 and August 1954, was a struggle between the Viet Minh and the French for control of the country. In the West this conflict is usually referred to as the First Indochina War; in Vietnam it is called the Anti-French War. This conflict followed the defeat of Japan in 1945 and the power struggle which followed their withdrawal from Vietnam. The Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, seized the opportunity to declare Vietnamese independence on September 2nd 1945. But the arrival of troops from China and Britain, tasked with overseeing the withdrawal of the Japanese, undermined the Viet Minh and its grip on power. The Chinese and British, driven by anti-communist agendas, allowed the restoration of French colonial rule, rather than leaving Vietnam in the hands of “red bandits”. By late 1946 the French had 50,000 troops in Vietnam and had regained control of Saigon. In November, French naval vessels bombarded the northern port city of Haiphong, killing large numbers of civilians. The Viet Minh retaliated by attacking French positions in Haiphong, then Hanoi, but these attacks were repelled by French artillery and naval guns. By mid-December the two sides were openly at war.
Aside from Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh’s most notable military leader was Vo Nguyen Giap. The beneficiary of a French education, Giap graduated from the University of Hanoi, where he studied history and politics. He spent most of the 1930s teaching history, as well as contributing to and editing several socialist newspapers. In 1939 Giap was forced to flee Vietnam because of his anti-French political activities. He remained in exile for five years, during which French authorities arrested and executed most of his family. While in exile in China, Giap joined up with Ho Chi Minh and other Viet Minh rebels. After their 1944 return to Vietnam, Giap was tasked with overseeing the military organisation of the Viet Minh.
Viet Minh strategy
During the war with France, the Viet Minh encountered similar difficulties to other anti-colonial forces around the world. They heavily outnumbered French forces but were hindered by severe shortages of weapons – particularly artillery – as well as munitions. Most Viet Minh weapons were retrieved from the retreating Japanese or seized from captured French. By the end of 1946, Giap’s northern Viet Minh units boasted 60,000 men – but they were armed with only 40,000 rifles. In addition, Viet Minh soldiers were largely untrained and had little understanding of organisation, discipline or strategy. Giap was not daunted by these shortcomings. A keen student of war and revolution, Giap had studied the philosophy and tactics of famous leaders: from Sun Tzu to Napoleon, from George Washington to Leon Trotsky. In particular, Giap recognised the need for strategies to make use of Viet Minh strengths and exploit French weaknesses. One invaluable source of ideas was a 1936 pamphlet called Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, written by Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. Though Mao was writing of the situation in his own country, his pamphlet had salient lessons for Giap and the Viet Minh:
“The principal characteristics of China’s revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically… a big and powerful enemy… and a small and weak [revolutionary] army… These characteristics determine the line for guiding China’s revolutionary war as well as many of its strategic and tactical principles. It is clear that we must [recognise] the guerrilla character of our operations; oppose protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision… and instead uphold a strategy of protracted war and campaigns of quick decision; oppose fixed battle lines and positional warfare, and favour fluid battle lines and mobile warfare; oppose fighting merely to rout the enemy, and uphold fighting to annihilate the enemy; oppose the strategy of striking with two fists in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one fist in one direction at one time.”
Giap and Ho Chi Minh adapted Mao’s strategies to the situation in Vietnam. It was impossible for the Viet Minh to win large-scale battles against the French; they could not withstand French artillery, air support or supply lines
. Instead, the Viet Minh would avoid decisive battles and withdraw to the countryside, jungles and mountains. There they would establish remote bases that would be difficult for the French to attack. In these bases they would train and arm Viet Minh soldiers for future campaigns. Meanwhile, Viet Minh cadres would move among the peasants, working to build up political support. The backing of the Vietnamese people was important, since they could supply food, information and cover for Viet Minh troops
(Giap often cited Mao Zedong’s saying: “A guerrilla soldier swims through the people like a fish swims through the sea”).
When ready, Viet Minh soldiers would launch surprise attacks, ambushes and raids on weaker French positions, while still avoiding full-scale battles. Their aim was to inflict casualties while prolonging the war, making it costly and unpopular back in France.
Eventually French forces would be weakened enough for the Viet Minh to engage them in a decisive battle.
The CEFEO
It is the fight between tiger and elephant. If the tiger stands his ground to fight, the elephant will crush him with its weight. But if he stays agile and keeps his mobility, he will finally vanquish the elephant, who will bleed to death from a multitude of small cuts.
Ho Chi Minh
The French military units that participated in the First Indochina War were called the
Corps Expeditionnaire Francais en Extreme-Orient (the ‘French Far-East Expeditionary Corps’, or CEFEO). It was a conglomerate force of native Frenchmen, pro-French Vietnamese, troops from other French colonies in Africa, as well as units of the French Foreign Legion. At its peak the CEFEO numbered more than 200,000 men, the majority Vietnamese. Though the CEFEO was better armed and equipped than the Viet Minh, it still suffered from severe shortages. France had been economically devastated by World War II and Paris had to mobilise the CEFEO on a shoestring budget. During the first phase of the war, many CEFEO troops had no uniforms or standard-issue weapons; they had to rely on whatever they could scrounge or capture. The situation did not improve until 1953, when the United States began supplying the CEFEO with military aid.
The first two years of the war (1947-48) saw only occasional fighting. The CEFEO was able to quickly capture the major cities, while the Viet Minh followed Giap’s strategic plan and withdrew into the mountains. In late 1947 the CEFEO launched Operation Lea, an attempt to destroy the Viet Minh leadership base at Bac Can, north of Hanoi. More than 1,000 French paratroopers were dropped into the area with orders to flush out the Viet Minh hierarchy. Meanwhile, a 15,000-strong CEFEO force was positioned to outflank the retreating Viet Minh and rout them in battle. Despite heavy Viet Minh losses (around 9,000 men) most proved too elusive. “The enemy,” according to one French soldier, “melted into the jungle”.
In search of a political solution
In early 1949, the French changed tack and began looking for a political solution rather than a military one. Setting up an alternative Vietnamese government – more moderate and pro-French than the Viet Minh – might undermine the enemy’s support base. Paris began negotiating with the figurehead emperor, Bao Dai, about forming a government. The new regime would remain part of the French Union but would be autonomous – at least in theory. Bao Dai agreed and relocated from Hue to Saigon, the new national capital. This itself was a tactical move, as support for the Viet Minh was much weaker in the south. The south contained a higher proportion of Vietnamese middle-class, Francophiles, Catholics, Confucians, Buddhists, political liberals and moderates. While these groups would welcome Vietnamese independence, they rejected communism and refused to support the Viet Minh, who many viewed as lower-class bandits led by political trouble-makers.
Bao Dai’s new government was also encouraged to create a military force, called the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). This was done by recruiting, but also by co-opting ‘private’ armies run by cultists, warlords and gangsters. VNA officers were given the same command training as French soldiers. Recruits were promised good pay and the opportunity to serve in France itself (promises which were later broken). By 1952 the VNA had more than 120,000 soldiers and was fighting alongside the CEFEO in many anti-Viet Minh campaigns. That same year also saw some of the most bitter fighting of the war, as the Viet Minh launched a series of advances in the north, to restore their supply lines and expel the French. When these attacks proved unsuccessful, Ho Chi Minh and Giap decided to move into Laos – Vietnam’s western neighbour and another French colony – to further stretch CEFEO resources. This shift would lead to the final decisive engagement of the First Indochina War: the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.
- See more at:
The First Indochina War
