Turkish Air Defence Programs

[GOKHAN TAYLAN]

Eşşek Arısı ???????

 

[Hurshid Celebi]

From WAFF, national Manpad - longer range then Stinger ?

 

[KediKesenFare3]

roketsan, çift darbeli motorun kullanıldığı uçuş testi ile bir ilke daha imza attı

Milli Alçak İrtifa Hava Savunma Füzesi Hisar-A’nın çift darbeli motora sahip Balistik Test Füzesi atışları Roketsan tarafından Haziran 2015’te Aksaray’da başarıyla gerçekleştirildi.

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin alçak ve orta irtifa hava savunma ihtiyacının karşılanması için milli imkânlarla özgün olarak geliştirilen HiSAR füzelerinin tasarım ve geliştirme çalışmaları emin adımlarla ilerliyor. Roketsan tarafından tasarlanan ve geliş- tirilen HiSAR füzeleri dünyada emsali nadir bulunan çift darbeli motor teknolojisi ile donatılacak.

Çift darbeli motorda, tek motor gövdesi içinde birbirinden bağımsız ateşlenebilen iki ayrı roket motoru bulunuyor. Hava savunma füzelerinin etkinliği (hız ve manevra kabiliyeti), ilk fırlatıldığı andan etkinlik menzilinin sınırına gelene kadar ciddi miktarda düşmekte, bu durum da tehdit hava unsurlarının füze tarafından vurulmadan kaçma şansını artırmaktadır. Bu teknoloji sayesinde HiSAR füzeleri, akıllı algoritmaları ile hedefine az mesafe kaldığında ikinci motorunu ateşleyerek son manevra evresinde çok yüksek etkinlik kabiliyeti kazanmaktadır.

Çift darbeli motor, teknolojik zorluğunun yanında bu teknolojinin kullanıldığı sistemlerin azlığı itibarıyla da HİSAR füzelerini ayrıcalıklı kılıyor. Roketsan’da HİSAR projeleri kapsamında, yenilikçi ve zorlayıcı çift darbeli motor teknolojisinin geliştirilmesi ve bunun bir hava savunma füzesine uygulanması faaliyeti eş zamanlı olarak yürütülüyor. 2015 yılı Haziran ayında Roketsan tarafından gerçekleştirilen atışlı testte, Türkiye’nin çift darbeli motora sahip ilk füzesi HİSAR-A, fırlatma platformundan birinci darbe motoru ile başarılı bir şekilde ayrılarak, ikinci darbe motorunu da havada ateşledikten sonra kendi bünyesindeki füze otopilotu kontrolünde, programlanan manevraları gerçekleştirerek başarı ile uçuşunu tamamladı.

Bu test ile Türkiye’nin, bu teknolojiye sahip dünyadaki sınırlı sayıda ülke arasındaki yerini almasında çok önemli bir kilometre taşı da aşılmış oldu. Çift darbeli motor teknolojisine sahip olacak milli hava savunma füzelerinin, seri üretime gireceği 2021 yılında dünyadaki en üstün teknolojiye sahip hava savunma sistemlerinden birisi olması hedefleniyor. Üstün savunma kabiliyetine sahip güçlü bir Türkiye için, geleceğe güvenle bakarak var gücüyle çalışan Roketsan, başarılarına yenilerini eklemeye devam edecek.

http://www.roketsan.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/RoketsanDergisi-8-Ocak2015-web.pdf

2021...

 

[Hurshid Celebi]

2021...

No , Hisar A- and O will be operational probably 2018-2019.
But indigenous LORAMID could be, if no road accident happens, operational between 2021-2023. That's what officials always claim.We all hope so.

Meanwhile we have to rely on our HAWK XX1 which has also a limited ABM and our allies.

But my heart and mind says that we have already some "Jokers" against Russia.

 

[TheConquerer]

roketsan, çift darbeli motorun kullanıldığı uçuş testi ile bir ilke daha imza attı

Milli Alçak İrtifa Hava Savunma Füzesi Hisar-A’nın çift darbeli motora sahip Balistik Test Füzesi atışları Roketsan tarafından Haziran 2015’te Aksaray’da başarıyla gerçekleştirildi.

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin alçak ve orta irtifa hava savunma ihtiyacının karşılanması için milli imkânlarla özgün olarak geliştirilen HiSAR füzelerinin tasarım ve geliştirme çalışmaları emin adımlarla ilerliyor. Roketsan tarafından tasarlanan ve geliş- tirilen HiSAR füzeleri dünyada emsali nadir bulunan çift darbeli motor teknolojisi ile donatılacak.

Çift darbeli motorda, tek motor gövdesi içinde birbirinden bağımsız ateşlenebilen iki ayrı roket motoru bulunuyor. Hava savunma füzelerinin etkinliği (hız ve manevra kabiliyeti), ilk fırlatıldığı andan etkinlik menzilinin sınırına gelene kadar ciddi miktarda düşmekte, bu durum da tehdit hava unsurlarının füze tarafından vurulmadan kaçma şansını artırmaktadır. Bu teknoloji sayesinde HiSAR füzeleri, akıllı algoritmaları ile hedefine az mesafe kaldığında ikinci motorunu ateşleyerek son manevra evresinde çok yüksek etkinlik kabiliyeti kazanmaktadır.

Çift darbeli motor, teknolojik zorluğunun yanında bu teknolojinin kullanıldığı sistemlerin azlığı itibarıyla da HİSAR füzelerini ayrıcalıklı kılıyor. Roketsan’da HİSAR projeleri kapsamında, yenilikçi ve zorlayıcı çift darbeli motor teknolojisinin geliştirilmesi ve bunun bir hava savunma füzesine uygulanması faaliyeti eş zamanlı olarak yürütülüyor. 2015 yılı Haziran ayında Roketsan tarafından gerçekleştirilen atışlı testte, Türkiye’nin çift darbeli motora sahip ilk füzesi HİSAR-A, fırlatma platformundan birinci darbe motoru ile başarılı bir şekilde ayrılarak, ikinci darbe motorunu da havada ateşledikten sonra kendi bünyesindeki füze otopilotu kontrolünde, programlanan manevraları gerçekleştirerek başarı ile uçuşunu tamamladı.

Bu test ile Türkiye’nin, bu teknolojiye sahip dünyadaki sınırlı sayıda ülke arasındaki yerini almasında çok önemli bir kilometre taşı da aşılmış oldu. Çift darbeli motor teknolojisine sahip olacak milli hava savunma füzelerinin, seri üretime gireceği 2021 yılında dünyadaki en üstün teknolojiye sahip hava savunma sistemlerinden birisi olması hedefleniyor. Üstün savunma kabiliyetine sahip güçlü bir Türkiye için, geleceğe güvenle bakarak var gücüyle çalışan Roketsan, başarılarına yenilerini eklemeye devam edecek.

http://www.roketsan.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/RoketsanDergisi-8-Ocak2015-web.pdf

2021...

Delivery time has postponed cause of new demands of KKK

http://savunmaveteknoloji.com/hisar-projesinde-teslimat-takvimi-degisti/

 

[Hurshid Celebi]

postponed

Interesting up to date news. Seems 1-2 year delay.
"Maybe" it is in correlation with national / indigenous Loramid
and complete integration of a national/indigenous low, medium and high altitude AD system.

 

[Successwill]

Why Turkey Chose, and Then Rejected, a Chinese Air-Defense Missile
10:18 AM ETBY MUSTAFA KIBAROGLUSELIM C. SAZAK

Ankara's decisions say a lot about what Turkey wants from the U.S. and NATO, if only the West will listen.

• added it to a long list of “Turkish provocations” from voting against Iran sanctions to flinching at hosting NATO X-Band radar installations in its territory to refusing to normalize ties with Israel and complicating U.S. intelligence-sharing efforts to supporting “anti-Western jihadi groups” in Syria, HAMAS at the expense of Fatah in Palestine, and the Kurdistan Regional Government as a wholly independent entity from Baghdad in Iraq.
  
  The missile-defense decision, however, was particularly worrisome to Turkey’s Western allies. As Koplow wrote, such a deal “meant that Turkey was not only flouting the sanctions regime that the U.S. had painstakingly constructed but also that Turkey was purchasing a system that could not be integrated into the larger NATO missile defense shield.”
  
  In reality, Ankara had neither the intention nor the capacity for such a dramatic departure from NATO’s defense infrastructure. All along, Turkish officials had planned to leverage its purchasing power to gain the know-how to develop its own long-range missile system and to expand the indigenous capabilities.
  
  Indeed, Turkey had been forthright about these intentions. It repeatedly pointed that the Chinese were offering a lower price, favorable technology transfer conditions, and early delivery on the first batch of batteries. “If Turkey opts for direct purchase of the system then it will be obliged to make new off-the-shelf purchases 15 or 20 years later. We will not settle for this. Our target is to gain national technological capability in the missile project,” Turkey’s chief arms procurer, Ismail Demir, said at theIDEF defense industry fair last May.
  
  And while the move astounded its transatlantic allies, it cohered perfectly with Turkey’s broader defense industrial strategy. Earlier this year, Turkish President R. Tayyip Erdogan had said that “the “plan is to completely eliminate external dependency on defence equipment supply with ongoing plans and investments until 2023 [and start developing] unique designs.” The country is already investing heavily in a number of indigenous land and missile systems from the Altay main battle tank to the MILGEM littoral combat warship to the fifth-generation TFX fighter jet, as well as several co-production projects like a localized variant of the Sikorsky S-70 Black Hawk helicopter.
  
  Ankara was expecting that its Western allies would easily sign on. Instead, things devolved into an intraalliance crisis.
  
  Ankara was convinced that its long-range missile defense tender was going to be smooth sailing. The deteriorating security situation in Syria and Iraq was a well-founded rationale for Turkey to expand its air-defense capabilities. Turkey’s defense industry was an offshoot of its alliance with NATO and it remained deeply ingrained into the transatlantic defense-industrial complex. The Western competitors in the tender already had longstanding partnerships with their Turkish counterparts. Lockheed Martin was the main contractor in Turkey’s largest coproduction project—the $7.4 billion F-16 Peace Onyx program—through a joint venture with the Turkish government. Raytheon had a similar co-production arrangement with the state-owned Roketsan under the Euro-Stinger program, Aselsan, which was tapped to be one of the leading local partners in the long-range missile defense project, was a global vendor to Raytheon’s Patriot program and co-producing Rapier surface-to-air missiles with MBDA. Therefore, Ankara was expecting that its Western allies would easily sign on. Instead, things devolved into an intraalliance crisis.
  
  In fairness, Ankara did not give Beijing an easy time in their negotations. Every time there appeared a window of opportunity for some agreement between Turkey and the West, however, regional developments got in the way. In September 2014, the talks with China faltered—over technology transfer conditions—and Ankara reopened talks with the runner-up, Eurosam. Right around the same time, Washington decided to provide military and humanitarian aid to Kobani to help the Kurds push the ISIS’s offensive back. Last summer, the talks with the Chinese were stalemated once again, but a secondISIS offensive on Kobani left Turkey and the West quibbling over the appropriate response. With coalition support, Kurdish forces to recaptured Kobani on July 19. Ten days later, Erdogan gave new momentum to the missile talks by reiterating his support for the Chinese offer during his visit to Beijing. And on August 15, the U.S. countered by withdrawing its Patriot batteries stationed on Turkey’s Syrian border.
  
  What wedged Turkey apart from its Western allies was not price or performance—it was the double standards Ankara perceived in how the allies were handling Turkey’s legitimate interests. In the griping of its allies over what it believed were feasible and legitimate demands, Ankara heard an undertone that it has grown tired of: Turkey can guard the camp, but not be allowed to sit in the tent. And where Ankara perceived a slight, its Western allies saw an erstwhile partner that has since become the bête noire of the transatlantic alliance. Had the West not stuck to this perception and took the time to look through Turkey’s eyes, it would have been possible to find the space for a middle-ground compromise. Instead, both Turkey and its Western allies got lost in translation.
  
  What Turkey needed was a dignified exit from its commitment to the Chinese offer and the assurance that its Western allies are not oblivious to its legitimate concerns. In this regard, it is not a coincidence that Turkey’s recent reversal came on the heels of the G20 Summit. The Paris attacks, which came right before the summit, increased intra-alliance solidarity and ledNATO to rethink its posture in the Middle East. This shift also increased the premium placed on Turkey’s continued support. Ankara’s bargaining position improved and the coalition’s grand strategy came into better alignment with its security interests.
  
  Turkey had neither the intention nor the capacity to go rogue on NATO. To expect a country that relies on NATO for more than half of its radar data to invest billions in a missile defense system that is not compatible with this infrastructure was not sensible. Ankara sees itself as one of NATO’s more critical members. It believes that as NATO’s easternmost member, it is pulling more weight than most others. What it wanted was not to leave the table but to get a better seat at the table.
  
  It is not a coincidence that Turkey’s recent reversal came on the heels of the G20 Summit.
  
  Now, with its allies sorely needing its support and better heeding its grievances, Ankara’s quest for affirmation as an equal partner in the transatlantic alliance diminished and the motivations that led to its deal with the Chinese withered. Had the West offered Ankara the affirmation it needed before—in the form of better technology transfer conditions, a Foreign Military Sales agreement, a side deal or even just a pat in the back—this rapport could have been achieved years ago.
  
  The controversy over the Chinese missile deal is a cautionary tale on how NATO should engage with Turkey. The remedy to the West’s fears over Turkey is to pull it towards the West, not to push it further away by failing to heed its legitimate political, economic and security interests, and throw tantrums when it seeks to assert those interests on its own. A robust alliance cannot be premised on bringing an ally around to another’s policies kicking and screaming. Such an approach only entrenches Turkey’s perception of exclusion and double standards, and pushes it away from the moral and political axis of the Atlantic Alliance.
  
  Update: An earlier version of this article mentioned an Aselsan-MBDA partnership that has since ceased; its mention has been replaced with the ongoing “Rapier surface-to-air missile” effort.
  

defenseone

 

[Bubblegum Crisis]

Why Turkey Chose, and Then Rejected, a Chinese Air-Defense Missile
10:18 AM ETBY MUSTAFA KIBAROGLUSELIM C. SAZAK

Ankara's decisions say a lot about what Turkey wants from the U.S. and NATO, if only the West will listen.

...

And while the move astounded its transatlantic allies, it cohered perfectly with Turkey’s broader defense industrial strategy. Earlier this year, Turkish President R. Tayyip Erdogan had said that “the “plan is to completely eliminate external dependency on defence equipment supply with ongoing plans and investments until 2023 [and start developing] unique designs.” The country is already investing heavily in a number of indigenous land and missile systems from the Altay main battle tank to the MILGEM littoral combat warship to the fifth-generation TFX fighter jet, as well as several co-production projects like a localized variant of the Sikorsky S-70 Black Hawk helicopter.



...

Turkey’s defense industry was an offshoot of its alliance with NATO and it remained deeply ingrained into the transatlantic defense-industrial complex. The Western competitors in the tender already had longstanding partnerships with their Turkish counterparts. Lockheed Martin was the main contractor in Turkey’s largest coproduction project—the $7.4 billion F-16 Peace Onyx program—through a joint venture with the Turkish government.

...

Selling Turkish military equipment to Saudi Arabia? Yes.

Accepting their sick ideology in Turkey? Under no circumstances.

If they agree to these terms


Yallaaaaaa

My pleasure ! Now Shake it off !

“Peace Onyx II

In March of 1992, a follow-on order for two batches of 40 block 50 F-16C/D's (68 C's and 12 D's) was placed under the Peace Onyx II FMS program. The funding of the first 40 planes will be met primarily by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates. Peace Onyx II started with the production of F-16 Block 50, serial number #93-0657. The program is worth some USD $3.5 billion. TEI (Turkish Engine Industries) will supply 96 F129 IPE engines, ASELSAN will produce 100 LN93-RLG. The Peace Onyx II aircraft were delevered from 1996 till 1997.“


“Peace Onyx II Program (TAI)

Under the follow on program of Peace Onyx I, TAI produced a total of 80 F-16C/D aircraft in Block 50 configuration during the 1995-1999 period for the Turkish Air Force. With the Peace Onyx II Program, the manufacturing percentage of TAI, as far as airframe is concerned, reached 80% with the addition of flaperons and the stuffing tasks for the forward fuselage to the airframe components manufactured in the first program.

Among the 278 F-16 aircraft produced at TAI's facilities, three were “Perfect” and 29 were with “Zero Discrepancy.”


...

 

[Hurshid Celebi]

My pleasure ! Now Shake it off !

Let's forget Jordan Serif clans traitor. We live in 21 .th century. Germans and French killed Millions in two WW and are now best friends.
Lets unite against the evils.

 

[Bubblegum Crisis]

Let's forget Jordan Serif clans traitor. We live in 21 .th century. Germans and French killed Millions in two WW and are now best friends.
Lets unite against the evils.

The major problem is rather the ‘superiority syndrome some Turkishs’ - Not all (A minority), thank you God ! -

 

[Hurshid Celebi]

‘superiority syndrome some Turkishs

No.

Power is only power if it is UNITED. No human is superior to an other.

Let's keep commercial business far from it.

 

[Bubblegum Crisis]

No.

Power is only power if it is UNITED. No human is superior to an other.

Let's keep commercial business far from it.

“Inutile de noyer le poisson”. Do you understand !

It is only a matter of mutual trust, fraternal friendship with brothers. Buisness has nothing to do in there.


...

 

[madmusti]

 

[Bismarck]

“Inutile de noyer le poisson”. Do you understand !

It is only a matter of mutual trust, fraternal friendship with brothers. Buisness has nothing to do in there.


...

You say nothing to do there. I say contrariwise./

What a strange vehicle. It's a mix of different vehicle like FNSS Bridge vehicle and others.

 

[Bubblegum Crisis]

You say nothing to do there. I say contrariwise./

But of course !