Nuclear weapons development must be consistent

[Aepsilons]

now we are back to this.....

你打算给我咖啡？

 

[Genesis]

你打算给我咖啡？

maybe if it'll get you to debate like a man.

 

[Aepsilons]

maybe if it'll get you to debate like a man.

ha ha ha ! oh, you're the fiesty type. Let me make some coffee before i write a long winded post. Can you wait?

 

[SOHEIL]

English PLZ !

 

[-SINAN-]

But i can't sleep ... congratulations !

Sleep well, bro. China knows that if they fire one nuke against a Western state, their country will turn into glass.

 

[TaiShang]

Sleep well, bro. China knows that if they fire one nuke against a Western state, their country will turn into glass.

Same applies to "a Western state" which dares to fire one nuke against China. They know they will be turned into a "smoldering heap" by China's Nuclear Strike Forces.

That's the beauty of having a strong nuclear destruction capability.

 

[-SINAN-]

Same applies to "a Western state" which dares to fire one nuke against China.

That's the beauty of having a strong nuclear destruction capability.

Until someone finds a way to stop it's enemy's missiles...

 

[Aepsilons]

Why were China and Japan able to talk so candidly about, and cooperate so closely on, such a wide range of issues in 1984? One argument to be made is that the personalities in place mattered. Nakasone Yasuhiro and Deng Xiaoping were both strong leaders with considerable control over their respective governments. Their careers, personas, and ambitions engendered mutual respect and allowed for frankness, honesty, and mutual understanding during the summit.

These friendly personal connections paralleled the friendly bilateral relations envisioned coming out of the 1984 summit. In Nakasone’s eyes, close Sino-Japanese relations were “the basis for peace in the Asian region, and… a powerful pillar for world peace.” On this point, the Japanese Prime Minister found himself in complete agreement with the Chinese. Deng, in particular, was emphatic that “the development of China-Japan relations into the 21st century is more important than all other issues.” He wanted both sides to look “even further, longer, and wider,” far into the future, “to the 22nd, 23rd, 33rd, and 43rd century.” Allowing for the inevitable hyperbole in these types of meetings, Deng was, in effect, calling for both side to see the big picture, even if that meant overlooking existing frictions and difficulties in bilateral relationship.

What were the issues that the Chinese were willing to overlook? One of them was the notion of Japan’s resurgent “militarism.” At the time, the loudest criticism of the Japanese government’s alleged militarization emanated from the Soviets who suspected Nakasone of plotting to create an “Eastern NATO.” By contrast, Deng Xiaoping at one point even encouraged Japan to rearm, seeing in its weakness an invitation for Soviet expansionism in Asia. Although by the mid-1980s, China’s assessment of the Soviet threat was beginning to change, Beijing continued to downplay the prospects for Japan’s militarization and showed some appreciation for maintaining the strength of the US-Japanese alliance. Zhao Ziyang, for instance, was very careful not to generalize about the nature of Japan’s foreign policy from comments made by a few right-leaning politicians. “We do not believe,” he told the Japanese Prime Minister, “that the Nakasone Cabinet’s security policy is a militarist policy.

When during his landmark meeting with Emperor Hirohito in 1978, Deng Xiaoping proposed to “let bygones be bygones,” he really meant it. As someone who had witnessed Japan’s war against China firsthand, Deng was not prone to understating the pain and the suffering that that war brought about. But he was not willing to reduce China’s relations with Japan to a singular meaning. In that, he and Nakasone remained on the same page. Seeing this bigger picture was a mark of true statesmanship that has evaded the later generation of Chinese and Japanese policy makers.

This leaves current policy makers, particularly Japanese and Chinese, questioning -- why is there such furor when these issues have been agreed upon to be settled.

 

[xesy]

@Nihonjin1051 Wow, you are quarelling with Chinese mems alone, that's incredible. In VNese we call this "Một mình chống mafia"/ Fighting again the mafia alone, which means "COOL". Do you need a hand?

 

[TaiShang]

@Nihonjin1051 Wow, you are quarelling with Chinese mems alone, that's incredible. In VNese we call this "Một mình chống mafia"/ Fighting again the mafia alone, which means "COOL". Do you need a hand?

Yes, your help is most appreciated.

And, not miraculously, Chinese members are having a decent debate with the most respected Nihonjin.

Same does not apply to your lot.

 

[Genesis]

Why were China and Japan able to talk so candidly about, and cooperate so closely on, such a wide range of issues in 1984? One argument to be made is that the personalities in place mattered. Nakasone Yasuhiro and Deng Xiaoping were both strong leaders with considerable control over their respective governments. Their careers, personas, and ambitions engendered mutual respect and allowed for frankness, honesty, and mutual understanding during the summit.

These friendly personal connections paralleled the friendly bilateral relations envisioned coming out of the 1984 summit. In Nakasone’s eyes, close Sino-Japanese relations were “the basis for peace in the Asian region, and… a powerful pillar for world peace.” On this point, the Japanese Prime Minister found himself in complete agreement with the Chinese. Deng, in particular, was emphatic that “the development of China-Japan relations into the 21st century is more important than all other issues.” He wanted both sides to look “even further, longer, and wider,” far into the future, “to the 22nd, 23rd, 33rd, and 43rd century.” Allowing for the inevitable hyperbole in these types of meetings, Deng was, in effect, calling for both side to see the big picture, even if that meant overlooking existing frictions and difficulties in bilateral relationship.

What were the issues that the Chinese were willing to overlook? One of them was the notion of Japan’s resurgent “militarism.” At the time, the loudest criticism of the Japanese government’s alleged militarization emanated from the Soviets who suspected Nakasone of plotting to create an “Eastern NATO.” By contrast, Deng Xiaoping at one point even encouraged Japan to rearm, seeing in its weakness an invitation for Soviet expansionism in Asia. Although by the mid-1980s, China’s assessment of the Soviet threat was beginning to change, Beijing continued to downplay the prospects for Japan’s militarization and showed some appreciation for maintaining the strength of the US-Japanese alliance. Zhao Ziyang, for instance, was very careful not to generalize about the nature of Japan’s foreign policy from comments made by a few right-leaning politicians. “We do not believe,” he told the Japanese Prime Minister, “that the Nakasone Cabinet’s security policy is a militarist policy.

When during his landmark meeting with Emperor Hirohito in 1978, Deng Xiaoping proposed to “let bygones be bygones,” he really meant it. As someone who had witnessed Japan’s war against China firsthand, Deng was not prone to understating the pain and the suffering that that war brought about. But he was not willing to reduce China’s relations with Japan to a singular meaning. In that, he and Nakasone remained on the same page. Seeing this bigger picture was a mark of true statesmanship that has evaded the later generation of Chinese and Japanese policy makers.

This leaves current policy makers, particularly Japanese and Chinese, questioning -- why is there such furor when these issues have been agreed upon to be settled.

I'm not going to explain it, cause you got a different view anyways. Bottom line, the reason China may sometimes question Japanese intentions is the same reason Japan do the same, we spend 1.4% on defense, how is that in anyway an indication of aggressiveness in all directions.

So what are our problems right now, military? Hardly, as I said it's easy enough we both overlook the other without a second thought.

The thing to remember, while things were agreed before, the current Japan China dynamic has dramatically shifted, you don't treat a struggling nation and a world power the same way. Japan never adapted, even now. I seen from your comments on how Chinese navy is inferior with no concrete evidence, while it could be true, with so little info on the Chinese side how can you know?

Perception, the China is weaker perception hasn't changed, and thus tension is bound to arise, why is there almost no tension with America? That dynamic remains the same. Super power and regional power-great power.

An example can be the islands, without going into who it belongs to, Japan knows China contests it right, why not talk to us first before nationalizing it. You can still do it, but the fact you didn't, isn't arrogance or anything, but it does show you don't recognize China's current strength.

Even if something is the fundamental right of Japan, but affects US a little you still talk to them first wouldn't you, that's respect you should give to your equal.



You said responsible and I agree, but your definition and my are different you know why, because that's not what the American media means when they say responsible. You using responsible and transparent is more of a continuation of it rather than your own views.

If you want to prove me wrong, tell me what those mean to you, specifically, if not what I out lined before.



When they say it they mean go back to status quo, the less spoken aspect of it is for China to never be able to challenge the US, it's not some disputes, the fundamental issue is China must obey American standards.


Right now harping on why is irrelevant, I'm open to negotiations and would accept a settlement, but Japan has to meet China half way here, and the reason is simple, we are far stronger. It's not a license to do whatever, but it's mighty difficult for Xi to explain to the public why China completely retreated from previous stances when we are stronger.

How does he justify the sacrifices Chinese made to make China the power it is today.

Before anyone say democracy, in case you forgot how democracy works, if we ever did turn, I'm moving to mars cause war would break out almost instantly. Imagine a democratic leader say he folded, he be ran out of the government.


You want status quo? There's only one option, become stronger than China, now and forever.

Would you be open to compromise. I mean real compromise.

 

[Viet]

Yes, your help is most appreciated.

And, not miraculously, Chinese members are having a decent debate with the most respected Nihonjin.

Same does not apply to your lot.

because you chinese begin to throw insultings on viet members as soon as a discussion starts.

If we have 3000 nukes we can sleep even better
enough to take out USA, Japan and our southern neighbor

mind your language

 

[terranMarine]

because you chinese begin to throw insultings on viet members as soon as a discussion starts.


mind your language

Dealing with our southern neighbor does not require politeness

 

[xesy]

Yes, your help is most appreciated.

And, not miraculously, Chinese members are having a decent debate with the most respected Nihonjin.

Same does not apply to your lot.

Chinese mems (not all of you though) often have a feeling of superior in your tone when speaking to VNese and Philippines. I think that's why. No one like to be looked down on when speaking. Oh and look at the above post, you'll see why. I bet many of you think the same too.

 

[Aepsilons]

An example can be the islands, without going into who it belongs to, Japan knows China contests it right, why not talk to us first before nationalizing it. You can still do it, but the fact you didn't, isn't arrogance or anything, but it does show you don't recognize China's current strength.

The issue here is not about perception of military strength and power, but on the issue of ownership. There is a significant dichotomy between these two issues, and thus I will emphasize our position on ownership.Japan , as you may already known through our history, was never afraid of engaging great powers. The 1st and 2nd Sino Japanese Wars, The Russo-Japanese War, the German-Japanese War (WWI), and the Great Pacific War is testament of our lack of fear towards great rivals/ adversaries.

The Senkaku Islands were not included in the territory which Japan renounced under Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 that legally defined the territory of Japan after World War II. Under Article 3 of the treaty, the islands were placed under the administration of the United States as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands. The Senkaku Islands are included in the areas whose administrative rights were reverted to Japan in accordance with the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands that entered into force in 1972.

The Senkaku Islands have historically and consistently been part of the Nansei Shoto Islands which have been part of the territory of Japan. From 1885, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly conducted by the Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and through other means. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been not only uninhabited but also showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty of China. Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895, to erect markers on the islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan. These measures were carried out in accordance with the internationally accepted means of duly acquiring territorial sovereignty under international law (occupation of terra nullius). The Senkaku Islands are not part of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands that were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty in accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, concluded in April 1895.

Even if something is the fundamental right of Japan, but affects US a little you still talk to them first wouldn't you, that's respect you should give to your equal.

The Senkakus have been administered by Japan since 1885, we had lost administrative control when we allowed the United States to administer it , as per the Peace Treaty. When the united States relinquished control of the Senkakus to Japan again in 1972, this was merely reinstating our continuity. Our side feels no need to tell our Chinese partners of our intent to nationalize the Senkakus because it has, it is and it shall always be part of Japan.

If you want to prove me wrong, tell me what those mean to you, specifically, if not what I out lined before.

I have been telling you what I mean at all times, straight to point and with decorum, if you noticed.

You want status quo? There's only one option, become stronger than China, now and forever.

Is this a threat, my dear and beautiful friend ? Because as you well know, in discourse, there is no need of such drivel.

Would you be open to compromise. I mean real compromise.

Indubitably. We look forward to this real compromise.


I Respectfully Remain,
Yours,
@Nihonjin1051