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What Should be the "ideal" size of the Pakistan Navy in 2020.

Surface fleet:
3-4 AAW oriented frigates
6-8 GP/ASW oriented frigates
6-8 corvettes /offshore patrol vessels
6-8 fast missile boats,
6-8 inshore patrol boats,
3-4 mine hunters,
2-3 ocean tugs,
1 submarine rescue ship (mod-tug)
2 Auxiliary Oiler Replenishement (AOR)
2 Joint Support Ship (crossed AOR/LPH)

Submarines:
6-8 state of the art submarines.

Naval aviation (same as above):
8 PC-3 Orions, 18 Jf-17 or F-16s capable of carrying anti ship missiles, 6 Search & Rescue helos, 16 armed helos to complement frigates and corvettes and a few helos and light aircrafts for inter base liaison.
 
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Niaz Sb - good analysis - except for the requirement in the last para, all the above are 'within' the PN budget and no 'additional' funding wld be required - also historically the numbers match.

Reading Aamir Hussain's two notes, thereafter Niaz's was very informative and instructive. With respect, however, what seems to be needed in this situation is zero-based budgeting. It may be useful to assume nothing available, and then evaluate the possible threats, at different levels of intent. This can serve to generate the requirements of the Navy, not full-fat requirements, but even asymmetric warfare-oriented requirements.

For example, assuming for a moment that the threat is as small as the Indian Navy, a Pakistani naval strategist might decide to assume three levels of warfare. These might be
  1. A state of tension between the two states, leading to a passive naval blockade of Pakistan;
  2. Another, more intense state of tension, marked perhaps by small raids on naval and commercial assets in coastal areas, mounted by aircraft, small boats and special forces, alone or in combination;
  3. Finally, the possibility of open warfare, with no holds barred.

For the first, it is safe to assume that the Indian Navy will mount the blockade as far from Pakistani submarines, and its P3C Orions, as is possible. It is probable that the blockade will be mounted by frigates, by submarines, possibly, just possibly by air cover from a carrier over the horizon.

Responses to this obvious scenario have included both surface ship opposition as well as submarine-based oppositon. Quite honestly, given the conditions, it does seem that investing in submarines is a better ROI for the PN. Small, coastal boats with AIP seem to be the ideal configuration, and the best part is that not only does Pakistan have the core of such a fleet already in place, but her all-weather ally is also in an ideal position to help further indigenisation with technology transfers, knowhow and even outright leases on easy terms.

It does not seem reasonable to dilute a strong defence by hybridising the response.

For the second, we are really considering three distinct, independent causes of tension: air attacks, sea attacks and amphibian attacks. These necessarily have different responses, bearing in mind again that a zero-based budget, and a keen eye for costs will be required.

Against air attacks, the cheapest solutions appear to be extensive missile defences based on thorough radar coverage. The PAF already has a good C4I system in place; either replicating it for the Navy's specific inshore requirements, or extending it and making defence against aerial attacks purely an Air Force responsibility are possible options.

Against small boat attacks, there are a variety of considerations which require to be borne in mind.

While on the one hand, land-based missile and artillery defences are very stable platforms, small boat platforms are difficult to detect; their radar signatures are not prominent and spotting them in time to prevent a surprise attack is extremely difficult. It seems to be reasonable to extend the detection range of shore-based radar by patrolling light aircraft and by a seaward screen of light boats, gunboats or even armed fishing vessels with robust communications capabilities. This system of shore-based gunnery or missile systems with land-based radar, extended by airborne surveillance patrols and auxiliary boats, should give reasonable cover against missile boat or gunboat attacks.

For the third foreseeable danger, amphibian attacks, it is suggested that the defences against missile boat or gun boat attacks will serve just as well for defences against marine craft carrying special forces commandos. However, an additional land-based quick-reaction force operating out of a systematic network of terrestrial bases and mounted on helicopters may be necessary to give teeth to these other defences in case of a successful landing.

Finally, in case of outright war, it appears likely that the state of war is likely to subsume both the states of hostility, of manoeuvres other than war, mentioned above. Therefore, on top of the operations mentioned already, it remains to guard against an additional two options, one of which is an outright forceful attack pressed home firmly by carrier-based strike aircraft, followed by amphibious landings. For such a situation, it is submitted that a simple expansion of the existing facilities mentioned above may suffice. More coastal submarines, more small boats, more spotter aircraft, more auxiliary fishing vessels, and more land-based radar-linked missile and artillery backed up by naval or air force strike aircraft, and a mobile reaction force.

It is submitted that a suitable defence against any imaginable situation confronting Pakistan from the sea may be composed of between
  • 15 to 20 coastal submarines with AIP, of
  • perhaps 40 to 50 gunboats and missile boats,
  • an additional 40 to 50 auxiliary craft consisting of converted fishing craft,
  • perhaps three squadrons of two-seater piston-engined aerial patrol aircraft,
  • the existing complement of P3C Orion marine surveillance aircraft, equipped with Harpoon missiles;
  • extensive land-based artillery, possibly based on older pieces and on retired tanks, whose guns can still be used;
  • a radar system which covers the entire coastline;
  • a network of land bases for a quick reaction force, the total strength of which may not exceed an infantry division for the entire coast line;
  • 2 to 3 squadrons of first-rate interceptors and strike aircraft.

It is submitted that this inventory, though somewhat at variance with other, more extensive projections, will cover every foreseeable threat that Pakistan will face, that it is a sustainable inventory and will not be difficult to maintain, staff and operate, or to replace progressively, and that it serves the purpose of defence to admiration. I might point out that each and every single aspect of this kind of force would be possible to build in Pakistan.

Quite obviously, it would be beyond the bounds of decency or legitimacy for any but a Pakistani commentator to propose organisation and structures, and equipment for offensive purposes. That is best undertaken by a Pakistani entity, and it will be fascinating to see the outcome. With some luck, they will squander on shiny new toys whatever savings may be achieved by the down-to-earth approach proposed above.
 
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@joe shearer
perhaps 40 to 50 gunboats and missile boats, an additional 40 to 50 auxiliary craft consisting of converted fishing craft, perhaps three squadrons of two-seater piston-engined aerial patrol aircraft,

nice analysis, however these 'elements' are better suited for the coast guard and the Maritime Security Agency (MSA) - currently they possess similar assets but not in the quantity mentioned in your analysis - upgrading these two organisations is the need of the day - i wld not 'bog down' the PN in the roles that have been proposed.

as for the air-arm for maritime strike - it is the responsibility of the PAF which has a dedicated mirage squadron equipped with the AM39 Exocet - the JFT is envisioned to carry this role in the future.
 
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@joe..

In your opinion.. would the land based artillery still be effective in operating over what is essentially marsh terrain along most of the coast line.
Where any possible amphibious operation is expected.. most likely to act as a pincer for any holding groups in the south..
Would it not be better to invest more in the hovercraft force as it exists.. expanding on their current capabilities as transports for the Marines and NSSG.
 
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Britten-Norman

BN-2T Maritime Defender
Current;3

operated by the MSA with Naval crews for coastal surveillance.

probably could use a few more.
 
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I have a confession to make.

There was no reaction to my post as late as 11:00 am today. Considering that some of the best brains on the forum were involved in the discussion which I rudely interrupted, this was utterly humiliating - either a tight slap in the face, or, a thousand times worse, an incredulous turning away in dead silence and some embarrassment at having watched someone make an *** of himself.

It is now 7:25 in the evening, but as far as I am concerned, the sun could be shining brightly, there are some noisy birds attempting a fairly complicated pahari dhun near my window and life has started again. While I was out on work, my mind did stray towards the Hooghly river, and the blessings of a quiet immersion in it, to be protected for all eternity from the having to face other human beings again. Fortunately, the Hooghly at Kolkata is muddy, about the texture and consistency of a good consomme, and only lacks a Riesling to wash it down; not the best instrumentality for quick exit from a life made unbearable by one's own brash rushing in where Air Marshals fear to tread.

Actually, the note was in dead serious vein. It was modelled on the PLAN model, and partially on the example of the present Bangladesh Navy; please note that there were cold, logical reasons for these models, of which more anon. But on the other hand, there were some hobby horses, like an obsession with armour that has been junked when it could be re-furbished and turned to much better use than just rusting away in tank parks. Unfortunately, hobby horses lend themselves to violent activity without budging from the spot. Let me answer, cap in hand, to the two comments made: Fatman17's point about light prop planes is so obvious that to respond would be silly - like becoming something out of Wodehouse's surreal concept of the hierarchy in Hollywood, where Yes Men outrank mere Nodders.

@joe shearer
perhaps 40 to 50 gunboats and missile boats, an additional 40 to 50 auxiliary craft consisting of converted fishing craft, perhaps three squadrons of two-seater piston-engined aerial patrol aircraft,

nice analysis, however these 'elements' are better suited for the coast guard and the Maritime Security Agency (MSA) - currently they possess similar assets but not in the quantity mentioned in your analysis - upgrading these two organisations is the need of the day - i wld not 'bog down' the PN in the roles that have been proposed.

I was more than a little nervous that the analysis should seem to be 'demeaning' to the PN. There is no such intention; as mentioned at the start, the intention was building a minimum, financially justified, sustainable, maintainable and possibly indigenous force.

For defensive purposes, what I have outlined, bar some howlers due to lack of knowledge of the local topograpy - as Santro has delicately pointed out - I submit that this is adequate.

It is quite another matter that a fighting defense, one based on an aggressive stance and a determination to keep the opposition at bay, would need a wholly different set of equipment and resources.

However, not for the world would I submit a plan that would add sensibly to the PN's offensive capabilities. You will understand that such a course of action would be unbefitting and unbecoming. I do hope that some wiser head will fill in the gap, and provide for the helicopter carriers, the ocean-ready helicopters, the strong missile corvettes, the missile frigates and even, perhaps, if some strategic alarm bells go off, and the enormous length of unprotected coastline with no military backing in the hinterland beyond makes any sense, the littoral command ships that will provide for the offensive part of the naval role.

However, it is humbly submitted that the defensive echelons mentioned in my note will serve as an excellent foundation for the more visible and glamorous craft involved in a fighting defense, which I have deliberately omitted from consideration.


as for the air-arm for maritime strike - it is the responsibility of the PAF which has a dedicated mirage squadron equipped with the AM39 Exocet - the JFT is envisioned to carry this role in the future.

I can only caution grimly that neither the PAF nor the IAF is really geared to meet their sister services' requirements. The sooner the Army and the Navy tease out their autonomous resources, the better. After a period of initial heart-burn, the air force may well come to understand that being left alone to concentrate on strategic strike, on air superiority and on air defense is not entirely a bad thing!

@joe..

In your opinion.. would the land based artillery still be effective in operating over what is essentially marsh terrain along most of the coast line.
Where any possible amphibious operation is expected.. most likely to act as a pincer for any holding groups in the south..
Would it not be better to invest more in the hovercraft force as it exists.. expanding on their current capabilities as transports for the Marines and NSSG.


I am sorry that a clerical error and a gap in knowledge have made their mark on my comments.

Clearly artillery will have a different effect in marshy terrain than in normal terrain. Since I am not familiar with conditions on the coastline - presumably the coastline near Karachi is meant - I am not sure what will happen. In Belgium and northern France, in heavy, loamy soil, heavy artillery created quagmires and marshes of their own. The horrors of WWI trench warfare, and the contributions of the land conditions to those horrors, are too well-known to bear repetition.

However, Santro's hint is, I think, that artillery explosions will be lost completely in marshy soil, and will merely throw up huge fountains of water. If that is so, then obviously he himself has supplied the answer; an expansion and systematic pursuit of the principles of mobile warfare adapted to Air Cushion Vehicles (hovercraft) is what is needed. Silly of me; I am kicking myself not to have noted that the Pakistani Army is already familiar with their use.

One last point: Where any possible amphibious operation is expected.. most likely to act as a pincer for any holding groups in the south..

In one word, no. That is not what was suggested. That is easy to anticipate, and the possibility has already been stifled at birth by the disposition of the Karachi Corps.

Instead, I will refer you to the map, and to the overall dispositions of the two southern corps, not one alone. I suggest that the huge wide-open gap that springs out of the map is an open invitation to explore the ability of the PA to react to unexpected incursions; will it get its units to this uninhabited spot on time?

Thank you, Aamir Hussain, Niaz, Santro and Fatman17, for not fitting me out with a dunce cap and seating me in the corner immediately.
 
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@joe shearer
Actually, the note was in dead serious vein

and taken as such......i for one appreciate your inputs. we r not 'perfect' - if we were, we wouldnt be here!
cheers!
 
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@joe shearer
I can only caution grimly that neither the PAF nor the IAF is really geared to meet their sister services' requirements

AFAIK - this is 'changing' at least as far as PA and PAF go esp during the SWA ops - however more is needed!!!
 
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@joe shearer
After a period of initial heart-burn, the air force may well come to understand that being left alone to concentrate on strategic strike, on air superiority and on air defense is not entirely a bad thing!

agree! unfortunately a recent NDC (Nat Defence College) report 'rejected' the idea.
 
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Thank you, Aamir Hussain, Niaz, Santro and Fatman17, for not fitting me out with a dunce cap and seating me in the corner immediately.

Mon Ami..
From what i have gathered from your posts..
it is you who should be judging whether I should wear a dunce cap or not..
I am but a young engineer ..albeit in the defense sector..still.. barely out of the starting line..

And I suppose the late reply was.. in part due to a very good post..
and posts that deserve well thought out.. if short replies.


Now.. for your consideration..
my query towards the artillery suggestion was based on the idea that most artillery currently in service with the PA would bog down in the marshes..the muddy terrain which is the coast line immediately east of Karachi. You give me credit for too much..
Since I made the direct assumption that an amphibious landing.. would be less effective at causing any direct damage(again.. I do not group small highly trained groups for sabotage with an amphibious assault force) to Karachi or any crucial facilities of the PN or PA..
Rather.. a backstab if you will for any PA corp's holding the Hyderabad/Sukkur.. or Nawabshah axis.. in case of an IA action to sever the link to the port city...or otherwise.

In such a scenario.. a defense force of PN marines may be counted to offer a temporary defense.. but what possible fire support apart from the Air can they count upon??
Will the 33 wing's actions be enough to slow such a force down.. especially once it ha established a beachhead??
I have rarely seen any heavy tracked vehicle in use.. or any wheeled vehicle in use in that terrain.. apart from Light armor or soft skinned vehicles.
If you recall the atlantique incident.. there was very little in the way of heavy armor deployed by the PA and the marines in that sector..
rapid deployment forces armed with AT and AA systems were used to establish a presence in the area.

What artillery support will any such force have in case a much larger force is expected.. I am unsure.
I suppose the PA could use the existing road network to move its assets as close to the expected FLOT.. would save some deployment time.. but would that be enough.

Which is why I brought in the Air Cushion vehicles..although the probable prohibitive cost may not be feasible for the PN after all.

On a side note..
the navy has gained some high speed assets such as patrol boats in the shape of the coast guards shiny new toys delivered for use in the WOT..
Ever had a ride in a 50 knot boat.. ??
Follow it up with a snorkeling tour of the undiscovered coral reefs off the Makran coast..
Australia aint got nothing on us..it is unbelievable..
 
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I have a confession to make.

There was no reaction to my post as late as 11:00 am today. Considering that some of the best brains on the forum were involved in the discussion which I rudely interrupted, this was utterly humiliating - either a tight slap in the face, or, a thousand times worse, an incredulous turning away in dead silence and some embarrassment at having watched someone make an *** of himself.

It is now 7:25 in the evening, but as far as I am concerned, the sun could be shining brightly, there are some noisy birds attempting a fairly complicated pahari dhun near my window and life has started again. While I was out on work, my mind did stray towards the Hooghly river, and the blessings of a quiet immersion in it, to be protected for all eternity from the having to face other human beings again. Fortunately, the Hooghly at Kolkata is muddy, about the texture and consistency of a good consomme, and only lacks a Riesling to wash it down; not the best instrumentality for quick exit from a life made unbearable by one's own brash rushing in where Air Marshals fear to tread.

Actually, the note was in dead serious vein. It was modelled on the PLAN model, and partially on the example of the present Bangladesh Navy; please note that there were cold, logical reasons for these models, of which more anon. But on the other hand, there were some hobby horses, like an obsession with armour that has been junked when it could be re-furbished and turned to much better use than just rusting away in tank parks. Unfortunately, hobby horses lend themselves to violent activity without budging from the spot. Let me answer, cap in hand, to the two comments made: Fatman17's point about light prop planes is so obvious that to respond would be silly - like becoming something out of Wodehouse's surreal concept of the hierarchy in Hollywood, where Yes Men outrank mere Nodders.





Thank you, Aamir Hussain, Niaz, Santro and Fatman17, for not fitting me out with a dunce cap and seating me in the corner immediately.

Hon Joe Shearer,

Your post looked at the scenario from a different angle for which I am thankful and lack of a reaction does not imply that it is not worth a reaction. As a rule I don’t make a reply if I have nothing worthwhile to say. Every country has different priorities and requirements , PN should not follow PLAN or any other model but her own.

On this particular subject, I would like to add that in my honest opinion PN does not need large number of gun boats or amphibian craft because any amphibian landing by India is likely to be only a hit and run affair and also don’t think PN has the capability to defend the forces that would make use of amphibian landing crafts.

Pakistan already has a few hovercrafts to chase smugglers and to deal with minor incursions on her territorial marsh lands. Besides, with such a large land border, why would India or Pakistan put lives of their soldiers at risk by landing an expeditionary force which is sure to be surrounded and eliminated? Destruction of enemy infra structure can be cheaply and more effective done thru aerial or naval bombardment.

Don’t think in the days of 200 mile range missiles, coastal defence artillery with about 12 miles range is much of a deterrent except to the gun boats. Thus a beyond a battery of coastal guns at the main ports, only guns that are really needed would be anti aircraft artillery.

Missile firing FAC has limited range and can only operate in brown waters. FAC are ideally suited to an archipelago or a coast line with lots of hiding places such as Greece where after hit and run attacks FAC can slip way to hide in a narrow fjord. Unlike Bangla Desh coast, Pakistani coast is rather flat therefore more than a dozen missile firing FAC would provide little value for money.

My post barely touched on blue water offensive capability which is severely lacking in the Pakistan Navy. However, pure blue water assets such as guided missile destroyers, nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers are very expensive to own, to operate and to defend. No country has infinite resources and Pakistan has been cash starved since I can remember. Therefore we need to establish what level of blue water capability is absolutely essential?

Don’t think PN has any ambitions to project power far beyond Pakistan’s shores; therefore I am not keen on a large surface fleet and /or aircraft carrier. Besides, defending such high value assets faraway from our shores would probably be beyond Pakistan’s economic and military capability in the foreseeable future.

I would venture to guess that a few long range hunter killer submarines that can fire ‘Babur’ type cruise missile would be the cheapest option. Acquisition of a nuclear submarine would make even naval supers powers such as US to take a cautious approach when dealing with PN.

With the aerial refueling now availble, additional squadron of land based missile firing long range aircraft such F-16 complementing a few guided missile frigates gathering deep sea intelligence could provide a very effective detterrent upto say 400 miles form our coast line.

I have nothing else to add on this subject.
 
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Mon Ami..
From what i have gathered from your posts..
it is you who should be judging whether I should wear a dunce cap or not..
I am but a young engineer ..albeit in the defense sector..still.. barely out of the starting line..

Heh. I'm just a bloody programmer, self-taught at that, who eked out a living except for a purple patch towards the end of his career. Of that, some little percentage of the time was on avionics and defence systems.

What I have been drawing on in contributing is some degree of fact-finding, some degree of management analysis (in this case in particular), and a determination to look at facts and logic and not get emotionally involved with the subject. That last is frankly difficult, extremely difficult, but still needs to be addressed.


And I suppose the late reply was.. in part due to a very good post..
and posts that deserve well thought out.. if short replies.


Now.. for your consideration..
my query towards the artillery suggestion was based on the idea that most artillery currently in service with the PA would bog down in the marshes..the muddy terrain which is the coast line immediately east of Karachi. You give me credit for too much..
Since I made the direct assumption that an amphibious landing.. would be less effective at causing any direct damage(again.. I do not group small highly trained groups for sabotage with an amphibious assault force) to Karachi or any crucial facilities of the PN or PA..
Rather.. a backstab if you will for any PA corp's holding the Hyderabad/Sukkur.. or Nawabshah axis.. in case of an IA action to sever the link to the port city...or otherwise.

In such a scenario.. a defense force of PN marines may be counted to offer a temporary defense.. but what possible fire support apart from the Air can they count upon??
Will the 33 wing's actions be enough to slow such a force down.. especially once it ha established a beachhead??
I have rarely seen any heavy tracked vehicle in use.. or any wheeled vehicle in use in that terrain.. apart from Light armor or soft skinned vehicles.
If you recall the atlantique incident.. there was very little in the way of heavy armor deployed by the PA and the marines in that sector..
rapid deployment forces armed with AT and AA systems were used to establish a presence in the area.

What artillery support will any such force have in case a much larger force is expected.. I am unsure.
I suppose the PA could use the existing road network to move its assets as close to the expected FLOT.. would save some deployment time.. but would that be enough.

Which is why I brought in the Air Cushion vehicles..although the probable prohibitive cost may not be feasible for the PN after all.

Very simply, I understand that what is being visualised is an attack by the Indian Army on Karachi across the Gujarat-Sind border, and the defensive response from your units.

A caveat first: PA V Corps has under its command two infantry divisions, two mechanised divisions and four independent brigades, of which there is one mechanised, two armoured and one artillery.

An attack on Karachi south of Hyderabad would put the strong concentration at Hyderabad in flank, with an infantry division and two independent brigades, an armoured brigade and a mechanised brigade to worry about. In addition, backing 25th Mechanised at Malir is the Corps reserve, one artillery brigade and an armoured brigade, located at an unknown place, but presumably, Corps HQ being Karachi, at Malir itself.

An attack on Karachi north of Hyderabad would place the attacker conveniently between the concentration at Hyderabad and 16th Infantry Div. at Pano Aqil.

So, two points:

one, an attacking column aimed at Karachi from the landward side would find itself between the anvil of Malir (25th Mech. Div. + Armoured Brigade + Artillery Brigade) and the hammer of Hyderabad (18th Inf. Div. + 31st Mech. Bde. + 2nd Armoured Bde.), or, marginally less unpleasant until one remembers the further concentration of XXXI Corps at Bahawalpur, between Pano Aqil and Hyderabad.

Two, given a desired preponderance of 3:1 for the attacker, it would need 12 divisions in the attack to prevail, according to older concepts (and both armies have so far demonstrated their ability to manage battalion sized operations only, to a template of operations at least 70 years old today).

Considering that the IA has only 23 divisions against the west and the north west, that would leave 11 divisions for the rest of the line, including the horrid thought that this number, less two divisions in Kashmir, would shrink to 9 against the chain-like structure represented by I Corps (Mangla) =>XXX Corps (Gujranwala) =>IV Corps (Lahore) => II Corps (Multan)=>XXXI Corps (Hyderabad)=>V Corps (Karachi).

This doesn't compute. But something else does, which might arise elsewhere, and may not be appropriate for this analysis.

However, returning to the thought exercise for the moment, it is possible that a combined land-sea operation might catch the PN and the PA flat-footed. But where might that blow fall? On the east of Karachi? Apparently away from the coastal swamps, the terrain is dry, semi-arid, and rapidly losing its pastoral character due to ecological degradation. On penetrating the wet patch, possible.

So now we come to the point. Are we going to have heavy artillery in this marshy area? How do we defend Karachi from such an attack (which would have to be several divisions strong, at least 5 divisions, to overcome 25th Mech Div and two independent brigades located within Karachi)? An outlying screen of marines? Or a fast, hard-hitting ACV force, with anti-tank missile launchers and heavy machine guns? And will the PAF stick moodily to its self-imposed task of reducing the IAF and bringing it to its knees, or will it mix it up and make life easier for the defenders of Karachi in particular, and Sind in general?

The answer perhaps lies in the combination of ACV forces used in conjunction with the mechanised troops and the independent brigades. To take up your suggestion, the ACV units and the light, covering screen of marines, could be used to patrol in force, aggressively, right up at the edges of the invading troops.

Those cannot stay within their bridgehead and still support the incoming thrust from the east; they have to move out and act as another jaw of the pincer. It is this committing move that must be detected by the ACV, and it is this that must be attacked directly by the Karachi garrison. That may seem like a counsel of desperation, leaving Karachi open to further attacks, perhaps a landing to the west, but we are already considering five divisions in a bridgehead from the sea, a potential one-in-six expansion; how much more can the IA hope to have in reserve, without warning everyone concerned what might happen?

But how did this disastrous situation come about? What happened to the small craft screens, the missile boats, the coastal submarines? What happened to the coastal batteries? Did the P3C Orions get shot down at the outset of hostilities?

Put this bluntly, one is forced to admit that more is needed. A determined sea-domination drive by several guided missile destroyers and diesel submarines of the IN working closely together under aggressive air cover, and sweeping clear the PN's screening coastal forces is a possibility. The PN as proposed earlier simply wouldn't be able to stop such a sweep, nor could it stop the amphibian landings.

What else is needed?

In retrospect, while surface vessels are still a threat to themselves, and are vulnerable to attack air, sea and under water, Niaz' idea of using more cruise-missile armed submarines may be the answer.

If I could rat on my own proposals and do a re-think, it may be not only cruise-missile armed coastal submarines, but long-distance, ocean-going submarines; while the IN will expect submarines in its path and will go for them with vigour, they will not be quite so comfortable knowing that some are on perpetual sea patrol, outside the line Kochi-Muscat, and are tasked to move in if there is major activity or fleet level hostilities off Karachi.

Will the IN be capable of pulling off a double blockade, an inner one and an outer one? Perhaps; the proof of the pudding and all that: if even a single cruise-armed submarine gets through at the time that the carrier is visible within radar range and troops are debouching, that is a recipe for red disaster.


On a side note..
the navy has gained some high speed assets such as patrol boats in the shape of the coast guards shiny new toys delivered for use in the WOT..
Ever had a ride in a 50 knot boat.. ??
Follow it up with a snorkeling tour of the undiscovered coral reefs off the Makran coast..
Australia aint got nothing on us..it is unbelievable..

This is wholly unfair and utterly demoralising. It might possibly come under the rubric of waging war on the moral defences of Indian citizens. I can only hope for a rapprochement in the foreseeable future, and educational tours for amateur strategists, obviously at 50 knots an hour, so as to cover a lot of territory. Until then, there is always Riesling.
 
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A question does PN operate any mine hunter vessels ?
 
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