MaXimMaRz
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This is in responce to Mastan Khan's Doubts about 65 war
Analysis of 1965 Air ops
Being three times smaller than IAF, whatever PAF achieved was certainly exceptional. On analyses we find that following 04 factors were the major aspects resulting in the difference of performance between the two air forces.
1. Offensive Strategy. PAF’s offensive oriented strategy enabled it to achieve the desired degree of control of air just in two days of the war. It wrested the initiative and maintained the psychological edge through out. IAF offensive action was restricted only to the places where it was not challenged in the skies. IAF actions appeared reactive and despite being numerically superior, did not give any impression of following an offensive philosophy. IAF failed to pre-empt, a decision criticized by their own analysis till today. Why they failed to do so, is a question that still preoccupies them and we can find internet flooded with reasons for this but none is convincing. They project the idea that it was a deliberate policy adopted by their superiors. If it was so,
then they were at fault, because they missed the opportunity of their life time of achieving glories. This is where leadership counts.
2. Leadership. “He was a formidable fellow, and I was glad that he was a Pakistani and not Egyptian”, wrote the Israeli C-in-C. Nur Khan was a bold person having lot of initiative. Leading from the front he provided a bold and offensive strategy to the PAF which he thought was the only recipe for a small but potent air force against a numerically superior enemy. This helped PAF gain the superiority in the air. On the other hand, despite numerical superiority, IAF leadership lacked this cohesiveness of purpose and theiraction portrayed uncertain mind set.
3. PAF morale, motivation and the spirit to fight and sacrifice was at its peak. Daytime Recce of airfields by F-104, time spent over target despite presence of AAA, launching of SSG personnel into certain death mission, initiative by C-130 personnel and carrying 1000 Lbs on F-86s and similar other instances speak volumes of high state of morale of the PAF personnel. Though it is not right to assume that enemy had any less of this actor, however, similar zeal and enthusiasm was not so prominent on the other side. Many a time IAF pilots were seen dispensing weapons short of the target or making one hurried pass. Most likely, couple of incidents such as shooting down of four vampires on 01st Sept before commencement of proper war and high attrition encountered by IAF during the opening round had resulted into cautious employment of IAF by its political and military leaders.
This is post is only in connection to to a previous post, i hope no one starts trolling over this..
Analysis of 1965 Air ops
Being three times smaller than IAF, whatever PAF achieved was certainly exceptional. On analyses we find that following 04 factors were the major aspects resulting in the difference of performance between the two air forces.
1. Offensive Strategy. PAF’s offensive oriented strategy enabled it to achieve the desired degree of control of air just in two days of the war. It wrested the initiative and maintained the psychological edge through out. IAF offensive action was restricted only to the places where it was not challenged in the skies. IAF actions appeared reactive and despite being numerically superior, did not give any impression of following an offensive philosophy. IAF failed to pre-empt, a decision criticized by their own analysis till today. Why they failed to do so, is a question that still preoccupies them and we can find internet flooded with reasons for this but none is convincing. They project the idea that it was a deliberate policy adopted by their superiors. If it was so,
then they were at fault, because they missed the opportunity of their life time of achieving glories. This is where leadership counts.
2. Leadership. “He was a formidable fellow, and I was glad that he was a Pakistani and not Egyptian”, wrote the Israeli C-in-C. Nur Khan was a bold person having lot of initiative. Leading from the front he provided a bold and offensive strategy to the PAF which he thought was the only recipe for a small but potent air force against a numerically superior enemy. This helped PAF gain the superiority in the air. On the other hand, despite numerical superiority, IAF leadership lacked this cohesiveness of purpose and theiraction portrayed uncertain mind set.
3. PAF morale, motivation and the spirit to fight and sacrifice was at its peak. Daytime Recce of airfields by F-104, time spent over target despite presence of AAA, launching of SSG personnel into certain death mission, initiative by C-130 personnel and carrying 1000 Lbs on F-86s and similar other instances speak volumes of high state of morale of the PAF personnel. Though it is not right to assume that enemy had any less of this actor, however, similar zeal and enthusiasm was not so prominent on the other side. Many a time IAF pilots were seen dispensing weapons short of the target or making one hurried pass. Most likely, couple of incidents such as shooting down of four vampires on 01st Sept before commencement of proper war and high attrition encountered by IAF during the opening round had resulted into cautious employment of IAF by its political and military leaders.
This is post is only in connection to to a previous post, i hope no one starts trolling over this..