I'm not refuting that the radars cannot differentiate between the debris, decoys and warhead. They absolutely can, provided the decoys are basic ones. Sure, this was the first time they actually demonstrated it against an ICBM-class target, but still the entire system is nowhere near capable of handling a massive strike from a formidable enemy.
Bro, how can you assert with certainty that the sensors [in question] can distinguish [only] basic decoys from the actual warhead? Please keep in mind that a great deal of secrecy is involved in these matters [understandably] and technicalities are not completely understood in public domain. Not wise to jump to conclusions therefore.
A single THAAD system spooked China when it was deployed in South Korea in 2017. China has openly expressed that the radar system of THAAD is counterproductive to Chinese interests and should be removed. China has even exerted pressure on South Korea to refuse deployment of THAAD system in its territory or face economic sanctions.
"The U.S. deployment of an advanced anti-missile system in South Korea gravely harms the strategic security interests of China, Russia and other countries in the region." - Chinese Premier Xi Jinping
If THAAD system is advanced, GMD network is a nightmare (for an adversary).
Similarly, deployment of relevant sensors in Poland and Romania has infuriated Russia, to the point that Russia commenced its S-500 missile defense project and continues to harass Baltic states with aggressive posturing from time-to-time. Russia has conveyed to US in clear terms that these sensors be removed from Poland and Romania to normalize relations.
Reactions of China and Russia strongly imply that the sensors [in question] represent a credible threat to their deterrence strategies because they have expanded the footprint of GMD network at the surface. US has repeatedly insisted that North Korea and Iran have necessitated these deployments. However, China and Russia are not stupid - they understand what US is up to.
Another factor is external source of facilitation in "midcourse discrimination" process. GMD EKV is equipped with advanced electro-optical and infrared sensors for this objective, but it is also capable of receiving and processing information from external assets to augment its chances of colliding with the right target. This boils down to its computing power which will be undoubtedly incredible.
"Multiple sensor systems, including space-based infrared satellites and likely an Aegis SPY-1 radar, detected the missile and tracked its location. The Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX) also surveilled the missile, providing high resolution imagery which allowed the GMD system to discriminate the missile’s warhead from its accompanying debris.
Using this data, a GBI was launched from Vandenberg AFB. Once in space, the GBI released its Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which identified the warhead with its onboard electro-optical and infrared sensors, diverted into the warhead’s path, and collided with it." - CSIS
SBX-1 is the most powerful AESA radar system in existence and its primary tracker is known to operate in the X-band frequency range. According to its operators, its results enable stunningly rich assessment of any matter of interest, and it can facilitate a GMD EKV in "midcourse discrimination." In-fact, SBIRS network in space can also facilitate a GMD EKV in "midcourse discrimination." Therefore, probability of defeating countermeasures increases accordingly. Primary advantage of network-centric approach is to address limitations of an asset with strengths of another.
"However, the system is able, today, to operate without the X-band radar. We use it in the test construct to gather the data that we need to gather, and to aid in the discrimination effort. But I don't want you to walk away to think that it was not a realistic test scenario." - James Syring
Source:
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...ess-briefing-by-vice-admiral-james-syring-on/
To give you an idea how effective those external facilitation techniques can be, SBX-1 platform enabled an Arleigh Burke class destroyer to eliminate a defunct spy satellite orbiting Earth at the speed of 17000 mph and at an altitude of 180 miles with an interceptor that was not optimized for ASAT missions, and precision was such that the interceptor struck its target at a spot where it was actually intended to. This was a clear-cut demonstration of precision that was greater than the typical "hitting a bullet with bullet" scenario. This mission took place in 2008.
---
Prior to the live intercept of an ICBM-class target in 2017, many were quick to point out that GMD network is not up to the task. Many were skeptical about the possibility of a GMD EKV to take out an ICBM-class target, let alone perform "midcourse discrimination." In sharp contrast to perceptions of some, GMD network was up the task by 2014 but public was not informed. Some were actually lobbying for termination of GMD program at the time, declaring it a waste of resources. However, North Korea motivated Trump administration to order MDA to conduct a live test to pacify growing concerns, and the network delivered.
Story does not end here. SOP of MDA is to deploy a minimum of two GMD EKVs to intercept a single warhead, therefore probability of escape is non-existent.
Now, of-course, it is not possible to satiate concerns of everybody. Criticism is a status-quo.
I did not assert that GMD network is capable of thwarting a [massive] strike from a formidably enemy at this stage but it will get there at some point. You need to look at GMD network from the standpoint of strategic calculus of the US, not in isolation.
GMD network, in its current stage, make it possible for the US to defeat a [near-peer] nuclear power, provided that the US take such initiative. Plan is to severely degrade war-fighting capability of the opponent with an overwhelming barrage of decapitating strikes [involving both conventional and nuclear weapons]. Under these circumstances, if the opponent is somehow able to launch a limited barrage of ICBMs towards US mainland, GMD network will come into play and neutralize this barrage. Therefore, US will win the war with [acceptable] costs. Very crude and barbaric, if you ask me, but this is how it is.
Conversely, GMD network grants sufficient leverage to US to threaten and destroy a [regional] nuclear power with minimum losses. China is also vulnerable because its strike options are really limited at present; efforts are underway to address this shortcoming though. However, arms-race is continuous.
Um no, its not. Its not wide enough, besides just look at the fuel lines going in. This target missile (Orbital ATK's OBV) seems to have a unitary warhead, accompanied with decoys.
Miniaturization is the name of the game, my friend. Looks can be deceiving.
Similar dimensions and size.
Top cone of the bottom ICBM is large enough to house a minimum of 3 warheads, IMO.
I am not asserting that the ICBM in question was actually armed with 3 warheads but I get the impression that it was armed with a real warhead and a dummy warhead for a realistic simulation of "midcourse discrimination." Not sure how many decoys it actually carried. MDA has withheld this kind of information from the public. But confidence of MDA chief is very telling.
"I was confident before the test that we have the capability to defeat any threat that they would throw at us. And I'm more confident today -- even more confident today after seeing the intercept test yesterday that we continue to be on that course." - James Syring
Of course, MIRVs only increase the number of required interceptions, they don't complicate the job that much. My point was that they haven't conducted this sort of test, and they probably don't need to. You can always selectively hit some of the decoys to prove that, just like they did in the test you mentioned.
Indeed! Glad you understood.
I'm afraid you've misunderstood the job of the superfuse. Its just an improved radar fuse for the RV, so that instead of detonating at a fixed altitude (or on impact), the altitude required for detonation is varied so that maximum damage can be inflicted on the target. See the following images from the article you quoted:
It has nothing to do with the maneuvering of the RV. Present US RVs are not capable of maneuvering inside the atmosphere, they spin all the way through in a relatively straight trajectory. The US nuclear arsenal is indeed aging when compared to contemporary Russian & Chinese systems.
Bro,
You misunderstood my point here. I shared that information with you to make you aware of the fact that US has optimized its SLBM fleet for carrying out "decapitating strikes." This advancement is in line with the plan of severely degrading the war-fighting capability of a [near-peer] nuclear power with an overwhelming number of decapitating strikes [first strike initiative].
Sure it is pretty precise, but EKV's own maneuverability doesn't gives it much advantage in this case. Consider a RV and a EKV in space. Both objects are closing in at a relative velocity of several km/s (nearly 10km/s in the worst case). There's no degree of maneuverability or sensor aboard the EKV which can help predict the maneuver the RV will execute during the last microseconds. Being a hard-kill vehicle makes the job even tougher. It can't 'chase' the RV, like a SAM.
I am not sure how you reached that conclusion.
Is an MaRV equipped with relevant sensors to detect an incoming EKV? I don't think so. So how would it outmaneuver an EKV at the last instant? Also, we are talking about an EKV which is actually equipped with advanced electro-optical and infrared sensors to get a lock on the warhead from considerable distance and would be actively
homing in for the kill. And watch this animation to understand how an EKV maneuvers:
"The EKV continuously adjusts its flight path until it collides with the target." - CSIS
An MaRV is known to perform
preplanned flight maneuvers during the re-entry phase of its flight in order to reach its target with a higher degree of precision. The only known practical method of safeguarding an MaRV from an attempt to intercept it during the midcourse phase of its flight is through use of decoys (i.e. threat cloud formation). However, this strategy is unlikely to work against GMD Network.
Haha what is this obsession with sensors? That's what I often tell the Indians. You can detect the entire bird species over a country for all they care, but the point is, can you do anything about it? Detection/tracking is only a part of the job.
The tricks I'm referring to are evasion tactics. More sophisticated decoys, more maneuverable RVs and most importantly, Hypersonic Glide Vehicles. The US has been building up this network since the 60s, but the only advantage it has given them is more time for retaliatory decision making.
Bro,
Sensors are the name of the game. You need to delve into this matter, to understand why.
FYI:
https://www.quora.com/Why-do-anti-ballistic-missiles-use-IR-sensors-and-not-radars
AND;
So have the Russians, so that doesn't gives the Americans any advantage.
Bro,
Of-course, Russian nuclear force represents a potent threat to the US due to its sheer size and capability. However, you are overlooking a number of other factors that may come into play in a conflict, should it ever break out. US has employed vast surveillance capabilities to study and
mark Russian strategic assets [and initiatives] over the course of years because there is no substitute for "meaningful intelligence" and not much window for aggressive posturing. Should an all-out war ever break out [God forbid], US will not take its chances and unleash a massive barrage of decapitating strikes on Russian inventories with the intent to severely degrade Russian war-fighting capability. In this manner, Russian retaliatory options will be reduced to a manageable threat. Now, assuming that a few Russian strategic assets escaped the initial barrage and retaliate, GMD network will take care of it.
Please keep in mind that Russian war-fighting capability has significantly eroded since the days of Cold War and shortcomings are glaring. Russian state-of-the-art assets are short in numbers. Understandable because Russian defense budget is really low in comparison to that of the US and even China. To give you an idea, study this comparison:
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/russia-s-involvement-in-syria-proves-that-its-far-behin-1794966734
This is why Russia doesn't have much to demonstrate in regards to its missile defense related programs because resources are limited. Russia has fielded some nuclear-tipped interceptors to counter a barrage of ICBMs from the US but American experts insist that ICBMs are designed to move at extreme speeds; therefore, probability of intercept is not good enough with an explosive warhead [even if it is nuclear]. American warheads are also hardened enough to withstand kinetic forces generated by a nuclear blast [to a certain extent]. Therefore, hit-to-kill mechanism is relatively much superior approach to intercept and also a safe bet. Unfortunately for Russia, US has the resources to experiment with hit-to-kill platforms and
hone them.
Conversely, China falls in the category of "manageable threat" at present. Chinese nuclear force is vast on paper but a chunk of its force is suitable for regional engagements. Relatively few assets threaten US mainland. China is attempting to address its shortcomings in this regard but arms-race is a given.
I shall also point out that US has commenced full-spectrum ASW program since 2014. They cannot take the threat of SLBMs lightly anymore. FYI:
https://news.usni.org/2014/08/27/opinion-new-era-anti-submarine-warfare
US currently operate largest fleet of so-called FAS [optimized for both offensive and surveillance missions] and is also employing a number of other techniques to hunt SLBMs across the seas. These include:
1. SURTASS*
2. SBIRS
3. P-8 Poseidon aircraft
4. Drones [WIP]
5. UUV [WIP]
6. Nanotechnologies [WIP]
*Superb method of tracking extremely quiet submarines across the breath of seas. However, activation in high-alert situations mostly because its emissions are harmful to marine mammals.
Again, sure the GMD has introduced a new dimension, and of course the Americans have planned decapitation strike strategies for a long time (even without the GMD)...but there is no 'big' game being played here as far as major powers such as Russia or China are concerned. The bottom-line is, that MAD is inevitable in such a scenario for the forseeable future. Countermeasures will continue to evolve at much cheaper costs.
Yes, but nobody was aware of superfuse related modifications in SLBMs to make them suitable for decapitating strikes until recently. Leak was intentional to send a message to relevant sources.
GMD network is expanding and improvements are non-stop. To give you an idea, MDA has received ample funds to replace GMD EKVs with more capable and cost-effective GMD RKVs, develop GMD MOKVs and expand the number of interceptors to 100 in the 2020s.
GMD network is also meaningful in the context that it may reduce prospects of a preemptive nuclear strike on US mainland from an adversary.
And why Russia and China are investing in missile defense platforms? Doesn't make sense if technologies are not up to the mark and/or threat of MAD will not diminish eventually.
That ICBM is certainly a decent feat of engineering but that article is also a propaganda piece to scare the gullible and maintain status-quo. FEAR FACTOR is crucial to ensure flow of funds.
Look at this video:
Sufficient thermal signature to get a lock from SBIRS, and this happens in an instant.
"This dual sensor design gives SBIRS the ability to scan a wide area of the earth’s surface and stare at, or quickly flip between others areas in great detail, at the same time. This way, one sensor can view the globe persistently for launch detection, while the other can be tasked to more closely watch certain regions or even possibly to track missiles not just during launch, but after their rocket motors burn out and they are coasting in space or the extremes of the upper atmosphere. In doing so, the system can help differentiate the reentry vehicles/warheads from decoys or debris."
+
"Because SBIRS high-fidelity sensors, which are said to be at least three times as sensitive as older systems, it is rumored that these satellites can detect and possibly track many other things than just ballistic missile launches. These speculations include surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, artillery fire, and even aircraft in flight."
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/these-are-the-doomsday-satellites-that-detected-the-exp-1737434876
http://spaceflight101.com/spacecraft/sbirs/
http://www.spacenewsmag.com/feature/unlocking-the-sbirs-data-revolution/
"SBIRS persistent surveillance capabilities enable detection and reporting of missile launches around the globe, support the nation's ballistic missile defense system, expand technical intelligence, and gather and bolster situational awareness for warfighters on the battlefield."
http://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Articl...2-launches-improves-space-based-capabilities/
No ballistic or cruise missile can evade SBIRS, my friend. Both DSP and SBIRS networks in-conjunction, provide a crucial capability to the US to track and monitor ballistic missile launches from any country so the US can respond to a threat in time, if necessary.
Of course it does. Take a look here:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/politics/north-korea-missile-defense-cyber-drones.html
If the US was so confident about the GMD's capability, why bother with developing North-Korea specific solutions? The problem is that rocket man doesn't seems to give a $hit about MAD, unlike the Russians or the Chinese. The Americans need to make sure that they find another way to deter North Korea. This unpredictability is worrying for the entire world.
All major US-based analysts rightly refuted Trump when he claimed a 97% success-rate of the GMD.
https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/d...gainst-north-korea-and-that-should-scare-you/
It is important to distinguish PSYOPS and propaganda from ground realities at individual capacity in the age of information (and disinformation).
Trump administration's assessment is in regards to [present-day] operational capacity of the GMD network and it is accurate - why would an American administration lie about matters of national security? Critics are missing the point by touting statistics of entire history of relevant tests. GMD network achieved operational maturity in 2014; earlier statistics are of little consequence today.
Boeing left a hint for observers in 2014:
http://www.boeing.com/features/2014/08/bds-gmd-test-08-19-14.page
Now, do you think that North Korea has the resources to develop and field a potent [first] strike capability of that scale and capability? From where North Korea would acquire such resources while being subjected to heavy sanctions? At most, North Korea will be able to field a small inventory of ICBMs with an RV suitable for exploding a nuke above a city. GMD network, in its existing capacity, can tackle this kind of threat on its own [easily].
Well that's your opinion, and you have the right to be entitled to it. However I would recommend reading up on the other side of the story, specifically China's upcoming HGV projects and Russia's Yars ICBM. I wish the Russians or Chinese would also release some information about the work they're doing with their extremely identical inflatable decoys.
Whatever countermeasures US and Russia are able to cook up, US is capable of replicating and experiment with.
I am not asserting that GMD network is
the end-game for an arms-race; no system is. However, it is
the end-game of COLD-WAR era nuclear MAD scenarios.
I believe that nuclear MAD with Russia will end in the 2030s give or take, depending upon the priorities of the US.
Therefore, solution is to explore new methods of warfare. Few nations have this luxury unfortunately.
Shaheen-3 warhead has a surface area of 2.88 meter square.
That's the maximum radar cross section you get .
How such a small target will be detected and tracked?
GMD network is capable of distinguishing and tracking movements of much smaller objects (less than 10 cm in width and/or length) in real-time.
but I had never claimed that Chinese system is better than Russia, some few exceptional arrogant Chinese made such claim is not my problem, they entitled to have their opinion 
