@The Deterrent
Sorry for late response; I felt the need to address some arguments.
I agree with your view that nuclear MAD between US and Russia have not diminished yet (this was not my claim in the first place); I used the term "diminishing" to describe the situation
but this trend will continue for long, and Russia would remain a significant threat regardless. Reasonable explanation of "diminishing" part below.
Fundamental point of contention is in regards to effectiveness of existing and/or emerging American missile defense capabilities, and overconfidence in known countermeasures. I am not asserting that such defenses are infallible but we need to acknowledge their merits. Please understand that I am a neutral observer in this matter.
Union of Concerned Scientists (UOCS) represent 'the disarmament lobby' and openly oppose
missile defense programs. Their critic of FTG-15 event is filled with erroneous assumptions which I have addressed below.
FYI:
"While our enemy’s capabilities are threatening, the overall record of real-world missile defense intercepts — the Patriots over the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, as well as the Iron Dome over Israel — 85 to 90 percent, is a highly positive number that exceeds by far the cooked-the-books criticism of the disarmament lobby." - Peter Huessy
https://capitalresearch.org/article...rned-scientists-undermines-national-security/
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorent...re-effective-than-critics-claim/#29642aee63c1
http://www.jinsa.org/jinsa-fellows/peter-huessy/missile-defense-once-again-under-attack
http://dailysignal.com/2012/05/01/critics-of-missile-defense-wrong-since-1983-and-counting/
https://www.coursehero.com/file/p5v...-defense-system-that-ensued-has-lessened-the/
http://thehill.com/opinion/national...erative-trump-must-enhance-us-missile-defense
Because I'm a bit familiar with what the US did back in 1973. Inflatable decoys mimicking the optical, thermal and radar signature of a real RV are relatively easy to develop.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/decoys.htm
Kindly go through this information first:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penetration_aid
Penetration aids (penaids) certainly vary in design, complexity and resultant effectiveness. However, some designs are convincing in theory but may not work well in real-time conditions. Sophisticated designs are expensive and difficult to employ as well. Therefore, operational challenges do not apply to interceptors [only].
"One should avoid overstating the ease with which countermeasures that are theoretically possible can actually be made to work in practice, especially against advanced discrimination techniques using multiple phenomenologies from multiple sensors and exploiting the long observation time that midcourse intercept makes possible. It is perhaps noteworthy that U.S. (and U.K.) experience with the development of high-confidence penetration aids during the Cold War was of mixed success. It would be difficult for an adversary to have confidence in countermeasures without extensive testing, which the United States might be able to observe and gather data on that would permit defeating the countermeasures." - Making sense of ballistic missile defense (2012)
Penaids might fool an individual sensor but can they fool multiple sensors working in tandem for target discrimination from different perspectives and angles?
Surface temperature of an object is likely to shift as it moves through endo- atmospheric conditions to exo- atmospheric conditions (boost phase), exo- atmospheric conditions in view of sunlight or Earth's shadow (midcourse phase), and through exo- atmospheric conditions to endo- atmospheric conditions (terminal phase).
Discrimination is possible through measurement of variations in surface temperature (heating rate [or] cooling rate) of every object in a
threat cloud throughout the duration of their collective flight. Discrimination is also possible through measurement of variations in structure, RCS and micro-motions of every object in a
threat cloud. Modern target discrimination equipment employ multi-spectral imaging and/or micro-doppler techniques to discriminate objects from each other in the aforementioned ways, and more.
The BM warheads and decoys exhibit different micromotions during their trajectories which lead to periodic variations of the aspect angle between the radar Line Of Sight (LOS) and the target symmetric axis.
Scientific paper:
https://udrc.eng.ed.ac.uk/sites/udrc.eng.ed.ac.uk/files/publications/sspd17_1 nOVEL.pdf
I came across a
patent which advice discrimination of objects in a
threat cloud via infrared-gamma sensor fusion technique to distinguish a nuclear warhead from other objects. Therefore, new propositions are on the cards.
Now, for the sake argument, let us assume a nearly perfect penaid package in an ICBM in which the warhead is concealed in a decoy (anti-simulation) and accompanied by balloon decoys of similar shape and dimensions (replica decoys) - all coated with 'aluminum silicone' to minimize the prospect of variation in their surface temperatures in the midcourse phase. Even in this case, high-resolution sensors might tell them apart by observing
inflating behavior of decoys during the course of their deployment vis-a-vis the warhead. Warhead does not inflates, right?
Anti-simulation is not a foolproof concealment technique either. If their is some gap between the warhead and its outer decoy covering, internal collision(s) might occur, which might create some variation in the behavior of
this object vis-a-vis replica decoys, inflating behavior of replica decoys notwithstanding.
Their is no guarantee that penaids (in use) can fool the entire sensor network of GMD. You need to understand that certain sensor elements of GMD such as seaborne SBX-1 and spaceborne STSS did not emerge out of the blue. US have an extensive history of developing and testing ballistic missiles. Similarly, US have an extensive history of developing and testing penaids for its ballistic missiles. Above all, US have an extensive history of developing, testing and fielding powerful sensors to observe flight characteristics of ballistic missiles (and peniads) of other countries over the course of years. Relevant agencies in the US have amassed this kind of information over the course of years (continue to do so today), and established detailed profiles and algorithms to inform American missile defense programs. This is the key to building robust defenses against such threats.
I have reiterated time and again that
surveillance is the name of the game. Rest is noise.
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Majority of penaids were conceptualized and developed during the Cold War era to confuse multi-target radars (Dunai family) of Soviet A-35M (ABM-1B) missile defense system.
Interceptors of A-35M (endo- atmospheric 5V61 and exo- atmospheric 5V61R) relied upon 'command guidance' from radars (Dunai family) to intercept ballistic missiles and armed with nuclear warheads to achieve high probability of intercept. These interceptors were planted around Moscow, therefore, intercept envelope of A-35M was limited to Moscow and its neighborhoods only. FYI:
http://www.ausairpower.net/Google-Earth/A35MOVERVIEWUPDATED.jpg
A-35M morphed into A-135 (ABM-4) in 1995; Dunai family of radars were substituted with a single but relatively superior multi-target Don-2N radar, and 5V61 family of interceptors were replaced with improved set of interceptors such as endo- atmospheric Gazelle (53T6) and exo- atmospheric Gorgon (51T6). These interceptors also rely upon 'command guidance' from Don-2N radar to intercept potential targets.
System A-135 initially employed two missiles, the Novator 53T6 (GAZELLE) endoatmospheric interceptor and the OKB Fakel 51T6 (GORGON) exoatmospheric interceptor. Both missiles were silo launched. The missiles are command guided by the Don-2N and initially used ten kiloton nuclear warheads to destroy their targets. 53T6 missiles are located at four sites around Moscow, and at a fifth site adjacent to the Don-2N radar facility. 51T6 missiles were located at two former A-350R sites. The 51T6 missiles have recently been taken offline, and the 53T6 missiles have had their nuclear warheads removed and presumably replaced by conventional explosives, leaving them as the sole operational interceptor component of System A-135.
Source:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-ABM-Systems.html
Exo- atmospheric interceptors (51T6) were deactivated some years ago. Therefore, A-135 currently incorporate endo- atmospheric interceptors (53T6) to counter potential targets; 68 in total. Intercept envelope of A-135 is restricted to Moscow and its neighborhoods much like its predecessor.
Russia is expected to deploy an S-500 battery to complement A-135 in its mission in the near future. Intercept ceiling of 53T6 is 80 KM whereas intercept ceiling of S-500 is 100 KM - not a big gap but interceptors of S-500 feature homing guidance to achieve
hit-to-kill intercepts much like their American counterparts.
Russia also inherited a network of BMEW radars from USSR to provide early warning of potential threats to A-135 and other missile defense systems. Most recent and notable addition in this network is Voronezh family of radars (3 in total). However, this network have its share of problems as well; some radars are not operating at their peak capacity and some went offline after dissolution of USSR due to their respective locations. To give you an idea, Russians were unable to measure flight characteristics of North Korean Hwasong-14 ICBM with a high degree of accuracy - they mistook it for an IRBM.
Russian missile defense systems are lacking in midcourse discrimination capability in exo- atmospheric conditions. Russian interceptors do not have the capability to intercept a ballistic missile in exo- atmospheric conditions either.
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Sensor network of GMD is massive in scale and scope (Sea, Land and Space), and incorporate several assets which are optimized for midcourse discrimination roles such as Cobra Dane, SBX-1 and STSS. Additional assets will join GMD for similar ends in 2020 such as LRDR and MRDR. Aegis can also contribute to midcourse discrimination upon demand.
GMD and its associated elements span 15 time zones, including Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) at two locations (Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, CA), seven types of sensors on land, sea, and space, and multiple and distributed fire control systems.
Overview in this link [
https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/ ], and some details in my response below. Sensor network of GMD is in good shape and arguably the best.
GMD can defeat a salvo of ICBM-class targets in exo- atmospheric conditions (midcourse phase), and its intercept envelope encompass entire North America. Aegis will also achieve similar capability in a few years with SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, and complement GMD in its mission. GMD and Aegis, in tandem, will offer a robust layer of defense against ICBM-class targets in the long-term. Midcourse phase offers largest window for intercept to the BMDS (80% of flight path), and ICBM-class targets are typically lacking in maneuverability in this phase.
Their is also the possibility of US transforming Japan into its first line of defense against ballistic missiles:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/shield-of-the-pacific/
Again, your assumption here is unrelated to whether the capability is credible or not. THAAD isn't even capable of countering ICBM-class targets, of course the Chinese & Russians wouldn't want to miss ANY of their MRBM targets when the time comes. But to equate this to diminishing MAD is absurd. If you had followed up the US BMD deployments in Eastern Europe, you would have come across what Russia deployed in response, and how easily it can overcome THAAD.
Complaining about these deployments is necessary, even if they don't pose a significant threat, as they allow the adversary to keep scaling up things without notice otherwise. Its like Pakistan complaining about Indian Agni-V and blaming India for initiating an arms race.
Russia and China are complaining about placement of powerful radars near their borders, and understandably so. THAAD battery uses AN/TPY-2 radar for target acquisition and discrimination, and AN/TPY-2 can be set to
forward-based mode in order to function as an extension of the 'sensor network' for GMD, share its data with GMD and contribute to its engagement opportunities accordingly. THAAD does not have the range to take out an ICBM-class target in
midcourse phase of its flight but AN/TPY-2 can alert GMD to flight path of one (or multiple) from its position.
"In forward-based mode, the radar provides crucial sensor tracks of missiles in boost/early midcourse phase to the GMD system. In this mode, the sensor is oriented outward to increase the range of the radar to detect missile launches over a larger territory. From these forward-based locations, the TPY-2 are able detect and track missiles in their boost and early midcourse phases, determining information such as its speed and trajectory."
Source:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/tpy-2/
Aegis platforms such as in Poland and Romania are also compatible with GMD, and contribute to its engagement opportunities accordingly.
Chinese concerns are well-documented in this article:
http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1736&context=nwc-review
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Contrary to claims in the public domain and resultant perceptions, THAAD is capable of intercepting an ICBM-class target in
terminal phase of its flight; it has sufficient range to intercept a target in both endo- and exo- atmospheric conditions (150 KM ceiling). US can complement defenses of its mainland with THAAD batteries, if necessary. THAAD defeated an IRBM-class target in a test in 2017:
http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/breaking-video/ftt-18-thaad-flight-test-video/
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THAAD battery contains 6 launchers (48 interceptors in total) at minimum, and it can defeat a wide range of targets on its own. In the time of crisis, a THAAD battery is unlikely to operate in isolation and is likely to be complemented with an assortment of other defenses in a particular sector. By no means, these defenses are easy to overcome. Moreover, THAAD is mobile and can be shifted to another location if the situation demands it.
Oh God, not the radar stuff again. Instead of singing endless praises of the SBX-1 (which is an incredible system nevertheless), please read up on penetration aids. As I've mentioned before, the radar/satellite/sensor network may be able to detect and track a thousand threats at a time...but the problem is discrimination of the right threats and the successful interception of those threats.
See above.
Missile defense program is a scientific endeavor, my friend. Scientists, who are developing missile defense systems, are absolutely aware of challenges in relation to target discrimination and interception. And they are conducting relevant scientific experiments to address such challenges. You will get some insight about midcourse discrimination concepts from the following paper:
Hua-ling Guo, Jia-hao Deng, Ke-rong Cai, "Detection technique of targets for missile defense system", Proc. SPIE 7513, 2009 International Conference on Optical Instruments and Technology: Optoelectronic Imaging and Process Technology, 751318 (25 November 2009); doi: 10.1117/12.837672; http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.837672
US have an extensive history of studying flight characteristics of ballistic missiles and their penetration aids by developing, deploying and using powerful radars and satellites tailored for these ends. Treasure-trove of information for you in this link:
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB235/20130108.html
"Space-layer defense concepts have included interceptors, lasers, and sensors, but only the sensing element has ever been operationally deployed—most notably, in the form of the Defense Support Program (DSP). These satellites scan the entire Earth from geosynchronous orbit by means of infrared sensors, looking for evidence of missile launches, detonations, and related phenomena. First launched in 1970, the DSP satellites are nearing the end of their service life; the final unit (23) was launched in November 2007. The decades of DSP collections have provided operations expertise, a database of target signatures, and processing innovations; these are the cornerstone of missile defense from space and provide a foundation for modern designs." - Watson and Zondervan (2008)
US is transforming DSP into more capable SBIRS in current times. FYI:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sbirs/
US also deployed STSS to study flight characteristics of ballistic missiles and their penetration aids, in relatively superior ways than ever before, in 2009:
"The Space Tracking and Surveillance System has three main components: a wide-view acquisition sensor, a narrow-view tracking sensor, and a signal and data processor subsystem.4 The wide-view acquisition sensor will detect missiles during their boost phase. Once it reaches its midcourse phase, STSS follows its trajectory through space with a narrow-view tracker. While both the wide- and narrow-view sensors hone in on a missile, they send information to the system’s signal and data processor subsystem which is capable of sifting through some 2.1 gigabits of data per second. This subsystem can detect and track over 100 objects at a time and will be able to determine what objects in space are missiles or warheads and which are decoys or space debris.5 This information is then transmitted to ground command and control and disseminated."
Source:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/stss/
STSS have VLWIR capabilities as well; not highlighted in the image above.
"Each satellite has a missile acquisition and a track sensor. Both the acquisition and tracking sensors capitalize on the magnitude and spectral content of the heat energy radiated by a missile. The acquisition sensor detects missiles in boost phase using its shortwave infrared waveband. The sensor signal is processed onboard for relay to the ground and handover to the track sensor. The tracking sensor has a narrow field of view and operates in multiple spectral wavebands, all of which are tailored to detect observable phenomena particular to each segment of a missile’s trajectory. For example, its “see-to-the-ground” and short-wave infrared bands are designed for tracking rockets in their boost phase. The midwave infrared is designed to track the upper stages of rockets and small engines of postboost vehicles. Mid/long-wave and long-wave infrared, with their sensitivity to cooler targets, are used for midcourse tracking and are designed to provide space surveillance as well. The track sensor data are used to create a “track file” that is sent to the ground for use in engaging the target. A separate visible sensor supports midcourse tracking and discrimination of sunlit objects and can provide space surveillance capability as well (see Fig. 7)." - Watson and Zondervan (2008)
STSS demonstrators (or SBIRS-Low) are operational since 2009:
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capa...tm_medium=Redirect&utm_campaign=STSS+Redirect
"As a major component for target monitoring, target detection, target tracking, and target discrimination in BMDS, infrared-ray (IR) sensors, including focal plane arrays (FPA) detectors, are mainly used in satellites, aircraft platforms, fixed position, or interceptors. The temperatures of most advanced BMD targets require that the FPA wavelengths be at medium-wave, long wave (LWIR), or very long wave (VLWIR) infrared wave band." - Guo, Deng and Cai (2009)
STSS capabilities are improving over time:-
You mentioned "Oh God, not the radar stuff again." Do you understand their significance in these matters? US have used Cobra radar
family to study flight characteristics of Soviet/Russian ballistic missiles over the course of years.
US is also developing additional set of radars which will facilitate GMD in the matters of midcourse discrimination. SBX-1 is operational since 2006 but US is also developing LRDR and MRDR for similar ends, and both will be active in 2020.
"A traditional radar sends out pulses of energy that are only polarized in one direction, horizontally. Imagine ripples expanding outward through a pond, only the ripples extend straight up into the air, like a moving wall. When such a horizontally polarized radar beam bounces off something, you only get a one-dimensional image of the target. But a dual-polarized radar sends out alternating pulses polarized at right angles to each other — one horizontal, then one vertical, then another horizontal — so you get a two-dimensional picture. By looking at both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions, the dual-polarized radar can tell apart objects that would look the same to a horizontal-only radar. While LRDR is presumably a rather more sophisticated implementation of this technology than a weather radar, the net effect is similar: the ability to tell objects apart — in this case warheads, not hailstones — at roughly twice the range."
Source:
https://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/missile-defense-radar-passes-key-review-lockheed-lrdr/
Official link:
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/long-range-discrimination-radar.html
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GMD EKV can take cues from virtually (any) surveillance asset across space, sea and land to [complement] its
onboard midcourse discrimination capabilities, during the course of its respective flight, in order to engage the right target.
"The combination of observations for more than 100 sec by an interceptor-mounted optical sensor that is closing on the threat complex, together with concurrent X-band radar observations and a firing doctrine that exploits the battle space available for SLS engagements, offers the greatest probability of being able to separate real threatening objects from decoys and other objects and should be central to any defense of the U.S. homeland, allies and friends, and U.S. deployed forces." - Making sense of ballistic missile defense (2012)
&
The Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) is the GMD’s means of physically destroying incoming target missiles. The EKV consists of a sensor-propulsion package that collides with the re-entry vehicle during the midcourse phase of the missile’s ballistic trajectory, using its own infrared seeker, guidance system, and motor. As it closes in on its target, the EKV integrates data from the X-band radars with its on-board sensors and locks on to the enemy missile. The EKV continuously adjusts its flight path until it collides with the target. The hit-to-kill impact causes complete destruction of the warhead, including any nuclear, chemical, or biological agents.
Source:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/gbi/
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Relevant agencies in the US have established detailed profiles of flight characteristics of Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles over the course of years. This treasure-trove of information is the driving force behind development of new kind of sensor systems and discrimination techniques accordingly. GMD EKV is likely to draw from such treasure-trove of information - accumulated over the course of decades - to facilitate its midcourse discrimination.
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Aegis, THAAD, MEADS and PAC-3 also have target discrimination capabilities. To give you an idea, THAAD defeated an MRBM with unspecified countermeasures in a test in 2017 (FET-01).
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I strongly emphasize that
surveillance is the name of the game in modern times [the age of information]. Unfortunately, majority of Pakistani are not aware of these realities, and where things are heading.
May I add here that just TWO units of R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 6), each with 10x MIRVs, without ANY penetration aids...are enough to exhaust the entire supply of 44 GBIs in the BEST case scenario?
Hmm...Good observation. I am not asserting that nuclear MAD between US and Russia is over; I understand that this MAD will not diminish anytime soon.
Nevertheless, it is not wise to overlook
strategic implications of a comprehensive 'missile defense' program as it continue to grow in capacity and capability over time. Today, US can decisively defeat a regional nuclear power in an
all-out war with minimum losses (one of these: Pakistan; North Korea; and India). US will catch up to China in similar respect in the near future. US have extensive knowledge of defenses (and tactics) of France, UK and Israel but these are friendly.
American missile defense is growing in capacity and capability over time, and MDA is planning to field MOKV to counter MiRV in the future. FYI:
http://www.militaryaerospace.com/ar...defense-to-kill-several-warheads-at-once.html
http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/m...ture-bmd-systems-2/multiple-kill-vehicle-mkv/
MOKV would make it possible for GMD to take out an entire
threat cloud in one go.
"Should an enemy salvo fire ICBMs, or if discrimination defenses cannot effectively determine re-entry vehicles from decoys, the DoD may employ a multiple-object kill vehicle to neutralize the threat. Unlike traditional interceptor missiles, multiple-object kill vehicles utilize a carrier vehicle which transports numerous kill vehicles to intercept multiple re-entry vehicles and decoys. - Ruppert (2017)
I believe that nuclear MAD between US and Russia will diminish after 2050.
You also need to keep in mind American preemptive denial capabilities. For example:
Sky is the limit in regards to evolution of missile defense program:
https://apps.militaryperiscope.com/SpecialReports/ShowReport.aspx?report=139
I honestly have no idea why you're trying to support your arguments without any real-world parameters. Probability of escape of a real-world midcourse phase MaRV with only 2 GBIs is "non-existent"? I've got nothing more to say.
You are really sold to the notion of an MaRV complicating the intercept process of a BMDS but which one? Any live demonstration of an MaRV getting through a salvo of GMD EKV or your criticism is reserved for missile defense programs only?
Since you mentioned real-world parameters, let us consider the example of highly maneuverable Chinese DF-21D ASBM which incorporate an MaRV to engage a moving target. Although terms like ASBM and MaRV have made an impression in theory, Chinese testing regime for this kind of stuff is woefully inadequate. Most notable test took place in 2013:
https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-01...-missile-mock-us-aircraft-carrier-gobi-desert
https://www.businessinsider.com/chi...le-test-proves-df-21d-lives-up-to-name-2013-1
Chinese forces tested their state-of-the-art ballistic missile on a large stationary defenseless target in the "Gobi desert." So realistic.
On the other hand:-
Aegis defeated a Chinese DF-21D class target in a test in 2016, using a salvo of SM-6 interceptors (FTM-27).
Last night the United States Navy tracked and intercepted the most capable and maneuverable ballistic missile deployed in the Pacific today, a target missile, representing the Dong- Feng 21 Chinese “carrier killer.” On this intercept the SM-6 was employed in a salvo firing, launching one missile following another, for increased Probability of Kill (PK).
Source:
https://defense-update.com/20161215_df21d_target.html
During the test, the USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53)... fired a salvo of two Raytheon [RTN] Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors in immediate succession against a medium-range ballistic missile target launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai, Hawaii. The first interceptor was not armed and was designed to collect test data, MDA said. The second interceptor, which carried an explosive warhead, intercepted the Lockheed Martin-built target.... MDA called the target “complex” but declined to elaborate. However, according to the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, the target emulated China’s Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21), a ballistic missile equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle and designed to destroy U.S., aircraft carriers. The event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-27 (FTM-27), was SBT’s first salvo test and its second intercept in as many tries.
Source:
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
The Missile Defense Agency and Sailors aboard USS John Paul Jones, an Aegis baseline 9.C1 equipped destroyer, successfully fired a salvo of two Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Dual I missiles against a complex, medium-range ballistic missile target on Dec. 14, demonstrating the sea-based terminal endo-atmospheric defensive capability and meeting the test’s primary objective, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) said on a Dec. 15 release.
Source:
http://seapowermagazine.org/stories/20161215-sm6.html
Similar test was carried out in 2017 (FTM-27 E2). FYI:
https://www.mda.mil/news/17news0009.html
SM-6 interceptor:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sm-6/
Now you see the difference? American testing regime is realistic and their BMDS sensor network delivers in complex real-time situations.
Recall experiences of Aegis platforms in Yemeni waters:
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/uss-...ise-missiles-in-yemeni-waters-in-2016.543523/
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I have learned that MDA will conduct a test in which an advanced ICBM-class target will be subjected to a salvo of GMD EKV, using see-shoot-see strategy. This target would represent TIER 3 in complexity which is maximum in MDA vocabulary.
TIER 1 = Simple
TIER 2 = Maneuvers and certain type of countermeasures involved
TIER 3 = Advanced maneuvers and countermeasures involved
Again, unnecessarily trying to support your argument with your own personal assumptions. "Looks can be deceiving"? Seriously?
The test target is based on Minuteman's booster itself, but not entirely. Only the first stage is of the same diameter. The second stage upwards is way narrower, nearly half the diameter. So its not capable of housing any MIRVs (or multiple non-inflatable warheads). The dummy warhead was an inflatable spherical decoy.
Please try to argue for things that matter, and not for the sake of a mere argument and trying to prove yourself right.
ICBM-T2 resemble Minuteman II in design which featured Mk-11c reentry vehicle and Mk-1 penaids.
Regarding decoys of ICBM-T2:-
The threat also included decoy warheads, splitting off from the rocket booster alongside the real one and designed to look as identical as possible on radar and infra-red.
Source:
https://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/missile-defense-test-realistic-syring-insists/
FYI:
http://www.lgarde.com/missile-defense-target.php
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I have a question: do you think that Ababeel MRBM is practical for MiRV?
Um you said "That is not news; American nuclear warheads have same capability.", in response to the mention of MaRVs, which is simply not true.
OK, my bad.
US does have history of developing and testing MaRV (e.g. Perishing II), but settled for
superfuze instead.
I became 'aware' of this fact when the first article came out about it. However I'm not aware of its relevance here in the US BMD & MaRV discussion.
I am surprised that an individual of your caliber missed the
context of an argument. Perhaps Chinese concerns will enlighten you:
The Chinese strategic community believes that BMD poses “the most serious threat to China’s nuclear deterrent.” While American BMD may be rudimentary at this point, some Chinese analysts fear that its potential to grow and improve over time is unlimited. This expectation fosters a fear that U.S. BMD will threaten China’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Sun Xiangli at the China Academy of Engineering Physics writes that “because China’s nuclear forces have maintained a limited scope for a long time, China is very sensitive to threats from strategic missile defenses. As long as strategic missile defenses develop without limit, China’s limited nuclear deterrent will inevitably be challenged.” 74 When combined with the risk of a U.S. first strike against China’s small nuclear force, effective BMD could secure the United States from nuclear retaliation, in the eyes of some Chinese analysts.
From:
http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1736&context=nwc-review
Of course the RV can't detect an incoming ABM/EKV. The point is, a RV with a small PBV (usually having a similar set of thrusters as in the video) can execute a pre-planned set of maneuvers (unknown to the adversary) throughout the midcourse phase. Such a sequence of maneuvers is extremely difficult to be predicted and handled with.
The scenario is analogous to a SAM interception. The only thing a pilot needs to evade is agility similar to a SAM, which can execute maneuvers of much higher Gs. However in the RV vs EKV case, both have similar maneuvering capability. When your enthusiasm cools down, read up again on the RS-12's & RS-24's MIRVs and their unconventional capabilities.
One object is
blind to incoming EKV and executes a pre-programmed set of maneuvers to reach its target, whereas the intercepting object is equipped with sophisticated electro-optical sensors to secure a lock on the incoming object (i.e. homing guidance) and
course-correct its trajectory until it collides with the incoming object. Under these circumstances, which object have advantage? A smart person can see through the nonsense.
MaRV could work against interceptors of the 1970s but they may not work against existing generation of American interceptors. Learn from the experiments of Aegis.
You can bet your house on the fact that relevant agencies in the US have studied flight characteristics of various Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles over the course of years, and
this treasure-trove of information informs U.S. missile defense databases and algorithms. Russia and China have repeatedly tested their MaRV over the course of years - patterns of their flight characteristics would have been identified and/or understood by now.
However, for the sake of argument, let us assume that an MaRV exhibit a different set of maneuvers during the course of its re-entry each time; current generation of American interceptors feature homing guidance to secure a lock on the incoming target and are able to course-correct their trajectory until they collide with the incoming target (hit-to-kill) or explode when very close (blast fragmentation).
No, they are a PART of the game. The threat cloud SBX can discriminate successfully is that of a potential North Korean launch. Its nowhere near the chaff + identical decoys armed cloud of the Russian or Chinese systems. Then there is the simple maneuvering.
Now, you are rushing to ill-informed conclusions. Chaff discrimination was sorted out long ago:
https://sbirsource.com/sbir/awards/...ing-multi-spectral-adaptive-signal-processing
As I pointed out earlier, SBX-1 and STSS did not emerge out of blue. While working in tandem, they can discriminate a huge number of objects across endo- atmospheric and exo- atmospheric conditions. The upcoming LRDR and MRDR will enrich these discrimination capabilities further. AN/TPY-2, Aegis and some airborne platforms also have considerable discrimination capabilities.
Data from STSS testing planned for FY10 will validate the ability to track cold, midcourse objects and close the fire control loop with BMDS interceptors from space. Additionally, STSS provides a new infrared sensor phenomenology for the BMDS, which, when combined with radars, provides robustness against current and advanced countermeasures.
Source:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/stss/
If you are relying on UOCS to evaluate these matters, you are making a mistake. They are not insiders, and they rely upon information in the public domain to establish their arguments - information which could be wrong and/or misleading.
In the real world, sun doesn't illuminates the RVs for EKVs to identify easily.
FYI:
To develop two-color and multi-color IR FPAS will be an important project for the future 10 years; military and aerospace research institutes like the Advanced Systems Department of the US Missile Defense Agency California Polytechnic University, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and Lockheed Martin Corporation are conducting researches in this field and have made progresses. The DRS Company, for example, has developed a two-color LW/LW HgCdTe FPA, having greatly improved the structure of 256×256 element array of 30μm FPAS in line with the Aegis BMD.
If target is easy to identify, single-color FPAS can be used for target monitoring, target detection and target tracking. If the target and its background are uncertain, two and multi-colors bands FPAS have a better comprehensive performance, particularly in detection and tracking. Simultaneous existence of multi-color FPAS can greatly improve the discrimination of targets from decoys and debris, and effectively eliminate the impact of the reflection from the Earth in identifying outer atmosphere targets. - Guo, Deng and Guy (2009)
Guo et al. (2009) are a bit late in their assessment. American researchers came to similar conclusion in 2000:
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/p010828.pdf
Aforementioned propositions are already in service; Multispectral imaging is the name of the game.
When an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is launched into an orbit toward a target, it can be readily detected by radar as it approaches a target area. Several decoy missiles, which are designed to appear to a radar system as though they are ICBM's, may accompany one or more ICBM's so that a cluster of missiles will appear to a tracking radar, thereby camouflaging the identity of the true ICBM's. However, this cluster of missiles is also being observed by detection systems other than radar. For example, passive infrared detection systems such as forward looking infrared systems (FLIRS) in the 3-5 micron band and the 8-14 micron band are used. These systems sense the temperature of an object by observing the thermal energy which it radiates. Thus, when an ICBM and accompanying decoys are launched into a polar orbit they will pass from a sun lit region into a region shaded by the earth's shadow. When this happens, both the massive ICBM's and any decoys which accompany them begin to radiate energy to the cold regions of outer space and begin to cool down. Since each radiates energy at about the same rate, the ICBM's with their large thermal mass tend to change temperature very slowly. However, the light weight decoys, because of their small thermal mass, change temperature very rapidly by comparison, allowing the FLIRS to quickly discriminate between the ICBM's and the decoys.
Source:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/ir.htm
In the real world, Russia bombs the crap out of the radar network.
Russia will bomb the crap out of radar network? You think that USAF and USN would be sleeping? Russia doesn't stand a chance against US forces in a conventional showdown.
American defenses are active even in remote (and harsh) locations such as Alaska:
https://theaviationist.com/2017/04/...-to-intercept-the-russian-bombers-off-alaska/
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...russian-su-35s-near-alaska-for-the-first-time
GMD and Aegis are intended to complicate attack plan of a potential adversary in the grand scheme of things. GMD elements are widely spaced (some mobile and elusive), and Aegis platforms are brimming with firepower and countermeasures. Enemy would have no choice but to direct substantial amount of firepower towards these defenses in order to overcome them, therefore, these defenses would bolster deterrence value of US in the long-term.
In the real world, pre-emptive high altitude detonations of 10 MT weapons disrupt communications by EMP.
EMP would not disrupt communications of DSP, SBIRS and STSS among others in space. These satellites can withstand stresses of nuclear explosions in space and continue to function, and important assets of national security on the ground are also adequately shielded.
https://warisboring.com/testing-satellites-by-nuking-them/
Do you really think that the most technologically advanced country in existence have not done its homework?
Again, too many assumptions and idher udher ki batain.
As I said earlier, US had planned decapitation strikes since the 60s, when there was no MD. Read up on the SIOPs issued till 2003, or OPLANs issued thereafter. The problem is, that even with GMD, the probability of success of a "Skyfall" is minimal. But obviously its the best call for when the time comes, as it will be the least deadly (funny in relative terms) option.
Nobody cares about the Russian conventional strength. All they have to do is pop open the hatches of their silo-ed Satans, mobile Topols and hidden Bulavas. Run the numbers, its a fun exercise.
Of-course, Russian nuclear force is massive, and if Russia
preempts, then game over for US.
But what if US
preempts? Game over for Russia, I suppose?
Since American surveillance operations are of global proportions, they have adequate understanding of Russian offensive capabilities and options, and how to defeat Russia.
Lastly, again you always try to talk about what the US is doing in terms of detection (of SSBNs here), but nothing about what evasion tactics the adversaries are coming up with.
Do you know about IUSS?
With IUSS in the picture, and a large number of American FSS on the hunt, evasive maneuvers won't last for long.
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2010/10/signal-processing.html
http://www.rovworld.com/article1275.htmlINSTALLATION/installSQL.phpINSTALLATION/news.html
https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/us-navy-upgrading-undersea-sub-detecting-sensor-network/
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Source:
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a19746695/us-navy-subs-infographic/
53 FSS in total - all of them really good.
Even the older
Los Angeles class submarines are better than majority of submarines (stationed by other countries) out there, although
Virigina class submarines are replacing them over time.
Superfuse does increases chance of a successful decapitation strike, but not by a huge amount. Also it is very convenient to admire it as some amazing breakthrough (whereas its a jugaad) which the Russians or the Chinese can't implement with their own vehicles.
Superfuze is not a
jugaad but a cost-effective innovation; it has transformed American ICBM and SLBM into
precision-strike munition of sorts, to defeat even the most hardened and well-dug targets.
FYI:
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-americas-new-nuke-upgrades-would-be-an-endgame-for-1793260891
Even a 1000 single-EKV GBIs are not enough to stop all the 40 R-36M2 systems. What about the Topols and the Bulavas? Run the numbers in a best case scenario for your own satisfaction. And last I heard, the MOKVs which already had a projected completion time of 2030 for beginning production.
Investment in small scale BMD is necessary because of three factors:
1. Rogue nations not deter-able by MAD
2. Rogue launches by a small faction of the adversary
3. Increasing survivability of the Command Centers to make sure a retaliatory strike is initiated successfully.
GMD would not be alone in defeating ICBM-class threats. Aegis and THAAD are being
fine-tuned for similar ends, and will complement GMD in the near future.
There is also a strong possibility for space-based interceptors to emerge in the near future. Trump administration is pushing for establishment of United States Space Force (USSF) which might incorporate space-based interceptors.
Lasers might also join the show at some point.
Again you conveniently ignored all the other stuff an operational Topol-M does, and focused on the detection part. Did you know that the primary purpose of the SBIRS network was to give more decision time to the President for retaliation options, rather than missile defense?
SBIRS can surely detect and track anything with a flame, but once again, the problem is successful discrimination and interception.
See above.
Right, because you of course have insider knowledge of US BMD programs.
Have you not read Trump's tweets? He's been begging Kim for a reason to go to war. Of course the MDA officials will cite the best possible theoretical success ratio against a North Korean strike. But is it the same as against the Russians or the Chinese?
The North Koreans can easily amass a strike force of 20+ ICBMs (HS-14s & HS-15s) in the immediate future, which is nearly enough to exhaust all the present GBIs (if all launch successfully and all are intercepted with a 97% probability). I agree however that the analysts were too harsh on the intercept probability estimates, but even Trump's best case scenario doesn't fits the bill for the foreseeable future against Russians/Chinese.
Well, US will eventually get there.
I was hoping that you would take a moment and read up about the things I mentioned previously, but it seems like you're sold already. The level of your confidence in US's BMD capability seems to be more than the OEM themselves, and your admiration of the sensor/radar/satellite network is beyond my understanding because its only a part of the whole process.
This whitepaper came out yesterday, and it is my sincere hope that you go through it thoroughly and try to understand every bit of it.
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ucs-docume...issile-defense-test-white-paper-1-24-18v4.pdf
If Hans M. Kristensen, David Wright, Jeffery Lewis, Vipin Narang etc. can't make you take a step back and reevaluate your assumptive conclusions, I have nothing more to add any further.
LMAO @ confidence remark.
I am of the view that no military asset is perfect and/or self-sufficient, and everything needs to evolve over time. Any MDS have its share of limitations in reality. However, I do not believe in the myth of perfect and/or unstoppable countermeasures either.
American missile defense program is grounded in credible scientific research and treasure-trove of information gleaned from global ballistic and/or cruise missile experiments over the course of years. I also see a comprehensive testing regime which is essential for developing robust systems.
How may live intercepts of S-500, S-400, S-300 and HQ-19 have you witnessed over the course of years? When you compare them to American PAC-3, THAAD, MEADS, Aegis and GMD, you will notice the difference between rhetoric and capability.
Overview of Chinese experiments with mysterious HQ-19:
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...terious-chinese-anti-ballistic-missile-launch
Not much there.
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Now I will address the paper.
1. Standard operating procedure (SOP) of MDA or any other national security agency is to
degrade/minimize visual information that is approved for public view. Due to this factor, we do not get to see true performance of sensors, and discrimination procedures, in any footage of FTG-15 event. I get the impression that omitted decoy(s) in the footage.
Secondly, emissivity of an object is not really a constant; it changes with spectrum and temperature. You will find numerous scientific papers which disclose as much. Here is an example:
https://physics.ucf.edu/~ishigami/Teaching/Phys4083L/lab descriptions/NETD/Comparison of Emissivity Evaluation Methods for Infrared Sources.pdf
Refer to the image(s) of STSS above! You will notice that STSS will attempt to discriminate objects across different infrared spectrums such as MWIR, MLWIR, LWIR and VLWIR respectively. Emissivity of objects will vary across these spectrums, and these variations will offer meaningful information for discrimination.
Even a replica decoy will not be 100% identical to a warhead in every aspect; only another warhead. State-of-the-art multi-spectral discrimination sensors can see through these tricks which was not the case in the 1970s.
Cook-the-books arguments of UOCS vs. ground realities. Take your pick.
2. Was the scenario realistic?
Information at hand indicate that MDA simulated a North Korean nuclear strike on a GMD base in Alaska. Grego and Wright (2018) argue that this kind of scenario is possible but unlikely due to poor CEP of North Korean ICBM.
I contend otherwise. North Korea have demonstrated the capability to put a satellite in orbit in 2016, and this feat require precision. North Korea also have developed warheads with spin stabilization for increased accuracy. FYI:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nd-a-warhead.htm
As I pointed out earlier, intercept envelope of GMD encompass entire North America. Therefore, North Korea have no choice but to attack GMD bases.
Secondly, Cobra Dane radar, close to Russia, might be looking towards Russia but it have sufficient power and field of view for midcourse discrimination of an ICBM-class target heading towards Alaska. More importantly, STSS and Aegis will join the show for similar ends. Grego and Wright (2018) somehow forgot this?
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Kwajalein Atoll island is dedicated to hosting ballistic missile targets for MDS by MDA. Its location make it an ideal choice for these kind of experiments, away from the prying eyes of potential enemies.
3.
Wobbling factor is no longer an issue. PAC-2 and PAC-3 in Saudi Arabia have defeated numerous Yemeni ballistic missiles since 2015. Take a look at the inventory of Yemen:
http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/yemen/
Some of those are the wobbling type.
Cook-the-books arguments of UOCS vs. ground realities. Take your pick.
