Seriously? That's the Best you can do?
Or Do you wish to counter my points with facts?
"
Former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto, on a state visit to
North Korea in 1993, smuggled in critical data on uranium enrichment -- a route to making a nuclear weapon -- to help facilitate a missile deal with Pyongyang, according to a new book by a journalist who knew the slain politician well."
In his book, Bhatia writes that Bhutto brought up the North Korea visit during a discussion in 2003 about her difficulties with
Pakistan's military.
"Let me tell you something," she declared, before telling Bhatia to turn off his tape recorder. "I have done more for my country than all the military chiefs of Pakistan combined."
At the time, Pakistan was in desperate need of new missile technology that would counter improvements in India's missiles. Bhutto said she was asked to carry "critical nuclear data" to hand over in Pyongyang as part of a barter deal.
Bhutto Dealt Nuclear Secrets to N. Korea, Book Says - washingtonpost.com
AQ Khan claims Benazir Bhutto ordered nuclear sale - Telegraph
The roots of cooperation are deep. North Korea and Pakistan have been engaged in conventional arms trade for over thirty years. In the 1980s, as North Korea began successfully exporting ballistic missiles and technology, Pakistan began producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratory. Benazir Bhutto’s 1993 visit to Pyongyang seems to have kicked off serious missile cooperation, but it is harder to pinpoint the genesis of Pakistan’s nuclear cooperation with North Korea.
By the time Pakistan probably needed to pay North Korea for its purchases of medium-range No Dong missiles in the mid-1990s (upon which its Ghauri missiles are based), Pakistan’s cash reserves were low. Pakistan could offer North Korea a route to nuclear weapons using HEU that could circumvent the plutonium-focused 1994 Agreed Framework and be difficult to detect.
..Pakistan’s Missile Development Pakistan, according to many observers, has two clearly distinct missile development programs. The first program is run by the Pakistan National Development Complex (PNDC) in collaboration with the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and has focused since the early 1980s on solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Pakistan currently fields about 80 of the first variant, the Hatf 1. The Hatf 1 is a short-range, solid propellant, unguided missile considered by some to be too small for a nuclear warhead, which was flight-tested in 1989 and fielded in 1992. The 80km-range was extended to 300km in the Hatf 2a, and to 800km in the Hatf 3. Despite claims of indigenous development, there are many indications that the Hatf 1, 2, and 3 benefitted from Chinese and European assistance. Some believe that Pakistan renamed some imported Chinese M-11 missiles as Hatf 2a missiles in the early 1990s; many believe that the Hatf 3 are variants of Chinese M-9 missiles, and there are those who believe that the Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1) may be based on Chinese M- 11s. Pakistan tested its Hatf 6 missile (Shaheen 2), which reportedly has a 2000-km range, in early March 2004 for the first time. The second development program has been headed by Khan Research Laboratories. One report has suggested that these competing ballistic missile development efforts were aligned with competing nuclear warhead efforts — that is, the team developing a plutonium warhead for Pakistan’s bomb, the PAEC, worked towards developing Chinese-derived nuclear-capable missiles, while the HEU team (KRL), collaborated with North Korea on liquid-fueled missiles derived from Scuds.32 In any event, it is clear that KRL cooperated with North Korea in RS-10 33 Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Thirty-Six, January 2002, p. 125. 34 Ibid., p. 126 35 See Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 2, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999, pp. 23-24. 36 Daniel A. Pinkston, “When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?” Weapon Systems, Issue 36, January 2002, p. 125. 38 “Pakistan’s Missile ‘Was a Nodong’,” Jane’s Missile and Rockets, Volume 2, Number 5, May 1998, pp. 1-2. 39 Seymour Hersh, “The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew About Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program,” New Yorker, January 27, 2003. “So Far U.S. Skirting Sanctions Issue on Pakistan’s Centrifuge Aid to DPRK,” Nuclear Fuel, December 9, 2002, quotes a Western source that A.Q. Khan was in the DPRK when the two countries’ representatives closed a deal to cooperate on ballistic missiles and uranium enrichment. “The Evil Behind the Axis?” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 2003, quotes U.S. officials that Khan initiated talks with the North Koreans in 1992 for No Dong missiles. developing the Ghauri (Hatf 5), reportedly beginning around 1993.33 The Ghauri 1 is a liquid-propellant, nuclear-capable, 1500km-range ballistic missile, which was successfully flight-tested in April 1998. Pakistan now fields approximately 5 to 10 of these missiles and is developing longer-range variants. North Korean Assistance Pakistani ballistic missile engineers developed working relationships with North Korean engineers in the mid-1980s when they both assisted Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. In fact, the close resemblance of Iran’s Shahab missile and the Ghauri 1 has led many to conclude that the development of the missiles was coordinated between Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea around 1993.34 In 1992, Pakistani officials visited North Korea to view a No Dong prototype, and again in 1993 for a No Dong flight test.35 There are reports that then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Pyongyang for one day in December 1993 and many analysts believe missile sales were on the agenda of her visit, despite her public denial.36 According to one report,
North Korea sent 5 to 12 No Dong missile assembly sets to Pakistan between 1994 and 1997; North Korea denies the allegation.37 At the end of 1997, intelligence agencies observed regular flights from North Korea to Pakistan, accelerating in the beginning of 1998 when there were about 9 flights per month. These flights reportedly followed the visit of high-level North Korean officials to Pakistan.38 A.Q. Khan apparently made 13 visits to North Korea, beginning in the 1990s.39 Many observers believe Pakistan accepted between 12 and 25 complete No Dong missiles in the late 1990s.
http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL31900.pdf
AQ Khan claims Benazir Bhutto ordered nuclear sale - Telegraph