Pakistan And India-Water Disputes-News And Updates

[Bang Galore]

Don't know why India would feel so threatened by talks on Kashmir. I don't quite understand "putting the issue on backburner"... You might see it differently, but the way we see it there are 600,000+ troops in Kashmir, it is the most highly militarized area on the planet, it is a disputed territory as recognized by the UN and the rest of the world, it is also a nuclear flashpoint, along with it being a place where every second day some child gets killed, or a protestor gets shot by police. It is not so simple to put an issue integral to millions of lives on the "backburner". That's very callous.

Kashmir will remain on the "front burner" until it is settled. You might think that settlement is far off, but again, let's just see what happens. Sometimes history surprises all of us as it unfolds.

Look, we are not going to get anywhere here. Lets agree to disagree.
I am not holding my breath waiting for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. You can if you want to. History does not surprise you necessarily in the way you want or imagine. India is not threatened by discussions on the Kashmir dispute. The arguments on this has been honed over the past half century during countless such discussions. You are right . I do see it differently. I just think that too many smart Pakistanis get carried away imagining a tooth fairy kind of solution. Front burner, back burner, wherever, it makes absolutely no difference to us.

 

[karan.1970]

There is no reason to assume that the IWT is being violated, because we can measure > 0.3MAF being held back whereas the IWT allows for reservoirs an order of magnitude smaller than this.


Pakistan has raised the possibility of WB intervention and if the upcoming bilateral IWT talks are not successful, then I think that route will be taken. But before one does this, is it not better to get in the same room and talk through things? Perhaps there is a resolution? That's how I see Pakistan's delay in approaching the WB. There is no question of Pakistan's stance regarding the violation, or intent to approach the WB if things cannot be worked out bilaterally. This policy has been voiced publicly and repeated multiple times.

How can you measure the water stored in Indian Dams?? Didnt Pakistan actually take this to WB in 2005 and WB rejected most of these claims while asking India to make some minor modifications in the dam structure that have been already factored in.

I believe this whole nonsense of India stealing water is a tactic to renegotiate the IWT. An interesting article from SAAG

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The Indus Water Treaty- Its Dynamics and Reverberations

Paper no. 3676
19-Feb-2010

The Indus Water Treaty- Its Dynamics and Reverberations

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

As late as February 13 this year, many members of Pakistan National Assembly expressed great concern over the alleged violation of the Indus Water treaty by India in building dams across rivers meant for Pakistan and warned of a possible war between the two countries over this issue.

These threats of war are nothing new to India. Even before the treaty of 1960, late Suhrawardy as Prime Minister of Pakistan threatened that Pakistan will go to war on the sharing of waters of the Indus. These threats have been repeated periodically and so regularly by people at the political, military, bureaucratic and technical levels that these threats have lost their meaning now. At one point, one of the influential editors of the Urdu press Majeed Nizami of Pakistan went one step further and threatened that Pakistan will have to go for a nuclear war over the river waters issue.

It should be conceded that the Indus Water Treaty has survived despite wars, near wars, acts of terrorism and other conflicts that have bedevilled the relations between India and Pakistan. This has been, as much acknowledged by many of the saner voices from Pakistan too.

In April 2008, Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner, Jamaat Ali Shah in a frank interview conceded that the water projects undertaken by India do not contravene the provisions of the Indus water treaty of 1960. He said that “in compliance with IWT, India has not so far constructed any storage dam on the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum rivers ( rivers allotted to Pakistan for full use). The Hydro electric projects India is developing are the run of the river waters, projects which India is permitted to pursue according to the treaty.”

Yet many in Pakistan at very senior levels have been whipping up frenzy among the people of Pakistan that “India is stealing the waters of Pakistan”.

Since 2004-2005 when the opposition to Bagilhar Project came out into the open, there has been a continuous attempt on the part of Pakistan to push India to renegotiate the Indus Water treaty.

This would mean going back to sharing of waters during the lean season and other extraneous factors and also to ignore the enormous changes that have taken place on both sides of the border in the last fifty years. This would also mean rewarding Pakistan for its failure to manage its scarce and life giving waters to optimum use.

Unfortunately, some Indian scholars without understanding the past history of negotiations with Pakistan have supported the idea. One of the senior analysts of India is said to have opined that “in negotiating an Indus Water Treaty 2, would be a huge Confidence Building Measure as it would engage both countries in a regional economic integration process.” A pious hope but an unrealistic one.

The Indus Water Treaty is unique in one respect. Unlike many of the international agreements which are based on the equitable distribution of waters of the rivers along with other conditions, the Indus Water Treaty is based on the distribution of the rivers and not the waters.

This unique division of rivers rather than the waters has eliminated the very hassles and conflict that would have followed had equitable distribution of water been based on current usage, historical use, past and potential use etc. People who advocate a revision of the treaty including some influential ones in India should realise the trap that India will be getting into.

Briefly, the Indus Water treaty, having discarded the joint development plan for developing the Indus Basin as suggested by some international bodies, allotted the three western rivers of the Indus basin- the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers Sutlej, Beas and Ravi to India. The Treaty in its Annexures acknowledged certain rights and privileges for agricultural use of Pakistan drawing water from eastern rivers and similarly India drawing water for similar reasons from the three western rivers.

The treaty permitted India to draw water from the western rivers for irrigation up to 642,000 acres that is in addition to another entitlement to irrigate 701,000 acres. India has so far not made full use of its rights to draw this quantity of water from the western rivers. These allocations were made based on the water flows and usage as existed on April 1960.

While India is not permitted to build dams for water storage purposes (for consumptive uses) on the western rivers passing through India, it is allowed to make limited use of waters including run of the river hydroelectric power projects. The Bagilhar project, the Kishenganga project as well as Tulbull (Wular) that come in this category are all being opposed by Pakistan on the narrow definition as to what it means by storage.

Pakistan disputed the Indian contention that Bagilhar project was a run of the river project and that the storage called pondage was necessary to meet the fluctuations in the discharge of the turbines and claimed that the water will ultimately go to Pakistan. Since talks over a long period remained unsuccessful, the World Bank intervened though it made it clear that it was not a guarantor of the treaty.

A neutral expert was appointed by the World Bank. The neutral expert Professor Lafitte of Switzerland while delivering the verdict, rejected most of Pakistan’s objections but did call for minor design changes including the reduction of the dam’s height by 1.5 metres. The expert did not object to the right of India to construct dams for storage purposes purely for technical reasons for the efficiency of the turbines and did not even call the project as a dispute between the two countries but as “differences.”

The Tulbul project similarly envisages a barrage to be built at the mouth of Wular lake to increase the flow of water in the Jhelum during the dry season to make it navigable. The other disputed project, is the dam across Kishenganga River to Wular lake for generation of hydro electric power. The contention of India has been that in both cases the waters will ultimately go to Pakistan.

In the case of Kishenganga Project, Pakistan also has objected to the storage of water on the Neelum river on the principle of “prior appropriation” though the project on the Pakistan side the Neelum- Jhelum power plant downstream had not then started.

In all the projects objected to, Pakistan has brought in a new dimension to the dispute on security and strategic considerations which are strictly outside the ambit of the Indus treaty. The reasoning goes thus- by regulating the waters of the Chenab and the Jhelum, India has the capability in times of war to regulate the flow of waters to its strategic advantage.

There is no doubt that Pakistan will be facing increasing water shortages in the days to come leading to prolonged drought in many of its regions. The reasons are many but some of these are Pakistan’s own doing. The availability of water even now has reached critical proportions.

Global warming over a period of time has depleted the flow of water in the Indus (the major supplier) which depends mostly on glacial runoffs.

As in other Himalayan regions like the Kosi in Nepal, the rivers carry very heavy sediments that result in silting the dams and barrages thus reducing the availability of water for cultivation. Proper and periodic maintenance have ben lacking.

The canals that feed the irrigated lands are not lined resulting in seepage and loss of water.

There is mismanagement in use of water by using antiquated techniques and heavy cropping of water intensive varieties of farm products. Optimum crop rotations have not been done extensively as it should have been done to save water.

No serious effort has been made to improve the storage for intensive seasons like Kharif.

Dwindling water flow has also been affecting power generation.

The discharge of fresh water into the Arabian sea has dwindled considerably ( less than 10 MAF) which has resulted in the sea water pushing further into the estuaries and beyond, making water in those areas unfit for cultivation.

Just as in India, there are many water disputes among the four provinces in Pakistan, but there, it is one- Punjab against the other three and Punjab happens to be the upper riparian.

There is a larger political dimension to the whole problem of the river water distribution between Pakistan and India. To Pakistan the Kashmir issue is irrevocably linked to the Indus water treaty as the headwaters of all the rivers of Pakistan and meant for Pakistan flow through Kashmir and India happens to be the upper riparian state. The fear exists that India could manipulate the waters to starve Pakistan.

From the Indian point of view, Pakistan need not fear if the Indus Water treaty is implemented both in letter and spirit. What is needed is a constructive approach from Pakistan and India should also respond constructively on a crisis that is reaching a very critical stage in Pakistan. Some analysts feel that the “waters issue” may take precedence over Kashmir.

If one were to interpret the spirit of the Indus Water treaty and not the letter, there has to be some give and take from both sides. It needs a conducive environment and mutual trust that are scarce commodities in the relations between India and Pakistan.

---------------------------------------------

 

[EjazR]

The IWT is not efficient, it will have to be reworked so that the waters can be used efficiently. Otherwise just by sticking to the IWT neither India or Pakistan will benefit. Lets not forget that inflows are also decreasing from the Himalayas naturally. But of course there needs to be an environment of trust so that India and Pakistan can resolve and work to utilize the IW more effciently

The Hindu : Opinion / Lead : Water as the carrier of concord with Pakistan

If Islamabad can win New Delhi's trust by cracking down on terror, it could pave the way for the two sides to work together for optimum development of
the Indus basin.

As India and Pakistan move towards the welcome resumption of dialogue, New Delhi needs to factor in a new reality: More than Kashmir, it is the accusation that India is stealing water that is rapidly becoming the “core issue” in the Pakistani establishment's narrative about bilateral problems.

The issue of water is emotive, touching people across Pakistan in a much more fundamental way than the demand for Kashmiri self-determination. Per capita water availability has fallen precipitously over the past few decades, thanks to rising population and poor water management and is expected to fall below 700 cubic metres by 2025 — the international marker for water scarcity. In most years, the Indus barely makes it beyond the Kotri barrage in Sindh, leading to the ingress of sea water, the increase in soil salinity and the destruction of agriculture in deltaic districts like Thatta and Badin.

Though Pakistan's water woes predate recent hydroelectric projects like Baglihar in Jammu and Kashmir, jihadi organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa have started blaming India for the growing shortage of water. Apart from inflaming public opinion against India, this propaganda helps to blunt the resentment Sindh and Balochistan have traditionally had — as the lowest riparians in the Indus river basin — against West Punjab for drawing more than its fair share of the water flowing through the provinces. The campaign also deflects criticism of Pakistan's own gross neglect of its water and sanitation sector infrastructure over the past few decades.

At the same time, the fact that river flows from India to Pakistan have slowly declined is borne out by data on both sides. Above Merala on the Chenab, for example, the average monthly flows for September have nearly halved between 1999 and 2009. India says this is because of reduced rainfall and snowmelt. Pakistan disputes this claim, preferring to link observable reductions in flows to hydroelectric projects on the Indian side. That is why, in the run-up to the February 25 meeting of the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries, Islamabad has gone out of its way to project water as the most important topic it intends to raise.

But just because water — and not terrorism — tops the Pakistani agenda today is no reason for India to refuse to discuss the subject or to treat it as important. Even as it pushes for incremental gains on terrorism, trade and CBMs, New Delhi should take a strategic view and consider two questions. First, how would a refusal to talk water play on the Pakistani political stage, where the two provinces least inclined towards jihad — Sindh and Balochistan — are also the most vulnerable to anti-India propaganda about water theft? Second, is it just possible that Islamabad could be so keen for Indian cooperation on water that it might be willing to abandon the terrorist groups it has nurtured all these years as an instrument of policy against India?

To pose the problem in this way is not to suggest a neat symmetry between two taps — that as Pakistan turns off the terrorism faucet, India can offer to turn on the water. If matters were that simple, the two neighbours would either have solved their problems by now or gone to war. Instead, the link between terror and water is more complex and it revolves around trust. Simply put, Pakistan needs to realise that decisive action against terrorism would create an enabling environment for India to go beyond the letter of its written commitments on water and open the door for cooperation in other fields like energy that could also relieve some of the water pressure both countries are facing.

Though inter-provincial disputes over water sharing were a fact of life in this region before 1947, the partition of the subcontinent introduced a further complexity. It was easy for Radcliffe to draw a line on a map and divide up the land of British India but people and water were harder to partition. The mass migration and bloodshed this triggered is well-known but the rupture to the region's hydrological system proved to be just as traumatic. The rivers which irrigated the new nation all had their origins in India. But as an upper riparian locked in a politically adversarial relationship with Pakistan, the Indian side had little or no incentive to look at the Indus basin as an integrated water system. The early years of independence saw bitter disputes as India treated the waters of the Indus's five tributaries — Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — as its own. Geography and terrain meant the Indus itself could not be harnessed on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir but intermittent, small-scale, diversions on the tributaries generated considerable tension with Pakistan. In 1960, the two countries sought to put an end to this tension by signing the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) with the World Bank's mediation.

The IWT partitioned the six rivers of the Indus watershed on a crudely longitudinal basis. India was given exclusive use of the waters of the three eastern tributaries, the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, and the right to “non-consumptive” use of the western rivers, namely the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Under the IWT, India renounced its right to block or divert the flows of the ‘western' rivers and agreed to confine itself to run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects and the drawing of irrigation water for a specified acreage of farm land. This partitioning was irrational from an ecological standpoint and led to both sides incurring considerable expense as they were forced to develop canal infrastructure drawing on “their” allocated rivers to compensate for the non-use of the other side's rivers despite that water flowing through their own territory.

Pakistani officials from time to time do accuse India of violating the 1960 treaty on the division of the Indus waters. The Indian side, of course, denies this, and there is, in any case, a system of international mediation built into the IWT for binding international arbitration if the two countries cannot resolve a water-related dispute. Pakistan invoked this mechanism for Baglihar in 2005, though the arbitrator ruled in favour of the project subject to certain modifications. An earlier dispute over the Salal project was resolved in the 1970s by the two Foreign Secretaries. Today, nothing prevents Pakistan from referring any or all of the projects India proposes to build on the Chenab and Jhelum for arbitration.

Though the treaty has a mechanism to ensure compliance with the stipulated partitioning of rivers, a major weakness from Pakistan's standpoint is that it does not compel or require India to do anything on its side for the optimum development of what is, after all, an integrated water system. Inflows to Pakistan depend not just on rainfall and snowmelt in India and China (the uppermost eastern riparian) but also on the health of tributaries, streams, nullahs and acquifers as well as groundwater, soil and forest management practices. This is a classic externality problem. Costs incurred by the upper riparian on responsible watershed management will produce disproportionate benefits for the lower riparian, hence they are not incurred.

The IWT anticipated the importance of cooperation with Article VII stating that both parties “recognise that they have a common interest in the optimum development of the rivers, and to that extent, they declare their intention to cooperate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest extent”. So far, little has been done by either side to develop this mandate.

Since water does not figure as a standalone topic in the Composite Dialogue framework, Pakistan's insistence on its revival is at odds with its professed priority. When the Foreign Secretaries meet, therefore, they should not allow process to stand in the way of progress. They could, for example, discuss a framework for a standalone dialogue on water going beyond project-related disputes — for which an arbitration mechanism already exists. The focus could be on identifying short, medium and long-term steps for the optimum development of the rivers.

The Pakistani side would very quickly realise that such a dialogue, whose benefits, especially over the long-term, are tilted in its favour, can only deliver meaningful results if there is an atmosphere of confidence and trust. If the activities of terrorists like the LeT/JuD are allowed to continue, this is unlikely to happen. But if the action Islamabad has repeatedly promised does take place, a path might open for cooperation in other areas too.

Many of the disputes that seem to be driven by fears of water scarcity are actually a reflection of another kind of scarcity: electricity. Pakistan opposes the Indian Kishenganga hydel project on the Jhelum, for example, because it will interfere with its proposed Neelum-Jhelum power plant. But if the two countries could build trust in one another, there is no reason why they cannot agree on energy swaps that could do away with the need to duplicate power projects, especially those which restrict the flow of water. Today, given the way terrorism has eroded the Indian political system's capacity and willingness to do business with Pakistan, such ideas seem hopelessly utopian. But they do offer a glimpse of the kind of future that might be possible should the terrorist menace end. Rather than refusing to talk water, India should show Pakistan how the keys to ending its aquatic insecurities lie in its own hands.

 

[qsaark]

If Islamabad can win New Delhi's trust by cracking down on terror, it could pave the way for the two sides to work together for optimum development of the Indus basin.

It is more than obvious that India is trying to blackmail Pakistan on the water issue and this new twist, that Pakistan should show progress on terrorism if it wants to work with India on the water issue is but an example of this blackmailing. The water issue would have to be resolved as per the IWT, and if I am not wrong, there is no clause in the IWT that suggests that Pakistan has to satisfy Indian demands on 'miscellaneous issues' to get resolve the water issues.

If India keeps twisting the Pakistani arm, I am afraid Pakistan will do the inevitable, that is, to fuel up the independence movement in Kashmir. Pakistan Military can go that far on cooperating with the Indians and the Americans, but if they were to chose between 'Pakistan and no Pakistan', I am pretty sure, they'll tell the Americans, "screw you", and they will do what they have to do. Therefore, it is in the best interest of both the countries, India and Pakistan, not to push each other too much, else neither Pakistan is Nepal or Bhutan, nor India is USA or Russia.

 

[Bang Galore]

It is more than obvious that India is trying to blackmail Pakistan on the water issue and this new twist, that Pakistan should show progress on terrorism if it wants to work with India on the water issue is but an example of this blackmailing. The water issue would have to be resolved as per the IWT, and if I am not wrong, there is no clause in the IWT that suggests that Pakistan has to satisfy Indian demands on 'miscellaneous issues' to get resolve the water issues.

If India keeps twisting the Pakistani arm, I am afraid Pakistan will do the inevitable, that is, to fuel up the independence movement in Kashmir. Pakistan Military can go that far on cooperating with the Indians and the Americans, but if they were to chose between 'Pakistan and no Pakistan', I am pretty sure, they'll tell the Americans, "screw you", and they will do what they have to do. Therefore, it is in the best interest of both the countries, India and Pakistan, not to push each other too much, else neither Pakistan is Nepal or Bhutan, nor India is USA or Russia.

This is not 1990. Pakistan is as much if not more vulnerable to internal "independence" movements. Threats are not going to get us anywhere. Assuming you are right that India is withholding water , what makes you think that they won't tighten the screws further if Pakistan attempts to ramp up its support to militants in Kashmir. I am pretty sure the lack of water will hit you way before India feels any pain from Pakistani actions.

 

[qsaark]

This is not 1990. Pakistan is as much if not more vulnerable to internal "independence" movements. Threats are not going to get us anywhere. Assuming you are right that India is withholding water , what makes you think that they won't tighten the screws further if Pakistan attempts to ramp up its support to militants in Kashmir. I am pretty sure the lack of water will hit you way before India feels any pain from Pakistani actions.

Pakistan is already feeling the maximum pain; not much harm is going to happen to Pakistan even if India wages a full scale war. However, the consequences of any such misadventure will prove more deadly for the India and result in the burst the bubble of Indian economy, its so-called largest democracy and shrewed diplomacy. And you are right, it is not 1990, and unlike Pakistan, India is far more vulnerable to internal 'Independence' movements. Pakistan would ramp up its support for the Kashmirs liberation if the Indian government remains committed to deprive Pakistan from the much needed and rightful water. Screws can be tightened so much, little more tightening and the wrench is going to hurt the hand that is holding it. It would be in the largest interest of both the countries if they realize it and stop pretending to be invulnerable and invincible because both of them are not. If the mighty US couldn't conquer and control Vietnam in 14 or so years and Afghanistan for past eight years, how on earth you think India would be able to do it to Pakistan.

 

[EjazR]

It is more than obvious that India is trying to blackmail Pakistan on the water issue and this new twist, that Pakistan should show progress on terrorism if it wants to work with India on the water issue is but an example of this blackmailing. The water issue would have to be resolved as per the IWT, and if I am not wrong, there is no clause in the IWT that suggests that Pakistan has to satisfy Indian demands on 'miscellaneous issues' to get resolve the water issues.

If India keeps twisting the Pakistani arm, I am afraid Pakistan will do the inevitable, that is, to fuel up the independence movement in Kashmir. Pakistan Military can go that far on cooperating with the Indians and the Americans, but if they were to chose between 'Pakistan and no Pakistan', I am pretty sure, they'll tell the Americans, "screw you", and they will do what they have to do. Therefore, it is in the best interest of both the countries, India and Pakistan, not to push each other too much, else neither Pakistan is Nepal or Bhutan, nor India is USA or Russia.

The official GoI position in no way tries to not implement the IWT. Even during war time past GoI govt. under the Congress have upheld the IWT and so have the BJP led govt. during Kargil

There is international arbitration built into the IWT which Pakistan or India can invoke anytime, and it has been invoked a few times. But by and large the IWT has been upheld.


The point of the Opinion piece is that we have to move ahead than just the IWT. Just sticking to the IWT will not be efficient and suitable for either Pakistan or India. But this extra re-negotiation and water sharing can only be done in an environment of trust. In the current environment both countries will look at any proposal of the either with suspicion.

The IWT is and should be upheld regardless of what is happening with terrorism related issues as India has done earlier even during war time. However, if we want to move ahead and better utilize the water, we will have to renegotiate and come up with a better treaty than the current IWT.

 

[Hutchroy]

Country’s water reservoirs depleting fast

ISLAMABAD: The country’s reservoirs are left with water sufficient for only three days, with one of the two major dams reaching “dead level” due to low inflows and high outflows.

A senior official of the water and power ministry said the total quantity of water in the reservoirs stood at 360,000 acre feet on Friday evening, compared to 1.46 million acre feet on the day last year.

“The amount of water in store today (360,000 acre feet) is equivalent to about 190,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs). The Indus River System Authority (Irsa) is already supplying 83,500 cusecs from the reservoirs.

“This means that the water we have will last only three days,” the official said.

An Irsa official said the water stock position had deteriorated mainly because of low rainfall during winter. He, however, was of the opinion that the situation could soon improve, as rain had been forecast.

“Snow in the northern areas is also expected to begin melting soon, which will improve inflows into the reservoirs,” he said.

At Mangla, the inflow stood at 11,596 cusecs on Friday, and the outflow at 25,000 cusecs. The wide gap between inflow and demand has resulted in the dam’s water level falling to the “dead level”, at 1,041 feet.

The water level in Tarbela dam has plunged to 1,398 feet, just 20 feet above the “dead level” mark of 1,378 feet. On Friday, the inflow was 29,000 cusecs and the outflow 40,000 cusecs.

When compared to last year, the flows of water at Tarbela, Mangla and Nowshera (Kabul river) have declined by 26 per cent this year. The flow in the Chenab has also declined; it was only 10,000 cusecs at Marala headworks on Friday, as compared to 11,700 last year.

The low flows in the rivers have adversely affected farmers because they need more water in February and March for the standing wheat crop.

Currently, Irsa is supplying 42,000 cusecs to Punjab, 35,000 cusecs to Sindh, 4,000 cusecs to Balochistan and 2,500 cusecs to the NWFP.

In Sindh the demand for water will remain high till the middle of March (requirement of the wheat crop) and in Punjab till the end of April.

 

[AZADPAKISTAN2009]

This will get ugly

 

[Storm Force]

INDIA IS PLAYING hard ball with Pakistan I FEAR.

The indians control; the Water into Pakistan since it runs from India

Pakistan is struggling internally with Terror war/ USA pressure to help in SWAT and this has effected their Industrial growth projections.

NOT to much cash in the coffers either.

India knows this and is playing games...

 

[Storm Force]

i ACTUALLY FEAR the indians want the Pakistanis to do something drastic

to forment a conflict.

Could be wrong.

 

[HAIDER]

It so surprising terrorism and water is two totally different issue. If India is linking terrorism with water then India is growing cause of terrorism in the region. Indian policy of steeling water and blocking water is not helping to curb terrorism but helping to spread more terrorism in the region. If India think that blocking the life line of people of country would help them to achieve something, then its totally wrong. And US and other allied power should interfere in this matter and resolve this huge water problem in this region, before it change the form of monster.
Water is life and death of any country, unfortunately Indian are not understanding.

 

[Hutchroy]

Barrage of issues

How the dispute has affected the relationship between the two countries through history

Today, over a hundred and forty of the world's countries depend on shared water systems for some portion of their freshwater needs. Logically enough, due to the limitations of fresh water resources in the world, the potential of international conflict is also always there. The present level of awareness about the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 shows that in spite of the fear of conflict, for Pakistan and India this Treaty remains one of the few agreements that brings the two countries together on one table.

Pakistan depends on the Indus River for 90 percent of its agricultural water needs. India, likewise, faces issues of irrigation, drought and flooding, and pollution. Furthermore, the population of the region is expected to touch 1.5 billion by the year 2020, with half of these people being below the poverty line. By this time, India will be four times its original population and Pakistan six times. Knowing this, one must go back in history to understand the effect of water on the relationship between the two neighbouring countries.

Close to Partition, India controlled the headwaters. Pakistan inherited lower riparian of the Indus water system. The Partition did not discuss nor provide any framework for the usage of that system. This was to be the beginning of a long-winded debate on the flow of water and the usage of the Indus water system.

Several interim agreements were reached but, mostly, there was a deadlock. When the World Bank got involved, in 1952, it was the first time that Pakistan and India were able to progress to a consensus regarding the Indus river. This would culminate in the 1960 agreement, now known as the Indus Waters Treaty. To be more specific, the World Bank's vision was that of an agreement where the vital interests of both countries would be tied to the system.

Instead, political instability and lack of trust on either part of the subcontinent resulted in the agreement developing into two independent river systems, wherein Pakistan would control the flow of Jhelum and Chenab, and India would control Ravi, Beas and Sultej rivers. Hence, even though the agreement was seen as a major breakthrough, in reality it was a 'Band-Aid' as it did not eliminate several key issues. Starting out, it did not encourage unified development and also did not fix the issue of water distribution for the future. So, moving forward to modern times, critics wondered whether the Treaty would last because both countries were looking for more water to cater for their growing needs.

This led to a great deal of rhetoric. In 2001-2002, India started to vocally consider pulling out of the Treaty. Fred Pierce, an international environment journalist, wrote at that time, "Leading Indian politicians are threatening to pull out of the Treaty unless Pakistan stops terrorists from crossing the border into disputed Kashmir. The Pakistani government has reacted angrily, and Kashmiri politicians are demanding the water for themselves."

Such independent voices determined that Kashmir was a vital part of fulfilling the moral obligation of the Treaty. Consequently, with the construction of the Bagilhar Dam project in 1998, worries from the Pakistan side exasperated, leading General (r) Musharraf to take matters to the World Bank. Awarding the World Bank chief James D. Wolfensohn the Hilal-e-Imtiaz further proved that Pakistan would receive an independent WB expert to discuss the Treaty. India would then respond to these inquiries saying that the dialogue process should be allowed to take shape. Hence, the parting shots were talked about, though the Treaty has remained intact despite the political situation.

Assuming that India was to renegotiate the Treaty, Pakistan stands to lose much in the process. Local analyses also explain that the Treaty does not account for the building of dams. Furthermore, the technical aspects of the agreement are a little shaky. Therefore, as is voiced by some, the agreement needs to be slightly altered rather than cancelled altogether. Also, confronting the popular attitude that India is stealing water has also been found to be incorrect because the waters have not been diverted. As it is, the issue that irks the government is the dams, which must be set up according to a certain design so that the waters continue to flow.

The Indus Waters Treaty is also seen as a way for both countries to come together and reach a relative consensus. The negotiation process is indicative of this fact. Despite political factors many technical and basic needs have taken precedence. This leaves the two countries with relatively usable agreement.

Unfortunately, this is not enough. WB's assessment of the issue gives an overall picture. To quote its former President Eugene Black, "There is a need to treat water development as a common project that is functional, and not political, in nature... undertaken separately from the political issues with which India and Pakistan are confronted."

As another round of talks between the two neighbours takes place, one thing has become clear: it will be minus the ministries of water and power. Leaving this to some other forum does not augur too well.

 

[Zaheerul Hassan]

Foreign Sectary level talks held at New Delhi have been ended without reaching to any conclusion. Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and her Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir met for three hours in New Delhi for talks. The purpose of the meeting was to bring regional stability while resolving conflicts. Pakistan was interested in resumption of Composite Dialogues but Rao rebuffed Pakistan’s request to resolve all outstanding issues between two traditional rivals.

In fact, India has desired to restart the peace process under US pressure which was well received by Pakistani authorities. The efforts of the talks was to move head for settling issues bilaterally but unfortunately New Delhi as usually displayed negative and non serious attitude towards the talks. It was quite disheartened to know that Indian foreign sectary came on the table without making any preparation to discuss the burning conflicts of two regional nuke powers. On culmination of talks while talking \g to the media, Pakistani Foreign Sectary has also stated that the gap between Pakistan and India has been widened and no substantial progress in this connection has been made. Pakistan raised major issues like, Kashmir, violations of Indus Basin Water Treaty and on going Indian supported terrorism in Balochistan and FATA.

Indian rulers are continuously kept on planning to destroy agricultural and hydel power projects of Pakistan and other regional countries. Islamabad time and again informed the Indian side about their violations of Indus Basin Water Treaty i.e. unauthorized storage of water, India’s plan to build more dams, the Kishanganga hydel project, pollution in sources of water and glacier melting. India is one of the largest water grabber of the world. She is using water as war instrument. Her hegemonic design can be judged while viewing his present and future plan of consttucting water channel, dams grabbing natural resources. She is illegally constructing dams on the rivers flowing towards Pakistan. She is also a declared water thief.

In Pakistan, Nepal, China, India and Bangladesh burning territorial and water disputes are interconnected and hanging with each other since their inceptions. The water dispute is the major problem which influences the remaining regional issues too. World community remained concern over water conflicts since it could be one of the causes of breaking out of future war. Thus, obviously chances of conversion of traditional to nuclear war increase manifold, when rivals are nuclear powers and equipped with all sort of nuclear arsenals. Pakistan and China always tried to avoid war over water issue despite knowing that India never paid any heed to the demands of neighbouring countries. New Delhi always remained irrational and adopted ridiculous approach in resolving the core regional issues. It is interesting to know that water grabber India is breaching almost water of 95 rivers in entire South Asia and proved herself a “World Largest Water Grabber”. The major sufferers of her grabbing are Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal.

Now let’s discuss the core issue of two traditional rivals of South Asia. It is a proven fact that after the partition, India went to war against Pakistan to maintain illegitimate occupation of Kashmir which continued in one form or the other from October 1947 until January 1949. Meanwhile, acting upon her shrewd diplomacy, India deliberately stopped the flow of Pakistan’s rivers which originate from the controlled territories of Kashmir. Even at that time, Indian rulers had used water as a tool of political coercion against Pakistan. On the other side, Pakistan sought the help of international arbitration. Consequently, Indus Basin Water Treaty between both the states was signed in 1960 and the World Bank, itself, is the mediator and signatory. The treaty which is still in force, allocates waters of three western rivers of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan while India has rights over eastern rivers of Ravi, Sutlej and Beas. Since the settlement of the dispute, India has always violated the treaty intermittently to create economic crisis in Pakistan. A controversy arose between the two neighbouring states in 1984 when India started construction of the Wullar Barrage on river Jhelum in its part of Kashmir. New Delhi stopped construction work in 1987 after Pakistan lodged a strong protest over the project, objecting that it violated the Indus Water Treaty. The issue of Wullar Barrage has also been discussed in various rounds of the composite dialogue process between the two adversaries. In the mid 1990s India started another violation by constructing the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River. In 2005 Pakistan had again sought the World Bank’s intervention to stop construction of the Baglihar dam. Although WB allowed India to go ahead with the project after a few minor modifications, yet it did not permit the interruption of the agreed quota of water flow to Pakistan. Quite contrarily, Indian present tact to reduce the flow of water is a blatant violation of the Indus Basin Treaty.

Regarding negative effects on Pakistan, Syed Jamaat Ali Shah while talking to a daily pointed out that India has deliberately interfered with the flow of river Chenab. He further said that reduced water inflows would bring about huge loss to cropped areas of Punjab, besides causing early depletion of Mangla Dam. He elaborated that India had violated the treaty provisions by putting the water inflow below 55000 cusec in Chenab River at Maralla Headworks. There are also some other fundamental reasons behind Indian shrewd diplomacy by using water dispute against Pakistan. India wants to keep her control on Kashmir which is located in the Indus River basin area, thus contributing to the flow of all the major rivers which enter Pakistan. A report in “New Scientist”, published in 2005 indicated a number of issues in relation to Pakistan. It wrote that Indian violation of the Indus Basin Treaty could lead to widespread famine, and further inflame the ongoing conflict over Kashmir?Pakistan relies on the Indus River and its tributaries for almost half of its irrigation supplies, and to generate up to half of its electricity. Pakistan also fears that India would use various dams as a coercive tool by causing floods in Pakistan through sudden release of waters.
These effects of the report have already been experienced by our country in the past. Unlike India, Pakistan is highly dependent on agriculture, which in turn is dependent on water. Without any doubt, almost 80% of Pakistan’s agriculture is dependent on irrigation. Many of Pakistan’s industries are agro-based such as the textiles industry. Moreover, 70% of Pakistan’s food needs are fulfilled domestically. But India has always dishonoured the accord from time to time to create economic crisis in Pakistan. It is worth mentioning here that Indus Basin treaty over distribution of water resources was concluded after 23 years of Pakistani struggle but once again after 23 years or so controversy rose up in 1984 when India violated the laws of the agreement and started construction of Wuler India will be having a strategic edge, during a military confrontation, enabling it to control the mobility and recoil of Pakistani troops and enhancing the maneuverability of Indian troops. It is mentionable here that India is already weakening Pakistan by sending miscreants from Afghanistan, who are creating unrest through bomb blasts and suicide attacks in wake of already strained relations between Islamabad and New Delhi. In these adverse circumstances, by employing water as a political instrument of shrewd diplomacy, India continues to intensify various political, economic and social crises in Pakistan.

The Indian unflinching quest of grabbing natural particularly water resources are seem to be putting devastating effects on her neighbours, Pakistan The looming water crisis, if unattended, will prove fatal for Pakistan, China, Bangladesh and Nepal and India too. Now choice is with delinquent child (India) to implement the international laws and respect the already concluded pacts.

US and world community should also realize that threat to South Asia or even to global peace has become quite eminent because of water grabbing by India. US should also realize that Indian ingress in Afghanistan is putting on adverse effects on global war on terror. The potent threat can only be removed if India is ready to adhere international contracts on water; world community should come out to pressurize Indian to carry out negotiations with her neighbouring countries to resolve the conflicts. Mediation on Kashmir and Water issue has now become necessity of future talks because of stubborn Indian attitude.

 

[HAIDER]

At the recent foreign secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan in New Delhi, Pakistan’s foreign office team presented a paper on water issues to India prepared by Pakistan’s Indus Water Commission. Although water is not a core issue for the resumption of talks between the two nuclear neighbours, differences over the use of rivers assigned according to the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty have undercut peace-making efforts. As Pakistan and India’s populations grow, water for agriculture and electricity generation is in short supply. Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah talks to Dawn.com about the urgent need to resolve water-sharing disputes.

Q. India says the Kishenganga project does not violate the Indus Waters Treaty. What is Pakistan’s position?

A. The Kishenganga River runs through Kashmir, and becomes the Neelum River. Water flows through Azad Jammu and Kashmir for 165 km before joining the Jhelum at Muzaffarabad. Now 70-80 kilometres of this river also run through Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. So the water re-routed by the Kishenganga power project reduces the flow of water going to Muzaffarabad. And then, Pakistan also has one project on the Jhelum River – the Neelum-Jhelum hyrdro-electric power project.

What are the adverse impacts of this one project according to the Indus Water Treaty? One, it reduces our annual energy generation. Two, the Kishenganga project also has an environmental impact because the depth of the water is reduced and this has an impact on the flora and fauna in Azad Jammu and Kashmir through which the Neelum flows. Three, there are technical problems in the design of the Kishenganga project such as the height of the gates and so on.

Q. But India contends that that it started its Kishenganga project earlier than Pakistan’s Neelum-Jhelum project. According to the Indus Water Treaty, India may construct a power plant on the rivers given to Pakistan provided it does not interfere with existing hydro-electric use by Pakistan. Is this true?

A. Yes. But the Jhelum waters were given to Pakistan. And going by the spirit of the treaty, while the waters are Pakistan’s to use, both countries can accrue benefits. When India made its plans known to Pakistan, that did not mean Pakistan did not have the intention [of constructing a plant]. In 1989, we told India that we are constructing a project there. India wanted to inspect the site. At the time, it was only a small exploration tunnel. Now the intention has been shown, with the Chinese being given the project. So we have a legal case.

Moreover, while the total quantity of water has not been changed, there are no guarantees that India will not store or divert water into the Wullar barrage. Certainly, re-routing will impact the flow-time and therefore reduce the quantum of water [to Pakistan].

Q. Where are talks between India and Pakistan on the Kishenganga project now?

A. In 1988, we came to know about Kishenganga and we asked for details. We were told that India was just conducting investigations. India is obliged by the treaty only to give detailed plans six months prior to construction.

In 1992 or 1993, India asked to conduct its first inspection of the site of the Neelum-Jhleum project in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. That was when there was just an underground tunnel. India told us unofficially that the tunnel was an eye-wash.

Then in 1994, we were officially informed about Kishenganga, which was to be a 330 watt storage work. Now in a storage work, there is no mention of diversion.

The commission held five meetings between 1994 and 2006 and the storage height of the dam was ultimately reduced by 40 metres. But by 2006, Kishenganga became a run-off project. Pakistan’s position was that this is a new project, the run-off was not in the 1994 project, and the 1994 project should be considered abandoned.

In June 2006, we raised objections. Between 2006 and 2008 the commission held three meetings. In 2008, Pakistan informed India that it intends to seek the opinion of a neutral expert appointed by the World Bank. India said Pakistan has no case and that there is no controversy since the Kishenganga project does not harm Pakistan’s usage. India wanted to resolve the issue at the level of the commission. So the government of Pakistan agreed to meet representatives of the government of India, but the meeting proved inconclusive.

So India and Pakistan agreed to negotiations, and in March 2009, Pakistan proposed two names of negotiators. But the Indian stance remained the same. According to the treaty, if negotiations reach a deadlock than a court of arbitration can be constituted with seven experts: two from the government of Pakistan, two from the government of India and three jointly named umpires. If these names are not jointly agreed upon, then the World Bank would help.

Pakistan’s point of view is that the direction of flow and environmental impact of the dam should be addressed by the court of arbitration, while the matter of design would be decided by the neutral expert.

Now, the Pakistan Indus Water Commission has shortlisted several names and these are with the foreign office and the law and justice ministry who have to finalise Pakistan’s two names.

Q. Will Pakistan be taking up other Indian projects with the World Bank?

A. As I said, India is planning two more power projects on the River Indus. But those of concern are the ones on the Chenab because we don’t have any storage site there. So the Chenab is more vulnerable. After constructing three, including Baglihar, India intends to construct 10 to 12 more dams on the Chenab and its tributaries.


Certainly, the treaty gives India the right, but the designs should be compliant. Already, India constructed the Wullar barrage unilaterally without informing Pakistan.

Q. It is said that the Baglihar dam issue was settled by the World Bank in India’s favour because Pakistan did not raise the objections in time. Do you agree with that?

A. Both parties had different points of view. When we approached the World Bank, India blocked us because it did not want a neutral expert. So the fact that a neutral expert was appointed was a small victory. The expert asked for documentation from us, which we provided. India believed that Pakistan was maligning them, but the fact is that the neutral expert settled three points in favour of Pakistan and one in India’s favour. And both parties bore the cost of the proceedings.

Both India and Pakistan need these waters and there is a need for candidness and transparency. Political considerations should not shadow the technical aspects. Unfortunately, the technical side is subordinate to the political side.

For example, India did not provide us updated flow data. In August 2008, India violated the treaty by not providing accurate data on the initial filling of the Baglihar dam. The treaty says the initial filling should not reduce the water flowing into Pakistan. So the initial filling of the Baglihar reduced Pakistan’s water and India should compensate for the lost water.

Q. What impact has the construction of Indian power projects had on Pakistan’s waters? We are, after all, facing shortages for agricultural use and electricity generation.

A. Apart from the Baglihar dam, neither Pakistan nor India has had problems with the Indus Water Treaty. But looking to the future, I foresee problems, especially given climate changes. India has already constructed 50-60, medium-sized projects and it plans more than a hundred. One hundred and fifty will be in the small catchment areas in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. This is human intervention: imagine how many trees will be cut, and the resulting environmental impact? They will also impact Pakistan’s water, given the environmental degradation and increased sediment flow.

I think we will now have to look beyond the treaty for solutions. India is allowed run-off hydro-electric projects according to the treaty, but two or three is different from more than a hundred.

In 1960, Pakistan did not want to give three of its rivers to India, but it did. But clearly the World Bank had not factored in climate change and the impact of human intervention. I think the World Bank treaty is likely to be jeopardised. Already, we are facing a shortage in the western rivers, how can we then compensate for the lack of water in the eastern rivers?

Q. Do you think it is time to expand the scope of the treaty?

A. There are some issues with that. Right now, we need to protect and implement the treaty in its full spirit without re-visiting it. But both governments should initiate talks along with expert stakeholders.

Q. Would this be in India’s interest?

A. Yes, because we are neighbours. The Indus Water Treaty was not a happy marriage but we accepted it. But Pakistan should take action at the appropriate time: what happens to the state of Bahawalpur where the rivers Sutlej and Ravi are dry?
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