Sir.
Absolutely as above. Only one difference, the BAT as a concept was first noticed somewhere in late 90s-early 2000s in the lexicon of intercepts made, if I recall correctly. We do not have concept of BAT in IA but of MOST. So, that should put to rest the origins of the concept.
Both remain offshoots of the 'small team, big impact' philosophy, more so in the LC context. By the time IK Gujral assumed the leadership, the back of the foreign (read Afghan led) militants was broken. His 'overtures' at peace resulted in orders for Indian Army to be scaled down and the primary responsibility of CI operations to be handed over to the CAPFs and JKP, albeit for a short but significant time period. The foolishness of the move can be assessed from the spike in violence that resulted as there was a 'security' vacuum that was created.
A subsequent increased level of forward posturing by the IA as it took over posts held by BSF at certain points till then and BSF was brought in alignment with the overall IA plan and not permitted to act (more often not) of own accord, resulted in a severe strain on the supply routes for sustaining the logistics of running an insurgency. To facilitate the movement, SSG created small teams concept, the BAT, with twofold aims:
a. To create pressure on forward and early warning elements of the Indian Security Forces along the LC.
b. To potentiate psychological impact created out of small profile/silhouette, hard hitting, highly mobile forces (in simpleton terms 'hit & run') that appear to strike at will with addendum incidents of mutilation (an old occurrence for decades by either side) publicized to boost morale of the militants and demoralize the Indian security personnel along LC.
I agree with your point here.
The PA takes care not to allow a launch pad/bivouac in its location or that of it's forward localities. Instead, the launch pads are in near proximity, anywhere between 150 to 500 meters, depending on the positions of PA. Anecdotal evidence has suggested that the PA follows this to limit interaction between the militants (oft radicalized on lines of religion to fight
jihad) and their own soldiers, to obviate the possibility of ancillary affectations. Equally amusing remains the propensity to overlook the obvious - the soldiers and the militants are being representative of the same set of population in general, the steps remain at odds with the intent.
@Joe Shearer I had explained it earlier on thread too .. the concept of
Tanzeem Commander - Launch Commander - ISI interface to liaise with the PA post(s) and the indirect support in terms of Intelligence from Thermal Imagers/Surveillance grid/UAVs and/or covering fire on (nowadays) or over Indian Posts (as observed in aftermath of 2003 agreement)
I would refer to the situation as more of
agonal respiration.
Absolutely agreed. There is no unit as such. Any claim to contrary is pure ignorance. But it is a small unit concept. May have metamorphised into some new term.
Then you would be wise not to follow them and take their words as Gospel Truth. They neither understand the concept of BAT, nor have any clue of the same.
Cheers