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PAF J-10C News, Updates and Discussion

@LKJ86 says it was from the PLAAF’s official weibo account. That’s as official as it gets, is it not?
I don't know. The video in the link is not PLAAF, it's just an ordinary TV program.
Maybe @LKJ86 has the original PLAAF video link.

The number in the video dry thrust 90kn, wet thrust 144kn may be right. But I would NOT say an ordinary city TV program are reliable source,


1672399135962.png

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PS: I need to apologise :sad: ... I opened indeed an old file but after checking the latest info I compiled to the new Flanker book I have the following likely / estimated performances:

View attachment 908316
 
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The video was indeed from PLAAF's official Weibo account, but made by SHENZHEN SATELLITE TV.

View attachment 908447
I see. I don't see it as a reliable source.
PLAAF doesn't need to be held accountable for the west/dry thrust published by a video of SHENZHEN SATELLITE TV.
It's just a weibo account, not a serious publication.
 
I like the plain standard camouflage much better. The other makes it seem like a cheap cardboard box.
I really like the camo but wish they had gone with a scheme similar to the Japanese F-2 for maritime ops
 
time-tested and battle proven = OLD

E-3 can't detect J-20s adequately. This is from Pacific Air Force chief. What more do you need to know?

USAF is retiring half of its E-3s before there is even a replacement. What does that tell you? It's too OLD.

E-3G proving itself in the recent Syrian conflict:




- is OLD ??? :cuckoo:

It looks like you missed some of the links embedded in my statements in my previous post. I am fully aware of your TOP LINK because I felt that you are confusing J-10C with J-20 when you originally claimed that E3G is having difficulty tracking J-10C from unspecified distance(s) which is unlikely:

"RSIP allow detection of targets about 10 times smaller than non-RSIP AWACS radars, including cruise missiles. Range Resolution improve by 6 times, with a 70 - 100 % increase in Detection Range, and much better Range, Altitude and Azimuth accuracy. RSIP radars are able to see targets with a 0.5 m radar cross section at 300 n.mi. or more. The modification include a new Pulse-compressed waveform, two new adaptive signature processors, and better electronic countermeasures proofing."

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/293774906_Airborne_early_warning_acquires_new_targets

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In 1987, the E-3 was upgraded to its current configuration, the Block 30/35 modification on its E-3B/C model. In this modification, the AN/APY-1/2 radar system went through a Radar System Improvement Program. This program was a joint venture between the United States and NATO. The RSIP improves the AN/APY-1/2 radar detection capability against targets with smaller radar cross section such as cruise missiles and low observable aircraft. The power for the radar is provided by electric generators mounted on each of the E-3s Pratt and Whitney’s TF33 engines produced a combined output of approximately one megawatt of power. The E-3 also gained a passive electronic support measure system (ESMS) the AN/AYR-2 or also known as the 8 passive detection system (PDS). The PDS system allows a specialist onboard the E-3 to “associate any electromagnetic emission to a specific threat system.” This system allows controllers onboard the E-3 to provide situational awareness of any possible threat surface-to-air missile systems or threat aircraft thus allowing friendly aircraft to determine strike routes and tactics to address those threats. Another key upgrade to the AWACS in this block upgrade is the installation of a Joint Tactical Distribution System (JTIDS) terminal. The installation of this terminal provides the E-3 a “jam-resistant digital communication of data and voice for command and control, navigation, relative positioning, and identification.” In 2003, the E-3 underwent a massive upgrade. The E-3G or Block 40/45 upgrade, is the first significant overhaul of the AWACS platform since its development in the late 1960s. This upgrade replaces the 1970’s based computer system with the latest commercial off the shelf computer systems in which according to Col David Gaedecke, a former commander of the 552nd Air Control Wing, would provide the AWACS community capabilities that are much more advanced the older model Block 30/35.


E-3G is very capable platform on the whole:

For a start, the E-3G brings a mission crew of between 13 and 19 people, and an almost unequalled multi-band communications suite to the area of operations. The mission crew receive a huge amount of information from not only the E-3G’s primary AN/APY-1/2 radar but also via satellite communications (SatComms), VHF and UHF radios, Link 16 and a range of other communications and datalink systems. This, coupled with their training as dedicated airspace battle-managers and fighter-controllers allows them to generate high levels of situational awareness. This situational awareness, and their capacity as a large mission crew, is what enables the US Air Force to coordinate in real time the extremely complex multinational air operations which the US and other NATO countries sometimes take for granted, but which most other countries struggle to conduct. The E-3 also typically acts as the Link 16 management function during complex operations, coordinating which data is pushed where and which users can send to others.


Do you expect K. S. Wilsbach to be sincere with you? This man could be spreading disinformation on purpose.

But American E-3G are based on OLD AIRFRAMES:

But the Air Force’s 31 E-3s are 43 years old on average, and keeping them maintained has become more and more challenging, prompting one top general to push for a replacement as soon as possible.

The Air Force’s statistics on mission-capable rates show the increasing difficulty in keeping the AWACS in the air. The E-3G’s mission-capable rates plunged 10 percentage points last year from 70.7% in 2020 to 60.7% in 2021. The E-3B similarly slumped from 65.8% to 55.8% during that same period.



This is why US feels the need to replace E-3G with E-7G in coming years.

Yes, E-2D can do the work of detecting modern aircraft.

WE agree on something. :thank_you2:

The onboard AN/APY-9 provides hybrid mechanical and electronically scanning in UHF-Band. This radar system mechanically rotates to cover a full circle around the aircraft but when it spots something of interest, it can stop and stare, concentrating power for a better image without waiting for the sweep of a purely mechanical array. By locking the antenna in place, it can focus on and electronically track a moving target using every photon generated by two 170 kVa generators (340 kVa combined); microwave photonics technology is involved. Space-time adaptive processing (STAP) is used coupled with digital low-noise receivers and processors to address noise or clutter on the screen and in target detection by extension.


Don't underestimate J-10C. According to my contact, it's borderline LO in PLAAF service. But keep in mind, PLAAF has a wide fleet of EW aircraft that can mess with adversary radar system. And in PLAAF, J-10C can more effectively limit emissions because it can rely on other platform to do sensor fusion and pass it the targeting data. It can be guided by AWACs. But if PAF gets similar aerial assets from China, it can make J-10C a lot harder to detect.

US developed its first airborne Electronic Warfare (EW) solutions back in the days of World War II.


China developed its first airborne EW solutions in the 1980s.

Both US and China had a measure of each other in the domain of EW not long ago:


J-10C can do all that can still be tracked from over 300 miles away. :tup:

absolutely not. F-35 can be detected very easily within first island chain. According to both Chinese sources and verified by my contact. This is entirely off topic, but USAF isn't going to be able to deploy F-35As or tankers. All the surrounding air bases will get destroyed in the event of a westpac conflict. The recent DoD alluded this as much. Everything inside of Guam will be lost in the opening hours.

Surrounding airbases as in Philippines and Guam? Yes, China can direct PLRAF to attack these airbases.

Philippines is inducting Israeli Spyder air defense system(s) in the present. Philippines placed an order of 3 Spyder batteries in total. Spyder air defense system can be used to intercept aircraft, cruise missiles, helicopters and UAVs but I am not sure about its BMD capability. PLRAF can use DF-26 to strike at airbases in Philippines. US might have to dispatch a THAAD battery to an airbase in Philippines if it is to be used.

A THAAD battery is stationed in Guam already. DF-26 will not be of much help in Guam, therefore. China will have to direct PLAN to attack Guam instead but it might face USN there. The Battle of Guam might be realized.

F-35 can be detected very easily now? :stop: Do you understand the difference between EARLY WARNING and TRACKING? You might receive EARLY WARNING within the first island chain when F-35 are used there. And there is a good chance that Chinese systems deployed in the first island chain are taken out in the process. I explained to you HOW this is possible in my previous post but you are back to square one on this one.

I have seen it all in this forum. Iranians claim to detect and shoot down F-35. Russians claim to detect and shoot down F-35. Chinese claim to detect and shoot down F-35. Every Tom, Dick and Harry claims to detect and shoot down F-35. Let's see if the rhetoric match claims made on a forum.

- Israel used its F-35 to infiltrate Iran to [simulate] strikes on desired targets in an unannounced drill as noted in here and here. ----(A)

- USAF used an F-35 to strike at desired targets in a sector of Syria in 2020 where Russian air defense systems such as S-300 and S-400 were active as noted in here. Both Syrian and Russian air defense systems could not detect the F-35 and counter it. ----(B)

- Israel used its F-35 to conduct strikes on desired targets in a well-protected sector of Syria as noted in here. These strikes also caught Syrian and Russian air defenses in the region by surprise. ----(C)

Just look at what an Iranian Brigadier General has to say about Russian air defense systems:


This is rare admittance from an Iranian military official.

You are now reminding me that this is off-topic discussion but YOU brought up F-35 in here. Funny.

Not even close to happening. That's why B-21 is needed. B-2 is 30 years old and in limited numbers. And very hard to maintain and have low availability.

THEY / THEM tell you this in supposedly classified debriefings?

The B-2 is one of the most game-changing aircraft ever built and one of the most cost-effective. It has a 172-foot wingspan, 20 feet wider than the Boeing 767 airliner, but unlike the 767, the B-2 has the radar signature of an insect—an amazing technical and manufacturing feat. Beyond the ability to use its low observability to penetrate enemy air defenses, the combination of the B-2’s large payload and precision delivery means its cost per effect is dramatically better than past or present power projection alternatives.

During World War II it took a thousand B-17 or B-24 bombers with 10,000 men and 9,000 weapons to attack a single target. Today the B-2 can attack 80 separate targets thousands of miles away with precision weapons in a single mission in a single day using two people. An aircraft carrier battle group with thousands of people, taking weeks of positioning time from thousands of miles away, and dozens of fighter-attack flights, can potentially achieve the same effects, but not with the same level of stealth, and at multiple orders of magnitude more cost both in terms of dollars and personnel.



B-2A is called into action on an as-needed basis, and it takes just two B-2A to produce battlefield effects on par with a strike package involving up to 75 aircraft in a conventional war otherwise.

During Allied Force, the air war over Serbia, six B-2s conducted 45 sorties out of 9,211 Air Force fighter and bomber sorties in the entire war—less than a half of one percent—but they struck 33 percent of the targets in the first eight weeks of combat.

Yugoslavian air defenses were modeled to counter stealthy aircraft in view of Operation Desert Storm but B-2A degraded them to the point of being utterly useless - Yugoslavian air defenses were able to shoot down only 2 aircraft in the entire war (F-117 = 1; F-16 = 1). B-2A delivered significant blows to Yugoslavian air defenses in opening phase of the war and made it much safer for the other aircraft to operate over the country by extension.

When B-2A are flying above, all those JUICY radar systems among other things shall be granted their last rites.

It still makes sense for US to produce a new bomber which would allow USAF to retire both B-1B and B-2A and bring something much more advanced to the table with the option to mass produce it. This is how things roll in life. Good things are eventually replaced by even BETTER things.

lol, you are talking about the most well defended air space in the world. A few hundred missiles aren't going to do much. Especially something that can as easily intercepted as subsonic cruise missiles. Even in operation desert storm, half of the tomahawk missiles were intercepted.

Baghdad was one of the most protected cities in the world in 1991, but:


I get it. Good defenses can instill confidence in Public but being over-confident is foolish.

I am not sure from where you are getting the idea that terrain-hugging cruise missiles are easy to detect and shoot down. And I am not sure from where you learned that HALF of the Tomahawk cruise missiles were intercepted over Iraq in 1991. Do you have relevant data on hand? A total of 288 Tomahawk Block II were used to strike at different targets in Iraq in 1991 with 85% of this inventory producing desired results. And a total of 218 Tomahawk Block III were used to strike at different targets in Yugoslavia in 1999 with over 90% of this inventory producing desired results.

Tomahawk Block IV mask itself very well in ground clutter, is found to be very difficult to jam (rare admission from Russians in here), and can be programmed to bypass threat zones in its pathway to reach desired target. It can also be instructed to change course or to loiter for a while. The window of opportunity to detect and intercept this cruise missile becomes very small, and a volley is virtually impossible to stop in any case. The image below shows older Block III capability:

TomahawkBlockIIIKillChain.png


Russians hinted about developing the capability to jam satnav receiver but Americans solved this problem in Block V:

With the modification Block V, Tomahawk has increased capabilities, which integrate new seeker, hitting the surface targets, more than 1000 miles range, greater penetrating power, less susceptible to jamming of its seeker and communication and navigation striking the target under the GPS taken down conditions.


A few hundred missiles are not going to do much? It comes down to which type of targets will be struck and what would be the resultant effects. US is known to attack airfields, air defense sites, and C2 nodes of any country. Defenses of any country are effective due to its C2 infrastructure - disable this infrastructure and you win half of the war in conventional terms. See the image above? What do you think it tells you?

The least you can do is to study how US fights a conventional war to understand why it does so well in this domain instead of allowing rhetoric to cloud your judgement. American armed forces understand conventional warfare on a scientific level and not as a mere collection of guns and bullets that are visible on the battlefield.

Nevertheless, China made an EXCELLENT decision to establish Military Theater Commands:

chinarussia_0.png



This division grants China sufficient mission flexibility to localize a conflict and preserve its resources while it can push for a diplomatic solution. Just look at how China is dealing with India.

China is using Western Theater Command to handle India, Southern Theater Command to handle Philippines, Eastern Theater Command to handle Taiwan, and Northern Theater Command to handle South Korea. US would also like to limit its response to a particular Military Theater Command that is involved in a localized conflict with a neighboring country that might warrant American attention such as in the case of Taiwan or in the case of South Korea. US is unlikely to get involved in other conflicts with the exception of Japan.

Good job there.

Why don't you take a look at how many ships USN has in 7th fleet and how many are in the port at any given time and how many tomahawk missiles they can hold (not how many VLS cells, but how tomahawk missiles they can actually hold). Hint: not every MK-41 cells can hold a tomahawk missile on Burke class ship. Due to age and excessive usage, USN ships have to spend a long time in port.

On any given day, up to (100 - 110) ships of the USN are found to be patrolling the oceans around the world. A total of 105 ships were active around the world as on 22-12-22 for instance; 50 were involved in various tasks while 55 were on patrol.

In case of hostilities with China, most of the active ships might be directed to the conflict zone. Assuming a mix of frigates, destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers, up to 5000 VLS might be onboard and loaded, with Tomahawk Block IV + Block V as 50% of the load-out. Now add submarines to the equation. More importantly, USN has resupply-purpose ships.

And then why don't you take a look at how many CRUDES China has right now and how many of them are new and have high availability.

You do realize hypersonic missiles are a lot harder to intercept than subsonic missiles, right? any this YouTube clip is out of date. The most threatening missile facing USN right now is DF-17, which uses HGV, so it is actually a lot hard to detect and intercept than DF-21D. DF-21D is almost 10 years old. It's irrelevant to a future conflict.

China created the ASBM PSYOPS to dissuade American activities in the South China Sea (SCS) but this did not work. ASBM can be useful against a naval force that does not have credible BMD capability and CEC but USN has both.

DF-17 has sufficient accuracy to engage an aircraft carrier. This is in line with the revelation that DF-17 has CEP of 30 m. Problem is that an American aircraft carrier is a moving target and a fast one at that, and DF-17 can miss it much like DF-21D or any ASBM. About time you learn something about hypersonic physics.

1. An HGV has to slow down during the terminal phase of its flight in order to engage a target:

The third technology involves launching a glider from a ballistic missile during its ascending phase, then piloting this device to “bounce” off the layers of the atmosphere to extend its range and change direction. This gives it a trajectory that is very complex to predict, but also leads to very high mechanical and thermal stresses on the terminal vehicle. Its range and final speed will depend on the initial thrust and then the profile of its kinetic energy degradation as it bounces off the layers of the atmosphere. As with the MaRV, the terminal velocity of the glider will be greatly reduced from the initial Mach 20, even potentially below Mach 5.


2. An HGV cannot be controlled like a Tomahawk cruise missile mid-flight:

Hypersonic maneuvers or “bounces” generate high g-force accelerations which dictates very strict requirements for navigation systems, in particular inertial ones. Furthermore, while the ionization of the air around a hypersonic body has little impact on its detection by terrestrial or maritime radars, it can severely limit radio communications (as witnessed by the re-entry of Apollo spacecraft and the Space Shuttle), which proves problematic for external guidance using data link or even GPS. Finally, in the case of an HCM, the operation of a scramjet entails flight constraints in altitude and in profile, because the combustion chamber is optimized for temperature and air pressure conditions corresponding to a specific altitude. In general, very high altitudes are chosen (greater than 50,000 feet). If tactics dictate the need to vary the altitude of the missile, this can only be done at the cost of “deoptimization” of fuel consumption and therefore range, which can be reduced by as much as 80 percent from the theoretical optimum.


3. An HGV is not an ideal choice to engage a moving target:

Hypersonic missiles have so far been used (for example, the alleged Kinjal strikes in Ukraine) against stationary sites. If it is a question of hitting a moving target like a ship, we must add to the constraints above the problems of targeting and terminal guidance. For this type of target, the challenges related to the transmission and real-time refresh of information on a moving target still seem far from resolved. Another solution would be use a seeker. The problem with placing a seeker on the missile is that it must be located at the nose, which as noted is subject to the highest thermal stresses. In the present case, the use of a heat shield seems incompatible with that of a seeker positioned just behind, which must either emit and receive electromagnetic waves in return, or possibly work in the visual or infrared fields, which reduces its range or exposes it to the thermal phenomena already discussed at length. There are solutions for jettisonable fairings in the dense layers of the atmosphere to protect the seeker, but this jettison must be carried out once the missile has left the hypersonic range to avoid high g-force stress on the missile airframe.

Beyond the thermal constraints, remains the question of targeting to correct the trajectory of the missile. The speed of these weapons implies unmasking at very long distances compared to subsonic missiles. In addition, if the hypersonic missile flies at very high altitude, it must solve radar discrimination problems in what is commonly called sea clutter and therefore must use radar imaging processes using SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) technologies. Added to this is the identification of the target, which must be based on powerful algorithms. All these elements mean that in order to target a naval vessel, the missile must slow down and leave the hypersonic domain in the final phase, returning to “normal” supersonic speeds. However, a maneuvering supersonic missile remains a very complex target to intercept, especially if a substantial part of its flight was made at hypersonic speeds, reducing the time available for the OODA loop.



A maneuvering supersonic missile remains a very complex target to intercept but USN has solved this problem for itself to large extent. USN has conducted a large number of live-fire tests to develop its capability to intercept ASBM. These tests also show that 100% intercept rate might not be possible, so it helps to move fast like an American aircraft carrier. USN will also attempt to take out ABSM launchers with suitable munitions that might be used against it.

In light of the above, DF-17 is better suited for strikes on military bases and infrastructure. But USN is developing relevant countermeasures just in case. SM-6 Block 1B is a hypersonic multi-purpose missile and can be used to intercept HGV. Older SM-6 variants might be up to the task as well. But you will not see Americans bragging about this capability on purpose - not anytime soon.

But this:


I have always maintained that PLAN is your best shot against USN in the Pacific. PLAN is looking forward to put together another Carrier Strike Group (CSG) involving Type 003 with a force composition of KJ-600, J-35 and J-15D - a step in the right direction if you ask me.

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DF-21D is irrelevant to a future conflict? It is very good MRBM and can be used in regional conflicts if not more. USN can do something about it but this does not suggest that others can.

I did maintain for a long time that Americans understand "rocket science" well enough and they will produce countermeasures for sophisticated ballistic missiles. PAC-3 interceptor is extensively tested and it defeated Pershing II (Storm II target) much like any other ballistic missile when it came in the "engagement envelope." Bypassing a Patriot battery is one thing, trying to engage a target that is protected by a Patriot battery is another. But THAAD provides much greater "engagement envelope" in comparison, THAAD and Patriot are interoperable.

you need to stop watching YouTube clips and get into reality. Ohio class according to my nuclear sub contacts are constantly breaking down because they are so old.

Facepalm. :stop: Each Ohio-class submarine was originally built to last 30 years in oceanic environment(s), and some were produced at a different point in time. But service life of each was extended to 42 years in time. USN feels the need to extend service life yet further of the oldest productions in use (5 in total)*; others are GOOD.

*A news like this comes out and you are assuming that USN is broke? Seriously dude.

You cry OLD each time but you need to realize that Americans have produced steel that is about 3 times stronger than top-of-the-line Chinese steel which Americans have access to in compliance with American IMPORT quality standards. Every country is not producing cheap disposable goods.

Seems like you've spent too much time reading US military propaganda. CEC is nothing new. China has that and sensor fusion. If you don't have these things, it's not fifth generation. J-20s have them. Even J-10Cs might have them (can't remember for sure). I'm not sure why you are constantly downgrading J-10C capabilities.

I like to do my own homework instead of taking any side's propaganda at face value.

Every professional military force has built C2 infrastructure to enable network-centric warfare (NCW) but level of complexity can be distinguished on following counts:

- PCW allows each platform to provide operational updates to the other through the Combat Information Center (CIC).

- NCW allows each platform to share valuable information in real-time with the other by linking radar systems and CIC across all platforms to produce a Common Operating Picture (COP).

- CEC is a step up above NCW by allowing all types of sensor systems to be linked to produce relatively rich COP with the element of Central Control (CC) that can automatically decide and assign air defense mission to individual platform.


CECs-Principal-Functions-Source-The-Cooperative-Engagement-Capability-Johns.png



In case of aircraft, you are looking at NCW capability much like Link 16.

Let me show you something:

benitez-6-3-19-figure-3-768x457-png.780813


F-15E and F-15EX can have NCW with each other via Link 16 but F-15E will have to depend upon F-15EX to achieve at par COP when both are deployed and used. This does not suggest that F-15E can leverage every sensor system of F-15EX to achieve at par COP but this information exchange will be limited to radar data.

F-35 can leverage every sensor system of another F-35 to produce excellent COP and reduce its footprint via MADL - this is 5th generation sensor fusion in American terms.

But the (F-35 - F-35) network level is not CEC because it must involve taking cues from other platforms to produce excellent COP for all of the platforms involved. CEC is enabled by equipment of its own which must be installed in each platform to do the needful and is tied to the NIFC-CA principle of USN.

Speaking of J-10C, do you think that it can process information at par with J-20 akin to the (F-15EX - F-15EX) network level? Or it will work with J-20 akin to the (F-15E - F-15EX) network level? Or do you think that J-10C can detect and track F-35 in real-time and provide cues to a Type 055 destroyer of PLAN to engage it from considerable distance akin to CEC?


Now you can understand following statement: "Those radar systems which can detect F-35 such as Chinese YLC-8E might not be able to track it in real time for long -- F-35 is equipped with state-of-the-art broadband EW capabilities for good reason. Combat tactics is another factor -- F-35 offers unprecedented situational awareness to the pilot who in turn will not wait for the kill chain to establish and work against him but engage and destroy valuable targets at earliest opportunity. If this is not possible then F-35 can be used to illuminate YLC-8E among other radar systems on the surface for the USN to take out with a barrage of Tomahawks. The benefits of CEC are boundless. Radar systems on the surface are vulnerable to decapitating strikes but airborne platforms like E-2D can survive with air escort. You might have faith in A2/AD systems like HQ-9 but virtually nothing could stop a volley of Tomahawks from approaching desired targets in conflicts around the world and these cruise missiles are kept up to date."

PLAN might have developed CEC of its own but I do not recall any demonstrations from PLAN to this effect. PLAN has yet to show that it can shoot down an ASBM let alone CEC. When PLAN will demonstrate these experiments much like USN then WE can talk.

Detecting and then locking onto F-35s is not that difficult for PLA. KJ-500s are locking onto F-35s constantly. That's why you see Wilsbach talking about how they want to break the PLAAF kill chain where KJ-500s can guide long range AAMs to USAF aircraft.

Keep in mind that USAF considers J-20's frontal stealth to be comparable to earlier blocks of F-35As. That's why the aggressor squad for J-20 uses earlier F-35As. In comparison, USAF uses F-16s to simulate Su-57.

F-35 is designed and currently equipped to deflect and absorb radar waves across a number of frequency bands ranging from L to V by virtue of its shaping when combined with its known RAM application:

A radar absorbing composite includes a (CNT)-infused fiber material disposed in at least a portion of a matrix material. The composite absorbs radar in a frequency range from about 0.10 Megahertz to about 60 Gigahertz. The CNT-infused fiber material forms a first layer that reduces radar reflectance and a second layer that dissipates the energy of the radar. A method of manufacturing this composite includes disposing a CNT-infused fiber material in a portion of a matrix material with a controlled orientation of the CNT-infused fiber material within the matrix material, and curing the matrix material. The composite can be formed into a panel which is adaptable as a structural component of a transport vessel or missile for use in stealth applications.


This RAM application allows F-35 to deflect and absorb radar waves across frequency bands ranging from L to V.

Ams2001glos-Rt1.gif


These measures allow F-35 to significantly reduce the Line-Of-Sight (LOS) of various radar systems including those operating in the L-band for it to maneuver through the threat environment. Please keep in mind that you will NOT find F-35 RCS simulation data involving its RAM application on the web in Public domain - you will have to use your imagination instead.

I can accept that KJ-500 can detect and track F-35 but but NOT from far away since its radar system is known to operate in the L-band unless it uses HARRY POTTER MAGIC in place of radar physics. Detecting and processing a target like F-35 from considerable distance(s) in the BVR regime is the ultimate challenge for every country that does NOT have access to American state-of-the-art.
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Your claim that "KJ-500s are locking onto F-35 constantly" cannot be taken seriously until you provide relevant details. When did these encounters took place? And are you sure that these F-35 were operating without luneburg lens? The only known operational flights of F-35 without luneburg lens are the ones that I have marked as (A), (B), and (C) respectively (see above).
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Wilsbach said that KJ-500 has a key role in long-range air-to-air kill chains - generic statement if you ask me. WE cannot tell much from this statement alone.

you really need to read more than just what US military is doing. Seriously.

Trust me, I am. But I cannot say the same about you.

The point is that PL-15 has large AESA seeker, so it can be a fire and forget weapon. The threshold for weapon grade locking aren't as high as something using an older mechanical seeker like every other AAMs out there.

It's again amazing to me here that Pakistani fans aren't appreciating what a great AAM you just got.

No air-to-air missile is truly Fire and Forget because it has to produce desired results in what could be possibly be an EW dense environment. Two-way datalink can be helpful in this matter.


But being VLO is very helpful:


FIRST LOOK - FIRST SHOT - FIRST KILL

In case you are wondering, F-15SG is 4++ generation fighter (one of the best in the world).

---
China has provided PL-15E to PAF by the way - this is less capable version than the original PL-15. But "thank you." :thank_you2:

Again, you spent too much time with this decade long Lockheed propaganda. F-35 is a great aircraft, but what is has right now is nothing special compared to J-20. I'm not sure why you are wasting this much breaths on F-35 on a J-10 thread.

It really isn't. J-20 and F-35 radar signature from the front is quite comparable once you get to S band or lower. Again, USAF uses a F-35 to simulate J-20 and it uses F-16 to simulate Su-57.

See above and tell me.

J-20 has relatively different shaping than F-35 and its effects are pointed out at length in following link:


And what about J-20 RAM application? How capable it is?

I could find following:

In this article, a multifunctional and tunable radar absorber which can achieve dynamical modulation of absorbing frequency, bandwidth, and amplitude is presented. Such a tunable radar absorber is composed of a graphene capacitor layer and an active metasurface layer. By controlling the impedance characteristic of each layer through the external bias voltages, the absorber not only can achieve the ultrawideband electromagnetic (EM) absorbing performance, but also can be switched to a narrowband absorption mode, and its absorption amplitude can be further adjusted at each of the above operation modes. Both simulated and experimental results have demonstrated that the −10-dB reflection bandwidth ranging from 3.55 to 19.6 GHz can be realized, and the average reflection amplitude can be dynamically tuned between −3.8 and −11.5 dB. In addition, by changing the bias voltages, the absorber can also, respectively, switch its −10 dB reflection bandwidth to 3.5−11.1 GHz and 10.9−18.9 GHz, where the larger dynamic range of amplitude modulation is obtained. The equivalent circuit model is employed to explain the tunable absorption mechanism by analyzing the impedance matching characteristics. This hybrid design approach can effectively expand the EM reconfigurable functionalities of the current tunable absorber, which may further open a novel way of the graphene application in microwave frequencies.


This RAM application allows J-20 to deflect and absorb radar waves across frequency bands ranging from S to Ku.

Ams2001glos-Rt1.gif


J-20 seems to be a well-equipped jet fighter and posit a significant threat to any adversary in theory but China is still learning the craft and you are expecting too much from your FIRST attempt at creating a VLO aircraft. You seem to have no clue about American advances in stealthy applications and technologies.

Yes, I am aware of USAF using F-35 to simulate RCS of J-20 - this is the LOGICAL on its part. F-35 allows USAF to simulate RCS of upcoming J-35 as well. What you see in this case is the advantage of having a significant headstart in the domain of stealth sciences.

JY27A is a very old export radar.

Now you admit it.

But don't worry - I appreciate your honesty.

YJ-27A is still a good radar system and an asset of PAF - helpful against Indian threat dynamics in the present. Thank you. :thank_you2:

People that are actually working with US military and have up to date classified information are all taking J-20, KJ-500 and UHF/VHF radar very seriously. And they are investing serious money into NGAD and B-21 in order to penetrate Chinese air space, because the current generation of aircraft cannot do so.

See above and tell me.

US finds itself in GREAT POWER COMPETITION with China so it is absolutely expected from the American Military Industrial Complex to push technological boundaries for the benefit of American armed forces.

NGAD and B-21 are being developed with battlefields of the future in mind like in the 2030s and beyond. What are you thinking really?

Frankly, my initial post was to explain to people here that J-10C and PL-15 are very capable platforms for PAF to use. PAF is clearly happy with what they got.

Somehow, you got triggered. It's not my problem that the thought of US military losing badly in a westpac conflict is so shocking to you. But these Chinese weapons are very capable and it's your loss for not understanding that.

And you could keep it simple and focused on how J-10C can be used to handle Rafale F3R which is the immediate concern and threat for PAF.

I am NOT triggered but addressing your rhetoric with technical information on hand for the benefit of all readers. WE must have realistic assessment of these themes instead of thinking like Saddam Hussein.

You are now resorting to ad-hominem which is unfortunate. PDF is a DISCUSSION BOARD and NOT any side's marketing echo chamber. Your input is appreciated but maturity is advised. And try to keep up with technical information because it becomes tiresome to explain it again and again. Thanks.
 
Actually I highly question this even if from an official PAF brochure.

View attachment 908297

32,000lbs ??? If I’m not mistaken this would be 142.34 kN, which is IMO impossible, since this is the thrust rating often given for the J-20‘s WS-10C but not for the WS-10B.

As such and since we have seen so many official brochures including wrong data and since this contradicts the official one from AVIC/CAC I’m not sure if simply one from the PAF staff googled a bit and used this. For the WS-10B this thrust is not even given for the J-16 but always something around 136-138 kN.
So why a user is not allowed to reveal actual specs?
Why such blockage from Chinese government?
 
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