New Threat to Pakistan with India,s New K4 SLBM test next month

[Iggy]

If its a anti-ship missile, it really cannot miss too much, can't it. Especially its a smaller ship. Even for a anti-ship missile, so CEP do not apply to anti-ship missile.

As for missile that require GPS, its the error of GPS signal that determine the accuracy.

But we are talking about ballistic missile here. Can India achieve CEP of zero for K4?

@gambit, can you explain what he is talking about ?

 

[JayAtl]

IMHO the Red line is way before that, In some peoples opinion it is the Indus valley.
There are many other types of threshold.

Surgical strikes?
Pakistan's conventional forces can counter that and there is no need to bring NUKES into this equation

if you can counter surgical strikes they can...it could be BVR missile strikes , it could be without crossing Indian borders missile strikes, it could abbottabad like strikes... time will tell. Of course indian govt also needs to grow a backbone, if another 26/11 is executed on their land.

 

[Secur]

@Alpha1 @Secur So, the best way to counter Pakistani missile threat is to develop strategy & resources to nutralize all known & suspected launch capabilities of Pakistan in a fast & massive preemptive strike, putting into use both conventional & electronic warfare. Woh bhi bana lenge, humlog badebhai hai!!

If wishes were horses ...

You know the rest If it was possible without initiating the MAD or a massive retaliation , it would have been done a long time ago , lets just say even before we went nuclear and had a handful of sites , no one dared to attack it then back during the 80's .

I dont see any thing I write is "underestimating". If you think "cleared off" is underestimation I am sorry but thats calculation. There are many dimensions that will come in play in case if full exchange. Sometimes simulations give you fare idea.

Well you said something about Pakistan wanting to clear itself off the map and setting India back by 100-200 years when no such thing as " survivability for thousands of years " can even be thought of .

 

[The Deterrent]

Very true.
Pakistani members don't really comprehend or want to comprehend a domineering factor in the battlefield.

The crux of the matter is that we will a system to defend ourselves while Pakistan won't.
Even if say, our ABM blocks out 'x' numbers of missiles however less, it IS blocking out 'x' numbers of missiles while Pakistan can't block a single BM; and on top of that with longer ranged SLBMs we will soon have 2nd strike capability.

And what if the 'x' is the number of 'extra' missiles?

As someone rightly pointed out, India's best bet in the nuclear scenario is a pre-emptive strike. If that doesn't happens and the situation boils down to all-out exchanges, BMDs won't be very helpful and Pakistan will still manage to inflict more damage onto India than India can inflict onto Pakistan.
So K-4 SLBM provides India with a pre-emptive strike option, and in that sense it is a newer threat to Pakistan (although the system is years away from being effectively operational).

I am all for nuclear triad, but I am apprehensive about the delegation of nuclear command to Naval commander, along with the this triad development, there needs to be also multiple failsafes, mid air self destruct and Multiple authorization for launch codes....

Wouldn't the ultimate authority reside with the President? And just like the land-based SFC, wouldn't there be a secure and reliable system in place to provide authentic launch codes?

 

[bloo]

And what if the 'x' is the number of 'extra' missiles?

As someone rightly pointed out, India's best bet in the nuclear scenario is a pre-emptive strike. If that doesn't happens and the situation boils down to all-out exchanges, BMDs won't be very helpful and Pakistan will still manage to inflict more damage onto India than India can inflict onto Pakistan.
So K-4 SLBM provides India with a pre-emptive strike option, and in that sense it is a newer threat to Pakistan (although the system is years away from being effectively operational).

Agreed.

 

[Sergi]

Well you said sonething about Pakistan wanting to clear itself off the map and setting India back by 100-200 years when no such thing as " survivability for thousands of wars " can even be thought of .

Hahahaa you get that from the post ??? Ok. Anything you "think" is fine by me. Wont drag it on.
Bye

 

[Secur]

Hahahaa you get that from the post ??? Ok. Anything you "think" is fine by me. Wont drag it on.
Bye

I got what you implied in that post , fine . I do not see any significant survivability of either , after a nuclear exchange , because of the long term effects of nuclear fallout , not just setting back of India by a mere hundred years . No worries .

 

[Slav Defence]

My argument was beyond the nitty gritty's of the successes and the feasibility of an ABM system - I am not here to discuss the costs and the probabilities of success of it as well. A credible ABM in the future will nullify Pakistan's nuclear blackmail and will give us some safety against it.

Pakistan Seeks To Counter Indian ABM Defenses | Missile ThreatMissile Threat
Broadsword: Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence: Star Wars over India



No problem other than the mere typical comprehension problems.

Wait a minute,what?nuclear blackmail?
Let me recall you that Pakistan's attempt to initiate her ballistic missile program was to respond Indian stimuli ie, their attempts to modify 'project Devil' and other programs.
While Indians were experimenting and advancing in such technology, how they were expecting us to sit idle and watch them doing so?such assumption or expectation is indeed a foolishness,since both nations identify each other as a threat for their existence.
My friend,the matter is far beyond cost effectiveness or power/range of ballistic missiles to 'impact damage',the situation is now to sustain our position and advancing our capacity to 'respond' each other thus balancing our position or hegemoney to some extent.
Pakistan and India will avoid major war till end...and the key factor which has stopped both nations doing so is 'nuclear capable ballistic missiles'!

 

[Secur]

I am getting bored of this now.

By your logic - if it does not save the entire nation it's not credible...right?

What I am saying is if it can protect major cities, key installations successfully then it's credible.

An ABM system nullifies the advantage of not having one - plain and simple.

First of all my argument was not on the technical aspects to begin with. This thread is not about ABM's. You haven't proved that it's not credible - your argument that countermeasures will be developed or that it will be overwhelmed does not mean that it's not credible.

You seem to have no idea what an ABM system is supposed to do or it's applications or how or why it gets deployed. There is a major row between the US and Russia about deployment of Missile shields in the Central Asian and European states or the row between China and US in deploying long range radars in Japan - read up on that.

Waste of time.

Because , you are cherry picking on the argument and trying to leave away the unpleasant ones .

No , I didn't say that , its impossible to have any such thing , just that the effectiveness and the feasibility isn't promising and the U.S. and Soviet Union/Russia have been playing around with these for decades and yet have nothing to put their faith in .

Indeed , then it is .

Obviously , some protection is better than nothing . You are able to stop a

Then there's no argument at all , because you cant determine something's effectiveness and success or declare it credible without involving the technical aspects . I know what it is about , but I do not agree with the notion of a shield providing an absolute protection to a country , as some members suggested here . Lets just get it operational first and get the technical data to prove if its " credible " or not .

Alright , please enlighten me in such case . I can understand their deployment around major cities , important places , strategic sites but even then , the past record speaks for itself , which is what I am pointing at . There's no remedy to the ' MAD ' scenario still . Countries will make sure that their defenses aren't threatened in any way and will use every leverage or diplomatic clout to prevent/stop that . Your country always whines on a smallest of military sale to Pakistan , doesn't it ? Are you threatened every time or is it just to make sure that the adversary doesn't get it ? The same is the thing for the missile shield in Europe .

The past history of ABM failures and their ineffectiveness from a credible source is a waste of time ?

History of Russia's Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) System (2002) | Union of Concerned Scientists

Despite the improvements, US military and intelligence reports say the Moscow system would still be relatively easy to defeat. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces told the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 that although the Soviets had spent over 10 years and billions of dollars developing an ABM system, the United States could penetrate it with a small number of Minuteman ICBMs equipped with "highly effective chaff and decoys," he went on to say that, "if the Soviets should deploy more advanced or proliferated defenses we have new penetration aids as counters."2 The Department of Defense has said that the Soviet system is no more advanced than was the US Safeguard system, which was developed in the early 1970's, but deactivated as soon as it was deployed in 1975 because of its military ineffectiveness and high cost.3 A 1989 report on Soviet Military Power also concluded that "with only 100 interceptor missiles, the system can be saturated, and with only the single Pillbox radar at Pushkino providing support to these missiles, the system is highly vulnerable to suppression."

How Effective Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense is Against Countermeasures? - Defense Update - Military Technology & Defense News

While the US administration openly stated confidence in its Ground Based Interceptors (GBI), research analysts from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) warn that such weapons may not be sufficient to protect from a deliberate attack launched by North Korea, since the current level of missile defense technology has not matured yet to the level enabling the defense systems to engage realistic-complex targets, or discriminate between real decoys and real warheads.

David Wright, co-director and senior scientist at UCS say it is likely that the US will face a ‘reactive enemy’ that will be able to develop and deploy decoys and other countermeasures to make it more difficult for U.S. defenses to defeat such missiles.“None of the intercept tests conducted so far of the U.S. ground-based or ship-based systems has included realistic countermeasures that you should expect in a real-world attack from North Korea.” Wright stressed, “The Pentagon still doesn’t know how to solve this problem… That’s why the large difference in technical sophistication between the U.S. and North Korea does not automatically tip the balance in favor of the U.S. in this challenge.”

“People frequently downplay the countermeasures issue, in part because it makes the problem so difficult. But unfortunately it is real.” Wright concludes, “The bottom line is that it makes no sense to add interceptors and/or an east-coast deployment site until the system has been shown to be effective against a real-world threat.”

Understanding the Extraordinary Cost of Missile Defense | RAND

Missile defense is a tough challenge, both technically and operationally. It was difficult enough when interceptors carried nuclear weapons and had a kill radius measured in hundreds of meters or even kilometers. But hit-to-kill requires precision that is measured in tens of centimeters and microseconds. It is especially challenging for national missile defense because there is very low tolerance for leakers, warheads that slip through the defense. Nearly everyone underestimates the breadth of the effort that will be required to field effective missile defenses. This does not necessarily mean that the job cannot be done, just that a program must fully account for all the challenges for it to be successful (assuming, of course, that the program is technically feasible to begin with). The technical challenges of missile defense amplify the effects of politically driven proposals and compressed schedules.

The British Government has been happy to allow US Radar installations to be based on British soil to feed into the US ABM system. The MOD seems to see ABM defences as too expensive and of too little ability to make any difference other than giving false assurance to the public. Given that the USA has spent $120 billion on ABM systems since the 1980's and achieved very little in terms of capability it is not hard to see why the MOD has this view.

Report Critiques U.S. Missile Defense | Arms Control Association

Arguing that the U.S.-based ballistic missile interceptor system is “very expensive” but has “limited effectiveness” against potential attacks from Iran, a September report by the independent National Research Council recommends replacing the current system with a revamped but largely similar system and expanding it by adding a new site in an East Coast state.

The panel of experts said, however, that its proposed system might not be effective against likely threats, saying “it depends” on how the United States and potential attackers design their systems and how much they know about each other’s technology.

The expert panel considered alternatives to midcourse interception, such as striking enemy missiles while still in their early “boost” phase, but found these options impractical. A missile’s boost phase is simply too short—just a few minutes—for an interceptor to reach it in time, the report said. Moreover, airborne lasers would have to fly near enemy airspace and would be vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, while space-based interceptors would require hundreds of satellites and cost as much as $500 billion over 20 years, the experts estimated.

The midcourse approach provides significantly more time for the intercept, but has its own drawbacks, according to the report. Most notably, it must confront the “discrimination problem” of telling the difference between real warheads and decoys, also known as countermeasures.

One of the main conclusions of the report is that no practical missile defense system “can avoid the need for midcourse discrimination,” which “must be addressed far more seriously if reasonable confidence is to be achieved.” Until that reality is accepted, they say, “there will be no end to the poorly thought[-]out schemes proposing to avoid the need for midcourse discrimination.”

The report finds that, “at some point, countermeasures of various kinds should be expected.” Initial decoys may be unintentional, such as debris from the booster rocket that would be traveling along with warheads through space. Yet, “as threat sophistication increases, the defense is likely to have to deal with purposeful countermeasures,” that adversaries may use to “frustrate U.S. defenses.”

At the same time, the report says that it is not clear if its own proposed system would be effective against decoys. On this central question, the panel says that its plan “offers the greatest potential for effective discrimination” but “it is by no means a certain solution” and “there is no unequivocal answer” to the question of whether missile defense can work against countermeasures.

Many experts say that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) never has conducted tests against realistic countermeasures, in part because the systems have had enough trouble against targets without decoys and in part because planners assume that countries such as Iran and North Korea would not initially deploy countermeasures on their missiles. The report said the MDA has canceled research programs that would try to deal with countermeasures and that the committee “could not find anyone at MDA” who could explain much of the past research in this area.

The report, called “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives,” is sharply critical of the current 30-interceptor system deployed on the West Coast, which it describes as “fragile” and ineffective against “any but the most primitive attacks.”

The system was first deployed in 2004 by President George W. Bush “before its development was complete in order to meet what was considered an urgent need to get a system deployed quickly,” according to the report.

Main US anti-ballistic missile defence system appears to have less than a 50:50 chance of an interception - Hyperbola

The US Missile Defence Agency has admitted that its latest test of its anti-ballistic missile interceptor missile failed to strike its target. The test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defence System missile occured on 5 July. It involved launching a target “ballistic” missile from the Kwajelein Atoll launch site in the Pacific followed by the launch intereptor missile carrying an upgraded (Capability Enhancement 1) Exoatrmospheric Kill Vehicle from the Vandenberg Air Force base in California. Unfortunately the planned interception and destruction of the target missile failed to take place.

This was the third failure in a row of the system which is designed to protect the continental United States of America from a limited hostile missile attack using the interceptors based at Fort Greely, Alaska. The previous two failures were in 2010.

Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "Failure to Launch?"

Despite the congratulatory announcement, the US-NATO plan has many critics. At the forefront of the criticism are the questions of whether the extremely expensive (around $12-15 billion per year) missile defense shield will be effective enough to warrant the high price tag. Others question if the allied countries are currently under the threat of a missile attack, and if not, whether the vast network of anti-ballistic missile defense systems will unnecessarily strain relations between Russia and the West and potentially create a strategically unstable climate.

Given the potential risks of missile defense development, BMD appears to be an extremely expensive and unproven form of security. Conversely, if a true ballistic missile threat presented itself in the absence of NATO’s current missile defense initiatives, the time required to develop a capable anti-missile system would put the West at a significant strategic disadvantage. These factors beg the questions: how close to perfect is useful? How much treasure are NATO allies willing to exhaust for relative success?


Special Commentary: India’s Missile Defence by Amit Gupta

While Indian scientists have expressed confidence in the system and claimed it has a 90% accuracy level, impartial observers tend to be more sceptical. The best anti-missile systems tend to have an accuracy rate of 70% and that statistic can also be challenged (Broad and Sanger, 2013). The most common complaint against anti-missile defences is that they cannot distinguish between real missiles and decoys thus, invariably, letting some actual warheads in and causing damage. Moreover, as Brigadier Arun Sahgal has pointed out, the missile shield would require round the clock online connectivity, uninterrupted power supply, and associated systems that even at the best of times, are unreliable in India (Bedi, 2012).

Read it and then discuss , how practical and effective is the thing you are talking about , currently in development phase when the world power's have this to say about their own developed advanced systems , in which billions of dollars and tremendous sources were poured and yet nothing substantial was obtained , they have reservations about North Korea and Iran's capabilities even .

@Alpha1 Something that might interest you , mate .
@Dillinger @AhaseebA I would like to have your views too .

 

[HariPrasad]

If its a anti-ship missile, it really cannot miss too much, can't it. Especially its a smaller ship. Even for a anti-ship missile, so CEP do not apply to anti-ship missile.

As for missile that require GPS, its the error of GPS signal that determine the accuracy.

But we are talking about ballistic missile here. Can India achieve CEP of zero for K4?

So you accepted that Brahmos have 0 cep right? I hope you saw the video.

K4 will have same trajectory as cruise missile in its terminal phase. We have achieved very low 2 digit accuracy in A4 and single digit accuracy in 2nd test of A5. We are not talking in air like J 20 is batter than F 22 etc.

 

[faithfulguy]

So you accepted that Brahmos have 0 cep right? I hope you saw the video.

K4 will have same trajectory as cruise missile in its terminal phase. We have achieved very low 2 digit accuracy in A4 and single digit accuracy in 2nd test of A5. We are not talking in air like J 20 is batter than F 22 etc.

Actually, I accept that all anti ship missile has 0 CEP. Not just Brahmos. If you measure a CEP of 1 as miss the ship by 1 meter, than its a failure. So a 1 CEP is no different than 100 Mile CEP as it miss the target.

the surface to surface ballistic missile is different though. That is when CEP matters.

 

[HariPrasad]

Actually, I accept that all anti ship missile has 0 CEP. Not just Brahmos. If you measure a CEP of 1 as miss the ship by 1 meter, than its a failure. So a 1 CEP is no different than 100 Mile CEP as it miss the target.
the surface to surface ballistic missile is different though. That is when CEP matters.

BS.

Anti ship missile do not target the edge of ship that if they miss the target by a meter, it will miss the ship. It will hit the ship even though they miss the target the by 10 to 20 meter as they are targeted at the middle of the ship about 1 to 2 meter of water level.

For surface to surface missile CEP do not matter much if they are equipped with Nuclear weapon. How ever DRDO is making the missile which can be targeted at a target with conventional role. So CEP matters a lot for us. We are Successful in making that.

 

[bloo]

Actually, I accept that all anti ship missile has 0 CEP. Not just Brahmos. If you measure a CEP of 1 as miss the ship by 1 meter, than its a failure. So a 1 CEP is no different than 100 Mile CEP as it miss the target.

the surface to surface ballistic missile is different though. That is when CEP matters.

Well how many AShMs can travel at supersonic speeds all throughout its flight and still have a 1 digit CEP at its terminal stage when its performing maneuvers.
In the ground where a missile(if) striking a populated area, it does not require to hit at more or less than a 2 digit CEP.
The predesignated area to incur most damage is already programed in the missile and it doesn't need to be a single digit CEP.
A 10-20kt nuke would still obliterate the area same way if it struck at 3m CEP or 30m CEP.
A single digit CEP for K4 is only the cherry on top, nothing to fuss about.

 

[Kaniska]

yaar ye mareen gay nhi aysy phokat main dara dara ker hamara khana peena kharab kareen gay

Dude..I always like your post in a way where you put so much of serious things in ligher vein...Keep in up..

 

[egodoc222]

Ummm don't make the mistake of attaching ABM with Nuclear tipped missile...ABM is meant for conventional missile...Nuclear Tipped one's are a different ball game...bcoz unless and until you are taking them down right at the ignition stage you are going to have problems...secondly if 50% of those nuclear tipped escaped ABM then you are anyways dead...then feel free to annihilate Pakistan...

wat do you mean by coventional missile? if your talking abt cruise missiles existing airdefence systems enough to tackle it...if your talking abt ballistic missile with coventional war head...it doesnt matter if a bm has covn war head ir nuclear..once lauched it triggers nuclear response...as bm are normally used for nuclear delivery... so pakistan would be naive lo launch bm with conventional war head... and abt destroying at ingintion Pakistan missile sites are within arms length..well within reach of system we intend to develop one with exo atmosphere capability.... and abt some missiles eacaping abm...we are already prepared for it when we didn't even have abm...so having abm will definitely give edge to india...as it will protect the metros and other big cities..with huge popln...especially as Pakistan and india nukes are of low yeild to cause more damage generally directed over populous areas