What I've said is taken from neutral sources. I suggest you read A History of the Pakistan Army. Its widely available and widely credited. I hope you understand my reluctance to quote the passages here. I was working on a Historical peice though based on Cloughley's and Nawaz's work. Perhaps you'll find some of it useful:
Soon after independence India had begun forceful subjugation of territories that had opted for Pakistan. Hyderabad and Junagadh were both annexed by India and the Pakistan Army could do nothing as these states were landlocked between India and shared no physical boundary with mainland Pakistan. The princely state of Kashmir was different in that it not only shared a strong cultural and physical link to Pakistan, but the rivers originating from its mountains were, and are, a life line to Pakistans agro-based economy. Upon that more than 3/4 of the state was Muslim populated, which would have left no doubt that Kashmir would secede to Pakistan, particularly since the British had explicitly agreed that division be along religious lines and the Indians themselves had used a plebiscite to justify their occupation of Hyderabad. This however would prove not to be the case.
The Maharaja, who was the ruler of Kashmir was a Hindu and would have preferred to stay independent and retain as much power as possible. His rule however was failing with several Muslim uprisings already in full swing soon after partition. There were claims that Pakistani Army Regiments were operating in that region, this was simply not true but there were, however, a number of tribesmen from Pakistan and Afghanistan who gradually started advancing into Kashmir. Many motivated by religion and others by less righteous ideals, the tribesmen were also joined by Muslim soldiers from the Maharajas army. The conduct of the tribal army was less than that expected from a professional army and as it were the British, almost instinctively, felt threatened by the prospect of Muslim tribesmen reaching the hundreds of British citizens residing in Srinagar.
The Pakistan Army at this time was forced to stand back for a number of reasons. First being the fact that Pakistan Armys then Commander-in-Chief was a British, Sir Douglas Gracey, who after being ordered by Jinnah, Pakistans Founder and Governor-General, to deploy Pakistans forces and restore order in Kashmir, simply refused. This order would undoubtedly have had saved the lives of countless thousands and brought things to a safe and firm conclusion, had General Gracey obliged. Though an honorable man, General Gracey owed part of his loyalty to the Supreme Commander in Delhi who owed it to Lord Mountbatten. Therefore, naturally, General Gracey was most reluctant to approve or initiate action that could lead to hostilities with Indian forces subordinate to his own commander.
In complete contrast to General Graceys pacifist attitude, however, Indias Nehru and Lord Mountbatten had convinced themselves that only Indian troops could be trusted to do the job of securing Srinagar and Kashmir. And to this end Lord Mountbatten himself was directing Indian military operations in Kashmir from Delhi. Lord Mountbatten was not a man well known for his respects towards Pakistan, or towards Islam for that matter.
It was not long before the Maharaja, already weak and desperate, threw his lot in to Indian pressure. And a preconceived plan to airlift regular Indian Army soldiers into Srinagar swung into action. (The Maharajas state army was already being commanded by an Indian Army officer on loan by the Indian government). At this time further efforts were being undertaken to impede Pakistans participation in what might've been considered the rightful protection of her people. With Indian troops massing in Srinagar, the Supreme Commander flew in from New Delhi to warn Jinnah against deploying Pakistani troops in Kashmir under the threat of withdrawing British officers still serving under the Pakistani flag.
Jinnah was left with no choice but to rescind the order to send Pakistani troops into Kashmir again. The young Pakistan Army needed British officers as it was still seriously short of sufficiently trained Pakistani officers. This shockingly discriminative attitude on behalf of the British was not entirely new, but worrisome nonetheless. These fast moving developments ensured that training and promotion of Pakistani officers was made a priority.
The Indians by this time had managed to gain a strong foothold in the Valley, and started pressing west towards Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar: territories that had already declared accession to Pakistan. It was around this time that Jinnah was eventually able to prevail upon General Gracey to deploy regular forces to confront the Indians. By now more British officers had been filtered out and even though the Pakistan army had still not managed to obtain its fair share of military equipment from India, it was in much better shape.
The Army rushed to take up and reinforce the remaining positions held by the tribals, who were by now under siege, outnumbered and out gunned by the heavy Indian presence. The ensuring fighting was brutal, bloody and took place in appalling conditions and terrain. However Pakistans military campaign in Kashmir had been restricted from the beginning, General Gracey was still in charge of the Army, and even though no British officers were involved in this theatre, Gracey did all in his power to avoid a direct confrontation with Indian forces still very much commanded by British officers.
This meant that the bulk of the fighting had to be done through the irregular tribal warriors, though they were by now, admittedly, being heavily assisted by Pakistani military men. Therefore operations were planned by the Pakistan Army but had to be executed by the irregular forces who were also becoming law onto themselves. Militarily this was far from an ideal situation, and neither was it the only constrain, civilian direction of war was completely lacking, in fact the general instruction was you can hit them but NOT too hard otherwise there will be all kinds of [political] repercussions. This not only killed the Armys Violence of Action, robbing it of initiative but also placed any attempt at wrestling control of the valley entirely in the intolerable.
General Gracey did however complain to his Indian counterpart and fellow Briton about the atrocities being committed by Indian troops in Kashmir, forcing tens of thousands of Kashmiri Muslims to seek refuge in Pakistan, this is said to have caused the dismissal of some brigade level officers. On the military front Pakistani backed forces checked Indian advances on Poonch and Kotli and wrestled Skardu and Gurais from them; everything was a close run thing and subject to much battlefield fluidity.