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This is a relatively large article written by military expert Uzi Rubin, I will post the relevant parts below, if you wish to read the full article, please visit the link. Uzi describes brilliantly the outdatedness of this "missile do not win wars" idea. This is in large parts thanks to the demonstration by Iran in development and use of accurate ballistic missiles. Iran appears to be re-defining modern warfare given now we are seeing a push by the likes of Israelis to start pursuing such systems as offensive capability.
Israel and the Precision-Guided Missile Threat
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The received wisdom that “missiles and rockets don’t win wars,” always a dubious assertion, is now obsolete and demonstrably false. Modern precision-guided missiles have the same combat effectiveness as fighting aircraft yet are easier to operate and less vulnerable as they don’t rely on huge, immovable, target-rich air bases. Precision-guided missiles and rockets can paralyze the civilian and military infrastructures of entire countries, thus paving the way to their defeat in war. These weapons most certainly can win wars, and Israel should do everything in its power not only to prevent defeat by them but to use them to defeat its enemies.
Rockets and missiles as originally conceived during WWII were not very accurate, making them unfit for precision strikes. As a result, they were used mainly to saturate troop concentrations and terrorize population centers. Improved accuracy could only be achieved via heavy, extremely costly, and highly complicated electromechanical guidance systems. Precision strikes thus remained the sole domain of manned combat aircraft that could close in upon targets and hit them with short-range precision-guided munitions.
Over time, however, technology has caught up. Today’s smartphones contain all the wherewithal necessary for precision guidance of vehicles, be they automobiles, drones, or missiles. For about a decade, it has been possible to incorporate such technologies into even simple Grads, converting unguided rockets into pinpoint precision missiles at modest expenditure.
This technological shift makes missiles as effective as air power for precision strikes. Precision-guided missiles are being developed and deployed today by all the major world powers as well as by many smaller states. In the Middle East, Iran is leading the way; it is currently converting all its older rockets and missiles into precision weapons. It also supplies its allies in the region with expertise and materials with which to build their own precision missile capabilities—hence the Precision Project of Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies in the region.
Why is Israel so anxious to frustrate Hezbollah’s Precision Project? Because once it is achieved, it will elevate Hezbollah’s war-making capability to that of a state military force. Hezbollah will possess all the advantages of an offensive air force without needing to own a single combat aircraft. Its precision missiles will be able to paralyze any vital installation or terrorize any civilian population center in Israel.
One of the biggest advantages of ground-launched rockets and missiles is their small footprint. Precision rockets and missiles enjoy the same advantage: their launchers are as small, stealthy, and hard to find and destroy as those of their more imprecise predecessors. Air power, by contrast, has the Achilles’ Heel of a reliance on huge air bases replete with kilometers-long runways, aircraft hangars, workshops, communication centers, and so on.
The vulnerability of giant, stationary air bases to precision missile strikes was demonstrated during the January 2020 Iranian missile strike on the US-operated Ein Assad air base in Iraq. Prior to the attack, the US teams at that base had launched a fleet of Predator UAVs for patrolling the base perimeter. One of the incoming Iranian missiles hit an underground communications conduit and cut the fiber optic lines between the UAV’s control vans and the system’s transceivers. This caused a loss of ground control over the entire UAV fleet. It took hours to reestablish communication via satellite and bring the UAVs back in.
Needless to say, US combat aircraft based in Iraq were powerless against this missile strike. Simply put, Iran gained air superiority over the air base by virtue of its precision missiles.
Once Hezbollah is equipped with precision missiles, it stands to reason that it will launch an Operation Focus of its own in the opening stage of any future war with Israel, firing salvoes of precision missiles to paralyze Israel’s air bases. Israel’s active defense structure—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and any future high power laser defense system—will probably be able to destroy most incoming missiles, but not all of them. Active defense cannot guarantee a hermetic defense. Whatever precision missiles do manage to leak through the defensive shield could erode the IAF’s capability—witness what Iranian precision missiles did in Iraq.
Against a precision missile threat, active defense is a necessary but insufficient condition. It requires complementary measures. One such measure is passive defense, meaning the shielding of vital installations with thick concrete walls that could withstand direct hits. While technically feasible, this kind of response is very expensive and time-consuming. Even if the necessary budgets were allocated, there is no guarantee that the shielding would be completed in time.
Another response would be to diversify the IAF’s offensive capability to compensate for degradation of its offensive power during the initial phase of future war. If Hezbollah can establish an “air force without aircraft,” so can Israel.
Israel’s own Precision Project is more than a decade old. Israel’s defense industries have developed and tested a number of ground-launched precision missiles with varying ranges and warheads. To date, the IDF has agreed to buy only the shortest-range version, and even that only in limited numbers. Longer-range precision missiles, such as the recently tested 400 km range LORA, are successfully exported to foreign armies, but not to the IDF.
A recent article in Israel Defense magazine disclosed that this was the product of IAF objections to the provision of Israel’s ground forces with an independent precision strike capability beyond the range of 100 km. If that is true, then the obstacle in the path of augmenting the air force with “air power without aircraft” is not technological or operational but rather prestige and budgetary battles within the IDF.
Such inter-service turf wars are not unique to the IDF. One of the most notorious occurred in the US, when the US Air Force fought tooth and nail against the introduction of ballistic missiles into the US Navy submarine fleet as they would “compete” with its own strategic bombers. It took years for the Pentagon to resolve this battle.
It is far from sure that Israel can afford that kind of time.
A proposal to establish an Israeli missile strike force to back up Israel’s aircraft strike force was mooted a couple of years ago. As far as is known, it was rejected by the IDF. The relatively short-range precision missiles now acquired are slated to provide ground forces with long-range artillery support for ground operations, not to back up and complement the IAF’s capability to conduct strategic strikes when its bases are under precision missile fire.
The received wisdom that “missiles and rockets don’t win wars,” always a dubious assertion, is now obsolete and demonstrably false. Modern precision missiles have the same punch as combat aircraft yet are less vulnerable, as they don’t rely on huge, immovable, target-rich air bases. Precision-guided missiles and rockets can paralyze the civilian and military infrastructures of entire countries, paving the way to their defeat.
Today, precision-guided missiles and rockets most certainly can win wars. Israel should do everything in its power not only to prevent defeat by such weapons but to use them to defeat its enemies.
View PDF
Uzi Rubin was founding Director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, which managed the Arrow program. He is now a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-precision-guided-missiles/
Israel and the Precision-Guided Missile Threat
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The received wisdom that “missiles and rockets don’t win wars,” always a dubious assertion, is now obsolete and demonstrably false. Modern precision-guided missiles have the same combat effectiveness as fighting aircraft yet are easier to operate and less vulnerable as they don’t rely on huge, immovable, target-rich air bases. Precision-guided missiles and rockets can paralyze the civilian and military infrastructures of entire countries, thus paving the way to their defeat in war. These weapons most certainly can win wars, and Israel should do everything in its power not only to prevent defeat by them but to use them to defeat its enemies.
Rockets and missiles as originally conceived during WWII were not very accurate, making them unfit for precision strikes. As a result, they were used mainly to saturate troop concentrations and terrorize population centers. Improved accuracy could only be achieved via heavy, extremely costly, and highly complicated electromechanical guidance systems. Precision strikes thus remained the sole domain of manned combat aircraft that could close in upon targets and hit them with short-range precision-guided munitions.
Over time, however, technology has caught up. Today’s smartphones contain all the wherewithal necessary for precision guidance of vehicles, be they automobiles, drones, or missiles. For about a decade, it has been possible to incorporate such technologies into even simple Grads, converting unguided rockets into pinpoint precision missiles at modest expenditure.
This technological shift makes missiles as effective as air power for precision strikes. Precision-guided missiles are being developed and deployed today by all the major world powers as well as by many smaller states. In the Middle East, Iran is leading the way; it is currently converting all its older rockets and missiles into precision weapons. It also supplies its allies in the region with expertise and materials with which to build their own precision missile capabilities—hence the Precision Project of Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies in the region.
Why is Israel so anxious to frustrate Hezbollah’s Precision Project? Because once it is achieved, it will elevate Hezbollah’s war-making capability to that of a state military force. Hezbollah will possess all the advantages of an offensive air force without needing to own a single combat aircraft. Its precision missiles will be able to paralyze any vital installation or terrorize any civilian population center in Israel.
One of the biggest advantages of ground-launched rockets and missiles is their small footprint. Precision rockets and missiles enjoy the same advantage: their launchers are as small, stealthy, and hard to find and destroy as those of their more imprecise predecessors. Air power, by contrast, has the Achilles’ Heel of a reliance on huge air bases replete with kilometers-long runways, aircraft hangars, workshops, communication centers, and so on.
The vulnerability of giant, stationary air bases to precision missile strikes was demonstrated during the January 2020 Iranian missile strike on the US-operated Ein Assad air base in Iraq. Prior to the attack, the US teams at that base had launched a fleet of Predator UAVs for patrolling the base perimeter. One of the incoming Iranian missiles hit an underground communications conduit and cut the fiber optic lines between the UAV’s control vans and the system’s transceivers. This caused a loss of ground control over the entire UAV fleet. It took hours to reestablish communication via satellite and bring the UAVs back in.
Needless to say, US combat aircraft based in Iraq were powerless against this missile strike. Simply put, Iran gained air superiority over the air base by virtue of its precision missiles.
Once Hezbollah is equipped with precision missiles, it stands to reason that it will launch an Operation Focus of its own in the opening stage of any future war with Israel, firing salvoes of precision missiles to paralyze Israel’s air bases. Israel’s active defense structure—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and any future high power laser defense system—will probably be able to destroy most incoming missiles, but not all of them. Active defense cannot guarantee a hermetic defense. Whatever precision missiles do manage to leak through the defensive shield could erode the IAF’s capability—witness what Iranian precision missiles did in Iraq.
Against a precision missile threat, active defense is a necessary but insufficient condition. It requires complementary measures. One such measure is passive defense, meaning the shielding of vital installations with thick concrete walls that could withstand direct hits. While technically feasible, this kind of response is very expensive and time-consuming. Even if the necessary budgets were allocated, there is no guarantee that the shielding would be completed in time.
Another response would be to diversify the IAF’s offensive capability to compensate for degradation of its offensive power during the initial phase of future war. If Hezbollah can establish an “air force without aircraft,” so can Israel.
Israel’s own Precision Project is more than a decade old. Israel’s defense industries have developed and tested a number of ground-launched precision missiles with varying ranges and warheads. To date, the IDF has agreed to buy only the shortest-range version, and even that only in limited numbers. Longer-range precision missiles, such as the recently tested 400 km range LORA, are successfully exported to foreign armies, but not to the IDF.
A recent article in Israel Defense magazine disclosed that this was the product of IAF objections to the provision of Israel’s ground forces with an independent precision strike capability beyond the range of 100 km. If that is true, then the obstacle in the path of augmenting the air force with “air power without aircraft” is not technological or operational but rather prestige and budgetary battles within the IDF.
Such inter-service turf wars are not unique to the IDF. One of the most notorious occurred in the US, when the US Air Force fought tooth and nail against the introduction of ballistic missiles into the US Navy submarine fleet as they would “compete” with its own strategic bombers. It took years for the Pentagon to resolve this battle.
It is far from sure that Israel can afford that kind of time.
A proposal to establish an Israeli missile strike force to back up Israel’s aircraft strike force was mooted a couple of years ago. As far as is known, it was rejected by the IDF. The relatively short-range precision missiles now acquired are slated to provide ground forces with long-range artillery support for ground operations, not to back up and complement the IAF’s capability to conduct strategic strikes when its bases are under precision missile fire.
The received wisdom that “missiles and rockets don’t win wars,” always a dubious assertion, is now obsolete and demonstrably false. Modern precision missiles have the same punch as combat aircraft yet are less vulnerable, as they don’t rely on huge, immovable, target-rich air bases. Precision-guided missiles and rockets can paralyze the civilian and military infrastructures of entire countries, paving the way to their defeat.
Today, precision-guided missiles and rockets most certainly can win wars. Israel should do everything in its power not only to prevent defeat by such weapons but to use them to defeat its enemies.
View PDF
Uzi Rubin was founding Director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, which managed the Arrow program. He is now a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-precision-guided-missiles/
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