HAIDER: UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S NEXT-GENERATION TANK
http://quwa.org/2016/05/24/haider-understanding-pakistans-next-generation-tank/
In 2015, the Pakistan Army evaluated a number of next-generation main battle tanks (MBT), including
the Chinese NORINCO VT-4. The program is under the designation “
Haider,” a new MBT positioned to support the al-Khalid series of MBTs in the Army’s tank formations.
On the surface, it may seem curious why the Pakistan Army is searching for a new tank, especially when it already has the al-Khalid. After all, the al-Khalid was to form the mainstay of the Army’s tank inventory, and there is nothing to stop the design from incorporating new subsystems (such as self-protection suites) should they become available. What is the need for the Haider?
Replacement of some 1000+ tanks is a time consuming process. In past such requirement was fulfilled by T-85 in 1980's and then T-80 in end of 1990's. Both these types were inducted in 300 odd numbers. Although the AK and AZ program had just started when T-85 and T-80 were inducted, the circumstances are again similar in case of AK-II program.
300 Modern tanks of a type apart from AK series will help PA shift atleast 5-6 more of its armoured regiments to 125mm caliber gun weaponry and ammo from 105mm of T-59/69. If capable of firing ATGM, the regiments will learn to fire a new weapon from the tank. The doctrine of the regiment may also change from infantry support to armoured thrust. NCW capability will help increase the regiments information, coordination and communication capabilities.
If the VT-4 (and another potential contestant, the Ukrainian Oplot-M) is to be considered, then it seems that the Haider program is leaning on the heavier side. In other words, the Pakistan Army is beginning to shift from its preference for highly mobile – but lightweight – MBTs in favour of heavier and up-armoured designs. The al-Khalid sits in the 45-ton area, the VT-4 and Oplot-M weigh a little over 50 tons. If powered by 1500hp engines, these designs could potentially take on even more weight should Pakistan require it.
Heavier weight was only a matter of time. The T-59 was originally 37 Ton, AZ upgrade made it 40-41 Tons. PA could potentially induct a MBT around 48-50 Ton range. AK and T-80 UD being in 46 Ton range.
Pakistan was reportedly even
interested in the Turkish Otokar Altay MBT, a heavyweight of 65 tons. While not currently available for export (as Turkey needs to secure an exportable powerplant), the Army’s look at the Altay may indicate an interest in heavier and qualitatively driven MBTs. Weight, power and armour aside, the Altay is flush with cutting-edge subsystems, most notably the
Akkor active self-protection suiteproduced by the Turkish electronics giant Aselsan.
To quantify what an active protection suite such as the Akkor would offer, it would be a good idea to start with how tanks are currently protected. There is the armour, but if facing a high velocity guided anti-tank missile (ATGM), one would prefer having that missile scuttled before it reaches the tank. This is done by trying to bury the ATGM’s guidance method, such as laser (through the use of a smokescreen). A passive protection suite basically tries to drive the incoming missile to miss; the Akkor
active protection suite on the other hand will try to intercept the missile itself! Why is this important? Laser is not the only method of guiding modern (and especially future) ATGMs; millimeter wave (mmW) and imaging infrared (IIR) threaten to greatly neutralize current passive protection measures.
Now, combine that active protection suite with improved armour and up-powered powerplant in the tank. The result is a balanced and agile machine capable of withstanding punishment; add the ability to launch guided missiles and shells, said tank will also be capable of inflicting damage as well. Relative to the al-Khalid as it is
today (we will get to its future development in a later article), the Haider would basically be the superior tank in every respect. As a platform, it gives Pakistan an opportunity to have a “smart tank” akin to the South Korean K2 Black Panther (developed by Hyundai Rotem).
By “smart tank” we refer to the idea of pairing a tank’s inherent firepower and defensive qualities within a
network-centric warfare environment. Imagine a scenario where the Pakistan Army acquires an air-to-ground
tactical data-link system that enables the Haider to build its situational awareness based on sensor data taken from
a GMTI-SAR. The GMTI-SAR would enable the Haider to see a real-time picture of the battlefield with an understanding of enemy movements. The tank crew can proactively adjust their movements vis-à-vis the enemy, and do it in very close concert with their
close air support (CAS)cover. In this scenario, a
true JSTARS-like system would be a major asset.
Although all these goodies like Air to Ground tactical data system, GMTI-SAR, CAS and JSTARS system sound impressive, it will take the cost of tank beyond a certain limit that PA can procure. This will have adverse affect of induction in low numbers probably the Russian story of T-64 and T-72 can get repeated in PA, but then PA armoured forces already has a similar picture with large numbers of T-59/69 and smaller numbers of T-80 and AK.
Apart from US Army, most western Armies which operate heavily upgraded and technologically advanced MBTs dont have them in thousands of numbers. Tanks operate with other arms like mechanised infantry, artillery, engineers, air defence etc. This means the whole Formation (e.g Armoured Division) will need to be upgraded to make different arms compatible with each other and perform with highest efficiency. That will increase the over all cost.
Its still surprising that PA wants to have a 1500 hp MBT but isnt looking for 500-600 hp engined APC to keep along with the new tank. The APC Talha series is not just a mechanised infantry platform but Air Defence and Ant-Tank Regiments also use the same platform. This means that Infantry, Anti-Tank an Air Defence may not keep up with the armour regiments.
Together, this formation would be a credible offensive asset and a means to add substantive depth to the Army’s conventional deterrence. Pakistan will not benefit from air superiority in a future war, but a sufficient number of (air covered) resilient machines on the ground networked to sensors that can acquire the complete battlefield picture could help Pakistan contest in tough situations.
The air superiority in own skies is possible however PA can surely benefit from Air Superiority in enemy territory. This is an uphill task for PAF.
Medium or High range SAM systems probably need radars for full functioning, its yet to be seen if PA inducts a medium range medium altitude Mobile SAM in its AD regiments of Armoured Division. Still, it was seen that PA uses Giraffe Radar with its Armoured Division so yes if the ground-to-air link is established between both forces, PAF can also get a picture of enemy skies from it without bringing AWACS closer to the enemy. A customised recon UAV can also be a cost effective solution but risks being shot down.
Secondly, PA aviation assets like Gunships should also be able to accompany its armoured forces to soften targets for its ground forces.
Its seen that some modern western Armoured divisions do have aviation assets assigned to their Armoured Divisions. these include Gunships and Transport helicopters. Its seen that western Armoured Divisions are bigger than PA Armoured Division as their they have more numbers of soldiers, armoured vehicles, fire power etc and also they operate in safe skies where own Air Force has gained air superiority. While the gunships engage enemy armoured forces, the transport helicopters help secure important strategic points like bridges, road intersections etc by rapidly deploying infantry ahead of advance. This helps the Armoured division less prone to ambushes and delays and makes its tasks much more easier.
In the absence of a dedicated CAS aircraft, PA lacks the ability to bomb an enemy encampment(HQ/ammo dump/supply depot/mobile workshop/staging area/resilient bunkers etc) or engage enemy armour with ATGM carrying fast movers. If such an aircraft is used, the burden on Armoured Division will be lowered.
The most important part being that the casualty rate of soldiers and tanks will be quite less as an aircraft will not ONLY fulfil the task instead of risking 100+ men and 20+ tanks, but in a lesser time too. This will keep the MBT strength of Armour Division intact so the replacements will also not be needed earlier.
In tandem, the comparatively lower-cost al-Khalid-series can be bought to continue phasing out the T-59 MBTs – in time, become the backbone. The Haider can serve as the offensive asset, and the al-Khalid can sit as a defensive or holding corps workhorse. Certain aspects of the Haider, such as the up-rated engine, newer armour technology, guided attack capabilities, and active protection suite could also be brought to the al-Khalid over the long-term. Of course, cost and added gains need to be balanced, there is no point in having an al-Khalid variant that ends up being as expensive as the Haider.
This is probably the same idea of IA cold start, use IBG's of holding Corps to launch attacks followed by Strike Corps. AK can probably fill the same role, allocated to independent armoured brigade group of Holding Corps. But its a long way to go.
On a flip side when compared with other tanks that may already be fulfilling this role, there are multiple tasks that AK can do which a T-59 or T-69 may find tough. AK can easily operate in the desert, far better than T-59/69. So AK can be used as replacement, when losses are faced by a regiment operating Al-Haider MBT in the desert region.
In such a case, having reserves of T-59/69 in desert region may not be suitable.
Besides the operational gains of the Haider, there is an industrial and self-reliance opportunity as well. The Army seems to have identified a new need, but it does not necessarily need to open a parallel support line – at least not entirely. Subsystems such as the powerplant, electronics, cannon, munitions, armour technology, and protection suite could be made common across the Army’s tank stable. These systems can be scaled across thousands of vehicles in the long-term, and in turn, should warrant domestic support. Local production and continued in-house support and development is a must.
The aforementioned technology can also be applied to wheeled vehicles as well, such as the 8×8 armoured personnel carrier (APC) the Army has been
seeking for some time. In parallel with its tracked armour, the Army could even build up a mobility-centric offensive element as well.
With the technology constantly evolving, operating 2000 modern tanks and constantly upgrading them is a very costly matter, even in the long term. New types of armour, electronics, sensors power plants etc come up after every few years. So commonality may not be possible. It is however required to maintain a standard that every MBT in PA arsenal should have certain number of essentials like NWC, ATGM firing capability, active protection system etc.
