Reorientation And Restructuring of Pakistan Army

[sparklingway]

A case for Total Reorientation And Restructuring of the Pakistan*Army

By:*Yasub Ali Dogar Brigadier(Rtd.)

I was born on 8th*Dec 1946. My father Maj (Late) Mahbub Ali was then a Capt of 6/12 FFR seconded to the Indian Army Education Corps. Thus you can say that I was born in the Army, grew up in the Army and got educated at the Military Collage Jhelum.

******I got commission in 1965 soon after the 1965 war, at that time the brigade, division and the corps commanders had no responsibility other than the operational one or to look after the welfare of troops under command. The then Corps Commander, Lt Gen M M Attiqur Rahman had known 2/Lt Yasub Ali personally and knew what books he was reading as he had questions regarding that book on his subsequent visit. Similarly as late as 1978 the GOC Maj Gen Shamas ur Rahman Kallue knew every officer of his division personally.

******This personal knowledge is needed for the simple reason that the troops have to be led from the front and it is only possible when you have deep intimate knowledge about everyone in your command.

******During this period of over 45 years I have seen a gradual degradation of the operational preparedness, efficiency, integrity and welfare of the subordinates particularly of the soldiers. It would have further degenerated had this trend not been arrested by Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. The credit goes to him to once again prioritize the wellbeing and welfare of soldiers. However the recent events have clouded that good work.

******The degradation of the military’s professionalism started off during the era of Gen Yahya Khan, was grossly accentuated during Gen Zia ul Haq’s period of 11 years and reached its’*climax in Gen Musharraf’s decade long rule. Since then over a period of time the Pakistan Army has become unwieldy, over staffed by general officers and has been moving away from its core responsibility of defending the Nation. Now a day’s a corps or a division commander would be involved in some or all of the following activities at the time and cost of operational preparedness of his command.

• DHA at all major military garrisons.
• Logistics Areas i.e. which control the static installations which were under GHQ before 1977 were placed under command corps during Gen Zia’s period.
• Garrison schools in the cantonments and admission for Army Public Schools/Garrison Academy’s.
• Looking after the Station/Services/Garrison clubs
• Golf courses /polo grounds which are mostly played by officers.*
• Managing shopping centres like the Fortress Stadium, petrol pumps and a host of other commercial activities.

***In short the corps/division commanders are doing most of the above tasks at the cost of their own primary responsibilities of keeping their commands operationally sound. This unfortunate trend to get involved in non-operational matters finally led to failures like the Abbottabad incident.

***An effort has been made to single out major problem areas and recommendations have been made to rectify them.

Problem Area and Recommendations

Operational Commands:* The corps, divisions or brigades should not have any station or administrative responsibilities. They should just concentrate on their operational roles. All other aspects may be looked after by other organizations/HQs within the Pak Army.

The Logistic Areas: They should fall under the GHQ with control over CMH’s, supply depots, ordinance depots and all other static installations. Similarly all APS/Garrison schools be placed under the HQ Logistics Area and monitoring responsibility be that of GSO 1 (Education) at the HQ Logistics Area.

Corruption:* There have been reports of corruption at higher level without any accountability e.g. the NLC scandal. It is clear that a corrupt leadership cannot lead*troops in the field to give the supreme sacrifice of their lives.

Austerity and Simplicity:** Simple and austere living should be the hall mark of Defence Services, they should be an example for the entire nation. Palatial messes, ornately decorated offices and excessive expenditures on entertainment from official funds are not keeping with Islamic or that matter military traditions. Similarly move Sanction to attend marriages and private functions should be ruthlessly cut down.

Restructuring of the Army:**Over a period of time the Pakistan Army has become too big for peace time and too small for a war with our main adversary. We need to find our solution in a military system like that of Switzerland, Sweden or Israel. The size of the Army can be safely reduced by 25% by adopting a hybrid system of mobilization suited for our requirements.

Organizational Restructuring:
In certain sectors the Division HQs may be reduced to the level of a Tactical Headquarters and huge paraphernalia of administrative services saved or merged in Logistics/Sub Areas. It is understood that France, Italy and even Turkey have removed one of the echelons i.e. either Brigade or Division HQ. I suggest merging the Corps HQs and Division HQs.

The concept of a pentangular organizational structure may be examined for adoption in the Army instead of the present triangular one. This entails having five brigade groups of five battalions each. Lahore/Sialkot Corps areas can be looked after by one such Combat HQ each. The strength ratios for other sectors can be worked out separately. There is no requirement for a division HQ in such a setup. The pentangular organizational structure is already in place to an extent in 10 Corps.

Cadrize one battalion in each brigade within holding divisions. Cadre. Cadrize the fourth infantry company in a Battalion. Even the last bastion of the British orthodoxy, the British Army has only three infantry companies in a battalion now. Quetta has the largest number of General Officers in Pakistan after Rawalpindi. A senior officer is also a catalyst for development in his area as because of his seniority he can pull lots of developmental efforts in his direction. By sending the two GOCs to Loralai and Khuzdar and creating a ‘Mekran Military District’ at Turbat, half the Balochistan problems will be solved besides achieving much better interaction with local population.
Special Forces:*It is the future of warfare, properly employed they yield results out of proportion to their numbers. At least one commando battalion can be created in every infantry division without

Wastefull Organizations:* Artillery Divisions, HAT, LAT in particular referring to the HAT and LAT battalions. If you recall that till the reorganization of the 60’s the Anti-Tank Regiments were part of the Corps of Artillery. The Infantry should have only two components i.e. the Light Infantry or the Mechanized Infantry
The remaining nomenclatures are just semantics. I visualize the anti-tank assets presently held with the LAT battalions be handed over to other infantry battalions of the formation thus augmenting their anti-tank resources. These units should be converted to light commando battalions on the pattern of US Rangers battalion in every division. Similarly the HAT elements if required to operate independently may be reorganized into independent companies to be attached with independent brigade groups.

Balochistan:*Quetta has the largest number of General Officers in Pakistan after Rawalpindi. A senior officer is also a catalyst for development in his area as because of his seniority he can pull lots of developmental efforts in his direction. By sending the two GOCs to Loralai and Khuzdar and creating a ‘Mekran Military District’ at Turbat, half the Balochistan problems will be solved besides achieving much better interaction with local population.

Teeth to Tail Ration:**
Maximum manpower of Army, Navy and PAF should be converted into teeth. Israeli Army IDF’ ratio may be taken as an example. It is felt that we have a very heavy tail employing a large number of officers and men on administrative tasks at the cost denuding these resources from operational tasks.
The large Army in waiting for a war in EME, S & T, and Medical units may be reduced. As an Independent Brigade Commander, I had almost 200 strong Infantry Workshop Company (EME) doing the job what 10-15 persons would be doing in the private sector. Similarly huge establishment of RV & FC needs new challenges in not becoming an unnecessary burden in this modern era. Most of their present tasks can be better performed by the private sector. Similarly, you may consider doing away with the ‘Ghori Paal Murabba’ and other such schemes, which are of no operational consequence and instrument of oppression for the allotted.

Manpower Issues:**
GHQ:**It should be right sized, 50% officers and staff should be cut down to be employed the field areas. Over a period of time it has become a dumping place for officers wanting to settle down in Rawalpindi/Islamabad area. A lean and thin organization will always produce better results that a overstaffed one and at the same time not suffer from confusion created by too many officials.

The ISI:**It also needs to be reduced to a size where quality and efficiency should be criteria for stay. It should not become a repository of officers waiting to serve in Islamabad & Rawalpindi.

Down Grading of Appointments:**A large number of appointments were upgraded in last 10 years to appease senior officers. They should be brought down to a natural level.

Civil Armed Forces.
Deployment of CAF for IS duties:**The CAF’s were taken out of their primary role of border surveillance and put on IS duties in Sindh. Additional troops were raised subsequently as the requirement kept on growing. Later their role in this field was extended in Punjab also. A large number of Army officers commanding troops in such roles have to do ‘public dealing’ like the police or magistracy for which they are neither trained nor required to do so. The recent cases in Karachi and Quetta are indicative of our own ill-preparedness for such roles. It is felt that with raising of additional ‘Elite Police Force’ the CAF’s can go back to their traditional role of guarding the Nation’s frontiers.

HQ CAF’s:* There is no coordinating HQ for the CAF’s in Pakistan unlike the BSF in India.* To have a uniform policy, guidelines and interaction with Ministry of Interior and GHQ the HQ CAF may be raised. It was under rasing in 1977 with Major General Amir Hamza as the 1st*Commander when the Martial Law was proclaimed by General Zia-ul-Haq. Both this HQ and FSF were disbanded.

Officers Deputation to CAFs:**There should be 2 streams, 1st*after 5 years of service in the Army followed by permanent absorption in CAF Cadre 2nd*after approximately 17 years of service in Army for officers who do not make the grade in the Army but still have potential for a 2nd*line service.
PAF/Navy Officers Induction to CAF:**Regular officers of the other Services may also be given an option to serve in the CAFs.*These Officers particularly with SSG training can act as value aided asset.

Deputation in ANF:*The arrest of 2 Majors in Lahore for the murder of an under trial person is a clear indication of the Army’s unpreparedness for such roles. As I was the persons who raised the ANF Punjab, I am fully aware of the pitfalls these officers were exposed to and at one time even recommended either their permanent absorption in the ANF cadre or its handing over to the Police officers who are trained for such jobs. It may also be borne in mind that a large number of Army officers in ANF are exposed to dealing with foreigners (Drug Liaison Officers) on daily basis which needs to be avoided at all costs.

Federal Security Force (FSF):** It was raised by the late Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in early seventies but was disbanded by the Martial Law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 being considered as forces countering the Army. Such a force maybe re-raised to take the burden of internal security from the Army and the CAF’s.

Training Institutions:**
Joint Services Staff College:***All Services Staff Colleges may be combined at Quetta. There is no justification for separate staff colleges particularly the Naval war College at Lahore.

Concentration of Training Institutions:**Almost all Training Institutions are within 100 miles of Rawalpindi. Even the Baloch Regimental and EME Centres which were in Quetta were brought near Rawalpindi being nearer to an area from where most of the Officers Corps hailed. I trust you will take cognizance of this and move some of the Training Institutions from heavily saturated Cantonments i.e. Abbottabad and Nowshera etc. to interior Sindh and Balochistan. This will ensure better interaction and economic growth for local population.*

Training Centres:***Finish off the recruit training at the Training Centers. This measure alone will liberate 6x Infantry Brigades, 1x Armour/Artillery/Engineer Brigades which is almost a Corps size strength locked in them. The ‘Record’ functions could go to the respective Directorates. The training could be at the formation battle schools and the advance one at respective schools of instructions. Advanced countries like Germany and France cannot afford the luxury of the Training Centers.

Nation Building Role:**Army should take pride in having a permanent role in nation building activities in inaccessible areas of Baluchistan, NWFP, Sindh, AK and Gilgit-Baltistan areas by earmarking at least one third of its elements like Engineers, Signals and EME etc. for this purpose. Besides FWO and NLC, even active formations’ elements may participate in such ventures. It is time it undertakes projects like the Gwadar Railway Link and Quetta-Zhob- DI Khan Railway Link Projects.

Cantonments Structure:**We have allowed our Cantonments to become a mixture of civilian areas, semi military, military and unit areas. There is no security as civilian population and military personnel are living next to each other. This trend should finish, military garrisons should be military garrisons and nothing else.
Rationalization of Accommodation Army/Navy/PAF:**In some of the cantonments particularly Karachi, the accommodation between the 3 Services is being shared in a most haphazard manner. There is a requirement to have clear Army, Navy or PAF areas. One suggestion is to move the Navy towards Korangi and Saddar, the PAF may take over along Drig Road including Karsaz and Army could be east of Karsaz towards Malir.

Army Housing Schemes:***Welfare projects like Army Housing Schemes may go to the Army Welfare Trust or Fauji Foundation, which could also act as a source of employment to the retired army personnel. The rank based housing/plot schemes should be finished. It has created more heart burning and polarization within the ranks of the Pak Army than be a source of welfare.
NLC:** It should be only in transportation of goods, all other aspects may be closed down. There is no need to duplicate functions of FWO e.g. road construction or infrastructure development. Only retired officers should be employed.

Fuji Foundation:***A Board of Management composed of ex Chairmen JCSC with 3*ex Chiefs of Services should manage its affairs. Besides the services being provided in the medical, education, vocational training, it should gradually move away to manufacture of vehicles, arms, munitions & equipment required by the Armed Forces. The ‘Turkish Askari Foundation Model may be followed.

AWT/Bahria/Shaheen Foundations:***3 x ex Chiefs of respective services should govern their affairs with of Board of 3 to 4 senior most retired officers to assist them. They may be asked to move into manufacture of goods & items required by the respective service as the first priority.

* DHAs:**They should be placed under the DCOAS. No serving officer should serve in them. The rules and regulations for any wrong doing by any one should be made very stringent so that these Institutions cannot be allowed to be used for any personal gains.
* Militarization of Civilian Posts:** Militarization of civilian posts i.e. DML&C (Director Military Lands & Cantts) and CMES (Commander Military Engineering Services) should stop as it has not improved anything. Instead cadre based officials should be selected on merit to give their best to the Defence Services.
De-centralization:**Quetta has the largest number of General Officers in Pakistan after Rawalpindi. A senior officer is also a catalyst for development in his area as because of his seniority he can pull lots of developmental efforts in his direction. By sending the two GOCs to Loralai and Khuzdar and creating a ‘Mekran Military District’ at Turbat, half the Balochistan problems will be solved besides achieving much better interaction with local population.
Special Forces:**It is the future of warfare, properly employed they yield results out of proportion to their numbers. At least one commando battalion can be created in every infantry division without any additional expenditure by changing the role of LAT Bn.

* Human Resource Quality
MS Branch needs to open up and not work as a secret service agency. Its working has created a lot of disgruntlement in our officers’ lot. It should adjust its attitude towards officers so that they are able to give their best till the last day of their service.
A survey may be taken of all Cols and above about how much time they have spent in and around 100 miles of Islamabad/Rawalpindi. They should all be posted out to the field commands.
At the lower ranks the usefulness of JCOs in Command appointments maybe re-examined. Whereas they could stay in administrative appointments, more NCOs could be directly commissioned to command platoon/troops at comparatively younger age (35-40 years maximum). This will have a blend of efficiency while keeping avenues open for promotion in the lower ranks.

Miscellaneous:
Officers Messes:**The concept of officers’ mess maybe re-examined. We are trying to live a post-colonial life, which was by no means ours. The mess staff on the TO&E of units may be converted into more useful categories. All differences between the feeding of men and officers should finish particularly in the field.

Ceremonial Guards:**Should finish off except at the residence of the senior most General officer in a Military Garrison. There should be a ceiling on the total number of persons working in a Flag Staff House.

Allotment of Plots/Agricultural Land:**It should be done only after the retirement notice has been served or maximum 6 months before retirement. Only 1 plot per officer, remaining all through ballot including commercial plots.

Border Lands Committee:**It had lost its purpose decades back, with 95 % of the border belt in private ownership it is just a tool of oppression for the hapless citizens who fell afoul of the prevailing system.

Accommodation:**Repairs and renovation expenditure of senior officers, brigadiers and above’s accommodation should be made transparent and*audit able.

A case for Total Reorientation And Restructuring of the Pakistan Army « Pakpotpourri2's Blog

 

[fatman17]

to add to the above.....this idea has actually been discussed but the implementation as always is slow....


Changing The Command System

from Crossed Swords...

Despite the introduction of the Higher Defence Organisation and the creation of the JCSC, composed of the chairman and the three service chiefs, command and control at the national level is unworkable and problematic since the army dominates all events and proceeds largely on its own. In almost all cases, the service chiefs persue their own service's agenda rather than the common national agenda in the JCSC. the recent lack of consultation on the Kargil imbroglio with India is a case in point. Inter-service co-ordination is absent in most cases. the JCSC has become more of a redundent burden than the asset that it could be.

A suggestion made by US Centcom Commander, Gen. Tony Zinni in the case of the US command structure might be worth persuing in Pakistan. to make the JCSC truly joint and to afford better co-ordination of national defence, it might be advisable to select the members of the JCSC from former chiefs or senior commanders, after they have retired from their regular appointments. this would allow the JCs to better co-ordinate, set priorities and manage the results of their plans and policies. by defination this would mean moving the overall budget controls and allocations of resources among the services to the new JCSC.

The internal structure of the army also needs to be re-examined. In 2007, the army announced a new command structure.

As part of restructuring of the Army, three new commands are being established to improve the operational efficiency and working of the land forces. the Northern, Southern and Central Commands are being created that will be responsible for the administrative arrangements of the corps falling under the respective commands. The Northern and South Commands establishment has been finalised, while the Central Command will be raised subsequently.

In some ways this harkens back to the partition when Pakistan had regional commands, including one for Waziristan. But with corps commanders and regional commander at the same rank (Lt.Gen.) there will be good cause for confusion about who has authority over whom.

A good idea, this regional command system needs to be expanded to three fully integrated regional commands, with air and naval components, as needed, and three strategic commands, including an integrated multi-service strike force, a central logistic command, and a reserve force for purely defensive purposes. the reserve force could then be the effective national guard that could be deployed in aid of civil power to tackle floods or other disasters. but to be truly effective, the army needs to be radically transformed into a leaner and highly mobile force, not the lumbering giant that it is today with a heavy tail-to-teeth ratio. this will require heavy and rapid investment in new equipment and training and shedding of a lot of fat.further, to improve the operational readiness of the commands and their subordinate corps and divisions, the logistical work and responsibilities need to be seperated from the military commanders. in other words, there needs to be a change away from the system that was introduced by Ziaul Haq, when Log area commanders began reporting to corps commanders. this unnecessarily involved corps commanders in administrative work and also introduced the prospects of corruption involving sale and handling of land and other assets or services in army cantonments.

 

[muse]

Incredible stuff, fatman - When we first started this on the "Towards a New and Improved Fauj" the idea seemed revolutionary and met with much resistance - but it seems that while the Pakistan armed forces may be slow to evolve, they are certainly aware of the changing environment and their capabilities and role(s) and that nothing is too radical in seeking a New and Improved Fauj.


About the commands:

In some ways this harkens back to the partition when Pakistan had regional commands, including one for Waziristan. But with corps commanders and regional commander at the same rank (Lt.Gen.) there will be good cause for confusion about who has authority over whom.

In other armed forces of a similar scope and ambition, there are a very large number of very, very well educated officers - can education be a criteria among the LTG with reference to authority?

 

[fatman17]

Incredible stuff, fatman - When we first started this on the "Towards a New and Improved Fauj" the idea seemed revolutionary and met with much resistance - but it seems that while the Pakistan armed forces may be slow to evolve, they are certainly aware of the changing environment and their capabilities and role(s) and that nothing is too radical in seeking a New and Improved Fauj.


About the commands:



In other armed forces of a similar scope and ambition, there are a very large number of very, very well educated officers - can education be a criteria among the LTG with reference to authority?

leadership,education, experience and capability are some key criteria for generals of such commands

 

[muse]

I'm no soldier clearly, you led with "Leadership" and I with "Education"

 

[muse]

India? Again the same rubbish line -

 

[VCheng]

Noble words one and all, but count me as skeptical where effective implementation is concerned, specially regarding commercial activities and lavish lifestyles. Results will always speak louder.

 

[laiqs@mi]

but sir Billi ke gale main ghanti kon bandhe ga???

 

[fatman17]

I'm no soldier clearly, you led with "Leadership" and I with "Education"

dont get me wrong but there is a 'saying' in the military esp middle ranks, 'if u want an average life,join the forces'! - education is not considered a priority amongst majority of those who join the forces.

 

[TaimiKhan]

Incredible stuff, fatman - When we first started this on the "Towards a New and Improved Fauj" the idea seemed revolutionary and met with much resistance - but it seems that while the Pakistan armed forces may be slow to evolve, they are certainly aware of the changing environment and their capabilities and role(s) and that nothing is too radical in seeking a New and Improved Fauj.


About the commands:



In other armed forces of a similar scope and ambition, there are a very large number of very, very well educated officers - can education be a criteria among the LTG with reference to authority?

By the time an officer reaches the rank of Lt Gen, he has gone through nearly all the educational qualifications meaning the war courses, staff colleges and in some cases masters degree which are there in the armed forces to be done. So, at the rank of Lt Gen nearly all are same in the educational qualification field by military standards. I say, the three senior most generals should get the command of the 3 newly created commands and next COAS should be among these 3 senior most generals, plus CJCSC should also have experience of this command. Commanding 3 or more corps by a Lt Gen would add more experience and a good contender for the job of COAS. And i do believe that would be the way too, but lets see.

But as fatman said, the criteria should be based on all the factors he mentioned. Education can not be the only criteria.

dont get me wrong but there is a 'saying' in the military esp middle ranks, 'if u want an average life,join the forces'! - education is not considered a priority amongst majority of those who join the forces.

But things are changing now Sir, the criteria for ISSB has gone up, things have become more tough at the ISSB level. graduation marks have gone up to 60% from the mere 40% required a few years back. From day one to last day in the military the emphasis is now on education and your promotion and career depends on how you perform in these courses. So now army is all about education, practical soldiering is gone by now.

And even those who will join with the idea to have an average life, they are not gonna go past the Major or at the most Lt Col ( lucky ones) rank.

 

[muse]

Taimi

So I was hanging out with this major (US Army) radar guy -- Phd, and working on another in a different field - and there were so many others, so well educated, especially technical education - most impressive and so many of them - just a broad, deep foundation of terribly well educated officers, they reflect where the army is in terms of capablities, especially technical and industrial know how.

 

[TaimiKhan]

Overall a good article, lot of new ideas and armed forces should certainly start thinking about such changes. Some have started to be implemented and majority of the others need a thought and implementation.

We have a funds short armed forces, so with whatever funds we have, we should reorganize and structure of the armed forces be changed to make it more lethal, professional and effective as well as efficient.

 

[TaimiKhan]

Taimi

So I was hanging out with this major (US Army) radar guy -- Phd, and working on another in a different field - and there were so many others, so well educated, especially technical education - most impressive and so many of them - just a broad, deep foundation of terribly well educated officers, they reflect where the army is in terms of capablities, especially technical and industrial know how.

Totally agreed Sir, technical guys should be more educated, the more educated they are, they more beneficial they would be. They can even be used after their retirement and used to educate the newer lot.

Technical guys need to be given special emphasis and send abroad for education purposes, higher education done on them and once they are back, used to make a mark in their respective technical field while in service and after service used also. Just like how HEC is sending people for Phd's and then using them in the country once they are back.

We can pour some money and these technical guys can start a research and development base for us, we can make systems for our own use as well as used for export purposes also.

I did shared the info of a young Captain of EME or Engineers at some corps level formation who designed an explosive detector, which was much efficient compared to the one being imported for protection duties in the cantt limits as well as it was much much more cheaper then the imported version. The imported thing cost was somewhere above 10K $$s, while the local prototype he developed was somewhere close to Rs.45-50K, and it did got approval from higher ups and was put in production for protection purposes and it has been i believe used till date.

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

It is about time that pak millitary start to take that leap of faith---in bringing about a change----they need to get away from the british mindset and get into the american setup of millitary operation and a soldier to officer relation.

 

[TaimiKhan]

Hi,

It is about time that pak millitary start to take that leap of faith---in bringing about a change----they need to get away from the british mindset and get into the american setup of millitary operation and a soldier to officer relation.

Well it seems the uniform change is the first step into that direction. Plus other changes within the army command structure are other steps too, but its a long road which needs to be navigated with care. Lot of change has to be brought in.

And Sir, the soldier to officer relation in our army is very strong. In PA the relation is not wide as speculated. Yeah there may have been a change but since these operations in FATA, the relationship between officers and jawans has become strong again, we have seen jawans giving their lives for their officers and vice versa. Giving example, my bro being a Captain used to live in one room with 10 jawans at some post and ate with them what the jawans used to, gave his share of sentry watch no matter day or night even though the jawans with him used to tell him that Sahab you should rest we will do the sentry watch but my bro used, similarly we have stories of Xeric who was shielded by his men during an artillery fire at Siachen, so many other stories i have to show that the relation between jawans and officers is strong. Further improvement can be done still.

But main emphasis should be on the operational preparedness of the army. Its structure, mobility, firepower, command and control structure etc etc.