Imran Khan
PDF VETERAN
- Joined
- Oct 18, 2007
- Messages
- 68,815
- Reaction score
- 5
- Country
- Location
still i believe they will go with su and mig .
US knocks on a closed door seeking to extend Iran arms embargo - Russia’s UN envoy
- Thread starter Piotr
- Start date
Philosopher
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 5, 2020
- Messages
- 3,683
- Reaction score
- 16
- Country
- Location
We know Iran was engaged in discussion with the Russians about a potential Sukhoi-30 package but we have no news with regards to how far they got. What Iran made clear is that they are not interesting in a mere purchase of aircrafts. A deal must come with transfer of technology and potentially the production line being opened inside Iran itself. Assuming such a thing passes through all the political hoops and become a reality, I can see Iran getting a good few dozen Sukhoi in the near future. Mid to long term will involve an indigenous attempt to go for 5th generation fighters with help from the outside. And of course, Iran's impressive UAV industry will continue to grow regardless of all this.
Ahmet Pasha
BANNED
- Joined
- May 23, 2017
- Messages
- 10,024
- Reaction score
- -5
- Country
- Location
Jf17s, russo/chinese helicopters, sams, some Sukhois and chinese tech weapons/subsytems
Imran Khan
PDF VETERAN
- Joined
- Oct 18, 2007
- Messages
- 68,815
- Reaction score
- 5
- Country
- Location
this is really great idea huge numbers of front line fighters like su-35 with assembly line so in future sanctions can not harm .
and small numbers of special fighters like su-57 3sqn will be great idea ever . and gradually throw all the junk .
Philosopher
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 5, 2020
- Messages
- 3,683
- Reaction score
- 16
- Country
- Location
Dalit
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Mar 16, 2012
- Messages
- 23,669
- Reaction score
- -12
- Country
- Location
This is the truth. After WWII the Americans realised very quickly how easy it is to fool and manipulate the world. It quickly formed an alliance with likeminded nations and setup a masterplan to rule over sheeps. Of course this had already happened much earlier during the colonial era, but the post WWII era really set the tone. It was a defining moment where all white colonialists sat down and decided to bundle their powers and rule the roost.
Other smart and hardworking nations like China have caught on. The American doesn't want to give up pole position. He is not in the mood of sharing the podium with others. Well, news is that he will have to share the gold medal because a multipolar world is a reality staring us straight in the face.
Last edited:
Hack-Hook
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 11, 2012
- Messages
- 19,448
- Reaction score
- 3
- Country
- Location
if we want S-400 we can order it right now , it never was part of any sanction , we are happy with the type of airdefence we already make and already regected S-400 offer
we had the same experience with c-802 and china
as I said if we want S-400 we could get it ages ago , it was not part of any sanction
TheImmortal
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Mar 11, 2017
- Messages
- 7,091
- Reaction score
- -12
- Country
- Location
You should probably first learn there are different grades and types of “oil”. Russian Oil is very different than Iranian oil. Refineries can only process certain oil. So Russia cannot pass off Iranian oil as its own. It can buy Iranian oil and sell Iranian oil, but it can’t hide the fact it’s Iranian oil to the buyer.
So much wrong in your words where do I even start. First of all Iran NEVER got drone technology from Russia and in fact probably SHARED drone technology with Russia. They gifted Russia a reverse engineered Scan Eagle copy.
Iran is one of the only countries in the world to have been using UAVs in combat as far back as 1980’s.
Also no proof of T-90 joint effort on Karrar especially given the fact it still uses T-72 engines on Karrar. It’s not hard for Iran to make something look like a T-90. What’s important is the sub systems and engine it uses.
Talks went no where.
If I remember correctly Iran wanted SU-35, Russia said no. Iran also wanted ToT in SU-30, Russia would only sell SU-30 with no ToT. Was only willing to give ToT on SU-27, which Iran refused.
Russia will only sell junk to Iran that Iran can either produce itself or won’t affect balance of power (Israeli tech advantage). Russia will not want to upset Arabs or Israel and also has no incentive to strength Iran’s regional power projection.
Realistically Russia could sell Iran
-Tanks
-Military support planes
-Helicopters
-Navy warships
-Air defense systems
-Radars and EW/ECW systems
-old fighter jets
I wouldn’t expect SU-30, SU-35, SU-57 or bombers. I can’t see Israel or US allowing that.
They might sell a “token” amount of SU-30’s like 6 or 12, not enough to make a difference
QWECXZ
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 28, 2010
- Messages
- 3,150
- Reaction score
- -3
- Country
- Location
Good post. You basically said what I had on mind.
I think Iran shouldn't order anything more than 10 or 20 jet fighters after the embargo is lifted. We shouldn't go for a big deal at all. And if we want to buy jet fighters, we should buy stealth fighters. Otherwise it will be a waste of money. If China sells us 10 Chengdu J-20's, that will be a good deal for us. We may also be able to convince the Chinese to transfer some old 4 gen. technology to us. Russians won't do that in my opinion.
I prefer that Iran approaches buying weapons step by step. So, first we place an order for a small number of jet fighters like 5 or 10. If it becomes materialized, we can place a new order for another small batch.
We can use Russians to upgrade our current Mig-29s. Maybe even ToT. They previously sold us RD-33 engines during Khatami's presidency for our Mig29s. Building our own Mig-29s will improve our air force greatly.
Last edited:
FuturePAF
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Dec 17, 2014
- Messages
- 10,546
- Reaction score
- 24
- Country
- Location
Considering the state of the global airline industry; many airlines would be glad to offload their slightly used jets to Iran for a decent price.as i am airliners fan i have seen a huge mismanagement by iranians at the time of ordering airliners hope they will repeat same mistakes and end up getting nothing
Your right. Iranian Crude is different then far north Siberian Crude Russia exports. Refineries have to be specifically setup to burn Iranian crude, as the Indians have done . It would be a tricky prospect to buy Iranian crude and find a buyer willing to risk sanctions to buy Iranian crude via Russia. Hence, why the arms supply country will have to be the user of the crude. This leaves basically just China.
Thanks for the clarification, that detail slipped my mind when I made that post.
Sineva
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- May 24, 2018
- Messages
- 4,657
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
Agreed,until the russians have conclusively demonstrated that they have turned over a new leaf regarding economic and military dealings with iran,it is rather pointless to risk spending not inconsiderable sums on things like aircraft that would then have to have whole sections of their logistics chain reverse/reengineered indigenously in iran at considerable expense of time,resources and effort simply because putin decide to kiss and make up with the west.
Sineva
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- May 24, 2018
- Messages
- 4,657
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
Can Pompeo trap a future President Biden in Trump’s self-imposed Iran crisis?
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2...ent-biden-in-trumps-self-imposed-iran-crisis/
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo does not seem confident that Donald Trump will be reelected in November. While his political consultant advises Republican senate candidates “don’t defend Trump” on his response to the coronavirus, Pompeo is spending his time pretending the U.S. is still part of the Iran nuclear deal at the United Nations in a bad faith and costly effort which may be a sneaky way to limit a future President Biden’s options for return to the agreement.
When Trump withdrew from the Iran deal in 2018, he chose not to use the so-called “snapback” measure which would restore all the U.N. sanctions suspended by the deal. John Bolton, then the national security adviser, explained that “we are not using the provisions…because we are out of the deal.”
Yet Pompeo is now saying that the U.S. is still a legal participant and so entitled to use snapback even though the administration has repeatedly touted “ceasing” its participation. State Department lawyers produced a memo with a less-than-ringing endorsement that “there is a legally available argument” to say the U.S. remains party to the deal, but which misses the point that this will be a political question for the members of the U.N. Security Council rather than a legal one.
The Trump administration claims that this is urgent because arms embargoes adopted in 2007 and 2010 will end this year unless the Security Council extends them (which Russia or China would certainly veto) or the Iran deal snapback mechanism is used.
This makes sense as a political slogan — ending the embargo seems like a dangerous step for an adversarial country like Iran — but it is largely a red herring. Iran was not a major arms importer before the embargoes, having found a less expensive set of asymmetric military tools like insurgents and terrorists. That is unlikely to change given the financial strain the country is now under, not to mention the effectiveness of its proxy alternatives. Iran may well sign some showy contracts to mark the end of the embargo, but it will not change the way it prepares for or fights war. (If we could trick Iran into spending its money on tanks instead of terrorist groups, we would be well served.)
U.N. arms embargoes are important in supporting U.S. efforts to keep arms out of the region, but other hot spots like Yemen and Lebanon are subject to separate arms embargoes that will continue to serve the same function. There are no arms embargoes on Syria or Iraq, but neither would there be an effective way to enforce them.
The truth is the arms embargo in the Iran deal was always more a symbolic than practical concession to get Iran to agree to nuclear limits. That does not make it unimportant — symbols in politics and diplomacy matter — which explains why members of the House have called to extend the embargo through diplomatic efforts with allies and partners. Extending it through snapback would be radically different, and not nearly worth the costs and risks of doing so for a few reasons.
First, Iran might fully withdraw from the Iran deal or even the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran hawks might cheer, but it would just create another crisis this administration cannot manage. In any case, the Trump administration has so far failed to predict or manipulate Iranian reactions to their provocations.
Second, Pompeo might try to use snapback and fail. It is a novel procedure uniquely designed to respond to Iran violating the deal. If the U.S. seeks to use it after withdrawing from the deal and in the face of unified opposition from even our closest allies, the U.N. Security Council may simply fail to act on it, creating a severe crisis between the U.N. and the United States.
Third, if snapback works, countries, including Russia and China, might still reject the legitimacy of the restored sanctions and proceed with arms sales to Iran in a way that would undermine the general legitimacy of U.N. embargoes.
Fourth, even our closest partners may refuse to implement the formally restored economic sanctions. As a matter of policy, the European Union enforces all U.N. Security Council sanctions, but we should expect at least an intense debate about whether to enforce sanctions resumed under a disputed snapback. European firms have already been pushed out of Iran trade by U.S. sanctions, but it would weaken a tool we rely on for crises around the world.
These scenarios describe a set of grievous risks to the U.N. system, either through a possible break with the U.S. or an erosion of legitimacy — neither of which would be easy to localize to the controversy over Iran. These risks may not mean much to the Trump administration given its ideological hostility to multilateral cooperation. If they were sincere about their concern about arms trade with Iran, the next scenario might be more worrisome.
Snapback may actually accelerate the arms sales that matter most. The embargo does not cover surface-to-air missiles, the weapons systems that can do the most damage to U.S. military superiority over Iran. Russia postponed the sale of their S300 air-defense system during nuclear deal negotiations and has so far rebuffed Iranian interest in the more advanced S400 since. But if Trump continues to play cowboy at the U.N., Moscow is more likely to reconsider. Quiet diplomacy would have a better chance of limiting these sales.
The Trump administration and Secretary Pompeo know all of this. So what’s this really about? Joe Biden. Iran hawks have dreamed of a “sanctions wall” that would prevent any Democratic president from returning to the Iran deal, but clever European diplomacy and careful moves from Tehran have kept the deal on life support. Vice President Biden joined all of his fellow presidential candidates in campaigning on a plan to return to the deal, which is a very real possibility as the U.S. election approaches. The hawks have turned to snapback or the crisis it provokes to prevent that. The loudest hawks of all at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy admitted as much, describing snapback as a litmus test for “supporters of the Iran nuclear deal in America and Europe” to demonstrate that we “understand great power competition is becoming the most important dynamic in the Middle East.”
Today, returning to the Iran nuclear deal would largely be a bilateral matter between the U.S. and Iran. The two countries could simply return to compliance with their obligations under the deal. After snapback, any return to the deal would require new action at the Security Council, thus allowing other parties — again, most especially Russia and China — to seek concessions. That does not mean a Biden administration would not return. Being stuck implementing Trump’s Iran policy ad infinitum is an unattractive proposition. But the U.S. would probably need to pay a price to undo Trump’s mess.
As with all the hawks’ moves, the snapback idea will fail to achieve its purported objectives with Iran, but not before doing real damage to U.S. interests.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2...ent-biden-in-trumps-self-imposed-iran-crisis/
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo does not seem confident that Donald Trump will be reelected in November. While his political consultant advises Republican senate candidates “don’t defend Trump” on his response to the coronavirus, Pompeo is spending his time pretending the U.S. is still part of the Iran nuclear deal at the United Nations in a bad faith and costly effort which may be a sneaky way to limit a future President Biden’s options for return to the agreement.
When Trump withdrew from the Iran deal in 2018, he chose not to use the so-called “snapback” measure which would restore all the U.N. sanctions suspended by the deal. John Bolton, then the national security adviser, explained that “we are not using the provisions…because we are out of the deal.”
Yet Pompeo is now saying that the U.S. is still a legal participant and so entitled to use snapback even though the administration has repeatedly touted “ceasing” its participation. State Department lawyers produced a memo with a less-than-ringing endorsement that “there is a legally available argument” to say the U.S. remains party to the deal, but which misses the point that this will be a political question for the members of the U.N. Security Council rather than a legal one.
The Trump administration claims that this is urgent because arms embargoes adopted in 2007 and 2010 will end this year unless the Security Council extends them (which Russia or China would certainly veto) or the Iran deal snapback mechanism is used.
This makes sense as a political slogan — ending the embargo seems like a dangerous step for an adversarial country like Iran — but it is largely a red herring. Iran was not a major arms importer before the embargoes, having found a less expensive set of asymmetric military tools like insurgents and terrorists. That is unlikely to change given the financial strain the country is now under, not to mention the effectiveness of its proxy alternatives. Iran may well sign some showy contracts to mark the end of the embargo, but it will not change the way it prepares for or fights war. (If we could trick Iran into spending its money on tanks instead of terrorist groups, we would be well served.)
U.N. arms embargoes are important in supporting U.S. efforts to keep arms out of the region, but other hot spots like Yemen and Lebanon are subject to separate arms embargoes that will continue to serve the same function. There are no arms embargoes on Syria or Iraq, but neither would there be an effective way to enforce them.
The truth is the arms embargo in the Iran deal was always more a symbolic than practical concession to get Iran to agree to nuclear limits. That does not make it unimportant — symbols in politics and diplomacy matter — which explains why members of the House have called to extend the embargo through diplomatic efforts with allies and partners. Extending it through snapback would be radically different, and not nearly worth the costs and risks of doing so for a few reasons.
First, Iran might fully withdraw from the Iran deal or even the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran hawks might cheer, but it would just create another crisis this administration cannot manage. In any case, the Trump administration has so far failed to predict or manipulate Iranian reactions to their provocations.
Second, Pompeo might try to use snapback and fail. It is a novel procedure uniquely designed to respond to Iran violating the deal. If the U.S. seeks to use it after withdrawing from the deal and in the face of unified opposition from even our closest allies, the U.N. Security Council may simply fail to act on it, creating a severe crisis between the U.N. and the United States.
Third, if snapback works, countries, including Russia and China, might still reject the legitimacy of the restored sanctions and proceed with arms sales to Iran in a way that would undermine the general legitimacy of U.N. embargoes.
Fourth, even our closest partners may refuse to implement the formally restored economic sanctions. As a matter of policy, the European Union enforces all U.N. Security Council sanctions, but we should expect at least an intense debate about whether to enforce sanctions resumed under a disputed snapback. European firms have already been pushed out of Iran trade by U.S. sanctions, but it would weaken a tool we rely on for crises around the world.
These scenarios describe a set of grievous risks to the U.N. system, either through a possible break with the U.S. or an erosion of legitimacy — neither of which would be easy to localize to the controversy over Iran. These risks may not mean much to the Trump administration given its ideological hostility to multilateral cooperation. If they were sincere about their concern about arms trade with Iran, the next scenario might be more worrisome.
Snapback may actually accelerate the arms sales that matter most. The embargo does not cover surface-to-air missiles, the weapons systems that can do the most damage to U.S. military superiority over Iran. Russia postponed the sale of their S300 air-defense system during nuclear deal negotiations and has so far rebuffed Iranian interest in the more advanced S400 since. But if Trump continues to play cowboy at the U.N., Moscow is more likely to reconsider. Quiet diplomacy would have a better chance of limiting these sales.
The Trump administration and Secretary Pompeo know all of this. So what’s this really about? Joe Biden. Iran hawks have dreamed of a “sanctions wall” that would prevent any Democratic president from returning to the Iran deal, but clever European diplomacy and careful moves from Tehran have kept the deal on life support. Vice President Biden joined all of his fellow presidential candidates in campaigning on a plan to return to the deal, which is a very real possibility as the U.S. election approaches. The hawks have turned to snapback or the crisis it provokes to prevent that. The loudest hawks of all at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy admitted as much, describing snapback as a litmus test for “supporters of the Iran nuclear deal in America and Europe” to demonstrate that we “understand great power competition is becoming the most important dynamic in the Middle East.”
Today, returning to the Iran nuclear deal would largely be a bilateral matter between the U.S. and Iran. The two countries could simply return to compliance with their obligations under the deal. After snapback, any return to the deal would require new action at the Security Council, thus allowing other parties — again, most especially Russia and China — to seek concessions. That does not mean a Biden administration would not return. Being stuck implementing Trump’s Iran policy ad infinitum is an unattractive proposition. But the U.S. would probably need to pay a price to undo Trump’s mess.
As with all the hawks’ moves, the snapback idea will fail to achieve its purported objectives with Iran, but not before doing real damage to U.S. interests.
THE DESERT FOX
FULL MEMBER
New Recruit
- Joined
- Apr 2, 2020
- Messages
- 50
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Messerschmitt
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Oct 27, 2019
- Messages
- 2,662
- Reaction score
- 1
- Country
- Location
TheImmortal
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Mar 11, 2017
- Messages
- 7,091
- Reaction score
- -12
- Country
- Location
Dont fall for the political theater of Russia and China.
Look at their actions not words. These guys have zero spine. They will complain, but when push comes to shove they bow to the Empire.
I will never forget that during nuclear negotiations, a member of Iran’s nuclear team revealed the brutal nature of China. Basically it was that Iran knew the tactics and backstab capability of the West and Russia, but that China was on a completely different level it terms of betrayal.
So this thinking that China is the savior in this arms scenario, couldn’t be further from the truth.
Similar threads
