Is it? Why Russians are exploring methods to reduce RCS of their aircraft then? Su-57 and the Okhotnik (“Hunter”) combat drone?
I do not take Russian perspectives and technologies for granted in person and I reiterate that Egypt made the right call by sourcing Russian-origin Resonance-NE radar system (good choice), but I also find some of your statements "overreaching."
Russians are expected to HYPE their products to the extent possible but it is important to understand the bigger picture:
"The growing number of stealth aircraft being fielded by the United States and its allies presents Russia with an unprecedented challenge. Yet, rather than acknowledge the qualitative leap in capability that a larger and more sophisticated fleet of stealth aircraft brings with it, contemporary Russian commentators and senior military officials have, for the most part, elected to follow a long-standing Russian tradition of publicly downplaying the utility of stealth. Their misleading and often inane statements on US and allied stealth aircraft are voiced with the purpose of bolstering the standing of the Russian Armed Forces in the eyes of the international community, instilling a sense of national pride among Russian audiences, and downplaying the severity of Russia’s stealth technology lag behind the United States. Derisive remarks by Russian officials can be expected to reoccur and perhaps intensify as not only the United States, but also American allies continue to field stealth aircraft in greater numbers. At the same time, seeing as more and more countries, including Russia’s strategic partner, China, are developing and/or introducing stealth aircraft, Russian officials may find it more difficult to justify their claims to Russian and international audiences."
LINK:
https://wavellroom.com/2019/05/02/moscows-perspectives-on-the-evolution-of-us-stealth-technology/
Unfortunately for you, Russians do not have intimate access to the very best of American stealthy applications. Americans might surprise you on the other hand because they have developed and fielded superior technologies
which can inform their experiments. Understand the difference.
So no - stealth cannot be almost secondary to the Russians now (or like ever) because these technologies continue to evolve much like marketed countermeasures.
See above.
Stealthy aircraft are not created equal - some are VLO in X-band (e.g. J-20) while others are VLO across a number of bands including VHF (e.g. B-2 Spirit). This comes down to shaping considerations, materials adopted for construction, and how electronic components are shielded/optimized for RCS reduction; depends upon what YOU can manage given YOUR resources (industrial base; tooling infrastructure; scientific research; budget allocated for experiments). Not many countries can live up to the HYPE in this game but one managed to (i.e. USA).
(1) For the sake of argument, let us consider B2 being representative of a
true VLO aircraft. The very best of Russian radar systems such as Nebo family would be capable of detecting
true VLO aircraft but your statement is lacking in CONTEXT (i.e.
proximity factor). An aircraft having
true VLO characteristics will
significantly shorten individual radar detection ring (IADS setup or not) - this is the net effect it can produce across all frequency bands as pointed out to you in the following response before:
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/this...fighter-aircrafts.685601/page-2#post-12724216
Further insight below.
I chose to challenge character versus material? In this very thread, I expanded on the 'resonance' method of detection and how it is addressed in practice (refer back to my posts on page # 2).
It looks like I missed one of your responses so I will address it now.
"Master Kenobi, you disappoint me. Yoda holds you in such high esteem. Surely you can do better!" - Count Dooku
The most convenient excuse is to blame the operator when a piece of technology repeatedly fails to live up to its HYPE from its manufacturer and fans.
Syrians and Libyans are not exactly subhumans who cannot figure out how to put modern technologies to good use and develop tactics with them. Give them and train them with the very best and see the results in time.
Syrians have recently admitted that they find Chinese radar systems to be better than Russian options and they are not satisfied with a number of Russian weapon systems by extension.
The Syrian military has criticised the Russian S-300 missile defence system, saying that it is largely ineffective against Israeli air strikes, Avia.pro reported yesterday. A Syrian military source told the...
www.middleeastmonitor.com
Russian Pantsir FLOPPED in the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as well - but wait... Armenians do not know how to fight either.
Russians do not have sufficient industrial capability and funds to keep up with NATO and even China in developing advanced technologies lately. This is not to say that Russians are unable to roll out impressive hardware from time-to-time (they certainly do) but come on.
Perhaps I am judging Pantsir more harshly but this is just an analogy to make you realize that COMBAT APPROVED videos are propaganda in large part.
You make it sound like as if I am sold to American perceptions or something on these lines? I have my own take of things and I explore any theme from different angles to my satisfaction. Last time I checked, Americans continue to lead in the technological front. If (or when) another country will roll out something better than American option in a particular domain, I will duly acknowledge it. Let us stick to the facts for now.
My sincere apologies. If this make you feel better:
"I am not asserting that Egypt made the wrong call by fielding Russian Resonance-NE radar system; I believe that this is good long-term investment. Something better than nothing A LOT more than just something, right? "
Where I asserted that Israeli military is invincible and mighty? This is strawman. They do outclass Egyptian military in the present and the gap continues to widen.
Ironic...
Let me explain some realities to you, my friend.
Damascus is among the best guarded spaces of Syria, and also in the Middle East by extension:
By Matti Suomenaro and Jennifer Cafarella with the ISW Russia Team Key Takeaway : Russia has finished an advanced anti-access/area denia...
www.iswresearch.org
Russia has been exclusively equipping Syria with its anti-aircraft systems since the Soviet era and trains the Syrian soldiers in their use under Russian doctrine. Syria’s air defense consists mainly of modernized but outdated S-200VE (NATO code: SA-5 Gammon – long-range) and more modern 9K40 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly – mid-range) which are supplemented by Panzir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound – close-range). Russia is also said to have rebuilt entirely Syrian air defenses and linked them with Russia’s air defense and radar systems at the military bases in Hmeimim (Air Force) and in Tartus (Navy). According to official statements, the two Russian bases on the Syrian Mediterranean coast are protected by three air defense layers, some of which also include Syrian systems. The outer ring is formed by S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler), S-300V4 (SA-23 Gladiator) and presumably Syrian S-200VE, the middle sea-based S-300FM (SA-N-20) and Buk-M2E, the inner Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko), S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-3 Goa) along with Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) and Panzir-S2 for immediate close-range defense (Mikhail Khodaryonok, “Three Layers of Russian Air Defense at Hmeymim Air Base in Syria“, TASS, 12.02.2016).
by Roger Näbig (Twitter). He works as a lawyer and freelance journalist in Berlin with a focus on global conflicts, defense, security, military policy, armaments technology, and international law. …
www.offiziere.ch
However:
Before this question can be answered, one must first address the common misconception about the alleged ability of Russian S-400 and S-300V4 anti-aircraft systems to create an impenetrable no-fly zone within a radius of up to 400 km. Although on paper, the technical data for both systems is impressive, many factors influence their actual range and efficiency in actual use against enemy fighter aircraft. For example, the 40N6 rocket with a range of 380 km on the S-400 was just approved for serial production at the end of October 2018 (Franz-Stefan Gady, “New Long-Range Missile for Russia’s S-400 Air Defense System Accepted Into Service“, The Diplomat, 23.10.2018). Even if it were to be available in larger quantities, only large targets, such as tanker, cargo and early warning aircraft flying at an altitude of more than 10 km could be detected and engaged at this range (Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund und Michael Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble – Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications“, Swedish Defence Research Agency Report, 04.03.2019). The accurate targeting of stealth-capable 5th generation aircraft (F-35, F-22) and needed low-flying cruise missiles remains an insurmountable technical problem for Russian air defense systems (Guy Plopsky, “Russia‘s Air Defenses in Syria: More Politics than Punch“, BESA Center Perspectives Paper, No. 618, 18.10.2017). Due to the radar horizon, even older 4th generation fighters can only be detected and identified at a distance of approx. 30-40 km and cruise missiles at an altitude of approx. 50 m at approx. 25 km which can only be partially improved by A-50 AWACS aircraft (Roger McDermott, “Russian Air Defenses and the US Strike on Al-Shayrat“, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 50, 11.04.2017). Finally, radar detection can be severely hampered by airborne electronic warfare, such as the use of specialized combat aircraft such as the EA-18G Growler used in the attack on the Syrian military airfield.
by Roger Näbig (Twitter). He works as a lawyer and freelance journalist in Berlin with a focus on global conflicts, defense, security, military policy, armaments technology, and international law. …
www.offiziere.ch
The above explains why Syrians are not satisfied with Russian radar systems and sourced Chinese YJ-27 to help mitigate target engagement shortfalls (versus IDF).
Russia also introduced substantial EW capabilities in Syria to compliment its forces and provide EW cover and cues to Syrian military assets to engage hostile actors over regime-controlled sectors:
"Russian electronic warfare equipment intended to disrupt airstrikes has arrived in Syria as Moscow moves rapidly to boost air defenses for its ally Damascus, according to Russian media reports Tuesday.
After a Russian plane was shot down by Syrian air defenses last week as they tried to repel an Israeli airstrike, Moscow said it would provide Syria with its advanced S-300 missile system as well as send jamming technology to the region, a move that has alarmed Israel and the US."
Equipment intended to interrupt radar, navigation of attacking aircraft and satellite-guided weapons; Moscow said planning to ship up to eight S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Assad
www.timesofisrael.com
RELATED
Since the reform of Russia’s Armed Forces began in late 2008, Moscow has developed a credible conventional military capability. Among the subset of capabilities over the past decade ar
www.realcleardefense.com
Witnessing Russian electronic-warfare capabilities up close has reportedly convinced the Pentagon it needs to get serious about countering it.
www.businessinsider.com
Imagine that.
IDF is known to snipe at desired targets in Syria from Lebanese airspace
but F-35 made it possible for Israeli Air Force to breach Russian security cover and strike at any target in Syria virtually unopposed (courtesy of authentic VLO characteristics and sophistication of this jet fighter).
IDF had to go to great lengths to achieve desired kills in Damascus back in 2019:
Israel’s airstrikes on Damascus International Airport and nearby weapons depots in January 2019 are indicative of Syria’s progress in expanding its air defense capabilities. After all, Syrian Buk-M2 and Panzir-S2 anti-aircraft batteries could intercept some Israeli missiles of the first wave of attack, but this did not prevent Israel from eventually gaining the upper hand in military terms. The Syrian systems were no match for the Israeli “saturation attack” with several more waves of rockets, guided bombs, cruise missiles, and so-called suicide drones “Harop” against the original targets and additionally against the Syrian air defense units. In addition to the Iranian weapons camps, two Syrian Panzir-S2s were hit and destroyed. A video (below) showing the final approach of an Israeli guided missile to the modern Russian SHORAD system spread like wildfire on the Internet.
by Roger Näbig (Twitter). He works as a lawyer and freelance journalist in Berlin with a focus on global conflicts, defense, security, military policy, armaments technology, and international law. …
www.offiziere.ch
Chinese YJ-27 radar system most likely enabled Syrian Buk-M2 and Panzir-S2 systems to score some kills against incoming payload while subjected to saturation attacks but was itself knocked out in the process; F-35 is credited for this kill in particular.
Latest developments:
Israeli air strikes on Syria are part of a shadow war approved by the US as part of its anti-Iran policy, sources say.
www.aljazeera.com
Private intelligence firm releases photographs of aftermath of recent attacks attributed to Israel against Iran-backed forces outside Damascus and near Palmyra
www.timesofisrael.com
Even if WE are to assume/believe that Russians do not wish to fight IDF in Syria, their EW assets remain in effect and are not helping much.
I respect your confidence in Egyptian IADS
but IDF will surprise you if they decide to probe it one day. While Egypt is watching developments in Syria from a distance and sourcing equipment from Russia, Israel decided to take its chances instead, and in doing so, was in the position to study Russian military technologies including EW capabilities up close to hone and inform its own military capabilities in recent years. Syrians (Assad regime) sourced sophisticated Chinese radar systems to complement their A2AD capabilities and even these inductions did not make much difference.
Good.
Where had you been all these years? See above.
Having peace with Israel is one thing (understandable), but being aloof its military advances is height of naivety.
Israel had a wake-up call back in 2006 when it was up against Hezbollah in a war.
A Briefing
www.csis.org
Emphasis mine. Israel have registered numerous advances in its military capabilities (developed a new generation of weapon systems) after the war with Hezbollah including setting the trend of equipping main battle tanks with APS. Now that Iran is in Syria, Israel have further reason to take its security requirements seriously.
"there isn't a single reason for us to give two flying hoots about them getting 50 F-35s"
Shabaash
Lethal Arrow drill simulates fighting in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and elsewhere against Iranian proxies and Palestinian terror groups
www.timesofisrael.com
Refer back to
(1) above.
Objective is to minimize resonance effects (and returns) to the point that detection and subsequent identification of a
true VLO aircraft is not feasible at long distances - PROXIMITY factor.
If you wish to learn a great deal about methods/substances suited to minimize resonance effects (and returns), then you won't find much here because this is CLASSIFIED information in large part. Nobody here can tell you much in this regard.
Bringing following study to your attention nevertheless:
Microwave absorption properties were systematically studied for double-layer carbon black/epoxy resin (CB) and Ni0.6Zn0.4Fe2O4/epoxy resin (F) nanocomposites in the frequency range of 8 to 18 GHz. The Ni0.6Zn0.4Fe2O4 nanoparticles were synthesized via high energy ball milling with subsequent...
www.nature.com
- because it expand on actual practices and provide meaningful information and hints in the process.
Just a hint:
"The motivation of designing double-layer absorbers is due to the limited number of parameters and narrow absorption bandwidth exhibited by single-layer designs. Furthermore, single-layer absorbers are normally narrowband. Therefore, the development of double-layer absorbers is devised in order to fully utilize the properties of different layers used in absorbing at a wider bandwidth, therefore achieving optimal absorption properties in the structure."
An example:
The study is but a tip of the iceberg.
Additional hints and considerations:
"The structure of the fuselage and airfoil of the American B-2 Bomber is a kind of structural radar absorbing material, which has a non-circular section of carbon fiber and honeycomb sandwich composite structure. The density of the absorbent material increases from the outside to the inside, while the multilayer permeable mask is used as the interlayer, and a resistive plate is embedded between the cover and the honeycomb core, all of which allows radar waves to be absorbed into the cell core when they are irradiated to B-2 by a multilayer transparent skin."
www.coating-club.com
Two things highlighted above.
1. The very structure of the fuselage and airfoil (shaping considerations)
2. Double-layer absorbers
Another more recent addition to B2:
"Known as alternate high-frequency material (AHFM), the radar-absorbing coating was developed by Northrop Grumman's Integrated Systems sector, the B-2 prime contractor, for application to the aircraft surface in areas where regular maintenance is performed. The B-2's stealth characteristics require a smooth outer surface without any gaps that could reflect radar waves and reveal its position to the enemy."
news.northropgrumman.com
There is even more beneath the surface: