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This is how "REZONANS-NE" Radar (Egypt) nullifies the effect of stealth fighter aircrafts

it was deliverd to Syria in 2006, which means it is late 90s or very early 2000s tech, which I am sure it ain't one of the best in China now let alone the world.
Syrian sources claim that the variant in their possession is optimized for detecting LO class targets. They do not allow close-up shots of this system. They are satisfied with its performance and got the destroyed piece rebuild.

The incident in question is not bad press for JY-27 class, rather indicative of the fact that true VLO class jet fighters are not to be taken for granted because VLO characteristics shorten detection range(s) and the jet fighters are very well equipped to jam/spoof/kill on top. No matter which radar system is in use, it is at disadvantage in this game. If you highlight networks then also keep in mind squadrons.
 
Syrian sources claim that the variant in their possession is optimized for detecting LO class targets. They do not allow close-up shots of this system. They are satisfied with its performance and got the destroyed piece rebuild.

The incident in question is not bad press for JY-27 class, rather indicative of the fact that true VLO class jet fighters are not to be taken for granted because VLO characteristics shorten detection range(s) and the jet fighters are very well equipped to jam/spoof/kill on top. No matter which radar system is in use, it is at disadvantage in this game. If you highlight networks then also keep in mind squadrons.
not saying it's bad or good, just saying it was an old system, also the example here is a bit weak because israeli are much more trained than a broken syria, in terms of men and equipments.
 
not saying it's bad or good, just saying it was an old system, also the example here is a bit weak because israeli are much more trained than a broken syria, in terms of men and equipments.

Check this out - this is the NEBO-M mobile radar. They're not even worried about detecting stealth aircraft anymore, that method has proved itself over and over many times and while they call these radars "Stealth Killers", this episode of Combat Approved gives you a sense of how advanced the Russians are in radar technology and how premature it is to take them lightly. Watch the way they solder gold strips that are smaller than hair strands into the circuitry of the computers they use. Check out the anechoic chambers where they test stealthy attributes against phased array radar wavelengths.

In the end, they're more impressed at how this mobile radar technology (which is extraordinarily impressive in its own right) is capable of detecting AND TRACKING a drone! Small drones offer much more challenging RCS' than stealth aircraft or supersonic & hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles which they also easily and efficiently are capable of detecting and tracking but more importantly, watch how exact and how sophisticated this system approaches the detection of a small drone using UHF and VHF and other radar wavelengths and information gathering to instantly detect and track the drone on a screen that is much easier to read. This is essentially the shared technology in the High Definition Protivnik-GE and Resonance-NE radars and others.

 
This is the Egyptian copy of the Chinese YLC-6 Early warning Radar. Egypt used to manufacture it locally with Chinese cooperation, it can detect low altitude air targets & has maximum range of 150Km. They mostly position these in coastal and border areas. Just to give you folks about the entire Egyptian Air Defense network by showing these little bits of sampling.

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Egypt also deploys the SPS-48 Early Warning radar with maximum range of 460 Km, PRV-11 Radar & P-14 Russian-Made High Altitudes Early Warning Radar with maximum Range of more than 600 Km. Another few pieces of this combined, intricate radar & surveillance network.

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KTM Kineto Model-433 US-Made Electrostatic thermal tracking system. It has the rather important role in detecting small-size UAVs and Stealth Fighter Jets.

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Part of EADs large air defense network command centers. This one is dedicated to notifying the airforce for interception command and part of this entire network are IADS with AWACS E-2Cs, F-16s Block-52/40, MIG-29M2/35, Rafale and Mirage-2000.


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All of the pervious are linked & combined into the main command and control network system C-4I & C-5I.

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Not until Sisi came into power could we actually see all this stuff that under Mubarak was always kept hush hush. But with Sisi, he's of the mind that what isn't in need of secrecy can certainly be shown to the Egyptian people which is a good thing.
 
Check this out - this is the NEBO-M mobile radar. They're not even worried about detecting stealth aircraft anymore, that method has proved itself over and over many times and while they call these radars "Stealth Killers", this episode of Combat Approved gives you a sense of how advanced the Russians are in radar technology and how premature it is to take them lightly. Watch the way they solder gold strips that are smaller than hair strands into the circuitry of the computers they use. Check out the anechoic chambers where they test stealthy attributes against phased array radar wavelengths.

In the end, they're more impressed at how this mobile radar technology (which is extraordinarily impressive in its own right) is capable of detecting AND TRACKING a drone! Small drones offer much more challenging RCS' than stealth aircraft or supersonic & hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles which they also easily and efficiently are capable of detecting and tracking but more importantly, watch how exact and how sophisticated this system approaches the detection of a small drone using UHF and VHF and other radar wavelengths and information gathering to instantly detect and track the drone on a screen that is much easier to read. This is essentially the shared technology in the High Definition Protivnik-GE and Resonance-NE radars and others.

Red highlight = Comedy

Your assumptions and innocence.... Main Sadqay Jaon

You may also watch Combat Approved documentary of the Pantsir defense system and let me know your thoughts.

I will tell you much about FAILURE of Pantsir defense system in Syria and Libya then - in actual theater of operations.
 
This is the Egyptian copy of the Chinese YLC-6 Early warning Radar. Egypt used to manufacture it locally with Chinese cooperation, it can detect low altitude air targets & has maximum range of 150Km. They mostly position these in coastal and border areas. Just to give you folks about the entire Egyptian Air Defense network by showing these little bits of sampling.

Dg8stsuX4AAoIcb


Egypt also deploys the SPS-48 Early Warning radar with maximum range of 460 Km, PRV-11 Radar & P-14 Russian-Made High Altitudes Early Warning Radar with maximum Range of more than 600 Km. Another few pieces of this combined, intricate radar & surveillance network.

Dg8uDPYXUAYwOYl

Dg8uDRPX4AAqPcF

Dg8uDRMXkAABya3


KTM Kineto Model-433 US-Made Electrostatic thermal tracking system. It has the rather important role in detecting small-size UAVs and Stealth Fighter Jets.

Dg8vnbxWsAAHrrp


Part of EADs large air defense network command centers. This one is dedicated to notifying the airforce for interception command and part of this entire network are IADS with AWACS E-2Cs, F-16s Block-52/40, MIG-29M2/35, Rafale and Mirage-2000.


Dg8zF7vXUAAnSiH


All of the pervious are linked & combined into the main command and control network system C-4I & C-5I.

Dt_kPF5WwAARHkL

Dt_kPF_WwAE4j9w


Not until Sisi came into power could we actually see all this stuff that under Mubarak was always kept hush hush. But with Sisi, he's of the mind that what isn't in need of secrecy can certainly be shown to the Egyptian people which is a good thing.
Sisi haters are silence in this threads :lol: :devil:
 
Red highlight = Comedy

Hahaha, good to see you find some humor in all this disparaging information. The point of that comedy when you take it seriously is that stealth is almost secondary to the Russians now. They're pretty confident that their radar technologies are well capable of detecting VLO aircraft and their main concern is more in UAVs (of the smaller kind) but mostly hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles which most certainly will be the upcoming, heavy threats to neutralize. Not only detecting them because of the altitudes of their flight paths but also because of their speed. Once you get into those kinds of speeds, detection becomes quite challenged and that's the point of that comment.

But it's ok to pick on it. Not much else there so attack any point you can. :-)

Your assumptions and innocence.... Main Sadqay Jaon

Assumptions? None of that was presumptive whatsoever. Everything was backed up with as much available data. But you chose to challenge character versus material. Not much to argue about that.

You may also watch Combat Approved documentary of the Pantsir defense system and let me know your thoughts.

I will tell you much about FAILURE of Pantsir defense system in Syria and Libya then - in actual theater of operations.

Pantsir in the wrong hand in the wrong application is horrible. That was really something impressive to watch and be all taken aback at the mighty capability of attacking a lone panstsir on an open road parked with its radar down and the crew eating lunch or doing whatever they were doing LOL! Yep, very impressive OH and those units left behind and operated in the hands of untrained Libyan personnel is also very impressive. You'll also notice that Egypt has never bothered with the Panstir. Not all systems work well and are great. Some of the Russian stuff certainly has its flaws. No one said otherwise.

Back to Egypt.
The Commander-SL is a British made early warning 3D radar, and is capable of detecting cruise missiles, UAVs and specific long-range air munitions. This is part of Egypt's coastal surveillance in the tiered system.

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A lot of observation points as part of the coastal line of defense mostly for air targets flying at very low altitude that are below radars beams. Even old-fashioned ways are employed while using new technologies.

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Oh ma goodness, that's quite the magnification LOL! Is that Jupiter? lol

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Hahaha, good to see you find some humor in all this disparaging information. The point of that comedy when you take it seriously is that stealth is almost secondary to the Russians now.
Is it? Why Russians are exploring methods to reduce RCS of their aircraft then? Su-57 and the Okhotnik (“Hunter”) combat drone?

I do not take Russian perspectives and technologies for granted in person and I reiterate that Egypt made the right call by sourcing Russian-origin Resonance-NE radar system (good choice), but I also find some of your statements "overreaching."

Russians are expected to HYPE their products to the extent possible but it is important to understand the bigger picture:

"The growing number of stealth aircraft being fielded by the United States and its allies presents Russia with an unprecedented challenge. Yet, rather than acknowledge the qualitative leap in capability that a larger and more sophisticated fleet of stealth aircraft brings with it, contemporary Russian commentators and senior military officials have, for the most part, elected to follow a long-standing Russian tradition of publicly downplaying the utility of stealth. Their misleading and often inane statements on US and allied stealth aircraft are voiced with the purpose of bolstering the standing of the Russian Armed Forces in the eyes of the international community, instilling a sense of national pride among Russian audiences, and downplaying the severity of Russia’s stealth technology lag behind the United States. Derisive remarks by Russian officials can be expected to reoccur and perhaps intensify as not only the United States, but also American allies continue to field stealth aircraft in greater numbers. At the same time, seeing as more and more countries, including Russia’s strategic partner, China, are developing and/or introducing stealth aircraft, Russian officials may find it more difficult to justify their claims to Russian and international audiences."

LINK: https://wavellroom.com/2019/05/02/moscows-perspectives-on-the-evolution-of-us-stealth-technology/

Unfortunately for you, Russians do not have intimate access to the very best of American stealthy applications. Americans might surprise you on the other hand because they have developed and fielded superior technologies which can inform their experiments. Understand the difference.

So no - stealth cannot be almost secondary to the Russians now (or like ever) because these technologies continue to evolve much like marketed countermeasures.

They're pretty confident that their radar technologies are well capable of detecting VLO aircraft and their main concern is more in UAVs (of the smaller kind) but mostly hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles which most certainly will be the upcoming, heavy threats to neutralize. Not only detecting them because of the altitudes of their flight paths but also because of their speed. Once you get into those kinds of speeds, detection becomes quite challenged and that's the point of that comment
See above.

Stealthy aircraft are not created equal - some are VLO in X-band (e.g. J-20) while others are VLO across a number of bands including VHF (e.g. B-2 Spirit). This comes down to shaping considerations, materials adopted for construction, and how electronic components are shielded/optimized for RCS reduction; depends upon what YOU can manage given YOUR resources (industrial base; tooling infrastructure; scientific research; budget allocated for experiments). Not many countries can live up to the HYPE in this game but one managed to (i.e. USA).

(1) For the sake of argument, let us consider B2 being representative of a true VLO aircraft. The very best of Russian radar systems such as Nebo family would be capable of detecting true VLO aircraft but your statement is lacking in CONTEXT (i.e. proximity factor). An aircraft having true VLO characteristics will significantly shorten individual radar detection ring (IADS setup or not) - this is the net effect it can produce across all frequency bands as pointed out to you in the following response before: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/this...fighter-aircrafts.685601/page-2#post-12724216

Further insight below.

Assumptions? None of that was presumptive whatsoever. Everything was backed up with as much available data. But you chose to challenge character versus material. Not much to argue about that.
I chose to challenge character versus material? In this very thread, I expanded on the 'resonance' method of detection and how it is addressed in practice (refer back to my posts on page # 2).

It looks like I missed one of your responses so I will address it now.

Pantsir in the wrong hand in the wrong application is horrible. That was really something impressive to watch and be all taken aback at the mighty capability of attacking a lone panstsir on an open road parked with its radar down and the crew eating lunch or doing whatever they were doing LOL! Yep, very impressive OH and those units left behind and operated in the hands of untrained Libyan personnel is also very impressive. You'll also notice that Egypt has never bothered with the Panstir. Not all systems work well and are great. Some of the Russian stuff certainly has its flaws. No one said otherwise.
"Master Kenobi, you disappoint me. Yoda holds you in such high esteem. Surely you can do better!" - Count Dooku

The most convenient excuse is to blame the operator when a piece of technology repeatedly fails to live up to its HYPE from its manufacturer and fans.

Syrians and Libyans are not exactly subhumans who cannot figure out how to put modern technologies to good use and develop tactics with them. Give them and train them with the very best and see the results in time.

Syrians have recently admitted that they find Chinese radar systems to be better than Russian options and they are not satisfied with a number of Russian weapon systems by extension.


Russian Pantsir FLOPPED in the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as well - but wait... Armenians do not know how to fight either.

Russians do not have sufficient industrial capability and funds to keep up with NATO and even China in developing advanced technologies lately. This is not to say that Russians are unable to roll out impressive hardware from time-to-time (they certainly do) but come on.

Perhaps I am judging Pantsir more harshly but this is just an analogy to make you realize that COMBAT APPROVED videos are propaganda in large part.

I've been meaning to get back into this thread but I keep getting distracted and didn't even realize it went into a 2nd page and missed some of these posts. And while @LeGenD brings it to the table, I think there are cooling points to tackle in his overwhelming American stealth be all end all outlook on its ability to defeat any type of electromagnetic wave in radars and in particular, the Resonance-NE and the resonance effect. We can certainly simplify things just a little bit for the sake of making everyone understand what we're talking about here.
You make it sound like as if I am sold to American perceptions or something on these lines? I have my own take of things and I explore any theme from different angles to my satisfaction. Last time I checked, Americans continue to lead in the technological front. If (or when) another country will roll out something better than American option in a particular domain, I will duly acknowledge it. Let us stick to the facts for now.

That's awfully generous of you! Seriously, though, it's A LOT more than just something better than nothing I mean that's borderline spitting on the effort. Mind you, I know the outlook is the losing side of Arabs and Egypt against Israel and the veritable Israeli army with the US' help and technology is something to behold.........and so the tendency is strongly affected to do exactly what you just did in such (and I'm not saying this in an attacking manner, just being truthful) a condescending and demeaning way because you've been steered to believing that and never giving anyone else in the mix the effort to understand what they're doing and if there is any credibility to it. We just hack away at it because hey, after all, we're talking about American ingenuity in stealth put in the hands of the invincible and mighty Israeli military going against the hapless Egyptian don't stand a chance don't know what they're doing military. Right? Am I right? lol, come on, you know I'm right!
My sincere apologies. If this make you feel better:

"I am not asserting that Egypt made the wrong call by fielding Russian Resonance-NE radar system; I believe that this is good long-term investment. Something better than nothing A LOT more than just something, right? "

:lol:

Where I asserted that Israeli military is invincible and mighty? This is strawman. They do outclass Egyptian military in the present and the gap continues to widen.

What's happening is that you're lacking the effort to analyze both sides and the efforts made by both sides. For example, that video you posted about the Israelis fighters taking out a Syrian radar and the presumptions you make just based on that is frankly absurd, ma man. I don't think you've even taken a minute to assess and understand the level and the manner in which the Egyptian air defense network has set up its surveillance and radar and the type of missiles it's using along with the early warning assets it possesses and how they're interconnected and linked. I'm certain that factor is missing from your vast knowledge of this subject.
Ironic...

Let me explain some realities to you, my friend.

Damascus is among the best guarded spaces of Syria, and also in the Middle East by extension:


Russia has been exclusively equipping Syria with its anti-aircraft systems since the Soviet era and trains the Syrian soldiers in their use under Russian doctrine. Syria’s air defense consists mainly of modernized but outdated S-200VE (NATO code: SA-5 Gammon – long-range) and more modern 9K40 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly – mid-range) which are supplemented by Panzir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound – close-range). Russia is also said to have rebuilt entirely Syrian air defenses and linked them with Russia’s air defense and radar systems at the military bases in Hmeimim (Air Force) and in Tartus (Navy). According to official statements, the two Russian bases on the Syrian Mediterranean coast are protected by three air defense layers, some of which also include Syrian systems. The outer ring is formed by S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler), S-300V4 (SA-23 Gladiator) and presumably Syrian S-200VE, the middle sea-based S-300FM (SA-N-20) and Buk-M2E, the inner Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko), S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-3 Goa) along with Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) and Panzir-S2 for immediate close-range defense (Mikhail Khodaryonok, “Three Layers of Russian Air Defense at Hmeymim Air Base in Syria“, TASS, 12.02.2016).


However:

Before this question can be answered, one must first address the common misconception about the alleged ability of Russian S-400 and S-300V4 anti-aircraft systems to create an impenetrable no-fly zone within a radius of up to 400 km. Although on paper, the technical data for both systems is impressive, many factors influence their actual range and efficiency in actual use against enemy fighter aircraft. For example, the 40N6 rocket with a range of 380 km on the S-400 was just approved for serial production at the end of October 2018 (Franz-Stefan Gady, “New Long-Range Missile for Russia’s S-400 Air Defense System Accepted Into Service“, The Diplomat, 23.10.2018). Even if it were to be available in larger quantities, only large targets, such as tanker, cargo and early warning aircraft flying at an altitude of more than 10 km could be detected and engaged at this range (Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund und Michael Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble – Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications“, Swedish Defence Research Agency Report, 04.03.2019). The accurate targeting of stealth-capable 5th generation aircraft (F-35, F-22) and needed low-flying cruise missiles remains an insurmountable technical problem for Russian air defense systems (Guy Plopsky, “Russia‘s Air Defenses in Syria: More Politics than Punch“, BESA Center Perspectives Paper, No. 618, 18.10.2017). Due to the radar horizon, even older 4th generation fighters can only be detected and identified at a distance of approx. 30-40 km and cruise missiles at an altitude of approx. 50 m at approx. 25 km which can only be partially improved by A-50 AWACS aircraft (Roger McDermott, “Russian Air Defenses and the US Strike on Al-Shayrat“, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 50, 11.04.2017). Finally, radar detection can be severely hampered by airborne electronic warfare, such as the use of specialized combat aircraft such as the EA-18G Growler used in the attack on the Syrian military airfield.


The above explains why Syrians are not satisfied with Russian radar systems and sourced Chinese YJ-27 to help mitigate target engagement shortfalls (versus IDF).

Russia also introduced substantial EW capabilities in Syria to compliment its forces and provide EW cover and cues to Syrian military assets to engage hostile actors over regime-controlled sectors:

"Russian electronic warfare equipment intended to disrupt airstrikes has arrived in Syria as Moscow moves rapidly to boost air defenses for its ally Damascus, according to Russian media reports Tuesday.

After a Russian plane was shot down by Syrian air defenses last week as they tried to repel an Israeli airstrike, Moscow said it would provide Syria with its advanced S-300 missile system as well as send jamming technology to the region, a move that has alarmed Israel and the US."



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Imagine that.

IDF is known to snipe at desired targets in Syria from Lebanese airspace but F-35 made it possible for Israeli Air Force to breach Russian security cover and strike at any target in Syria virtually unopposed (courtesy of authentic VLO characteristics and sophistication of this jet fighter).

IDF had to go to great lengths to achieve desired kills in Damascus back in 2019:

Israel’s airstrikes on Damascus International Airport and nearby weapons depots in January 2019 are indicative of Syria’s progress in expanding its air defense capabilities. After all, Syrian Buk-M2 and Panzir-S2 anti-aircraft batteries could intercept some Israeli missiles of the first wave of attack, but this did not prevent Israel from eventually gaining the upper hand in military terms. The Syrian systems were no match for the Israeli “saturation attack” with several more waves of rockets, guided bombs, cruise missiles, and so-called suicide drones “Harop” against the original targets and additionally against the Syrian air defense units. In addition to the Iranian weapons camps, two Syrian Panzir-S2s were hit and destroyed. A video (below) showing the final approach of an Israeli guided missile to the modern Russian SHORAD system spread like wildfire on the Internet.


Chinese YJ-27 radar system most likely enabled Syrian Buk-M2 and Panzir-S2 systems to score some kills against incoming payload while subjected to saturation attacks but was itself knocked out in the process; F-35 is credited for this kill in particular.

Latest developments:



Even if WE are to assume/believe that Russians do not wish to fight IDF in Syria, their EW assets remain in effect and are not helping much.

I respect your confidence in Egyptian IADS but IDF will surprise you if they decide to probe it one day. While Egypt is watching developments in Syria from a distance and sourcing equipment from Russia, Israel decided to take its chances instead, and in doing so, was in the position to study Russian military technologies including EW capabilities up close to hone and inform its own military capabilities in recent years. Syrians (Assad regime) sourced sophisticated Chinese radar systems to complement their A2AD capabilities and even these inductions did not make much difference.

And I actually agreed with you to a certain extent. I said it's quite possible that those RCS numbers are blown way out of proportion because I am looking at things objectively and with reason, not bias...
Good.

Stop right there for a second because I think with such a complicated subject as this, it's important to break it down into one subject at a time instead of piling them all into one paragraph. So as I move on, I'm going to leave out jamming and EW factors for now and just concentrate on the resonance radar and the stealth attribute of the aircraft, in this case, the F-35. We'll get back to the jamming no doubt because it's an important factor of all of this.

I will only focus on the last part of your comment there for now because it's actually pretty funny and kinda exposes you a little bit, my friend. Sorry to say but there is a little bit of gullability there. You're talking about when Netanyahu was asked if he was worried that Egypt had bought the S-300VM and he said no, not at all or not worried about it whatsoever, right? Honestly, did you really expect him to say anything differently? Let's say they are worried just hypothetically, do you think he would ever admit to being worried even a tiny bit?

Let me tell you something, many on this forum kiss up and suck up to the Israelis because of all this kinda crap they read and hear but no one, not even the Palestinians know them and their ways of deceit and propaganda and behavior about war and military than us Egyptians. I'm not saying this for some stupid ego-driven reason. I don't do that childish crap. I'm being serious here in that we've fought them more than anyone and regardless of what anyone thinks, had tremendous success against them in the last go-around but with all decades of fighting and dealing with them, we've learned the most about how they fake things and how they don't and I can assure you that he would never admit that he's concerned about Egypt buying the S-300VM system and not just that, the IRIS-T_SL SAM system from Germany as well as the Protivnik-GE which all 3 work in congruence with one another.

Also, there is a diplomatic factor here. We don't answer these types of questions based strictly on a military perspective!? Are you kidding me?! That would be the most childish thing ever. There is a high degree of diplomacy between the two countries since we are at peace with one another and because of that reason, of course there would never be any reason to worry about us acquiring the S-300 just like there isn't a single reason for us to give two flying hoots about them getting 50 F-35s. We're at peace, or is that not something that needs to be respected in this day and age? And should we be discussing things to reporters as if we're ready to fight a war?!?!? lol, of course not! Surprised you didn't take any of these things into account.

Don't forget, this is the same country that jumps up and down in severe temper tantrums the minute any advanced weapon is introduced to congress to be sold to Egypt!!! Why do you suppose the AIM-120 is in Pakistan and not in Egypt?!?!! looool. These are all the things I'm surprised you haven't taken into consideration.
Where had you been all these years? See above.

Having peace with Israel is one thing (understandable), but being aloof its military advances is height of naivety.

Israel had a wake-up call back in 2006 when it was up against Hezbollah in a war.


Emphasis mine. Israel have registered numerous advances in its military capabilities (developed a new generation of weapon systems) after the war with Hezbollah including setting the trend of equipping main battle tanks with APS. Now that Iran is in Syria, Israel have further reason to take its security requirements seriously.

"there isn't a single reason for us to give two flying hoots about them getting 50 F-35s"

Shabaash


So you talked mostly about all the stealthy (specifically VLO) elements that are taken into account on US stealth fighters such as the F-35 from shaping to RAM and how mostly those two defeat the resonance effect.

Let's simplify things a little bit when we go into how resonance radar and EM wavelengths work with the Resonance-NE. Since resonance radars work primarily in the long wavelength pattern, specifically the 1 meter wavelength, they work best against stealthy targets simply because:

One meter wavelengths are longer wavelengths hammering a very small RCS and by being a longer wavelength bouncing off a very small target i.e. the small RCS since some of the long wavelengths have already been scattered due to shaping, the remaining wavelength still bouncing off the target creates or induces harmonics within that remaining wave length and those harmonics create varied RETURN waves that are long and short which give more discernable information on the target that can then be categorized. Once that unique return is seen often enough and in specific instances and locations and is recognized in a pattern effect, it's then categorized which is essential because now it has an identifiable characteristic. That is how resonance works in a very simplified, layman way since it's actually a very complex subject.

So what Egypt is doing all this time is gathering a monumental amount of information as we speak and argue on this forum on a daily basis and constantly inputting all this information and categorizing it in computers that will recognize it in micro-seconds and go into the next plan of action. For F-35s, F-15s, F-16s and for all sorts of other military assets on the other side.

This is what an individual who is very well-informed about radars in general and his background is very strong in physics and quantum mechanics said about resonance radars and their ability to work against stealthy targets. Give this a read. If anything, I think you will enjoy it quite a bit simply because of the extent of how informative it is:

Just as materials can resonate at certain vibrational frequencies (e.g. Tacoma Narrows bridge incident), they can also vibrate in the EM realm as well. All materials absorb since there are no perfect reflectors (and absorbers outside of black holes if they exist).

One meter radar EM waves will go through materials including metal. The Faraday cage effect from electrostatics applies to some extent but since scanning waves are not some steady state illumination and include a magnetic component they will penetrate the skin of the aircraft (with attenuation due to absorption and scatter). Even the skin of the aircraft is a source of resonance harmonics and it does not have to be just the frame, the engines or other "volume filling" objects.

So think of the targeted aircraft as absorbing the 1 meter radar waves and then emitting a broad spectrum of waves with both shorter and longer wavelengths compared to the scanning radar beam. Being resonance harmonics, they do not form a continuous spectrum of emissions but are organized in spikes depending on the characteristics of the aircraft. So different aircraft will give different spectra

of resonance emissions but likely not wildly different. So the return signal that the radar system needs to process is not 1 meter original wavelength scanning beam scatter, but new wavelengths likely to form from resonance in the aircraft body. This requires testing with targets to figure out what bands to detect for resonance return signal.

A detail that should be mentioned is that the amplitude of the scanning beam can be cranked up to produce a better return signal. No amount of RAM coating will save you from this. And no RAM coating works 100%. In fact, since RAM is an absorber it must be an emitter (in some other wavelengths). So the aircraft will still be exposed to EM waves induced by the original radar scanning beam and will produce harmonics in some other bands compared to what the radar beam itself would directly induce. Regardless, cranking up the scanning beam amplitude returns a "cornucopia" of resonance EM emissions that one could detect if one looked for them.

By contrast, using passive IR emissions does not allow you do dial the return signal since the source of those IR emissions is independent of the radar (no longer radar really) system. Also, IR is scattered and blocked by clouds and fogs more effectively than radar and at least some of the resonance harmonics.


Might have to sleep on that a little bit lol.
Refer back to (1) above.

Objective is to minimize resonance effects (and returns) to the point that detection and subsequent identification of a true VLO aircraft is not feasible at long distances - PROXIMITY factor.

If you wish to learn a great deal about methods/substances suited to minimize resonance effects (and returns), then you won't find much here because this is CLASSIFIED information in large part. Nobody here can tell you much in this regard.

Bringing following study to your attention nevertheless:


- because it expand on actual practices and provide meaningful information and hints in the process.

Just a hint:

"The motivation of designing double-layer absorbers is due to the limited number of parameters and narrow absorption bandwidth exhibited by single-layer designs. Furthermore, single-layer absorbers are normally narrowband. Therefore, the development of double-layer absorbers is devised in order to fully utilize the properties of different layers used in absorbing at a wider bandwidth, therefore achieving optimal absorption properties in the structure."

An example:

RAM-applications1.png


The study is but a tip of the iceberg.

Additional hints and considerations:

"The structure of the fuselage and airfoil of the American B-2 Bomber is a kind of structural radar absorbing material, which has a non-circular section of carbon fiber and honeycomb sandwich composite structure. The density of the absorbent material increases from the outside to the inside, while the multilayer permeable mask is used as the interlayer, and a resistive plate is embedded between the cover and the honeycomb core, all of which allows radar waves to be absorbed into the cell core when they are irradiated to B-2 by a multilayer transparent skin."


Two things highlighted above.

1. The very structure of the fuselage and airfoil (shaping considerations)
2. Double-layer absorbers

Another more recent addition to B2:

"Known as alternate high-frequency material (AHFM), the radar-absorbing coating was developed by Northrop Grumman's Integrated Systems sector, the B-2 prime contractor, for application to the aircraft surface in areas where regular maintenance is performed. The B-2's stealth characteristics require a smooth outer surface without any gaps that could reflect radar waves and reveal its position to the enemy."


There is even more beneath the surface:

Stealth-declassified.png
 
Is it? Why Russians are exploring methods to reduce RCS of their aircraft then? Su-57 and the Okhotnik (“Hunter”) combat drone?

I do not take Russian perspectives and technologies for granted in person and I reiterate that Egypt made the right call by sourcing Russian-origin Resonance-NE radar system (good choice), but I also find some of your statements "overreaching."

Russians are expected to HYPE their products to the extent possible but it is important to understand the bigger picture:

"The growing number of stealth aircraft being fielded by the United States and its allies presents Russia with an unprecedented challenge. Yet, rather than acknowledge the qualitative leap in capability that a larger and more sophisticated fleet of stealth aircraft brings with it, contemporary Russian commentators and senior military officials have, for the most part, elected to follow a long-standing Russian tradition of publicly downplaying the utility of stealth. Their misleading and often inane statements on US and allied stealth aircraft are voiced with the purpose of bolstering the standing of the Russian Armed Forces in the eyes of the international community, instilling a sense of national pride among Russian audiences, and downplaying the severity of Russia’s stealth technology lag behind the United States. Derisive remarks by Russian officials can be expected to reoccur and perhaps intensify as not only the United States, but also American allies continue to field stealth aircraft in greater numbers. At the same time, seeing as more and more countries, including Russia’s strategic partner, China, are developing and/or introducing stealth aircraft, Russian officials may find it more difficult to justify their claims to Russian and international audiences."

LINK: https://wavellroom.com/2019/05/02/moscows-perspectives-on-the-evolution-of-us-stealth-technology/

Unfortunately for you, Russians do not have intimate access to the very best of American stealthy applications. Americans might surprise you on the other hand because they have developed and fielded superior technologies which can inform their experiments. Understand the difference.

So no - stealth cannot be almost secondary to the Russians now (or like ever) because these technologies continue to evolve much like marketed countermeasures.


See above.

Stealthy aircraft are not created equal - some are VLO in X-band (e.g. J-20) while others are VLO across a number of bands including VHF (e.g. B-2 Spirit). This comes down to shaping considerations, materials adopted for construction, and how electronic components are shielded/optimized for RCS reduction; depends upon what YOU can manage given YOUR resources (industrial base; tooling infrastructure; scientific research; budget allocated for experiments). Not many countries can live up to the HYPE in this game but one managed to (i.e. USA).

(1) For the sake of argument, let us consider B2 being representative of a true VLO aircraft. The very best of Russian radar systems such as Nebo family would be capable of detecting true VLO aircraft but your statement is lacking in CONTEXT (i.e. proximity factor). An aircraft having true VLO characteristics will significantly shorten individual radar detection ring (IADS setup or not) - this is the net effect it can produce across all frequency bands as pointed out to you in the following response before: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/this...fighter-aircrafts.685601/page-2#post-12724216

Further insight below.


I chose to challenge character versus material? In this very thread, I expanded on the 'resonance' method of detection and how it is addressed in practice (refer back to my posts on page # 2).

It looks like I missed one of your responses so I will address it now.


"Master Kenobi, you disappoint me. Yoda holds you in such high esteem. Surely you can do better!" - Count Dooku

The most convenient excuse is to blame the operator when a piece of technology repeatedly fails to live up to its HYPE from its manufacturer and fans.

Syrians and Libyans are not exactly subhumans who cannot figure out how to put modern technologies to good use and develop tactics with them. Give them and train them with the very best and see the results in time.

Syrians have recently admitted that they find Chinese radar systems to be better than Russian options and they are not satisfied with a number of Russian weapon systems by extension.


Russian Pantsir FLOPPED in the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as well - but wait... Armenians do not know how to fight either.

Russians do not have sufficient industrial capability and funds to keep up with NATO and even China in developing advanced technologies lately. This is not to say that Russians are unable to roll out impressive hardware from time-to-time (they certainly do) but come on.

Perhaps I am judging Pantsir more harshly but this is just an analogy to make you realize that COMBAT APPROVED videos are propaganda in large part.


You make it sound like as if I am sold to American perceptions or something on these lines? I have my own take of things and I explore any theme from different angles to my satisfaction. Last time I checked, Americans continue to lead in the technological front. If (or when) another country will roll out something better than American option in a particular domain, I will duly acknowledge it. Let us stick to the facts for now.


My sincere apologies. If this make you feel better:

"I am not asserting that Egypt made the wrong call by fielding Russian Resonance-NE radar system; I believe that this is good long-term investment. Something better than nothing A LOT more than just something, right? "

:lol:

Where I asserted that Israeli military is invincible and mighty? This is strawman. They do outclass Egyptian military in the present and the gap continues to widen.


Ironic...

Let me explain some realities to you, my friend.

Damascus is among the best guarded spaces of Syria, and also in the Middle East by extension:


Russia has been exclusively equipping Syria with its anti-aircraft systems since the Soviet era and trains the Syrian soldiers in their use under Russian doctrine. Syria’s air defense consists mainly of modernized but outdated S-200VE (NATO code: SA-5 Gammon – long-range) and more modern 9K40 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly – mid-range) which are supplemented by Panzir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound – close-range). Russia is also said to have rebuilt entirely Syrian air defenses and linked them with Russia’s air defense and radar systems at the military bases in Hmeimim (Air Force) and in Tartus (Navy). According to official statements, the two Russian bases on the Syrian Mediterranean coast are protected by three air defense layers, some of which also include Syrian systems. The outer ring is formed by S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler), S-300V4 (SA-23 Gladiator) and presumably Syrian S-200VE, the middle sea-based S-300FM (SA-N-20) and Buk-M2E, the inner Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko), S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-3 Goa) along with Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) and Panzir-S2 for immediate close-range defense (Mikhail Khodaryonok, “Three Layers of Russian Air Defense at Hmeymim Air Base in Syria“, TASS, 12.02.2016).


However:

Before this question can be answered, one must first address the common misconception about the alleged ability of Russian S-400 and S-300V4 anti-aircraft systems to create an impenetrable no-fly zone within a radius of up to 400 km. Although on paper, the technical data for both systems is impressive, many factors influence their actual range and efficiency in actual use against enemy fighter aircraft. For example, the 40N6 rocket with a range of 380 km on the S-400 was just approved for serial production at the end of October 2018 (Franz-Stefan Gady, “New Long-Range Missile for Russia’s S-400 Air Defense System Accepted Into Service“, The Diplomat, 23.10.2018). Even if it were to be available in larger quantities, only large targets, such as tanker, cargo and early warning aircraft flying at an altitude of more than 10 km could be detected and engaged at this range (Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund und Michael Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble – Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications“, Swedish Defence Research Agency Report, 04.03.2019). The accurate targeting of stealth-capable 5th generation aircraft (F-35, F-22) and needed low-flying cruise missiles remains an insurmountable technical problem for Russian air defense systems (Guy Plopsky, “Russia‘s Air Defenses in Syria: More Politics than Punch“, BESA Center Perspectives Paper, No. 618, 18.10.2017). Due to the radar horizon, even older 4th generation fighters can only be detected and identified at a distance of approx. 30-40 km and cruise missiles at an altitude of approx. 50 m at approx. 25 km which can only be partially improved by A-50 AWACS aircraft (Roger McDermott, “Russian Air Defenses and the US Strike on Al-Shayrat“, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 50, 11.04.2017). Finally, radar detection can be severely hampered by airborne electronic warfare, such as the use of specialized combat aircraft such as the EA-18G Growler used in the attack on the Syrian military airfield.


The above explains why Syrians are not satisfied with Russian radar systems and sourced Chinese YJ-27 to help mitigate target engagement shortfalls (versus IDF).

Russia also introduced substantial EW capabilities in Syria to compliment its forces and provide EW cover and cues to Syrian military assets to engage hostile actors over regime-controlled sectors:

"Russian electronic warfare equipment intended to disrupt airstrikes has arrived in Syria as Moscow moves rapidly to boost air defenses for its ally Damascus, according to Russian media reports Tuesday.

After a Russian plane was shot down by Syrian air defenses last week as they tried to repel an Israeli airstrike, Moscow said it would provide Syria with its advanced S-300 missile system as well as send jamming technology to the region, a move that has alarmed Israel and the US."



RELATED



Imagine that.

IDF is known to snipe at desired targets in Syria from Lebanese airspace but F-35 made it possible for Israeli Air Force to breach Russian security cover and strike at any target in Syria virtually unopposed (courtesy of authentic VLO characteristics and sophistication of this jet fighter).

IDF had to go to great lengths to achieve desired kills in Damascus back in 2019:

Israel’s airstrikes on Damascus International Airport and nearby weapons depots in January 2019 are indicative of Syria’s progress in expanding its air defense capabilities. After all, Syrian Buk-M2 and Panzir-S2 anti-aircraft batteries could intercept some Israeli missiles of the first wave of attack, but this did not prevent Israel from eventually gaining the upper hand in military terms. The Syrian systems were no match for the Israeli “saturation attack” with several more waves of rockets, guided bombs, cruise missiles, and so-called suicide drones “Harop” against the original targets and additionally against the Syrian air defense units. In addition to the Iranian weapons camps, two Syrian Panzir-S2s were hit and destroyed. A video (below) showing the final approach of an Israeli guided missile to the modern Russian SHORAD system spread like wildfire on the Internet.


Chinese YJ-27 radar system most likely enabled Syrian Buk-M2 and Panzir-S2 systems to score some kills against incoming payload while subjected to saturation attacks but was itself knocked out in the process; F-35 is credited for this kill in particular.

Latest developments:



Even if WE are to assume/believe that Russians do not wish to fight IDF in Syria, their EW assets remain in effect and are not helping much.

I respect your confidence in Egyptian IADS but IDF will surprise you if they decide to probe it one day. While Egypt is watching developments in Syria from a distance and sourcing equipment from Russia, Israel decided to take its chances instead, and in doing so, was in the position to study Russian military technologies including EW capabilities up close to hone and inform its own military capabilities in recent years. Syrians (Assad regime) sourced sophisticated Chinese radar systems to complement their A2AD capabilities and even these inductions did not make much difference.


Good.


Where had you been all these years? See above.

Having peace with Israel is one thing (understandable), but being aloof its military advances is height of naivety.

Israel had a wake-up call back in 2006 when it was up against Hezbollah in a war.


Emphasis mine. Israel have registered numerous advances in its military capabilities (developed a new generation of weapon systems) after the war with Hezbollah including setting the trend of equipping main battle tanks with APS. Now that Iran is in Syria, Israel have further reason to take its security requirements seriously.

"there isn't a single reason for us to give two flying hoots about them getting 50 F-35s"

Shabaash



Refer back to (1) above.

Objective is to minimize resonance effects (and returns) to the point that detection and subsequent identification of a true VLO aircraft is not feasible at long distances - PROXIMITY factor.

If you wish to learn a great deal about methods/substances suited to minimize resonance effects (and returns), then you won't find much here because this is CLASSIFIED information in large part. Nobody here can tell you much in this regard.

Bringing following study to your attention nevertheless:


- because it expand on actual practices and provide meaningful information and hints in the process.

Just a hint:

"The motivation of designing double-layer absorbers is due to the limited number of parameters and narrow absorption bandwidth exhibited by single-layer designs. Furthermore, single-layer absorbers are normally narrowband. Therefore, the development of double-layer absorbers is devised in order to fully utilize the properties of different layers used in absorbing at a wider bandwidth, therefore achieving optimal absorption properties in the structure."

An example:

RAM-applications1.png


The study is but a tip of the iceberg.

Additional hints and considerations:

"The structure of the fuselage and airfoil of the American B-2 Bomber is a kind of structural radar absorbing material, which has a non-circular section of carbon fiber and honeycomb sandwich composite structure. The density of the absorbent material increases from the outside to the inside, while the multilayer permeable mask is used as the interlayer, and a resistive plate is embedded between the cover and the honeycomb core, all of which allows radar waves to be absorbed into the cell core when they are irradiated to B-2 by a multilayer transparent skin."


Two things highlighted above.

1. The very structure of the fuselage and airfoil (shaping considerations)
2. Double-layer absorbers

Another more recent addition to B2:

"Known as alternate high-frequency material (AHFM), the radar-absorbing coating was developed by Northrop Grumman's Integrated Systems sector, the B-2 prime contractor, for application to the aircraft surface in areas where regular maintenance is performed. The B-2's stealth characteristics require a smooth outer surface without any gaps that could reflect radar waves and reveal its position to the enemy."


There is even more beneath the surface:

Stealth-declassified.png
And did Usrael attack the Russian base in Syria..ever?
So on what facts are you basing your assumptions about the Russian Air Defense systems in there?

Syrian defenses are weak..apart from that S-300 protecting around the Palace in Damascus..



You have also this:
The-pioneering-Nebo-M-combines-three-existing-3D-radars-the-VHF-band-Nebo-SVU-the.png


The pioneering Nebo M combines three existing 3D radars, the VHF band Nebo SVU, the L-band Protivnik G and the S/X-band Gamma S1. All tracks are fused in the command post. It is designed to counter l.o. threats like the F-35. Placing the radars as in drawing, left, with respect to the threat axis, the VHF radar offers early warning, while the L- and X-band radars offer finer track, illuminating the targets from angles where the RCS is increased. Furthermore, Nebo M exhibits better jamming resistance.

3D Multiband Radar RLM-M NEBO-M
Presented in 2008, the Nebo-M is a system of 3 pre-existing 3D radars of NNIIRT, which were properly upgraded and modified to provide radar picture to a central command and control station. These radars are: the above-mentioned Nebo SVU (VHF-band), the Protivnik G (L-band) and the Gamma S1 (S/X-band). All subsystems are on-board 8× 8 trucks. There are no official statements concerning the range, however according to estimations, it is expected to be 40 % higher than the one of the NEBO SVU, with better resolution.

2D VHF Radar VOSTOK E (Agat/KB Radar, Belarus): mobile radar (on a 6 x 6 truck), able to deploy in 6 min, featuring digital, solid state design. In the case of a "heavy" environment of electronic warfare, it can detect the F-117 at 57 km (according to other sources, at 72 km [62]) and the F-16 at 133 km. In a clear environment, the F-117 can be detected at 350 km.

AESA L-band Airborne Radar (Tikhomirov NIIP, Russia): Presented at MAKS 2009, it is designed to be installed inside the leading edge of the wings of a fighter, such as the Su-35. It is expected to provide higher detection and tracking ranges for l.o. targets with respect to other airborne X-band AESA radars.

Infrared Detection Systems
Even though stealth aircraft make use of various techniques for reducing their thermal signature, IR radiation cannot be totally eliminated. In the case of F-35, the F135 engine used is the most powerful jet fighter engine, with the highest combustion chamber temperature (more than 2.200° C ([93])). Even if this does not necessarily mean also high “external” temperature, it is expected that the F135 has a considerable thermal signature ([94] and [95]), allowing the detection of the F-35 by IR systems from a considerable distance. Some examples of IRST systems are the following:

AN/AAQ-37 Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS) of the F-35 (Northrop Grumman)
AN/AAQ-40 Electro-optical Targeting System (EOTS) of the F-35 (L.M.)
PIRATE (Passive Infra Red Airborne Tracking Equipment) of the Eurofighter Typhoon (EUROFIRST consortium)
OSF (Optronique Secteur Frontal) of the Rafale (Thales Optronique – SAGEM)
OLS-35 of the Sukhoi Su-35 BM (NIIPP)


A promising approach relies on a combination of the following:

 Very low frequency band radars, for medium to high altitude surveillance: as the frequency decreases, the wavelength increases and becomes comparable with major parts of the aircraft. Thus, scattering enters the resonance region, exhibiting a higher Radar Cross Section (RCS), at least momentarily. Also, the Radar-Absorbent Materials (RAM) are not very effective at lower frequencies. For these reasons, radars operating, e.g., in the VHF band, are expected to see a l.o. target at a longer distance with respect to “conventional”, higher frequency radars, transmitting in the L or S-band.

 Passive radars can complement their active counterparts, covering low to medium altitudes: such radars detect and track targets passively, measuring distortions and disturbances on existing signals from radio, TV, mobile telephony, Wi-Fi etc. They feature low frequency and bistatic operation (different locations of transmitter and receiver), offering increased probability of revealing stealth aircraft, which are optimized for monostatic radars.

All information from every radar system or sensor should be fused in a central command and control entity (data fusion). If possible, low level, raw data should be taken into account. A few “hits” from a radar may not result to a “plot”, however a few “hits” from different radars corresponding to the same location certainly indicate a possible target.

 Any unidentified track should be transferred to combat aircraft via tactical data link, in order to be intercepted.

 The interceptors should be equipped with an IRST (InfraRed Search and Track) system, allowing detection and tracking of l.o. targets at longer distances, with respect to their radar sets. Ideally, they should be also capable of engaging a designated target sent to them via data link, even if they cannot “see” the target by their on-board sensors.
 Following the same way of thinking, IR air-to-air missiles should be preferred to radar seeker missiles, even for BVR (Beyond Visual Range) distances.

As a final conclusion, it should be noted that the development of l.o. technology and the proliferation of stealth aircraft have changed the modern warfare, rendering most legacy systems almost useless. In order to cope with this new type of threats, older systems should be upgraded, modified accordingly and interconnected, following the principles of the net-centric warfare doctrine, while new, suitable systems should also be employed, as described in this paper.

www.scienpress.com › Upload › JCM
If the link does not work ..just type the title ..since it is a pdf :

Low Observable Principles, Stealth Aircraft and Anti-Stealth Technologies
 

Attachments

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Is it? Why Russians are exploring methods to reduce RCS of their aircraft then? Su-57 and the Okhotnik (“Hunter”) combat drone?

I do not take Russian perspectives and technologies for granted in person and I reiterate that Egypt made the right call by sourcing Russian-origin Resonance-NE radar system (good choice), but I also find some of your statements "overreaching."

Russians are expected to HYPE their products to the extent possible but it is important to understand the bigger picture:

"The growing number of stealth aircraft being fielded by the United States and its allies presents Russia with an unprecedented challenge. Yet, rather than acknowledge the qualitative leap in capability that a larger and more sophisticated fleet of stealth aircraft brings with it, contemporary Russian commentators and senior military officials have, for the most part, elected to follow a long-standing Russian tradition of publicly downplaying the utility of stealth. Their misleading and often inane statements on US and allied stealth aircraft are voiced with the purpose of bolstering the standing of the Russian Armed Forces in the eyes of the international community, instilling a sense of national pride among Russian audiences, and downplaying the severity of Russia’s stealth technology lag behind the United States. Derisive remarks by Russian officials can be expected to reoccur and perhaps intensify as not only the United States, but also American allies continue to field stealth aircraft in greater numbers. At the same time, seeing as more and more countries, including Russia’s strategic partner, China, are developing and/or introducing stealth aircraft, Russian officials may find it more difficult to justify their claims to Russian and international audiences."

LINK: https://wavellroom.com/2019/05/02/moscows-perspectives-on-the-evolution-of-us-stealth-technology/

Unfortunately for you, Russians do not have intimate access to the very best of American stealthy applications. Americans might surprise you on the other hand because they have developed and fielded superior technologies which can inform their experiments. Understand the difference.

So no - stealth cannot be almost secondary to the Russians now (or like ever) because these technologies continue to evolve much like marketed countermeasures.


See above.

Stealthy aircraft are not created equal - some are VLO in X-band (e.g. J-20) while others are VLO across a number of bands including VHF (e.g. B-2 Spirit). This comes down to shaping considerations, materials adopted for construction, and how electronic components are shielded/optimized for RCS reduction; depends upon what YOU can manage given YOUR resources (industrial base; tooling infrastructure; scientific research; budget allocated for experiments). Not many countries can live up to the HYPE in this game but one managed to (i.e. USA).

(1) For the sake of argument, let us consider B2 being representative of a true VLO aircraft. The very best of Russian radar systems such as Nebo family would be capable of detecting true VLO aircraft but your statement is lacking in CONTEXT (i.e. proximity factor). An aircraft having true VLO characteristics will significantly shorten individual radar detection ring (IADS setup or not) - this is the net effect it can produce across all frequency bands as pointed out to you in the following response before: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/this...fighter-aircrafts.685601/page-2#post-12724216

Further insight below.


I chose to challenge character versus material? In this very thread, I expanded on the 'resonance' method of detection and how it is addressed in practice (refer back to my posts on page # 2).

It looks like I missed one of your responses so I will address it now.


"Master Kenobi, you disappoint me. Yoda holds you in such high esteem. Surely you can do better!" - Count Dooku

The most convenient excuse is to blame the operator when a piece of technology repeatedly fails to live up to its HYPE from its manufacturer and fans.

Syrians and Libyans are not exactly subhumans who cannot figure out how to put modern technologies to good use and develop tactics with them. Give them and train them with the very best and see the results in time.

Syrians have recently admitted that they find Chinese radar systems to be better than Russian options and they are not satisfied with a number of Russian weapon systems by extension.


Russian Pantsir FLOPPED in the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as well - but wait... Armenians do not know how to fight either.

Russians do not have sufficient industrial capability and funds to keep up with NATO and even China in developing advanced technologies lately. This is not to say that Russians are unable to roll out impressive hardware from time-to-time (they certainly do) but come on.

Perhaps I am judging Pantsir more harshly but this is just an analogy to make you realize that COMBAT APPROVED videos are propaganda in large part.


You make it sound like as if I am sold to American perceptions or something on these lines? I have my own take of things and I explore any theme from different angles to my satisfaction. Last time I checked, Americans continue to lead in the technological front. If (or when) another country will roll out something better than American option in a particular domain, I will duly acknowledge it. Let us stick to the facts for now.


My sincere apologies. If this make you feel better:

"I am not asserting that Egypt made the wrong call by fielding Russian Resonance-NE radar system; I believe that this is good long-term investment. Something better than nothing A LOT more than just something, right? "

:lol:

Where I asserted that Israeli military is invincible and mighty? This is strawman. They do outclass Egyptian military in the present and the gap continues to widen.


Ironic...

Let me explain some realities to you, my friend.

Damascus is among the best guarded spaces of Syria, and also in the Middle East by extension:


Russia has been exclusively equipping Syria with its anti-aircraft systems since the Soviet era and trains the Syrian soldiers in their use under Russian doctrine. Syria’s air defense consists mainly of modernized but outdated S-200VE (NATO code: SA-5 Gammon – long-range) and more modern 9K40 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly – mid-range) which are supplemented by Panzir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound – close-range). Russia is also said to have rebuilt entirely Syrian air defenses and linked them with Russia’s air defense and radar systems at the military bases in Hmeimim (Air Force) and in Tartus (Navy). According to official statements, the two Russian bases on the Syrian Mediterranean coast are protected by three air defense layers, some of which also include Syrian systems. The outer ring is formed by S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler), S-300V4 (SA-23 Gladiator) and presumably Syrian S-200VE, the middle sea-based S-300FM (SA-N-20) and Buk-M2E, the inner Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko), S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-3 Goa) along with Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) and Panzir-S2 for immediate close-range defense (Mikhail Khodaryonok, “Three Layers of Russian Air Defense at Hmeymim Air Base in Syria“, TASS, 12.02.2016).


However:

Before this question can be answered, one must first address the common misconception about the alleged ability of Russian S-400 and S-300V4 anti-aircraft systems to create an impenetrable no-fly zone within a radius of up to 400 km. Although on paper, the technical data for both systems is impressive, many factors influence their actual range and efficiency in actual use against enemy fighter aircraft. For example, the 40N6 rocket with a range of 380 km on the S-400 was just approved for serial production at the end of October 2018 (Franz-Stefan Gady, “New Long-Range Missile for Russia’s S-400 Air Defense System Accepted Into Service“, The Diplomat, 23.10.2018). Even if it were to be available in larger quantities, only large targets, such as tanker, cargo and early warning aircraft flying at an altitude of more than 10 km could be detected and engaged at this range (Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund und Michael Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble – Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications“, Swedish Defence Research Agency Report, 04.03.2019). The accurate targeting of stealth-capable 5th generation aircraft (F-35, F-22) and needed low-flying cruise missiles remains an insurmountable technical problem for Russian air defense systems (Guy Plopsky, “Russia‘s Air Defenses in Syria: More Politics than Punch“, BESA Center Perspectives Paper, No. 618, 18.10.2017). Due to the radar horizon, even older 4th generation fighters can only be detected and identified at a distance of approx. 30-40 km and cruise missiles at an altitude of approx. 50 m at approx. 25 km which can only be partially improved by A-50 AWACS aircraft (Roger McDermott, “Russian Air Defenses and the US Strike on Al-Shayrat“, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 50, 11.04.2017). Finally, radar detection can be severely hampered by airborne electronic warfare, such as the use of specialized combat aircraft such as the EA-18G Growler used in the attack on the Syrian military airfield.


The above explains why Syrians are not satisfied with Russian radar systems and sourced Chinese YJ-27 to help mitigate target engagement shortfalls (versus IDF).

Russia also introduced substantial EW capabilities in Syria to compliment its forces and provide EW cover and cues to Syrian military assets to engage hostile actors over regime-controlled sectors:

"Russian electronic warfare equipment intended to disrupt airstrikes has arrived in Syria as Moscow moves rapidly to boost air defenses for its ally Damascus, according to Russian media reports Tuesday.

After a Russian plane was shot down by Syrian air defenses last week as they tried to repel an Israeli airstrike, Moscow said it would provide Syria with its advanced S-300 missile system as well as send jamming technology to the region, a move that has alarmed Israel and the US."



RELATED



Imagine that.

IDF is known to snipe at desired targets in Syria from Lebanese airspace but F-35 made it possible for Israeli Air Force to breach Russian security cover and strike at any target in Syria virtually unopposed (courtesy of authentic VLO characteristics and sophistication of this jet fighter).

IDF had to go to great lengths to achieve desired kills in Damascus back in 2019:

Israel’s airstrikes on Damascus International Airport and nearby weapons depots in January 2019 are indicative of Syria’s progress in expanding its air defense capabilities. After all, Syrian Buk-M2 and Panzir-S2 anti-aircraft batteries could intercept some Israeli missiles of the first wave of attack, but this did not prevent Israel from eventually gaining the upper hand in military terms. The Syrian systems were no match for the Israeli “saturation attack” with several more waves of rockets, guided bombs, cruise missiles, and so-called suicide drones “Harop” against the original targets and additionally against the Syrian air defense units. In addition to the Iranian weapons camps, two Syrian Panzir-S2s were hit and destroyed. A video (below) showing the final approach of an Israeli guided missile to the modern Russian SHORAD system spread like wildfire on the Internet.


Chinese YJ-27 radar system most likely enabled Syrian Buk-M2 and Panzir-S2 systems to score some kills against incoming payload while subjected to saturation attacks but was itself knocked out in the process; F-35 is credited for this kill in particular.

Latest developments:



Even if WE are to assume/believe that Russians do not wish to fight IDF in Syria, their EW assets remain in effect and are not helping much.

I respect your confidence in Egyptian IADS but IDF will surprise you if they decide to probe it one day. While Egypt is watching developments in Syria from a distance and sourcing equipment from Russia, Israel decided to take its chances instead, and in doing so, was in the position to study Russian military technologies including EW capabilities up close to hone and inform its own military capabilities in recent years. Syrians (Assad regime) sourced sophisticated Chinese radar systems to complement their A2AD capabilities and even these inductions did not make much difference.


Good.


Where had you been all these years? See above.

Having peace with Israel is one thing (understandable), but being aloof its military advances is height of naivety.

Israel had a wake-up call back in 2006 when it was up against Hezbollah in a war.


Emphasis mine. Israel have registered numerous advances in its military capabilities (developed a new generation of weapon systems) after the war with Hezbollah including setting the trend of equipping main battle tanks with APS. Now that Iran is in Syria, Israel have further reason to take its security requirements seriously.

"there isn't a single reason for us to give two flying hoots about them getting 50 F-35s"

Shabaash



Refer back to (1) above.

Objective is to minimize resonance effects (and returns) to the point that detection and subsequent identification of a true VLO aircraft is not feasible at long distances - PROXIMITY factor.

If you wish to learn a great deal about methods/substances suited to minimize resonance effects (and returns), then you won't find much here because this is CLASSIFIED information in large part. Nobody here can tell you much in this regard.

Bringing following study to your attention nevertheless:


- because it expand on actual practices and provide meaningful information and hints in the process.

Just a hint:

"The motivation of designing double-layer absorbers is due to the limited number of parameters and narrow absorption bandwidth exhibited by single-layer designs. Furthermore, single-layer absorbers are normally narrowband. Therefore, the development of double-layer absorbers is devised in order to fully utilize the properties of different layers used in absorbing at a wider bandwidth, therefore achieving optimal absorption properties in the structure."

An example:

RAM-applications1.png


The study is but a tip of the iceberg.

Additional hints and considerations:

"The structure of the fuselage and airfoil of the American B-2 Bomber is a kind of structural radar absorbing material, which has a non-circular section of carbon fiber and honeycomb sandwich composite structure. The density of the absorbent material increases from the outside to the inside, while the multilayer permeable mask is used as the interlayer, and a resistive plate is embedded between the cover and the honeycomb core, all of which allows radar waves to be absorbed into the cell core when they are irradiated to B-2 by a multilayer transparent skin."


Two things highlighted above.

1. The very structure of the fuselage and airfoil (shaping considerations)
2. Double-layer absorbers

Another more recent addition to B2:

"Known as alternate high-frequency material (AHFM), the radar-absorbing coating was developed by Northrop Grumman's Integrated Systems sector, the B-2 prime contractor, for application to the aircraft surface in areas where regular maintenance is performed. The B-2's stealth characteristics require a smooth outer surface without any gaps that could reflect radar waves and reveal its position to the enemy."


There is even more beneath the surface:

Stealth-declassified.png
I agree, although not fully, on your main point. I always believe Egypt should secure the best of American weapons without restrictions over Russian weapons.
 
I agree, although not fully, on your main point. I always believe Egypt should secure the best of American weapons without restrictions over Russian weapons.
But what if Egypt can not secure that.. the smartest thing to do is to secure the closest technologies to the American ones and counter the best US systems.. it has no choice.. because Usrael..is considered a state of the US..
 
But what if Egypt can not secure that.. the smartest thing to do is to secure the closest technologies to the American ones and counter the best US systems.. it has no choice.. because Usrael..is considered a state of the US..
Would rather go to the other European countries for solutions on all aspects.
 
Would rather go to the other European countries for solutions on all aspects.
it is not always possible..and most European technologies mostly weapons are linked to the US ones..
 
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