As I keep saying, there is nothing in this fiasco that is 'Black or white'. Another anlaysis by an impartial observer. However, this is certainly not "Jihad"
Syria aflame
Farooq Sulehria
Thursday, September 06, 2012
The Arab Spring in its Syrian version has claimed over 20,000 lives since March 2011. Assad dynasty is losing ground. On August 6, Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected to the opposition. However, Bashar al-Assad, who inherited the presidency in 2000 from his father, refuses to budge.
Meantime, the Syrian Intifadas original aims democratic rights and economic justice remain a distant objective as multi-pronged foreign manipulation has complicated the situation beyond description. Outside of Syria, opinion is divided. Broadly, three positions are being taken.
Firstly, there are certain progressives, liberals and pro-Iran elements. For pro-Assad progressives, this regime is anti-Israel and anti-imperialist, and hence it should be supported against US manipulations. Certain liberals are horrified at the prospect of pro-Saudi rebels winning in Syria. The pro-Iran elements consider the Assad regime a vital link that joins Hezbollah-controlled south Lebanon with Tehran via post-Saddam Iraq.
Secondly, there are puritan pro-Saudi elements, Al-Qaida-style. For these elements, an Alawite and secularist Assad dynasty is an infidel aberration.
Thirdly, there are sections of the left that refuse to lend any support to the Assad regime but oppose any foreign intervention whatsoever. They argue against CIA supplies to rebel groups as well as the Russian and Iranian arming of the Assad regime. Sympathising with the third position, this writer will map the geopolitics of the Syrian intifada besides taking issue with characterisition of the Assad regime as secularist, anti-imperialist, anti-Israel.
Let us begin with Israel. Ideally, Israel would like to have pliant pharaohs like Hosni Mubarak at the helm in all its neighbouring countries. The Assads, father and son, have been tricky partners. They have been hosting Palestinian resistance forces of all hues, partnering with the Ayotollahs of Iran and backing Hezbollah. Most importantly, the Assad dynasty never withdrew the Syrian claim to Golan Heights occupied by Israel in 1967. However, Syria has maintained a comfortable status quo with Israel. Since 1973, not a bullet has been fired to disturb the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. On the contrary, Palestinian blood was mercilessly shed in 1976 and 1985-86 to demonstrate to Israel that Syria under Hafez al-Assad would prove as good a Camp David partner as Egypt under the Mubarak regime. The Muslim Brotherhood or an even radical Saudi-backed faction coming to power in post-Assad Syria is least likely to maintain the status quo. That by removing Assad, Israel will undermine the Shia axis stretching from Lebanon to Iran is not what Israel is counting upon. If Assad is replaced by Salafis, Israel will be surrounded by an even more radical Sunni axis: Hamas in Palestine, the Brotherhood in Egypt and Salafis at the helm in Damascus. For Israel, Assad is a lesser evil. Most likely, Israel will prefer to maintain the Baath regime, but without Assad. Probably Washington would also prefer such an arrangement. However, elements backed by the Gulf monarchies and Turkey will be incorporated in a new Baath-dominated regime. Turkeys major concern is the Kurdish population. Before the present uprising, Syria and Turkey were cooperating in the suppression of the Kurds besides improving trade ties. But Turkish interest is not restricted to the Kurdish question. Ankara is trying to revive soft Ottomanism under Islamists: an Arab market for Turkish capital emerging in Anatolia. Recep Tayyip Erdogans Islamist AKP, analysts argue, represents peripheral Anatolian capital unlike Kemalism that represented the traditional bourgeoisie concentrated in Istanbul. Turkey remained neutral initially in the case of Libya as well as Syria because it wanted to avoid an impression of an aggressive neo-Ottoman imperial force.
The Gulf monarchies, however, have different concerns. They stand to lose most if democracy gains a foothold in the Arab world. Hence, they intervened through their proxies to control the Arab revolutions from above instead of blocking the unstoppable changes. Qatar has been supporting a moderate Islamic Brotherhood while Saudi Arabia patronises Salafi elements. However, whenever possible the Gulf sultans have intervened more decisively to derail the revolution. Bahrain is a case in point. In Yemen, Riyadh was also able to win a favourable compromise. Beyond the counter-revolutionary political considerations, the Gulf monarchies have an equally important concern in the case of Syria. By removing Assad, the sultans of the Arab Peninsula want to contain Tehran. Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rule over restless Shia populations. The Assad dynasty draws its social support largely from Syrias Alawites, who constitute ten percent of the Syrian population.
But the Assad dynasty, in spite of its sectarian social base and a secularist outlook rooted in its Baathist past, opportunistically maintained good relations with the Saudi dynasty too. This opportunism is a hallmark of the Assad regime. As a matter of fact, the Assad dynasty was neither anti-imperialist nor anti-Israel. It was opportunist through and through. While a status quo was maintained with Israel, Hafez al-Assad joined George H W Bush to attack Iraq in 1991. A thorough account of the Assads anti-imperialism will require a separate report. A genuine secular, anti-imperialist Arab world will take shape when the Arab masses will themselves form their policies in a democratic fashion.
The writer is a freelance contributor.
Email:
mfsulehria@hotmail.com
Syria aflame - Farooq Sulehria
