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Shahed-136 - Tracking usage & expanding understanding.


Iran must be proud of his contribution to mankind, making this devil thing and selling to evil Kremlin.
reducing the use of energy and emission , help fight global warming
the weapon is a tool , its not evil or life saver. how you use it is important , and russia most answer on how they use it , not Iran
 
reducing the use of energy and emission , help fight global warming
the weapon is a tool , its not evil or life saver. how you use it is important , and russia most answer on how they use it , not Iran

Only a crazy psychopath would be glad of making such troubles to civilian people in a cold country.
 

Iran must be proud of his contribution to mankind, making this devil thing and selling to evil Kremlin.
Yeah, now US will have less bio-labs to develop new viruses against the humanity.

NATO war criminals who have killed millions of people during past decades will have less resources to attack other countries

and people of east and south of Ukraine who didn't accept the coup regime of Ukraine wont be killed by US-backed Nazis.
 
Yeah, now US will have less bio-labs to develop new viruses against the humanity.

NATO war criminals who have killed millions of people during past decades will have less resources to attack other countries

and people of east and south of Ukraine who didn't accept the coup regime of Ukraine wont be killed by US-backed Nazis.
I wonder how low must be the IQ of someone to believe that Russian nonsense of Ukraine Bio-labs.

What is the purpose of have biolabs if you dont use bioweapons when a country has invaded you since half year ago?


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It's a shame so little information about the machine, when they are falling by dozens from the sky.

Spread OSINT about Shahed-136 can not damage Ukraine, only can benefit them, so they should take high res pics and publish it all in internet.
 
I wonder how low must be the IQ of someone to believe that Russian nonsense of Ukraine Bio-labs.

What is the purpose of have biolabs if you dont use bioweapons when a country has invaded you since half year?
Honestly as much I don’t want to agree with you because so far every post I have read of yours and replied to has been a half truth or exaggeration of reality, minus the insult I do agree bio labs don’t exist, no one is going to use anthrax, just giving a example,on a nuclear ready country that wouldn’t hesitate to use them in case of an attack.
 
(Google Translate from Chinese)
Small motorcycles made in Iran
Submitted by: gxrx at 2022-10-23 20:37 read 1288 times 2 likes

Soft core transformation Uncle Zhu Rong
After the Crimea Bridge was bombed, the Russian army began to put Iranian drones into actual combat, of which the biggest result was the cruise missile unmanned-Geran-2, which Iran called Shahed-136 (Witness-136). The drone looks like a delta-wing model aircraft, and the data looks quite impressive. The fuselage length is about 3.5 meters, the flight speed is 185 kilometers per hour, and the weight is about 200 kilograms, with a 50 kilogram warhead. The theoretical flight distance is 2,000 kilometers. Even if it is folded in half, it can strike any place in the rear of Ukraine.

The fact is also true, the Russian army has used hundreds of "Witness-136". Targeted strikes were launched against the military camps, warehouses, substations, command posts and other fixed facilities in the rear of the Ukrainian army.

Moreover, it is cheap to manufacture. The cost of a plane is about 20,000 to 30,000 US dollars. In comparison, Ukraine's long-range rocket launcher Haimas used to attack the Russian army costs 150,000 US dollars for a shell.

Because of the low cost, saturation attack is often used in use. A dumper launch vehicle can instantly launch 5 Shahed-136s. The advantage of using the side-to-rear launch is that a container is added to the civilian dumper, and the shelf can be welded. The launch can greatly save costs, and at the same time, it can be well camouflaged. The Iranians are really good at spending money on the edge.


Dismantling analysis of Shahed 131
The Ukrainian army captured a Shahed 131 and dismantled it in detail. This is an early model that Russia also imported. Compared with the 136, there are basically only parameter differences between the two. The overall structure is the same. We can analyze why the Iranian drone is The secret to great success on the Ukrainian battlefield.

And on October 15th, Ukraine also picked up a crashed "Witness-136" in Nikolayev Oblast. You can see the shell made of composite materials for the aircraft, and the size comparison of an adult and a drone.


The original text is too long and written in Ukrainian. As an embedded software development engineer, I am familiar with some of the modules in it, so I will come to the conclusion. The chips are built, and the main chips are all TI chips. On the one hand, it saves costs and on the other hand, it is convenient to purchase. For example, the chips basically use American chips. Of course, the Iranians certainly cannot purchase from the Americans, but the global civilian products are collected. Tens of thousands of chips are still possible.

The reason why Russia cannot handle similar planes is that the electronic design level is limited, and the military system rarely uses digital circuits. Without this psychological barrier, one is that people can lure U.S. drones to land without damage. In 2011, Iran "captured" a U.S. RQ-170 "Sentry" stealth drone, and then successfully copied it.

Second, people who make American equipment are professional. For example, the main American-made F14 Hornet heavy fighter in the Air Force is the one in Tom's "top gun". In order to prevent the Iranians from getting accessories, the Americans not only retired all F14s from active service , and also dismantled all the storage machines. In this way, Iran has become the only country in the world that uses this fighter jet. Without the support of the manufacturers, it can still work normally for decades. It is still difficult to do without a few brushes.

It uses a civilian engine

This engine looks like a Limbach L550 (Limbach L550), a gasoline-burning drone engine. It is produced by Xiamen Linbahe Aviation Engine Co., Ltd., so this engine can be bought in the civilian market.


This engine is widely used in drones. The ECU electronic control unit is controlled by external equipment. It is on the outermost side of the right side of the flying wing on the Iranian drone. Texas Instruments is used. The chip model is unknown.


The flight control unit (FCU) of the drone can be seen clearly, using five Texas Instruments TMS320F28335


The disassembly of the automatic take-off and landing system (ATOL) can also be seen using TI's chip

Another global navigation satellite system GNSS receiver module is located in the middle of the right side of the wing

Its signal is introduced into an internal signal receiver, and the board is like a ready-made board purchased directly from the market, using Intel Altra's fpga board

On the outside of it is an inertial measurement unit (IMU) used to take the original inertial navigation when there is no GPS signal

And the only attack weapon of this aircraft, the warhead is placed on the nose, like a water pipe.


Honestly as much I don’t want to agree with you because so far every post I have read of yours and replied to has been a half truth or exaggeration of reality, minus the insult I do agree bio labs don’t exist, no one is going to use anthrax, just giving a example,on a nuclear ready country that wouldn’t hesitate to use them in case of an attack.
We can guess about what kind of weapons Ukraine got before the Russia invasion.

But today is ridiculous.

Any Ukrainian big weapon have already used by obvious reasons.

It's like USA and Iraq WMD lies in his day, but some people seems that can believe nonsenses if the lie is said by his side.
 
I wonder how low must be the IQ of someone to believe that Russian nonsense of Ukraine Bio-labs.
Certainly mach higher IQ than those who believe US lies.


What is the purpose of have biolabs if you dont use bioweapons when a country has invaded you since half year ago?
Based on the ex-Ukraine officials like ex-prime minister or ex-intelligence oficers (which perhaps you would call traitors cause they didn't serve US) those labs were under authority of US defense department (not health department) and even Ukraine government had no access to their research.

And by the way, even US senators do believe them and no, it's not based on the Russian reports!
 
The images of the previous url dont load in the page (I dont know why), but there are in the server, so I put here manually.

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Certainly mach higher IQ than those who believe US lies.



Based on the ex-Ukraine officials like ex-prime minister or ex-intelligence oficers (which perhaps you would call traitors cause they didn't serve US) those labs were under authority of US defense department (not health department) and even Ukraine government had no access to their research.

And by the way, even US senators do believe them and no, it's not based on the Russian reports!
Then it's like biolabs in USA mainland in the practice, so there is no reason to worry.

Or come on and take over USA biolabs in USA land.

USA doesnt need Ukraine permission or Ukraine land to develop bio/chems weapons they already have weapons and labs in their own land, to kill whole mankind several times.

And if Ukraine could not to access those weapons until now, then they will never do.
 

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More here:


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It must exist some original source with all the images of "figures", but I dont have a clue of what or where is, doing reverse image search in google images / tineye.com you can localise the mirrors of a image, I didnt test all.
 
I found it, here is the original source:


The original PDF is too large for the forum, so I split in two files.

The original document name is: 20210716-CNW-IRN-05-Shahed-131-UKRAINE.docx

i.e: it's about Shahed-131, not 136.
And it starts by "20210716", i.e: the original creation date is 16 July 2021?
The original PDF as file has the creation date of 23 Sept 2022. And it was uploaded to slideshare 26 Sept 2022.
 

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Here the Google Translate from Ukrainian to English of the previous PDF:

IRN-05 (Shahed-131) UAV Technical report
1.

General overview. The IRN-05 (Shahed-131) is a deadly drone
one-way attack device (OWA - one way attack). (UAS) production system
Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center (SAIRC). IRN-05 (Figures 1-4) is made of
carbon fiber reinforced with internal metal supports. Total length
2.6 m; The wingspan is 2.2 m with an estimated weight of 135 kg. Internal piston engine
combustion sets the platform in motion by means of a wooden screw with a fixed
step by step The electronic system inside the UAS was interconnected using
special marked wire. All markings in the UAS were written in English
language It is estimated that it can be launched from static rails or a truck.

2.

Components to be studied:
a. GNSS transceiver. A commercial off-the-shelf GNSS receiver (Figure 18-22) was
encased in a custom-made metal box made of CPC. It should be noted,
that the GNSS has been processed and manufactured from the same material as the GNSS,
flight control unit (FCU) and power control unit (PCU) that can
see on the IRN-16 platform. He has the ability to receive from four
outer washers of the COTS receiver. A fifth COTS GNSS receiver was also present
outside the fuselage of IRN-05, but the wire leading from it was cut. black
GNSS washers from other systems were also either cut out or disabled, FIT Comment:
this suggests that an OWA UAS has been conducted on Iranian weapons systems
modernization of the average service life; system upgrade from standard black
GNSS systems to a system that can now operate in airspace where
prohibited GNSS (multiple white GNSS washers). End of FIT comment.
b. Flight Control Unit (FCU) The FCU (Fig. 12-14) contained five
order of printed circuit boards (PCBs) that contained TMS320 F28335 processors “Texas
Instruments". It is a highly integrated high performance chipset for
demanding management programs. Four printed circuit boards were identical, and the fifth
the circuit board was evaluated as a power distribution system for others
printed circuit boards. FIT Comment: Four identical PCBs look very similar to
fee from IRN-16 FCU. End of FIT comment. As of May 2019 in
the MEPED reports claimed that the IRN05 had the ability to connect a direct line
line of sight (LOS), Iridium SATCOM radio, possibly a homing gun and pre
programmed flight paths, which may explain that each of the 4 PCBs
programmed to run.
c. ATOL. The UAS had a box marked ATOL (Automatic take off and landing) (Fig.
27-30). FIT Comment: Evaluated Acronym for Automatic Takeoff and Landing. It
the first time this system was used by FIT exploit teams.
End of FIT comment. This system is connected between the GNSS system and the FCU and,
appears to be a new addition. This system can offer many extras
services for UAVs, but can also simply be part of a commercial system that
is not used. As seen in Figure 30, there are four LEDs labeled;
PGNSS, DGNSS, SGNSS and HDG. Initial open source research has shown
the following regarding LED labels:
i.

PGNSS. Unknown through search from open sources..

ii.

DGNSS. Differential GNSS. Functions as a supplement system,
based on the improvement of primary information about the GNSS constellation; by
by using a network of ground base stations that allow

broadcast differential information to UAS to improve accuracy
determining its position. This can be used to transfer known
GPS coordinates on the drone to help it
maintain a flight path in airspace where GPS is prohibited.

iii.

SGNSS. The S-GNSS upgrade provides improved accuracy, sensitivity and
multipath mitigation and also provides
a completely new measurement category for the GNSS receiver with one
antenna - reception angle. It is by distinguishing the direction of arrival that the SGNSS can identify, ignore and (if necessary) locate the source
GNSS spoofing.

iv.

HDG. Hold direction – holds the current direction
UAV platform. This is possibly used if/when the UAV
loses the GNSS signal and continues its flight at altitude until it receives
the GNSS signal or will not recover it. This may indicate why
UAV platforms get close to targets but are not 100% accurate
for the desired purpose. When course hold is enabled and switched from GNSS
per unit of inertia to continue flight, ambient wind
will cause in-flight drift that the FCU cannot accommodate,
as a result of which the UAV slightly deviates from the target but continues its flight and
lands close behind. FIT Comment: For example, if the UAV received
jamming/spoof signal 5km from target and switched to HDG, it will
drift about 5% in distance depending on speed and
wind direction, (5000 m/100)x5=250 m of potential drift from
original GPS target. End of FIT comment.

d. Power Distribution Unit (PDU). The PDU (Fig. 12, 15, 16) has two inside
custom printed circuit boards. It is believed that this device
designed to receive input power from the battery pack at
25.9 volts and converting it to the probable 5 volts needed to run everything
printed circuit boards in the system.
e. Battery. The 25.9 V, 17,000 mAh Li-ion battery consists of 35
of battery cells in a blue heat-shrinkable package. Marked as S/N: 004, Code
client: D19BS0705.
f.

Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). Digital air data computer (Fig. 23).
The IMU used both static and pitot tubes. This will allow you to evaluate the air
aircraft speed, altitude and altitude trend. They will go to FCU and ATOL,
to help determine flight altitude and can be used as a primary
input source in case of GNSS loss.

e. Cables Several connections were labeled as follows: P31 FC, P13 PDU, P2 AV PANEL, P43
S.L.R, P19 IRIDUME, P45 L.O.E, P44 S.L.I.E, P1 REG, P15 ATOL, P41 S.R.I.E, J1. P106
FUEL.D, P107. Some connectors are not marked.
g. Internal combustion piston engine. The UAV contained a large piston
engine. A scan of the fluid in the fuel tank showed a mixture of diesel fuel and
other oil-based substances. According to estimates, the maximum range is
up to 900 km
h. Engine control unit (ECU). The ECU (Fig. 31-33) contained one printed circuit board with
processor "Texas Instruments", according to estimates, this module will control all
engine performance during flight.

3.

Payload. The payload of the system consisted of high-explosive (HE)
warhead (Fig. 5-8), copper cone-shaped charge and preformed
shrapnel sleeve. The copper conical charge had a diameter of 111 mm and a depth of 162 mm. Size
of pre-formed fragmentation is 7 mm in a cube. Materials and components
of this warhead are very similar to IRN-16. The content of BP is estimated at 10-15 kg of cast explosive
substances; explosives could not be tested during operation. Comment
FIT: the formation of a copper cone-shaped charge will be negatively affected by its placement
in the nose cone of the UAV. Both the battery box and several lead ballasts
are in the zone where the jet is formed, this will negatively affect the ability
jets penetrate. There is a hole in the center of the lead weights that can be passed through
form charge. This shows a lack of understanding of the Munro effect and how
formation charges are formed, or that this warhead has a modular one
a design that can be retro-installed in various systems. End of comment.
a. Safety device/fuse. The Safe To Arm (STA) block/fuse is the same as the
in IRN-16. It is made of a ground alloy consisting of a pre
of a wound rotor that acts as a physical barrier between the striker and the detonator is
acts as a safety measure during transport and storage. Percussive inertial percussion
the trunnion is held by an uncompressed spring; it is this spring that must be overcome
inertia striker on impact to trigger the detonator. The battle platoon probably
takes place during flight using a rotating electronic motor
inside the fuse, giving room for the firing pin to go back,
ready to strike There was no presence of electrically controlled initiation. Bloc
The STA/fuse in this IRN-05 was not on a combat platoon during service; it
was confirmed by the use of a protective window on the safety system
an entrenchment that glowed green for the unarmed.

4.

Weight and dimensions. The weight and dimensions of the UAV platform are estimates because the platform
was not intact during operation. Table 1 shows the weights
"gross weight" including approximately full fuel tanks.
Component
General
BLA
Warhead
Capacity
fuel

Mass
135 kg

Section
Wingspan

dimensions
2.2 m

15 kg
unknown

length

2.6 m

Table 1. IRN-05 weight and dimensions

Figure 1. IRN-05 (Shahed-131).

.

Figure 2. IRN-05 (Shahed-131) rebuilt showing warhead.

Figure 3. IRN-05 main fuselage with panels labeled.

Figure 4. IRN-05 base of fuselage.

Figure 5. IRN-05 Warhead with fuse

Figure 6. IRN-05 warhead with a copper cone for the forming charge

Figure 7. IRN-05 striking elements in the warhead (cubes 7mm edge)

Figure 8. IRN-05 Warhead with installed
.
fuse

Figure 9. Panel 1, Panel 1 (power supply device)

Figure 10. Panel 2 Fuel tank

.Figure 11. Panel 3 - empty

.

Figure 12 Panel 4 containing Flight Control Unit (FCU) and Power Distribution Unit (PDU).

Figure 13 Flight Control Unit. Flight control unit

Figure 14. Internal FCU, containing five bespoke PCBs. Inertial block
control

Figure 15. Power Distribution Unit (PDU).
B

Figure 16. Internal PDU.

Figure 17. Panel 5 containing fuel tank.

Figure 18. Panel 6 showing four new “hardened” GNSS pucks in white. Figure 18 also shows the
old black GNSS puck, which has been cut from the system.

Figure 19. Panel 6, Containing GNSS Transceiver.

Figure 20. IRN-05 Transceiver.

Figure 21. IRN-05 GNSS Transceiver.

Figure 22. Internal GNSS Transceiver.

Figure 23. Panel 7 containing Inertia Measurement Unit (IMU).

Figure 24. Panel 8 containing connectors for aileron servos.

Figure 25. Panel 9 containing wiring loom connectors.

Figure 26. Panel 10 fuel or lubricants tank.

Figure 27. Panel 11 containing ATOL – “Automatic Take Off and Landing”.

Figure 28. ATOL - "Automatic Take Off and Landing".

Figure 29. Internal ATOL.

Figure 30. LEDs on ATOL PCB showing “PGNSS, DGNSS, SGNSS, HDG”.

Figure 31. Panel 12 containing Engine Control Unit (ECU).

Figure 32. Panel 12 containing Engine Control Unit (ECU).

Figure 33. IRN-05 Combustion Engine.

Figure 34. 3D Scan of IRN-05 fuselage.

Figure 35. 3D Scan of IRN-05 fuselage.

Figure 36. 3D Scan of IRN-05 fuselage.

Figure 37. 3D Scan of new “hardened” GNSS pucks on panel 11.

Figure 38. 3D Scan of IRN-05 Power Distribution Unit (PDU).

Figure 39. 3D Scan of IRN-05 Engine Management Unit (ECU).

Figure 40. 3D Scan of IRN-05 ATOL “Automatic Take Off and Landing” Unit.

Figure 41. 3D Scan of IRN-05 panel 10 fuel/lubricants tank.

Figure 42. 3D Scan of IRN-05 Flight Control Unit (FCU).
 

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