S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems delivery to India can begin in 2020

[jaiind]

Relationship between India and Russia is much greater than deeper than pacific ocean and higher than himalyas !!

 

[Hellfire]

All China calculus weapons are always used in the eastern theatre.



Long time in the making, and a technical challenge to reckon with.

Sir.

The Indo-Pak scenario is pretty much saturated in terms of military aspects. The chances of a wider conflict are pretty low, even in present tense times. The Chinese dimension (although the probability is low) is what is being catered to. Since AD is bound to be more comprehensive and diffused than be restricted at theatre level, this should be taken in overall picture.

Although, I would rather wait for India to actually sign the deal than speculate further.

 

[dadeechi]

It is a good omen if the deal is really signed on October 15. It falls on Sharad Poornima.

This is the time when the great Mauryans of Magadha celebrated the Kaumudi Mahotsav (Moon Festival) right after the Sharad Navratri.

Fast forward to today, Indians would be celebrating this deal as part of the BRICS festival...

 

[Crixus]

Now happy buddy , I think you want such deals with Russia to through

It is a good omen if the deal is really signed on October 15. It falls on Sharad Poornima.

This is the time when the great Mauryans of Magadha celebrated the Kaumudi Mahotsav (Moon Festival) right after the Sharad Navratri.

Fast forward to today, Indians would be celebrating this deal as part of the BRICS festival...

 

[vinay]

breaking or not ???

Global Hunger Index: Welcome to India, world's hottest economy where 39% kids are stunted


http://www.firstpost.com/business/g...my-where-39-children-are-stunted-3046864.html

Are you on a defence forum or a poverty forum ?

 

[Crixus]

A chinese quality post from a Chinese member ...thanks for this pearl of wisdom sir

breaking or not ???

Global Hunger Index: Welcome to India, world's hottest economy where 39% kids are stunted


http://www.firstpost.com/business/g...my-where-39-children-are-stunted-3046864.html

 

[migflug]

Stealth frigates, missiles among big-ticket defence deals with Russia
The defence deals come in the backdrop of the first-ever joint military exercises between Russia and Pakistan on Pakistani soil after the Uri terror attacks.
Sushant Singh | New Delhi | Updated: October 14, 2016 7:52 am

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. (Source: File)

INDIA AND Russia are expected to ink defence deals worth billions of dollars during the meeting in Goa on Saturday between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin, on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. They include the procurement from Russia of four stealth frigates and five units of the S-400 anti-aircraft system, and the announcement of a joint venture for the manufacture of 200 Kamov-226T helicopters in India.

“India and Russia have come back to a point where we are making a significant investment in the relationship with Moscow. The S-400 procurement is an example of our commitment to the relationship. We might have a better relationship with the US but it doesn’t change the content of our relationship with Moscow,” top government sources told The Indian Express.

Sources confirmed that the deal would be worth billions of dollars but did not provide an overall estimate — the missile systems alone may cost $4.5 bn.

The defence deals come in the backdrop of the first-ever joint military exercises between Russia and Pakistan on Pakistani soil after the Uri terror attacks. India had expected the exercise to be rescheduled but New Delhi understands that the Russian relationship with India remains “strong and unaffected” by Moscow’s engagement with Islamabad, said sources.

The deal for four Admiral Grigorovich-class (Project 11356) guided-missile stealth frigates will involve the direct supply of two vessels from Russia while another two will be made in India. The shipyard for making these frigates in India will be chosen by a competitive process, sources said.

The 3,620-tonne Admiral Grigorovich-class, which can be fitted with BrahMos missiles, is a derivative of the six Talwar-class frigates that Russia built for the Indian Navy between 2003 and 2013.

India will also sign an inter-government agreement for the supply of S-400 LRSAM anti-aircraft systems, which is one of the most advanced air defence options available and capable of destroying missiles, drones and incoming fighter jets within a range of 400 km.

The approval for procuring the S-400 missile systems was given by the Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar-led Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC) last December. India will be the second international buyer of the missile system after China.

Sources said that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) will be the Indian partner for the JV to manufacture the light multipurpose Kamov-226T helicopters. An Indian private defence manufacturer may be involved at a later stage, said sources.

Kamov helicopters had undergone testing in India as part of the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Helicopter (RSH) acquisition programme, which was cancelled by the defence ministry in 2014. An agreement for these helicopters was signed by the two countries during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Moscow last December.

“The Kamov helicopter is a new model and the first real ‘Make in India’ project in a way. The same is the case with the stealth frigates,” said sources.

However, no progress is expected on the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) being jointly developed by the two countries, which remains a “sore point” for Moscow, sources said. The R&D contract for the FGFA is not expected to be signed during the meet, as India is yet to make up its mind on various issues related to the fighter aircraft.

According to sources, the two sides have also “progressed through constant engagement in exploring new ways” to the problem of spare parts for military equipment of Russian origin. Nearly two-thirds of equipment with the armed forces is of Russian and Soviet origin. For instance, the serviceability of the Russian-origin Sukhoi fighter aircraft, the main workhorse of the Indian Air Force, has been a glaring issue with barely 50 per cent of the fleet being airworthy at any given time.

“Besides showing our commitment by buying new equipment, we have to also keep the older ones running. HAL has worked out a detailed list of spares for Sukhois. The Russians have understood our requirement and will designate an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) or agency empowered to handle the supply of spares. This will be a long-term arrangement,” said sources.

Russia and India will begin joint production of helicopters and airplanes

Ka-226T
Photo: Ilya Pitalev / RIA Novosti

Russia and India will begin joint production of the Ka-226T. About this in an interview with the Economic Times said Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov.

Head of Industry and Trade said that the necessary documents have been agreed. "The project that involves the creation of a joint venture for the production and delivery of Ka-226T, is a key step. All documents are consistent. We plan to sign them during the Indo-Russian summit and the summit of the BRICS in Goa on October 15-16 ", - the minister said.

Manturov also said that the holding company "Helicopters of Russia" participates in the tender for the supply of India's passenger helicopters. In this case we are talking about the sale of two helicopters Mi-172 (passenger version of the Mi-8). Such machines are already in operation in India.


Hello, Sergei!
Ka-226 will get a chance for the licensed production in India
7:03 May 19, 2015

reaching the ceiling
The Russian helicopter industry change is coming
In addition, the Minister said that Russia is ready to participate in the project on creation of the Indian civil aircraft.According to him, the Indian company Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has sent a formal request to Moscow to study the possibility of production of Indian civil aircraft.

"We can offer the Russian experience in the creation of this plane, and we can consider the possibility to participate in the project as a whole, and its individual stages (from design to sales service)," - said the head of department.

Russia has offered to establish a joint venture for the production of IL-114-300 regional passenger aircraft, he recalled. Parties can also cooperate in the field of new generation MS-21 passenger aircraft production.

Ka-226T - a new version of a light multi-purpose helicopter Ka-226 (development of the Ka-26), which appeared in 2008. The machine take-off weight of 3.6 tonnes has a top speed of 250 kilometers per hour and is capable of carrying 1050-1100 kg payload in the cabin or on the external sling.

Short and medium passenger aircraft MS-21 is created to replace obsolete vessels Tu-154. The machine applies for the same commercial niche as the Boeing-737 MAX and Airbus A320neo. The aircraft is able to take on board from 150 to 210 passengers. The maximum flight distance - up to five thousand kilometers.

 

[dani958]

dont buy this buy david sling is cheaper

 

[DavidSling]

Quality is always costly ... and its a defencive purchase not an offensive one and no other country is going to sell us system like this .



US blocked arrow sale to india almost 13-14 years back ..but allowed the sale of green pine ..which we still have .

U.S doesn't "Allow" Israel to sell Green Pine radar cause those were manafuctured by IAI with no support from the U.S and were chosen to the Arrow program.
You could buy terra radar, and U.S couldn't block it aswell.

And if i'd look at U.S interests by blocking the deal, it would be the right thing to do for them for couple of reasons.
They were afraid u'd sell Arrow to Iran or Russia, which are key enemies of both Israel and United states.
Arrow has key features which serve U.S beyond the Arrow program aka Thaad and more.

U.S invest in Israel's interceptors but reserves the knowledge to produce it's home made interceptors, but ofcourse, with key differences

 

[dani958]

the spectra is gan aesa
why the ultra isnt galium nitrid also/?

 

[Immortan.Joe]

And if i'd look at U.S interests by blocking the deal, it would be the right thing to do for them for couple of reasons.
They were afraid u'd sell Arrow to Iran or Russia, which are key enemies of both Israel and United states.
Arrow has key features which serve U.S beyond the Arrow program aka Thaad and more.

U.S invest in Israel's interceptors but reserves the knowledge to produce it's home made interceptors, but ofcourse, with key differences

That is pretty stupid reasoning on part of US to block Arrow's sale. Why would India sell (I think you mean giving full access) to Iran or Russia? So that they could tell everything to Pakistan and China respectively!

Arrow type weapons are strategic weapons and no one out their secret to even their 'friends'; and our relation with Iran is not so good to begin with, and even those with Russia are one dimensional. Neither is USA or any other country going to get full access to S-400, if it is used in ABM role.

USA probably blocked arrow as it would undercut potential sale of USA's BMD .

 

[DavidSling]

That is pretty stupid reasoning on part of US to block Arrow's sale. Why would India sell (I think you mean giving full access) to Iran or Russia? So that they could tell everything to Pakistan and China respectively!

Arrow type weapons are strategic weapons and no one out their secret to even their 'friends'; and our relation with Iran is not so good to begin with, and even those with Russia are one dimensional. Neither is USA or any other country going to get full access to S-400, if it is used in ABM role.

USA probably blocked arrow as it would undercut potential sale of USA's BMD .

The argument against the sale of Arrow to India

Sheela Bhatt in Mumbai | September 06, 2003 17:58 IST


On the eve of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to India starting Monday, September 8, a Washington think tank has argued strongly against the sale of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile defence system to India.

The system, developed jointly by the United States and Israel, needs American approval before it can be sold to any other country.

While India has expressed an interest in it, but not put in a formal request, Israel, already the second largest arms exporter to India with deals worth more than $1 billion, has sought Washington's permission to sell it to New Delhi.

But a source in the diplomatic corps in New Delhi said the American approval is unlikely to come soon. "It will take its own time," the source said. "America will first settle its issues with Pakistan before agreeing to allow India to have the defence it deserves," he added.

"The Arrow should come to India and it will be understood by America that it is vital for India's long-term strategic interests," Dr Subhash Kapila, a former diplomat and intelligence officer, told rediff.com.

But in a paper titled 'Arrows for India?' prepared for the Washington Institute, Richard Speier, a former Pentagon official specialising in missile non-proliferation issues, argues that the sale of the system to India would backfire on American and Israeli strategic interests.

The paper starts by listing the perceived advantages of such a sale. Geopolitically, India could be an important security partner. India is threatened by radical Islamist terrorists. Democratic India is a logical partner of the United States. A strong India can help balance China's growing power. Being close to the Persian Gulf, India's naval facilities are an attraction for the US Central Command. To discourage possible hi-tech co-operation between India and Iran, an increase in Israeli and American influence is recommended.

Speier also argues that in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, whoever strikes first would have a substantial advantage. In a crisis, this incentive to launch a first strike could lead to disaster. Misssile defences are one way to create uncertainties about the effectiveness of such strikes.

Israel's recent sale to India of the Phalcon air defence system could be considered the first step towards shifting New Delhi's security orientation.

But, says Speier, the Arrow is not India's only missile defence option. Russia is discussing the sale of the comparable S300V system, and Washington could offer the Patriot missiles, made famous by Gulf War I.

He then goes on to list the disadvantages of such a sale to India. He fears that if India gains the advantage in defence, "it might behave more recklessly toward Pakistan," which would accelerate the South Asian nuclear arms race.

This would also incur Pakistan's displeasure, which could hit US-Pakistani co-operation on Afghanistan and counter-terrorism.

Another important issue America will have to consider is that of non-proliferation, says Speier. The Arrow uses a large, sophisticated rocket motor, which exceeds the threshold set by the Missile Technology Control Regime endorsed by 33 nations, including Israel. The MTCR has already voiced its objections to such a sale.But the US Patriot missile does not come under the MTCR.

Though "rare" exports are permitted by the MTCR, Speier argues that "India and Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes make them dubious candidates for such allowances." The sale of the Arrow will harm the non-proliferation movement and "could also hurt its [America's] efforts to define illicit missile exports in its new Proliferation Security Initiative."

Speier then goes on to assert that "India has a record of diversion of sensitive technology. India diverted the engine of a Soviet air defence missile, the SA-2, to make the offensive Prithvi ballistic missile. It also diverted the design of a US space-launch rocket, the Scout, to make the Agni medium-range ballistic missile.

"Arrow interceptors could be a source of more sophisticated missile technology not only for India but also for its customers. India seeks to export missiles; it has not agreed to abide by MTCR restrictions. Its export control record is spotty; although New Delhi has halted some dangerous shipments, the CIA has reported Indian assistance to Libya's missile programme, and Washington recently imposed sanctions on Indian firms for missile and chemical weapon-related exports to Iraq and, possibly, Iran," says the paper.

"India's missile relationship with Russia raises the additional possibility that Arrow technology could make its way to experts there who would examine it to find ways to develop countermeasures against it."

The fear has been expressed that Russia could then export these countermeasures to Israel's adversaries in the Middle East, such as Iran. The MTCR, to which Russia is also a signatory, does not control the export of most countermeasures.

Moreover, the Arrow employs US command guidance, seeker, and computer hardware and software technology to direct it to its target. Hence, lessons learnt from examining the Arrow might lead to countermeasures that could compromise US missile defences that employ similar technology, says Speier.

In view of these arguments, what are the options before America?

Speier agrees that the US decision on the Arrow sale to India is a difficult one. In case of approval, he strongly recommends the use of diplomacy and export conditions to try and limit adverse consequences such as Pakistani anger.

"Approval," he says, "would offer short-term diplomatic gains for the United States, Israel, and India. It will also leave a long follow-up agenda with an uncertain outcome."

Another option is to deny the sale and strictly follow the MTCR threshold and have less sensitive US and Israeli defence co-operation with India. This option, though certain to cause bilateral problems in the short term, will offer long-term global security advantages.

A third option suggested in the paper is for Israel to offer India "missile defence services" rather than the Arrow interceptor hardware. Israel could keep the interceptors under its control, but deploy them to India with the help of the Indian armed forces. Recently, US Patriot missiles were deployed in a similar way by countries threatened by Iraqi missiles. This would address the concerns of the MTCR and the potential for development of countermeasures.

But since New Delhi will never agree to not have complete control over its defences, the paper argues that the US should 'convince' Russia to restrict any offer of its S300V system under a similar 'services' approach, thus leaving India with no other choice.

Arguing strongly against outright sale of the Arrow, Speier warns, "Missile proliferation may be more of a danger to Israel than to any other nation. Israel should reconsider the Arrow sale and ensure that its actions reduce this danger."

http://www.thehindu.com/2003/09/08/stories/2003090805451100.htm

 

[Immortan.Joe]

The argument against the sale of Arrow to India

Sheela Bhatt in Mumbai | September 06, 2003 17:58 IST


On the eve of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to India starting Monday, September 8, a Washington think tank has argued strongly against the sale of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile defence system to India.

The system, developed jointly by the United States and Israel, needs American approval before it can be sold to any other country.

While India has expressed an interest in it, but not put in a formal request, Israel, already the second largest arms exporter to India with deals worth more than $1 billion, has sought Washington's permission to sell it to New Delhi.

But a source in the diplomatic corps in New Delhi said the American approval is unlikely to come soon. "It will take its own time," the source said. "America will first settle its issues with Pakistan before agreeing to allow India to have the defence it deserves," he added.

"The Arrow should come to India and it will be understood by America that it is vital for India's long-term strategic interests," Dr Subhash Kapila, a former diplomat and intelligence officer, told rediff.com.

But in a paper titled 'Arrows for India?' prepared for the Washington Institute, Richard Speier, a former Pentagon official specialising in missile non-proliferation issues, argues that the sale of the system to India would backfire on American and Israeli strategic interests.

The paper starts by listing the perceived advantages of such a sale. Geopolitically, India could be an important security partner. India is threatened by radical Islamist terrorists. Democratic India is a logical partner of the United States. A strong India can help balance China's growing power. Being close to the Persian Gulf, India's naval facilities are an attraction for the US Central Command. To discourage possible hi-tech co-operation between India and Iran, an increase in Israeli and American influence is recommended.

Speier also argues that in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, whoever strikes first would have a substantial advantage. In a crisis, this incentive to launch a first strike could lead to disaster. Misssile defences are one way to create uncertainties about the effectiveness of such strikes.

Israel's recent sale to India of the Phalcon air defence system could be considered the first step towards shifting New Delhi's security orientation.

But, says Speier, the Arrow is not India's only missile defence option. Russia is discussing the sale of the comparable S300V system, and Washington could offer the Patriot missiles, made famous by Gulf War I.

He then goes on to list the disadvantages of such a sale to India. He fears that if India gains the advantage in defence, "it might behave more recklessly toward Pakistan," which would accelerate the South Asian nuclear arms race.

This would also incur Pakistan's displeasure, which could hit US-Pakistani co-operation on Afghanistan and counter-terrorism.

Another important issue America will have to consider is that of non-proliferation, says Speier. The Arrow uses a large, sophisticated rocket motor, which exceeds the threshold set by the Missile Technology Control Regime endorsed by 33 nations, including Israel. The MTCR has already voiced its objections to such a sale.But the US Patriot missile does not come under the MTCR.

Though "rare" exports are permitted by the MTCR, Speier argues that "India and Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes make them dubious candidates for such allowances." The sale of the Arrow will harm the non-proliferation movement and "could also hurt its [America's] efforts to define illicit missile exports in its new Proliferation Security Initiative."

Speier then goes on to assert that "India has a record of diversion of sensitive technology. India diverted the engine of a Soviet air defence missile, the SA-2, to make the offensive Prithvi ballistic missile. It also diverted the design of a US space-launch rocket, the Scout, to make the Agni medium-range ballistic missile.

"Arrow interceptors could be a source of more sophisticated missile technology not only for India but also for its customers. India seeks to export missiles; it has not agreed to abide by MTCR restrictions. Its export control record is spotty; although New Delhi has halted some dangerous shipments, the CIA has reported Indian assistance to Libya's missile programme, and Washington recently imposed sanctions on Indian firms for missile and chemical weapon-related exports to Iraq and, possibly, Iran," says the paper.

"India's missile relationship with Russia raises the additional possibility that Arrow technology could make its way to experts there who would examine it to find ways to develop countermeasures against it."

The fear has been expressed that Russia could then export these countermeasures to Israel's adversaries in the Middle East, such as Iran. The MTCR, to which Russia is also a signatory, does not control the export of most countermeasures.

Moreover, the Arrow employs US command guidance, seeker, and computer hardware and software technology to direct it to its target. Hence, lessons learnt from examining the Arrow might lead to countermeasures that could compromise US missile defences that employ similar technology, says Speier.

In view of these arguments, what are the options before America?

Speier agrees that the US decision on the Arrow sale to India is a difficult one. In case of approval, he strongly recommends the use of diplomacy and export conditions to try and limit adverse consequences such as Pakistani anger.

"Approval," he says, "would offer short-term diplomatic gains for the United States, Israel, and India. It will also leave a long follow-up agenda with an uncertain outcome."

Another option is to deny the sale and strictly follow the MTCR threshold and have less sensitive US and Israeli defence co-operation with India. This option, though certain to cause bilateral problems in the short term, will offer long-term global security advantages.

A third option suggested in the paper is for Israel to offer India "missile defence services" rather than the Arrow interceptor hardware. Israel could keep the interceptors under its control, but deploy them to India with the help of the Indian armed forces. Recently, US Patriot missiles were deployed in a similar way by countries threatened by Iraqi missiles. This would address the concerns of the MTCR and the potential for development of countermeasures.

But since New Delhi will never agree to not have complete control over its defences, the paper argues that the US should 'convince' Russia to restrict any offer of its S300V system under a similar 'services' approach, thus leaving India with no other choice.

Arguing strongly against outright sale of the Arrow, Speier warns, "Missile proliferation may be more of a danger to Israel than to any other nation. Israel should reconsider the Arrow sale and ensure that its actions reduce this danger."

http://www.thehindu.com/2003/09/08/stories/2003090805451100.htm

The reasoning here seems to be "What would Pakistan say?" ,something which was prevalent with USA in 2003, with rest of the reasons thrown in to fill space and make core argument sound credible.

It is a paper about how to deny any BMD to India ,even exhorting USA to lobby with Russia to deny S-300V to India. It was probably written by a lobbyist in employ of Pakistan.

 

[DavidSling]

The reasoning here seems to be "What would Pakistan say?" ,something which was prevalent with USA in 2003, with rest of the reasons thrown in to fill space and make core argument sound credible.

It is a paper about how to deny any BMD to India ,even exhorting USA to lobby with Russia to deny S-300V to India. It was probably written by a lobbyist in employ of Pakistan.

So what were the reasons according to u

 

[migflug]

U.S doesn't "Allow" Israel to sell Green Pine radar cause those were manafuctured by IAI with no support from the U.S and were chosen to the Arrow program.
You could buy terra radar, and U.S couldn't block it aswell.

And if i'd look at U.S interests by blocking the deal, it would be the right thing to do for them for couple of reasons.
They were afraid u'd sell Arrow to Iran or Russia, which are key enemies of both Israel and United states.
Arrow has key features which serve U.S beyond the Arrow program aka Thaad and more.

U.S invest in Israel's interceptors but reserves the knowledge to produce it's home made interceptors, but ofcourse, with key differences

Suprise we recently floated a tender for long range randar (10 radar) ,most probably it would be green pine/super green pine unless Raytheon can manage to enter the competition. Still i would bet on super green pine