Featured Pakistan Navy Type 054AP Frigates - Update, News & Discussion

[Rafi]

This is a piece I had written before the acquisition of Type 54A was revealed in another thread (Sparrow needed). We do talk about the weapon systems till death but seldom discuss where they fit into the strategy. So I thought let me give it a try--so here it goes. I have updated the write-up in italics in light of new acquisitions.

"IMHO and with little bit of study of Naval Power, Pak Navy's role is defensive and keeping its SLOC open during a conflict with India. Its strike element is its Submarine Force and Aviation Arm and not its surface fleet!

Adding a AAW frigate with strong AShM is at the most extending the Air Defense umbrella a little bit further into the ocean to guard its SLOC.... again essentially, a defensive role for the surface fleet.

I for one do not see PN going beyond acquiring two heavy AAW Frigates around which it can build two flotillas with a mix of one AAW and possibly two ASW frigates with heavy AShM punch. Two ASW (this was written before the announcement of Type 54A) Frigates are a min. must for an effective ASW patrol and hunting (but I have serious doubts about F22P and its ASW capability with light weight torps. and its sonar. Maybe, the next round of purchase from either Turkey or China will beef up this area). This dove tails with two Fleet Replenishment Platforms operated by PN (I believe very soon, work on the second ship of the Turkish Fleet Tanker will be started). By the latest order, of surface vessels not one but two fleet replenishment ships need to be added to the fleet to support four patrol groups.

One of the Patrol groups will be, in my opinion, stationed off the coast of Southern part of Oman in the event hostilities and the other will be somewhere off the coast of Gawader. Gawader becoming the primary port of entry for both oil and dry cargo and very soon and will be used as such in the event of open hostilities breaking out between India and Pakistan. Ideally there should be three patrol groups one should be based near Socotra (Using Chinese base at Djibouti as replenishment base) and the other, somewhere off the coast of Al Wusta province of Oman. The north most group should be positioned east of Gawader and its patrol area should be the approaches to the straits of Hurmuz. This way search and seizure of India bound vessels can be carried out (However, If China openly sides with Pakistan than Djibouti can be used to mount patrols by Chinese Navy and free up PN units to concentrate more towards the coast mid of Oman and Hurmuz) This strategy would require a home port for the southern most group (That will be provided by I guess Djibouti.. the Chinese Base there). PN has now pretty long experience of navigating/patrolling these waters for anti piracy operations. However such a strategy will dictate three AAW frigates and atleast four more ASW/AShM frigates.

The above strategy has been vindicated by the order of not two, not three but four Type 54A frigates! They will form the core of the four Surface Patrol/Hunter Killer Anti Submarine Groups and the fourth will be stationed behind the picket/patrol line of submarines south east of Karachi, complimenting their patrol and provide support in the event of a seaborne landings near Sir Creek area which I anticipate will happen to tie down PA troops south of Chorr away from Northern Sindh and Naara Area.

The COMSUB would most certainly use its hunter killers in a patrol arc starting about 100 KM off the coast of Runn of Kutch and ending somewhere west of Karachi but between Ormara and KHI.

The airborne LRP and Early Warning will be provided, in this area, by Orions and Karakoram Eagles and Deep Strike by the Naval Strike element out of Mehran and Masroor respectively.

Airborne LRP/Strike will be provided again by Orions and KE's out of Turbat. (One of the KE is temporarily stationed at PAF Shahrahe e Faisal. There are only Three permanent facilities for KE at Masroor. I believe the fourth and any subsequent follow-on orders for these birds will be stationed at Turbat to provide long range AWACS support West of Karachi.) In the West. Point air defense and CAP will be provided by PAF planes out of Pasni. But this needs to be beefed up as currently the PAF base over there can only handle eight fighter a/c to cover Ormara and Gawader (Pasni is situated about midway between Gawader and Ormara). Two more pens are under construction at PAF Pasni that would give 8 + 2 pens at Pasni, and 4 at Gawader. Again inadequate Point defense cover specially keeping in-view that they will be facing the Indian SU menace)

Close in Littoral defense will be the responsibility of various of corvettes and Fast Attack Missile boats being added to PN fleet. The pivot points for this defense would be the three ports of PQA, KHI & Gawader. Ormara would defend its self from air and sea attack by on Land AA/SAM assets and shore based AsHM if need be. The high powered surveillance radar at both Hawakes Bay and Ormara gives a panoramic view of the approaches to both KHI (Main Naval Base) and Ormara (Right now the secondary Naval Facility). Addition of six more FAC's are expected that will help provide the inshore defense at both Gawader and Ormara.

The strategic punch will remain with atleast two Chinese built Subs out of the eight being acquired, armed with nuclear tipped cruise missiles. By the end of the program of inducting eight subs, PN will have 11 subs (INMHO 12 are the min. required but that is my opinion). Which will be sufficient to mount effective aggressor patrols far out into and beyond our EEZ. ACNS NSFC will have direct command over the use of the two nuclear armed subs through COMSUB PN.

I also believe that PN is looking for an effective deep strike Air Element to counter the IN Carrier Group. Also lacking is a coherent and credible Air defense of the coastal belt West of Karachi. PAF has neglected this area and I do not see any significant activity on ground to close this gap. In total there are not more than a dozen or so hardened pens in the entire Markran Coastal Belt!! In past wargames conducted at the War College, SU-30 long range and the threat of its use towards the western approaches was a real headache. This was validated in a number of simulations played over many courses at the War College. I am not divulging a military secret here. It is a known fact and was played out even where foreign course participants/officers were part of the simulations.

I acknowledge that there are definite holes in the above scenario. But the general deployment would be similar to what I surmise above.

My 2C's worth. Please feel free to shoot holes in it!!"

A thorough thoughtful analysis.

 

[Armchair]

This is a piece I had written before the acquisition of Type 54A was revealed in another thread (Sparrow needed). We do talk about the weapon systems till death but seldom discuss where they fit into the strategy. So I thought let me give it a try--so here it goes. I have updated the write-up in italics in light of new acquisitions.

"IMHO and with little bit of study of Naval Power, Pak Navy's role is defensive and keeping its SLOC open during a conflict with India. Its strike element is its Submarine Force and Aviation Arm and not its surface fleet!

Adding a AAW frigate with strong AShM is at the most extending the Air Defense umbrella a little bit further into the ocean to guard its SLOC.... again essentially, a defensive role for the surface fleet.

I for one do not see PN going beyond acquiring two heavy AAW Frigates around which it can build two flotillas with a mix of one AAW and possibly two ASW frigates with heavy AShM punch. Two ASW (this was written before the announcement of Type 54A) Frigates are a min. must for an effective ASW patrol and hunting (but I have serious doubts about F22P and its ASW capability with light weight torps. and its sonar. Maybe, the next round of purchase from either Turkey or China will beef up this area). This dove tails with two Fleet Replenishment Platforms operated by PN (I believe very soon, work on the second ship of the Turkish Fleet Tanker will be started). By the latest order, of surface vessels not one but two fleet replenishment ships need to be added to the fleet to support four patrol groups.

One of the Patrol groups will be, in my opinion, stationed off the coast of Southern part of Oman in the event hostilities and the other will be somewhere off the coast of Gawader. Gawader becoming the primary port of entry for both oil and dry cargo and very soon and will be used as such in the event of open hostilities breaking out between India and Pakistan. Ideally there should be three patrol groups one should be based near Socotra (Using Chinese base at Djibouti as replenishment base) and the other, somewhere off the coast of Al Wusta province of Oman. The north most group should be positioned east of Gawader and its patrol area should be the approaches to the straits of Hurmuz. This way search and seizure of India bound vessels can be carried out (However, If China openly sides with Pakistan than Djibouti can be used to mount patrols by Chinese Navy and free up PN units to concentrate more towards the coast mid of Oman and Hurmuz) This strategy would require a home port for the southern most group (That will be provided by I guess Djibouti.. the Chinese Base there). PN has now pretty long experience of navigating/patrolling these waters for anti piracy operations. However such a strategy will dictate three AAW frigates and atleast four more ASW/AShM frigates.

The above strategy has been vindicated by the order of not two, not three but four Type 54A frigates! They will form the core of the four Surface Patrol/Hunter Killer Anti Submarine Groups and the fourth will be stationed behind the picket/patrol line of submarines south east of Karachi, complimenting their patrol and provide support in the event of a seaborne landings near Sir Creek area which I anticipate will happen to tie down PA troops south of Chorr away from Northern Sindh and Naara Area.

The COMSUB would most certainly use its hunter killers in a patrol arc starting about 100 KM off the coast of Runn of Kutch and ending somewhere west of Karachi but between Ormara and KHI.

The airborne LRP and Early Warning will be provided, in this area, by Orions and Karakoram Eagles and Deep Strike by the Naval Strike element out of Mehran and Masroor respectively.

Airborne LRP/Strike will be provided again by Orions and KE's out of Turbat. (One of the KE is temporarily stationed at PAF Shahrahe e Faisal. There are only Three permanent facilities for KE at Masroor. I believe the fourth and any subsequent follow-on orders for these birds will be stationed at Turbat to provide long range AWACS support West of Karachi.) In the West. Point air defense and CAP will be provided by PAF planes out of Pasni. But this needs to be beefed up as currently the PAF base over there can only handle eight fighter a/c to cover Ormara and Gawader (Pasni is situated about midway between Gawader and Ormara). Two more pens are under construction at PAF Pasni that would give 8 + 2 pens at Pasni, and 4 at Gawader. Again inadequate Point defense cover specially keeping in-view that they will be facing the Indian SU menace)

Close in Littoral defense will be the responsibility of various of corvettes and Fast Attack Missile boats being added to PN fleet. The pivot points for this defense would be the three ports of PQA, KHI & Gawader. Ormara would defend its self from air and sea attack by on Land AA/SAM assets and shore based AsHM if need be. The high powered surveillance radar at both Hawakes Bay and Ormara gives a panoramic view of the approaches to both KHI (Main Naval Base) and Ormara (Right now the secondary Naval Facility). Addition of six more FAC's are expected that will help provide the inshore defense at both Gawader and Ormara.

The strategic punch will remain with atleast two Chinese built Subs out of the eight being acquired, armed with nuclear tipped cruise missiles. By the end of the program of inducting eight subs, PN will have 11 subs (INMHO 12 are the min. required but that is my opinion). Which will be sufficient to mount effective aggressor patrols far out into and beyond our EEZ. ACNS NSFC will have direct command over the use of the two nuclear armed subs through COMSUB PN.

I also believe that PN is looking for an effective deep strike Air Element to counter the IN Carrier Group. Also lacking is a coherent and credible Air defense of the coastal belt West of Karachi. PAF has neglected this area and I do not see any significant activity on ground to close this gap. In total there are not more than a dozen or so hardened pens in the entire Markran Coastal Belt!! In past wargames conducted at the War College, SU-30 long range and the threat of its use towards the western approaches was a real headache. This was validated in a number of simulations played over many courses at the War College. I am not divulging a military secret here. It is a known fact and was played out even where foreign course participants/officers were part of the simulations.

I acknowledge that there are definite holes in the above scenario. But the general deployment would be similar to what I surmise above.

My 2C's worth. Please feel free to shoot holes in it!!"

I am not qualified to shoot holes into this excellent and professional write-up, but let me still make an attempt.

If you are attempting to block the Gulf oil routes using Type 54A - centric battle groups, it may backfire. IN could use its aircraft carrier and very long ranged FLANKERS, along with powerful destroyer battle groups to attack such a screen and destroy these deployments.

PAF can never come to the rescue, nor does it have enough assets to even keep a meaningful air defense screen over its own EEZ let alone near Sokutra and south of Oman. China cannot militarily come to your aid, as it has never done so in the past.

This means your battle-groups in this area will sink, after a valiant but fruitless fight.

What WW2 has taught us about beach landings is to not let the enemy get a foothold. This means forward defenses have to be planned now on the beach. The area should also be mined during war.

Sir Creek is not strategic. India cannot move heavy armor into this area, no matter how much it tries. The area is bog. There is no meaningful vector from here towards Karachi or further north. If the Indians make the mistakes over overcoming missile boat attacks, mines, submarine assualts, then makes a landing on Sir Creek, a total mangrove, get stuck in deep mud, then somehow fight there way to any axis, they have gained nothing.

Why? because they cannot launch a meaningful maneuver towards anywhere, and when the war ends, this land will surely have to be surrendered as its an international boundary.

Planners at whatever war college are writing this stuff, they need to actually visit a mangrove area. They need to visit Sir Creek, find were the Indians could potentially land, and then try to make there way somewhere to the north of Karachi. They will see how fruitless and stupid this idea is.

Problem is most people haven't visited mangroves or swamps, or bogs.

Next there is the issue of harrassing PN via attacks on Karachi, Gawadar, Port Qasim, etc. This will be done with powerful Indian naval groups supported by missile boats, armed with cruise missiles. Then there will be FLANKERS and FULCRUMS armed with cruise missiles raining down hell. This will be a 1971 like event were numerous navy ships, naval installations, civilian installations will be burnt to the ground.

Because the major assets were left out there near Oman and Sokutra, there just wont be enough punch left to defeat this. Meanwhile, IAF will fly over Gawadar and attack the PAF from behind, from their soft belly. This will cause even more mayhem.

By this time (or even before that), the war will end and it will be yet another humiliating defeat for the PN and a slap in the face of the PAF. Everyone will wonder why they didn't get a devil's advocate for whatever group-think they were fantasizing.

 

[Imran Khan]

i think 2021 is too late for delivery . or its ok ?

 

[Rafi]

I am not qualified to shoot holes into this excellent and professional write-up, but let me still make an attempt.

If you are attempting to block the Gulf oil routes using Type 54A - centric battle groups, it may backfire. IN could use its aircraft carrier and very long ranged FLANKERS, along with powerful destroyer battle groups to attack such a screen and destroy these deployments.

PAF can never come to the rescue, nor does it have enough assets to even keep a meaningful air defense screen over its own EEZ let alone near Sokutra and south of Oman. China cannot militarily come to your aid, as it has never done so in the past.

This means your battle-groups in this area will sink, after a valiant but fruitless fight.

What WW2 has taught us about beach landings is to not let the enemy get a foothold. This means forward defenses have to be planned now on the beach. The area should also be mined during war.

Sir Creek is not strategic. India cannot move heavy armor into this area, no matter how much it tries. The area is bog. There is no meaningful vector from here towards Karachi or further north. If the Indians make the mistakes over overcoming missile boat attacks, mines, submarine assualts, then makes a landing on Sir Creek, a total mangrove, get stuck in deep mud, then somehow fight there way to any axis, they have gained nothing.

Why? because they cannot launch a meaningful maneuver towards anywhere, and when the war ends, this land will surely have to be surrendered as its an international boundary.

Planners at whatever war college are writing this stuff, they need to actually visit a mangrove area. They need to visit Sir Creek, find were the Indians could potentially land, and then try to make there way somewhere to the north of Karachi. They will see how fruitless and stupid this idea is.

Problem is most people haven't visited mangroves or swamps, or bogs.

Next there is the issue of harrassing PN via attacks on Karachi, Gawadar, Port Qasim, etc. This will be done with powerful Indian naval groups supported by missile boats, armed with cruise missiles. Then there will be FLANKERS and FULCRUMS armed with cruise missiles raining down hell. This will be a 1971 like event were numerous navy ships, naval installations, civilian installations will be burnt to the ground.

Because the major assets were left out there near Oman and Sokutra, there just wont be enough punch left to defeat this. Meanwhile, IAF will fly over Gawadar and attack the PAF from behind, from their soft belly. This will cause even more mayhem.

By this time (or even before that), the war will end and it will be yet another humiliating defeat for the PN and a slap in the face of the PAF. Everyone will wonder why they didn't get a devil's advocate for whatever group-think they were fantasizing.

Long range coastal Anti ship batteries and our AIP subs would kill any Indian surface fleet.

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

IMO ... I agree with @Aamir Hussain as far as the PN building composite flotillas - i.e. 1 054A with 2 F-22P/Ada plus the Harba AShM/LACM-equipped Azmat FAC. However, I also agree with @Armchair in terms of accepting the inherent limitations of the PN, even with four flotillas. These ships will not be interdicting Indian trade and forcing the IN's hand so brazenly.

Rather, I think the PN will station each of its flotillas in key areas of its EEZ for the express purpose of firing the Harba AShM, which should offer a minimum (based on the Babur 3 SLCM) range of 450 km. In effect, the 054A's purpose is to basically give area-wide AAW cover and stand-off range targeting (via the OTHR) to the Azmat FACs and, again ideally, other FACs and possibly even submarines (once their ASCMs are in the air) in the area. The idea is to maintain the ability to threaten those ships from long-range.

There's no guarantee of blocking India's supplies, but the ability to strike those targets and/or the IN from within a safety umbrella (i.e. within the PAF's range) could dissuade some activity. If not offensive, then perhaps at least an assurance that your own trade doesn't get compromised by the IN!

 

[CriticalThought]

IMO ... I agree with @Aamir Hussain as far as the PN building composite flotillas - i.e. 1 054A with 2 F-22P/Ada plus the Harba AShM/LACM-equipped Azmat FAC. However, I also agree with @Armchair in terms of accepting the inherent limitations of the PN, even with four flotillas. These ships will not be interdicting Indian trade and forcing the IN's hand so brazenly.

Rather, I think the PN will station each of its flotillas in key areas of its EEZ for the express purpose of firing the Harba AShM, which should offer a minimum (based on the Babur 3 SLCM) range of 450 km. In effect, the 054A's purpose is to basically give area-wide AAW cover and stand-off range targeting (via the OTHR) to the Azmat FACs and, again ideally, other FACs and possibly even submarines (once their ASCMs are in the air) in the area. The idea is to maintain the ability to threaten those ships from long-range.

There's no guarantee of blocking India's supplies, but the ability to strike those targets and/or the IN from within a safety umbrella (i.e. within the PAF's range) could dissuade some activity. If not offensive, then perhaps at least an assurance that your own trade doesn't get compromised by the IN!

Inherint in any description of strategy is a perception of threat. I would like seniors like yourself, @Rafi and @Rashid Mahmood to delineate the threat. Exactly what threat will PN face from IN in terms of:

1. Number and type of assets used by IN.
2. Military objectives of IN.

Given this threat, we have a number of options:

1. Meet the threat head on
2. Pre-emptively eliminate or lessen the threat.
3. Threaten the enemy to scuttle his plans and take him by surprise.

Why should we prefer one over the other?

I strongly lean towards using the power of surprise to our advantage. Take the fight to him from a direction he does not expect.

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

Inherint in any description of strategy is a perception of threat. I would like seniors like yourself, @Rafi and @Rashid Mahmood to delineate the threat. Exactly what threat will PN face from IN in terms of:

1. Number and type of assets used by IN.
2. Military objectives of IN.

Given this threat, we have a number of options:

1. Meet the threat head on
2. Pre-emptively eliminate or lessen the threat.
3. Threaten the enemy to scuttle his plans and take him by surprise.

Why should we prefer one over the other?

I strongly lean towards using the power of surprise to our advantage. Take the fight to him from a direction he does not expect.

IMO any surprise would likely come from the submarines and, possibly, the FACs (esp. those equipped with the Harba, though ideally we'd see that expand to the Babur Ver2 etc).

 

[Zarvan]

you're seem not normal, you always relay your baseless source of yours, you're the most unreliable so called insider poster on the PDF, two and a half year ago you telling us Su-35 100% confirmed arriving within 6 month or so in Pakistan, so where are your those Su-35, its almost 2.5 year @Zarvan

I never said confirmed I said talks are taking place and now defense minister has confirmed the talks. We are in talks for SU-35 and T-90 and S-400. Things take time. India took at least 6 years to get Rafale finalized Janab. We would do much before that

 

[Ultima Thule]

I never said confirmed I said talks are taking place and now defense minister has confirmed the talks. We are in talks for SU-35 and T-90 and S-400. Things take time. India took at least 6 years to get Rafale finalized Janab. We would do much before that

You're lier, you did tells 2.5 year ago that 100%confirmed arriving in Pakistan within 6 months or within a year,don't contradict/twist your words @Zarvan

 

[Zarvan]

You're lier, you did tells 2.5 year ago that 100%confirmed arriving in Pakistan within 6 months or within a year,don't contradict/twist your words @Zarvan

I have always said we are in talks for SU-35 I never said 100 % confirmed. What I was saying was that Pakistan is looking for a 4.5 Generation Fighter Jet and two options are SU 35 and Eurofighter

 

[Armchair]

Long range coastal Anti ship batteries and our AIP subs would kill any Indian surface fleet.

The shore-based AShM have a range of 290 km. Fired from inland, reducing range further. Indian ships only need to get within 400 km of Karachi or Gawadar or Port Qasim to rain hell and cause mayhem.

Since the submarines will be on patrol in the given scenario, they would be scattered. A few may get in the way and sink a few Indian boats, but IN ASW and return fire will ensure these are quickly sunk. After that, its open season. Turkey shoot.

 

[帅的一匹]

Yes but India has enough coast guard to main that for two weeks in which they fight us. No other country will mess with India and imagining or even taking a chance that China will come to help you is stupid. India can pretty much bring their entire Navy against us. We have to come up with answer fast. When India was only 40 Major Ships than our 12 Frigates were good to defend ourselves but not any more. Now we need to have at least 24 to 30 Major Frigates and Destroyers and around 14 to 16 Submarines backed by at least two Squadron of Fighter Jets and several Anti Submarine Planes. Other wise sorry but we don't stand a chance. And I totally agree with your last part and for that part ships which have VLS for Cruise Missiles are needed.

pakistan need subs to launch cruise missle, enemy doesnt know where your sub will pop out. you can at least make 270 degree attack.

 

[Rafi]

The shore-based AShM have a range of 290 km. Fired from inland, reducing range further. Indian ships only need to get within 400 km of Karachi or Gawadar or Port Qasim to rain hell and cause mayhem.

Since the submarines will be on patrol in the given scenario, they would be scattered. A few may get in the way and sink a few Indian boats, but IN ASW and return fire will ensure these are quickly sunk. After that, its open season. Turkey shoot.

The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.








"Classified"

 

[Armchair]

The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.








"Classified"

Thank you.


XXXXXXXXXXX ON A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT TOPIC XXXXXXXXX

Military history has shown that, almost consistently, the more aggressive and assertive naval fleet has carried the day. We saw this at the Pearl Harbor attack. It is believed that had Japan pressed the assault and taken over Hawaii, the war would have been very different.

Similarly, going as far back as Admiral Nelson. Or to the German completely offensive with negligible defensive capability - u-boats. That changed the face of naval warfare forever. But today's admirals seem to buck all this and build defensive naval strategies, for some very odd reasons.

In fact, one does not need to be aware of naval history even, if one knows enough about chess, you know that as the board frees up, the player that is more aggressive, wins. The seas are the mother-of-all free and open board.

I'm scratching my head trying to think of a time in contemporary history that a defensive naval doctrine succeeded. Perhaps someone can help.

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

Thank you.


XXXXXXXXXXX ON A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT TOPIC XXXXXXXXX

Military history has shown that, almost consistently, the more aggressive and assertive naval fleet has carried the day. We saw this at the Pearl Harbor attack. It is believed that had Japan pressed the assault and taken over Hawaii, the war would have been very different.

Similarly, going as far back as Admiral Nelson. Or to the German completely offensive with negligible defensive capability - u-boats. That changed the face of naval warfare forever. But today's admirals seem to buck all this and build defensive naval strategies, for some very odd reasons.

In fact, one does not need to be aware of naval history even, if one knows enough about chess, you know that as the board frees up, the player that is more aggressive, wins. The seas are the mother-of-all free and open board.

I'm scratching my head trying to think of a time in contemporary history that a defensive naval doctrine succeeded. Perhaps someone can help.

The Hangor SSPs (with their SLCMs) and/or Harba (w/Harba ASCM/LACM) may be tasked to hit key coastal targets in India from the onset, thereby pushing the IN ASW effort closer to their area than Pakistan. This is where having a relatively large number of mini-SSKs capable of firing SLCMs would be key; they can operate from busy shallow waters (stronger acoustic masking) and just keep the IN preoccupied closer to home.