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Pakistan’s New Midget Submarine: Emerging Challenge to India in the Arabian Sea

What will Pakistan’s new indigenous midget submarine bring to its naval capabilities?

By Prakash Panneerselvam
April 29, 2020

This article is presented by
Diplomat Risk Intelligence, The Diplomat’s consulting and analysis division.

Pakistan’s New Midget Submarine: Emerging Challenge to India in the Arabian Sea

Credit: Pakistan Navy Official Website (via Wikimedia Commons)

Pakistan’s submarine force is undergoing major modernization. In the last five years, Pakistan has inked two major submarine deals with China and Turkey to upgrade its submarine force.

In 2015, Pakistan approved the purchase of eight Hangor (Type 042 Yuan-class) submarines with a provision to construct four at Karachi Shipyard with a possible Transfer of Technology (ToT) from China.

Subsequently, in 2016, Pakistan awarded the Agosta 90B Submarine Modernization Project worth $350 million to Turkey-based weapon manufacturer STM. Interestingly, this was the first time Pakistan has selected a Turkish company as the prime contractor for a submarine project. Under this project, STM will be exporting design and engineering services to the Pakistan Navy.

The submarine deals with China and Turkey are expected to be a major game changer for the Pakistan Navy. Along with that, Pakistan is now focusing on building new midget submarines for its Navy.

Pakistan’s Special Service Group (Navy) has been using the Cosmos MG110 midget for overt and covert operations. These submarines have been in service from the early 1990s and are nearing the end of their service lives.

In order to replace these aging submarines, Pakistan has proposed to build a new midget submarine. In the Ministry of Defense Production (MoDP) Year Book 2015–2016, Pakistan listed the development and construction of a midget submarine as a target for 2017–2018. The MoDP documents have also mentioned that midget submarine project will be based on indigenous design and production.

Notably, a recent satellite image (Figure 1) confirms that Pakistan might have indigenously developed a new midget submarine as it proposed in the MoDP 2015–2016.

From 2016 on, one can see the submarine partially covered in a tent in. Since 2019, the submarine can be seen in open view, suggesting that the construction is near completion and that sea trials may have commenced.

The new midget submarine, which is compact in size, is leading to speculation regarding its possible role in the Arabian Sea and in combat.


Figure 1 –Satellite imagery shows an MG 110 Submarine docked in Karachi Port along with a domestically built new midget submarine. Source: Google Earth, DOI: 18/12/2019 (24°50’3.74″N, 66°58’14.23″E)


Figure 2 – The image shows the fully constructed hull of a new midget submarine at Karachi Port Source: Google Earth, DOI: 2/11/2018 (24°50’3.74″N, 66°58’14.23″E)

Image Analysis




The midget submarine as seen from the satellite images has a length of around 55 feet (16.7 m) and a beam measurement of around 8 feet (2.43 m). The vessel’s displacement is currently unknown.

The prominent vertical rudder, propeller, and the round-shaped nose are visible from the shadow of the midget submarine. The snorkel is not visible in the image. But it is clear from the image that the submarine appears to be larger than the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) and slightly smaller than the MG110 midget submarines.

The compact size of the submarine with simple hull constructions suggests that it is easy to operate and maintain. The vessel can likely be transported over land due to its size. The defense expert H. I. Sutton writes in Forbes that the submarine design is new and doesn’t appear to be an imported one.

Given the present level of cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey, one cannot rule out the possibility of a Turkish firm’s involvement in the development of new midget submarines. In an interview in 2019, Murat İkinci, the general manager of STM, confirmed that the “Pakistan Navy and STM are currently discussing new projects, including serious and dedicated works for midget submarines.” However, there are no official sources to confirm that the new midget submarine has been codeveloped with Turkey.

A Role for the Midget Submarine

The Pakistan has been using new midget submarines for many years now. The development of a new midget submarine not only showcases its indigenous capability, but also shows that Pakistan is prepping its underwater warfare capability.

As Pakistan continues to lay emphasis on a sea denial strategy there is a possibility that it may use the midget submarine in an offensive role during any conflict with India in the coming months and years.

The seaward defense of Karachi has been one of the major challenges for the Pakistan Navy since the 1971 war with India. The midget submarine would fill a gap in protecting Karachi Port from sea-based attack. Most importantly, it would replace the current MG110s in service with the SSG (Navy) for operations such as frogmen operations, laying mines, and so on.

Also, with the Agosta 90B submarines undergoing midlife upgrades and modernization, scheduled to join the Pakistan Navy in 2020, and first four Hangor submarines stated to be delivered in 2023, the Pakistan Navy would find a significant increase in its ability to execute an anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) posture in the Indian Ocean. Along with that, the new midget submarine would upgrade Pakistan’s underwater warfare capabilities in a significant way.

In short, the changeover in the Pakistan submarine force could pose a real security threat to India in the Arabian Sea. Given India’s preparedness to develop a credible anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, Pakistan’s new midget submarine can challenge India’s maritime operations in the Arabian Sea.

Besides, Pakistan might use the new midget submarine to expand its clandestine operations off the western Coast of India, particularly around Gujarat’s Sir Creek area and Mumbai.

Hence, it’s essential that India strengthen its subsurface detection and track capability to thwart any Pakistan anti-access capability in the Arabian Sea and to protect India’s maritime security interests in the region.

Prakash Panneerselvam, Ph.D, is an Assistant Professor at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) in Benagluru, India.

View attachment 628067View attachment 628068View attachment 628069

 

[fatman17]

CNS Adm Zafar Mahmood Abbasi chaired Command & Staff Conference of #PakNavy at NHQ, Isb. The Field Commands attended through VTC frm Field HQs. Matters w.r.t geo strategic milieu, national security, Ops prep, trg & welfare of troops were reviewed. (1/2) https://t.co/fQlIPUtNw4

 

[fatman17]

???

Sajeeeeesh(na pak)

 

[fatman17]

CNS Adm Zafar Mahmood Abbasi chaired Command & Staff Conference of #PakNavy at NHQ, Isb. The Field Commands attended through VTC frm Field HQs. Matters w.r.t geo strategic milieu, national security, Ops prep, trg & welfare of troops were reviewed. (1/2) https://t.co/fQlIPUtNw4
View attachment 628187

Countrywide spread of COVID-19 & PN relief Ops to assist civil admin was reviewed. The forum resolved to maintain ops preparedness and continue nationwide relief Ops. PN reaffirmed support for struggle of Kashmiris while reviewing deteriorated security situation in IoK. (2/2)

 

[fatman17]

Indian navy’s elusive hunt for Pakistani submarine



Indian media ran an interesting and highly deceptive story about Pakistan Navy submarine Saad, on 23 June 2019. India Today, India TV, Times of India, News Nation and Times Now News narrated almost a similar tale, which appeared to have been fed by the officials void of independent reporting and rational analysis. All of these online news agencies claimed that as the events unfolded post Balakot ‘surgical strike’, Pakistan Navy Submarine Saad suddenly ‘vanished’. Linking post-fake across the LOC strike to disappearance of a submarine seems nothing less than a reduction ad absurdum. Indian news broadcasters forgot to appreciate the outcome of publishing such a thoughtless story, which comprehensively exposed Indian navy. Submarine story suggests that the Indian navy had shackled itself to what may be called the ‘operational treachery’, i.e., consistently failing to live up to its acclaimed size and strength. Indian media reported that ‘vanishing act’ of Saad forced the entire Indian navy to focus its efforts in finding and forcing the Pakistani submarine out of its operating depth. While citing nameless ‘sources’, the Indian media noted that Saad was a “major threat to security of the country [India]”.Re-establishing, Pakistani submarine Fleet supremacy like 1965 war, when entire Indian Navy Fleet remained blocked inside Ports due fear of lone PN Submarine Ghazi.

The Gujarat coast, waters off Mumbai and Maharashtra were searched for days, claimed the Indian media, by anti-submarine warfare ships and long range maritime patrol aircraft. Additionally, Chakra-II (the Russian Akula class nuclear submarine) and Kalvari (the French Scorpene class submarine) were also tasked to hunt for Saad, maintains the Indian media. Extensive search was also conducted through satellites, and after 21 days, observes the Indian media, Saad was found in Pakistan’s western seaboard purportedly “hiding to ensure a covert capability”.

It took Indian navy, an aspirant of global reach and power projection, nearly a month to find where exactly was a lone conventional submarine that had the ability to jeopardize the security of entire India. Cumulative result of using anti-submarine warfare ships and aircraft, nuclear submarines and the satellites was a mythical absurdity about Saad operating in Pakistani western waters. This reflects some of the starkest realities and truths about the Indian navy’s operational culture, which besides being comprehensively reductionists, is rooted deep into self-deception and illusions. Some key questions arise on operational competence of the Indian navy: firstly, why Indian navy bogged down with the presence of a single conventional submarine, which unlike a nuclear propelled vessel is restricted in its speed and discretion. Secondly, why Indian navy failed to hypothesize the deployment patterns of Pakistani submarines.

Submarines, generally, are considered as offensive platforms around the world. Its defensive role is very limited and is mostly regarded as ‘under-utilization’ of a platform that could provide assured lethality. If Pakistan were to deter India, post-Pulwama attacks, then deploying a lone submarine in the western waters serves no purpose. Placing a submarine in the Pakistani western seaboard and subsequently directing her to take offensive positions against India is operationally an infeasible proposition as assumed outlandishly by the Indian media. The reported episode exposes several operational paradoxes that the Indian navy has to come to terms with. For instance, in a typical anti-submarine warfare, a nuclear submarine is never pitched against a conventional submarine. Nuclear submarine is a capital asset and generates much more noise than a electric driven Conventional Submarine thus, turning it into vulnerability against a diesel electric sub would be an unwise proposition. The report maintained that Indian carrier was also operating in the south Arabian Sea. Operation of a carrier without the support of a nuclear submarine is in conflict with the established doctrine for carriers. This raises a question on Indian navy’s tactical prudence of leaving a ‘high value unit’ without a nuclear sub’s escort. Failure to detect and track a conventional submarine by Indian navy’s P-8I’s anti-submarine aircraft is another aspect to quiz as a modern airborne platform that has reliable sensors and resources to detect, locate and track the submarines.

The report on India’s hunt for Saad unmasked the Indian weaknesses more than it did any good to the Indian navy. While Pakistani submarines remained poised undetected, stealthily defying the entire Indian anti-submarine warfare mechanics, ‘throughout recent standoff’, the Indian media consistently claimed that to be an ‘Indian success’, whereas this must be a moment to ponder on the failure of Indian navy’s core combat capability.

 

[ghazi52]

Pakistan Navy continued humanitarian support to aggrieved families in different areas of the country during COVID-19 pandemic. Troops of Pakistan Navy reached out to needy families and distributed food, other commodities and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in Coastal, Creeks area of Balochistan and Sindh beside support to the deserving families living in far-flung villages/ localities of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

In Baluchistan, thousands of ration bags were distributed in towns/ villages of Coastal area surrounding Jiwani, Pishukan, Gwadar and Sur Bandar areas. Ration bags along with other commodities were also distributed in Ormara and remote localities of Shamal Bandar, Vinder and Damb. The locals of rural areas, Govt officials and notables applauded Pakistan Navy’s ongoing noble supporting efforts in the area.

In Sindh, medical equipment including PPE and PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) kits were provided to District Hospitals of Thatta, Sujawal and Badin for doctors and para medical staff.

 

[Pakistani Fighter]

Sir how do you see Pakistan Navy against Indian Navy? To me it looks like a very small force. We don't even have destroyers

navy.

 

[SD 10]

Sir how do you see Pakistan Navy against Indian Navy? To me it looks like a very small force. We don't even have destroyers

how many destroyers India has?

 

[PanzerKiel]

Sir how do you see Pakistan Navy against Indian Navy? To me it looks like a very small force. We don't even have destroyers

Dear, in simplest words, c We have been going after sophistication and quantity in terms of weapon systems, not platforms. Sea denial strategy, instead of sea control.

 

[Pakistani Fighter]

how many destroyers India has?

I think currently they 11(Kolkata, Dehli, Rajput class). Most advanced Vishakhapatnam class (4 more)will be there in few years

Dear, in simplest words, c We have been going after sophistication and quantity in terms of weapon systems, not platforms. Sea denial strategy, instead of sea control.

Means Defensive strategy instead of Offensive?

 

[Ultima Thule]

Means Defensive strategy instead of Offensive?

Yes what you want that we should go near Mumbai or elsewhere in Indian Ocean and challenge them???
This is era of standoff weapons no need to go closer to the enemy
Its a similar strategies that had Soviets/Russians adopted in cold war

 

[Bossman]

Pakistan Maritime model test basin has been completed near Islamabad. Locally designed naval ships can now be expected. It’s 350 meter long so a pretty decent facility by global standards.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Yes what you want that we should go near Mumbai or elsewhere in Indian Ocean and challenge them???
This is era of standoff weapons no need to go closer to the enemy
Its a similar strategies that had Soviets/Russians adopted in cold war

Germans in WWII.

 

[Viper27]

Indian navy’s elusive hunt for Pakistani submarine



Indian media ran an interesting and highly deceptive story about Pakistan Navy submarine Saad, on 23 June 2019. India Today, India TV, Times of India, News Nation and Times Now News narrated almost a similar tale, which appeared to have been fed by the officials void of independent reporting and rational analysis. All of these online news agencies claimed that as the events unfolded post Balakot ‘surgical strike’, Pakistan Navy Submarine Saad suddenly ‘vanished’. Linking post-fake across the LOC strike to disappearance of a submarine seems nothing less than a reduction ad absurdum. Indian news broadcasters forgot to appreciate the outcome of publishing such a thoughtless story, which comprehensively exposed Indian navy. Submarine story suggests that the Indian navy had shackled itself to what may be called the ‘operational treachery’, i.e., consistently failing to live up to its acclaimed size and strength. Indian media reported that ‘vanishing act’ of Saad forced the entire Indian navy to focus its efforts in finding and forcing the Pakistani submarine out of its operating depth. While citing nameless ‘sources’, the Indian media noted that Saad was a “major threat to security of the country [India]”.Re-establishing, Pakistani submarine Fleet supremacy like 1965 war, when entire Indian Navy Fleet remained blocked inside Ports due fear of lone PN Submarine Ghazi.

The Gujarat coast, waters off Mumbai and Maharashtra were searched for days, claimed the Indian media, by anti-submarine warfare ships and long range maritime patrol aircraft. Additionally, Chakra-II (the Russian Akula class nuclear submarine) and Kalvari (the French Scorpene class submarine) were also tasked to hunt for Saad, maintains the Indian media. Extensive search was also conducted through satellites, and after 21 days, observes the Indian media, Saad was found in Pakistan’s western seaboard purportedly “hiding to ensure a covert capability”.

It took Indian navy, an aspirant of global reach and power projection, nearly a month to find where exactly was a lone conventional submarine that had the ability to jeopardize the security of entire India. Cumulative result of using anti-submarine warfare ships and aircraft, nuclear submarines and the satellites was a mythical absurdity about Saad operating in Pakistani western waters. This reflects some of the starkest realities and truths about the Indian navy’s operational culture, which besides being comprehensively reductionists, is rooted deep into self-deception and illusions. Some key questions arise on operational competence of the Indian navy: firstly, why Indian navy bogged down with the presence of a single conventional submarine, which unlike a nuclear propelled vessel is restricted in its speed and discretion. Secondly, why Indian navy failed to hypothesize the deployment patterns of Pakistani submarines.

Submarines, generally, are considered as offensive platforms around the world. Its defensive role is very limited and is mostly regarded as ‘under-utilization’ of a platform that could provide assured lethality. If Pakistan were to deter India, post-Pulwama attacks, then deploying a lone submarine in the western waters serves no purpose. Placing a submarine in the Pakistani western seaboard and subsequently directing her to take offensive positions against India is operationally an infeasible proposition as assumed outlandishly by the Indian media. The reported episode exposes several operational paradoxes that the Indian navy has to come to terms with. For instance, in a typical anti-submarine warfare, a nuclear submarine is never pitched against a conventional submarine. Nuclear submarine is a capital asset and generates much more noise than a electric driven Conventional Submarine thus, turning it into vulnerability against a diesel electric sub would be an unwise proposition. The report maintained that Indian carrier was also operating in the south Arabian Sea. Operation of a carrier without the support of a nuclear submarine is in conflict with the established doctrine for carriers. This raises a question on Indian navy’s tactical prudence of leaving a ‘high value unit’ without a nuclear sub’s escort. Failure to detect and track a conventional submarine by Indian navy’s P-8I’s anti-submarine aircraft is another aspect to quiz as a modern airborne platform that has reliable sensors and resources to detect, locate and track the submarines.

The report on India’s hunt for Saad unmasked the Indian weaknesses more than it did any good to the Indian navy. While Pakistani submarines remained poised undetected, stealthily defying the entire Indian anti-submarine warfare mechanics, ‘throughout recent standoff’, the Indian media consistently claimed that to be an ‘Indian success’, whereas this must be a moment to ponder on the failure of Indian navy’s core combat capability.

PNS Saad Captain was to receive a gallantry award from the President on 23 March but didn't happen due to Covid. The navy spokesperson's tweet mentioned PNS Saad had operated undetected in enemy waters.

 

[khanasifm]

PNS Saad Captain was to receive a gallantry award from the President on 23 March but didn't happen due to Covid. The navy spokesperson's tweet mentioned PNS Saad had operated undetected in enemy waters.

So now what ?? Is he receiving the award ???