PAF Base Mianwali is now PAF MM Alam Base

[SQ8]

How is that possible ? 1 to 2 Minute would be much credible isn't it ?

But 4 Air combat in less than 30 secs does not add up.

Refer to post 2 by me. And avoid further derailment.

 

[Viper0011.]

How is that possible ? 1 to 2 Minute would be much credible isn't it ?
But 4 Air combat in less than 30 secs does not add up.

I would question that too. But remember, there were gun-camera's in the F-86's that the PAF flew, just like the USAF planes had. These cameras had time, date and they pictured the gun fire and what it hit. I wasn't there to witness it or anything but from what I've heard about this story many years ago was that some independent sources from the UK verfiied the gun-camera footage. Plus, there was radio chatter recorded that backed it up too. I think the pilot counted the planes that he shot or something or the Indian pilot that escaped told his GC as to what happened. It's been too long that I don't remember all the details but I do remember this claim was challenged and then verified by the UK based sources.

Now is it possible? Looking at today's Mach + fighter standards and the training .....probably not. in 1960's, a plane diving onto a formation of 4-5 planes back then that didn't have sophisticated radars to warn them, and a long gun fire burst that ruptures through the close formation of 4-5 jets that are still flying closer together.....yes, it is possible.

 

[That Guy]

This needs to be translated.

 

[fatman17]

our PM is wondering why his face is not on a pakistan postage stamp!!!

 

[45'22']

I have no problem accepting 5 kills just that 30 sec factor is too much I mean seriously , 30 sec. and 4 jets.

Evene on wiki , its noted as "Unreliable source".

there is a thread running on the same topic and acc. to Indian sources,the claim has been debunked......
the pilots name,their squadron number,the dates......nothing matchs up...............

even the co pilot of Mr MM ALAM has made some different claims........

 

[fatman17]

Battle for Pakistan - John Fricker.
30 seconds over Sargodha.


Alam's account of the action is more graphic:

'As we were vectored back towards Sargodha, Akhtar called, "Contact - four Hunters", and I saw the IAF aircraft diving to attack our airfield. So I jettisoned my drops [most jet fighters carry additional fuel in external under-wing tanks which can be quickly released before going into action] to dive through our own ack-ack after them. But in the meantime I saw two more Hunters about 1,000ft to my rear, so I forgot the four in front and pulled up to go after the pair behind. The Hunters broke off their attempted attack on Sargodha, and the rear pair turned into me. I was flying much faster than they were at this stage - I must have been doing about 500knots - so I pulled up to avoid overshooting them and then reversed to close in as they flew back towards India.
'I took the last man and dived behind him, getting very low in the process. The Hunter can out-run the Sabre, it's only about 50 knots faster, but has a much better acceleration, so it can pull away very rapidly. Since I was diving, I was going still faster, and as he was out of" gun range, I fired the first of my two GAR-8 Sidewinder (air- to-air missiles at him. [The Sidewinder homes on the heat radiations from the target aircraft's jet engine but is sometimes affected by ground returns if fired in a dive at low altitudes. I In this case, we were too low and I saw the missile hit the ground short of its target.
'This area east of Sargodha, however, has lots of high tension wires, some of them as high as 100-150ft, and when I saw the two Hunters pull up to avoid one of these cables, I fired my second Sidewinder. The missile streaked ahead of me, but I didn't see it strike. The next thing I remember was that I was overshooting one of the Hunters and when I looked behind, the cockpit canopy was missing and there was no pilot in the aircraft. He had obviously pulled up and ejected and then I saw him coming down by parachute. This pilot [Sqn. Ldr. Onkar Nath Kakar, commander of an IAF Hunter squadron] was later taken prisoner.
'I had lost sight of the other five Hunters, but I pressed on thinking maybe they would slow down. There were, of course, still only two Sabre’s pitted against the remaining five IAF aircraft. I had lots of fuel so I was prepared to fly 50-60 miles to catch up with them. We had just crossed the Chenab river when my wingman called out, "Contact - Hunters 1o’clock," and I picked them up at the same time - five Hunters in absolutely immaculate battle formation. They were flying at about 100-200ft, at around 480 knots and when I was in gun-fire range they saw me. They all broke in one direction, climbing and turning steeply to the left, which put them in loose line astern. This, of course, was their big mistake. If you are bounced, which means a close range approach by an enemy fighter to within less than about 3,000ft, the drill is to call a break. This is a panic maneuver to the limits of the aircraft's performance, which splits the formation and both gets you out of the way of an attack and frees you to position yourself behind your opponent.
But in the absence of one of the IAF sections initiating a break in the other direction to sandwich our attack, they all simply stayed in front of us.
'It all happened very fast. We were all turning very tightly - in excess of 5g or just about on the limits of the Sabre's very accurate A-4 radar ranging gun sight. And I think before we had completed more than about 270 degrees of the turn, at around 12 degrees per second, all four Hunters had been shot down.
In each case, I got the pipper of my sight around the canopy of the Hunter for virtually a full deflection shot. Almost all our shooting throughout the war was at very high angles off – seldom less than about 30 degrees. Unlike some of the Korean combat films I had seen, nobody in our war was shot down flying straight and level.'
Accurate shooting is difficult enough at the best of times fighter travelling not far off the speed of sound. The problems of flying with such precision while In a turn of such crushing force that every part of you weighs more than five times its normal amount may be imagined. And yet throughout the short 1965 war, in which he claimed nine enemy aircraft destroyed in only three encounters, never had to fire more than twice at an opponent.
He continues;
I developed a technique of firing very short bursts – around half a second or less. The first burst was almost a sight-er, but with a fairly large bullet pattern from six machine guns, it almost invariably punctured the fuel tanks that they streamed kerosene.
During the battle on 7 September, as we went round in the turn, I could just see, in the light of the rising sun, the plumes of fuel gushing from the tanks after my hits. Another half-second burst was then sufficient to set fire to the fuel, and, as the Hunter became a ball of flame, I would shift my aim forward to the next aircraft. The Sabre carries about 1,800 rounds of ammunition for its six 0.5in guns, which can therefore fire for about 15 seconds. In air combat, this is a lifetime. Every fourth or fifth round is an armor piercing bullet, and the rest are HEI - high-explosive incendiary. I am certain after this combat that I brought back more than half of my ammunition, although we didn’t have time to waste counting rounds.
My fifth victim of this sortie started spewing smoke and then rolled on to his back at about 1,000ft. I thought he was going to do a barrel roll, which at low altitude is a very dangerous maneuver for the opponent if the man in front knows what he's doing. I went almost on my back and then I realized I might not be able to stay with him so I took off bank and pushed the nose down. The next time I fired was at very close range - about 600ft or so – and his aircraft virtually blew up in front of me. None of ejected, and all of them were killed. ,*
*[post-war Indian reports list two IAF Hunter pilots as missing in action over Pakistan on 7 September – Sqn.Ldr. SB Bhagwat and Flt.Lt. JS Btar. In addition the names of at least a further five Hunter pilots, all but one of whom were killed, are listed as being shot down in air combat on unknown dates]
How could a formation of jet fighters flown by senior and experienced pilots (three were squadron leaders and the other three flight lieutenants) allow themselves to be shot down by aircraft of inferior performance which they outnumbered some three to one?
Wg. Cdr. Alam comments;
Hunter pilots won’t believe it. I have flown Hunters myself in England and they are very maneuverable aircraft, but I think the F-86 is better.
'Actually, the Sabre has a fantastic turning performance. Although the normal stalling speed with flap is around 92 knots, you can fly it round in a steep turn down to as little as 80 knots or less in a descending scissors maneuver. Between 100 and 120 knots is quite a normal speed range to rack the Sabre round in combat. If you applied aileron at that speed in a Hunter you would flick out the other way. The F-86F is almost faultless on the controls, but it's a pity it doesn't have a bit more thrust. Provided that you see your opponent in time, you can never be outturned or outfought in a Sabre.
'I think, also, that the 0.5in Browning machine-gun is the best possible weapon against fighters for close combat. But if the Hunters hadn't all broken in the same direction, I could have been in trouble. As it was, they left themselves no initiative for turning the tables. The sixth and last Hunter disappeared from view, but we later heard that the pilot had ejected, he said because of engine trouble'.
Not everyone shares Wg. Cdr. Alam's views concerning the relative merits of the Sabre versus the Hunter. Even in the PAF, where many pilots have flown Hunters with the RAF, opinions are divided, but there is a strong element in favor of the British aircraft, which, after all, flew for the first time four years later than the Sabre. Wg. Cdr. Alam is prepared to defend his beloved Sabre with supporting technicalities, which he quotes with authority:
'In a turn the Hunter slows down more quickly than the F-86 for the same application of g. For one thing, it has a much higher aspect ratio - the span of the wings in relation to their chord - and induced drag increases in inverse proportion to the square of the velocity. In other words, the lower the speed, the higher the induced drag.'
He readily acknowledges the far better thrust/weight ratio of the Hunter, which has 10,000lb of thrust from its Rolls-Royce Avon 203 engine for a clean aircraft weight of 19,000lb, compared with 6,0001b output from the General Electric J47 turbojet of the 15,000lb F-86F Sabre, without external stores. In his opinion, however, this is more than offset in combat by the higher induced drag of the Hunter. He continues:
'This means that the Hunter loses speed faster than the Sabre in a turn because of its bigger drag rise, which the extra thrust cannot counter. So in the turn I steadily closed up on the Hunters, which quickly decelerated from about 450 down to around 240 knots, and would have had to have pulled about 7g to get away from me. As it was they just slid back into my sights, one by one.'
In the final reckoning, could it be the man in the cockpit that counts more than the aircraft?
'Certainly flying skill matters a great deal. When I went to war I had about 1,400 hours on the F-86 which is a lot of experience and, with another pilot, I held the record for the highest gunnery scores in the PAF, with an average around 70 per cent. And I would definitely say this, that PAF air combat standards are as good as any in the world. Many of our pilots go on exchange postings to England and elsewhere, and come back proudly claiming that in air combat practice they have matched their skill with the best. I don't know whether by nature we Pakistanis are more aggressive, but we lay a lot of stress on aerobatics, gunnery, and air combat itself.'
These are some of the principal reasons for the establishment of air" supremacy by the Pakistan Air Force, from almost the very beginning of hostilities, although something more than mere superiority in flying proficiency had to be present to offset the overwhelming numerical advantage held by the Indian forces. For an indication of this additional element, which was unquestionably the key to the entire Pakistani posture in the critical events of 1965, Wg. Cdr. Alam articulately expresses the national view point:
'We were fighting with a passion founded on faith. That concept of nationhood that you have in the West has perhaps not yet dawned upon us. We fought as Muslims against a people who were trying to destroy our way of life… We went through great 'anxieties, great fear often. But we knew one thing, that faith in one's destiny, faith in a cause - all this sustains a man, and faith sustained us.'
Here, then, was the main motivation of the Pakistani people, who do not hold their official status of an Islamic Republic in light regard. As Wg. Cdr. Alam put it:
'We may not be first-rate Muslims, but this I know, that we, have a faith in God extending through everyone in Pakistan, and a belief that He takes care of us. To feel that my life is in the hands of God, and that any risks that I undertake are for a good purpose, leaves me nothing to fear. Before the war officially started three or four of us were briefed for a raid against the Indian airfield at Adampur, on which we were told by our intelligence that there were 48 aircraft. We didn't grumble, but we all knew it was going to be a one-way mission - and for some of us, like the late Sqn. Ldr. Rafiqui, it was. I called one of my pilots and wrote a short letter for him to give to my mother - I'm not married - if I didn't come back. But once I knew that it had to be done, it had to be done.
When we came back we felt that there was a power greater than us taking care of these things.'
Wg. Cdr. Alam's faith was reinforced by several incidents during the 1965 war. On 4 September, for example, when leading a low-level recce mission against the IAF airfield at Jammu, and when passing the outskirts of the Indian town, the canopy of his Sabre was suddenly shattered by ground fire while he was skimming just above the trees at around 420 knots. He remembers:
'One moment I felt so secure and the next it was almost as if the world had come to an end. When the canopy goes, you get a lot of dust sucked up from the bottom of the cockpit, and this goes on for as long as 10 or 15 seconds. I was half-blinded, and the next thing that occurred to me was, God! Before the war has even started I'll be taken prisoner. I turned the shortest way towards Pakistan, but just then I saw smoke ahead from a regiment of Indian artillery - 16 guns firing towards Chamb and holding up our crossing of the river. I couldn't speak to my wingman because of the noise of the slipstream through the cockpit, so I pulled up and made signs that I was going to attack. I made two passes and kept firing on the Indian artillery until my own guns jammed through overheating.
'I climbed up to about I,000ft, and suddenly I lost all fear. It was a feeling of almost mystical experience, and I thought, "If I'm attacked by enemy aircraft while my guns are jammed, I'll simply ram my aircraft into my opponent." But I got back safely, and I never felt like that again throughout the war.
'After the combat with the six Hunters, my main feeling was of a sudden anti-climax. All that excitement ... and then it all seemed too much. I certainly didn't feel the elation I expected from my avid reading of all the classic books on air combat from World War II when a junior officer. There was no passion in the killing itself; while I was shooting I was firing at an airplane rather than a man. We shot with cold blood ness but not with the intent of killing a human being.
In the wreckage of one of the Indian Hunters was found the pilot's wallet, and this man come from my home town - Calcutta. In the wallet were pictures of his wife and children and for a while 1 felt sad. I don't know if killing can ever be morally completely justified, but I killed in defense of my country and not as an individual. When I landed back at Sargodha, I was tremendously grateful to my God, that's one thing I remember.’
For Pakistan, this was the mood of the 1965 war. Fighting without hate, but with a fierce determination that took little account of the odds, based on a religious and unifying fervor.

 

[Secularpakistani]

Very good decision but MM Alam deserves much more than this.