COMMENT: Waziristan: the last bastion of terrorists —Shaukat Qadir
So far the army is meeting its timetable for the offensive, but progress from here onwards is likely to be much slower as the lines of communication are extended and become vulnerable to guerrilla action
Waziristan is the largest chunk of territory in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It is harsh, rugged, semi-mountainous terrain, with very few springs and waterholes; therefore, sparsely populated. The last census two decades ago (all censuses of tribal areas are notoriously inaccurate), calculated the population of South Waziristan, the area of the Mehsud tribe, at 250,000; a rough estimate today would place it at about 400,000. Out of which 200,000 left South Waziristan before commencement of the ground operation on October 17, and about 150,000 left since.
The remaining 50,000 Mehsuds are not all Taliban; I estimate about 30,000; equally divided under Hakimullah and Waliur Rahman; the latter having separated from the former; both ex-deputies to Baitullah.
South Waziristan is southern extreme of FATA and a strip to its southeast juts in towards Punjab. To its north is North Waziristan. To the east lie settled areas of the NWFP. To the south is Balochistan, and to its west is Afghanistan.
When I spoke to some of the young officers and soldiers who were ready to enter South Waziristan for ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat’ — which roughly translates to ‘the path to rid oneself...’ as soon as they received orders, what impressed me most was that they were totally calm and unworried. It was obvious that these were battle-hardened veterans, some expressed their unhappiness at having to fight their own citizens, but they had seen what the Taliban were capable of and, despite the regret, were fully determined. My confidence in their ability increased with each minute that I spoke to them.
Unlike Swat, which shared no borders with Afghanistan, enabling the military to utilise all entry points into the region, ensuring minimal escape, in South Waziristan, Pakistan has only three openings available. Pakistan’s security forces have chosen to block the southern exit and attack from the north and east. The army has obviously been permitted to use North Waziristan with the assurance that their rear will not be threatened; what the military forces promised the Wazirs in return for this ‘safe passage’ is unknown.
The northern direction gives the security forces the shortest route to the areas where terrorist headquarters and training camps are located as well as Kotkai, the parent village of both Hakimullah and Qari Hussain, alias Qari Raees, the one responsible for training suicide bombers. This village fell to the army after two days of fierce fighting on October 24.
Obviously, therefore, it was to be expected that US forces would have sealed entry and exit to South Waziristan from Afghanistan.
Surprisingly, instead of playing the ‘anvil’ to the Pakistan Army’s ‘hammer’, they unexpectedly vacated seven posts they were manning on the Afghan border with South Waziristan. Despite whatever deal has been struck between the army and the Wazirs, and despite the fact that the Wazirs have traditionally fought to oust foreigners from their territory, it is not unlikely that some among them may still be inclined to give ‘safe passage’ to Afghan reinforcements transiting to South Waziristan, which can compound the problem by threatening the rear of the army.
I am certain that US forces are not unaware of this fact and that if they have opened this door, reinforcements can enter South Waziristan at will and, in the face of impending defeat, will be able to escape back to Afghanistan. Pakistan’s COAS has raised his concerns on this issue with General Petraeus, Commander CENTCOM, during his visit on October 19.
Militarily, the only plausible explanation that comes to mind for this otherwise inexplicable act by US forces is that they want reinforcements to enter South Waziristan from Afghanistan and will, thereafter, close the exits. However, unless this is prearranged with Pakistani forces, whose task will be made many times more difficult, which is obviously not the case, this is tantamount to accepting the ineptitude of US forces in Afghanistan, who are passing on their problem for Pakistani forces to solve. If this is true, I can only feel sorry for the US commanders, who obviously lack faith in their own abilities and troops.
Any such terrorist organisation needs some territory under its control, for their HQ, training, administration, issuance of coordinated instructions, and a safe haven. South Waziristan is their last bastion and they will fight for it. If reinforcements sneak through from Afghanistan, the battle could be prolonged and take greater toll. Even as the Americans, recognising the significance of this operation, are promising all possible assistance by way of intelligence and employing drones in support of the Pakistan forces, they also seem to be making things as difficult as possible by vacating posts from where Uzbeks and Tajiks can, and will, reinforce the Mehsuds.
If we go by the population figures I have quoted, there are less than 50,000 Mehsuds left in South Waziristan and not all of them are aligned with the Taliban. The presence of a few thousand foreigners and Punjabis will swell the Taliban ranks but not by much. Pakistani troops carrying out the offensive number a mere 30,000; they undoubtedly have more fire power, but as they capture and hold territories, their numbers will thin further, despite reinforcements moving in to hold captured territories.
Progress of the northern prong has been understandably slow, both due to mountainous terrain and stiff resistance. However, troops have captured the heights first and have attacked valleys from there. Sararogha will be the next test; it is another stronghold, followed by another two till they reach the Ladha, the last stronghold.
So far the army is meeting its timetable for the offensive, but progress from here onwards is likely to be much slower as the lines of communication are extended and become vulnerable to guerrilla action.
Despite the difficulties, it appears that the Pakistan Army is likely to succeed in retaking South Waziristan; while the US helps both protagonists! The US has often done this on many a prior occasion; assisting Iran (the Iran Gate Scandal), after having encouraged Iraq into attacking the former; even Baitullah was acknowledged among the Mehsuds to be a CIA agent and was obviously killed when he had outlived his utility, but this was the least expected occasion.
The writer is a former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Insititute (IPRI)