Just a thought I had by reading this, aren't the Russians the same opinion like you?
Everyone does.
The US fighters focus mainly on not beeing detected by radar with increased stealth capabilities, but the Pak Fa (at least as far we have seen now), with a minimum of 5 AESA radar arrays in addition to IRST and only some stealth capabilites, seems to focus mainly on radar and detecting first right?
Just becuase the AESA on the T-50 has a long range does not equate to detecting an F-22 at that range. F-15 pilots report in red flag exercises that they have a hard time getting a radar lock with the F-22 directly in front of them.
At the risk of being redundant, I am going to rehash my previous explanation on how does a radar detect and finally recognize an object, be it a pencil or an aircraft or the Eiffel Tower.
Everything on a body is a 'scattering point'...
Radar imaging and multiple scatter-point localization
...reconstruct the spatial function of reflectivity of a target from the returned radar signals. Radar imaging is investigated from the point of view of multiple scatter-point localization.
The highlighted is significant and directly related to the illustration above. Basically...The receiver portion of the radar system process, or 'reconstruct', all the scattering points that reflected the transmitted signal, plot those points in a virtual 3D graph, assess if those points are in a cluster, or 'localization', and display the entire cluster as a 'dot' on the scope. The key phrase here is -- 'multiple scatter-point localization'. This effect
MUST be constant over time as radar detection is at its core a stochastical process, fancy word for statistics and probability...
CiteSeerX Nonlinear Stochastic Filtering Technique for Radar/Lidar Inversion
...joint estimation of backscatter and extinction coefficients from range/time noisy data under a nonlinear stochastic filtering setup. This problem is representativeofmany remote sensing applications such as weather radar and elastic-backscatter lidar. A Bayesian perspective is adopted. Thus, in addition to the observation mechanism, relating in a probabilistic sense the observed data with the parameters to be estimated, a prior probability density function has to be specified.
Note the highlighted. Everything points towards the fact that unless there is effective detection over time, even if the aircraft is violently maneuvering,
ALL scattering points
MUST remain localized in a format that the receiver can recognize as an 'aircraft'. Return to the illustration above. It is up to us, Americans or Russians or Chinese or Indians or Pakistanis or Marvin the Martian, to instruct the receiver, via algorithms, that if there is a cluster of scattering points in such-and-such manner over X timespan -- display it as a target. So clearly the problem here is how to resolve the variability of those scattering points as not only is the target in motion but so is the transmitter itself, like two boxers circling each other and as they do so, each will constantly see different angles of his opponent from different perspectives. Some scattering points will be lost from that virtual 3D graph and new ones will appear but the question is -- Are they as localized as the ones that disappeared? Inferior hardware can break target lock as perhaps the electronic engineering could not compensate for newly appeared scattering points that do not have the same power level as the ones that disappeared. Same for inferior algorithms. The combination of both inferior capabilities will result in an overall inferior system.
The reason why the human pilot can visually lock himself on to the F-22 but not his radar is because each
TYPE of receiver processes the target thru different target characteristics, particularly in the EM region. The human pilot is one type of receiver. The radar system is another type. The infrared sensor is another type. Each has advantages and disadvantages. All are looking at the
SAME TARGET. The human eye and the IR sensor are passive and does not have the ranging capability of the radar transmission, but the radar sensor is highly dependent upon those scattering points
BEFORE it can determine, at those great distances, that there is a
VALID target. The human sees constant valid targets, such as my G/F's shapely gluteus maximus for me. For the IR sensor, every body/object may emit different levels of heat but the greater the distance between sensor and target, the less details available and eventually all that remain is a single point of heat source, giving the IR sensor the distance advantage over the human eye. This is also why sensor suites that contains multiple sensor types are necessary but the negative here is cost as flight remains highly mass influenced. Given a mass limitation, the question is how to balance the sensor suite and the explosive warhead. More sophisticated missile avionics will require less explosive charge and perhaps some day we could have air-air missiles as purely kinetic kill type. The AIM-120 has a seven inch diameter and its solid fuel is very much an explosive. Straight into a jet engine exhaust or a body-wing root juncture and there would be no need for a separate explosive charge warhead.
High Off-Boresight (HOB) sensor system is essentially a combination of the human pilot sensor assisted by IR sensor. The 'off boresight' here is
RADAR boresight, aircraft's and missile's radar boresights. The IR sensor, with its superior range over the human eyes, give the pilot general target direction. The pilot then focus his attention on that sector and launch his missile.
F16 Radar - Avitop.com
A boresight ACM mode is used for multiple aircraft engagement situations. The boresight uses a pencil beam positioned at 0-deg azimuth and minus 3-deg elevation to "spotlight" a target for acquisition.
Any fighter radar system is capable of having and entering the 'boresight' mode, this reduces the odds of distractions.
Boeing: History -- Products - Boeing Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System
...airborne targets located at high off-boresight lines-of-sight relative to the shooter, providing a weapon with a short-range intercept envelope significantly larger than any air-to-air weapon in use today.
The HOBS system (the combination of JHMCS and AIM-9X) results in a weapon that can attack and destroy nearly any airborne enemy seen by the pilot. Additionally, this weapon can be employed without maneuvering the aircraft, minimizing the time spent in the threat environment.
Now it is up to the missile's own sensor suite to effect target detection and tracking, in other words, uses its own 'boresight' mode.
Nutation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Nutation (from Latin: nūtāre, to nod) is a slight irregular motion (etymologically a "nodding") in the axis of rotation of a largely axially symmetric object, such as a gyroscope, planet, or bullet in flight. A pure nutation is a movement of the rotation axis such that the first Euler angle (precession) is constant.
JSTOR: An Error Occurred Setting Your User Cookie
...remote sensing capabilities of entomological radar provide a solution to this seemingly intractable problem. We describe a novel, nutating-beam, vertical-looking radar with autonomous data analysis software.
What the antenna does in the 'boresight' mode is to 'nutate' or move in a circular movement. As the transmission impact the target, scattering points are activated, be they from an insect swarm or an aircraft. As a man, I would not be satisfied at looking at a Playboy Playmate of the Year just from the frontal view, no matter how beautiful she is. I would rather see her from as many perspectives as possible. Strip joint lap dances, anyone? Same for a radar seeking to create a target profile, hence the 'nutation' movement and that 'autonomous software'. But this is possible only as long as the target remain inside this 'nutation' or 'boresight' area.
So if the larger aircraft radar has a problem locking on to the F-22 even when it is within pilot's visual detection range and
INSIDE the radar's 'boresight' area, what are the odds of the smaller missile radar having superior odds? The F-15's radar failed to effect target lock, not because it could not detect the F-22, but because the F-22's scattering points are insufficiently localized and the F-15's radar algorithms could not compensate because they were, to put it bluntly -- inferior. The F-15's radar could not create a valid target profile. What about chaff/flares discharged by the violently maneuvering F-22? How are the capabilities of the aggressor radar to compensate for the chaff distractors? It is not that difficult to imagine the F-15 pilots' frustrations when they can see the F-22 in front of them but their radars -- aircrafts' and missiles' -- could not.
There are those here perfectly content with their 'gut feelings' that the PAK-FA will be the F-22's equal and have disdain for sources and explanations that contradict those 'gut feelings'. What I presented are publicly available information. I hope interested readers will use appropriate keywords to find out more their own benefits.
If a F-22 is in passive mode. it is designed to detect anything with an electronic emission
( AN/ALR-94 one of the most closely guarded secrets on the F-22). Which means if an AESA radar is pinging away it will be detected.
The
AN/ALR-94 has a range of 402km+
Exactly, but with the limitations that Gambit pointed out! My point was, that Russia seems not to count only on the stealth and passive detection capabilities and seem to focus on radar detection first, with passive detection and stealth capabilities in addition only.
So the most important point on Pak Fa might not be stealth, but possibly it's situational awareness.
Without AWACS support, would the F22 enter Russian airspace with radar turned on, or focus on beeing not detected with radar turned of and passive detection only?
It would still remain to be seen. At what range even with AESA turned on. A T-50 would get a lock on an F-22. And though the F-22 may enter the battle space in passive mode. at some point it will turn it's radar on to get more exact tracking data. it will then transmit that targeting information to every aircraft and naval ship in the battle space. making that T-50 or any aircraft or SAM site a big target. It is in effect a mini AWACS.
There is a Cold War tactic that NATO pilots often used, in training and against 'the commies', to avoid radar detection and I will use the F-111 as I am familiar with it and the fact that it was a strategic nuclear bomber. What the WSO will do is use inertial navigation to guide the aircraft to the radar protected airspace. Radar often assisted INS, but not at this time. Upon approach said protected airspace, the WSO will use his RWR to create a border of this radar boundary by having the pilot fly in a way that just touches the limit of the enemy radar coverage. At this furthest point, most radar returns will be classified as suspicious at best and often discarded as 'clutter' returns. Remember that distance affect power level, in transmit and echo, this is 'atmospheric attenuation' or loss. But as far as the RWR is concerned, it found a transmision at this maximum distance.
Aircrew coordination and system proficiency are crucial in finding any radar coverage gaps, and there always are gaps, then enter enemy airspace through those gaps. Of course, said gaps could be traps. That is the chance everyone must accept in war. Now imagine the F-22 and F-35 does this automatically with GPS instead of radar assist. Both aircrafts are fully capable of ingress/egress hostile airspace in passive mode. Any airborne or ground volume search radar will be mapped and avoided. Data links and sharing information will allow the entire force to have even more comprehensive radar intelligence as the force traverse enemy airspace. Gaps that are traps works best against 'non-stealth' aircrafts like the F-111 but not against extremely low radar observable aircrafts like the F-22 and F-35. What good is a trap if you cannot detect what is passing through the trap?