Analysis: Moeed Yusuf
India cannot conduct an air strike without at the very least planning seriously for a potential Pakistani response, and in turn, further escalation. This is because for Pakistan, the ultimate way to put pressure on India is to threaten, indeed execute, a response that initiates movement along the escalation ladder
Senator John McCain, on a daylong visit to Pakistan along with two other US senators, brought a stern message from New Delhi. Mr McCain was quoted as saying that if Pakistan did not fulfil Indian demands, India was certain to launch air strikes.
The Indian media too has presented the possibility of an Indian air strike as an easy-to-execute, surgical option short of an all-out war. Some have even begun to invoke the US drone strikes in the northwest against select targets as a precedent for India to do the same.
This is a serious error of conflation.
Consider that in the northwest, the drone strikes serve what the Pakistan Army believes is its own cause i.e., to target the lynchpins of militant networks. All strikes during former General-President Pervez Musharrafs time were pre-cleared with Pakistan and while the Americans have upped the ante and ignored Islamabads sensitivities in conducting strikes in recent months, a tacit understanding on the permissibility of their actions remains intact.
An Indian strike would be a different story altogether.
The Army will be facing its traditional rival, inaction against whom would cause reputational concerns and alter once and for all the perceptual balance of power that has favoured Pakistan since the 1998 nuclear tests.
Moreover, with most key states having signalled clearly that they are amenable to Indias stance (although they would try to dissuade India from exercising the military option), Pakistan could, given the situation, hardly hope to score any diplomatic points by refraining from a similar response.
Finally, for Pakistan, the ultimate way to put pressure on India is to threaten, indeed execute, a response that initiates movement along the escalation ladder. As soon as that happens, the nuclear weapon equation will come to life and so will the superpower diplomacy designed to keep a lid on tensions.
Let us postulate how the scenario may play out.
India will choose a limited number of locations to strike within Azad Kashmir or Pakistan-proper, most probably in the northwest. The idea would not be to wipe out the militant leadership, which by now would have relocated from predictable targets; nor even to eliminate the alleged terrorist infrastructure. Rather, the strikes would be meant to teach Pakistan a lesson, reverse the claim of victory by the Pakistani military in the 2001-02 crisis, and challenge the impunity with which India claims Pakistan and elements within have used asymmetric warfare to prick India over the past 15 years.
In essence then, Pakistani inaction would amount to the success of Indias mission.
To thwart such a possibility, Pakistan is likely to engage Indian strikes coming either from aircrafts or short range Prithvi missiles using its air defence assets. Meanwhile, the air force would have to be ready for any eventuality in the skies. Moreover, to up the ante, Pakistan is certain to put its own missile batteries on high alert and even show exaggerated movement, perhaps through a mixture of real assets and decoys.
Apart from complete inaction, the above depiction would be Pakistans minimal response. Even then, it inevitably carries with it an escalation ladder whose top rung entails a nuclear calculus. This is so since both sides are bound to carry mutually exclusive perceptions of victory. Just as success for India entails conducting a strike without being met by a Pakistani response, any successful engagement or retaliation by Pakistan will be taken equally harshly by India.
In short, there is no room for a face-saver in a one-shot exchange. By implication, escalation would be a given as long as India initiates and Pakistan avoids complete inaction.
The nuclear calculus invariably comes into play since neither side can differentiate between each others strike assets in terms of conventional and nuclear delivery. While it is unimaginable that Indias initial strikes will be nuclear-tipped, New Delhi will necessarily have to include the nuclear dimension in calculating Pakistans response.
This is not to say that the latter will be rash enough to deploy nuclear missiles. However, if the escalation dynamic is unleashed and Pakistan does decide to respond beyond an attempt at air defence (this would happen if the air defence fails or if India ups the ante after a successful Pakistani engagement), employment of any kind of air or land-to-air assets in an escapade, no matter how limited, will bring to the fore the entire set of concerns frequently raised by proliferation pessimists read high potential for inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.
What is being argued is not that the two sides will reach the nuclear rung. Rather, simply that both sides cannot be complacent about the threat of escalation; the calculations would be no different than in a scenario where an all-out conventional war is being contemplated. In fact, should a tit-for-tat response continue past the first exchange, both sides are likely to put their ground forces on high alert. That would then repeat the 2001-02 dynamic. The international community, led by the US would be forced to jump in to pull both sides back from the brink.
At this stage, the US would not only be concerned about the nuclear equation, but more urgently, the prospect of Pakistan pulling out its troops from the Western border. In all likelihood then, Washington would act as a relatively more neutral broker than it seems at present; it will continue to put diplomatic pressure on Pakistan but will also force India to ease tensions.
A number of lessons can be deciphered from this scenario. First, India cannot conduct an air strike without at the very least planning seriously for a potential Pakistani response, and in turn, further escalation.
Second, barring Pakistani inaction, escalation will be highly likely. Whether it spirals rapidly or stops at the level of first exchange, the situation will be inherently dangerous given the employment of dual-use air and land-to-air assets; proliferation pessimism will apply from the very onset.
Third, the situation sets up a self-defeating perverse incentive for Pakistan to escalate in response to India, both to avoid humiliation and to bring the international community to force India to call it a draw.
Fourth, it flows from the above that Pakistan should already be signalling clearly its intent to respond with force to any Indian move. At the minimum it should be conveyed unequivocally to Washington and New Delhi directly.
Fifth, no matter what the ultimate outcome, the South Asian powers would have played into the hands of the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack who wanted precisely this, i.e. force India to escalate, Pakistan to respond and mobilise on the eastern border and in effect ease pressure off from the Northwest. Pakistan pulling the troops will give them the much-sought opportunity to put their jihad against the US in top gear.
Sixth, even if Pakistan does not respond to India, Islamabads quitting will make the government extremely unpopular, a sentiment that would translate into street anger and thus destabilisation just what the terrorist groups want to find recruits. It would still result in greater anti-India feeling which would feed into the objectives of the terrorist groups. This is hardly a situation the Indian planners should be aiming at or, one dares say would like to materialise.
Finally, it must be noted that New Delhi faced virtually the same constraints when it was contemplating punitive strikes in Azad Kashmir in 2001-02. Better sense prevailed on that occasion. A sensible mind would realise the fallacy of acting rashly this time also.
That having been said, the media drumbeat and political pressure on the Congress party in India is quite acute. Inaction on New Delhis part would make this the second time in less than a decade that it has pulled back after huffing and puffing. Indeed, the militant enclave is eagerly watching, hoping that India takes the bait. If it does, India, Pakistan, and the US, all will have lost out to the vested interests behind the Mumbai attacks.
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