MiG-23MF still easily prevails over most of the PAF

[МиГ-29]

Had a wonderful time chatting with one of the pilots from Tridents Squadron a couple of weeks back. This squadron switched to MiG-29B when it started arriving in the IAF in the 80s but he said that they were the first squadron to receive the MiG-23MF, India's first BVR missile capable fighter jet. So they were they first squadron to operate a BVR fighter in India's History and he was quite proud of it, although he wasn't there in the IAF during that time. Ironically he didn't give any info on the MiG-29B other than what is already known in the public domain since he didn't want to lose his job , but he spoke a lot about the MiG-23MF. His squadron, still closely follows the swing wing fighters which they once operated. He said even though the MiG-23MF was decommissioned, many were still mothballed - stored away to use during war-times incase the requirement to put them back into air arises. He said since most of the PAF currently are not BVR capable fighters, MiG-23MF would still easily prevail over them. He also said - "MiG-23MF was procured as an answer to PAF F-16 procurement. IAF pre-empted the PAF in acquiring the MiG-23MF before PAF got the F-16. Even though MiG-23MF was not made for dogfights, PAF F-16A are not BVR capable. Our squadron was trained basically to engage the F-16s in BVR, and if the BVR missile didn't score a hit, then finish them off using short range missiles while they were low on energy after avoiding the initial salvo of BVR missiles." They were specifically told to avoid guns combat as the MiG-23MF was not maneuverable against the PAF F-16. When asked about the R-23R, R-23T and R-60 hit probability, he didn't say anything except that those above mentioned missiles which the MiG-23 carries, or infact any Air-Air missiles for that matter, when stored properly under cold dry conditions would retain its lethality. Prolonged warmness or heat is the biggest killer of Air-Air missiles. A missile's effectiveness or lethality plummets if storage is not proper.
At last he said, he would love to fly the MiG-23MF if given the chance, but won't trade a MiG-29B for it.

A MiG-23MF releasing a R-23 BVR Missile

Edit(almost forgot): Also from him, MiG-23MF doesn't have a likewise contemporary in the PAF, but is loosely analogous with China's J-8.

 

[DrSomnath999]

thanks mate for sharing such a nice experience

well mig planes have whole heartedly serve our airforce for a very long time .Really i salute to their service for IAF.

 

[airmarshal]

All PAF F-16As are going midlife upgrade. That will make them compatible with new build F-16C block 52s which carry BVR AIM-120C . So your source in IAF is out of synch with new developments. Now that will make you even more proud!!

 

[janon]

All PAF F-16As are going midlife upgrade. That will make them compatible with new build F-16C block 52s which carry BVR AIM-120C . So your source in IAF is out of synch with new developments. Now that will make you even more proud!!

Those F-16s represent the cutting edge of PAF's inventory. While in the case of IAF, we are talking about an aircraft that has been retired/mothballed. And we are comparing the two. That's what makes us proud.

F-16 block 70 with AESA was not good enough for our air force.

 

[AbhijitSingh]

All PAF F-16As are going midlife upgrade. That will make them compatible with new build F-16C block 52s which carry BVR AIM-120C . So your source in IAF is out of synch with new developments. Now that will make you even more proud!!

He is commenting about present, not future.. Looking at your relationship with USA, the MLU may or may not go thru anyway..

 

[SQ8]

He is commenting about present, not future.. Looking at your relationship with USA, the MLU may or may not go thru anyway..

And he is thankfully misinformed.. COMPLETELY misinformed.

 

[AbhijitSingh]

And he is thankfully misinformed.. COMPLETELY misinformed.

Sir.. Please expand.. Hearing from you about planes and air force capabilities is always a joy...

 

[SQ8]

Sir.. Please expand.. Hearing from you about planes and air force capabilities is always a joy...

The Mig-23 MF was originally bought as a stop-gap to the PAF's purchase of F-16's till a more potent aircraft(M2K and mig-29) could be procured.
Apart from the R-23R system which was only partially reliable at BVR ranges(and easily defeated by the then ECM systems on board PAF fighters which were targeted at being able to defeat Soviet fighters).. the Mig-23MF offered little advantage to the IAF other than an aircraft that could climb at similar rates to the F-16.
It record in usage with the syrians who also had similar hardware against Israeli F-16's is fairly dismal...even when using similar tactics...
The Mig-23 was more comparable to the F-4.. However, being gung ho is typical of many fighter pilots on both sides..
as some F-6 veterans would claim that they could defeat the Mirage-2000 by avoiding its BVr and forcing it into a knife fight.
Everybody likes to talk about what they see as their best case scenario..Not what is most likely to happen.

 

[Imran Khan]

a plane which was falling apart and thrown in junk is being compared to F-16 because wt that time F-16 can't carry BVR?

your great pilot seriously need to read it


Shooting Down Two Mig-23 Aircraft - September 12, 1988

Pilots: Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mehmood (Leader), Squadron Leader Anwar Hussain (No. 2)
Controller: Squadron Leader Irfan-ul-Haq
Date: September 12, 1988
Aircraft shot: Two Mig-23s
Area: South of Chitral (Nawagi)


This formation took-off from Minhas Air Base at 0606 hours a detailed mission briefing. The formation set up CAP in Nawagai area at 10,000 feet AGL as directed by the GCI controller. At about 0640 hours, the controller vectored the formation to a northwesterly heading for two enemy aircraft that were heading east. No. 2 picked up the intruders flying at 34,000 feet on his AI. Meanwhile, the targets had turned away and started flying parallel to the border in a northerly direction.

The GCI quickly repositioned the formation for four other potential intruders that were heading east. At 18 NM, the leader picked up one blip followed by five more blips within a second. No. 2 also had AI lock on these targets. However, the GCI radar was reporting only five blips. The enemy aircraft appeared in two distinct formations on the scope. There were four aircraft in the first formation and two in the trailing one. The leader locked on the last bogey in the first formation and took necessary tactical actions. The F-16s were flying at 10,000 feet while the intruders were flying at 34-36,000 feet. The F-16s initiated a climb.

They were closing in fast towards the enemy at rates higher than 1,000 knots. The radar controller was continuously updating on the rapidly changing aerial situation. The rear section of two enemy aircraft was flying faster than the front one and had come quite close to the leading section. Vital seconds were passing quickly. The leader rechecked his electronic sensors (ALR-69) to confirm that no enemy aircraft had locked onto his formation. At the same time, with the help of HUD TD Box, the leader quickly picked up the enemy aircraft visually at 7 NM and announced it on the radio. The leading section of the enemy was flying in a right extended echelon with a distance of about 4,000 feet between each aircraft. The rear section was also in the same formation and was positioned on their left side. All six aircraft were Mig-23s, camouflaged in Khaki colour.

The leader closed in and at a distance of about 7 NM, the computer had started flashing the DLZ symbol on the HUD, confirming that the enemy was with his AIM-9L missile range. However, the other two conditions i.e. the IR tone and the missile seeker head being locked on the target were not met. This was probably because the enemy had brought the throttle back as a part of his counter tactics to the IR missile. The leader was closing in fast and he made three attempts to lock the missile seeker head-on with the enemy aircraft but all without success. Luckily, in the fourth attempt, when less than 2 NM from the enemy aircraft, his AIM-9L seeker head locked the bogey and he got solid audio tone that further confirmed that he could fire his missile. In the words of Khalid:

At 1.7 NM, I launched my first missile. My aircraft shuddered as the missile left the aircraft, upsetting me for a while. This was my first experience of firing a missile. I saw my missile taking a lead for its target while I started looking for other enemy aircraft. I had made an oblique, left to right, low to high, conversion attack on the enemy at 130-140 degrees aspect angle. After firing the first missile, I reversed my bank to clear my belly from any unnoticed enemy threat. At this time, I was 1-2 NM behind all the enemy aircraft, which is an ideal position for shooting down a bandit. The leading section was exactly in front of me, whereas the trailing section was 11 o'clock just a few thousand feet ahead. I had rejected lock from my first target and switched over to Missile Override ACM 20x20 radar mode for auto lock on the enemy aircraft. This action would also select AIM-9P missiles that were more suitable for firing under the new set of conditions. I chose the third aircraft of the leading formation as my second prey: the No. 2 and leader could become my subsequent targets. When my Sidewinder-P missile left the aircraft rail, I saw it navigating towards the target, I quickly took aim for the next target.

While Khalid was busy doing this, the GCI controller announced that two enemy aircraft were behind him. He immediately turned around to face the new threat but found nothing. A mistake had been made; the radar controller had given him a wrong break due to false clutter on his scope. Khalid's next target had meanwhile flown out of his weapon ranges and was heading for his own territory. Chasing the enemy was out of the question because of tactical considerations and strict instructions to avoid violating the Afghan airspace. Khalid decided to exit in a safe tactical manner.

After the mission, the Base authorities as well as squadron pilots saw the video repeatedly. Everyone was convinced that Khalid had achieved the kills; however, the wreckage was not found and nothing was heard on the subject for a few days. Meanwhile, a team of American experts analysed the recording and commented that in all probability, missiles had hit the target. Later, Inspector General Frontier Corps (IGFC) visited the squadron about seven weeks later. Since the combat area fell under his jurisdiction, he had organized the search and recovery of the wreckage. The search party had reported that one aircraft had fallen on the Pakistani side of the border while the second debris had drifted into the territory controlled by the Afghan troops. The Afghan forces had mined the area to curb Mujahideen movements; therefore, the recovery of the wreckage was not possible. As explosions above 30,000 feet caused the wreckage to be scattered over a large area, and due to the risk of mine explosions, only one missile pylon of the downed enemy aircraft was recovered and presented to the IGFC by the search party.

 

[Imran Khan]

Top man on the totem pole

Shoulder patch of No. 14 Squadron The remaining three kills were all claimed by Flight Lieutenant Khalid mahmood, who in the space of just over seven weeks, established himself as 'top man on the totem pole' when it came to the F-16 community. There is every possiblity that he could have surpassed Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam's celebrated 1965 feat of destroying five aircraft in a single sortie. Khalid's first success came on:

September 12th, 1988

Khalid recieved an order to scramble from the ADA facility at Kamra at 0700 hours. On getting airborne, Khalid ( who was flying as lead in F-16A 85-728) and his wingman were directed by GCI to head a north-west towards the border in the vicinity of Nawagai. As they moved towards the designated area, word was passed by GCI that radar revealed the presence of a pair of hostile aircraft at around 32,000 ft on a heading og 90 degrees and behaving in such a way that a voilation appeared likely. To head off this threat, the two F-16s were vectored almost north on a heading of 330 degrees, only to learn that the radar contacts had also turned on to a northernly course and were now flying parallel to the border but remaining inside Afghanistan. At this point, the the F-16s swung right to an easterly heading and 'shackled' (performed a cross-over manoeuvre). Within a few moments of taking up this new course, GCI reported three more enemy aircraft at about 33,000 ft. The two fighting Falcons performed roughly a 180 degrees turn and headed towards the fresh contacts. Still at 10,000 ft, Khalid very quickly brought his own radar into play. This revealed the enemy flight to be four-strong, in echelon starboard with about 3,000 ft of separation between each member of the formation . Khalid proceeded to lock up the No. 4 at a range of 16 nm and saw that his own heading was 280 degrees. He then engaged afterburner and told GCI that he was accelerating to 550 kt before instructing his wingman to begin climbing. As they ascended, both aircraft passed

Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mehmoodthrough broken cloud at 20,000 ft, Khalidthen observing a RHAW (Radar Homing and Warning) indicating which alerted him to the fact that the hostile aircraft were Mig-23s. He notified GCI of this and then succeeded in gaining a visual 'tally' at a range of 7 nm, subsequently noticing that the four Afghan warplanes were in clean condition (i.e., no drop-tanks or bombs) and that they all featured a basically khaki camouflage colour scheme. At about the same time the first two MIGs reversed their course and began heading back towardsthe F-16s at about 33-34,000 ft. It was also apparent that this pair was rapidlyoverhauling the front four, which would seem to indicate that the latter had decelerated, perhaps in an attempt to place F-16s under threat. If it were indeed a tactical ploy, it failed dismally to succeed in its objective. Khalid chose to press on with his pursuit of the larger group and at a arange of 1.3 nm while in an attitude of 135 degrees of bank (i.e. near inverted) at 33,000 ft, he launched an AIM-9L at the No. 4 aircraft. Quickly rejecting the lock, he rolled out into level flight and turned to look for the original pair which was now much too close (about 5,000ft/1524 m away) as they overshot the four-ship. Since the pair clearly posed no immediate danger, Khalid turned his attaention back to the larger group and locked on to the No. 3 from almost directly astern at a distance of about 13,500 ft. It was now that Khalid worked out a cunning plan which, if executed correctly, would allow him to kill all six enemy aircraft. Basically, it envisaged using his three remaining Sidewinders (one AIM-9L and two AIM-9Ps) to 'splash' the last three of the four-ship element before disposing of the other two with the Vulcan M61 cannon.

In accordance with that plan, Khalid launched an AIM-9P at the No. 3 aircraft while at 34,000 ft on a heading of 40 degrees, and then began moving towards the No. 2. At this moment, GCI intervened with a warning call to break right. Khalid responded immediately and in doing so lost his chance of outdoing Alam's earlier achievement. Perhaps the most frustrating thing about this call was that it was subsequently found to be unnecessary and was probably prompted by 'clutter' on GCI's radar display.Whatever the reason, that manoeuvre cost Khalid precious seconds and even though he attempted to re-engage, by now the remaining enemy aircraft were in a descending left-hand turn and accelerating away towards the sanctuary of Afghanistan. With regard to the two MIG-23s that Khalid did engage, the Pakistan Army later found wreckage of both. Khalid remains confident that he would have taken all six had he not been distracted by the false call.

Pakistan Military Consortium :: www.PakDef.info

 

[Pakistanisage]

Mig 23 = Piece of Junk from the 1970's.

 

[Windjammer]

The Indian military aviation historian don't shy from the fact that in response to 40 F-16s acquired by the PAF, the IAF went into a frenzy ending up purchasing some 220 fighter jets. After having little confidence in the Flogger to counter the Fighting Falcon, the
IAF went for the very expensive Mirage-2000s and onto the MiG-29.

 

[dearone4u_22]

The Indian military aviation historian don't shy from the fact that in response to 40 F-16s acquired by the PAF, the IAF went into a frenzy ending up purchasing some 220 fighter jets. After having little confidence in the Flogger to counter the Fighting Falcon, the
IAF went for the very expensive Mirage-2000s and onto the MiG-29.

You guys think bhai duniya tumhi pe suru aur tumhi logon par khatam hoti hai....But aisa nahi hai..
India has other threat perception which u know of And india has to prepare for a war on two front as a possible reality....

 

[mjnaushad]

They might prevail us if they dont crash after takeoff.......

 

[The Great One]

Probably talking about the F-16's which have not been MLU'ed[which are a lot]. But still, his views are too overtly jingoistic, it seems especially in today's world.
For me
Mig-23MF