Indian Acquisition of the Gorshkov
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It is definitely not a ToT. An Italian firm was hired for consultancy regarding certain aspects. From what I know, 2010-11 could bring the good news. The project is farther towards completion than you think.
And since it is not a DRDO project, there isn't really much public info about the same. If it was a DRDO project, MSM would be calling it a white floating sitting duck elephant already! ROFL!
And since it is not a DRDO project, there isn't really much public info about the same. If it was a DRDO project, MSM would be calling it a white floating sitting duck elephant already! ROFL!
Keysersoze
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TO DRDO,
Hire me for Media management, will ya!
You might look funny after you have ripped out all your hair
Navy confirmed there's a three-four month delay.
Adux
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I dont think the Divine Overload has any idea when it comes to Indian Weapons procurement, Last time I spoke to him, he said " Good Luck finding,cuz he has given up hope".
mujahideen
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Indian defence team to make fresh move to break deadlock over delivery of Gorshkov warship
NEW DELHI, Feb 1 (APP): India will make a fresh move to break deadlock over delivery of aircraft carrier Gorshkov to India.
In this connection, India is appeared to be ready for upward revision of price tag for the ship on the insistence of Moscow.
An Indian defence team headed by Defence Secretary Vijay Singh will leave for Moscow on February 19 to carry out physical verification of additional refit work needed to be done on the carrier as claimed by Moscow, media reports said.
According to the schedule, the 45,000 tonne displacement carrier was to be delivered by August this year as per $ 1.5 billion deal signed in 2004 but Russia put India in embarrassing situation in November by demanding $ 1.2 billion more for the ship. This demand means a delay of upto four years, the reports said.
The original contract was sketchy, an Indian Defence Ministry official said, indicating that India was ready for upward revision of the price.
Moscow has conveyed to India that extensive refit work would be needed on the warship which would now have to undergo sea trials for a year in Russian waters under their experts, the cost of which would be borne by India, the Defence Ministry official said. This amount is in crores, he further said.
The India team is also likely to discuss with Russian delegation the matters related to malfunctioning of Klub missiles which are to arm the upgraded Kilo-class submarines, the reports added.
Associated Press of Pakistan - Indian defence team to make fresh move to break deadlock over delivery of Gorshkov warship
NEW DELHI, Feb 1 (APP): India will make a fresh move to break deadlock over delivery of aircraft carrier Gorshkov to India.
In this connection, India is appeared to be ready for upward revision of price tag for the ship on the insistence of Moscow.
An Indian defence team headed by Defence Secretary Vijay Singh will leave for Moscow on February 19 to carry out physical verification of additional refit work needed to be done on the carrier as claimed by Moscow, media reports said.
According to the schedule, the 45,000 tonne displacement carrier was to be delivered by August this year as per $ 1.5 billion deal signed in 2004 but Russia put India in embarrassing situation in November by demanding $ 1.2 billion more for the ship. This demand means a delay of upto four years, the reports said.
The original contract was sketchy, an Indian Defence Ministry official said, indicating that India was ready for upward revision of the price.
Moscow has conveyed to India that extensive refit work would be needed on the warship which would now have to undergo sea trials for a year in Russian waters under their experts, the cost of which would be borne by India, the Defence Ministry official said. This amount is in crores, he further said.
The India team is also likely to discuss with Russian delegation the matters related to malfunctioning of Klub missiles which are to arm the upgraded Kilo-class submarines, the reports added.
Associated Press of Pakistan - Indian defence team to make fresh move to break deadlock over delivery of Gorshkov warship
ejaz007
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INS Vikramaditya Hits Delay, Cost Increases
February 10th, 2008
On January 20, 2004 India and Russia signed a deal to refurbish and convert the 40,000t Soviet/Russian Admiral Gorshkov into a full carrier by removing the guns, anti-shipping and anti-air missile launchers on the front deck, and replacing it with a full runway and ski jump, changing the boilers to diesel fuel, enlarging and strengthening the rear aircraft elevator, and many other modifications. The announced delivery date for INS Vikramaditya was August 2008 an ambitious schedule, but one that would allow the carrier to enter service in 2009, around the time as their light carrier/LHA INS Viraat (formerly HMS Hermes, last of the Centaur class) was scheduled to retire.
The Viraats retirement is now set for 2010-2012. India Defence reports that delivery of the Vikramaditya must be pushed back until 2010, however, due to cabling issues. As the Russians seek to evade the terms of their deal and negotiations drag on, however, some estimates are placing the ships in-service date even later.
Right now, there are 2 major concerns in India. One is that slipping timelines could leave India without a serviceable carrier. The other is the extent of the increases, especially if more are added once India has paid for most of the budgeted work and is deep into the commitment trap. Current estimates place the overall cost of the refit as high as $1.35 billion, but figures are not final and time/money tradeoffs may well lie ahead. The initial reports sparked controversy in India, but even the Ministry has now admitted their veracity. The buy has now become the subject of high level diplomacy and an amusing recent rationale from the Russians
INS Vikramaditya Hits Delay, Cost Increases - Defense Industry Daily
More details from the link provided.
February 10th, 2008
On January 20, 2004 India and Russia signed a deal to refurbish and convert the 40,000t Soviet/Russian Admiral Gorshkov into a full carrier by removing the guns, anti-shipping and anti-air missile launchers on the front deck, and replacing it with a full runway and ski jump, changing the boilers to diesel fuel, enlarging and strengthening the rear aircraft elevator, and many other modifications. The announced delivery date for INS Vikramaditya was August 2008 an ambitious schedule, but one that would allow the carrier to enter service in 2009, around the time as their light carrier/LHA INS Viraat (formerly HMS Hermes, last of the Centaur class) was scheduled to retire.
The Viraats retirement is now set for 2010-2012. India Defence reports that delivery of the Vikramaditya must be pushed back until 2010, however, due to cabling issues. As the Russians seek to evade the terms of their deal and negotiations drag on, however, some estimates are placing the ships in-service date even later.
Right now, there are 2 major concerns in India. One is that slipping timelines could leave India without a serviceable carrier. The other is the extent of the increases, especially if more are added once India has paid for most of the budgeted work and is deep into the commitment trap. Current estimates place the overall cost of the refit as high as $1.35 billion, but figures are not final and time/money tradeoffs may well lie ahead. The initial reports sparked controversy in India, but even the Ministry has now admitted their veracity. The buy has now become the subject of high level diplomacy and an amusing recent rationale from the Russians
INS Vikramaditya Hits Delay, Cost Increases - Defense Industry Daily
More details from the link provided.
Contrarian
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Operationalising the Gorshkov
Abstract
The paper takes a critical look at various issues connected with Indias
acquisition of the Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov. It
examines Indias choice of fighter and various problems it is likely to face
in making the carrier operational and fully effective for its task. It
recommends the early acquisition of aerial refuelling and early warning
systems by the Navy. The paper also argues for greater jointmanship among
the services and an increase in specialist cross-postings in order to improve
inter-service rapport and the pool of trained manpower.
*
Introduction
On January 20, 2004, India finally signed the deal to acquire the 44,900-
ton Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, the replacement for the
Vikrant. 1 The Vikrant, Indias first aircraft carrier, had been commissioned
in 1961.
Indian efforts to acquire its first carrier began in 1948, soon after
independence, when an expansion plan mooted the concept of two fleets on
either ocean flank, with a light carrier each. These were to be replaced later
by two fleet carriers. Naval plans also called for the creation of 16 squadrons
and two Fleet Replacement Units (FRU) for training a total of 280 aircraft.2
The Government was however, reluctant to accept the proposal due to the
huge outlay involved. It eventually agreed to the acquisition of one light
carrier in 1955, followed by that of another, if available, in 1957.3 Plans for
a second carrier were later put on hold due to fund constraints. A Fleet Air
Arm was also approved in 1950. This called for the acquisition of a fighter
and a strike squadron, with 16 aircraft each, for each carrier. However, pilot
training had already begun in 1948, with the help of the Royal Navy.4 The
Indian Navy had to wait till 1986 to obtain its long sought after second carrier,
Revised paper received
on March 31, 2004
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2004
© Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
38 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004
with the acquisition of INS Viraat, formerly HMS Hermes. In this context, it
is noteworthy that the Indian navy actually has more experience operating
aircraft carriers than the Russian Navy.
The Admiral Gorshkov, formerly the Baku, was initially classified as an
anti-submarine cruiser.5 This classification was later changed to that of tactical
aircraft-carrying cruiser.6 Only four ships of the type were built, the lead
ship, the Kiev, launched in 1972. The Baku was the fourth and last Kiev class
carrier. It was retired by the Russian Navy in 1994, after budget cuts made
operations unsustainable.
The Gorshkov was named after Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the father of
the Soviet Unions blue-water navy. Until he took over, the Soviet Navy had
emphasised submarine construction and ballistic missile deterrence. However,
Soviet views on naval power were profoundly affected by the Soviet Unions
inability to challenge the US Navys blockade of Cuba during the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis.7 Soviet analysis attributed the humiliation to the weakness of
their surface navy.8 While nuclear submarines might have deterrent capability,
they could not run blockades.
Admiral Gorshkov felt that the Soviet Navy
needed to project power on the worlds oceans, to challenge US domination.
During his thirty-year stint as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, he
changed Soviet naval policy to favour the construction of large, powerful
guided missile cruisers like the Sverdlov class and culminating in the Kirov
class cruisers, instead of the corvettes and destroyers that were the staple
earlier. The Soviet Navy also started a programme for the construction of
aircraft carriers. The first ships of this type, the Moskva class helicopter
cruisers, launched in 1965, operated only helicopters. The Kiev class which
followed were the first Soviet ships to operate fighters. This kind of
incremental progress was typical of the Soviet development process. To
operate from these ships, the Yakovlev aircraft design bureau developed the
Yak-36 and Yak-38 fighters. While initially only VTOL (Vertical Takeoff
and Landing) capable, a STOVL (Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing)
capability was later built up. Unlike the British Sea-Harrier however, these
aircraft had three engines, two for lift and one for forward flight. This made
them considerably less flexible and versatile than the Harrier.
Operationalising the Gorshkov
Before it can become operational, the Gorshkov will have to be
refurbished. It has been lying alongside in Severodvinsk in the White Sea,
Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal 39
near Arkhangelsk, since 1996.
The various contracts concluded will cover
the fitment of a ramp or ski-jump angled at 14.3 degrees, various radar,
avionics and landing systems and modifications to the ship to enable it to
operate the MiG-29K, which has been selected by the Indian Navy.9
Indications are that the forward deck, which now houses launchers for
the SS-N-12 Bazalt cruise missiles (SSMs) and the SA-N-9 Gauntlet SAMs
will be cleared to fit the ski-jump on the forward flight deck.9 This would
create more space on deck to make it a true flat-top. Blast deflectors and
restraints to enable aircraft to run up to maximum power before take-off,
will also need to be be fitted. The angled deck will also incorporate arrester
cables to enable the MiG-29K to land.10 According to one source, the forward
deck runway could be 200m long with the landing runway being 198m long.11
Redesigning the Island
The Kiev class was only the second generation of Soviet carriers. The
Soviets were thus on a learning curve. This could account for the rather large
island on the Gorshkov. This has a very large footprint, by western standards,
and greatly reduces the area available on deck for aircraft operations.12
Since the Gorshkov was originally designed to operate only the Yak-36/38 and
helicopters, this did not matter very much then. However, with the decision
to operate rather larger fighters, deck space will be at a premium. Operations
would benefit if the island could be redesigned to occupy a smaller footprint
on the flight deck, with greater overhangs above, as in the Nimitz or Charles
de Gaulle.13 There would then be enough room above for the bridge and
flying control, while the deck could be de-cluttered. This would also enable
the incorporation of a suitably angled forward flight deck, with the SAMs
and SSMs removed.
Indeed, the new US carrier class, the CVN 21, due to enter service in the
year 2014, is being planned with the island shifted aft and outboard and with
a very small footprint, in order to increase deck operating and parking area.14
Further, all operations not considered absolutely essential will be moved out
of the island and below deck, to make it smaller. This includes the flag bridge,
normally below the ships bridge on the Nimitz class.14 Reducing the islands
size will also have the added benefit of reducing radar cross-section, with
suitable redesign, for whatever that is worth.
40 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004
A Catapult for the Gorshkov
According to Frontline magazine, the installation of a powder-type
catapult on the Gorshkov is being considered.15 The Nimitz class carriers of
the US Navy use steam catapults, instead of hydraulic or explosive powered
catapults. These are reportedly capable of accelerating a 20 tonne aircraft
from 0 to 266 kmph in two seconds.16 The new CVN 21 class will use electromagnetic
aircraft launching systems (EMALS). 17
The fitment of a catapult on the angled deck would enable two aircraft to
take-off simultaneously, one using the catapult and the other, the ski-jump.
Since an extensive refit will in any case be undertaken, the feasibility of the
fitment of a catapult needs to be considered, in view of its operational utility.
Russian efforts to fit a catapult on the Admiral Kuznetsov were apparently
not successful. However, we need to tap any available expertise, whether
Russian, French or American.
Once work is complete, the Gorshkov will have a maximum speed of 30
knots and an operational range of about 13,800 nautical miles (about 26,000
km) at 18 knots. It will carry a normal complement of 24 MiG-29K and six
helicopters. The Ka-28 and Ka-31 helicopters have also been contracted.
The Ka-28 helicopters will have an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role. The
Ka-31 is an early warning helicopter and will be used mainly to detect aerial
threats. Eleven MiG-29s will remain on deck. The hangar can reportedly
house either 13 fighters and six helicopters or ten fighters and 13 helicopters.
The ship will thus be able to operate a maximum of 34 aircraft. 18
The Gorshkov will take about five years to operationalise, at the very
least. With the Viraat expected to soldier on till 2010, there will therefore be
a period when both the Gorshkov and the Viraat are in operation together.
However, each will be able to operate only its own type of aircraft MiG-
29s on the Gorshkov and Sea-Harriers on the Viraat. This is because the Sea-
Harriers would not be able to takeoff from the Gorshkovs proposed skijump,
which would be too sharply angled. The aircrafts undercarriage would
not be able to take the strain of rotation. The MiG-29s would have difficulty
taking off from the Viraats short deck without a catapult. In any case, the
Viraat lacks the arresting gear necessary for the MiG-29K to land safely.
A compromise, which might enable both types to be operated from the
Gorshkov, would be to reduce the ski-jump angle from the planned 14.3
degrees to a more moderate 10-12 degrees. This would allow the Sea-Harriers
Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal 41
to operate from the Gorshkov and also provide the MiG-29s sufficient ballistic
boost for take-off. However, this would only be justifiable if the Sea-Harriers
were likely to be around for longer than planned.
The Viraat will retire in 2010. The Sea-Harriers too, are due to go out of
service in 2010, unless they are upgraded to Sea-Harrier II standard. A midlife
update was reportedly planned in 1999, but cancelled in view of the
impending Gorshkov/MiG-29 deal. It is now reported that an upgrade,
probably featuring the Israeli ELTA EL/M 2032 radar and air-to-air missiles,
may be carried out by HAL. However, this has not been finalised.
Operating Two Different Fighters
Operating two fighters of different origin from a carrier is difficult. If we
consider only the maintenance angle, the entire range of maintenance tools,
testers and spares would have to be available on the ship. With hardly any
commonality between the two types, this would mean having full sets of
such equipment for each type, along with manpower trained on each type.
Further, differences in fuel, oil and lubrication specifications, which could
require different storage arrangements, would also need to be considered.
Imagine a carrier deployment with, say fifteen MiG-29Ks and fifteen Sea-
Harriers to the South China Sea for a period of two months, with each aircraft
averaging three sorties a day. Assume an average consumption of 4,000 and
3,000 litres per sortie each for the MiG-29K and Sea-Harrier respectively.
The Gorshkov carries 1,200 tonnes of aviation fuel (1.5 million litres).19
However, another report indicates that the ship will carry 1,500 tonnes (1.9
million litres). It will also carry 260 tonnes of aircraft ammunition, bombs
and missiles etc., which also have to be provisioned for operations.20 Merely
imagining the housekeeping requirements makes the mind boggle. Extended
deployments presuppose sufficient tanker and replenishment at sea
capabilities. This capability too needs to be built up. As a point of interest,
the Nimitz class carriers carry as much as 11.3 million litres on board,21
sufficient for 12 days operations.22
Choice of Carrier Fighter : The Su-30/33 or The MiG-29K
The choice of fighter aircraft to operate on the carrier is an issue which
may be debated. The MiG-29K has been selected as the carrier aircraft.
However, despite its undoubted capabilities, it will add another fighter type
to the many that India already operates, and all that means in terms of
42 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004
maintenance and spares problems. The Russian carrier, the Admiral
Kuznetsov, operates the Su-33, a naval variant of the Su-30, which the IAF
already operates. Navalising an aircraft mainly involves modifying the
undercarriage for the stresses of carrier landing, the fitment of a tail-hook,
the strengthening of the hook attachment point and the incorporation of wing
and stabiliser folding mechanisms to cater for cramped operating and storage
areas. This has already been done for the Su-33. 23 In fact, the aircraft has
already had its fins clipped to reduce its height from 6.35m to 5.72m in
order to enable it to be housed in the Kuznetsovs hangar. 23 The other
considerations are anti-corrosion measures for the airframe and the engines.
However, these do not involve major re-design but merely need certain
maintenance procedures and practices to be followed.
Selection of the Su-30 would have ensured a certain commonality between
the Air Force and the Indian Navy and also facilitated cross training between
the two services. greatly furthering the concept of jointmanship. It would
also have resulted in greater work for HAL, which is to manufacture the Su-
30 in India.
The Su-30 is definitely the more capable aircraft (Table-1). It has greater
range and endurance. This would give it the ability to range over greater
expanses of ocean and enable the carrier to exercise greater sea control over
vast swathes. The Su-30s superior radar (even more so in the MKIII version)
would enable it to detect and attack targets in collaboration with the maritime
reconnaissance aircraft. It has a greater payload. The Su-30 and the MiG-
29K are about equal at the moment, in terms of manoeuvrability. However,
the Su-30MKIII with its canards and thrust vectoring nozzles would be far
more manoeuvrable.
The Brahmos Anti-Ship Missile
India and Russia have now jointly developed the Brahmos anti-ship
missile, which is reportedly one of the most advanced in the world. The
original Russian Moskit 3M82 missile (airborne version of 3M80 naval
SSM, NATO SS-N-22 Sunburn), on which the Brahmos is based, was also
tri-sonic, a design characteristic implemented essentially to defeat the Aegis
class destroyers of the US Navy. These destroyers use a sophisticated,
computerised threat evaluation and destruction system and are used for fleet
defence. Soviet analysis deduced that these ships could be defeated by a very
fast missile, which would hit the ship, before it had completed its detectlaunch-
destroy cycle. 24
Hence the Moskit. Similarly, the Brahmos missile
can hit ships up to 290 km away. As it travels at close to three times the
speed of sound, any potential target would find it difficult to evade. Detection
and counter-measures would also be difficult to implement, in view of the
short reaction time afforded by its great speed. However, the standard version
weighs about three tonnes and is over eight metres long. An airborne version
is being developed. It is doubtful whether the weight can be reduced without
affecting its capability. This would probably preclude its carriage by any
fighter other than the Su-30. Even the Su-30 can only carry one on the
underbelly station. The aircrafts wings are planned to be strengthened to
carry two more missiles. This would give the Su-30 tremendous anti-ship
capability and would have made it a welcome addition to the Admiral
Gorshkov. The MiG-29K will probably be unable to carry the Brahmos, due
to its load carrying limitations, without extensive modification, which may
not be cost-beneficial.
Why We Opted for the MiG-29K: Some Possible Reasons
One possible reason we have opted for the MiG-29K instead of the Su-
30/33 could be its smaller size. This would allow more aircraft to be
accommodated on the Gorshkovs deck and in its hangar. A second could
also be doubts about deck strength requirements for operating the Su-33,
which has a maximum carrier take-off All Up Weight (AUW) of 30 tonnes,
compared to the MiG-29Ks max AUW of 22 tonnes.25 A third possibility
could be the elevator weight limits on the Gorshkov. However, it is understood
that one lift has a 20-ton capacity and that the other is being upgraded to 30-
ton capacity.26
This latter would have been sufficient for operating the Su-
30. However, the main consideration could possibly have been hangar height
limitations on the Gorshkov, which would leave little, if any, clearance for
the Su-33. According to one report, the hangar on the Gorshkov has
dimensions 130m x 23m x 5.7m,26 compared to the Kuznetsovs 153m x
26m x 7.2m.27 The Su-33s fins were reportedly shortened to enable it to fit
into the Kuznetsovs hangar deck.28 While some of these problems could
possibly have been addressed in the refit, that of hangar height probably was
the decisive factor against the Su-30/33.
Another reason for our selection of the MiG-29K could possibly be due
to the Gorshkov being offered as part of a package deal with the MiG-29K.
Of late, orders for fighters, both from the Russian Air Force and abroad,
have been cornered by the Sukhoi bureau. Given the shrinking defence budget,
Russia has found it difficult to support both firms by splitting Air Force
fighter requirements between the MiG and Sukhoi bureaus. Therefore,
governmental assistance to help the MiG bureau obtain export contracts is in
order. This would serve to keep this famous design bureau from disappearing
altogether and help the country retain the design expertise it has built up
over the years.
The MiG-29K
While the Indian Air Force acquired the MiG-29 in 1986, it was first
displayed in the West during the Farnborough Air Show in 1988. Its superb
manoeuvrability made it an instant hit. Since then many versions have been
developed. The MiG-29, selected for the Gorshkov is a development of the
MiG-29SMT. At the time the MiG-29SMT was first displayed, Rostislav
Belyakov, then Chief Designer of the Mikoyan Bureau, was quoted as saying
that the aircraft was actually entirely a new aircraft. The MiG-29 label had
been retained mainly for its brand recognition value. The MiG-29K
incorporates improved avionics, radar, engines and fly-by-wire controls.
While the superb manoeuvrability of the MiG-29 was achieved through
aerodynamic design and a purely hydro-mechanical control system, the MiG-
29K will in fact further improve that performance with its fly-by-wire controls.
Internal fuel capacity has been increased and an in-flight refuelling capability
has been added. The aircraft will also be able to carry drop fuel tanks.
All
this should go a long way to improve its flight endurance, one of the main
complaints against the original MiG-29 being its inadequate fuel capacity. It
will also have improved pulse-Doppler radar and opto-electronic sensors,
besides an active data-link. The aircraft will carry the latest air-to-air missiles
(AAMs), like the RVV-AE active AAM, the R-73 short range AAM and
also a variety of air-to-surface armament. The MiG-29Ks airframe has been
lightened and clipped, and the wing-fold pivots moved inwards towards the
fuselage. All this, together with the folding tail unit, will ensure that it occupies
less space on deck. The aircrafts internal fuel has also been increased from
3,340 kg in the series production MiG-29 to 4,560 kg in the MiG-29K. A
buddy refuelling capability has also been built in with the UPAZ refuelling
pack. This version will carry 7,820 kg.29 Eleven MiG-29s will be able to
park on deck. The rest will be housed in the hangar below decks.
Landing Conventionally on the Gorshkov
Landing on a carrier is always a tricky affair, whether vertically on a
Harrier, or conventionally, on an F-14 or a MiG-29K. Both are different skillsets.
Since the Sea-Hawk was retired, the Indian Navys fighter pilots have
landed only vertically, on the Sea-Harrier. The art of making a conventional
approach and engaging an arrester cable, never an easy one, has by now been
lost. This skill will have to be re-acquired.
Where will the training be done?
The Russian carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov operates the Su-33 and in
any case, puts to sea only rarely. A recent article in Pravda dated in early
February this year, quotes the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy,
Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, as saying that Russia has no need of an aircraft
carrier.30 According to Kuroyedov, Russia has no blue water ambitions for
46 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004
the foreseeable future. In fact, it plans to acquire smaller vessels like destroyers
and corvettes, suitable for a coastal defence role, rather than the large cruisers
of the Kirov class, favoured by Admiral Gorshkov.
The same article quotes a Russian defence expert as saying that the
Admiral Kuznetsov, should be scrapped since it is uneconomical to operate.
In fact, according to him, Russia has only twelve naval pilots left, and this
number does not justify the maintenance of an aircraft carrier.30 The Russian
Navy is not therefore likely to be in any position to train Indian naval pilots
in carrier operations. In fact, according to Russian analyst, Mikhail Tsypkhin,
Russian naval fighter crews fly an average of only seven hours a year.31 The
question of who is to train whom is therefore moot. The US Navy could be
approached for training, but they operate different aircraft and use different
systems. It is obvious therefore, that any training on the Gorshkov will have
to be carried out at home.
On landing, the MiG-29K will be brought to a halt by having its tailhook
grabbed by cables connected to an energy absorption system. In order
to ensure that the arrester cable is engaged by the tail-hook, conventional
aircraft like the US Navys F-14 Tomahawk and F-18 Hornet, and the MiG-
29K, are generally banged down on deck, on landing. For this reason, carrier
landings are often described in pilot jargon as arrivals or smack-downs.
Pilots will be aided by a landing system, which will tell them whether
they are high or low on approach. This could be a laser or microwave system,
unlike with the Viraat, which uses a Mirror Landing System. The Commander
Air, who would normally control all flying activity on the carrier, would be
aided by lights on the nose undercarriage of the MiG-29, which would change
colour depending on the aircrafts angle of attack. On touch-down, the MiG-
29s tail-hook, lowered along with the undercarriage for landing, would
engage an arrester cable stretched across deck. About three to four such cables
would be available for redundancy. If an aircraft misses one, it will usually
engage another. In the event that the aircraft fails to catch any of these, we
have what the US Navy calls a bolter an aircraft that has to go around
again and make another attempt at landing. This raises another issue.
The Requirement of Aerial Refuelling
In carrier operations, aircraft sometimes return with low fuel states. In
case of out of range of airfields ashore, the aircraft have no option but to land on the carrier. However, the lack of fuel itself complicates the recovery. Afterone or two failed attempts to catch the cable, the pilots awareness of his
rapidly reducing fuel state often induces nervousness, further aggravating
the situation, leading to a loss of motor skills, and in extreme cases, of the
aircraft. This situation is by no means uncommon. In the US Navy, this is
usually handled by launching an aerial refuelling aircraft to transfer fuel to a
serial bolter. It has been observed that this is often followed by a perfect
landing on the next attempt, the pilot recovering his nerve and flying skills
as his aircraft imbibes the fuel it needs to stay airborne. Therefore, for
successful long-range and long-duration operations, it is imperative that a
ship-board refuelling aircraft be available. This could be a buddy-refueller
a MiG-29K itself modified to carry a refuelling pod to supply fuel or a
specialist refuelling aircraft, which could also carry out anti-submarine (ASW)
or Electronic Warfare (EW) duties in addition.The first approach would seem preferable.
A number of MiG-29Ks
modified to carry the refuelling pod, would confer a degree of flexibility in
operations. Performance similar to that of the fighter could also be
advantageous in certain critical refuelling situations. The US Navy earlier
used the Grumman EA-6B Electronic Warfare aircraft, some of which were
modified to serve as buddy-refuellers. An interesting description of combat
operations from an aircraft carrier can be obtained from Stephen Coontzs
book, The Flight of the Intruder. Even today, buddy refuelling systems are
extensively used by the US Navy, which has modified S3A Viking ASW
aircraft and F-18E/F fighters for the role, using Sargent Fletchers buddy
refuelling systems. The F3 version of the Rafale, Frances latest naval and
air force fighter, will also have buddy-buddy refuelling capability.
In any case, the need for aerial refuelling capability is inescapable.
Airborne Early Warning
An aircraft carrier is a prime target for any attacker. It is a national asset
carrying tens of aircraft and a repository of national prestige. Any successful
attack on a carrier could conceivably alter the course of any conflict. The
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, was despite its
success, ultimately a failure, because it failed to damage any of the American
carriers, which fortunately for the US, happened to be at sea on that fateful
day. Had they been sunk, as were the battleships in harbour that day, the
course of the war might have been different. Carriers are normally protected
by a screen of ships, some specially developed for that purpose. This has led
many to question the worth of a weapon, which needs to be so heavily
defended. Be that as it may, an aircraft carrier needs to be defended, from
surface, sub-surface and aerial attacks.
Defence against aerial and surface attacks would require the availability
of an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. On the Gorshkov, this will be
provided by the Ka-31 helicopter. The radar can detect fighter-sized aircraft
from a range of 110-115 km and surface ships at a horizon of 200 km from
an altitude of three km. It is claimed that up to 200 targets can be detected
and twenty airborne or surface threats simultaneously tracked, with a detection
range for aerial targets up to 80 nautical miles (150 km) and for surface
targets up to 135 nautical miles (250 km).32 However, helicopters have limited
range and endurance and cannot match conventional aircraft in both these
aspects.
The US Navy uses the carrier-launched E2C Grumman Hawkeye. At
one time in the eighties, there were reports that Pakistan had been offered
these aircraft. With the IAF going in for the Israeli Phalcon system mounted
on an Il-76 airframe, some thought needs to be given to a naval variant.
This cannot obviously use the II-76 airframe, but will need to be mounted on
a smaller aircraft, one capable of being launched from the carrier. However,
there is no reason why work on this cannot proceed concurrently with the
Air Force requirement. A smaller version of the Phalcon radar, mounted on
a small turbo-prop, would suit naval requirements quite nicely.
It is therefore clear that purposeful utilisation of the Gorshkov will require
the acquisition of air-to-air refuelling and early warning capabilities. The
acqui-sition of these capabilities would be a significant boost to national
prepared-ness, one that the IAF might find itself thankful for in the future.
Operating a small tanker or AEW aircraft (transport aircraft) would be
difficult without a catapult to assist launch. As mentioned earlier, this would
require a study to determine the feasibility of catapult fitment. If judged
feasible, this would greatly enhance operational capability.
Greater Navy-Air Force Cooperation
The IAF is today the sole operator of MiG-29s and has built up great
experience in both operations and maintenance. This could be useful to the
Navy as it decides on the equipment fit that it desires. The IAFs MiG-29s
Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal 49
are also long overdue for an upgrade, with improved avionics, radar and
engine. Logically, this would dovetail quite well with the Navys plans to
acquire the MiG-29K.
With the acquisition of the MiG-29K, the IAF and the Navy will for the
first time be operating a common fighter. Since the Navys fighter fleet is
quite small, it would be logical to have a number of IAF pilots also trained in
carrier operations. This would both serve to improve inter-service relations
and also provide a pool of trained pilots, who could be used for special
operations involving the carrier, if necessary. Cooperation between the
services needs to improve for this to happen. It is a sad but illuminating
statistic on the relations between the services, that in the forty odd years that
the Indian Navy has operated aircraft carriers, the number of IAF fighter
pilots trained to carry out deck operations can be counted on the fingers of
one hand. This needs to change.
Utilising the Su-30 and MiG-21 Upgrade Experience:
System Integration on the MiG-29K
The MiG-29K will also need to be modified to suit Indian requirements
and with avionics of our choice. In this context it is worth recalling that we
already have two ongoing projects with the Russians, on the MiG-21 upgrade
and the Su-30. The Su-30 programme envisages a three-stage modernisation,
at the end of which the aircraft will have acquired a very comprehensive set
of capabilities that will include major improvements and substantial changes
to the original aircraft. The Su-30 MKIII (final version) will have thrust
vectoring nozzles and canards (for super-manoeuvrability), a phased array
radar, and so on. Since these require extensive work, it was proposed that the work be done in stages.
The avionics selected for the Su-30 include Israeli,American, French, British and also indigenously developed equipment. Infact the mission computer in the Su-30MK versions was developed by the DRDOs Aeronautical Development Establishment and is said to be state of the art.
The MiG-21 upgrade too uses an array of avionics from different
manufacturers, both Indian and foreign. Both aircraft incorporate the MIL
1553B databus to handle data exchange. The integration work has been carried out by Indian engineers, in collaboration with the aircraft and equipment manufacturers. A wealth of expertise has therefore been built up in systems integration. This experience may be utilised usefully in developing the MiG-29K. It is necessary that the lessons learnt during the course of the other two projects be used in the MiG-29K project, instead of starting all over again
with a tabula rasa and repeating the same mistakes. Developing the MiG-
29K by drawing upon the experience of the Su-30 and MiG-21 upgrade
programmes will require drawing upon the IAFs experience. This will
necessitate looking at all these programmes and requirements as part of an
integrated whole.
The Development of the Ski-Jump
We have taken close to a decade to decide on our purchase of the Admiral
Gorshkov. The AJT decision has taken us twenty years. In this context, it is
illuminating to learn how the ski-jump was conceptualised and implemented.
A conventional aircraft taking off from a carrier, leaves the deck without
actually having reached flight-sustaining speed. On a conventional flat top
carrier, it actually sinks slightly soon after take-off, coming down to say
thirty or twenty feet above the water, before it has picked up enough speed to climb.
This is the most critical phase of flight. Any engine failure at this
stage could be fatal. The ski-jump helps by giving a ballistic boost to the
aircraft, effectively kicking it higher into the air. The aircraft thus continues
to climb even though it has not yet reached flying speed. Taking off on a
Harrier from the carrier, one can actually see the rate of climb reduce soon
after take-off, before it starts showing an increase as the aircraft accelerates
and achieves flight-sustaining speed. The ski-jump was the product of a
doctoral thesis submitted by Lt Cdr Frank Taylor of the Royal Navy, in 1976.
Impressed by the concept, the Royal Navy immediately implemented it. HMS
Hermes was fitted with a ski-jump during refit in 1980, in time for the 1982
Falklands war. A ski-jump enables an aircraft to get airborne off a much
shorter run. It also enables an aircraft to get airborne carrying a much heavier
weapon load. Incidentally, fitting the ski-jump actually makes ship handling
more difficult and so is not an unmixed blessing. HMS Hermes is today INS
Viraat.
Interestingly, the US has not used the ski-jump thus far, since their carriers
are large and provide a deck long enough for their fighters to take off
comfortably, even if loaded. In any case, US carriers use steam catapults to
enable the fighters to build up sufficient speed for take-off. And further, US
Navy fighters like the F-18 enjoy high thrust to weight ratios (greater than or
close to unity) and hence are capable of extremely high acceleration and
rates of climb. This obviates to some extent the necessity for the ski-jump.
Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal 51
Conclusion
Acquiring the Admiral Gorshkov will be the easy part. Operationalising
it will be much trickier. Decisions on the ships configuration itself will need
a lot of hard thinking, if it is to serve us well at least for the next two decades.
Commonality of systems, between existing aircraft in inventory and the new
acquisitions, therefore needs to be given high priority. Priority needs to be
given to the early acquisition of aerial refuelling capability either through
buddy-refuelling or through the acquisition of a tanker. While the Ka-31
does provide some early warning capability, this is not likely to match that
provided by a fixed wing aircraft. This too needs consideration. Inter-service
cooperation also needs to improve so that each service can benefit from the
experience of the others. Cross-postings of specialists would help the services
build up greater rapport than they enjoy presently. A beginning could be
made by having more Air Force and naval pilots train together in operations
aboard the carrier and ashore.
http://www.idsa.in/publications/strategic-analysis/2004/jan/R Sukumaran.pdf
Abstract
The paper takes a critical look at various issues connected with Indias
acquisition of the Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov. It
examines Indias choice of fighter and various problems it is likely to face
in making the carrier operational and fully effective for its task. It
recommends the early acquisition of aerial refuelling and early warning
systems by the Navy. The paper also argues for greater jointmanship among
the services and an increase in specialist cross-postings in order to improve
inter-service rapport and the pool of trained manpower.
*
Introduction
On January 20, 2004, India finally signed the deal to acquire the 44,900-
ton Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, the replacement for the
Vikrant. 1 The Vikrant, Indias first aircraft carrier, had been commissioned
in 1961.
Indian efforts to acquire its first carrier began in 1948, soon after
independence, when an expansion plan mooted the concept of two fleets on
either ocean flank, with a light carrier each. These were to be replaced later
by two fleet carriers. Naval plans also called for the creation of 16 squadrons
and two Fleet Replacement Units (FRU) for training a total of 280 aircraft.2
The Government was however, reluctant to accept the proposal due to the
huge outlay involved. It eventually agreed to the acquisition of one light
carrier in 1955, followed by that of another, if available, in 1957.3 Plans for
a second carrier were later put on hold due to fund constraints. A Fleet Air
Arm was also approved in 1950. This called for the acquisition of a fighter
and a strike squadron, with 16 aircraft each, for each carrier. However, pilot
training had already begun in 1948, with the help of the Royal Navy.4 The
Indian Navy had to wait till 1986 to obtain its long sought after second carrier,
Revised paper received
on March 31, 2004
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2004
© Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
38 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004
with the acquisition of INS Viraat, formerly HMS Hermes. In this context, it
is noteworthy that the Indian navy actually has more experience operating
aircraft carriers than the Russian Navy.
The Admiral Gorshkov, formerly the Baku, was initially classified as an
anti-submarine cruiser.5 This classification was later changed to that of tactical
aircraft-carrying cruiser.6 Only four ships of the type were built, the lead
ship, the Kiev, launched in 1972. The Baku was the fourth and last Kiev class
carrier. It was retired by the Russian Navy in 1994, after budget cuts made
operations unsustainable.
The Gorshkov was named after Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the father of
the Soviet Unions blue-water navy. Until he took over, the Soviet Navy had
emphasised submarine construction and ballistic missile deterrence. However,
Soviet views on naval power were profoundly affected by the Soviet Unions
inability to challenge the US Navys blockade of Cuba during the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis.7 Soviet analysis attributed the humiliation to the weakness of
their surface navy.8 While nuclear submarines might have deterrent capability,
they could not run blockades.
Admiral Gorshkov felt that the Soviet Navy
needed to project power on the worlds oceans, to challenge US domination.
During his thirty-year stint as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, he
changed Soviet naval policy to favour the construction of large, powerful
guided missile cruisers like the Sverdlov class and culminating in the Kirov
class cruisers, instead of the corvettes and destroyers that were the staple
earlier. The Soviet Navy also started a programme for the construction of
aircraft carriers. The first ships of this type, the Moskva class helicopter
cruisers, launched in 1965, operated only helicopters. The Kiev class which
followed were the first Soviet ships to operate fighters. This kind of
incremental progress was typical of the Soviet development process. To
operate from these ships, the Yakovlev aircraft design bureau developed the
Yak-36 and Yak-38 fighters. While initially only VTOL (Vertical Takeoff
and Landing) capable, a STOVL (Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing)
capability was later built up. Unlike the British Sea-Harrier however, these
aircraft had three engines, two for lift and one for forward flight. This made
them considerably less flexible and versatile than the Harrier.
Operationalising the Gorshkov
Before it can become operational, the Gorshkov will have to be
refurbished. It has been lying alongside in Severodvinsk in the White Sea,
Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal 39
near Arkhangelsk, since 1996.
The various contracts concluded will cover
the fitment of a ramp or ski-jump angled at 14.3 degrees, various radar,
avionics and landing systems and modifications to the ship to enable it to
operate the MiG-29K, which has been selected by the Indian Navy.9
Indications are that the forward deck, which now houses launchers for
the SS-N-12 Bazalt cruise missiles (SSMs) and the SA-N-9 Gauntlet SAMs
will be cleared to fit the ski-jump on the forward flight deck.9 This would
create more space on deck to make it a true flat-top. Blast deflectors and
restraints to enable aircraft to run up to maximum power before take-off,
will also need to be be fitted. The angled deck will also incorporate arrester
cables to enable the MiG-29K to land.10 According to one source, the forward
deck runway could be 200m long with the landing runway being 198m long.11
Redesigning the Island
The Kiev class was only the second generation of Soviet carriers. The
Soviets were thus on a learning curve. This could account for the rather large
island on the Gorshkov. This has a very large footprint, by western standards,
and greatly reduces the area available on deck for aircraft operations.12
Since the Gorshkov was originally designed to operate only the Yak-36/38 and
helicopters, this did not matter very much then. However, with the decision
to operate rather larger fighters, deck space will be at a premium. Operations
would benefit if the island could be redesigned to occupy a smaller footprint
on the flight deck, with greater overhangs above, as in the Nimitz or Charles
de Gaulle.13 There would then be enough room above for the bridge and
flying control, while the deck could be de-cluttered. This would also enable
the incorporation of a suitably angled forward flight deck, with the SAMs
and SSMs removed.
Indeed, the new US carrier class, the CVN 21, due to enter service in the
year 2014, is being planned with the island shifted aft and outboard and with
a very small footprint, in order to increase deck operating and parking area.14
Further, all operations not considered absolutely essential will be moved out
of the island and below deck, to make it smaller. This includes the flag bridge,
normally below the ships bridge on the Nimitz class.14 Reducing the islands
size will also have the added benefit of reducing radar cross-section, with
suitable redesign, for whatever that is worth.
40 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004
A Catapult for the Gorshkov
According to Frontline magazine, the installation of a powder-type
catapult on the Gorshkov is being considered.15 The Nimitz class carriers of
the US Navy use steam catapults, instead of hydraulic or explosive powered
catapults. These are reportedly capable of accelerating a 20 tonne aircraft
from 0 to 266 kmph in two seconds.16 The new CVN 21 class will use electromagnetic
aircraft launching systems (EMALS). 17
The fitment of a catapult on the angled deck would enable two aircraft to
take-off simultaneously, one using the catapult and the other, the ski-jump.
Since an extensive refit will in any case be undertaken, the feasibility of the
fitment of a catapult needs to be considered, in view of its operational utility.
Russian efforts to fit a catapult on the Admiral Kuznetsov were apparently
not successful. However, we need to tap any available expertise, whether
Russian, French or American.
Once work is complete, the Gorshkov will have a maximum speed of 30
knots and an operational range of about 13,800 nautical miles (about 26,000
km) at 18 knots. It will carry a normal complement of 24 MiG-29K and six
helicopters. The Ka-28 and Ka-31 helicopters have also been contracted.
The Ka-28 helicopters will have an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role. The
Ka-31 is an early warning helicopter and will be used mainly to detect aerial
threats. Eleven MiG-29s will remain on deck. The hangar can reportedly
house either 13 fighters and six helicopters or ten fighters and 13 helicopters.
The ship will thus be able to operate a maximum of 34 aircraft. 18
The Gorshkov will take about five years to operationalise, at the very
least. With the Viraat expected to soldier on till 2010, there will therefore be
a period when both the Gorshkov and the Viraat are in operation together.
However, each will be able to operate only its own type of aircraft MiG-
29s on the Gorshkov and Sea-Harriers on the Viraat. This is because the Sea-
Harriers would not be able to takeoff from the Gorshkovs proposed skijump,
which would be too sharply angled. The aircrafts undercarriage would
not be able to take the strain of rotation. The MiG-29s would have difficulty
taking off from the Viraats short deck without a catapult. In any case, the
Viraat lacks the arresting gear necessary for the MiG-29K to land safely.
A compromise, which might enable both types to be operated from the
Gorshkov, would be to reduce the ski-jump angle from the planned 14.3
degrees to a more moderate 10-12 degrees. This would allow the Sea-Harriers
Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal 41
to operate from the Gorshkov and also provide the MiG-29s sufficient ballistic
boost for take-off. However, this would only be justifiable if the Sea-Harriers
were likely to be around for longer than planned.
The Viraat will retire in 2010. The Sea-Harriers too, are due to go out of
service in 2010, unless they are upgraded to Sea-Harrier II standard. A midlife
update was reportedly planned in 1999, but cancelled in view of the
impending Gorshkov/MiG-29 deal. It is now reported that an upgrade,
probably featuring the Israeli ELTA EL/M 2032 radar and air-to-air missiles,
may be carried out by HAL. However, this has not been finalised.
Operating Two Different Fighters
Operating two fighters of different origin from a carrier is difficult. If we
consider only the maintenance angle, the entire range of maintenance tools,
testers and spares would have to be available on the ship. With hardly any
commonality between the two types, this would mean having full sets of
such equipment for each type, along with manpower trained on each type.
Further, differences in fuel, oil and lubrication specifications, which could
require different storage arrangements, would also need to be considered.
Imagine a carrier deployment with, say fifteen MiG-29Ks and fifteen Sea-
Harriers to the South China Sea for a period of two months, with each aircraft
averaging three sorties a day. Assume an average consumption of 4,000 and
3,000 litres per sortie each for the MiG-29K and Sea-Harrier respectively.
The Gorshkov carries 1,200 tonnes of aviation fuel (1.5 million litres).19
However, another report indicates that the ship will carry 1,500 tonnes (1.9
million litres). It will also carry 260 tonnes of aircraft ammunition, bombs
and missiles etc., which also have to be provisioned for operations.20 Merely
imagining the housekeeping requirements makes the mind boggle. Extended
deployments presuppose sufficient tanker and replenishment at sea
capabilities. This capability too needs to be built up. As a point of interest,
the Nimitz class carriers carry as much as 11.3 million litres on board,21
sufficient for 12 days operations.22
Choice of Carrier Fighter : The Su-30/33 or The MiG-29K
The choice of fighter aircraft to operate on the carrier is an issue which
may be debated. The MiG-29K has been selected as the carrier aircraft.
However, despite its undoubted capabilities, it will add another fighter type
to the many that India already operates, and all that means in terms of
42 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004
maintenance and spares problems. The Russian carrier, the Admiral
Kuznetsov, operates the Su-33, a naval variant of the Su-30, which the IAF
already operates. Navalising an aircraft mainly involves modifying the
undercarriage for the stresses of carrier landing, the fitment of a tail-hook,
the strengthening of the hook attachment point and the incorporation of wing
and stabiliser folding mechanisms to cater for cramped operating and storage
areas. This has already been done for the Su-33. 23 In fact, the aircraft has
already had its fins clipped to reduce its height from 6.35m to 5.72m in
order to enable it to be housed in the Kuznetsovs hangar. 23 The other
considerations are anti-corrosion measures for the airframe and the engines.
However, these do not involve major re-design but merely need certain
maintenance procedures and practices to be followed.
Selection of the Su-30 would have ensured a certain commonality between
the Air Force and the Indian Navy and also facilitated cross training between
the two services. greatly furthering the concept of jointmanship. It would
also have resulted in greater work for HAL, which is to manufacture the Su-
30 in India.
The Su-30 is definitely the more capable aircraft (Table-1). It has greater
range and endurance. This would give it the ability to range over greater
expanses of ocean and enable the carrier to exercise greater sea control over
vast swathes. The Su-30s superior radar (even more so in the MKIII version)
would enable it to detect and attack targets in collaboration with the maritime
reconnaissance aircraft. It has a greater payload. The Su-30 and the MiG-
29K are about equal at the moment, in terms of manoeuvrability. However,
the Su-30MKIII with its canards and thrust vectoring nozzles would be far
more manoeuvrable.
The Brahmos Anti-Ship Missile
India and Russia have now jointly developed the Brahmos anti-ship
missile, which is reportedly one of the most advanced in the world. The
original Russian Moskit 3M82 missile (airborne version of 3M80 naval
SSM, NATO SS-N-22 Sunburn), on which the Brahmos is based, was also
tri-sonic, a design characteristic implemented essentially to defeat the Aegis
class destroyers of the US Navy. These destroyers use a sophisticated,
computerised threat evaluation and destruction system and are used for fleet
defence. Soviet analysis deduced that these ships could be defeated by a very
fast missile, which would hit the ship, before it had completed its detectlaunch-
destroy cycle. 24
Hence the Moskit. Similarly, the Brahmos missile
can hit ships up to 290 km away. As it travels at close to three times the
speed of sound, any potential target would find it difficult to evade. Detection
and counter-measures would also be difficult to implement, in view of the
short reaction time afforded by its great speed. However, the standard version
weighs about three tonnes and is over eight metres long. An airborne version
is being developed. It is doubtful whether the weight can be reduced without
affecting its capability. This would probably preclude its carriage by any
fighter other than the Su-30. Even the Su-30 can only carry one on the
underbelly station. The aircrafts wings are planned to be strengthened to
carry two more missiles. This would give the Su-30 tremendous anti-ship
capability and would have made it a welcome addition to the Admiral
Gorshkov. The MiG-29K will probably be unable to carry the Brahmos, due
to its load carrying limitations, without extensive modification, which may
not be cost-beneficial.
Why We Opted for the MiG-29K: Some Possible Reasons
One possible reason we have opted for the MiG-29K instead of the Su-
30/33 could be its smaller size. This would allow more aircraft to be
accommodated on the Gorshkovs deck and in its hangar. A second could
also be doubts about deck strength requirements for operating the Su-33,
which has a maximum carrier take-off All Up Weight (AUW) of 30 tonnes,
compared to the MiG-29Ks max AUW of 22 tonnes.25 A third possibility
could be the elevator weight limits on the Gorshkov. However, it is understood
that one lift has a 20-ton capacity and that the other is being upgraded to 30-
ton capacity.26
This latter would have been sufficient for operating the Su-
30. However, the main consideration could possibly have been hangar height
limitations on the Gorshkov, which would leave little, if any, clearance for
the Su-33. According to one report, the hangar on the Gorshkov has
dimensions 130m x 23m x 5.7m,26 compared to the Kuznetsovs 153m x
26m x 7.2m.27 The Su-33s fins were reportedly shortened to enable it to fit
into the Kuznetsovs hangar deck.28 While some of these problems could
possibly have been addressed in the refit, that of hangar height probably was
the decisive factor against the Su-30/33.
Another reason for our selection of the MiG-29K could possibly be due
to the Gorshkov being offered as part of a package deal with the MiG-29K.
Of late, orders for fighters, both from the Russian Air Force and abroad,
have been cornered by the Sukhoi bureau. Given the shrinking defence budget,
Russia has found it difficult to support both firms by splitting Air Force
fighter requirements between the MiG and Sukhoi bureaus. Therefore,
governmental assistance to help the MiG bureau obtain export contracts is in
order. This would serve to keep this famous design bureau from disappearing
altogether and help the country retain the design expertise it has built up
over the years.
The MiG-29K
While the Indian Air Force acquired the MiG-29 in 1986, it was first
displayed in the West during the Farnborough Air Show in 1988. Its superb
manoeuvrability made it an instant hit. Since then many versions have been
developed. The MiG-29, selected for the Gorshkov is a development of the
MiG-29SMT. At the time the MiG-29SMT was first displayed, Rostislav
Belyakov, then Chief Designer of the Mikoyan Bureau, was quoted as saying
that the aircraft was actually entirely a new aircraft. The MiG-29 label had
been retained mainly for its brand recognition value. The MiG-29K
incorporates improved avionics, radar, engines and fly-by-wire controls.
While the superb manoeuvrability of the MiG-29 was achieved through
aerodynamic design and a purely hydro-mechanical control system, the MiG-
29K will in fact further improve that performance with its fly-by-wire controls.
Internal fuel capacity has been increased and an in-flight refuelling capability
has been added. The aircraft will also be able to carry drop fuel tanks.
All
this should go a long way to improve its flight endurance, one of the main
complaints against the original MiG-29 being its inadequate fuel capacity. It
will also have improved pulse-Doppler radar and opto-electronic sensors,
besides an active data-link. The aircraft will carry the latest air-to-air missiles
(AAMs), like the RVV-AE active AAM, the R-73 short range AAM and
also a variety of air-to-surface armament. The MiG-29Ks airframe has been
lightened and clipped, and the wing-fold pivots moved inwards towards the
fuselage. All this, together with the folding tail unit, will ensure that it occupies
less space on deck. The aircrafts internal fuel has also been increased from
3,340 kg in the series production MiG-29 to 4,560 kg in the MiG-29K. A
buddy refuelling capability has also been built in with the UPAZ refuelling
pack. This version will carry 7,820 kg.29 Eleven MiG-29s will be able to
park on deck. The rest will be housed in the hangar below decks.
Landing Conventionally on the Gorshkov
Landing on a carrier is always a tricky affair, whether vertically on a
Harrier, or conventionally, on an F-14 or a MiG-29K. Both are different skillsets.
Since the Sea-Hawk was retired, the Indian Navys fighter pilots have
landed only vertically, on the Sea-Harrier. The art of making a conventional
approach and engaging an arrester cable, never an easy one, has by now been
lost. This skill will have to be re-acquired.
Where will the training be done?
The Russian carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov operates the Su-33 and in
any case, puts to sea only rarely. A recent article in Pravda dated in early
February this year, quotes the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy,
Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, as saying that Russia has no need of an aircraft
carrier.30 According to Kuroyedov, Russia has no blue water ambitions for
46 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004
the foreseeable future. In fact, it plans to acquire smaller vessels like destroyers
and corvettes, suitable for a coastal defence role, rather than the large cruisers
of the Kirov class, favoured by Admiral Gorshkov.
The same article quotes a Russian defence expert as saying that the
Admiral Kuznetsov, should be scrapped since it is uneconomical to operate.
In fact, according to him, Russia has only twelve naval pilots left, and this
number does not justify the maintenance of an aircraft carrier.30 The Russian
Navy is not therefore likely to be in any position to train Indian naval pilots
in carrier operations. In fact, according to Russian analyst, Mikhail Tsypkhin,
Russian naval fighter crews fly an average of only seven hours a year.31 The
question of who is to train whom is therefore moot. The US Navy could be
approached for training, but they operate different aircraft and use different
systems. It is obvious therefore, that any training on the Gorshkov will have
to be carried out at home.
On landing, the MiG-29K will be brought to a halt by having its tailhook
grabbed by cables connected to an energy absorption system. In order
to ensure that the arrester cable is engaged by the tail-hook, conventional
aircraft like the US Navys F-14 Tomahawk and F-18 Hornet, and the MiG-
29K, are generally banged down on deck, on landing. For this reason, carrier
landings are often described in pilot jargon as arrivals or smack-downs.
Pilots will be aided by a landing system, which will tell them whether
they are high or low on approach. This could be a laser or microwave system,
unlike with the Viraat, which uses a Mirror Landing System. The Commander
Air, who would normally control all flying activity on the carrier, would be
aided by lights on the nose undercarriage of the MiG-29, which would change
colour depending on the aircrafts angle of attack. On touch-down, the MiG-
29s tail-hook, lowered along with the undercarriage for landing, would
engage an arrester cable stretched across deck. About three to four such cables
would be available for redundancy. If an aircraft misses one, it will usually
engage another. In the event that the aircraft fails to catch any of these, we
have what the US Navy calls a bolter an aircraft that has to go around
again and make another attempt at landing. This raises another issue.
The Requirement of Aerial Refuelling
In carrier operations, aircraft sometimes return with low fuel states. In
case of out of range of airfields ashore, the aircraft have no option but to land on the carrier. However, the lack of fuel itself complicates the recovery. Afterone or two failed attempts to catch the cable, the pilots awareness of his
rapidly reducing fuel state often induces nervousness, further aggravating
the situation, leading to a loss of motor skills, and in extreme cases, of the
aircraft. This situation is by no means uncommon. In the US Navy, this is
usually handled by launching an aerial refuelling aircraft to transfer fuel to a
serial bolter. It has been observed that this is often followed by a perfect
landing on the next attempt, the pilot recovering his nerve and flying skills
as his aircraft imbibes the fuel it needs to stay airborne. Therefore, for
successful long-range and long-duration operations, it is imperative that a
ship-board refuelling aircraft be available. This could be a buddy-refueller
a MiG-29K itself modified to carry a refuelling pod to supply fuel or a
specialist refuelling aircraft, which could also carry out anti-submarine (ASW)
or Electronic Warfare (EW) duties in addition.The first approach would seem preferable.
A number of MiG-29Ks
modified to carry the refuelling pod, would confer a degree of flexibility in
operations. Performance similar to that of the fighter could also be
advantageous in certain critical refuelling situations. The US Navy earlier
used the Grumman EA-6B Electronic Warfare aircraft, some of which were
modified to serve as buddy-refuellers. An interesting description of combat
operations from an aircraft carrier can be obtained from Stephen Coontzs
book, The Flight of the Intruder. Even today, buddy refuelling systems are
extensively used by the US Navy, which has modified S3A Viking ASW
aircraft and F-18E/F fighters for the role, using Sargent Fletchers buddy
refuelling systems. The F3 version of the Rafale, Frances latest naval and
air force fighter, will also have buddy-buddy refuelling capability.
In any case, the need for aerial refuelling capability is inescapable.
Airborne Early Warning
An aircraft carrier is a prime target for any attacker. It is a national asset
carrying tens of aircraft and a repository of national prestige. Any successful
attack on a carrier could conceivably alter the course of any conflict. The
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, was despite its
success, ultimately a failure, because it failed to damage any of the American
carriers, which fortunately for the US, happened to be at sea on that fateful
day. Had they been sunk, as were the battleships in harbour that day, the
course of the war might have been different. Carriers are normally protected
by a screen of ships, some specially developed for that purpose. This has led
many to question the worth of a weapon, which needs to be so heavily
defended. Be that as it may, an aircraft carrier needs to be defended, from
surface, sub-surface and aerial attacks.
Defence against aerial and surface attacks would require the availability
of an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. On the Gorshkov, this will be
provided by the Ka-31 helicopter. The radar can detect fighter-sized aircraft
from a range of 110-115 km and surface ships at a horizon of 200 km from
an altitude of three km. It is claimed that up to 200 targets can be detected
and twenty airborne or surface threats simultaneously tracked, with a detection
range for aerial targets up to 80 nautical miles (150 km) and for surface
targets up to 135 nautical miles (250 km).32 However, helicopters have limited
range and endurance and cannot match conventional aircraft in both these
aspects.
The US Navy uses the carrier-launched E2C Grumman Hawkeye. At
one time in the eighties, there were reports that Pakistan had been offered
these aircraft. With the IAF going in for the Israeli Phalcon system mounted
on an Il-76 airframe, some thought needs to be given to a naval variant.
This cannot obviously use the II-76 airframe, but will need to be mounted on
a smaller aircraft, one capable of being launched from the carrier. However,
there is no reason why work on this cannot proceed concurrently with the
Air Force requirement. A smaller version of the Phalcon radar, mounted on
a small turbo-prop, would suit naval requirements quite nicely.
It is therefore clear that purposeful utilisation of the Gorshkov will require
the acquisition of air-to-air refuelling and early warning capabilities. The
acqui-sition of these capabilities would be a significant boost to national
prepared-ness, one that the IAF might find itself thankful for in the future.
Operating a small tanker or AEW aircraft (transport aircraft) would be
difficult without a catapult to assist launch. As mentioned earlier, this would
require a study to determine the feasibility of catapult fitment. If judged
feasible, this would greatly enhance operational capability.
Greater Navy-Air Force Cooperation
The IAF is today the sole operator of MiG-29s and has built up great
experience in both operations and maintenance. This could be useful to the
Navy as it decides on the equipment fit that it desires. The IAFs MiG-29s
Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal 49
are also long overdue for an upgrade, with improved avionics, radar and
engine. Logically, this would dovetail quite well with the Navys plans to
acquire the MiG-29K.
With the acquisition of the MiG-29K, the IAF and the Navy will for the
first time be operating a common fighter. Since the Navys fighter fleet is
quite small, it would be logical to have a number of IAF pilots also trained in
carrier operations. This would both serve to improve inter-service relations
and also provide a pool of trained pilots, who could be used for special
operations involving the carrier, if necessary. Cooperation between the
services needs to improve for this to happen. It is a sad but illuminating
statistic on the relations between the services, that in the forty odd years that
the Indian Navy has operated aircraft carriers, the number of IAF fighter
pilots trained to carry out deck operations can be counted on the fingers of
one hand. This needs to change.
Utilising the Su-30 and MiG-21 Upgrade Experience:
System Integration on the MiG-29K
The MiG-29K will also need to be modified to suit Indian requirements
and with avionics of our choice. In this context it is worth recalling that we
already have two ongoing projects with the Russians, on the MiG-21 upgrade
and the Su-30. The Su-30 programme envisages a three-stage modernisation,
at the end of which the aircraft will have acquired a very comprehensive set
of capabilities that will include major improvements and substantial changes
to the original aircraft. The Su-30 MKIII (final version) will have thrust
vectoring nozzles and canards (for super-manoeuvrability), a phased array
radar, and so on. Since these require extensive work, it was proposed that the work be done in stages.
The avionics selected for the Su-30 include Israeli,American, French, British and also indigenously developed equipment. Infact the mission computer in the Su-30MK versions was developed by the DRDOs Aeronautical Development Establishment and is said to be state of the art.
The MiG-21 upgrade too uses an array of avionics from different
manufacturers, both Indian and foreign. Both aircraft incorporate the MIL
1553B databus to handle data exchange. The integration work has been carried out by Indian engineers, in collaboration with the aircraft and equipment manufacturers. A wealth of expertise has therefore been built up in systems integration. This experience may be utilised usefully in developing the MiG-29K. It is necessary that the lessons learnt during the course of the other two projects be used in the MiG-29K project, instead of starting all over again
with a tabula rasa and repeating the same mistakes. Developing the MiG-
29K by drawing upon the experience of the Su-30 and MiG-21 upgrade
programmes will require drawing upon the IAFs experience. This will
necessitate looking at all these programmes and requirements as part of an
integrated whole.
The Development of the Ski-Jump
We have taken close to a decade to decide on our purchase of the Admiral
Gorshkov. The AJT decision has taken us twenty years. In this context, it is
illuminating to learn how the ski-jump was conceptualised and implemented.
A conventional aircraft taking off from a carrier, leaves the deck without
actually having reached flight-sustaining speed. On a conventional flat top
carrier, it actually sinks slightly soon after take-off, coming down to say
thirty or twenty feet above the water, before it has picked up enough speed to climb.
This is the most critical phase of flight. Any engine failure at this
stage could be fatal. The ski-jump helps by giving a ballistic boost to the
aircraft, effectively kicking it higher into the air. The aircraft thus continues
to climb even though it has not yet reached flying speed. Taking off on a
Harrier from the carrier, one can actually see the rate of climb reduce soon
after take-off, before it starts showing an increase as the aircraft accelerates
and achieves flight-sustaining speed. The ski-jump was the product of a
doctoral thesis submitted by Lt Cdr Frank Taylor of the Royal Navy, in 1976.
Impressed by the concept, the Royal Navy immediately implemented it. HMS
Hermes was fitted with a ski-jump during refit in 1980, in time for the 1982
Falklands war. A ski-jump enables an aircraft to get airborne off a much
shorter run. It also enables an aircraft to get airborne carrying a much heavier
weapon load. Incidentally, fitting the ski-jump actually makes ship handling
more difficult and so is not an unmixed blessing. HMS Hermes is today INS
Viraat.
Interestingly, the US has not used the ski-jump thus far, since their carriers
are large and provide a deck long enough for their fighters to take off
comfortably, even if loaded. In any case, US carriers use steam catapults to
enable the fighters to build up sufficient speed for take-off. And further, US
Navy fighters like the F-18 enjoy high thrust to weight ratios (greater than or
close to unity) and hence are capable of extremely high acceleration and
rates of climb. This obviates to some extent the necessity for the ski-jump.
Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal 51
Conclusion
Acquiring the Admiral Gorshkov will be the easy part. Operationalising
it will be much trickier. Decisions on the ships configuration itself will need
a lot of hard thinking, if it is to serve us well at least for the next two decades.
Commonality of systems, between existing aircraft in inventory and the new
acquisitions, therefore needs to be given high priority. Priority needs to be
given to the early acquisition of aerial refuelling capability either through
buddy-refuelling or through the acquisition of a tanker. While the Ka-31
does provide some early warning capability, this is not likely to match that
provided by a fixed wing aircraft. This too needs consideration. Inter-service
cooperation also needs to improve so that each service can benefit from the
experience of the others. Cross-postings of specialists would help the services
build up greater rapport than they enjoy presently. A beginning could be
made by having more Air Force and naval pilots train together in operations
aboard the carrier and ashore.
http://www.idsa.in/publications/strategic-analysis/2004/jan/R Sukumaran.pdf
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