Proposed Indian Riposte
India’s foremost priority must be exorcising the ghost of 1962 and recover confidence and morale. Indian troops actually have a very successful track record against the Chinese.
1 May 1841: The Dogras under Zorawar Singh routed the Chinese.
2 August 1842: The Dogras under Dewan Hari Chand and Wazir Ratnu again beat the Chinese in the Battle of Chusul after which Ladakh officially became a part of India.
3 1839-1842: The First Opium War. The East India Company expeditionary forces comprising 7,069 navy personnel, 5,000 British troops and 7,000 Indian troops took on Chinese forces of 200,000 and inflicted 18,000-20,000 casualties for 69 killed 451 wounded. This gave the Punjab Regiment its crest showing a ship and the motto “sthal wa jal”, emphasizing their fighting prowess as maritime expeditionary forces.
4 1856-1860: The Second Opium War. Again a similar number of Indian soldiers participated with similar results.
5 1900: The Boxer Rebellion where Indian troops were the major part of the British contingent and defeated the siege laid by the Imperial Chinese forces.
6 1967: the Nathu La and Cho La episodes when the Chinese were given a bloody nose.
7 1986/87: Sumdorong Chu, when the Indian Army successfully stared the Chinese down.
1962 was thus an aberration. The reasons for it are manifold. They have been well documented and bear no repetition here. What is noteworthy, however, is that just three years after that debacle, in 1965, the Indian armed forces gave a good account of themselves and six years later, in 1971, they enjoyed their finest hour. India should deal with China with confidence and not adopt a posture of appeasement. With a more confident posture, an Indian riposte along the following contours could be implemented:
1. State and restate India’s desire and intention to be a ‘status quo’ nation with no aggressive designs on any neighbour.
2. Continue border negotiations with the Chinese on the basis of the 2005 framework agreement.
3. Deny the Chinese asymmetric advantages in force application. The overall size of the Army is secondary, what matters is how much force can be brought to bear at the point of attack and subsequently what logistics train exists in men and material to consolidate the gains. The fact that the Chinese withdrew from Tawang/NEFA was due to un-sustainability of the logistics train. The border has been peaceful for the last 50 years because a surprise asymmetrical force level build-up cannot be achieved by China. In two instances, 1967 and 1987, when the border livened up in the east, India rapidly moved sufficient forces and occupied advantageous positions, thus denying the Chinese an asymmetric force advantage and forcing the Chinese to blink. For a serious war in the mountains, the attacker needs to apply force in a 9 to 1 ratio. China will therefore need to position at least 30 combat divisions against India. The build-up for this and the logistical train would require at least two months of preparation as demonstrated by the PLA in an exercise in 2011. Such a build-up cannot escape attention and the element of surprise would be lost, thus giving India enough time to organize its defences. Ultimately, if India can ensure even a stalemate, it wins!
4. Strengthen surveillance capability, remote sensing, SIGINT and HUMINT so as to spot any unusual troop/material movement and/or change in the order of battle. Denial of surprise to the Chinese is crucial.
5. Deny the Chinese the advantage of their superior infrastructure. The Chinese infrastructure can be used for replenishment of supplies and quick rotation of troops to exploit breakthroughs. India’s raising of two additional regiments of BrahMos and positioning them in the northeast will neutralize this Chinese advantage. BrahMos employed in the steep diving mode and with a 290 km range can degrade the Chinese infrastructure advantage in the opening hours of the conflict.
6. Expedite the deployment of ‘Nirbhay’— the 700 km range, terrain following, cruise missile under development — must be given high priority and brought under deployment as soon as possible. This range can bring Chinese infrastructure even deep within Tibet including the Qinghai-Tibet Railway into attack range. Such an enlargement of the attack bubble will nullify a large part of the infrastructural advantage that the Chinese have built up.
7. Match the Chinese capability of logistics through airlift capability till India’s own ground infrastructure is developed. The quick switching of troops from one sector to another on the Chinese side can be neutralized by India’s Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) using AN 32s and C 130s for bulk transport. Sufficient helicopter assets should be inducted to achieve quick transport of troops to frustrate PLA breakthroughs as also to neutralize soft targets and fortifications.
8. Strengthen the armoured and mechanized capability in Aksai Chin and the tri-junction area of Sikkim. Both these theatres could have an independent armoured brigade with mechanized infantry and integral anti-air assets.
9. Enlarge the scope of Indian asymmetry by doubling the strength of SF. These troops gave a good account of themselves in 1971, a war that was moreover not theirs. Against the Chinese, they will come into their own and would be a tremendous force multiplier.
10. Create additional options vis a vis Tibet without overtly questioning the ‘One China’ policy. Reduce and eventually cease the ‘apologetic’ posture adopted on the Dalai Lama. This will enlarge the manoeuvring envelope in negotiations.
11. The Malacca Straits along with other choke points like Lumbok and Sunda should be brought under enhanced surveillance and force application capability. The further development of air and sea infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar islands is critical as these are closest to this theatre. Basing of extensive air, sea and under-sea assets there will give India an advantageous position. The Chinese cannot ignore this and will have to take this into their calculations while planning any adventurous move.
12. Gain, retain and strengthen diplomatic engagement with the island nations of the Indian Ocean. Lately, India has shown its deftness at ‘cheque-book diplomacy’ with Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka with excellent results. The island nations would require far lesser sums. A separate MEA desk dealing only with these island nations will bring sharper focus to policy and its implementation.
