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How can Pakistan counter India’s ABM system?

It takes very little time for it to reach a point where the infrared early-warning satellites can detect the hot exhaust from its engines. yes, yes... I read the ABC :D .
Several sattelites detect the rocket, they can crudely track it in three dimensions by stereo-viewing. However, the satellites can only see the hot exhaust from the rocket's engines, so their tracking ends abruptly when the engines shut down.



after few minutes of engine shutdown the rocket's upper stage and the just released warhead and decoys rise above the horizon, where they can be tracked by these radars.
These radar systems originally planned for this task operate on a very short wavelength, which allows them to identify objects to an accuracy of 10 to 15 centimeters from a thousand kilometer away. This makes it possible to observe distinct reflections from different surfaces -- even the seams on an object as it tumbles through space. The spacing and intensity of these signals, and the way their echoes vary as the orientation of a target object changes, can in some circumstances be used to determine which object is a warhead and which a decoy.
But
we could alter the reflections from decoys and warheads by covering surfaces and seams with wires, metal foil or radar-absorbing materials. we will deploy decoys and warheads close together and in multiple clusters. Under these conditions, even if the radar could initially identify a warhead among all the decoys, it can't track it accurately enough to predict the relative locations of the different objects when the kill vehicle encountered them. radar will be unable to reliably sort out warheads from swarm of decoys.

How will the kill vehicle will identify warheads?
reply in detail so I can reply




The fact is countermeasures for BMD are far more easily developed

The problem I am facing in answering you is you are jumping from one place to the other..

Initially you started with "the launch location is crucial" bit, which I proved that is not necessary to which you came up with the errors in detection and intercepting range, height and deviation angle to which I answered you and now you are talking about decoys and counter measures.

I would appreciate if you complete a discussion fully before jumping on to the next one and confusing it.

One answer to your multiple decoys (???) (like how, I'll explain it when you come up with how will you launch multiple decoys in close formation and clusters) is an LRTR system can track 200 objects at any given time.
 
It takes very little time for it to reach a point where the infrared early-warning satellites can detect the hot exhaust from its engines. yes, yes... I read the ABC :D .
Several sattelites detect the rocket, they can crudely track it in three dimensions by stereo-viewing. However, the satellites can only see the hot exhaust from the rocket's engines, so their tracking ends abruptly when the engines shut down.

The time duration of the engine burning depends on the type of missile and its stages, the tracking part is done by the radars and not dependent on the sats or the aew&c's - these just pass on the target vectors to the battle and air defense management network.
 
History of Russia's Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) System (2002) | Union of Concerned Scientists

Despite the improvements, US military and intelligence reports say the Moscow system would still be relatively easy to defeat. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces told the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 that although the Soviets had spent over 10 years and billions of dollars developing an ABM system, the United States could penetrate it with a small number of Minuteman ICBMs equipped with "highly effective chaff and decoys," he went on to say that, "if the Soviets should deploy more advanced or proliferated defenses we have new penetration aids as counters."2 The Department of Defense has said that the Soviet system is no more advanced than was the US Safeguard system, which was developed in the early 1970's, but deactivated as soon as it was deployed in 1975 because of its military ineffectiveness and high cost.3 A 1989 report on Soviet Military Power also concluded that "with only 100 interceptor missiles, the system can be saturated, and with only the single Pillbox radar at Pushkino providing support to these missiles, the system is highly vulnerable to suppression."

How Effective Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense is Against Countermeasures? - Defense Update - Military Technology & Defense News

While the US administration openly stated confidence in its Ground Based Interceptors (GBI), research analysts from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) warn that such weapons may not be sufficient to protect from a deliberate attack launched by North Korea, since the current level of missile defensetechnology has not matured yet to the level enabling the defense systems to engage realistic-complex targets, or discriminate between real decoys and real warheads.

David Wright, co-director and senior scientist at UCS say it is likely that the US will face a ‘reactive enemy’ that will be able to develop and deploy decoys and other countermeasures to make it more difficult for U.S. defenses to defeat such missiles.“None of the intercept tests conducted so far of the U.S. ground-based or ship-based systems has included realistic countermeasures that you should expect in a real-world attack from North Korea.” Wright stressed, “The Pentagon still doesn’t know how to solve this problem… That’s why the large difference in technical sophistication between the U.S. and North Korea does not automatically tip the balance in favor of the U.S. in this challenge.”

“People frequently downplay the countermeasures issue, in part because it makes the problem so difficult. But unfortunately it is real.” Wright concludes, “The bottom line is that it makes no sense to add interceptors and/or an east-coast deployment site until the system has been shown to be effective against a real-world threat.”

Understanding the Extraordinary Cost of Missile Defense | RAND

Missile defense is a tough challenge, both technically and operationally. It was difficult enough when interceptors carried nuclear weapons and had a kill radius measured in hundreds of meters or even kilometers. But hit-to-kill requires precision that is measured in tens of centimeters and microseconds. It is especially challenging for national missile defense because there is very low tolerance for leakers, warheads that slip through the defense. Nearly everyone underestimates the breadth of the effort that will be required to field effective missile defenses. This does not necessarily mean that the job cannot be done, just that a program must fully account for all the challenges for it to be successful (assuming, of course, that the program is technically feasible to begin with). The technical challenges of missile defense amplify the effects of politically driven proposals and compressed schedules.

The British Government has been happy to allow US Radar installations to be based on British soil to feed into the US ABM system. The MOD seems to see ABM defences as too expensive and of too little ability to make any difference other than giving false assurance to the public. Given that the USA has spent $120 billion on ABM systems since the 1980's and achieved very little in terms of capability it is not hard to see why the MOD has this view.

Report Critiques U.S. Missile Defense | Arms Control Association

Arguing that the U.S.-based ballistic missile interceptor system is “very expensive” but has “limited effectiveness” against potential attacks from Iran, a September report by the independent National Research Council recommends replacing the current system with a revamped but largely similar system and expanding it by adding a new site in an East Coast state.

The panel of experts said, however, that its proposed system might not be effective against likely threats, saying “it depends” on how the United States and potential attackers design their systems and how much they know about each other’s technology.

The expert panel considered alternatives to midcourse interception, such as striking enemy missiles while still in their early “boost” phase, but found these options impractical. A missile’s boost phase is simply too short—just a few minutes—for an interceptor to reach it in time, the report said. Moreover, airborne lasers would have to fly near enemy airspace and would be vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, while space-based interceptors would require hundreds of satellites and cost as much as $500 billion over 20 years, the experts estimated.

The midcourse approach provides significantly more time for the intercept, but has its own drawbacks, according to the report. Most notably, it must confront the “discrimination problem” of telling the difference between real warheads and decoys, also known as countermeasures.

One of the main conclusions of the report is that no practical missile defense system “can avoid the need for midcourse discrimination,” which “must be addressed far more seriously if reasonable confidence is to be achieved.” Until that reality is accepted, they say, “there will be no end to the poorly thought[-]out schemes proposing to avoid the need for midcourse discrimination.”

The report finds that, “at some point, countermeasures of various kinds should be expected.” Initial decoys may be unintentional, such as debris from the booster rocket that would be traveling along with warheads through space. Yet, “as threat sophistication increases, the defense is likely to have to deal with purposeful countermeasures,” that adversaries may use to “frustrate U.S. defenses.”

At the same time, the report says that it is not clear if its own proposed system would be effective against decoys. On this central question, the panel says that its plan “offers the greatest potential for effective discrimination” but “it is by no means a certain solution” and “there is no unequivocal answer” to the question of whether missile defense can work against countermeasures.

Many experts say that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) never has conducted tests against realistic countermeasures, in part because the systems have had enough trouble against targets without decoys and in part because planners assume that countries such as Iran and North Korea would not initially deploy countermeasures on their missiles. The report said the MDA has canceled research programs that would try to deal with countermeasures and that the committee “could not find anyone at MDA” who could explain much of the past research in this area.

The report, called “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives,” is sharply critical of the current 30-interceptor system deployed on the West Coast, which it describes as “fragile” and ineffective against “any but the most primitive attacks.”

The system was first deployed in 2004 by President George W. Bush “before its development was complete in order to meet what was considered an urgent need to get a system deployed quickly,” according to the report.

Main US anti-ballistic missile defence system appears to have less than a 50:50 chance of an interception - Hyperbola

The US Missile Defence Agency has admitted that its latest test of its anti-ballistic missile interceptor missile failed to strike its target. The test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defence System missile occured on 5 July. It involved launching a target “ballistic” missile from the Kwajelein Atoll launch site in the Pacific followed by the launch intereptor missile carrying an upgraded (Capability Enhancement 1) Exoatrmospheric Kill Vehicle from the Vandenberg Air Force base in California. Unfortunately the planned interception and destruction of the target missile failed to take place.

This was the third failure in a row of the system which is designed to protect the continental United States of America from a limited hostile missile attack using the interceptors based at Fort Greely, Alaska. The previous two failures were in 2010.

Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "Failure to Launch?"

Despite the congratulatory announcement, the US-NATO plan has many critics. At the forefront of the criticism are the questions of whether the extremely expensive (around $12-15 billion per year) missile defense shield will be effective enough to warrant the high price tag. Others question if the allied countries are currently under the threat of a missile attack, and if not, whether the vast network of anti-ballistic missile defense systems will unnecessarily strain relations between Russia and the West and potentially create a strategically unstable climate.

Given the potential risks of missile defense development, BMD appears to be an extremely expensive and unproven form of security. Conversely, if a true ballistic missile threat presented itself in the absence of NATO’s current missile defense initiatives, the time required to develop a capable anti-missile system would put the West at a significant strategic disadvantage. These factors beg the questions: how close to perfect is useful? How much treasure are NATO allies willing to exhaust for relative success?


Special Commentary: India’s Missile Defence by Amit Gupta

While Indian scientists have expressed confidence in the system and claimed it has a 90% accuracy level, impartial observers tend to be more sceptical. The best anti-missile systems tend to have an accuracy rate of 70% and that statistic can also be challenged (Broad and Sanger, 2013). The most common complaint against anti-missile defences is that they cannot distinguish between real missiles and decoys thus, invariably, letting some actual warheads in and causing damage. Moreover, as Brigadier Arun Sahgal has pointed out, the missile shield would require round the clock online connectivity, uninterrupted power supply, and associated systems that even at the best of times, are unreliable in India (Bedi, 2012).

Read it and then discuss , how practical and effective is the thing you are talking about , currently in development phase when the world power's have this to say about their own developed advanced systems , in which billions of dollars and tremendous sources were poured and yet nothing substantial was obtained , they have reservations about North Korea and Iran's capabilities even .
 
Special Commentary: India’s Missile Defence by Amit Gupta

While Indian scientists have expressed confidence in the system and claimed it has a 90% accuracy level, impartial observers tend to be more sceptical. The best anti-missile systems tend to have an accuracy rate of 70% and that statistic can also be challenged (Broad and Sanger, 2013). The most common complaint against anti-missile defences is that they cannot distinguish between real missiles and decoys thus, invariably, letting some actual warheads in and causing damage. Moreover, as Brigadier Arun Sahgal has pointed out, the missile shield would require round the clock online connectivity, uninterrupted power supply, and associated systems that even at the best of times, are unreliable in India (Bedi, 2012).

Read it and then discuss , how practical and effective is the thing you are talking about , currently in development phase when the world power's have this to say about their own developed advanced systems , in which billions of dollars and tremendous sources were poured and yet nothing substantial was obtained , they have reservations about North Korea and Iran's capabilities even .


Plain Bull Sh!t!!!
 
Defending cities will be even more difficult fo the BMD
Cities are targeted with multiple Warheads (airburst) in concentration ,
Plan for attack on leningrad.jpg

Harder to intercept because of obvious reasons , some we even discussed earlier
@Secur @illusion8 @gslv mk3
 
If you could highlight the part which you think is bullshyt , I would be able to reply you

This...
'' the missile shield would require round the clock online connectivity, uninterrupted power supply, and associated systems that even at the best of times, are unreliable in India ''

And lets see Pakistan testing MRVs before discussing the scenario described in #712
 
scenario described in #712
let me elaborate it :
"The accumulated impact of weapons in urban areas (countervalue targets), where boundaries for significant damage produced by one weapon overlap and intrude into the area of damage of others is not normally discussed. Thus, the potential devastation from this type of attack is significantly understated. No serious modeling or analysis of this type of problem is associated with discussions in the open literature." [1]
A single 20 Kt nuclear weapon would produce 8.04 square miles of 3+ psi destruction.
Untitled.jpg



From this we can easily calculate that detonating eight individual 20 Kt weapons would produce 64 square miles of 3+ psi destruction [64.3=8x8.04]. This is the same area of 3+ psi destruction that would occur upon detonating one 475 Kt thermonuclear weapon.

beight.jpg

Inshort Pakistan can deal a lot of damage by nuclear devices of even trivial yeilds

[1] Life After Nuclear War, Arthur Katz in 1982 wrote [p. 29]:



@Secur @FaujHistorian @RAMPAGE @illusion8
 
Last edited:
This...
'' the missile shield would require round the clock online connectivity, uninterrupted power supply, and associated systems that even at the best of times, are unreliable in India ''

And lets see Pakistan testing MRVs before discussing the scenario described in #712

This actually proves that the article is amateur - ish at best.

let me elaborate it :
"The accumulated impact of weapons in urban areas (countervalue targets), where boundaries for significant damage produced by one weapon overlap and intrude into the area of damage of others is not normally discussed. Thus, the potential devastation from this type of attack is significantly understated. No serious modeling or analysis of this type of problem is associated with discussions in the open literature." [1]
A single 20 Kt nuclear weapon would produce 8.04 square miles of 3+ psi destruction.
View attachment 13778


From this we can easily calculate that detonating eight individual 20 Kt weapons would produce 64 square miles of 3+ psi destruction [64.3=8x8.04]. This is the same area of 3+ psi destruction that would occur upon detonating one 475 Kt thermonuclear weapon.

beight.jpg

Inshort Pakistan can deal a lot of damage by nuclear devices of even trivial yeilds

[1] Life After Nuclear War, Arthur Katz in 1982 wrote [p. 29]:



@Secur @FaujHistorian @RAMPAGE @illusion8

That's nice - wondering that the 8 missiles should have 0 cep to achieve that pattern.
 
That's nice - wondering that the 8 missiles should have 0 cep to achieve that pattern.
0 CEP is not needed, a rough encirclement pattern will do too, interaction of forces and firestorms will cause great amount of destruction
10 , 50kt devices detonated as an airburst to maximise Blast effects over a counter value ( high population density urban area)
will cause atleast as much destructions as a single 4 MT detonation.
btw this is like killing 2 birds with one stone.
smaller multiple warheads not only have higher chances of evading BMD but they will also cause more destruction as compared to a single detonation of much larger yeild
 
Pakistan, to increase its defensive capabilities, has started preparing intercontinental missile with a range of 7000 kilometres.
According to sources, the intercontinental missile has a range of 7000 kilometres and is capable of hitting its target falling within its range. The missile can contain nuclear as well as traditional warheads. The missile has been termed a significant milestone for the defence of the country and is believed to strengthen the defence. According to sources, the missile would soon be test fired.
Taimur Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 7000 Km Range.
Timeline Photos - PakistaN Army(the best) | Facebook
 
Plz stop wasting Indian tax payers money plz, this region is a poor region and use it to develop your inhabitants.
Peace,
 

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