Can you be specific about the bold part?
L150 pastel as a passive monitoring system has the capabilities of directing a large spectrum of ammunition with passive sensors, and a large part of them didn't enter service with the Mig-35..
Defensive systems in legacy and production Flankers include a Radar Warning Receiver, mostly variants of the SPO-32 / L150 Pastel digital receiver carried. The latest subtypes like the Su-35BM/Su-35-1 carry the KNIRTI L175M Khibiny M Radio Frequency Surveillance (RFS = ESM/RHAW) system, initially developed for the Su-34 Fullback. The Khibiny M is believed to use a channelised receiver and most likely employs a wideband dual baseline interferometer in the forward sector, to permit passive targeting of Kh-31P and R-27P/R-77P variants in defence suppression and air combat roles.
Newer Flankers carry the podded wingtip mounted KNIRTI SPS-171 / L005S Sorbtsiya-S mid/high band defensive jammer (ECM), this system being an evolution of a jammer developed for the Backfire C. The Sorbtsiya-S, unlike most Western jamming pods, is designed to operate in pairs and uses forward and aft looking steerable wideband phased arrays to maximise jamming effect, a similar arrangement to the Eurofighter Typhoon EWSP package. It is worth observing that the Sorbtsiya is clearly built to provide cross-eye jamming modes against monopulse threats, and the wideband mainlobe steering capability provided by the phased array permits best possible utilisation of available jamming power. A graded dielectric lens is employed.
Russian contractors have been recently using Digital RF Memory (DRFM) technology, which is of the same generation as the US IDECM EWSP..
Concurrently KNIRTI displayed a high power support jamming pod, the SAP-14, intended for centreline carriage on a large pylon. To date little has been disclosed on these pod designs, which are likely to retain the wideband phased array / lens antenna system first used on the Sorbstiya.
the encrypted TKS-2/R-098 (Tipovyi Kompleks Svyazi) Intra Flight Data Link (IFDL) which permits the networking of up to 16 Sukhoi fighters. It is not known whether the 5U15K-11 datalink designed for networking the A-50 AWACS and MiG-31 has been adapted to the Sukhoi fighters..
Air to air weapons are one area where the Russians have been very aggressively developing and marketing new products. The baseline Su-27S was armed with the R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) semiactive radar homing BVR missile and the R-73 (AA-11 Archer) WVR missile. The thrust vectoring R-73 (refer AA 4/97) was a trend setter and we have since seen an improved R-73M marketed, as well as a digitised seeker equipped R-74E variant credited with 75 degree off boresight capability and kinematics to kill 12 G targets. Indian press reports suggest the Rafael Python 4 has been offered to India and it is not inconceivable that this missile will find its way on to Indian and other regional Sukhois - India is currently negotiating for the Phalcon AEW&C system fitted to the Ilyushin A-50E airframe and has acquired ballistic missile defence radars from Israel.
The Vympel R-27 is the Russian equivalent to the late model US AIM-7 Sparrow series BVR missiles, but the similarity ends there since the R-27 is available in a plethora of variants. The basic airframe is supplied in long and short burn variants with differing range performance, and with heatseeking or datalink aided inertially midcourse guided semi-active radar seekers. The R-27R1 and R-27ER1 are the radar guided long and short burn versions, respectively, credited with F-pole ranges of 70 nautical miles and 43 nautical miles. The R-27T1 and R-27ET1 are the respective heat seeking equivalents, credited with slightly lower engagement ranges. The X-band anti-radiation seeker equipped R-27P/EP has been reported, designed to kill emitting fighters in the forward quarter by homing on their radar emissions. More recently Agat have offered new build or retrofit active radar seekers as the R-27A/EA, the AGAT 9B-1103M/9B-1348E, derived from the R-77 seeker.
The most recently exported missile in the region is the Vympel R-77 RVV-AE (AA-12 Adder), the AMRAAMski. This missile, with unique lattice controls, is a modern BVR weapon designed to kill 12G targets, and credited with an A-pole range of 54 nautical miles, although some reports suggest early production rounds are not delivering the kinematic performance advertised, not unlike early AIM-120A AMRAAMs. As the R-77 has AMRAAM-like capabilities, it permits an Su-30 to launch multiple rounds and guide these concurrently, engagement geometry permitting. As the R-77 matures, we can expect to see refinements in propellants, autopilot kinematics and seeker jam resistance.
We have yet to see reports of regional deliveries of the Vympel R-77M RVV-AE-PD (Povyshlenayya Dal'nost') ramjet adder, credited with an A-pole range around 80 nautical miles. This missile is a direct derivative of the R-77.
Alternate seekers for the R-77 have been advertised - the heatseeking R-77T using an MK-80M seeker from the R-73M and R-27T, and the antiradiation R-77P. The deployment of the new F/A-22A later in the decade will see significant pressure on Vympel to supply heatseeking, anti-radiation and electro-optical imaging seekers on the R-77/R-77M in an attempt to counter the combined kinematics and all-aspect stealth of the F/A-22A. While such seekers may do little to offset the overwhelming advantages of the supercruising F/A-22A, they are likely to prove quite effective against inferior types such as the JSF, F/A-18E/F, late model F-15E and F-16C/B50. If the Su-30 can close to a range where an advanced longwave IRST can track the target, an optical seeker equipped R-77 variant can be used to effect an engagement, defeating the RCS reduction measures on these aircraft. The anti-radiation R-77P could be used to engage at maximum missile range.
In the long range missile domain, the Vympel R-37 (AA-X-13) series of AIM-54 Phoenix look-alikes have been proposed - a developmental R-37 successfully engaged a target at 162 nautical miles of A-pole range in 1996. A more interesting proposal has been the use of the Novator R(KS)-172 RVV-L (AAM-L) missile, a 215 nautical mile range 1,650 lb launch weight long range AAM. The R-172 uses datalink/inertial midcourse guidance and an active radar terminal seeker, and Russian sources claim a snap-up capability to 100,000 ft and snap-down capability to 10 ft AGL. KS-172 mockups have been photographed on Su-30 displays but its production status is unclear at this time, although India is negotiating licence production.
Of no less interest is the Kh-31P (AS-17 Krypton) family of ramjet anti-radiation missiles, offered as a standard store on the Su-30/35 subtypes. This missile, in basic anti-radiation and dual mode seeker variants is often dubbed the AWACS killer and would be used to destroy opposing AEW&C aircraft, or surface based radars. Sukhoi advertise a load of up to six rounds, two on the inlet stations.
Russian missiles either carried by or proposed for Flanker variants (Author).
Notes: O/B - seeker off-boresight acquisition angle; IRH - heatseeking, single or dual colour scanning seeker; SARH - semi-active radar homing seeker; DL - datalink for midcourse guidance corrections - either analogue or digital; IMU - inertial package for midcourse guidance; Passive RF - passive radio frequency anti-radiation seeker; ARH - active radar homing seeker; Acquisition Range is that at which the seeker can acquire its target; Kinematic Range is A-pole or F-pole; Target G - max load factor of target vehicle; Launch G - max load factor of launch aircraft; APU - Aviatsionnaya Puskovaya Ustanovka (rail launcher); AKU - Aviatsionnaya Katapultnaya Ustanovka (ejector); This is a current open source compilation based on manufacturers' and third party data therefore figures should be treated with appropriate caution (Author).
The dominance of US ISR capabilities is producing an increasing demand for hard kill 'counter-ISR' weapons and the Sukhoi fighter equipped with missiles like the Vympel R-77M, R-37, Novator KS-172 and Zvezda-Strela Kh-31 variants qualifies exactly as that.
It is clear that the Su-30 has at least two decades more of yet to be exploited technological growth capacity, especially in systems and weapons. The excellent kinematics, large airframe and large apertures give it a decisive long term advantage in growth potential against all teen series types, and with an increasingly borderless international upgrade market, regional users with the cash required will be able to fit some very capable upgrades over time.
We can summarise growth options thus (IASC, 2006):
Supersonic cruise 40,000 lbf class AL-41F engines replacing the AL-31F.
Thrust vectoring (TVC) engine nozzles with 2D or 3D capability.
Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) becoming standard for late build Flankers. The Su-37 included redundant sidestick controls for the pilot.
Canard foreplanes for enhanced high alpha agility. Production hardware on Su-33 and Su-30MKI.
An active phased array (AESA) fire control radar replacing the N-001 and N-011/011M series.
A two color band FLIR/IRST sensor replacing the OLS-30, using QWIP imaging array technology.
COTS based computer hardware running COTS based software.
A Helmet Mounted Display with FLIR projection capability. Such an upgrade was being discussed some years ago, and would be easily accommodated with a FLIR/IRST sensor.
Full glass cockpit based on digital technology. Given the current delivery of first generation glass cockpits in Su-30MK and Su-27SKM, this is a natural progression.
Heatseeking and anti radiation variants of the R-77 Amraamski, and extended range ramjet powered variants of the R-77. All are in advanced development and actively being marketed.
Advanced digital variants of the R-73/74 Archer close-in air to air missile. These have been actively marketed.
AWACS killer long range missiles in the 160 to 200 nautical mile range category. The R-37/AA-X-13 Arrow remains in development for the Su-35, the R-172 was recently reported as the subject of licence negotiations with India. Su-35 upgrade marketing literature depicts the use of such missiles.
Cruise missiles for standoff attacks. China acquired Kh-55SM/AS-15 Kent cruise missiles from the Ukraine, and is manufacturing indigenous designs. India intends to use the supersonic Brahmos on its Su-30MKIs.
Advanced jam resistant fighter to fighter and fighter to AWACS datalinks and networks.
Further evolution of protocol software will see this technology grow to match current US capabilities.
Radar absorbent materials for radar observables reduction. Numerous Russian unclassified papers detail a range of technologies for surface wave suppression and edge signature reduction, with a specific aim of reducing legacy aircraft observables.
Aerial refuelling probes, pylon plumbing for drop tanks, and buddy refuelling stores.
Production hardware available off the shelf.
GNPP KAB-500 and KAB-1500 guided bombs
The Russians are also actively marketing guided bomb kits for the Sukhoi fighters. The KAB-500L is a direct equivalent to the GBU-16 using the 27N series laser seeker, the KAB-500Kr is equivalent to a TV contrast lock guided 1,000 lb GBU-8 HOBOS fitted with a bunker busting or fuel air explosive warhead. The KAB-1500 is a family of guidance kits for 3,000 lb class dumb bombs, available with unitary or bunker busting warheads. The KAB-1500L is a semi-active laser homing kit, the KAB-1500TK a TV command link guided kit analogous to the GBU-15 but 50% bigger, and the KAB-1500Kr a TV contrast lock guided system. Either three of the 1,500 kg weapons, or six of the 500 kg weapons can be carried by an Su-27/30 with suitable avionics.
Su-27SKM loadout (Sukhoi).
Su-30MK loadout (Sukhoi).
I'm an old member here who visits and reads in the forum from time to time (sometimes anonymously), but I didn't post too much. To be honest, I'm mainly concerned with the Egyptian affairs in first place then those of other Muslim/Arab countries and remembered this valuable forum after the recent Egyptian deals. Sometimes you read somethings that provoke you to log in and reply/post.
. That's why also we are trying to narrow the gap and diversify the sources of our weapons because we don't trust the US even against any other enemy.
