Def.pk op-ed: Mutual Blackmail, ETO for Afg, Pak and Ind

[VCheng]

..................- those concerns should be listened to. Granting MFN status does not mean the floodgates of trade between India and Pakistan will be opened.

Pakistan should engage in regulated trade with India, where it benefits/complements Pakistani industry AND the Pakistani consumer.

Exactly; there needs to be more trade, but of the correct type.

The history of Pakistan and India is one of the reasons I argue for a US role in ensuring that the process is not seen as a cakewalk by either side over the other.

 

[LaBong]

The 'jingoistic' comment is a very broad and incorrect generalization - the same charge can be laid against Indians based on the comments of some of their political leaders and on various fora and news sites.

I don't see Pakistanis as being excessively more patriotic than citizens of nations like the US and India.

Yes same can be laid against Indians as well, but Kashmir does not touch a raw nerve of general Indian population, corruption does, therein lies the difference.

Moving beyond that though, there have been concerns/opposition voiced by members of various industries about regulating the import of certain kinds of goods such as finished textiles, pharmaceuticals and auto-parts from India - those concerns should be listened to. Granting MFN status does not mean the floodgates of trade between India and Pakistan will be opened.

Pakistan should engage in regulated trade with India, where it benefits/complements Pakistani industry AND the Pakistani consumer.

Pakistan off-course should look for her interests, when and if Pakistan can ripe benefits out of India, it will be less likely of them to pull off a Kargil.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Yes same can be laid against Indians as well, but Kashmir does not touch a raw nerve of general Indian population, corruption does, therein lies the difference.

What scientific study or empirical data are you basing your conclusions of 'X touches a raw nerve of general Indian population and Y of general Pakistani population'?

Pakistan off-course should look for her interests, when and if Pakistan can ripe benefits out of India, it will be less likely of them to pull off a Kargil.

One would hope India would also be less likely to pull a Siachen invasion or support terrorists in Pakistani territory in order to dismember it (ala East Pakistan) as its relationship with Pakistan becomes 'more mutually beneficial' as well.

 

[LaBong]

What solution to the Kashmir dispute can Pakistan hope to obtain through negotiations with India, currently or in the near past?

Accept loc as International border and make it irrelevant like Durand line. Disarm the Jihadis.

How do you see the potential solutions arrived at through negotiations, in the future, being worse than those that could be arrived at through negotiations today?

That is essentially maintaining the status-quo, and as I have said it will be of India's benefit to maintain status-quo. We can sustain a cold-war style prolonged war without affecting our economy. Below chart says a lot of things.

 

[lem34]

Like someone pointed out to me, we should stop looking at the scenario as a zero-sum game. No efforts in the region will ever be successful, unless they are beneficial for all the nations involved, and in long term, for the whole world.

Excellant el presidente and I agree with you but my assertion is that op is american policy which happens to suit India but has little in it for any other actors that are or need to be involved

 

[LaBong]

What scientific study or empirical data are you basing your conclusions of 'X touches a raw nerve of general Indian population and Y of general Pakistani population'?

When Pakistani policy makers say Kashmir is the core issue of between India and Pakistan and peace can't prevail without solving it(and mind you, if we go by Pakistan's policy vis-a-vis Kashmir, by solving it they mean Kashmir accession to Pakistan), then I have to assume they reflect the wish of Pakistan's population.

One would hope India would also be less likely to pull a Siachen invasion or support terrorists in Pakistani territory in order to dismember it (ala East Pakistan) as its relationship with Pakistan becomes 'more mutually beneficial' as well.

Oh come on, same old, same old!

 

[lem34]

Exactly; there needs to be more trade, but of the correct type.

The history of Pakistan and India is one of the reasons I argue for a US role in ensuring that the process is not seen as a cakewalk by either side over the other.

Please explain to me how this is relevant to op and afghanistan and pakistan allowing its encirclement by india or being itself used against its premier ally.

And america acts as umpire but has ulterior motives that may or may not be good for our neighbourhood

 

[VCheng]

Please explain to me how this is relevant to op and afghanistan and pakistan allowing its encirclement by india or being itself used against its premier ally

I would suggest that you try to think that one out on your own!

 

[lem34]

I would suggest that you try to think that one out on your own!

I went and read your op again to see if I had missed a trick. I have not. I suggest you go and read all our posts and then come back or as santro agreed earlier with me that anyone that ignored actors like iran needs to go back to the drawing board. Not bad for a first try but the suggestion postulated in the op is flawed and you and all posters are going around in circles. Agno or some other poster comes along and states that india pakistan trade is good etc you then thank them and go off on one as if thats what you suggested. No thats not what your op suggested. It suggested that America fund a regional economic block of india afghanistan and india. Ignoring the fact that america would have to borrow that money from china that has an interest which they have shown by paying for Gwador, making a large investment in afghanistan. Ignoring the fact that iran just happens to have a border with afghanistan who america wants to damage. ignoring the fact that Pakistan would have to say good bye to any aspiration of a deal on kashmir as the deal you postulate would simply reinforce the status quo. Oh and of course ignore afghanis

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Accept loc as International border and make it irrelevant like Durand line. Disarm the Jihadis.

How does this potential solution change if we decide to ignore India and take up negotiations 50 years down the road?

That is essentially maintaining the status-quo, and as I have said it will be of India's benefit to maintain status-quo. We can sustain a cold-war style prolonged war without affecting our economy. Below chart says a lot of things.

So what you are saying is basically what I said, that 50 years down the road India will offer no different a solution than the one you outlined above, that it would be potentially amenable to currently.

Whether Pakistan can maintain its military or not is a separate question - Pakistan's tensions with the US and Afghanistan would probably require a continued investment in its military, and even 'resolution of disputes' with India would not mean an immediate 'lowering of the guard' by either country.

Nor is Pakistan's military budget the main cause for its economic and/or developmental issues - Pakistan loses as much money through its PSE's as it allocates to its military budget.

---------- Post added at 02:11 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:10 PM ----------

Oh come on, same old, same old!

As is the refrain of 'another Kargil' from Indians ...

 

[lem34]

I actually think op is dishonest. I think its just trying to sell a role for an empire in decline in our neighbourhood. Yes we all appreciate and want to trade and alleviate the suffering of people in our region. But why should the trade be limited to afghanistan pakistan and india. Why not include iran. Oh not because india pakistan and afghanistan dont want iran involved but the great umpire and outsider with ulterior motives wants iran out. On the contrary all the neighbourhood wants to deal with iran

 

[President Camacho]

Excellant el presidente and I agree with you but my assertion is that op is american policy which happens to suit India but has little in it for any other actors that are or need to be involved

It does suit India, and indeed it suits the US too. But let us discount that for a moment.

Tell me, does it not suit Afghanistan and Pakistan both?

And before you point out to the 'encirclement' by India and the US, I would like you to consider the crux of the talk in the first few pages - The need to reduce military presence, and increase economic activity in the region.

That should not be considered a dangerous encirclement, India is not a superpower of some kind, and Indians are aware of the common sense that any sort of military adventure will be very detrimental to India's economic growth.

Finally, before India or Pakistan or China or the US, we ought to take into consideration the welfare of Afghanistan and its people. That will be impossible unless all the countries contribute in the infrastructure development of that country. Such a development and unhampered economic activity will benefit none more than Pakistan itself which still hosts the largest number of Afghan refugees. It will lead to reduction in militancy in both, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

-----------------

Now, my sole contention in not allowing Pakistan a free, or a strong hand (be it along with its closest ally - China) in Afghanistan is that any repetition of whatever happened '94-2001 shall be avoided. If the problems of Afghanistan were restricted only to Afghanistan, or at max Pakistan, no one would care. But the problems turned into a monster that threatened to create war like situations between nations. That shall never be allowed again, and the newer way of reducing militancy and developing that country is only through a high-paced economic activity.

So you see, reduced military presence (except for that of Afghans), and higher economic activity shall not be a problem no matter what countries are involved. And please, do not say that the US is uninvited because the invitation card was sent by none other than the Emir of Afghanistan when he decided to protect 9/11 culprits, against all odds.

 

[muse]

Focus people!!


Istanbul: The Search for Consensus

Posted: 01 Nov 2011 06:06 AM PDT

An orderly ‘transition’ in 2014, when American and Nato combat forces pull out from Afghanistan, rests on progress towards a negotiated political settlement. But a serious peace process to advance Afghan national ‘reconciliation’ has yet to get off the ground.

That is why a regional conference that will convene in Istanbul on November 2 will focus less on this pivotal issue than on how regional states will assist Afghanistan’s stabilisation. If the joint hosts of the conference, Turkey and Afghanistan, backed by the US, have their way – as they will – this summit will be as much about the region as about Afghanistan.

The conference marks a curious reversal of the order of business necessary to establish peace and security in Afghanistan. Progress in the process of reconciliation with the insurgency ought to have preceded declarations of support and cooperation by regional states. Instead the Istanbul conference is set to shift the emphasis beyond Afghanistan to the broader region. The region is defined for the purposes of the Istanbul initiative as consisting of fourteen so-called ‘Heart of Asia’ countries. Apart from Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours they include India, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, and the Central Asian republics.

Istanbul is the venue for the first of three conferences intended to erect a framework of international support and cooperation for Afghanistan during and after the planned transition in 2014. The Istanbul conference has been billed as an initiative ‘to promote regional security and cooperation in the heart of Asia for a secure and stable Afghanistan’. The Bonn and Chicago conferences will follow this December and May next year.

Had the Istanbul conference set its sights from the outset on eliciting the endorsement by regional states for the 2014 transition and Afghan reconciliation as well as affirmation of broad principles including mutual undertakings of non-interference, it would have been easy to mobilise a strong consensus and produce a successful outcome with no glitches along the way.

But the initiative’s backers and sponsors started by wanting much more. They sought to establish a new security architecture, complete with an institutional mechanism and a ‘contact group’ charged with implementing an ambitious set of confidence building measures. These were outlined in the draft outcome document originally drawn up for the conference.

This sparked contention rather than help to promote a consensus. The sponsors were urged by this to trim their ambition and give up the idea of having a signed and binding document adopted by the conference. Whether the document under negotiation will now turn out to be a declaration or an undertaking is unclear. More importantly last minute efforts are on to secure agreement on its content.

In two preparatory meetings held in Oslo on September 30 and Kabul on October 22, the main disagreement swirled around the attempt to create a regional security structure. Russia, Pakistan, China and Iran among others, objected to establishing any security apparatus or a new regional organisation. As delegates pointed out at the Kabul meeting, establishing another organisation would duplicate the work of at least ten other existing organisations. Others pointed to the fact that there were several mechanisms and trilateral or bilateral forums already available that could be utilised or strengthened for the same purpose.

Meanwhile the Russians tabled their own draft, essentially a statement of principles of regional cooperation, which listed a number of political, economic and other measures to build confidence and encourage collaboration. The Russian text won support from the Central Asian states and came closest to Pakistan’s position. But lack of agreement at the Kabul meeting meant that contentious issues were referred back to the participating states’ capitals for further consideration. Since then behind-the-scenes consultations have been underway with Washington playing a key role in trying to reconcile differences.

Although Islamabad has not made its reservations public, they were clearly conveyed by its diplomats in the meetings at Oslo and Kabul. They now relate mainly to the operative clauses in the revised Turkish-Afghan draft, which provide for a regional security process. Even though the word ‘mechanism’ has been dropped to meet objections from many countries, the document retains its ingredients. The “follow up” steps specified in these clauses that are to be pursued after the Istanbul conference reflect an effort to institutionalise meetings of “senior officials” from the Heart of Asia countries. They will be expected to start applying CBMs through ‘working groups’, if necessary.

These and other provisions that envisage a ‘structured’ level of regional collaboration are seen by Islamabad and other objecting countries as an effort that continues to aim at a regional security arrangement in all but name. If these clauses are not deleted or significantly modified to accommodate the views of Moscow, Islamabad and Beijing among others, they could be later taken up at Bonn and Chicago and given more concrete shape to eventually set up a full fledged security apparatus.

Some diplomats from certain western countries have invoked a Helsinki-type process as the template for regional cooperation i.e. a security-oriented conference leading to a more permanent regional structure to stabilise Afghanistan. The Helsinki process refers to the multilateral forum that was created in the 1970s to improve relations between the West and Eastern Europe and which eventually transformed, with the end of the cold war, into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

To apply the Helsinki example to the region is to ignore fundamentally different contexts, issues and realities. The Helsinki process was an arrangement forged between two rival blocs during the cold war. It was aimed at sanctifying the territorial status quo already in existence for four decades. Here that process is being advocated by some as a way of pacifying a country in the throes of a raging insurgency, which is motivated by the presence of foreign ‘occupation’ troops. The contrast between the two situations cannot be starker.

The OSCE in any case took decades to evolve and this evolution was impelled by seminal developments including the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is a profoundly mistaken view that the Istanbul conference could emulate and telescope that process through one document and that too without a buy-in by the major regional states.

With the conference only a day away the draft document will have to be amended to accommodate the views and interests of all the regional countries to ensure that the declaration at Istanbul is backed by consensus. If that is not done and a document is rammed through it will only run aground of complex and fraught regional realities. This will hardly be an auspicious start to an international effort to support and stabilise Afghanistan.

The way forward at Istanbul is to adopt an agreed document that enunciates practical principles to promote Afghanistan’s stability in line with the UN charter and supports a common vision for economic collaboration. The 2002 Kabul declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations sets out many of these principles including non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and respect for Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. Supplemented by the commitment to support Afghan reconciliation as well as the economic agenda outlined in the ‘New Silk Road’ concept, this can provide a robust foundation for future cooperation.

But participating states at Istanbul will also need to acknowledge that Afghanistan’s stabilisation lies principally and fundamentally in actions taken within that country. That means stepping up efforts to spur the process of reconciliation with the Afghan insurgency and accelerating the search for a political solution to end a war that has brought so much grief to Afghanistan, the region and its people.

Dr. Maleeha Lodhi is a former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States and special adviser to the Jang Group/GEO

 

[lem34]

It does suit India, and indeed it suits the US too. But let us discount that for a moment.

Tell me, does it not suit Afghanistan and Pakistan both?

.

Well Aghanis have no representation. unpleasent as the taleban may be to you and me they are a factor that needs to be taken into account.

Pakistan has had a number of wars with india and precious blood has been lost on both sides. The way that op suggests a deal is tantamount to accepting the status quo in Kashmir for kashmir. the role that you are suggesting for India could just as well be fulfilled with pakistans ally china.

---------- Post added at 06:39 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:37 PM ----------

. And please, do not say that the US is uninvited because the invitation card was sent by none other than the Emir of Afghanistan when he decided to protect 9/11 culprits, against all odds.

I heard or read somewhere that afghans were prepared to give up osama to an international court composed of a number of nations. In any event the americans could have got Osama by other means.

 

[lem34]

Focus people!!



But participating states at Istanbul will also need to acknowledge that Afghanistan’s stabilisation lies principally and fundamentally in actions taken within that country.[/COLOR][/B] That means stepping up efforts to spur the process of reconciliation with the Afghan insurgency and accelerating the search for a political solution to end a war that has brought so much grief to Afghanistan, the region and its people.
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Something which the OP has failed completly to factor in his protect "American interests" in th neighbourhood under the guise of improving our neighbourhood.