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Debunking Bangladesh's Myths of "Exploitation" and "Genocide"

RiazHaq

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Aided and abetted by the Indian and western media, the Bangladeshi Nationalists led by the Awami League have concocted and promoted elaborate myths about the events surrounding Pakistan's defeat in December 1971.


Pakistan's Lt Gen Niazi Surrenders to Indian Army Dec, 1971
Sheikh Mujib's daughter and current Bangladesh Prime Minister Shaikh Hasinaalleges "colonial exploitation" of Bengalis by Pakistan and "Bengali genocide" by the Pakistan Army. They claim economic disparities between East and West Pakistan as the main cause of their "war of independence" in which "Pakistan Army killed 3 million Bangladeshis".

Let's examine the Bangladeshi claims on the basis of real facts and data known today as follows:

1. The per capita income in West Pakistan was 60% higher than in East Pakistan in 1971. But they never tell you that the per capita income in East Pakistan was higher than in West Bengal and India. They also don't tell you that the ratio of per capita incomes between Bangladesh and Pakistan has changed little in the last four decades since "independence'.


Per Capita Incomes Source: World Bank


2. Bangladeshi nationalists claims that "three million people were killed, nearly quarter million women were raped". These claims have failed the scrutiny of the only serious scholarly researcher Sarmila Bose ever done into the subject. Bose's investigation of the 1971 Bangladeshi narrative began when she saw a picture of the Jessore massacre of April 2, 1971. It showed "bodies lie strewn on the ground. All are adult men, in civilian clothes....The caption of the photo is just as grim as its content: "April 2, 1971: Genocide by the Pakistan Occupation Force at Jessore." Upon closer examination, Bose found that "some of the Jessore bodies were dressed in shalwar kameez ' an indication that they were either West Pakistanis or ‘Biharis’, the non-Bengali East Pakistanis who had migrated from northern India". In Bose's book "Dead Reckoning" she has done case-by-case body count estimates that lead her in the end to estimate that between 50,000 and 100,000 people were killed on all sides, including Bengalis, Biharis, West Pakistanis and others, in 1971 war.

3. Dr. M. Abdul Mu’min Chowdhury, a Bengali nationalist who actively participated in the separatist cause, in his publication "Behind the Myth of 3 Million", challenges the falsehood. Citing an extensive range of sources to show that what the Pakistani army was carrying out in East Pakistan was a limited counter-insurgency, not genocide, the scholar discloses that after the creation of Bangladesh, the new de facto government offered to pay Taka 2,000 to every family that suffered loss of life but only 3,000 families claimed such compensation. Had there been three million Bengalis dead, a lot more of such families would have come forward. The actual fighting force of Pakistan was 40,000 not 93,000. They were given the responsibility to maintain law and order and protect civilians from the India-backed insurgents of Mukti Bahini. India's Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw praised the professionalism and gallantry of Pakistani soldiers facing the Indian Army's 50:1 advantage in the 1971 war.

Recent books and speeches by Indian officials, including Prime Minister Narendra Modiand ex top RAW officials, confirm what Pakistanis have know all along: India orchestrated the East Pakistan insurgency and then invaded East Pakistan to break up Pakistan in December 1971.

Here's a video of Indian Army Chief Field Marshal Manekshaw talking about Pakistan Army in 1971 War:


Related Links:

Haq's Musings

Ex Indian Spy Documents RAW's Successes in Pakistan

Shaikh Hasina's Witch Hunt

Bangladesh and Pakistan Compared

Economic Disparity Between East and West Pakistan

Is this a 1971 Moment in Pakistan's History?

India's Hostility Toward Pakistan
 
Let's just move on. Pakistan is never going to lose any sleep over anything that happens in Bangladesh, ever.
I could not have put it any better.kudos
 
Here are excerpts of an Aljazera English piece "Myth-busting the Bangladesh war of 1971" by Sarmila Bose:

"My aim was to record as much as possible of what seemed to be a much-commented-on but poorly documented conflict - and to humanise it, so that the war could be depicted in terms of the people who were caught up in it, and not just faceless statistics. I hoped that the detailed documentation of what happened at the human level on the ground would help to shed some light on the conflict as a whole.

The principal tool of my study was memories. I read all available memoirs and reminiscences, in both English and Bengali. But I also embarked on extensive fieldwork, finding and talking to people who were present at many particular incidents, whether as participants, victims or eye-witnesses. Crucially, I wanted to hear the stories from multiple sources, including people on different sides of the war, so as to get as balanced and well-rounded a reconstruction as possible.

As soon as I started to do systematic research on the 1971 war, I found that there was a problem with the story which I had grown up believing: from the evidence that emanated from the memories of all sides at the ground level, significant parts of the "dominant narrative" seem not to have been true. Many "facts" had been exaggerated, fabricated, distorted or concealed. Many people in responsible positions had repeated unsupported assertions without a thought; some people seemed to know that the nationalist mythologies were false and yet had done nothing to inform the public. I had thought I would be chronicling the details of the story of 1971 with which I had been brought up, but I found instead that there was a different story to be told.

Product of research

My book Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, the product of several years of fieldwork based research, has just been published (Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press). It focuses on the bitter fratricidal war within the province of East Pakistan over a period of a little more than a year, rather than the open "hot" war between India and Pakistan towards the end. It brings together, for the first time, the memories of dozens of people from each side of the conflict who were present in East Pakistan during the war. It lets the available evidence tell the stories. It has been described as a work that "will set anew the terms of debate" about this war.

Even before anyone has had the chance to read it, Dead Reckoning has been attracting comment, some of it of a nature that according to an observer would make the very reception of my book a subject of "taboo studies". "Myth-busting" works that undermine nationalist mythology, especially those that have gone unchallenged for several decades, are clearly not to be undertaken by the faint-hearted. The book has received gratifying praise from scholars and journalists who read the advance copies, but the word "courageous" cropped up with ominous frequency in many of the reviews. Some scholars praised my work in private; others told me to prepare for the flak that was bound to follow. One "myth-busting" scholar was glad my book was out at last, as I would now sweep up at the unpopularity stakes and she would get some respite after enduring several years of abuse.

Scholars and investigative journalists have an important role in "busting" politically partisan narratives. And yet, far too often we all fall for the seductive appeal of a simplistic "good versus evil" story, or fail to challenge victors' histories."

Myth-busting the Bangladesh war of 1971 - Al Jazeera English
 
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 13

13. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, March 28, 1971.

  • SUBJECT
  • Situation in Pakistan
As you will have noted from the cables2 and situation reports, the situation in East Pakistan appears to have taken another turn for the worse. Having beaten down the initial surge of resistance, the army now appears to have embarked on a reign of terror aimed at eliminating the core of future resistance. At least this seems to be the situation in Dacca. We have virtually no reliable information on the situation in the other major cities or what is going on in the countryside where most of the population resides.

3

—The Indians are clearly nervous about the situation. They do not seem disposed to intervene but there is considerable pressure on Mrs. Gandhi and we know that they are dusting off their own contingency plans. At a time when tensions are high in the subcontinent, there is always a chance that another irrational move could ignite a larger and even more serious conflict. Is now the time, as our contingency plans would seem to suggest, to begin closer consultations with New Delhi?

—There are a whole range of AID issues that will be coming up because of prior commitments and things already in the pipeline. Our actions on those could add up, in some peoples' eyes, to approval or disapproval of the West Pakistani actions. At a minimum, they imply U.S. involvement given the situation in Pakistan.

4

1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71–15 May 1971. Secret. Sent for action.
2On March 28 Consul General Blood reported from Dacca as follows: “Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have a list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down.” He recommended that the United States express shock to the Pakistani authorities “at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by Pak military.” (Telegram 959 from Dacca) On March 29 the Consulate General reported that the army was setting houses on fire and shooting people as they emerged from the burning houses. (Telegram 978 from Dacca) On March 30 the Consulate General reported that the army had killed a large number of apparently unarmed students at Dacca University. (Telegram 986 from Dacca) The Embassy in Islamabad concurred in expressing its sense of horror and indignation at the “brutal, ruthless and excessive use of force by the Pak military,” but went on to state: “In this Embassy's view, deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international political issue.” (Telegram 2954 from Islamabad, March 31) All cables cited here are published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 125128. When President Nixon discussed the reports of atrocities in East Pakistan briefly with Kissinger in a telephone conversation on March 28, he agreed with the position taken by the Embassy: “I wouldn't put out a statement praising it, but we're not going to condemn it either.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
3Brackets in the source text.
4Kissinger did not indicate whether he approved or disapproved the recommendation, but there was only passing discussion of the issue when the Senior Review Group considered developments in East Pakistan on Wednesday, March 31; see Document 17.
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 17

17. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting1
San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 11:55 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

  • SUBJECT
  • Greece and Pakistan
  • PARTICIPATION
  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. James S. Noyes
  • JCS
  • Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles
  • CIA
  • Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
  • Mr. David Blee
  • VP Office
  • Mr. Kent Crane
  • NSC Staff
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Mr. Keith Guthrie
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here are conclusions relating to Greece.]

Pakistan

1. The SRG briefly reviewed current developments in East Pakistan.

[Omitted here is discussion relating to Greece.]

Pakistan

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Can you give us a two-minute rundown on Pakistan?

Mr. Johnson: You probably know more than I do. We are approaching the Pakistanis about getting planes in to evacuate our people. As the story [of what is happening in East Pakistan]2 comes out, 3 comment: “Sentiment in India may force the Indians to be the first to recognize unless Ambassador Keating beats them to the punch.”

Lt. Gen. Cushman: That [what Mr. Johnson reported]3a is about all we have. The Pakistani situation is posing a problem for India by raising the question of whether they should try to help the Bengalis.

Dr. Kissinger: India is the one country that would suffer from the establishment of an independent East Pakistan.

Mr. Packard: How much fighting is there?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Dacca is quiet.

Mr. Blee: Chittagong has been hit badly. The Indians are having a problem with East Pakistani refugees.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our judgment on the countryside generally? Can 30,000 troops do anything against 75 million people?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: It could be very bloody.

Dr. Kissinger: Unless it turns out that with the cities under control of the government, the countryside will be indifferent.

Mr. Blee: The Bengalis may be pretty indifferent if they think they really aren't in a position to fight.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the countryside politically conscious?

Mr. Blee: The Bengalis are extremely politically conscious, but they are not fighters.

Mr. Johnson: In the long run, it will be difficult for 35,000 troops to maintain control over 75 million people.

Mr. Blee: In the long run there will be pressure. The Bengalis may seek help from the Indians.

Dr. Kissinger: Will the Indians provide it?

Mr. Blee: Four hundred Indian parliamentarians signed a statement in favor of recognizing East Pakistan.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: If India doesn't provide support, the Communist Chinese will.

Mr. Blee: The Communist Chinese are on the other [West Pakistani]3b side right now, but they could change.

Dr. Kissinger: Does the government have Mujibur Rahman?

Mr. Blee: They captured him. Presumably he is in West Pakistan, perhaps in Quetta.

4 Frankly, we slipped on this. VOA just picked up what Charlie said at the briefing. Charlie talked on the basis of his daily report. No one had briefed him on the sensitivity of the Consulate communications.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know about that either until I saw Farland's blast.5

Mr. Blee: If the Indians recognize the Government of Bangla Desh, the Pakistanis might recognize Kashmir. However, this doesn't look probable.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no government to recognize in East Pakistan.

Mr. Blee: There is a radio [that purports to speak for the government of East Pakistan].6

Dr. Kissinger: Where is it located?

Mr. Blee: Probably in one of the small towns.

Dr. Kissinger: Did they kill Professor Razak? He was one of my students.

Mr. Blee: I think so. They killed a lot of people at the university.

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't dominate 400 million Indians all those years by being gentle.

1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information is indicated on the source text. The meeting was held in the Conference Room at the Western White House in San Clemente, California.
2Brackets in the source text.
3Brackets in the source text.
3aBrackets in the source text.
3bBrackets in the source text.
4Spokesman of the Department of State.
5On March 27 Ambassador Farland reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had registered a complaint about a report broadcast by the Voice of America, All India Radio, and the BBC, which cited Consul General Blood as the source of a report that heavy fighting was taking place in Dacca and that tanks were being used. Farland noted that, despite the fact that communications between Islamabad and Dacca had been severed, he had denied that Blood was the source of the report. He also said that he had counseled against spreading incendiary rumors. (Telegram 2770 from Islamabad; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9)
6Brackets in the source text.


FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 19

19. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State1
Dacca, April 6, 1971, 0730Z.

1138. Subj: Dissent From U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan.

1. Aware of the task force proposals on “openness” in the Foreign Service, and with the conviction that U.S. policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined, numerous officers of AmConGen Dacca, USAID Dacca and USIS Dacca consider it their duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy. Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent President Yahya a message2 defending democracy, comdemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-West) and calling for end to repressive measures and bloodshed. In our most recent policy paper for Pakistan,3 our interests in Pakistan were defined as primarily humanitarian, rather than strategic. But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies 4

3. Signed:

Brian Bell
Robert L. Bourquein
W. Scott Butcher
Eric Griffel
Zachary M. Hahn
Jake Harshbarger
Robert A. Jackson
Lawrence Koegel
Joseph A. Malpeli
Willard D. McCleary
Desaix Myers
John L. Nesvig
William Grant Parr
Robert Carce
Richard L. Simpson
Robert C. Simpson
Richard E. Suttor
Wayne A. Swedengurg
Richard L. Wilson
Shannon W. Wilson5

4. I support the right of the above named officers to voice their dissent. Because they attach urgency to their expression of dissent and because we are without any means of communication other than telegraphic, I authorize the use of a telegram for this purpose.

5. I believe the views of these officers, who are among the finest U.S. officials in East Pakistan, are echoed by the vast majority of the American community, both official and unofficial.6 I also subscribe to 7

blood-Archer-Blood.jpg

Blood

1Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent as a joint State/AID/USIS message. Also sent to Islamabad and repeated to Karachi and Lahore. Received at 1008Z. In his memoirs Kissinger suggests that the Consulate General deliberately gave a low classification to this telegram in order to encourage broad circulation in Washington. (White House Years, p. 853) The distribution limitation was added to the telegram in the Department.
2The text of President Podgorny's message to Yahya Khan, as released to the press by TASS on April 3, was transmitted to Islamabad on April 3 in telegram 56617. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK)
3Apparent reference to the contingency study on Pakistan prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia on March 2; see footnote 5, Document 5.
4The dissenting members of the Consulate General sent a follow-on telegram to the Department on April 10 in which they characterized the martial law regime in East Pakistan as being of “dubious legitimacy” and took further issue with the view that the “current situation should be viewed simply as ‘constituted’ government using force against citizens flouting its authority.” They concluded that it was “inconceivable that world can mount magnificent effort to save victims of last November's cyclone disaster on one hand, and on other condone indiscriminate killing of same people by essentially alien army defending interests different from those of general populace.” Telegram 1249 from Dacca is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 130.
5On April 6 seven specialists on South Asian affairs from the NEA bureau, one from INR, and another from AID/NESA sent a letter to Secretary Rogers associating themselves with the views expressed in telegram 1138 from Dacca. (National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Box 6396, Pakistan)
6Ambassador Farland supported the principle that members of his mission had the right to express their views on the problems facing the United States in the crisis developing in Pakistan. He noted that the Embassy had also submitted a proposal to register serious concern about developments in East Pakistan, and he suggested that it was time to review the policy toward Pakistan which excluded interference in its domestic affairs. (Telegram 3196 from Islamabad, April 6; ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US)
7The Department responded on April 7 in telegram 58039 to Dacca, drafted by Sisco and approved by Rogers. In addressing the complaint that the United States had failed to denounce the actions taken by Pakistan's army in East Pakistan, Sisco noted that there were conflicting reports about atrocities. He stated that the Department had not been silent about the conflict in East Pakistan and he reviewed a number of statements made by the Department spokesman between March 26 and April 5. One of the statements expressed concern about the “loss of life, damage and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan,” but none of them addressed the atrocities reported from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 27 INDIA–PAK) Telegram 58039 is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 129.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 20

20. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, April 6, 1971, 9:35 a.m.

R: I wanted to talk about that goddam message from our people in Dacca.2 Did you see it?

K: No.

R: It's miserable. They bitched about our policy and have given it lots of distribution so it will probably leak. It's inexcusable.

K: And it will probably get to Ted Kennedy.

3

R: If you can keep it from him I will appreciate it. In the first place I think we have made a good choice.

K: The Chinese haven't said anything.

R: They talk about condemning atrocities. There are pictures of the East Pakistanis murdering people.

K: Yes. There was one of an East Pakistani holding a head. Do you remember when they said there were 1000 bodies and they had the graves and then we couldn't find 20?

R: To me it is outrageous they would send this.

K: Unless it hits the wires I will hold it. I will not forward it.

R: We should get our answers out at the same time the stories come out.

K: I will not pass it on.4

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]

1Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2See Document 19.
3Reference is to the speech Nixon delivered to the nation on April 7 on the situation in Southeast Asia. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 522–527.
4In his memoirs Kissinger writes that the dissent cable from Dacca pointed up a dilemma for the administration. “The United States could not condone a brutal military repression,” and there was “no doubt about the strong-arm tactics of the Pakistani military.” He explains the administration's decision not to react publicly to the military repression in East Pakistan as necessary to protect “our sole channel to China.” As a result of the cable, President Nixon ordered Consul General Archer Blood transferred from Dacca. Kissinger conceded that “there was some merit to the charge of moral insensitivity.” (White House Years, p. 854)
 
Let's just move on. Pakistan is never going to lose any sleep over anything that happens in Bangladesh, ever.
Wait till 2018 election in bangladesh. GOP and GOB both should investigate this episode jointly. Truth will be very different what we were listening from childhood.
 
Let's just move on. Pakistan is never going to lose any sleep over anything that happens in Bangladesh, ever.
Perceptions do matter, and those based on falsehoods, especially when making allegations like genocide and 'hundreds of thousands raped' absolutely need to be countered.
 
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 72

72. Editorial Note
When President Nixon met with Ambassador Keating at the White House on June 15, 1971, Keating gave an upbeat assessment of prospects for improved relations between the United States and India. He noted that his relationship with Prime Minister Gandhi, which had always been pleasant, had become more cordial since her electoral victory. He characterized her as a woman with a “weight off her mind.” She no longer had to try to govern without a working majority and as a result, he found it easier to deal with her.

In the context of briefing Nixon in advance of his meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister, Keating painted a grim picture of the situation in East Pakistan. He suggested that Nixon could put pressure on Pakistan to stop what he described as genocide in East Pakistan by withholding economic assistance. Keating pointed to the flood of five million refugees into India and said that the problem was growing at a rate of 150,000 a day. The strain on India was tremendous, and Keating said that the situation was further inflamed by what he described as a deliberate policy by Pakistan to drive out or kill the Hindus in East Pakistan. His assessment of the Indian response to the problem was that India wanted the killing stopped and a climate created in East Pakistan which would allow the refugees to return to their homes. In his view, India had adopted a moderate position and was seeking a political solution to the building crisis. Keating did not believe a political settlement would emerge until Yahya Kahn's government was prepared to deal with the Awami League leaders who had been outlawed. He said that, in his opinion, “the old Pakistan is through.” Keating indicated that he was aware that Nixon had a “special relationship” with Yahya, but he still wanted to endorse a recommendation that would be coming to the White House from the Department of State that some of the scheduled economic assistance for Pakistan be diverted to help India deal with the refugee problem. Kissinger observed that Pakistan could be expected to react negatively if money was taken from its budget and given to India. Nixon, who had earlier noted that the United States was helping to feed 300,000 refugees in India, said that more money to deal with the problem would have to be found.

Nixon responded to Keating's assessment of the situation in South Asia by indicating that he wanted to maintain good relations with India: “We'll play a friendly game with the Indians.” But he made it clear that “it would not be in our interest” to contribute to the collapse of Pakistan: a collapse, he noted, that might occur within the next 6 months. “We do not want to do something that is an open breech with Yahya.” He added that he did not want to “allow the refugee problem to get us involved in the internal political problems” of the subcontinent. Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 137.


FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 144

144. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1
Washington, September 8, 1971, 3:07–4:25 p.m.

  • SUBJECT
  • South Asia
  • PARTICIPANTS
  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
  • John N. Irwin
  • Joseph Sisco
  • Bruce Laingen
  • David Schneider
  • Defense
  • G. Warren Nutter
  • James H. Noyes
  • JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • Captain Howard N. Kay
  • CIA
  • Richard Helms
  • John Waller
  • AID
  • John Hannah
  • Maurice Williams
  • Donald MacDonald
  • NSC Staff
  • Col. Kennedy
  • Mr. Saunders
  • Mr. Hoskinson
  • Adm. Welander
  • Jeanne Davis
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that

1) We would make another approach to India to try to establish a common interest in avoiding famine and try to get an accurate count of the refugees;

2) State and AID will prepare a joint memorandum on an approach to the Congress for additional aid funds;

3) We should repeat the warning to India about military activity;

4) We should avoid giving any assurances to the Indians that we would support them in the event of a Chinese attack; nor should we make any threatening noises to the Indians.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we could ask Maury Williams to give us a brief rundown on relief, then discuss what I thought was to be a feeler on arms supply policy. I wonder what we would do if we were instructed to use a baseball bat—go to nuclear war?

Mr. Williams: As you know, I had discussions in Islamabad and Dacca from August 17 to 23. We nailed down a number of points. We got agreement with Yahya on the priority of the relief effort. He agreed that this was important to his objective of maintaining a Government position in East Pakistan. We also got Yahya to agree, although grudgingly, to the first UN field mission of some 40 people. Also, Yahya said that his policy was for a “civilianization of the Government in East Pakistan” which means deemphasizing the role of the military in running the place. He has now appointed Dr. A.M. Malik, a Bengali, as Governor of East Pakistan in place of the Commanding General there.

Dr. Kissinger: If I may interrupt—Senator Kennedy was in to see me today and claims there is a good possibility that Mujibur is already dead. Is that possible?

Mr. Sisco: Yahya told (Ambassador) Farland categorically that Mujib would not be hanged.

Mr. Helms: We have no information to support the rumor that he is dead.

Dr. Kissinger: I told (Senator) Kennedy that, and he asked why there has been no picture of him published to still the rumors. So we are reasonably sure he is alive?

Mr. Williams: It is inconceivable to me that they would announce a trial and arrange for a well-known defense attorney if he were dead.

Mr. Sisco: It's even more inconceivable for the President of the country to tell our Ambassador to relax—that Mujib would not be killed.

Dr. Kissinger: I can't imagine that he is dead. Go on with your briefing Maury.

Mr. Williams: With regard to political accommodation, the amnesty does not extend to most of the Awami League. Only 88 of the elected League members of the General Assembly and 94 League members of the Provincial Assembly have been cleared of criminal charges and therefore included in the amnesty. Most of these are in India—only 16 of the 88 General Assembly members are in Dacca. The remaining 79 General Assembly members and 60 Provincial Assembly members are on trial either in person or in absentia. There has been some blunting of anti-Hindu practices and some improvement in a more balanced distribution of relief supplies.

With regard to Pakistan's relations with the consortium, we got agreement to try to have a consortium meeting in early October, at the time of the IBRD Executive Directors meeting in Washington, and some agreement on strategy and tactics for such a meeting as well as a sense of the agenda. We proposed they consider: a) immediate relief requirements for East Pakistan and the need for more international help; b) debt relief by common donor action; and c) longer term relief and rehabilitation needs, particularly for agriculture. As of yesterday, McNamara agreed to this.

Dr. Kissinger: Were the Paks happy?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, they asked us to help them and are pleased that we are carrying the load for them.

Mr. Williams: They're delighted—the debt rescheduling is worth $75 million to them this year. They assured me Mujib would be tried. He's worth more to them alive than dead. With regard to the security situation in East Pakistan, there is much guerrilla activity on the eastern border, primarily directed against transportation lines.

Dr. Kissinger: Is this parallel to the Indian border?

Mr. Williams: Yes—it's a battle for the life-line, with the guerrillas trying to cut the railroad and blow up the bridges. This will make the East Pakistanis dependent on water transport. In the north, the bands seem to be operating independently. To the south, there are bands of 3–600, well equipped and using sophisticated tactics. Their targets are transportation lines, bridges, police stations and the administrative structure generally. The first step in the communal violence may have been the killing by the Bangla Desh of the Urdu-speaking Bihari Minister. The counter-reaction when the Pak troops arrived led to the communal riots. The exact number of casualties is not known, but the deaths in the communal riots were probably in the thousands and in the later attacks on the Hindus, probably in the ten-thousands.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't understand they had attacked the Hindus.

Mr. Williams: They were raped twice—once by the Bangla Desh, then by the troops.

Dr. Kissinger: Why didn't this story come out?

Mr. Williams: I can't tell you.

Mr. Hannah: The journalists don't see that side of it.

Mr. Williams: I lived there for four years and have many friends there, and this is their assessment.

Dr. Kissinger: But you believe it?

Mr. Williams: Yes. The guerrilla activity has been slowly intensifying, thus forcing the Army to exercise increasing control. Army officers have been assigned down to the district level, and the Army is arming some anti-Hindu elements.

Dr. Kissinger: Are the infiltrators mostly Hindu?

Mr. Williams: Not necessarily. But the Urdu and the orthodox Moslems are more loyal to the Pakistan Government. They are being armed at the village level through what they call Peace Committees. They are the least experienced in leadership but are considered the most reliable by the central Government. These elements tend to be anti-Hindu, and this has generated fear and continued flight on the part of the Hindus...
 
@Solomon2

R: They talk about condemning atrocities. There are pictures of the East Pakistanis murdering people.

K: Yes. There was one of an East Pakistani holding a head. Do you remember when they said there were 1000 bodies and they had the graves and then we couldn't find 20?

R: To me it is outrageous they would send this.

The excerpts above, that reference physical evidence and attempts to validate exaggerated claims by the East Pakistani terrorists & rebels, support the points made in Riaz Haq's post. The declassified parts of the Hamood-ur-Rehman commission investigation and report and the newly formed Bangladesh government's own attempts to register and aid families who were victims of violence also validate the more recent investigations and research by individual's such as Bose, who failed to find credible evidence supporting the exaggerated claims of 'millions killed and hundreds of thousands raped'.
 
@AgNoStiC MuSliM : I suppose. Does that also mean that the P.A. officers and men who participated in the massacre at Dacca University should not have been punished, or allowed to retire with their "good" reputations intact?

Also, there's still one important document that appears not to have been declassified, Backchannel memo 1089 is referred to but I couldn't find it online. That would be, I think, the CIA's estimate of the total and daily civilian casualties in Bangla Desh. S Sorry, that's not correct, 1089 is Sultan Khan's estimate.
 
@AgNoStiC MuSliM : I suppose. Does that also mean that the P.A. officers and men who participated in the massacre at Dacca University should not have been punished, or allowed to retire with their "good" reputations intact?

Also, there's still one important document that appears not to have been declassified, Backchannel memo 1089 is referred to but I couldn't find it online. That would be, I think, the CIA's estimate of the total and daily civilian casualties in Bangla Desh. S Sorry, that's not correct, 1089 is Sultan Khan's estimate.
Solomon,

You're mistaking the argument against grossly exaggerated claims of 'millions killed and hundreds of thousands raped' with one of complete denial of any atrocities.

I've always maintained that atrocities were committed, by both East Pakistani terrorists/rebels and Pakistani troops and their local supporters, but so long as these unsubstantiated and absurd claims of genocide, millions killed and hundreds of thousands raped continue to be bandied around, the truth will remain buried and closure, via punishment and/or reconciliation (on both sides), will remain elusive.
 
...so long as these unsubstantiated and absurd claims of genocide, millions killed and hundreds of thousands raped continue to be bandied around, the truth will remain buried and closure, via punishment and/or reconciliation (on both sides), will remain elusive.
Why would you endorse letting unsubstantiated rumor clog the wheels of justice?
 
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