FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 13
13. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, March 28, 1971.
- SUBJECT
- Situation in Pakistan
As you will have noted from the cables
2 and situation reports, the situation in East Pakistan appears to have taken another turn for the worse. Having beaten down the initial surge of resistance, the army now appears to have embarked on a reign of terror aimed at eliminating the core of future resistance. At least this seems to be the situation in Dacca. We have virtually no reliable information on the situation in the other major cities or what is going on in the countryside where most of the population resides.
3
—The Indians are clearly nervous about the situation. They do not seem disposed to intervene but there is considerable pressure on Mrs. Gandhi and we know that they are dusting off their own contingency plans. At a time when tensions are high in the subcontinent, there is always a chance that another irrational move could ignite a larger and even more serious conflict. Is now the time, as our contingency plans would seem to suggest, to begin closer consultations with New Delhi?
—There are a whole range of AID issues that will be coming up because of prior commitments and things already in the pipeline. Our actions on those could add up, in some peoples' eyes, to approval or disapproval of the West Pakistani actions. At a minimum, they imply U.S. involvement given the situation in Pakistan.
4
1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71–15 May 1971. Secret. Sent for action.
2On March 28 Consul General Blood reported from Dacca as follows: “Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have a list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down.” He recommended that the United States express shock to the Pakistani authorities “at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by Pak military.” (Telegram 959 from Dacca) On March 29 the Consulate General reported that the army was setting houses on fire and shooting people as they emerged from the burning houses. (Telegram 978 from Dacca) On March 30 the Consulate General reported that the army had killed a large number of apparently unarmed students at Dacca University. (Telegram 986 from Dacca) The Embassy in Islamabad concurred in expressing its sense of horror and indignation at the “brutal, ruthless and excessive use of force by the Pak military,” but went on to state: “In this Embassy's view, deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international political issue.” (Telegram 2954 from Islamabad, March 31) All cables cited here are published in
Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972,
Documents 125–
128. When President Nixon discussed the reports of atrocities in East Pakistan briefly with Kissinger in a telephone conversation on March 28, he agreed with the position taken by the Embassy: “I wouldn't put out a statement praising it, but we're not going to condemn it either.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
3Brackets in the source text.
4Kissinger did not indicate whether he approved or disapproved the recommendation, but there was only passing discussion of the issue when the Senior Review Group considered developments in East Pakistan on Wednesday, March 31; see
Document 17.
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 17
17. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting1
San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 11:55 a.m.–12:15 p.m.
- SUBJECT
- Greece and Pakistan
- PARTICIPATION
- Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
- State
- Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
- Defense
- Mr. David Packard
- Mr. James S. Noyes
- JCS
- Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles
- CIA
- Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
- Mr. David Blee
- VP Office
- Mr. Kent Crane
- NSC Staff
- Col. Richard T. Kennedy
- Mr. Keith Guthrie
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
[Omitted here are conclusions relating to Greece.]
Pakistan
1. The SRG briefly reviewed current developments in East Pakistan.
[Omitted here is discussion relating to Greece.]
Pakistan
Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Can you give us a two-minute rundown on Pakistan?
Mr. Johnson: You probably know more than I do. We are approaching the Pakistanis about getting planes in to evacuate our people. As the story [of what is happening in East Pakistan]
2 comes out,
3 comment: “Sentiment in India may force the Indians to be the first to recognize unless Ambassador Keating beats them to the punch.”
Lt. Gen. Cushman: That [what Mr. Johnson reported]
3a is about all we have. The Pakistani situation is posing a problem for India by raising the question of whether they should try to help the Bengalis.
Dr. Kissinger: India is the one country that would suffer from the establishment of an independent East Pakistan.
Mr. Packard: How much fighting is there?
Lt. Gen. Cushman: Dacca is quiet.
Mr. Blee: Chittagong has been hit badly. The Indians are having a problem with East Pakistani refugees.
Dr. Kissinger: What is our judgment on the countryside generally? Can 30,000 troops do anything against 75 million people?
Lt. Gen. Cushman: It could be very bloody.
Dr. Kissinger: Unless it turns out that with the cities under control of the government, the countryside will be indifferent.
Mr. Blee: The Bengalis may be pretty indifferent if they think they really aren't in a position to fight.
Dr. Kissinger: Is the countryside politically conscious?
Mr. Blee: The Bengalis are extremely politically conscious, but they are not fighters.
Mr. Johnson: In the long run, it will be difficult for 35,000 troops to maintain control over 75 million people.
Mr. Blee: In the long run there will be pressure. The Bengalis may seek help from the Indians.
Dr. Kissinger: Will the Indians provide it?
Mr. Blee: Four hundred Indian parliamentarians signed a statement in favor of recognizing East Pakistan.
Lt. Gen. Cushman: If India doesn't provide support, the Communist Chinese will.
Mr. Blee: The Communist Chinese are on the other [West Pakistani]
3b side right now, but they could change.
Dr. Kissinger: Does the government have Mujibur Rahman?
Mr. Blee: They captured him. Presumably he is in West Pakistan, perhaps in Quetta.
4 Frankly, we slipped on this. VOA just picked up what Charlie said at the briefing. Charlie talked on the basis of his daily report. No one had briefed him on the sensitivity of the Consulate communications.
Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know about that either until I saw Farland's blast.
5
Mr. Blee: If the Indians recognize the Government of Bangla Desh, the Pakistanis might recognize Kashmir. However, this doesn't look probable.
Dr. Kissinger: There is no government to recognize in East Pakistan.
Mr. Blee: There is a radio [that purports to speak for the government of East Pakistan].
6
Dr. Kissinger: Where is it located?
Mr. Blee: Probably in one of the small towns.
Dr. Kissinger: Did they kill Professor Razak? He was one of my students.
Mr. Blee: I think so. They killed a lot of people at the university.
Dr. Kissinger: They didn't dominate 400 million Indians all those years by being gentle.
1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information is indicated on the source text. The meeting was held in the Conference Room at the Western White House in San Clemente, California.
2Brackets in the source text.
3Brackets in the source text.
3aBrackets in the source text.
3bBrackets in the source text.
4Spokesman of the Department of State.
5On March 27 Ambassador Farland reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had registered a complaint about a report broadcast by the Voice of America, All India Radio, and the BBC, which cited Consul General Blood as the source of a report that heavy fighting was taking place in Dacca and that tanks were being used. Farland noted that, despite the fact that communications between Islamabad and Dacca had been severed, he had denied that Blood was the source of the report. He also said that he had counseled against spreading incendiary rumors. (Telegram 2770 from Islamabad; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9)
6Brackets in the source text.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 19
19. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State1
Dacca, April 6, 1971, 0730Z.
1138. Subj: Dissent From U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan.
1. Aware of the task force proposals on “openness” in the Foreign Service, and with the conviction that U.S. policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined, numerous officers of AmConGen Dacca, USAID Dacca and USIS Dacca consider it their duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy. Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent President Yahya a message
2 defending democracy, comdemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-West) and calling for end to repressive measures and bloodshed. In our most recent policy paper for Pakistan,
3 our interests in Pakistan were defined as primarily humanitarian, rather than strategic. But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies
4
3. Signed:
Brian Bell
Robert L. Bourquein
W. Scott Butcher
Eric Griffel
Zachary M. Hahn
Jake Harshbarger
Robert A. Jackson
Lawrence Koegel
Joseph A. Malpeli
Willard D. McCleary
Desaix Myers
John L. Nesvig
William Grant Parr
Robert Carce
Richard L. Simpson
Robert C. Simpson
Richard E. Suttor
Wayne A. Swedengurg
Richard L. Wilson
Shannon W. Wilson
5
4. I support the right of the above named officers to voice their dissent. Because they attach urgency to their expression of dissent and because we are without any means of communication other than telegraphic, I authorize the use of a telegram for this purpose.
5. I believe the views of these officers, who are among the finest U.S. officials in East Pakistan, are echoed by the vast majority of the American community, both official and unofficial.
6 I also subscribe to
7
Blood
1Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent as a joint State/AID/USIS message. Also sent to Islamabad and repeated to Karachi and Lahore. Received at 1008Z. In his memoirs Kissinger suggests that the Consulate General deliberately gave a low classification to this telegram in order to encourage broad circulation in Washington. (
White House Years, p. 853) The distribution limitation was added to the telegram in the Department.
2The text of President Podgorny's message to Yahya Khan, as released to the press by TASS on April 3, was transmitted to Islamabad on April 3 in telegram 56617. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK)
3Apparent reference to the contingency study on Pakistan prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia on March 2; see
footnote 5, Document 5.
4The dissenting members of the Consulate General sent a follow-on telegram to the Department on April 10 in which they characterized the martial law regime in East Pakistan as being of “dubious legitimacy” and took further issue with the view that the “current situation should be viewed simply as ‘constituted’ government using force against citizens flouting its authority.” They concluded that it was “inconceivable that world can mount magnificent effort to save victims of last November's cyclone disaster on one hand, and on other condone indiscriminate killing of same people by essentially alien army defending interests different from those of general populace.” Telegram 1249 from Dacca is published in
Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 130.
5On April 6 seven specialists on South Asian affairs from the NEA bureau, one from INR, and another from AID/NESA sent a letter to Secretary Rogers associating themselves with the views expressed in telegram 1138 from Dacca. (National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Box 6396, Pakistan)
6Ambassador Farland supported the principle that members of his mission had the right to express their views on the problems facing the United States in the crisis developing in Pakistan. He noted that the Embassy had also submitted a proposal to register serious concern about developments in East Pakistan, and he suggested that it was time to review the policy toward Pakistan which excluded interference in its domestic affairs. (Telegram 3196 from Islamabad, April 6; ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US)
7The Department responded on April 7 in telegram 58039 to Dacca, drafted by Sisco and approved by Rogers. In addressing the complaint that the United States had failed to denounce the actions taken by Pakistan's army in East Pakistan, Sisco noted that there were conflicting reports about atrocities. He stated that the Department had not been silent about the conflict in East Pakistan and he reviewed a number of statements made by the Department spokesman between March 26 and April 5. One of the statements expressed concern about the “loss of life, damage and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan,” but none of them addressed the atrocities reported from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 27 INDIA–PAK) Telegram 58039 is published in
Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 129.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 20
20. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, April 6, 1971, 9:35 a.m.
R: I wanted to talk about that goddam message from our people in Dacca.
2 Did you see it?
K: No.
R: It's miserable. They bitched about our policy and have given it lots of distribution so it will probably leak. It's inexcusable.
K: And it will probably get to Ted Kennedy.
3
R: If you can keep it from him I will appreciate it. In the first place I think we have made a good choice.
K: The Chinese haven't said anything.
R: They talk about condemning atrocities. There are pictures of the East Pakistanis murdering people.
K: Yes. There was one of an East Pakistani holding a head. Do you remember when they said there were 1000 bodies and they had the graves and then we couldn't find 20?
R: To me it is outrageous they would send this.
K: Unless it hits the wires I will hold it. I will not forward it.
R: We should get our answers out at the same time the stories come out.
K: I will not pass it on.
4
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
1Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2See
Document 19.
3Reference is to the speech Nixon delivered to the nation on April 7 on the situation in Southeast Asia. For text, see
Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 522–527.
4In his memoirs Kissinger writes that the dissent cable from Dacca pointed up a dilemma for the administration. “The United States could not condone a brutal military repression,” and there was “no doubt about the strong-arm tactics of the Pakistani military.” He explains the administration's decision not to react publicly to the military repression in East Pakistan as necessary to protect “our sole channel to China.” As a result of the cable, President Nixon ordered Consul General Archer Blood transferred from Dacca. Kissinger conceded that “there was some merit to the charge of moral insensitivity.” (
White House Years, p. 854)
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