Debunking Bangladesh's Myths of "Exploitation" and "Genocide"

[Solomon2]

What laws?

War crimes.

Investigations and trials can't take place without Bangladesh ending their poisonous propaganda and lies -

Gahhh! Don't you get it? Once Pakistan starts prosecutions then the Bangladeshis must either open their files or admit they have nothing!

 

[Indika]

and western media,

Western media was against india in those days. If they are coming with the news then they would have surely dumbed/toned it down to show pakistan in not so bad light.

Figures are always estimates not exacts, ppl who claim it was in thousands not in millions are nothing but unofficial apologists. Ask the same ppl about kashmir they will say millions have been killed or 700000 troops are stationed without backing of any statistical information. Going by the past muslim invaders record of death/destruction in india and their penchant to oppress ppl brutally the figures should be a realistic estimate.

 

[cloud4000]

1. The per capita income in West Pakistan was 60% higher than in East Pakistan in 1971. But they never tell you that the per capita income in East Pakistan was higher than in West Bengal and India. They also don't tell you that the ratio of per capita incomes between Bangladesh and Pakistan has changed little in the last four decades since "independence'.

I don't even understand what this is suppose to say. What does West Pakistan having higher per capita income than East Pakistan have to with economic exploitation? Is it not possible these disparity was due to exploitation of East Pakistan?

2. Bangladeshi nationalists claims that "three million people were killed, nearly quarter million women were raped". These claims have failed the scrutiny of the only serious scholarly researcher Sarmila Bose ever done into the subject. Bose's investigation of the 1971 Bangladeshi narrative began when she saw a picture of the Jessore massacre of April 2, 1971. It showed "bodies lie strewn on the ground. All are adult men, in civilian clothes....The caption of the photo is just as grim as its content: "April 2, 1971: Genocide by the Pakistan Occupation Force at Jessore." Upon closer examination, Bose found that "some of the Jessore bodies were dressed in shalwar kameez ' an indication that they were either West Pakistanis or ‘Biharis’, the non-Bengali East Pakistanis who had migrated from northern India". In Bose's book "Dead Reckoning" she has done case-by-case body count estimates that lead her in the end to estimate that between 50,000 and 100,000 people were killed on all sides, including Bengalis, Biharis, West Pakistanis and others, in 1971 war.

Pakistanis have really attached to Sharmila Bose's book as if were gospel. Forget that her methodology was shoddy, relying on interviews and memories, the weakest of evidence. She has been criticized for this.

I agree that the 3 million figure is a gross exaggeration, but even Sharmila Bose admits 100,000 people were killed. Reminds me of the adage: kill one it's murder, kill many and it's a statistic.

Recent books and speeches by Indian officials, including Prime Minister Narendra Modiand ex top RAW officials, confirm what Pakistanis have know all along: India orchestrated the East Pakistan insurgency and then invaded East Pakistan to break up Pakistan in December 1971.

Every Pakistani seems to make the claim India orchestrated the dismembering of Pakistan, but none of them never seem to answer why it was so successful.

 

[Solomon2]

... ppl who claim it was in thousands not in millions are nothing but unofficial apologists.

Give the Bangladeshis a break: their people who could have been expected to count accurately were those at Decca University who were slaughtered by the Pakistani Army.

 

[livingdead]

I think it's astonishing that even when Kissinger learned that one of his former students had been slaughtered by the Pakistani Army he didn't let emotion take over and still decided to remain pro-Pakistan for geopolitical purposes - the communication channel to China.

one of his ex-students, one of many hundreds probably, not exactly his own kids. I mean it would have made him sad for a few seconds, but its not difficult to get over death of a brown man who you used to know.
If you read all the declassified documents, they were not only driven by geopolitical purpose, personal relation with head of states(pakistan as well as India) mattered too, quite a bit.
Pak president was this charming buddy they felt comfortable with, where as Indira Gandi was the wrenched witch who they detested.

 

[Solomon2]

...Pak president was this charming buddy they felt comfortable with, where as Indira Gandi was the wrenched witch who they detested.

It makes me wonder how history would have been different if the Chinese had accepted the Paris channel the U.S. attempted, in which case Yahya's survival would have been not have been an important geopolitical concern of KIssinger's at all.

 

[livingdead]

It makes me wonder how history would have been different if the Chinese had accepted the Paris channel the U.S. attempted, in which case Yahya's survival would have been not have been an important geopolitical concern of KIssinger's at all.

I doubt it would have changed much. The relationship with pakistanis might have got major boost due to pakistanis opening channels with chinese but pakistanis were always in friendlist from 51 onwards.
India on other hand was neither ally nor friend although not exactly enemy(and suspected communist ally, only to be proved true in 71).
Pakistan was central to stopping soviets in cental asia, american involvement in 50s points to that (later proved helpful during afgan war. )

 

[Solomon2]

Believing in one’s own propaganda: Newspapers of Dhaka and the war of 1971
By Ali Usman Qasmi Published: December 14, 2015

Dated: December 15, 1971 Indian army soldiers attacking Naya Chor, Sindh in support of Bengali rebels of the liberation army. PHOTO: AFP

During a recent visit to Dhaka, I had the opportunity to do research in the National Archives of Bangladesh and the Library of Dhaka University. Although the creation of Bangladesh was not the focus of my research, I was anxious to learn more about the tragic events resulting in the death of countless civilians and the dismemberment of Pakistan.

For this purpose, I picked up the files of two English newspapers, Morning News and Pakistan Observer, published from Dhaka and examined their contents for the months of November and December. I looked at the headlines, feature articles and advertisements printed in these newspapers between November 23, 1971 and December 30, 1971. It was during this period that emergency was declared in Pakistan, war broke out with India and the independent State of Bangladesh came into existence.

It did not come as a surprise to me that newspapers in East Pakistan were under strict State control and used for propaganda purposes. Anyone who tried to report accurately was snubbed and declared an enemy of Pakistan. General Niazi, the commander of Pakistan’s forces in East Pakistan, described BBC as “Brahman Broadcast” and refused to take its reports seriously. He was more content with the reports appearing in Morning News and Pakistan Observer. During the period of active combat starting from late November, these newspapers projected an image of Pakistan as being in complete control of the situation. Both newspapers, till the very end of the war, kept on reporting on the advance of Pakistan’s military and the huge losses incurred by the Indian military.

The idea was to keep the people (especially of West Pakistan) in the dark about the atrocities being committed in East Pakistan and the rapid military advancements made by Indian troops to exploit Pakistan’s precarious internal situation. But it seems that it was not just the people of Pakistan, but the military command itself which started believing in this propaganda. This is why the decision to surrender came as a huge shock to many of the military men as well.

A cursory glance at these newspapers of the last few weeks of united Pakistan should serve as an eye-opener for those who believe that censoring media and suppressing voices of dissent are justified under the larger banner of serving the ‘national interests’ of Pakistan. A time comes when those trying to control the thoughts of masses through repressive means start believing in their own deceits and distortions. This happened in Pakistan during 1971 and it continues to be the case when it comes to media’s coverage of Balochistan and tribal areas. These areas are generally off-limits to independent media and one simply has to rely on information funneled through the tweets of ISPR’s spokesperson.

Just because the media is not allowed to report on the missing persons of Balochistan, large-scale displacement of population from tribal areas and collateral damage of military operation, it does not mean that there is no political turmoil or unrest in these regions. Nor does it mean that a media blackout will help to control or resolve the situation amicably. Among the most important lessons to be learnt from 1971 is the failure of such policies.

Proclamation of Emergency

The news of the victory of Pakistani forces over India and occupation of its areas were repeated on almost daily basis till December 16.

In order to give a semblance of the situation under control while the war was ravaging major parts of East Pakistan, Morning News published a feature on the popularity of miniskirts

Headline of Morning News on December 11, 1971 when the war was at its peak on both fronts

Recruitment ads were still being printed as war had broken out on the Eastern Front with the overwhelming number of Bengalis opposed to the Pakistani military

Making people believe in the myth of Pakistani military’s victory over India during the war of 1965 and expecting a repetition of the same in 1971

• 
  

 

[Solomon2]

Headline of Pakistan Observer just three days before surrender

Pakistan Observer becomes Observer as East Pakistan becomes Bangladesh

An ad published in Morning News on December 27, 1971 in which the name Pakistan has been crossed out

All photos: Ali Usman Qasmi

Ali Usman Qasmi
The author is an Assistant Professor of History in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). He tweets as @AU_Qasmi (twitter.com/AU_Qasmi)

The views expressed by the writer and the reader comments do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of The Express Tribune.

 

[Solomon2]

^^^
Aside: See the ads? I wonder how many Pakistani grandmothers recall wearing thigh-length swimsuits and miniskirts, and what they thought of them then and today?

 

[Cyberian]

If 3 million people had been killed between 26 March 1971 - 16 December 1971, that would mean around 11,000 people would had been killed a day, every day for 10 months.

Where are the thousands of mass graves? Maybe Indian canabals ate dead bodies.

Friday 26 March 1971 - Thursday 16 December 1971
(8 months, 2 weeks, 2 days)
= 265 days in total

3,000,000 people / 265 days = 11,321 people per day

Either the Bangladeshi people are really stupid or really dumb.

 

[Sugarcane]

Pakistan Army did what was needed to neutralize terrorists and traitors. Doesn't matter numbers of terrorists killed are in thousands or millions.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Give the Bangladeshis a break: their people who could have been expected to count accurately were those at Decca University who were slaughtered by the Pakistani Army.

More like 'give every rational and sane individual a break' - the rest of East Pakistan was not illiterate and incapable of 'counting'

There is no evidence supporting 'millions killed and tens of thousands raped' because the allegations are exaggerations.

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 13
13. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, March 28, 1971.

• SUBJECT
• Situation in Pakistan

As you will have noted from the cables2 and situation reports, the situation in East Pakistan appears to have taken another turn for the worse. Having beaten down the initial surge of resistance, the army now appears to have embarked on a reign of terror aimed at eliminating the core of future resistance. At least this seems to be the situation in Dacca. We have virtually no reliable information on the situation in the other major cities or what is going on in the countryside where most of the population resides.

3

—The Indians are clearly nervous about the situation. They do not seem disposed to intervene but there is considerable pressure on Mrs. Gandhi and we know that they are dusting off their own contingency plans. At a time when tensions are high in the subcontinent, there is always a chance that another irrational move could ignite a larger and even more serious conflict. Is now the time, as our contingency plans would seem to suggest, to begin closer consultations with New Delhi?

—There are a whole range of AID issues that will be coming up because of prior commitments and things already in the pipeline. Our actions on those could add up, in some peoples' eyes, to approval or disapproval of the West Pakistani actions. At a minimum, they imply U.S. involvement given the situation in Pakistan.

4

1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71–15 May 1971. Secret. Sent for action.
2On March 28 Consul General Blood reported from Dacca as follows: “Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have a list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down.” He recommended that the United States express shock to the Pakistani authorities “at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by Pak military.” (Telegram 959 from Dacca) On March 29 the Consulate General reported that the army was setting houses on fire and shooting people as they emerged from the burning houses. (Telegram 978 from Dacca) On March 30 the Consulate General reported that the army had killed a large number of apparently unarmed students at Dacca University. (Telegram 986 from Dacca) The Embassy in Islamabad concurred in expressing its sense of horror and indignation at the “brutal, ruthless and excessive use of force by the Pak military,” but went on to state: “In this Embassy's view, deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international political issue.” (Telegram 2954 from Islamabad, March 31) All cables cited here are published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 125–128. When President Nixon discussed the reports of atrocities in East Pakistan briefly with Kissinger in a telephone conversation on March 28, he agreed with the position taken by the Embassy: “I wouldn't put out a statement praising it, but we're not going to condemn it either.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
3Brackets in the source text.
4Kissinger did not indicate whether he approved or disapproved the recommendation, but there was only passing discussion of the issue when the Senior Review Group considered developments in East Pakistan on Wednesday, March 31; see Document 17.
View Image

• Page 33
• Page 34
• Page 35

Persons

• Blood, Archer K.
• Farland, Joseph S.
• Gandhi, Indira
• Hoskinson, Samuel M.
• Kissinger, Henry A.
• Nixon, Richard M.

Abbreviations & Terms

• AID
• MLA
• NSC

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 17
17. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting1
San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 11:55 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

• SUBJECT
• Greece and Pakistan

• PARTICIPATION
• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
• Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
• Defense
• Mr. David Packard
• Mr. James S. Noyes
• JCS
• Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles
• CIA
• Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
• Mr. David Blee
• VP Office
• Mr. Kent Crane
• NSC Staff
• Col. Richard T. Kennedy
• Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here are conclusions relating to Greece.]

Pakistan

1. The SRG briefly reviewed current developments in East Pakistan.

[Omitted here is discussion relating to Greece.]

Pakistan

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Can you give us a two-minute rundown on Pakistan?

Mr. Johnson: You probably know more than I do. We are approaching the Pakistanis about getting planes in to evacuate our people. As the story [of what is happening in East Pakistan]2 comes out, 3 comment: “Sentiment in India may force the Indians to be the first to recognize unless Ambassador Keating beats them to the punch.”

Lt. Gen. Cushman: That [what Mr. Johnson reported]3a is about all we have. The Pakistani situation is posing a problem for India by raising the question of whether they should try to help the Bengalis.

Dr. Kissinger: India is the one country that would suffer from the establishment of an independent East Pakistan.

Mr. Packard: How much fighting is there?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Dacca is quiet.

Mr. Blee: Chittagong has been hit badly. The Indians are having a problem with East Pakistani refugees.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our judgment on the countryside generally? Can 30,000 troops do anything against 75 million people?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: It could be very bloody.

Dr. Kissinger: Unless it turns out that with the cities under control of the government, the countryside will be indifferent.

Mr. Blee: The Bengalis may be pretty indifferent if they think they really aren't in a position to fight.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the countryside politically conscious?

Mr. Blee: The Bengalis are extremely politically conscious, but they are not fighters.

Mr. Johnson: In the long run, it will be difficult for 35,000 troops to maintain control over 75 million people.

Mr. Blee: In the long run there will be pressure. The Bengalis may seek help from the Indians.

Dr. Kissinger: Will the Indians provide it?

Mr. Blee: Four hundred Indian parliamentarians signed a statement in favor of recognizing East Pakistan.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: If India doesn't provide support, the Communist Chinese will.

Mr. Blee: The Communist Chinese are on the other [West Pakistani]3b side right now, but they could change.

Dr. Kissinger: Does the government have Mujibur Rahman?

Mr. Blee: They captured him. Presumably he is in West Pakistan, perhaps in Quetta.

4 Frankly, we slipped on this. VOA just picked up what Charlie said at the briefing. Charlie talked on the basis of his daily report. No one had briefed him on the sensitivity of the Consulate communications.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know about that either until I saw Farland's blast.5

Mr. Blee: If the Indians recognize the Government of Bangla Desh, the Pakistanis might recognize Kashmir. However, this doesn't look probable.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no government to recognize in East Pakistan.

Mr. Blee: There is a radio [that purports to speak for the government of East Pakistan].6

Dr. Kissinger: Where is it located?

Mr. Blee: Probably in one of the small towns.

Dr. Kissinger: Did they kill Professor Razak? He was one of my students.

Mr. Blee: I think so. They killed a lot of people at the university.

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't dominate 400 million Indians all those years by being gentle.

1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information is indicated on the source text. The meeting was held in the Conference Room at the Western White House in San Clemente, California.
2Brackets in the source text.
3Brackets in the source text.
3aBrackets in the source text.
3bBrackets in the source text.
4Spokesman of the Department of State.
5On March 27 Ambassador Farland reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had registered a complaint about a report broadcast by the Voice of America, All India Radio, and the BBC, which cited Consul General Blood as the source of a report that heavy fighting was taking place in Dacca and that tanks were being used. Farland noted that, despite the fact that communications between Islamabad and Dacca had been severed, he had denied that Blood was the source of the report. He also said that he had counseled against spreading incendiary rumors. (Telegram 2770 from Islamabad; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9)
6Brackets in the source text.


FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 19
19. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State1
Dacca, April 6, 1971, 0730Z.

1138. Subj: Dissent From U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan.

1. Aware of the task force proposals on “openness” in the Foreign Service, and with the conviction that U.S. policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined, numerous officers of AmConGen Dacca, USAID Dacca and USIS Dacca consider it their duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy. Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent President Yahya a message2 defending democracy, comdemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-West) and calling for end to repressive measures and bloodshed. In our most recent policy paper for Pakistan,3 our interests in Pakistan were defined as primarily humanitarian, rather than strategic. But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies 4

3. Signed:

Brian Bell
Robert L. Bourquein
W. Scott Butcher
Eric Griffel
Zachary M. Hahn
Jake Harshbarger
Robert A. Jackson
Lawrence Koegel
Joseph A. Malpeli
Willard D. McCleary
Desaix Myers
John L. Nesvig
William Grant Parr
Robert Carce
Richard L. Simpson
Robert C. Simpson
Richard E. Suttor
Wayne A. Swedengurg
Richard L. Wilson
Shannon W. Wilson5

4. I support the right of the above named officers to voice their dissent. Because they attach urgency to their expression of dissent and because we are without any means of communication other than telegraphic, I authorize the use of a telegram for this purpose.

5. I believe the views of these officers, who are among the finest U.S. officials in East Pakistan, are echoed by the vast majority of the American community, both official and unofficial.6 I also subscribe to 7

Blood

1Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent as a joint State/AID/USIS message. Also sent to Islamabad and repeated to Karachi and Lahore. Received at 1008Z. In his memoirs Kissinger suggests that the Consulate General deliberately gave a low classification to this telegram in order to encourage broad circulation in Washington. (White House Years, p. 853) The distribution limitation was added to the telegram in the Department.
2The text of President Podgorny's message to Yahya Khan, as released to the press by TASS on April 3, was transmitted to Islamabad on April 3 in telegram 56617. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK)
3Apparent reference to the contingency study on Pakistan prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia on March 2; see footnote 5, Document 5.
4The dissenting members of the Consulate General sent a follow-on telegram to the Department on April 10 in which they characterized the martial law regime in East Pakistan as being of “dubious legitimacy” and took further issue with the view that the “current situation should be viewed simply as ‘constituted’ government using force against citizens flouting its authority.” They concluded that it was “inconceivable that world can mount magnificent effort to save victims of last November's cyclone disaster on one hand, and on other condone indiscriminate killing of same people by essentially alien army defending interests different from those of general populace.” Telegram 1249 from Dacca is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 130.
5On April 6 seven specialists on South Asian affairs from the NEA bureau, one from INR, and another from AID/NESA sent a letter to Secretary Rogers associating themselves with the views expressed in telegram 1138 from Dacca. (National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Box 6396, Pakistan)
6Ambassador Farland supported the principle that members of his mission had the right to express their views on the problems facing the United States in the crisis developing in Pakistan. He noted that the Embassy had also submitted a proposal to register serious concern about developments in East Pakistan, and he suggested that it was time to review the policy toward Pakistan which excluded interference in its domestic affairs. (Telegram 3196 from Islamabad, April 6; ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US)
7The Department responded on April 7 in telegram 58039 to Dacca, drafted by Sisco and approved by Rogers. In addressing the complaint that the United States had failed to denounce the actions taken by Pakistan's army in East Pakistan, Sisco noted that there were conflicting reports about atrocities. He stated that the Department had not been silent about the conflict in East Pakistan and he reviewed a number of statements made by the Department spokesman between March 26 and April 5. One of the statements expressed concern about the “loss of life, damage and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan,” but none of them addressed the atrocities reported from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 27 INDIA–PAK) Telegram 58039 is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 129.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 20
20. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, April 6, 1971, 9:35 a.m.

R: I wanted to talk about that goddam message from our people in Dacca.2 Did you see it?

K: No.

R: It's miserable. They bitched about our policy and have given it lots of distribution so it will probably leak. It's inexcusable.

K: And it will probably get to Ted Kennedy.

3

R: If you can keep it from him I will appreciate it. In the first place I think we have made a good choice.

K: The Chinese haven't said anything.

R: They talk about condemning atrocities. There are pictures of the East Pakistanis murdering people.

K: Yes. There was one of an East Pakistani holding a head. Do you remember when they said there were 1000 bodies and they had the graves and then we couldn't find 20?

R: To me it is outrageous they would send this.

K: Unless it hits the wires I will hold it. I will not forward it.

R: We should get our answers out at the same time the stories come out.

K: I will not pass it on.4

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]

1Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2See Document 19.
3Reference is to the speech Nixon delivered to the nation on April 7 on the situation in Southeast Asia. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 522–527.
4In his memoirs Kissinger writes that the dissent cable from Dacca pointed up a dilemma for the administration. “The United States could not condone a brutal military repression,” and there was “no doubt about the strong-arm tactics of the Pakistani military.” He explains the administration's decision not to react publicly to the military repression in East Pakistan as necessary to protect “our sole channel to China.” As a result of the cable, President Nixon ordered Consul General Archer Blood transferred from Dacca. Kissinger conceded that “there was some merit to the charge of moral insensitivity.” (White House Years, p. 854)

All this has been rubbished by Sarmika Bose in Dead Reckoning.

Arthur Bloods telegrams were based in heresay and mistakes he later admitted himself!

Indians themselves accepted direct involvement/action in Pakistani territory !

All these myths have been busted with facts,figures and testimonies of the alleged perpetrators and the "victims"...

More like 'give every rational and sane individual a break' - the rest of East Pakistan was not illiterate and incapable of 'counting'

There is no evidence supporting 'millions killed and tens of thousands raped' because the allegations are exaggerations.

After the war Bangladeshi govt announced compensation for the "victims".. @solomon. Guess how many turned up!

The so called Daca University episode is also wel documented in Sarmila Bose's book - with testimonies of both the Pakistanis and the "victims" including the professor who shot the film ! And the widow of the professor who was shot!

And guess what! That's enough to shut a lot of clowns !

The book also documented massacres of Pakistani troops and their families by fellow Bengali soldiers..the massacre of Pakistani officers,soldiers and their family at East Pakistan Rifles HQ... The killings of west Pakistanis,Biharis in ghazi pur,Premium,crescent mills,new Bihari colony .. The wiping out of entire Bihari villages .. The rivers full of Pakistani and Bihari bodies .., the use of factory equipment and rooms as execution centres .. Etc etc is all documented!

Including the reason why Operation Searchlight was started.. Which was the result of killings of Pakistanis,arson and looking of Pak ships,businesses and homes,, the attacks on foriegn citizens (including US),the attack on Continental hotel.. The swami league inciting violence.. Looting Pak army trucks and killings troops,setting up check posts outside comilla garrison.. All are documented facts !

The lies of 3 million have also been busted.. The figure initially quoted by the Indian officer 150,000 and than 300,000 and than 3 million after the superior officers antics to Leo and sissoun are all documented !

So stop spreading shyt!

 

[cloud4000]

All this has been rubbished by Sarmika Bose in Dead Reckoning.

Pakistanis really treat this shoddy piece of work as gospel. She attached PDF for response to Bose's work

Arthur Bloods telegrams were based in heresay and mistakes he later admitted himself!

Source please.

Indians themselves accepted direct involvement/action in Pakistani territory !

You're point? How does this change the fact that India succeeded beyond its wildest dreams in managing to split Pakistan in two?

All these myths have been busted with facts,figures and testimonies of the alleged perpetrators and the "victims"...

Not really. The only myth being pushed is those by Pakistan, who are still in a state of denial over what happened in East Pakistan in 1971. You need no further proof than Pakistan FO issuing statements regarding of Bangladeshi citizens for war crimes, whatever the merits of the trial.