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Death Of The Liberal Turkish Dream

You know, when people can't back their claims in anyway, they just add "it's a fact" at the beginning of their sentences.

You can also say that "It's a fact that sun's color is purple" and believe in what you say...it's a free forum after all.
Most of Turkey's conservatives are from the eastern parts of the country, where the birthrates happen to be highest:

Turkey-TFR-Map.png
 
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Is Turkey really no longer liberal or is Edrogen just being hyped?
Well, i'm living and breathing in Turkey for 30 years...i live the same way before Erdoğan come in to power. I have the same rights. So, people may say whatever they want. I don't really care.

Most of Turkey's conservatives are from the eastern parts of the country, where the birthrates happen to be highest:

Turkey-TFR-Map.png
Fertility Rate is not equal liberalism....you are confusing the terms here.
 
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Well, i'm living and breathing in Turkey for 30 years...i live the same way before Erdoğan come in to power. I have the same rights. So, people may say whatever they want. I don't really care.


Fertility Rate is not equal liberalism....you are confusing the terms here.

But what about the others and the state policy? Is there any change or tilt towards fundamentalism?
 
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Fertility Rate is not equal liberalism....you are confusing the terms here.
Not really. The people from eastern Turkey are far more conservative than those of western Turkey, and they're slowly taking over the country. This is exactly why the AKP keeps winning the elections.
 
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Not really. The people from eastern Turkey are far more conservative than those of western Turkey, and they're slowly taking over the country. This is exactly why the AKP keeps winning the elections.
You are ignorant beyond words. Those red regions almost entirely vote for Kurdish party HDP. They yellow and blue regions are almost entirely in the hands of AKP=Erdogan, only some coastal cities got majority Leftist votes aka CHP.
I should do smth similar, take a random map of Kuwait and utter random retarded sentences.

During AKP fornication outside marriage became legal, during AKP nude Hotels came to the fore etc. Things in daily life hasn't changed from Leftist to Rightist governments, only things that change considerably is foreign + economic policy. AKP got some very conservative capitalistic economic policy. But at the same time they are also very corporatist minded. One thing doesn't exclude the other in the real world. You arab's should learn a thing or two from Turish discipline and nationalism, maybe you still can learn to coexist with each other
 
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Eastern turkey is leftist and population there total (redpart) is 5 million tops

Turkey is a country of 80 million

@Kuwaiti Girl someone said you're aren't even real kuwaiti arab but baloch :partay:

Balochi liberalism and democracy is more advanced right? :lol:
 
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Eastern turkey is leftist and population there total (redpart) is 5 million tops

Turkey is a country of 80 million

@Kuwaiti Girl someone said you're aren't even real kuwaiti arab but baloch :partay:

Balochi liberalism and democracy is more advanced right? :lol:
Yes, my father's originally Balochi. :-)

Anyway, this isn't meant to be a bragging contest.
 
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Turkey is becoming more secular, not less

Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey’s “Islamization” has been a recurrent theme in the media. Over the past two years — during which time Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president and AKP leader, has combined increasingly authoritarian rule and an overtly Islamist narrative — this theme has become more common and assumed greater validity. It is often asked whether Turkey is turning into “another Iran,” and most commentators take it for granted that, at the very least, Turkey is becoming more “conservative.” Turkish academic Volkan Ertit, a doctoral candidate focusing on the sociology of religion at Radboud University, in the Netherlands, emphatically argues otherwise.


In his new book, "The Age of Anxious Conservatives: Turkey, That Moves Away From Religion" (Endiseli Muhafazakarlar: Dinden Uzaklasan Turkiye), Ertit presents ample evidence suggesting that the power of religion is actually declining in Turkish society. To Ertit, the “secularization of society” means the decline in the “impact of the individual's faith in the sacred on the actual conduct of life.” In this regard, he thinks Turkey is certainly on a secularization path. If the trend were toward Islamization, he argues, Turkey should have experienced the following:

  • Increased religiosity among young generations than in older generations

  • Decline in the visibility of homosexuality

  • Decline in the rate of premarital flirtation

  • Decline in the rated of premarital and extramarital sex

  • Increase in the belief in supernatural beings

  • Greater preference for dress that does not reveal body shapes

  • Greater impact of the “sacred” on daily affairs
What one sees in Turkey, however, Ertit says, is the opposite. As documented by a 2008 survey, “Turkish Family and Religion,” for example, 84% of parents believe that the younger generation is less religious. Homosexuality, along with all the other spectrums of the LBGT movement, is much more visible and acceptable than before, as shown by attendance at Istanbul's gay pride parade. Premarital and extramarital relationships are becoming common, as seen in the media and social media. In addition, fewer people are searching for healing through supernatural beings, such as the jinn, and almost all religious conservatives take advantage of modern medicine without hesitation. “Sexy dresses” are seen more often, even among headscarf-wearing young girls, who can be counted as “conservative” but who are quite different from their truly conservative mothers. These “chic hijabis” have their own fashions and style magazines, such as Ala, which basically feature a “Cosmopolitan”-like lifestyle with only a hint of Islam.

Ertit’s book presents an abundance of such evidence for the secularization of Turkish society. This does not mean, however, that large segments of Turks are becoming atheists, he notes, although atheists are more vocal than ever. Rather, it means that religion is becoming more personal, relaxed and easygoing. Famous stand-up comedians are publicly poking fun at religion. For example, Cem Yilmaz tells jokes making light of the Islamic notions of heaven and hell and has not received any strong negative reactions. Hell, Yilmaz says, can only make one look “a bit more tanned.”

On television, the most popular theologians are the ones who do not threaten with imminent hellfire, but who offer comfort for distinctly modern tastes. When asked by a young girl whether putting up a poster of the musician Justin Bieber is “haram,” i.e., religiously forbidden, the televangelist Nihat Hatioglu jokingly gave his permission. Such popular theologians, Ertit argues, “are not making people more religious. They are rather giving some peace of mind to those people who believe that they have moved away from religion in modern times … They carefully avoid giving answers that will force people to fundamentally alter their daily lives.”

That is precisely the reason why there are “anxious conservatives” in Turkey today. These are older generation Islamists who feel nervous about the more modern and diluted form of the faith that the young generation finds appealing. The reaction by Yeni Akit, one of the most hard-core newspapers in the Islamist camp, to a rock concert where headscarf-wearing female university students danced on the shoulders of their male friends was symbolic: “Have we struggled for years for this! What a shame!” The newspaper displayed the must-see photos below its lamenting headline.

What about the AKP and its increasingly overt Islamism, along with Erdogan’s self-declared objective of raising a “pious generation”? Ertit does not deny the phenomenon and provides a long list of AKP policies and narratives that promote or impose “conservative” values. He also emphasizes that under the AKP, Turkey’s religious conservatives have become much more visible, powerful and ambitious. As a result, he says, the Turkish state is less “laic” (secular) than before, but an increasingly religious state and an increasingly religious society are two different things. The latter does not exist in Turkey. The society is secularizing not due to the AKP’s will, after all, but because of deeper dynamics, among them the influence of technology, urbanization and capitalism.

As a Turkey observer, I agree with most of Ertit’s arguments and his overall assessment. I also believe that the AKP experience, including its dreams of re-Islamizing Turkey, is likely to be counterproductive and will serve to further accelerate secularization. Before the AKP, religion was untested, so the Islamists could persuasively argue that their incumbency would produce a more virtuous social order. Of note, the AKP’s precursor was called the Virtue Party. At the end of 13 years of Islamist rule, however, the result is an unimpressive tableau of corruption, nepotism, hubris and a bitter intra-Islamic (AKP versus Gulen) struggle. As Turkey’s top cleric, Mehmet Gormez, head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, recently noted, the younger generation today can say, “If this is religion, then let’s not take it.” Thus, Turkey may well move further away from religion.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/turkey-is-getting-more-secular.html
Analyst: Turkey is not becoming pious, in fact it is moving away from religion
AHMET HAKAN

Volkan Ertit, an academic popularly known for his books ‘Secularism’ and ‘The Age of Concerned Conservatives,’ argues that Turkish people are becoming less pious. ‘Turkey is shifting away from religion,’ Ertit says, citing changing attitudes to a series of social issues. Speaking to daily Hürriyet, Ertit listed 11 criteria supporting his thesis.
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ONE: If Turkey is getting more conservative… The new generations would be more pious than previous ones.

Sinan Yılmaz of Marmara University’s Faculty of Theology conducted a PhD dissertation researching 2,790 different families. Eighty-seven percent of these families stated that they believed interest in the topic of religion has decreased in the newer generations, prompted by the influence of Western values.

TWO: If Turkey is getting more conservative… There would be a drop in the public visibility of LGBTIs.

In 1993, when there was a wish to hold a “Pride March” in Turkey for the first time, guests attending from abroad were held up at the airport and then sent back. The parades were cancelled. At that time, a writer in a secularist newspaper described homosexuality as a “perversion.” Later, in 2003 and 2004 the “Pride March” was held in Turkey with around 15-20 participants. This year, 40,000 people tried to walk in the center of Istanbul, during Ramadan. It was not public crowds that interfered in the march to prevent it, but the police.

THREE: If Turkey is getting more conservative… There would be a drop in pre-marital flirting.

Is there an increase in pre-marital flirtation from past to present, or a decrease? There is a significant increase. How do we know? I conducted interviews with many high-school students, and nowadays students go to each other’s homes, they send naked pictures to each other on WhatsApp, there is talk about students kissing at school. Before 1995, the only means for flirtation was through land-based phone lines, which was seen as very dangerous. Nowadays, girls text their boyfriends even while sitting at the dinner table with their fathers.

FOUR: If Turkey is getting more conservative… There would be a drop in pre-marital or extra-marital sex.

Graduate and doctoral studies conducted in universities show that new generations are much more open to pre-marital sex compared to older generations. Let us give a popular example: Arda Turan is the most respected, most popular footballer in Turkey. This summer I read stories in the newspapers about his vacation. He vacationed with his girlfriend, who he is not married to, but no one found this odd unlike in the past. Turkish society has, perhaps unconsciously, started to internalize such attitudes.

FIVE: If Turkey is getting more conservative… There would be an increase in belief in supernatural powers.

My paradigm of secularization is not just about Islam, but also about metaphysical forces. If a society is getting more conservative, then not just organized religion but also belief in supernatural forces must have more of an impact on society. In the 1990s there was a certain kind of TV program, in which supernatural topics would be discussed like “sheep with ‘Allah’ written on their wool,” or “the rock that came out of nowhere.” These would attract a great deal of attention, but nowadays such programs would only be mocked on Twitter or Facebook. Although there is still a special interest in astrology, fortunes and psychics, they have no effect on everyday life.

SIX: If Turkey is getting more conservative… There would be a decrease on the marriages between groups with different beliefs.

Today, Alevi-Sunni marriages and friendships are rising. Due to the increase of education and the increase of urbanization, Sunnism and Alevism - at least compared to the past - have become less definitive as identities.

SEVEN: If Turkey is getting more conservative… Clothes that cover up the body would be increasingly preferred.

Both the conservative and secular women are tending to prefer clothes that bring out their body lines compared to their mothers. It is not only women; men are also increasingly comfortable showing their body lines.

EIGHT: If Turkey is getting more conservative… There must be an increase of the prestige and power of religion in the public sphere.

If a society is getting more conservative then the prestige of men of religion would be expected to increase. But let’s look at the situation of imams. They used to be the people who had the final word in villages. They used to be administrators in every aspect: Health, economy, etc. But now with 80 percent of Turkey’s population now living in towns, no one is left to ask imams for their opinion. Now, other experts respond to the questions once answered by the imams.

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NINE: If Turkey is getting more conservative… The language of the media should be getting more conservative.

In one newspaper, there is a description of high-school teenagers and non-married couples about how to have sex via text messages. In another, a writer shares details of a group sex session he witnessed on a Greek island. Would these have appeared in the mainstream media 20 or 30 years ago? Or let’s look at the example of the most popular TV programs: Many shows aired on prime time, watched by millions, present a highly secular lifestyle as the norm.

TEN: If Turkey is getting more conservative… Secular references would be being replaced by religious ones.

If abortion and drinking are discussed in a truly religious society, then you tell the public that “religion prohibits this” and the subject is dropped. But politicians in Turkey, including President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, do not usually use the Quran or Islam but secular references regarding these topics. They talk about them in terms of human rights and health. If society has become more pious, then why are the religious references pushed to the side and secular references taking their place?

ELEVEN: If Turkey is getting more conservative… The “sacred” effect on our daily practices should increase.

The “sacred” has less of an impact on ordinary lives compared to the past, and the pious are aware of this. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has recognized this, saying: “The youth of today sees the past generation’s world as narrow and unacceptable. We must work on a new language and tone with this in mind.” In a society becoming more conservative and pious, the Diyanet would not feel the urge to make such statements. It is aware that new generations do not have the same rhetoric anymore. In the world of Islam, we are facing a youth that values being a free individual.


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“The prohibition of selling alcoholic beverages on high-speed trains in Turkey, the desire to ban extramarital sex, the discussion of boys and girls living under the same roof, the statements that the Justice and Development Party [AKP] is raising a ‘pious generation’… All these are about the relation between the state and religion. But I am talking about the relation between religion and society. Society is not becoming more pious, the political arena is. The two are separate things. The number of woman wearing Islamic headscarves is actually decreasing. If other scientific developments, capitalism and urbanization are taking place in a society, then it is very difficult for that society to be altered from above. Kemalists tried to do that for 90 years but still failed. These changes cannot happen with impositions from a higher institution. “

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/an...gion-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=88624&NewsCatID=338

Translated by Alkım Kutlu.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/an...islam.aspx?PageID=238&NID=51138&NewsCatID=338

Have fun.
 
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Is Turkey really no longer liberal or is Edrogen just being hyped?

Liberal is not the correct word for the Turkish republic Atleast not in the Western liberalism content, I would say it's a Muslim nation with secular values

But those values threatened under the current regime
 
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Is Turkey really no longer liberal or is Edrogen just being hyped?
According to foreigners Turkey is drifting towards sharia since 15 years but didnt happen so far, AKP made some laws like forbidding selling alcohol after 22:00 (as in many European countries and Israel).
They are trying to push their conservative agenda but so far everything within the Constitutional frame, the liberties are same or even improved in some fields (like the first gay pride in muslim world since 2003).
The number of people who supported sharia in 90s was double as much as today, if there is a danger for Turkey than its drifting towards autocracy not sharia.

Turks have a social codex where religion is involved, some follow it more others less but it doesnt have necessarily to with being reglious, its about what you are being thought since childhood what to do in public and what not, and this is the case in most families be it conservative or liberal.
Another exsample with a even more strict social codex and gerder roles is Japan but its often referred as a liberal western country.

Erdogan might be a fool but it should be mentioned that his words are often twisted in media since there is this sensational Erdogan hysteria recently.
 
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According to foreigners Turkey is drifting towards sharia since 15 years but didnt happen so far, AKP made some laws like forbidding selling alcohol after 22:00 (as in many European countries and Israel).
They are trying to push their conservative agenda but so far everything within the Constitutional frame, the liberties are same or even improved in some fields (like the first gay pride in muslim world since 2003).
The number of people who supported sharia in 90s was double as much as today, if there is a danger for Turkey than its drifting towards autocracy not sharia.

Turks have a social codex where religion is involved, some follow it more others less but it doesnt have necessarily to with being reglious, its about what you are being thought since childhood what to do in public and what not, and this is the case in most families be it conservative or liberal.
Another exsample with a even more strict social codex and gerder roles is Japan but its often referred as a liberal western country.

Erdogan might be a fool but it should be mentioned that his words are often twisted in media since there is this sensational Erdogan hysteria recently.
Hello there, xenon54. :-)

Could you please describe Erdogan's current relations with the Muslim Brotherhood?
 
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Hello there, xenon54. :-)

Could you please describe Erdogan's current relations with the Muslim Brotherhood?
Its like the only political fraction he is good with but he even managed to piss them off a couple years ago.

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Brotherhood-angry-at-Erdogan-call-for-secular-Egypt

It should be mentioned that Erdogan pretty much pissed off everyone at some point, his problem is that he doesnt have the diplomatic tone that a politician needs which often forces him to backtrack from his statements.
 
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Its like the only political fraction he is good with but he even managed to piss them off a couple years ago.

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Brotherhood-angry-at-Erdogan-call-for-secular-Egypt

It should be mentioned that Erdogan pretty much pissed off everyone at some point, his problem is that he doesnt have the diplomatic tone that a politician needs which often forces him to backtrack from his statements.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe that the former Turkish prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, was a huge supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. I think he wrote in his famous book, Stratejik Derinlik, that his dream was to establish a "Muslim Brotherhood belt" across the MENA region. To be honest, the AKP comes across as an ill-intentioned, pan-Islamic political party.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/opinion/ahmet-davutoglu-and-turkeys-imperial-fantasy.html?_r=0
 
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