Kyusuibu Honbu
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Interesting read.
China and the United States in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Strategic
Triangle?
CHINESE VIEWS OF INDIAN SEA POWER
If American analysts seem blasé about the intentions and capabilities of their
prospective strategic partner, many Chinese analysts depict the basic motives be-
hind Indias maritime ambitions in starkly geopolitical terms. Indeed, their as-
sumptions and arguments are unmistakably Mahanian. Zhang Ming of Modern
Ships asserts, The Indian subcontinent is akin to a massive triangle reaching into
the heart of the Indian Ocean, benefiting any from there who seeks to control
the Indian Ocean.30 In an article casting suspicion on Indian naval intentions,
the author states, Geostrategically speaking, the Indian Ocean is a link of com-
munication and oil transportation between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and
India is just like a giant and never-sinking aircraft carrier and the most impor-
tant strategic point guarding the Indian Ocean.31 The reference to an unsinkable
aircraft carrier was clearly meant to trigger an emotional reaction, given that for
many Chinese the phrase is most closely associated with Taiwan.
Intriguingly, some have invoked Mahanian language, wrongly attributed to
Mahan himself, to describe the value of the Indian Ocean to New Delhi. One
Chinese commentator quotes (without citation) Mahan as asserting, Whoever
NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R EV I EW
controls the Indian Ocean will dominate India and the coastal states of the Indian
Ocean as well as control the massive area between the Mediterranean and the
Pacific Ocean.32 In a more expansive reformulation, two articles cite Mahan as
declaring, Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. The Indian Ocean
is the gateway to the worlds seven seas. The destiny of the world in the 21st cen-
tury will be determined by the Indian Ocean.33 (As noted before, a very similar,
and likewise apocryphal, Mahan quotation has made the rounds in Indiaeven
finding its way into the official Maritime Military Strategy.) Faulty attribution
notwithstanding, the Chinese are clearly drawn to Mahanian notions of sea pow-
er when forecasting how India will approach its maritime environs.
Zhao Bole, a professor of South Asian studies at Sichuan University, places
these claims in a more concrete geopolitical context. Argues Zhao, four key geo-
strategic factors have underwritten Indias rise. First, India and its surrounding
areas boast a wealth of natural resources. Second, India is by far the most power-
ful country in the Indian Ocean region. Third, the physical distance separating
the United States from India affords New Delhi ample geopolitical space for ma-
neuver. Fourth, India borders economically dynamic regions such as the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states and China. Zhao quotes Nehru
and K. M. Panikkar to prove that Indian politicians and strategists have long rec-
ognized these geopolitical advantages and that they have consistently evinced the
belief that Indias destiny is inextricably tied to the Indian Ocean.34 However, due
to Indias insistence on taking a third way during the Cold War superpower com-
petition, New Delhi was content to focus on its own subcontinental affairs.
In the 1990s, though, Zhao argues, India sought to shake off its nonaligned
posture by increasing its geopolitical activism in Southeast Asia under the guise
of its Look East policy. According to Zhao Gancheng, New Delhi leveraged
its unique geographic position to make Southeast Asiaan intensely maritime
theatera breakthrough point (突破口, particularly in the economic realm.
In the twenty-first century, Zhao argues, the Look East policy has assumed sig-
nificant strategic dimensions, suggesting that India has entered a new phase
intimately tied to its great-power ambitions. While acknowledging that the un-
derlying strategic logic pushing India beyond the subcontinent is compelling,
Zhao worries that Indian prominence among the ASEAN states could tempt the
United States to view India as a potential counterweight to China.35
To Chinese observers, these broader geopolitical forces seem to conform to the
more outward-looking Indian maritime strategy on exhibit in recent years, and
they tend to confirm Chinese suspicions of an expansive and ambitious pattern
to Indias naval outlook. Zhang Xiaolin and Qu Yutao divide the evolution of
Indian maritime strategy, particularly with regard to its geographic scope, into
three distinct phases:
Offshore defense (近海防御
Area control (区域控制
Open-ocean extension (远海延伸
During the first stage, the navy was confined to the east and west coasts of
India and parts of the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal in support of ground and
air operations ashore. The second phase called for a far more assertive control
of the Indian Ocean. Indian strategists, in this view, divided the Indian Ocean
into three concentric rings of operational control. First, India needed to impose
complete or absolute control over three hundred nautical miles of water out
from Indias coastline to defend the homeland, the exclusive economic zone, and
offshore islands. Second, the navy had to exert moderate control over an ocean
belt extending some three to six hundred nautical miles from Indian coasts in or-
der to secure its sea lines of communications and provide situational awareness.
Finally, the navy needed to exercise soft control, power projection and deterrent
capabilities, beyond seven hundred nautical miles from Indian shores.37
Chinese analysts differ over the extent of Indian naval ambitions in the twenty-
first century. But they concur that India will not restrict its seafaring endeavors to
the Indian Ocean indefinitely. Most discern a clear transition from a combination
of offshore defense and area control to a blue-water offensive posture. One com-
mentator postulates that India will develop the capacity to prevent and imple-
ment its own naval blockades against the choke points at Suez, Hormuz, and
Malacca.38 Unsurprisingly, the prospect that India might seek to blockade Ma-
lacca against China has attracted substantial attention. One Chinese analyst, us-
ing language that would have been instantly recognizable to Mahan, describes the
244 islands that constitute the Andaman-Nicobar archipelago as a metal chain
(铁链
further argues that once India commands the Indian Ocean, it will not be satis-
fied with its position and will continuously seek to extend its influence, and its
eastward strategy will have a particular impact on China.40 The author concludes
that India is perhaps Chinas most realistic strategic adversary.41
While they pay considerable attention to the potential Indian threat to the
Malacca Strait, Chinese observers also believe the Indian sea services are intent
on
Achieving sea control from the northern Arabian Sea to the South China Sea
Developing the ability to conduct SLOC defense and combat operations in
the areas above
Maintaining absolute superiority over all littoral states in the Indian Ocean
NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R EV I EW
Building the capacity for strategic deterrence against outside naval powers42
Amassing long-range power-projection capabilities sufficient to reach and
control an enemys coastal waters in times of conflict
Fielding a credible, sea-based, second-strike retaliatory nuclear capability
Developing the overall capacity to enter east (东进
Sea and the Pacific, exit west (西出
into the Mediterranean, and go south (南下
Hope and the Atlantic.43
Clearly, the Chinese foresee the emergence of a far more forward-leaning In-
dian Navy that in time could make its presence felt in Chinas own littoral realm.
Moreover, the Chinese uniformly believe that New Delhi has embarked on an
ambitious modernization program to achieve these sweeping aims. Interestingly,
some have pointed to Americas apparent lack of alarm at Indias already power-
ful navy. This quietude, they say, stands in sharp contrast to incessant U.S. con-
cerns over the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), representing a blatant
double standard.44 In any event, Chinas assessments of Indian capabilities and its
emerging body of work tracking Indias technological and doctrinal advances are
indeed impressive. For instance, Modern Navy, the PLANs monthly periodical,
published a ten-month series on the Indian Navy beginning in November 2005.
Subjects of the articles ranged widely, from platforms and weaponry to basing
and port infrastructure.45 Not surprisingly, given the decades-long debate within
China surrounding its own carrier acquisition plans, Indias aircraft carriers have
attracted by far the most attention.46
A number of Chinese analysts, however, hold far less alarming, if not sanguine,
views of Indias rise. The former Chinese ambassador to India, Cheng Ruisheng,
argues that policy makers in Beijing and New Delhi have increasingly abandoned
their antiquated, zero-sum security outlooks. Indeed, Cheng exudes confidence
that improving U.S.-Indian ties and Sino-Indian relations are not mutually ex-
clusive, and thus he holds out hope for a balanced and stable strategic triangle in
the region.47 Some Chinese speculate that Indias burgeoning friendships with a
variety of extraregional powers, including the United States and Japan, are de-
signed to widen Indias room for maneuver in an increasingly multipolar world
without forcing it to choose sides. As Yang Hui asserts, Indias actions smack of
fence-sitting. This is a new version of non-alignment.48 On balance, then, stra-
tegic continuity might prevail over the potentially destabilizing forces of change.
Even those projecting major changes in the regional configuration of power
seem confident that Indias rise will neither upend stability nor lead automati-
cally to strategic advantages for New Delhi. To be sure, a small minority in China
believes that an increased Indian presence in the Indian Ocean would generate
great-power contradictions that could in time lead New Delhi to displace the
United States as the regional hegemon, consistent with more forceful concep-
tions of an Indian Monroe Doctrine.49 But a far more common view maintains
that growing Indian sea power will likely compel Washington and other powers
in Asia to challenge or counterbalance New Delhis position in the Indian Ocean
region.50 Structural constraints will tend to act against Indian efforts to wield
influence beyond the Indian Ocean. Zhao Gancheng, for example, argues that
Chinas firmly established position in Southeast Asia and Indias relative unfamil-
iarity with the region will prevent New Delhi from reaping maximum gains from
its Look East policy.51
On the strictly military and technological levels, some Chinese analysts believe
that Indian naval aspirations have far outstripped the nations concrete capacity
to fulfill them. Noting that increases in the defense budget have consistently out-
paced the annual growth rate of Indias gross domestic product, Li Yonghua of
Naval and Merchant Ships derides Indias ambition for an oceangoing naval fleet
as a python swallowing an elephant (蟒蛇吞象
tifies three major deficiencies that cast doubt on Indias ability to develop a fleet
for blue-water combat missions. First, Indias current comprehensive national
power simply cannot sustain a global navy and the panoply of capabilities that
such a force demands. Second, Indias long-standing dependence on foreign tech-
nology and relatively backward industrial base will severely retard advances in
indigenous programsespecially plans for domestically built next-generation
aircraft carriers. Finally, existing Indian Navy surface combatants are unequal
in both quantitative and qualitative terms to the demands of long-range fleet
operations. In particular, insufficiently robust air-defense constitutes the most
fatal problem for future Indian carrier task forces.53 Interestingly, key aspects of
Zhangs critique apply equally to the PLAN today.
This brief survey of Chinese perspectives suggests that definitive conclusions
about the future of Indian sea power would be premature. On the one hand,
evocative uses of Mahanian language and worst-case extrapolations of Indian
maritime ambitions certainly represent a sizable geopolitically minded school of
thought in China. On the other, the Chinese acknowledge that India may not be
able to surmount for years to come the geopolitical and technological constraints
it confronts. Such mixed feelings further suggest that Sino-Indian maritime com-
petition in the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea is not fated. Neither side has
the credible capacityyetto reach into the others nautical backyard. At the
same time, the broader geostrategic climate at the moment favors cooperation.
There should be ample timeuntil either side acquires naval forces able to influ-
ence events beyond its own maritime domain, and as long as New Delhis and
NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R EV I EW
Beijings extraregional aims remain largely aspirationalto shape mutual threat
perceptions through cooperative efforts.
China and the United States in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Strategic
Triangle?
