China's Incomplete Military Transformation

[kankan326]

Bottom line is that South Korea was preserved as a democratic institution and the United Nations + US were able to cease the communist threat, which envisaged a Communist Korean Peninsula.

South Korea , presently, is a major economic power, a flowering democracy a sharp contrast to the failed state such as North Korea whose entire population live in utter and absolute poverty.

Therein lies the dichotomy. And the success of the Allied Cause.

Period.

North Korea:

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South Korea

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As a Japanese, you should be grateful for the Korea War. Before that US wanted to change Japan into a big farm.

 

[BoQ77]

Having one child will make one country militarily weak？I don't know how this retarded report get this conclusion.If that's true，then Japan and Korea should worry about that more than us.Some brainless westerners think all one child family are chinese，or all chinese only have one child.This report is written by collecting this kind of stereotypical useless stories for sure，I don't even need to read it.

They argue that the Only Child doesn't dare to fight to death. If he died, the bloodline ends.

 

[Aepsilons]

As a Japanese, you should be grateful for the Korea War. Before that US wanted to change Japan into a big farm.

Grateful? We had to sit still and see our Korean Colony be destroyed. Korea , prior to the war, was heavily industrialized, railways connected Pyongyang to Seoul, to Pusan , throughout the whole country. It was a nightmare to observe ! Korea ever has been precious to Japan.

 

[F-22Raptor]

I do have one more question regarding this report, since you read it. @F-22Raptor

What is the report's projection of the future? Or in regards to other surrounding nations?

Let's assume the report to be true, it is also true that most of China's hardware are new, and most of China's global and regional responsibilities are new, some not even a decade. What's the report's stance on the direction China is going?

Example, we didn't have any Y-20 equivalent before, I mean in a meaningful number, what is the report's conclusion on the future of China's strategic lift?

We didn't really have to contest South and East China Sea, with Africa and Indian Ocean as a goal before, what is the report's opinion on that?

Something of that nature, because while the US has been global power for decades now, we haven't even been one for one decade, or had a modern military for that matter. How does the report take this into consideration?

The report divides the PLA's combat capabilities into domains: land, sea, air, space/cyberspace/electromagnetic spectrum, and finally nuclear deterrence. The sections discuss some strengths of the PLA in that particular domain, then moves on to its weaknesses and how those weaknesses will affect the ability of the PLA to achieve its missions. For example, in the land domain it identifies the PLA "missions" as border, periphery, Taiwan, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It then assigns scores by 3 types of "military weakness." One being, "outright inability to perform a mission", two "high risks of mission failure", and three, "inefficiencies that result in degraded mission outcomes." The scores are assigned to subsets of each domain such as "training" and "communications" in the land domain, or "fleet air defense" and "logistics support" for the sea domain. It then continues under each domain on the attempts of the PLA to rectify those weaknesses. It is my understanding that this is projected out to the year 2025. The authors reference a significant number of PLA internal assessments then compares those with external assessments from the US defense department.

If your looking for more specific answers I suggest reading the report for yourself.

http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china’...assessing-weaknesses-people’s-liberation-army

 

[Genesis]

The report divides the PLA's combat capabilities into domains: land, sea, air, space/cyberspace/electromagnetic spectrum, and finally nuclear deterrence. The sections discuss some strengths of the PLA in that particular domain, then moves on to its weaknesses and how those weaknesses will affect the ability of the PLA to achieve its missions. For example, in the land domain it identifies the PLA "missions" as border, periphery, Taiwan, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It then assigns scores by 3 types of "military weakness." One being, "outright inability to perform a mission", two "high risks of mission failure", and three, "inefficiencies that result in degraded mission outcomes." The scores are assigned to subsets of each domain such as "training" and "communications" in the land domain, or "fleet air defense" and "logistics support" for the sea domain. It then continues under each domain on the attempts of the PLA to rectify those weaknesses. It is my understanding that this is projected out to the year 2025. The authors reference a significant number of PLA internal assessments then compares those with external assessments from the US defense department.

If your looking for more specific answers I suggest reading the report for yourself.

http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china’...assessing-weaknesses-people’s-liberation-army

so it goes to 2025? That doesn't make any sense then, IF these are the things that are wrong with the PLA up to 2025.

On institutional issues, the PLA faces shortcomings regarding outdated command structures.

There's been talk of changes in the internal structure for a few years now and changes are happening. The battalion structure has changed with more capabilities given to a battalion, divisions have been made into brigades, NCOs are now in a Sargent major role in select test units, a increase in NCO's role and salary in the army, and ranks are being reassessed for different roles, while joint chiefs and a few other things are also in the pipeline, Xi has promised a wide range of changes within the PLA.

quality of personnel,

I can see this being a problem, but with recent economic restructuring, and a increased desire to hire men and women from universities and pretty much a increase in education spending for the army, including soldiers. This is a work in progress though.

professionalism and corruption.

I have talked about professionalism, and corruption, two deputy chiefs of the previous government are now under arrest, there's only two in total. Corruption is being tackled, this also ties in with the other things, we'll see how effective Xi is, but the signs look promising.

of Combat weaknesses include logistical, insufficient strategic airlift capabilities,

Ships being built 6 071 in total, and possibly 6 more LHD, landing tanks, and other platforms for transportation. On land, logistics company have been added to the new battalions, logistics are now a key role in the PLA, it will need time to evolve, but attention has been paid.

Airlifts, Y-20, Y-9, Z-20, Z-18a, all and more are already more or less ready, experiments with civilian airliners are also undertaken, by 2025, it could still be a problem, but we will easily have the second most in terms of air lifts in the world.

limited numbers of special-mission aircraft,

This is a major problem that I see going beyond 2025, but by then a few very good models should be out with more and more platforms available for it.

and deficiencies in fleet air defense

Well, if it's into 2025, I don't understand, even now we have 7 052C and 2 052D, by 2025, we will easily be the second most dominate anti air navy in the world.

and anti-submarine warfare.

again new anti sub platforms, but yes going to take a while to catch up to Japan in this area.



Having said all of that, do you have any problem with what I said, and is this in terms of how we stack up with the US? Cause 2050 is the goal has always been the case.

Weakness compare to what missions? Or what countries?

We can't do the US global missions that's a fact, not yet, or is it even in our immediate neighbourhoods.

 

[northeast]

They argue that the Only Child doesn't dare to fight to death. If he died, the bloodline ends.

Yeah，yeah，Whatever.At least you should know that japan and korea may have more single child family than China due to their lower fertility rates.

 

[Genesis]

Grateful? We had to sit still and see our Korean Colony be destroyed. Korea , prior to the war, was heavily industrialized, railways connected Pyongyang to Seoul, to Pusan , throughout the whole country. It was a nightmare to observe ! Korea ever has been precious to Japan.

lol, give a speech to Korean students man, they'll love you.

 

[Aepsilons]

lol, give a speech to Korean students man, they'll love you.

hahaha

 

[TaiShang]

I do hope all US reports on China are as good as this one.


By the way, I do not know how this army can beat war-hardened ISIS and Taleban. No wonder the Afghan Taliban is no longer a terrorist organization and the Army and Taliban have shared the opium trade just fine. China? No, China is not definitely in the same league.

Male-on-male rape has become epidemic in the U.S. Military.

Same-Sex Rape In The Military On The Rise | The Daily Caller

US: 38 Men Raped in Military Every Day

 

[Shotgunner51]

I checked the original article:
China’s Incomplete Military Transformation - Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, Samuel K. Berkowitz
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/de...ncomplete Military Transformation_2.11.15.pdf

Does take some time to read, it's 201 pages! Its a nice read though, very useful and inspiring article.

When some media has been focusing on China's advancements and modernizing, it would be useful to see media paying attention to what it needs to work on. Articles, reports, & speeches in China from its leadership, government-affiliated think tanks, and military publications have all said the same thing, and this RAND report even mentions that fact.

It's a work in progress and it will take years to get everything up to speed. China roll out 2 or 3 models, see if it works, then 2 or 3 more models, and if see fit then production. No hurry, test and test, improve and improve. As long as China don't fall into the arms race trap it can maintain and modernize at it's own pace. Got to be patient, there isn't going to be any direct confrontation between China and the US anytime soon, despite what some China haters would want & some China ultra-nationalists are hankering for, cooler heads will prevail. It's going to a long game of chess moves, with most of the countries in buffer zone as the chess pieces but ones with their own individual agendas that can manipulate the US and China. We are going to be living in interesting times.

 

[Beast]

Media reports of China's new J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters, "carrier-killer" anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-satellite weapons have unnerved many in the Pentagon.

But a new report to be released on Wednesday by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), outlines the various Achilles' heels of the Chinese military, including opportunities the US military could exploit.

Defense News got first rights, before its release, on reviewing the report, entitled, "China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army."

Sponsored by the USCC and produced by the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the Rand National Security Research Division, the report is based on the premise that understanding where the People's Liberation Army (PLA) falls short of its aspirations, or has not fully recognized the need for improvement, is just as important as recognizing the PLA's strengths.

The report looks at two critical shortcomings: institutional and combat capabilities. On institutional issues, the PLA faces shortcomings regarding outdated command structures, quality of personnel, professionalism and corruption. Combat weaknesses include logistical, insufficient strategic airlift capabilities, limited numbers of special-mission aircraft, and deficiencies in fleet air defense and anti-submarine warfare.

"Although the PLA's capabilities have improved dramatically, its remaining weaknesses increase the risk of failure to successfully perform some of the missions Chinese Communist Party [CCP] leaders may task it to execute, such as in various Taiwan contingencies, maritime claim missions, sea line of communication protection, and some military operations other than war scenarios."

The report sifted through over 300 Chinese-language articles from CCP publications, along with numerous books and studies, including important books on strategic missile forces issues, such as "The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns" by Yu Jixun.

The PLA's own weakness assessments revolve around a concept alternately referred to as "two incompatibles" or "two gaps."

"Indeed, PLA publications are replete with references to problems in many areas, and discussions of these problems often highlight what Chinese writers refer to as the 'two incompatibles, reflecting their assessment that the PLA's capabilities are still unable to (1) cope with the demands of winning a local war under informatized conditions and (2) successfully carry out the PLA's other [historic] missions."

Although the two incompatibles and two gaps refer to the same concept, the literature uses them to highlight different traits. "Mentions of the two incompatibles are intended to state what the problem is, while mentions of the two gaps seek to diagnose why the problem exists and, often, how to solve it."

With the first incompatible, problems identified as "broad and endemic" are training, organization, human capital, force development and logistics. Training has not kept pace with modernization. Organizationally, China's military is not prepared to address continued "problems related to administrative structures and mechanisms" and remaining "institutional obstacles and structural conditions."

Force development suffers because the PLA is not an informatized force but rather a 20th-century mechanized force. Other commentators quoted in the report are even harsher in their assessments of force development.

"According to CMC [Central Military Commission] Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang, although the PLA seeks to become an informatized force, it is not fully mechanized." Logistics has been cited in PLA literature as an area of "weakness, specifically being at an 'insufficient ... modernization level ... to win informatized local wars.'"

In the second incompatible, the report states that literature points to comparable problems of training, organization and logistics, but less on force development. Training for the new missions is "insufficient" since "traditional ideas and habitual practices have not been drastically changed." Organizational issues, such as human capital, are also a problem, as "the overall level of talented personnel in our army does not meet the requirements for fulfilling its historic mission in the new century."

The "construction and development" of PLA logistics are "not meeting the requirements" because there is "insufficient support capability for the requirement of fulfilling the historical missions."

The report illustrates numerous examples of weaknesses in the PLA.

These include bungling and disagreement between state bureaucracies and the PLA during the 2001 P-3C aircraft collision off Hainan Island; the 2003 "severe acute respiratory syndrome" crisis; the 2006 Kitty Hawk incident with a Chinese submarine; the 2007 anti-satellite missile test; and the mismanagement of humanitarian operations for the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.

During the Sichuan earthquake relief efforts, Premier Wen Jiabao had difficulty soliciting the full support of the PLA and People's Armed Police. Reportedly, the PLA refused to co-locate its disaster response headquarters with one being run by the State Council.

Corruption is abundant, according to the report. In 2000, the director of military intelligence in the PLA's General Staff Department was arrested. In 2012, the former deputy director of the General Logistics Department was detained. In 2014, the vice chairman of the CMC, Xu Caihou, was arrested.

There is the possibility, according to the report, that the co-vice chairman of the CMC, Guo Boxiang, could be charged with corruption as well.

The PLA's seven military regions group large provinces and urban areas together and do not reflect today's power projection requirements. This makes it hard to "meet the needs of commanding multidimensional operations under high technology conditions."

The report indicates the PLA has limited amounts of new equipment to train on, and difficulties integrating new and old equipment. In 2014, the PLA's main battle tank fleet consists "overwhelmingly of first- and second-generation tanks."

The Navy's 4,000-ton Type 054A frigate is considered a "mini-Aegis" vessel, but the ships are small and cannot carry enough long-range missiles for an actual area defense capability or handle a saturation attack from anti-ship missiles, particularly supersonic and hypersonic variants. The Chinese Navy also lacks anti-submarine warfare capabilities, most likely because the military has focused on anti-access rather than expeditionary deployments.

The report suggests deterrent actions the US could take. These include intentionally revealing the development and testing of new capabilities designed to "exploit specific PLA weaknesses, releasing details about new operational concepts that enable these countries to capitalize on PLA vulnerabilities, or highlighting training and exercises that demonstrate the ability to take advantage of gaps in the PLA's capabilities."

If deterrence fails, the US could work to present the PLA with challenges that are "fast paced, unexpected, and intended to overload or outmaneuver a slow-moving decision system that could have difficulty keeping up with a rapidly developing situation."

The report outlines 16 "critical assumptions" based on assessments made by the authors. The authors of the report are: Michael Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen Gunness, Scott Harold, Susan Puska and Samuel Berkowitz.

Preservation of the CCP will remain the top priority of the party, state, and military leadership, and the CCP will remain in control of the PLA.

"Despite its verbal and sometimes physical aggressiveness, the CCP tends to avoid conflict and wants to sustain a peacetime environment to ensure the strength of another pillar of legitimacy — economic development."

The objective of improving the PLA's integrated joint operations must dominate plans for organizational restructuring and training reforms, and a joint operations capability "must be realized sooner rather than later, to ensure that the PLA will be able to deter or, if necessary, win future informatized local wars."

Even though the PLA Army's traditional dominance over the Air Force and Navy could forestall restructuring and improving the military, the Army will continue to attempt to keep itsr established position.

"The PLA's transition to integrated joint operations will be incremental over the medium to long term. Tough decisions will be deferred or watered down if they affect the entrenched power of the CCP." Due to the Army's influence, "continental thinking will continue to dominate in operational art and leadership thinking."

China's recruitment and short rotation of personnel will not change drastically in the short to medium term.

"China's military personnel system will continue to be plagued by undertrained and inexperienced officers and men in the areas of modern combat, which will impede the force's ability to apply modern equipment and concepts effectively in line with China's concepts for force employment in future joint operations." This means that the number of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) will remain too small, poorly trained, and inexperienced to "transform combat power as rapidly and decisively as senior leaders wish."

Chinese leaders will continue to believe that nuclear weapons underpin China's status and function as a central component of its broader suite of strategic deterrence options.

"If we are incorrect and Chinese leaders do see the strategic utility of nuclear weapons as declining, the leaders may choose to emphasize other aspects of strategic deterrence — such as long-range conventional strike, counterspace or cyberwarfare capabilities — more heavily than nuclear forces."

The authors further assume that Chinese strategists will continue to see nuclear weapons as a means to deter nuclear coercion.

"If we are incorrect and China begins to see nuclear weapons as more useful in tactical roles, it could result in the development of tactical nuclear capabilities that most Chinese strategists thus far have seen as unnecessary and potentially destabilizing."

The report further assumes that China will continue to see the US as the primary focus of its nuclear force modernization. However, that might change if other neighbors, such as India, continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. This could force the Chinese to focus on "theater-range nuclear deterrence and strike capabilities."

China will continue to have a large defense budget needed for recruitment, training, and "retaining highly qualified personnel; conducting necessary operations and maintenance; and investing in a wide range of force modernization programs," such as big ticket items — aircraft carriers, stealth fighters and national security space capabilities.

China will continue to qualitatively and quantitatively strengthen its nuclear deterrent capabilities without sharp trade-offs between nuclear force modernization and conventional force modernization. If the authors are incorrect and the economy declines or government spending shifts to curtail defense spending, the Chinese military could be forced to make trade-offs. This includes the possibility that China might either have to slow its nuclear force modernization efforts in order to procure big-ticket conventional weapons or the opposite.

If the report is wrong to conclude that the absence of civilian oversight is a weakness, the US might incorrectly believe that the "PLA is less efficient or effective at generating combat power because of the absence of oversight and coordination." If China can successfully coordinate without extensive civilian contribution, a US war-fighting strategy that seeks to "complicate Chinese military operations by striking at the seams of civilian and military coordination may be misplaced."

If the author's conclusions are right, the US might "complicate China's ability to generate combat power if it could induce doubt into the minds of the Party about the honesty and fidelity of the PLA to the broader leadership of the CCP."

Also, the report suggests the US might seek to cause "the PLA to doubt the wisdom of the broader policies of the Chinese state and to question whether the line agencies of the government are actually supporting their mission or are leaving the PLA to fight on its own without sufficient economic, diplomatic, policing, or other forms of institutional support for its security mission."

The authors state that in the unlikely event that the "broad community of PLA watchers" have "grossly overestimated its ability to evaluate the relationship of observed exercises to effective combat capabilities," then it would require a "major reassessment of our knowledge of the PLA" and would fall in line with recent statements from former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and former US Pacific Commander Adm. Robert Willard that the US has "consistently underestimated China's capacity to innovate and catch up in the military domain."

The report assumes there is a large gap between academic and foreign-area offices in the PLA with those who have actual operational control. This will make military dialogue and engagement difficult for the US and suggests that those in operational control are hawkish and "immune to outside influences."

There is a general lack of professionalism in the PLA. This is evident in morale and discipline problems. Much of this originates from China's "one-child" policy, which has created the "'little emperor' phenomenon of spoiled children."

This had produced recruits who are not tough enough to withstand military discipline. Roughly, 70-80 percent of personnel are from one-child families.

"Recruits usually need two years to adjust to life within a unit through tough routine training and psychological counseling."

The report assumes there will be no major change in Sino-Russian relations. If this is incorrect, the authors suggest it could change China's external security environment. A downturn in relations could force China to reallocate more military resources in response to Russian provocations.

If relations improve and Russia continues to intimidate Europe, the US could be forced to reallocate military forces to NATO and reduce military plans to reorganize and reinforce its forces in the Asia-Pacific.

The report doubts there will be "drastic" technological surprises from China's military. However, if China should make a quantum leap in the areas of directed-energy weapons or hypersonic technology, it could force China to rethink its force modernization requirements and the way it conducts military campaigns in the future.

Report: China's Incomplete Transformation

This report is just a continuous smearing campaign deploy by US. Poor equip, corrupt and lack professionalism? Lol.. How did our snow leopard team manage to win the anti terrorism competition in Jordan for continuous for 2years? US team must be sleeping or you want to come out with the usual loser comment like we never send the best team? If i tell you snow leopard is our worst team in China, will you believe it?

Talking about corruption? Yes, China is a very corrupted country, so corrupted that we can achieved 10 trillion economy mark in 30years time. Have the most extensive HSR, being the largest export country in the world. A highly corrupt country in US context shall not achieved that feat.

 

[Aepsilons]

Gentlemen,

Take it as an inspiration -- to improve the military command structure. Like any SWOT analysis, don't focus on the weaknesses and threats, but, rather, focus on the opportunities and the strengths you have. As for weaknesses and threats -- implementing a MCP (managerial change program) can be useful -- this platform can be used to address curren weaknesses and implement policies to ameliorate it.

Instead of reacting with abrasion and unnecessary hostility, Chinese colleagues, take this report as a learning tool and a constructive praxis. We Japanese do the same -- it is part of the Kaizen Culture -- continuous improvement.

The honorable @Shotgunner51 has a proper response , pragmatic, and ever in the utilitarian spirit. That is the responsible way!


Regards to all,

 

[Shotgunner51]

Gentlemen,

Take it as an inspiration -- to improve the military command structure. Like any SWOT analysis, don't focus on the weaknesses and threats, but, rather, focus on the opportunities and the strengths you have. As for weaknesses and threats -- implementing a MCP (managerial change program) can be useful -- this platform can be used to address curren weaknesses and implement policies to ameliorate it.

Instead of reacting with abrasion and unnecessary hostility, Chinese colleagues, take this report as a learning tool and a constructive praxis. We Japanese do the same -- it is part of the Kaizen Culture -- continuous improvement.

The honorable @Shotgunner51 has a proper response , pragmatic, and ever in the utilitarian spirit. That is the responsible way!


Regards to all,

Wow thanks @Nihonjin1051 , feel flattered, I am just a rough man...

Yeah it's no big deal to see articles like these, very normal, one should be worried if your enemy sweet talk you into dreamy land then kill you. And RAND, they can charge a lot for their work (assume McKinsey's or BCG's rate) fellows, and now we got a 201-pages SWOT analysis for free, what's bad about it? Though I am happy to see my compatriots so confident in our country, not bad at all!

 

[slng]

Well, the way I look at it is that, why don't you look at the free detailed analyst and apply fix if its valid within Chinese context.

It's a positive situation when a big power start to put attention on you...

Chinese must have something to offer in return eh!

 

[Aepsilons]

Wow thanks @Nihonjin1051 , feel flattered, I am just a rough man...

Yeah it's no big deal to see articles like these, very normal, one should be worried if your enemy sweet talk you into dreamy land then kill you. And RAND, they charge a lot for their work fellows, and now we got a 201-pages SWOT analysis for free, what's bad about it? Though I am happy to see my compatriots so confident in our country, not bad at all!

Sure, its better than one's competitor / rival gives us a fair constructive criticism --- than , like what you said, sugar talk us and say, "oh you're great in everything, there is absolutely no issue with your military chain , in fact, you do to much x, y, z, --- you don't have to focus on these so much ." That's when any military cadre should raise his / her eyebrows. lol.

Let me give you an example -- the JGSDF has some units of the Western Army training with Americans in Southern California right now. And do you know what in? Amphibious warfare doctrine. We know that we have limited Amphibious warfare experience , compared to the US Marines, and thus take the learning opportunity with them as a necessary experience. Afterall, perfection and honing one's skills is continuous, am i right?

Secondarily. JGSDF has absolute lack in dealing with IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) that are used by terrorists / insurgents. The United States has extensive experience in dealing with this threat and thus our JGSDF are continuously training with them regarding this , a preparatory experience, in the event that we have to deploy soldiers into the Middle East / Africa. Without the training and learning experience with US Army and US Marines, we would remain inexperienced and unable to respond effectively in the event our forces are struck with IEDs.

So in that context, I have no doubt that the soldiers of the PLAN, PLA -- are hardy and dedicated professionals. However, in the modern day warfare, doctrines are continuously changing and any military command structure has to be fluid in responding / evolving to these new parameters. A great military , an efficient military is one that can adapt to any exigency -- we must never be static. That said, best of luck to Chinese Military.

Well, the way I look at it is that, why don't you look at the free detailed analyst and apply fix if its valid within Chinese context.

It's a positive situation when a big power start to put attention on you...

Chinese must have something to offer in return eh!

Precisely.