China's Incomplete Military Transformation

[BoQ77]

Then I suggest you go read the 150 page report. I just got done reviewing it. It offers a detailed analysis of the PLA and its strengths and weaknesses.

'
It's better for the world, if they ignore the report and do whatever they want.

 

[70U63]

I'm not arguing whose at fault , I'm just stating the plain and obvious truth. Afterall, China's FTA with South Korea this year is testament to the success of South Korea since the Korean War. Whilst Seoul basks in great opportunity , Pyongyang languors in its own mire. The unfortunate 28 million souls in that country suffer utter and dismal poverty whilst its leadership bask in food and money. Communism , ideologically speaking, preaches universal equality for the masses , yet this is not true in practice there. Those in power may benefit , but the 28 million North Koreans are practically slaves , devoid of human rights and treated as grass for sheep to graze upon.

An absolute shame.

Exactly, a lot of countries are in bad shape only have themselves to blame. Either their leaders are too incompetence or selfish or the citizen are too naive to believe they have the same luxury (compare to stronger nations) without doing all the 'hard' works to develop their nation to suit themselves.

 

[BoQ77]

You insulted your friend.

The Korean peninsula is important for its strategic position as an entry point into the Asian mainland, nothing more. North Korea is a guard dog on a chain controlled by China. It doesn't matter if they are rich or poor.

Think about it like this. Russia is an ally and is able to secure China's northern border. Mongolia is landlocked. Central Asia is landlocked. The Himalayas separate China from India. The US has no military bases in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the Korean peninsula is the only credible entry point into Asia for the US. But first you have to get through our dog.

 

[Aepsilons]

Exactly, a lot of countries are in bad shape only have themselves to blame. Either their leaders are too incompetence or selfish or the citizen are too naive to believe they have the same luxury (compare to stronger nations) without doing all the 'hard' works to develop their nation to suit themselves.

Its just interesting when academe posit comparative historical analysis of Korea. Personally, I have a historical fondness for Korea, but the current position of North Korea --- primarily referencing its lack of internal development, predicated culture of corruption (and lack of anti-corruption drives), practically non-existent health care system, and the culture of ubiquitous food shortage that continues to plague its populace -- yes-- in the 21st century ! North Korea is the only contrary example of the generalized assumption of Northeast Asian development: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China -- all are developed and enjoy either one of the highest HDI (Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan) or growing HDI (PRC).

North Korea , to me, reminds me of how Korea was like before Japan colonized her and developed that country and transformed it from a feudal society to an industrialized colony --- all in a matter of 50 years as an Imperial Crown Colony. South Korea , to me, is a successor to Chosen under Japanese rule. The South Koreans took what they learned during Japanese rule and used that in the transformation of their nation into an Asian Economic Tiger. North Korea -- forced with Communist Ideology and the Kim's feudal nepotism have regressed their country.

Park Chung Hee, was pivotal in helping transform South Korea and used Japanese managerial and fiscal policies for his own country. The culture of privatization was observed. Succeeding South Korean leaders have built on that , of course with their own national spirit, but their programs have paralleled if not copied that of Japan's. And now, look at South Korea. An envy of many developed nations.

 

[Steakhouse]

US couldn't hold on to Irag after 10 yrs of occupation, same with afghan US still not defeat AlQuida or Taliban after 12 yrs of occupation. Anyway China still a nuclear arm state, US will never defeat China in a war. There alway a chance US war against China can lead to nuclear exchange. Chinese General publish the short coming of China military in the key area, China been rectify their problem for the last 10 yrs, China will continue improve on their military preparedness. 5 to 10 yrs China military will greatly enhance their logistic support and improve their deployment capacity by build up transport aircraft and ship, China build many transport helicopter, China just axes the retire general for corrupt and many thousands more being investigated. China military still lack war experience that will hinder their combat effective.

 

[70U63]

You insulted your friend.

What he stated is the reality (although in a bad way).
Small (& weaker) nations located adjacent to powerful nation/s need to play the game smart to get the advantage. For example, Singapore leaders know how to get most from US and China without offending them.

 

[sword1947]

When ?
I missed something i think.

1951, google it yourself

 

[hans]

I want to remind you that in around 20-30 years after Korea war, north Korea is a place more better than south Korea.
It was until South Korea start to develop its economy in 1970-1980s and Soviet union fall that the situation switched.
So it much depends on the situation..

Bottom line is that South Korea was preserved as a democratic institution and the United Nations + US were able to cease the communist threat, which envisaged a Communist Korean Peninsula.

South Korea , presently, is a major economic power, a flowering democracy a sharp contrast to the failed state such as North Korea whose entire population live in utter and absolute poverty.

Therein lies the dichotomy. And the success of the Allied Cause.

Period.

North Korea:

View attachment 192295

View attachment 192296


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South Korea

View attachment 192297


View attachment 192298

 

[BoQ77]

What he stated is the reality (although in a bad way).
Small (& weaker) nations located adjacent to powerful nation/s need to play the game smart to get the advantage. For example, Singapore leaders know how to get most from US and China without offending them.

if you know that the Chinese moderator banned me because I called a customer as lab rat for Chinese weapon. even before China use it for themselves. Reason for ban: insult a national

 

[hans]

Also you need to think about the demand of Chinese military..
China is not seeking the power of defeat US in world wide..
China is only trying to disable US military capacity in east Asia targeting at China.
If Chinese military can drive US power away from east Asia, the next step will not be Guam or Hawaii.
But India Ocean and Africa where China need to buy material and sell products..
China welcome US power in the world that is not close to China..

Media reports of China's new J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters, "carrier-killer" anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-satellite weapons have unnerved many in the Pentagon.

But a new report to be released on Wednesday by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), outlines the various Achilles' heels of the Chinese military, including opportunities the US military could exploit.

Defense News got first rights, before its release, on reviewing the report, entitled, "China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army."

Sponsored by the USCC and produced by the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the Rand National Security Research Division, the report is based on the premise that understanding where the People's Liberation Army (PLA) falls short of its aspirations, or has not fully recognized the need for improvement, is just as important as recognizing the PLA's strengths.

The report looks at two critical shortcomings: institutional and combat capabilities. On institutional issues, the PLA faces shortcomings regarding outdated command structures, quality of personnel, professionalism and corruption. Combat weaknesses include logistical, insufficient strategic airlift capabilities, limited numbers of special-mission aircraft, and deficiencies in fleet air defense and anti-submarine warfare.

"Although the PLA's capabilities have improved dramatically, its remaining weaknesses increase the risk of failure to successfully perform some of the missions Chinese Communist Party [CCP] leaders may task it to execute, such as in various Taiwan contingencies, maritime claim missions, sea line of communication protection, and some military operations other than war scenarios."

The report sifted through over 300 Chinese-language articles from CCP publications, along with numerous books and studies, including important books on strategic missile forces issues, such as "The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns" by Yu Jixun.

The PLA's own weakness assessments revolve around a concept alternately referred to as "two incompatibles" or "two gaps."

"Indeed, PLA publications are replete with references to problems in many areas, and discussions of these problems often highlight what Chinese writers refer to as the 'two incompatibles, reflecting their assessment that the PLA's capabilities are still unable to (1) cope with the demands of winning a local war under informatized conditions and (2) successfully carry out the PLA's other [historic] missions."

Although the two incompatibles and two gaps refer to the same concept, the literature uses them to highlight different traits. "Mentions of the two incompatibles are intended to state what the problem is, while mentions of the two gaps seek to diagnose why the problem exists and, often, how to solve it."

With the first incompatible, problems identified as "broad and endemic" are training, organization, human capital, force development and logistics. Training has not kept pace with modernization. Organizationally, China's military is not prepared to address continued "problems related to administrative structures and mechanisms" and remaining "institutional obstacles and structural conditions."

Force development suffers because the PLA is not an informatized force but rather a 20th-century mechanized force. Other commentators quoted in the report are even harsher in their assessments of force development.

"According to CMC [Central Military Commission] Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang, although the PLA seeks to become an informatized force, it is not fully mechanized." Logistics has been cited in PLA literature as an area of "weakness, specifically being at an 'insufficient ... modernization level ... to win informatized local wars.'"

In the second incompatible, the report states that literature points to comparable problems of training, organization and logistics, but less on force development. Training for the new missions is "insufficient" since "traditional ideas and habitual practices have not been drastically changed." Organizational issues, such as human capital, are also a problem, as "the overall level of talented personnel in our army does not meet the requirements for fulfilling its historic mission in the new century."

The "construction and development" of PLA logistics are "not meeting the requirements" because there is "insufficient support capability for the requirement of fulfilling the historical missions."

The report illustrates numerous examples of weaknesses in the PLA.

These include bungling and disagreement between state bureaucracies and the PLA during the 2001 P-3C aircraft collision off Hainan Island; the 2003 "severe acute respiratory syndrome" crisis; the 2006 Kitty Hawk incident with a Chinese submarine; the 2007 anti-satellite missile test; and the mismanagement of humanitarian operations for the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.

During the Sichuan earthquake relief efforts, Premier Wen Jiabao had difficulty soliciting the full support of the PLA and People's Armed Police. Reportedly, the PLA refused to co-locate its disaster response headquarters with one being run by the State Council.

Corruption is abundant, according to the report. In 2000, the director of military intelligence in the PLA's General Staff Department was arrested. In 2012, the former deputy director of the General Logistics Department was detained. In 2014, the vice chairman of the CMC, Xu Caihou, was arrested.

There is the possibility, according to the report, that the co-vice chairman of the CMC, Guo Boxiang, could be charged with corruption as well.

The PLA's seven military regions group large provinces and urban areas together and do not reflect today's power projection requirements. This makes it hard to "meet the needs of commanding multidimensional operations under high technology conditions."

The report indicates the PLA has limited amounts of new equipment to train on, and difficulties integrating new and old equipment. In 2014, the PLA's main battle tank fleet consists "overwhelmingly of first- and second-generation tanks."

The Navy's 4,000-ton Type 054A frigate is considered a "mini-Aegis" vessel, but the ships are small and cannot carry enough long-range missiles for an actual area defense capability or handle a saturation attack from anti-ship missiles, particularly supersonic and hypersonic variants. The Chinese Navy also lacks anti-submarine warfare capabilities, most likely because the military has focused on anti-access rather than expeditionary deployments.

The report suggests deterrent actions the US could take. These include intentionally revealing the development and testing of new capabilities designed to "exploit specific PLA weaknesses, releasing details about new operational concepts that enable these countries to capitalize on PLA vulnerabilities, or highlighting training and exercises that demonstrate the ability to take advantage of gaps in the PLA's capabilities."

If deterrence fails, the US could work to present the PLA with challenges that are "fast paced, unexpected, and intended to overload or outmaneuver a slow-moving decision system that could have difficulty keeping up with a rapidly developing situation."

The report outlines 16 "critical assumptions" based on assessments made by the authors. The authors of the report are: Michael Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen Gunness, Scott Harold, Susan Puska and Samuel Berkowitz.

Preservation of the CCP will remain the top priority of the party, state, and military leadership, and the CCP will remain in control of the PLA.

"Despite its verbal and sometimes physical aggressiveness, the CCP tends to avoid conflict and wants to sustain a peacetime environment to ensure the strength of another pillar of legitimacy — economic development."

The objective of improving the PLA's integrated joint operations must dominate plans for organizational restructuring and training reforms, and a joint operations capability "must be realized sooner rather than later, to ensure that the PLA will be able to deter or, if necessary, win future informatized local wars."

Even though the PLA Army's traditional dominance over the Air Force and Navy could forestall restructuring and improving the military, the Army will continue to attempt to keep itsr established position.

"The PLA's transition to integrated joint operations will be incremental over the medium to long term. Tough decisions will be deferred or watered down if they affect the entrenched power of the CCP." Due to the Army's influence, "continental thinking will continue to dominate in operational art and leadership thinking."

China's recruitment and short rotation of personnel will not change drastically in the short to medium term.

"China's military personnel system will continue to be plagued by undertrained and inexperienced officers and men in the areas of modern combat, which will impede the force's ability to apply modern equipment and concepts effectively in line with China's concepts for force employment in future joint operations." This means that the number of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) will remain too small, poorly trained, and inexperienced to "transform combat power as rapidly and decisively as senior leaders wish."

Chinese leaders will continue to believe that nuclear weapons underpin China's status and function as a central component of its broader suite of strategic deterrence options.

"If we are incorrect and Chinese leaders do see the strategic utility of nuclear weapons as declining, the leaders may choose to emphasize other aspects of strategic deterrence — such as long-range conventional strike, counterspace or cyberwarfare capabilities — more heavily than nuclear forces."

The authors further assume that Chinese strategists will continue to see nuclear weapons as a means to deter nuclear coercion.

"If we are incorrect and China begins to see nuclear weapons as more useful in tactical roles, it could result in the development of tactical nuclear capabilities that most Chinese strategists thus far have seen as unnecessary and potentially destabilizing."

The report further assumes that China will continue to see the US as the primary focus of its nuclear force modernization. However, that might change if other neighbors, such as India, continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. This could force the Chinese to focus on "theater-range nuclear deterrence and strike capabilities."

China will continue to have a large defense budget needed for recruitment, training, and "retaining highly qualified personnel; conducting necessary operations and maintenance; and investing in a wide range of force modernization programs," such as big ticket items — aircraft carriers, stealth fighters and national security space capabilities.

China will continue to qualitatively and quantitatively strengthen its nuclear deterrent capabilities without sharp trade-offs between nuclear force modernization and conventional force modernization. If the authors are incorrect and the economy declines or government spending shifts to curtail defense spending, the Chinese military could be forced to make trade-offs. This includes the possibility that China might either have to slow its nuclear force modernization efforts in order to procure big-ticket conventional weapons or the opposite.

If the report is wrong to conclude that the absence of civilian oversight is a weakness, the US might incorrectly believe that the "PLA is less efficient or effective at generating combat power because of the absence of oversight and coordination." If China can successfully coordinate without extensive civilian contribution, a US war-fighting strategy that seeks to "complicate Chinese military operations by striking at the seams of civilian and military coordination may be misplaced."

If the author's conclusions are right, the US might "complicate China's ability to generate combat power if it could induce doubt into the minds of the Party about the honesty and fidelity of the PLA to the broader leadership of the CCP."

Also, the report suggests the US might seek to cause "the PLA to doubt the wisdom of the broader policies of the Chinese state and to question whether the line agencies of the government are actually supporting their mission or are leaving the PLA to fight on its own without sufficient economic, diplomatic, policing, or other forms of institutional support for its security mission."

The authors state that in the unlikely event that the "broad community of PLA watchers" have "grossly overestimated its ability to evaluate the relationship of observed exercises to effective combat capabilities," then it would require a "major reassessment of our knowledge of the PLA" and would fall in line with recent statements from former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and former US Pacific Commander Adm. Robert Willard that the US has "consistently underestimated China's capacity to innovate and catch up in the military domain."

The report assumes there is a large gap between academic and foreign-area offices in the PLA with those who have actual operational control. This will make military dialogue and engagement difficult for the US and suggests that those in operational control are hawkish and "immune to outside influences."

There is a general lack of professionalism in the PLA. This is evident in morale and discipline problems. Much of this originates from China's "one-child" policy, which has created the "'little emperor' phenomenon of spoiled children."

This had produced recruits who are not tough enough to withstand military discipline. Roughly, 70-80 percent of personnel are from one-child families.

"Recruits usually need two years to adjust to life within a unit through tough routine training and psychological counseling."

The report assumes there will be no major change in Sino-Russian relations. If this is incorrect, the authors suggest it could change China's external security environment. A downturn in relations could force China to reallocate more military resources in response to Russian provocations.

If relations improve and Russia continues to intimidate Europe, the US could be forced to reallocate military forces to NATO and reduce military plans to reorganize and reinforce its forces in the Asia-Pacific.

The report doubts there will be "drastic" technological surprises from China's military. However, if China should make a quantum leap in the areas of directed-energy weapons or hypersonic technology, it could force China to rethink its force modernization requirements and the way it conducts military campaigns in the future.

Report: China's Incomplete Transformation

 

[Aepsilons]

I want to remind you that in around 20-30 years after Korea war, north Korea is a place more better than south Korea.
It was until South Korea start to develop its economy in 1970-1980s and Soviet union fall that the situation switched.
So it much depends on the situation..

Sure, i mean, both countries (South Korea, North Korea) were destroyed by the war. We all can agree to this. South Korea's infancy years were riddled with issues with governance, heck, even Syngman Ree and Park Chung Hee utilized a 'iron fist' policy of rule, one could even argue that they were dictators. However, here's the caveat --- Park Chung Hee allowed the privitization of companies --- and copied the Zaibatsu system in Japan. This was the catalyst for South Korea's industrial growth (explosion, more so) in just the first 20 years of its existence. As the standard of living increased, government emphasized greater liberal democracy, judiciary independence, and thus overall quality of life improved. You see there was a gradual and linear growth.

But for North Korea? Their entire existence was based on a begging bowl system -- they had never produced a culture of industrialization (well, they were industrialized under Japan -- quite heavily actually) as they became uber dependent on the Soviet Union ; fiscally, militarily, politically. What development was there was focused only on Pyongyang -- the overwhelming majority of their country does not even have basic water systems, lack of sewage systems, medical system is non-existent (unless you live in Pyongyang). Even under Soviet patronage --- they've regressed. Now, they've regressed even further.


Regards,

 

[hans]

You are right..
I would say north Korea give up so many chance of developing its economy..
You see South Korea and China catch up the world development.
If North Korea focus more on economy, the situation will not be that bad..

Sure, i mean, both countries (South Korea, North Korea) were destroyed by the war. We all can agree to this. South Korea's infancy years were riddled with issues with governance, heck, even Syngman Ree and Park Chung Hee utilized a 'iron fist' policy of rule, one could even argue that they were dictators. However, here's the caveat --- Park Chung Hee allowed the privitization of companies --- and copied the Zaibatsu system in Japan. This was the catalyst for South Korea's industrial growth (explosion, more so) in just the first 20 years of its existence. As the standard of living increased, government emphasized greater liberal democracy, judiciary independence, and thus overall quality of life improved. You see there was a gradual and linear growth.

But for North Korea? Their entire existence was based on a begging bowl system -- they had never produced a culture of industrialization (well, they were industrialized under Japan -- quite heavily actually) as they became uber dependent on the Soviet Union ; fiscally, militarily, politically. What development was there was focused only on Pyongyang -- the overwhelming majority of their country does not even have basic water systems, lack of sewage systems, medical system is non-existent (unless you live in Pyongyang). Even under Soviet patronage --- they've regressed. Now, they've regressed even further.


Regards,

 

[northeast]

Having one child will make one country militarily weak？I don't know how this retarded report get this conclusion.If that's true，then Japan and Korea should worry about that more than us.Some brainless westerners think all one child family are chinese，or all chinese only have one child.This report is written by collecting this kind of stereotypical useless stories for sure，I don't even need to read it.

 

[Genesis]

I do have one more question regarding this report, since you read it. @F-22Raptor

What is the report's projection of the future? Or in regards to other surrounding nations?

Let's assume the report to be true, it is also true that most of China's hardware are new, and most of China's global and regional responsibilities are new, some not even a decade. What's the report's stance on the direction China is going?

Example, we didn't have any Y-20 equivalent before, I mean in a meaningful number, what is the report's conclusion on the future of China's strategic lift?

We didn't really have to contest South and East China Sea, with Africa and Indian Ocean as a goal before, what is the report's opinion on that?

Something of that nature, because while the US has been global power for decades now, we haven't even been one for one decade, or had a modern military for that matter. How does the report take this into consideration?

Lastly, China has conducted 18 anti pirates patrols, how does the first one differ to the last one and future ones? What indication does that give to the future of changes in the PLA based on experience?

 

[xunzi]

Having one child will make one country militarily weak？I don't know how this retarded report get this conclusion.If that's true，then Japan and Korea should worry about that more than us.Some brainless westerners think all one child family are chinese，or all chinese only have one child.This report is written by collecting this kind of stereotypical useless stories for sure，I don't even need to read it.

I don't know how a country forcing their K-pop or J-pop teeny junior to enlist in the military is better than one who is on a volunteer basis. LOL I must say thought. This article love to put our PLA down but lack the ball to test us. What is the point if you have no ball? LOL