Ho would formally request military aid in the nature of equipment, advisors and training for the PAVN in April of 1950. Interestingly enough he would also request Chinese commanders at the regimental and battalion level to assist the Vietnamese Army, a request wisely denied by China, who would send advisors, not commanders to the North of Vietnam. [23] Such a request for Chinese commanders of PAVN units highlights the leadership problems present at the time in the Vietnamese forces, and the prevailing lack of confidence in Vietnamese commanders.
Chinese Military Advisory Group
After this request by Ho, the PRC in April of 1950 would begin forming the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) in order to provide military assistance to the Vietnamese forces fighting the French. General Wei Guoqing would lead the CMAG to North Vietnam, along with Senior General Chen Geng, the “scholar general,” and the PRC ambassador. The Second, Third and Fourth PLA field armies were directed to select experienced officers for service in Vietnam. Some 281 officers were selected with many having command experience. [24]
the Chairman spoke with his military advisors enroute to Vietnam, “It is President Ho chi Minh who has asked me for [your assistance], Who would have thought our revolution would succeed first? We should help them. It is called internationalism. You will help them to win the battles after you get to Vietnam.” [25] The advisors of the CMAG would do exactly that as the impact of these Chinese advisors and new weapons for the PAVN would soon be apparent in the war. Standard Chinese Maoist doctrine for revolutionary wars would be stressed and advisors were informed to avoid the “mentality of big-state chauvinism and not to display contempt for the Vietnamese.” [26] By 1950 the French had almost completely lost control of the border region with China with isolation garrisons in Cao Bang and Langson struggling to maintain a presence.
The border region would be the first test of the new Chinese trained and equipped PAVN forces. General Chen Geng wrote in a report that “Some Vietnamese crack units are in high morale after receiving training and equipment in Yunnan and Guangxi, but Vietnamese cadres above the battalion level lack command experience in actual combat.” [27] This was an accurate statement concerning the PAVN but it was one problem about to be corrected.
The CMAG would provide planning guidance, among other things, for the upcoming Border Campaigns of 1950. This campaign would begin in September with garrison after garrison falling to the Viet Minh in the north with tremendous losses for the isolated French garrisons near the Sino-Vietnamese border. Outnumbered 8 to 1 by the Vietnamese, the French would lose immense amounts of men to include 6,000 of 10,000 men in the north, and supplies to include 13 artillery pieces, 125 mortars and 450 trucks, in what some have described as the greatest defeat in French colonial history since the French and Indian War in North America. [28]
Within 48 hours after these successful assaults on those isolated French outposts in the north, Chinese General Chen would hold what we would call today an after action review. Chen would brief Giap and other high ranking officers for four hours on the shortcomings of the Vietnamese Army. These short comings according to Chen would include not following the order for battle and attacking late, commanders not leading assaults from the front, poor communications, and cadres making false reports to superiors.[29] One wonders how such criticism was received but such reviews are vital for an army’s subsequent growth and improvement. To General Giap “The victory shows Mao’s military thought was very applicable to Vietnam.” [30]
In addition to the training and planning guidance by the CMAG the logistical support from China began to increase steadily. The support provided was only 10-20 tons a month in 1951, increasing to 250 tons a month in 1952, further increasing to 600 tons a month in 1953 and 1,500 to 4,000 tons monthly during the last year of the war in 1954. [31] Additionally the Chinese transportation network to include roads and railways leading from China to Vietnam was improved also with some 1,000 trucks provided to the PAVN. This military aid provided by China enabled the PAVN to expand into a well armed and trained conventional force capable of defeating the French Army in large scale offensive operations. From a force in 1950 of 3 divisions the PAVN would expand two years later into a force of 7 divisions. All in all the Chinese military aid would arm a total of over 7 PAVN divisions. All this military support would not go unnoticed by the west, with the CIA, by March 1952, estimating that some 15,000 Chinese Communists were serving in Vietnam in various “technical, advisory and garrison capacities” with the PAVN against the French. [32] The Vietnamese Army now was a lethal force well equipped with small arms, machine guns, heavy 120mm mortars and 105mm howitzers, in addition to 20 and 40mm anti-aircraft guns. [33]
Decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu
By 1954 “Giap and the Chinese had built a tough, well-equipped, experienced, and dedicated army-a tool awaiting a great task and a master craftsman.” [34] The great task would be the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu in western Vietnam near Laos, a battle that would end the First Vietnam War and the French presence in Indochina. Evidence suggests that the Vietnamese leadership did not see the opportunity provided by the French reoccupation of the valley until Chinese advisors alerted the Vietnamese, who initially wanted to move through Laos to invade South Vietnam, until convinced otherwise by General Wei Guoqing. [35] Additionally the CMAG would provide the Viet Mihn with a copy of the Navarre Plan, outlining French goals and objectives by the new French Commander in Vietnam.
With the signing of the Korean Armistice in July 1953 China could and would shift additional resources to Vietnam. Specific support provided for the Dien Bien Phu campaign would include planning, logistics, engineering advisors, trucks, rocket and 75mm recoilless rifle battalions, and Soviet Katyusha Rocket Launchers or “Stalin Organs.” A combined headquarters was established as the Dien Bien Phu Campaign Command with General Giap as Commander in Chief with Chinese General Wei Guoqing as General Advisor. [36]
Giap wrote years after the battle that “I felt there needed to be a meeting with the head of the team of friendly military experts who was also present. Generally speaking, relationships between us and friendly military experts ever since the Border Campaign had been excellent. Our friends had given us the benefit of their invaluable experience drawn from the revolutionary war in China and the anti-US war in Korea.” [37] It is interesting that in his account of the battle Giap makes no mention of Chinese material support or advice and planning assistance provided throughout this decisive last battle of the First Vietnam War. The Chinese advisors, such as General Wei Guoqing, are not identified or given any credit by Giap. Perhaps this is understandable given that one of the Chinese advisors would write later that “The greatest shortcoming of the Vietnamese Communists was their fear of letting other people know their weaknesses. They lacked Bolshevist self-criticism.” [38] The siege of Dien Bien Phu was to last 8 weeks with China providing 8,286 tons of supplies, including 4,620 tons of petroleum, 1,360 tons of ammunition, 46 tons of weapons and 1,700 tons of rice from supply depots 600 miles away. [39]
Chinese advisors would be involved at all levels during the battle including digging in the all important Vietnamese artillery into shellproof dugouts, experience learned the hard way in the hills of Korea. [40] In effect the battle of Dien Bien Phu would be planned and assisted by Chinese advisors and fought with Chinese trained, equipped, supplied, transported and fed PAVN troops in a military soup to nuts manner. This support is rarely mentioned as a contributing factor to the Vietnamese victory in 1954 but should be acknowledged in analyzing the battle.
Post-war support, 1955-63
In 1954, with the ending of the First Vietnam War, and the Big Power Geneva conference, Vietnam would be split into two nations, North and South Vietnam. In the north Ho and the party’s attention would be focused; at least for several years, on consolidating power and economic development. The inevitable Communist collectivization and tribunals began with confiscations, arrests, localized uprisings and the execution of 15,000 Vietnamese before order could be restored by the PAVN. [41] The CMAG returns to China in September of 1955 having accomplished its mission, quite possibly one of the most successful advisory missions ever. [42]
China would continue; however, to provide substantial levels of military aid for North Vietnam to the tune of $106 million from 1955 to 1963, effectively giving the North the resources needed to begin the insurgency in the South. [43] Thus, the North Vietnamese would form the National Liberation Front, NLF, in December of 1960 and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces, PLAF, the following year in 1961. Both the NLF and PLAF would be more commonly referred to as the Viet Cong, or Vietnamese Communists. [44]
A campaign of terror and assassination against the South Vietnamese government would soon begin as thousands of officials would be killed or kidnapped by Viet Cong insurgents. [45] The United States would not sit idly by during this period but began an ambitious program of military aid to the fragile government of South Vietnam. The stage was set, for a second war in Vietnam which would be, once again, fought largely with Chinese military aid.
