An article by "Chandra Tamirisa" on a Wordpress
blog?
Now that is hilarious. Didn't you notice the big words on the top of the page saying "blog"?
Alright ! If you insist !
Ex-French PM: Notion of China-US 'G2' 'an illusion'
from Chinese source.
East Asia Needs Change, Too
President Obama was elected on a platform of change, and in most areas he hasn't hesitated to deliver. One important exception, however, is East Asia. There the keyword is continuity. Ever since Richard Nixon opened the door to normal relations with China, every U.S. administration has worked to deepen economic ties and encourage China's integration into the international system, while also hedging against the danger that China will use its growing power in ways inimical to American interests. Obama has been no exception. The same goes for calling for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, and emphasizing the importance of the alliance with Japan.
But continuity should involve progress and adaptation to changing circumstances; it doesn't mean simply carrying on the policies and practices of the past. Obama came into office determined to make a sharp break with George W. Bush's policies in the Middle East and South Asia. In East Asia, the challenges are more subtle—and thus so are the policy adjustments required. Still, the stakes are just as high: Asia today is the economic growth engine of the world and also a place where nuclear proliferation threatens; where a great power (China) is emerging; and where its neighbor, Japan, remains the world's second-largest economy.
The danger is that, distracted by pressing events in other parts of the globe—in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and elsewhere—the Obama administration might be lulled into treating East Asia with a kind of benign neglect. That's dangerous, because it would leave the administration in a position of constantly having to catch up with developments in this dynamic and rapidly changing region, rather than helping shape those developments.
The most pressing need is for a comprehensive strategy on North Korea. When I visited Pyongyang in February 2009 to take part in a Track II dialogue with senior North Korean officials, our group was told in no uncertain terms that the regime's price for giving up its nukes included the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea. The North Koreans know they are not going to get that, but they are trying to make the most of a weak hand, hoping that Obama will conclude that he has to deal with a North Korea that has nuclear weapons even as he deems its possession of them unacceptable. The only way to find out whether the North Koreans can be persuaded to give up their nuclear quest is to talk with them about the terms of a comprehensive deal. And while doing that the Obama administration needs to reassure Japan and South Korea of the credibility of the U.S. commitment to protect them against attack and nuclear blackmail; make sure that U.S. and Chinese policies are in sync; and prevent North Korea from exporting missiles, weapons, and nuclear technology. Only the U.S. president can provide the leadership that is needed to craft a successful North Korea policy.
Thinking on several levels at once is key to a successful East Asia strategy, especially when it comes to dealing with both China and Japan. Obama has to reassure Japan that deepening U.S. ties to China won't the diminish the importance of Washington's relationship with Tokyo, yet he also needs to avoid making Beijing think Washington is strengthening the Japan alliance in order to contain China
. The creation of a new "G2" partnership between China and the United States to deal not only with bilateral issues but also with regional and global ones—as many pundits have recommended—is a bad idea. The notion of a G2 grossly exaggerates China's strengths; China is a developing country facing myriad economic, social, and political problems. It is foolish to encourage China to believe that it has more power to influence global affairs than it actually possesses. But the alternative is not to institutionalize trilateral consultations between the U.S., China, and Japan either. The South Koreans would be unhappy about being left out, and China and Japan would constantly worry that the U.S. was going to side with the other. The Americans, meanwhile, would be wary about being pushed to take sides—with good reason.
What the Obama administration must recognize is that in our interconnected and interdependent world, the process of bilateral negotiations resembles a game of billiards as much as it does chess. When one ball hits another, it sets that ball into motion, striking and moving still others. The result when this is applied to international politics is a multiparty game that quickly expands past the original two players. The U.S. must be willing to engage with Asia flexibly and with imagination. What is most important is not to put East Asia on the policy back burner or to put policy on an automatic pilot. Change there is the order of the day. The president who came into office promising that now has to take charge in responding to it.
