In the wake of Huââ¬â¢s visit
By Tariq Fatemi
NOW that Chinaââ¬â¢s President Hu Jintao has returned home after his state visit to Pakistan, it is time to examine this important event and analyse the current state of Pak-China relations. Leaders from both countries have spoken of their satisfaction with the results of the visit and this view finds corroboration in the large number of agreements and understandings signed. There is thus no reason to doubt official claims that Huââ¬â¢s visit was a success.
To those of us fortunate to have worked in China and interacted closely with its people, we cannot but express admiration at the foresight and vision of the leaders of both countries, who very early on recognised the importance of forging close, mutually beneficial ties between their countries. This led to Pakistan-China relations being described in the most hyperbolic language, on occasion soaring to poetic levels, leaving many foreign analysts somewhat bewildered, when hearing Sino-Pak relations characterised as ââ¬Åhigher than the Himalayas, deeper than the Indian Ocean and sweeter than honeyââ¬Â. This is all the more inexplicable, given the major differences between them, whether ideological, cultural, religious or political.
Nevertheless, a clear understanding of their common strategic interests is a strong and enduring basis for establishing what has proven to be a truly strategic relationship that has prospered notwithstanding the many changes in personalities and policy in both countries. In the case of Pakistan, it was the security imperative arising from the hostility of a bigger and stronger neighbour.
In the case of China, it was recognition of Pakistanââ¬â¢s importance as a link to the Muslim world and later to the US, and appreciation of the many bold initiatives taken by Pakistan to provide China a window on the world, while actively lobbying on its behalf in various forums, including the UN. The current leadership in both countries owes a debt of gratitude to their predecessors for not having permitted short-term, transient considerations to lose sight of long-term interests. This is all the more remarkable when it is recalled that for decades Pakistan was a member of two anti-communist western alliances.
It was, therefore, natural for expectations to be high when it was announced that Chinaââ¬â¢s president would be coming to Pakistan, after a gap of 10 years. These hopes were met, to a large extent, by the many agreements and understandings signed during the course of Hu Jintaoââ¬â¢s visit. They covered a host of subjects that included the landmark Free Trade Agreement that is expected to boost bilateral trade from $4.2 billion last year to $15 billion within the next five years. The two countries also agreed to an unprecedented five-year plan to enhance economic ties, while their defence cooperation will also be taken to new heights, with China agreeing to collaborate in the production of an AWACS system.
Commenting on these agreements, the Chinese president emphasised that they ââ¬Åserved the fundamental interests of our two peoples, and are also conducive to the peace and development of our regionââ¬Â, adding, ââ¬Åwe want to work with Pakistan to raise our strategic ties to a new levelââ¬Â. As evidence of this, he confirmed that China would continue to help Pakistan in the fields of nuclear power and provide assistance in the sectors of hydro electricity, coal and alternative sources of energy.
Since Hu Jintao had come to Pakistan from India, where his visit had gone off well, it was inevitable that comparisons would be drawn. In particular, two aspects of the India visit aroused some concern in Pakistan. The first was Huââ¬â¢s comment that ââ¬ÅChina welcomes and supports improvement in relations between India and Pakistanââ¬Â, and that Beijing stood ready to play a ââ¬Åconstructive role for the promotion of peace and development in South Asiaââ¬Â.
Some eyebrows were raised in Pakistan at this offer, especially as China was perceived to be ââ¬Åin our cornerââ¬Â. In reality, it is India that should have been upset at this offer because any internationalisation of Indo-Pak differences, in particular, the Kashmir dispute, goes against Indiaââ¬â¢s long-standing policy. Pakistan, on the other hand, has encouraged greater interest on the part of the international community in the peace process.
It was nevertheless reassuring to hear the Chinese president explain that his country supported the ââ¬Åpeace process between India and Pakistan as it is conducive for South Asia and Asia as a wholeââ¬Â. In Pakistan, President Hu made it clear that China would continue to view its relations with Pakistan from ââ¬Åa strategic and long-term perspectiveââ¬Â. This was an important statement as was his declaration that China was ââ¬Åready to work with Pakistan to raise their strategic partnership to a new levelââ¬Â.
The other issue that aroused considerable speculation related to reports that President Hu had endorsed the US-India nuclear deal. These concerns were further reinforced when Huââ¬â¢s visit to Pakistan did not yield an agreement on a new nuclear deal, as had been speculated in the media. It is, however, important to note that China did not endorse the Indo-US nuclear deal, though it did agree to promote civilian nuclear cooperation with India. In my view, this was an ingenious initiative, for it establishes Chinaââ¬â¢s credentials as an internationally credible supplier of nuclear technology, while depriving the Indians of any excuse to object to a similar arrangement between China and Pakistan.
As to why the Islamabad visit did not yield an agreement on nuclear reactors, I view it as evidence of Chinese caution and prudence. Given continuing western concerns about Pakistanââ¬â¢s less than exemplary non-proliferation record, I think it was wise of the Chinese not to draw attention to this aspect of their cooperation with Pakistan, especially now that China is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
I also gather from reliable sources that the Chinese had already given us strong assurance of continuing assistance in the construction of more nuclear reactors but that the agreements had to be predated to the time before China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group so as not to create another irritant in its relations with the US and other members of the NSG. In my view, our requirement of nuclear reactors has been taken care of, which is what matters. President Hu confirmed this view when he categorically stated, with reference to Chashma I and II, that ââ¬Åin the future we will continue to carry out such cooperationââ¬Â.
It is, nevertheless, important to note that China is no longer merely a regional power; it is now a global player, with worldwide interests. While Pakistan remains ââ¬Åa strategic friendââ¬Â of China, Islamabad has to appreciate that it no longer has a sole claim on Chinaââ¬â¢s affection. Moreover, China has to balance its ties with Pakistan in a manner that its interests elsewhere are not hurt or compromised.
In this context, it is important to appreciate that China has to take into account Indiaââ¬â¢s emergence as a major economic and political entity ââ¬â one that is being courted by the major powers and which the US is promoting as a counterweight to China. Instead of pursuing a hostile policy towards Delhi that would only push India closer to the US, Beijing has chosen to improve its own relations with India, especially in the trade and economic spheres, to discourage India from playing the American game.
Last week, the prestigious US Congressional Research Service pointed out in a report that China would soon become Indiaââ¬â¢s largest trading partner, supplanting the US. It also commented that while the two are seen as rising 21st century powers, they are also ââ¬Åpotential strategic rivalsââ¬Â. Around the same time, James Wolfensohn, the former World Bank president, observed that the ââ¬ÅWest must prepare for a future dominated by China and India, whose rapid economic rise will soon fundamentally alter the global balance of power.ââ¬Â
China knows this and is already preparing to take advantage of these changes. Unlike the former Soviet Union, it has no ideological preferences and unlike the US, it does not wish to divide the world into rival centres of power. Instead, it wishes to deal with other countries as ââ¬Åsovereign equalsââ¬Â, promoting mutually advantageous relations with them. Its primary concern is to ensure that China remains strong and economically prosperous, since that is the only guarantee of its independence and stability. It thus has no hesitation in investing massively in the US economy, while forging economic links with the countries of Africa and Latin America that see the US as a predator state.
In fact, the Chinese have always favoured a low-key, restrained approach to international relations, with primacy on economic ties, while refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. I recall being told in Beijing, that the veteran Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, just before his death, had warned his comrades to ensure that China remained firmly wedded to economic reforms and refrained from any adventure lest its economic development was disrupted and the West given an excuse to harm Chinese interests. His successors have remained faithful to this wise counsel, as evident from the remarkable growth rate that has brought them both economic success and political clout.
As part of this policy, the Chinese have sought to settle their differences with their neighbours peacefully and through negotiations. Where a political resolution has not been easily achievable, they have chosen to freeze the issue, rather than permit it to sour relations. This is most evident in Chinaââ¬â¢s relations with India.
As regards Pakistanââ¬â¢s relations with Beijing, there is no doubt that the Chinese leaders are appreciative of the basic contours of our foreign policy. They are also supportive of the ââ¬Åpeace processââ¬Â with India. But two issues nevertheless continue to worry the Chinese. One is the continuing ability of radical Islamists to ââ¬Ådisturb the peaceââ¬Â in Chinaââ¬â¢s Muslim areas. The other is the alarming scale of our cooperation and collaboration with Nato. As is their wont, they will not speak out publicly about their concerns, but they have raised these issues in their own quiet way. In particular, they appear not to understand our growing cooperation with Nato which has expanded its area of operation at the behest of the US. This is definitely causing some concern to the Chinese.
These developments and subtle changes do not mean that Pakistan will fade away from the Chinese radar screen. In fact, China wants Pakistan to play a greater role in regional and international affairs and promises to help in this endeavour. But it does mean that Pakistan will have to do much more to remain in the focus of Chinese leaders. The agreements are all wonderful, but we have to ensure that we are able to deliver on them. It may sound a cliche, but Pakistanââ¬â¢s relationship with China has been truly of a ââ¬Åstrategic natureââ¬Â. We, however, need to nurture it with sincerity and devotion and refrain from doing anything that would cause the Chinese to question our commitment to this relationship.
The writer is a former ambassador.
http://www.dawn.com/2006/12/02/op.htm
